<u>THE AGE OF AMERICANISM</u> (1945-1970)

Volume XI of <u>AN ESSAY IN UNIVERSAL HISTORY</u> From an Orthodox Christian Point of View

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No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be loyal to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and Mammon. <u>Matthew</u> 6.24.

We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of *liberties of the world.* Herman Melville, <u>White Jacket</u>.

> *We cannot be the world's policeman.* Henry Kissinger (1968).

Can economics swallow art, religion and politics without digestive calamity? Does the multiplication of wants through commercial advertising bring us happiness or have we merely re-established misery by other means? What happens to the virtues of self-denial and self-control under a regime that sustains itself by breaking these virtues down and by cultivating (especially through television) a regime of selfindulgence?

J.R. Nyquist, Origins of the Fourth World War (1999).

As soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight an evil, then their good becomes indistinguishable from the evil that they set out to destroy. C. H. Dawson.

The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with... Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping. George Kennan (1947).

Totalitarianism probably demands a disbelief in the very existence of objective truth. George Orwell.

The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e. the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e. the standards of thought) no longer exist.

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).

In individuals, insanity is rare, but in groups, parties and epochs it is the rule. Nietzsche, <u>Beyond Good and Evil</u>.

Since men are not endowed with the same capacities, if they are free they will not be equal, and if they are equal they are not free. Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

The only way to convince oneself and the rest of humanity that the socialist system is best is to see to it that there are no other systems. Jean-Francois Revel (1985).

The nations of Europe must be guided towards a Superstate without their peoples understanding what is happening. This can be carried out in successive stages, each camouflaged as having an economic goal, but which will end up by leading them irreversibly into a federation. Jean Monnet (1952).

The individual is handicapped by coming face to face with a [Communist] conspiracy so monstrous he cannot believe it exists. The American mind simply has not come to a realization of the evil which has been introduced into our midst. It rejects even the assumption that human creatures could espouse a philosophy which must ultimately destroy all that is good and decent. J. Edgar Hoover, The Elks Magazine (August 1956).

I dread government in the name of science. That is how tyrannies come in. In every age the men who want us under their thumb, if they have any sense, will put forward the particular pretension which the hopes and fears of that age render most potent. They 'cash in'. It has been magic, it has been Christianity. Now it will certainly be science. Perhaps the real scientists may not think much of the tyrants' 'science' – they didn't think much of Hitler's racial theories or Stalin's biology. But they can be muzzled.

C.S. Lewis (1958).

Family, society, state, civilization is not a goal in itself. All this is just, to a greater or lesser extent, a means of achieving the main goal, the sole purpose of saving the soul. St. Nikolai Velimirovič (+1956).

The world is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality. The experiment will fail; but we must be very patient in awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time: so that the Faith may be preserved alive through the dark ages before us; to renew and rebuild civilization, and save the world from suicide. T.S. Eliot, Thoughts after Lambeth.

The violence wrought by the sexual revolution is incalculable: 50 million dead babies, countless broken homes, and generations of grown-ups who can't grow up. Photius Avant.

Within the next generation I believe that the world's leaders will discover that infant conditioning and narcohypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging them and kicking them into obedience. Aldous Huxley.

In holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. President Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation (1961).

You Americans are so gullible. No, you won't accept Communism outright, but we'll keep feeding you small doses of socialism until you'll finally wake up and you find you already have Communism. We won't have to fight you. We'll so weaken your economy until you fall like over-ripe fruit into our hands. Nikita Khrushchev

The main mark of modern governments is that we do not know who governs, de facto any more than de jure. We see the politician and not his backer; still less the backer of the backer; or, what is most important of all, the banker of the backer. J.R.R. Tolkien.

The average person might well be no happier today than in 1800. We can choose our spouses, friends and neighbours, but they can choose to leave us. With the individual wielding unprecedented power to decide her own path in life, we find it ever harder to make commitments. We thus live in an increasingly lonely world of unravelling commitments and families. Yuval Noah Harari, (2014).

We placed too much hope in political and social reforms, only to discover that we were being deprived of our most precious possession: our spiritual life. Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

> *The age of dogma has passed.* Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople (1963).

The time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires, because they have itching ears, will heap up for themselves teachers, and they will turn their ears away from the truth, and be turned aside to fables. <u>II Timothy</u> 4.3-4.

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INTRODUCTION

This book is the eleventh volume in my series entitled *An Essay in Universal History*. It covers the period from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the crisis in American democracy at the end of the 1960s.

The centre of world history for many centuries had been Europe. Before 1914, as Charles Emmerson writes, "the world came to Europe, the world went from Europe, and Europe remained its midpoint".¹ However, the weaknesses, not to say criminality, of European statehood in the inter-war period, and the devastation of the Second World War, saw the banner of global hegemony move decisively to the New World, to the United States. Concomitantly, an ideology of Americanism, which Hugh Brogan has defined as "democratic, nationalist, capitalist, individualist"², became dominant. Indeed, while the war was still being fought, "Henry Luce, the publisher of *Time, Life* and *Fortune* magazines, had complacently proclaimed the opening of 'the American century'."³ Hence the title of this book, *The Age of Americanism*.

American dominance in the Age of Americanism was contested by the world's other superpower, the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was a third power which, while not as powerful as the two superpowers yet, was intended, in the minds of many, to fulfil the functions of global hegemon, provider and policeman - the United Nations. However, in the period after 1945, although somewhat more useful than its predecessor, the League of Nations, the United Nations was not able to fulfil its main task, not least because the two leading superpowers were represented on the Security Council, each with a power of veto that they were quite prepared to use against each other. But the first two world wars had created a single world with major problems that could only be addressed in a global context with a global umpire, as it were. Therefore one of the two superpowers had to at least attempt to fulfil this role. It fell to the United States, abandoning its inter-war isolationist stance, to take upon itself this burden - the post-1945 equivalent of the pre-1914 "White Man's Burden". And indeed, there was no other nation with the resources and idealism to take it on, in that America was by a very wide margin the richest and most powerful country in the world, upon whose benevolence the prosperity of the rest of the world depended. From the beginning, however, the Soviets contested the Americans' suitability for this role, putting themselves forward instead, together with their own quasi-messianic vision of salvation for the world.

The resultant Cold War, the main theme of this book, was not simply a political or military, but also, and primarily, an *ideological* struggle between two world-views, both of which had their origins in the godless Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, but which contradicted each other in certain ways. In

¹ Emmerson, 1813. The World before the Great War, London: Vintage, 2013, p. 131.

² Brogan, The Penguin History of the USA, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 264.

³ Brogan, op. cit., p. 588.

their ideological and messianic character, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw themselves as possessing the one truth, as protecting the world against the evil and lies that they saw as coming from their geopolitical rival, and as bringing their truth and freedom to a benighted world. But both were antichristian in essence, albeit in different ways and with different intensities. The antichristianity of the Soviet Union was evident from the beginning, having been officially proclaimed and practiced since 1917: that of the United States was more subtle and took more time to reveal itself.

In the meantime, American power did serve a providential purpose in protecting most of the world from the worst effects of Soviet militant atheism. However, being herself imbued with a version of the philosophy of secular atheism, America could not adequately carry out the task of restraining the progress of antichristian evil that God has entrusted only to the Orthodox monarchies. For Orthodox monarchism had been destroyed in its main stronghold in 1917, and more completely by 1945 – with the connivance and blessing of America herself.

Arguably the greatest defeat suffered by the United States in this period was the loss of China to world communism, whose massive consequences, not only for East Asia, but for the world are only now, in the early twenty-first century, becoming clearer. If the West needed to be reminded of the apocalyptic evil of Communism (which it did), then such a reminder was provided by the tens of millions killed by Mao's regime in China, culminating in Mao's equivalent of Stalin's Great Terror, the Cultural Revolution of 1966.

*

Another major theme of this book is the *religious* struggle between the Russian revolution in its post-war form and *the Orthodox Church*. Insofar as Orthodoxy found itself opposed not only to Soviet Communism, but also to Western Capitalism – not only to the beast of the Apocalypse, but also to the Babylonian whore! – we can say that this was not a two-way, but a three-way contest, involving the true faith in opposition to two godless secular ideologies, Liberal Capitalism and Antitheist Communism.

But Orthodoxy, although an essential part of the history of this period, especially in Eastern Europe, and the major theme of this Universal History, had very little impact on its political or cultural history, or on other arenas of the Cold War such as Africa, Asia and South America. This was because, first, the most significant fact of this period is the collapse, in all except a few regions of the world, of the influence of religion. And secondly, because genuine Orthodoxy was by now a small, minority religion even in its homeland; it was fiercely persecuted, and had to operate, for the most part, underground.

We must make an immediate qualification here. By "the influence of religion" we do not mean numbers of believers in the organized religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. Even if reliable statistics were to demonstrate that the absolute or relative numbers of believers in these religions had declined, this would only be confirming a trend that had been evident for centuries, especially in the developed world.

The more significant fact was that most men in this era, and especially in the West, even if professing to belong to one of the organized religions, in fact believed *at the same time and primarily* in a very specific form of materialist, secular religion that has been called *scientism*.

Scientism is, in the first place, the belief that empirical science is the only reliable path to truth, superseding and in effect rejecting all religious revelation, and secondly, the belief that the model of the universe and man's place in it that most scientists adhere to is unquestionably true – the idea, namely, that the world and everything in it has evolved by chance from a tiny mass of superheated dust to produce all the beings, animal, vegetable and mineral, that we see around us without the addition or intervention of any purely spiritual, immaterial power.

Paradoxically, scientism received a severe defeat – nay, comprehensive refutation – in this period with the discovery of DNA, the highly complex code underlying all living organisms, which could not have come into being except through an intelligent designer of infinite power – that is, God. But the implications of this discovery were covered up by scientists in both East and West. Only in very recent times has the anti-Darwinian revolution begun to pick up speed...

Christian hypocrisy took somewhat different forms in East and West. In the East, pseudo-Orthodox hierarchs sang hymns of praise to the greatest persecutor in Christianity in history, while proclaiming their loyalty to Communism. In the West, trendy bishops wrote books such as *Honest to God*, but were anything but honest about their abandonment of the basic principles of Christianity in both dogma and morality. They also flattered non-Christian religions in the ecumenical movement, betraying the basic principle that salvation is possible only in Christ. Unfortunately, Orthodox hierarchs joined in this charade, propelled thereto by their KGB bosses...

In fact, Ecumenism-cum-scientism became the real religion of most Christians in this period, and the First General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam (1948) – the first institutional expression of this new religion of *indifference to religious truth*, or *religious pacifism* – not peace, for true peace can only be based on truth, but pacifism, that is, the refusal to fight, or even search, for truth. Sadly, more and more official Orthodox Churches were drawn into this movement of religious apostasy, which was accompanied by the moral apostasy of the so-called sexual revolution. And this just as the time when western Christians, sensing the apostasy and lifelessness of the official western churches, were beginning to see in Orthodoxy the original, true faith of Christian Europe...

True Orthodox Christianity was forced underground or marginalized, while the only conventional religion to make a significant impact on world politics while rejecting ecumenism-scientism was Islam. However, Islamic fundamentalism became important only in the later part of the century. Before that, we see the combined assault on traditional religion provided by the militant atheism of the Soviet Union and other communist countries, on the one hand, and the more subtle assault provided by the Darwinism and human rights philosophy of the western countries, and the ecumenical movement, on the other.

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The post-1945 era witnessed liberation and enslavement on a vast scale. The European empires collapsed in the so-called "Third World", liberating hundreds of millions from foreign rule, even while vast areas fell under Communist dominion in the so-called "Second World". Vast unifications and equally vast divisions abounded. On the one hand, most nations entered the the United Nations, which sought to unite the world politically, while the World Council of Churches and other ecumenical bodies sought to unite it religiously. The old unities of the United States and the Soviet Union were joined by a reunified China under Maoist rule, and a partially unified Europe under the democratic socialist rule of the European Union. The English language, Americanism and the American dollar were further unifying factors - at least in the "First World". On the other hand, the enmity between Hindus and Muslims became more lethal in newly liberated India and Pakistan, while the world's leading nation, the United States, upon which the prosperity of the rest of the world depended, threatened to tear itself apart. And atheism, which is the enemy of all "peace on earth and goodwill among men", made giant strides in all the formerly Christian countries...

Through the prayers of our Holy Fathers, Lord Jesus Christ our God, have mercy on us!

I. FROM UNDER THE RUBBLE (1945-1949)

<u>1. THE AMERICAN NEW WORLD ORDER: (1) BRETTON</u> <u>WOODS</u>

The outlines of the American new world order, writes Paul Kennedy, "were already being described by American military planners even as the conflict was at its height. As one of their policy papers expressed it: 'The successful termination of the war against our present enemies will find a world profoundly changed in respect of relative national military strengths, a change more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years... After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude. This is due in each case to a combination of geographical position and extent, and vast munitioning potential.'"⁴

If by "the fall of Rome" we understand the fall of all three of the Romes of history – the Old Rome of the Caesars and Augusti, which fell in 476, the New Rome of the Christian Roman emperors, which fell in 1453, and the Third Rome of the Russian Orthodox tsars, which fell in 1917 – we may agree with this assessment. In 1945 the Third Reich of Nazi Germany fell to two powers that both claimed, in different ways, to be heirs of the fallen Romes: the United States, whose capital's classical architecture recalled nothing more than the Capitol of Old Rome, and the Soviet Union, which had destroyed the Third Rome of Tsarist Russia, and now claimed the whole of its patrimony and sphere of influence while fiercely persecuting the remnants of its Orthodox Christian faith. So now the prophecy of Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 came true: the Christian heartland of Europe was divided up between the two "outlying" (and, to many Europeans, "barbarian") nations of America and Soviet Russia.

Among the world's powers, continues Kennedy, "Only the United States and the USSR counted, so it seemed; and of the two, the American 'superpower' was vastly superior.

"Simply because much of the rest of the world was either exhausted by the war or still in a stage of colonial 'underdevelopment'. American power in 1945 was, for want of another term, *artificially* high, like, say, Britain's in 1815. Nonetheless, the actual dimensions of its might were unprecedented in absolute terms. Stimulated by the vast surge in war expenditures, the country's GNP measured in constant 1939 dollars rose from \$88.6 billion (1939) to \$145 billion (1945), and much higher (\$220 billion) in current dollars. At last, the 'slack' in the economy which the New Deal had failed to eradicate was fully taken up, and underutilized resources and manpower properly exploited: 'During the war the size of the productive plant within the country grew by nearly 50 per cent and the physical output of goods by more than 50 per cent. Indeed, in the years 1940 to 1944, industrial expansion in the United States rose

⁴ Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London: William Collins, 1988, pp. 459-460.

at a faster pace – over 15 per cent a year – than at any period before or since. Although the greater part of this growth was caused by war production (which soared from 2 per cent of total output in 1939 to 40 per cent in 1943), non-war goods also increased, so that the civilian sector of the economy was not encroached upon as in the other combatant nations. Its standard of living was higher than any other country's, but so was its per capita productivity. Among the Great Powers, the United States was the only country which became richer - in fact, much richer - rather than poorer because of the war. At its conclusion, Washington possessed gold reserves of £20 billion, almost two-thirds of the world's total of \$35 billion. Again, '... more than half the total manufacturing production of the world took place within the USA, which, in fact, turned out a third of the world production of goods of all types. This also made it by far the greatest exporter at the war's end, and even a few years later it supplied one-third of the world's exports. Because of the massive expansion of its shipbuilding facilities, it now owned half of the world supply of shipping. Economically, the world was its oyster.

"This economic power was reflected in the military strength of the United States, which at the end of the war controlled 12.5 million service personnel, including 7.5 million overseas. Although this total was naturally going to shrink in peacetime (by 1948, the army's personnel was only one-ninth what it had been four years earlier), that merely reflected political choices, not real military potential. Given the early postwar assumptions about the limited overseas roles of the United States, a better indication of its strength lay in the tallies of its modern weaponry. By this stage, the US Navy was unquestionably 'second to none'; its fleet of 1,200 major warships (centred upon dozens of aircraft carriers rather than battleships) now being considerably larger than the Royal Navy's, with no other significant maritime force existing. In both its carrier task forces and its Marine Corps divisions, the United States had simply demonstrated its capacity to project its power across the globe to any region accessible from the sea. Even more imposing was the American 'command of the air': the 2000-plus heavy bombers which had pounded Hitler's Europe and the 1,000 ultra-long-range B-29s which had reduced many Japanese cities to ashes were to be supplemented by even more powerful jet-propelled strategic bombers like the B-36. Above all, the United States possessed a monopoly of atomic bombs, which promised to unleash a devastation upon any future enemy as horrific as that which had occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As later analyses have pointed out, American military power may actually have been less than it seemed (there were very few A-bombs in stock, and dropping them had large political implications), and it was difficult to sue it to influence the conduct of a country as distant, inscrutable, and suspicious as the USSR; but the image of ineffable superiority remained undisturbed until the Korean War, and was reinforced by the pleas of many nations for American loans, weapons, and promises of military support..."5

⁵ Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 460-462.

"Between 1947 and 1960," writes Hugh Brogan, "personal disposable income went up, in real terms, by 17 per cent, while the population increased from 141 million to 181 million. A steadily expanding market, a steadily improving standard of living for all and only trifling inflation seemed to be the new law of nature. Encouraged by the prospect of an endless boom, moneylenders grew amazingly confident. By the mid-fifties they were regularly lending former GIs the entire purchase price of houses, and most cars were bought on credit - \$100 down and three years to pay. All this stimulated the boom still more. American prosperity became the wonder of the world In the mid-forties, while Europe starved and (in the winter of 1947) froze; while revolution marched across China, which had not known peace for over thirty years; while the British Empire in India came to an end amid great bloodshed; while Stalin prepared to consolidate his new empire in Eastern Europe by the tried methods of police terror; and while dictatorships rose and fell as usual in Latin America, the citizens of the United States began to enjoy a generally diffused well-being which eclipsed even the experiences of the midtwenties..."6

The biggest question arising, therefore, in 1945 was: how would the United States use its enormous power, unprecedented in human history? Would it use it to create a new despotic hegemony, or for the good of the whole world? The remarkable fact was that America used her unprecedented power - in general and for the time being - well: not in order to conquer the rest of the world, but in order to feed it and protect it...

Already before the end of the Second World War the western leaders were planning new economic and political institutions that would be appropriate channels for American power in the new world order...

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America came out of the war, writes Yanis Varoufakis, "as the major (indeed, if one excludes Switzerland, the only) creditor nation. For the first time since the rise of capitalism, all of the world's trade relied on a single currency (the dollar) and was financed from a single epicenter (Wall Street). While half of Europe was under the control of the Red Army and its system, the New Dealers who had been running Washington since 1932 realized that history had presented them with a remarkable opportunity: to erect a post-war global order that would cast American hegemony in stainless steel. It was an opportunity that they seized upon with glee.

"Their audacious scheme sprang from the two sources that lie behind every great [secular] achievement – fear and power. The war endowed the United States with unprecedented military and economic might. But, at the same time, it acted as a constant reminder of America's failure properly to come to terms with the legacy of 1929 before the Japanese navy unleashed its bombs and

⁶ Brogan, The Penguin History of the USA, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 589.

torpedoes on Pearl Harbor. The New Dealers never forgot the unexpectedness of the Great Depression and its resistance to 'treatment'. The more power they felt they had in their hands, the greater was their fear that a new 1929 could turn it into ash that trickled through their fingers.

"Even before the guns had fallen silent in Europe, and even before the Soviet Union emerged as a dragon to be slain, the United States understood that it had inherited the historic role of reconstructing, in its own image, the world of global capitalism. For if 1929 nearly ended the dominion of capital at a time of multiple capitalist centres, what would a new 1929 do when the larger game, global capitalism, revolved around a single axis, the dollar?

"In 1944, the New Dealers' anxieties led to the famous Bretton Woods conference. The idea of designing a new global order was not so much grandiose as essential. At Bretton Woods a new monetary framework was designed, acknowledging the dollar's centrality but also taking steps to create international shock absorbers in case the US economy wavered. It took fifteen years before the agreement could be fully implemented. During the preparatory phase, the United States had to put together the essential pieces of the jigsaw puzzle of the Global Plan, of which Bretton Woods was an important piece.

"While the war was still raging in Europe and the Pacific, in July 1944, 730 delegates converged on the plush Mount Washington Hotel located in the New Hampshire town of Bretton Woods. Over three weeks of intensive negotiations, they hammered out the nature and institutions of the post-war global monetary order.

"They did not come to Bretton Woods spontaneously, but at the behest of President Roosevelt, whose New Deal administration was determined to win the peace, after having almost lost the war against the Great Depression. The one lesson the New Dealers had learned was that capitalism cannot be managed effectively at the national level. In his opening speech, Roosevelt made that point with commendable clarity: 'The economic health of every country is a proper matter of concern to all its neighbours, near and far.'

"The two issues that were ostensibly central to the conference were the design of the post-war monetary system and the reconstruction of the war-torn economies of Europe and Japan. However, under the surface, the real questions concerned (a) the institutional framework that would keep a new Great Depression at bay, and (b) who would be in control of that framework. Both questions created specific tensions, especially between the two great allies represented, in the US corner, by Harry Dexter White⁷ and, in the British corner, by none other than John Maynard Keynes. In the aftermath of the conference, Keynes remarked: 'We have had to perform at one and the same time the tasks

⁷ White was exposed in 1948 as a Soviet agent since 1935. See Ben Steil, "Why a Founding Father of Postwar Capitalism Spied for the Soviets", *Foreign Affairs*, August 15, 2021. (V.M.)

appropriate to the economist, to the financier, to the politician, to the journalist, to the propagandist, to the lawyer, to the statesman – even, I think, to the prophet and to the soothsayer.'

"Two of the institutions that were designed at Bretton Woods are still with us and still in the news. One is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the other the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), today known simply as the World Bank. The IMF was to be global capitalist system's 'fire brigade' – an institution that would rush to the assistance of any country whose house caught (fiscal) fire, handing out loans on strict conditions that would ensure that any balance of payments deficit would be fixed and the loans repaid. As for the World Bank, its role would be that of an international investment bank, with a remit to channel productive investments to regions of the world devastated by the war." ⁸

The Bretton Woods system is "a system of fixed exchange rates, with the dollar at its heart. The main idea was that each currency would be locked to the dollar at a given exchange rate. Fluctuations would be allowed only within a narrow band of plus or minus 1 per cent, and governments would strive to stay within this band by buying or selling their own dollar reserves. A renegotiation of the exchange rate of a particular country was only allowed if it could be demonstrated that its balance of trade and its balance of capital flows could not be maintained, given its dollar reserves. As for the United States, to create the requisite confidence in the international system, it committed itself to pegging the dollar to gold at the fixed exchange rate of \$35 per ounce of gold and to guarantee full gold convertibility for anyone, American or non-American, who wanted to swap their dollars for gold."⁹

The essence of the Bretton Woods system was a mechanism for the recycling of surpluses that would keep trade going and prevent the loss of confidence and "freezing up" that had led to the Great Depression.

"Keynes' blueprint for the surplus recycling," writes Varoufakis, "was wonderfully grandiose. It included the creation of a new world currency, a system of fixed exchange rates between the world currency and the national currencies, and a world central bank that would run the whole system.

"The purpose of this system would be to maintain monetary stability everywhere, to keep both surpluses and deficits in check throughout the Western world and, at the first sign of a crisis in a troubled nation, speedily recycle surpluses into it so as to prevent the crisis spreading. An international fund would be created to play the role of the world's central bank and issue its currency – the bancor, as Keynes provisionally named it. The bancor would not be printed, just as the digital crypto-currency bitcoin does not exist in material form today, only as numbers on some spreadsheets or digital device. But it

⁸ Varoufakis, The Global Minotaur, London: Zed Books, 2013, pp. 57-59.

⁹ Varoufakis, op. cit., p. 60.

would function as the world's currency nevertheless. Every country would have a bancor account with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), from which to draw when it bought goods from other countries, and into which other nations would deposit bancors when their citizens or corporations bought goods and services from it. All international trade would thus be denominated in the global currency, with the national currencies continuing to oil the cogs of the national economies.

"Crucial to this system was a fixed exchange rate between each national currency and the bancor, and thus between all participating national currencies. The board of the IMF, on which all nations would be represented, would decide these rates centrally and by negotiation. They would be adjusted whenever necessary, so that countries with stubborn surpluses would see their currencies buying increasingly more bancors (to make their exports more expensive and their imports cheaper), and vice-versa for nations in persistent deficit.

"Even more radically, Keynes's IMF, recognizing that one nation's deficit is another's surplus, would levy a tax on a nation's bancor account if its imports and exports diverged too much. The idea was to penalize both types of imbalance (excessive surpluses as well as excessive deficits; the Germanys of the world as well as the Greeces) and in the process build up a war chest of bancors at the IMF so that, when some crisis hit, deficit nations in trouble could be propped up and prevented from falling into a black hole of debt and recession that might spread throughout the Bretton Woods system.

"White certainly understood the importance of political surplus recycling within the global system they were setting up, but Keynes's proposals sounded ludicrous to his American ears. Is this wily Englishman, he might have asked, seriously proposing that the Europeans have a majority say in how our surpluses are recycled? Is he for real?

"As a good Keynesian, White agreed that Bretton Woods should do more than merely dollarize the Western world. He recognized the need for a politically administered (extra-market) surplus recycling mechanism, which of course meant the recycling of America's surpluses to Europe. Nevertheless, the idea that bankrupt Europeans who had put the world through the wringer of two world wars in less than three decades and still yearned for the reconstruction of their repulsive empires would now control America's surplus was anathema to an anti-imperialist patriotic New Dealer like White. Quite understandably, he was going to have none of it. America was the only surplus nation, and America alone would decide how, when and to whom it would recycle it.

"White listened respectfully while Keynes presented his grandiose scheme but then immediately rejected two of its key features. First on the chopping block was the idea of a new shadow global currency (the bancor) to be managed by an IMF governing committee in which the United State would be one of many. The second idea White vetoed was that of taxing the surplus nations – namely the United States. For White, the die had already been cast. Europe was to be dollarized and the dollar would be the world currency. The bancor was a great idea in the multilateral world but a joke in one where the dollar had already been crowned king and queen. Moreover, the idea that the IMF's governing committee, with the Europeans in the majority, would tax America's surpluses seemed to him too ludicrous for words. America owned its surpluses and would recycle them herself, without petitioning a group of bankrupt Europeans for their permission to do so.

"By the end of the Bretton Woods conference, White had cherry-picked Keynes's proposal so eclectically that its multilateralist spirit had vanished. Yes, the IMF would be created, but its purpose would not be to issue a new world currency. The loss of the bancor and the official elevation of the dollar to world currency statues meant that the IMF could not function as the world's central bank. That role was now assigned de facto to America's central bank, the Fed..."¹⁰

The success of the "Bretton Woods system", writes Liam Halligan, has meant that the world since then "has traded relatively freely, with the shortterm protectionist instincts of politicians being kept in check by WTO [World Trade Organization] rules", with the result that there was "a 12-fold expansion in global trade between 1950 and 2010 – and a huge increase in global prosperity".¹¹ As we shall see, there was an important change in the Bretton Woods system in 1973. Nevertheless, the "spirit of Bretton Woods" survived into the twenty-first century.

Varoufakis appears to favour Keynes' truly globalist and internationalist solution to the solution proposed by White which eventually triumphed, preserving the hegemony of one country, the United States, in the post-war period. From a purely economic point of view, he may well be right. But

¹⁰ Varoufakis, *And the Weak Suffer What They Must?* London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 25-27. Richard Horowitz writes: "The US assumed that a formal identification of their own currency as the official world reserve would be too aggressive a position diplomatically... The US proposed instead a vague euphemism: 'gold-convertible currency'. It fooled no sophisticated observer and Keynes called it 'idiocy'. Given its uniquely vast gold holdings, the US had the only currency realistically convertible into bullion. But the US delegation feared diplomatic disaster by trying to codify this fact.

[&]quot;Handling the issue at the conference for Britain would be Dennis Robertson, the Cambridge economist to whom Keynes delegated many key negotiations, admiring his intellectual subtlety and patience of mind and tenacity of character to grasp and hold on to all details and fight them through. Robertson was present during the final discussion of the IMF's charter when the delegation representing British India demanded that the US define exactly what 'gold-convertible currency' meant. To the amazement and delight of the Americans, Robertson rose to propose its replacement with 'gold and United States dollars', effectively crowning the dollar supreme. A giddy White stayed up until three o'clock in the morning incorporating Robertson's proposal into the draft articles. The rest is monetary history..." ("How a Briton Created the Almighty Dollar", *History Today*, January, 2017, p. 6)

¹¹ Halligan, "We should be tearing down barriers, not putting them up", *The Sunday Telegraph*, Business section, September 4, 2016, p. 4.

economics is never entirely divorced from politics and even religion; and we may be grateful that Keynes did not prevail and that the spectre of a single world government (for that is what it entailed) was put off for several generations. For there is no doubt about it: as the head of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, said many years later in the context of the creation of the euro, a single currency area can only be effectively governed by a single government. It was largely the hegemonic political and economic power of the United States that kept the world free, not only from that other globalist project, Soviet Communism, but also from the project of world rule by the IMF that was first proposed at Bretton Woods in 1944...

2. THE AMERICAN NEW WORLD ORDER: (2) THE UNITED NATIONS

There had already been much discussion of the future political world order during the war. Two things were clear. On the one hand, totalitarianism of the Nazi kind was unacceptable, and defences against its possible re-emergence had to be constructed. On the other hand, there could be no return to the kind of parliamentary, laissez-faire democracy that had failed so miserably in the 1930s. The pendulum had shifted towards a more collectivist, albeit democratic order. This was lamented by free market thinkers like the Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek, who argued in his book, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), that a refusal to return to the "abandoned road" of pre-war economic liberalism would inevitably lead to totalitarianism; "democratic socialism", he argued, was a contradiction in terms.

But Hayek lost the argument (until the advent of Thatcherism in the 1980s). Even the most democratic states moved in a more collectivist direction. Britain's Labour government of 1945, building on the Beveridge Report of 1942, introduced welfarism and nationalization on a large scale without abandoning parliamentary democracy, while the first steps towards what would become the social-democratic European Union were soon under way...

At the international level, too, nothing would ever be the same again. The Second World War had ended in a most paradoxical way. The two major victors were, on the one hand, the United States, which had fought, supposedly, "to save democracy", and on the other, the Soviet Union, which had from the beginning of the revolution sought to destroy democracy and replace it with its own despotism. So who won? Democracy or Despotism? Since both had won, and since democracy and despotism were ideologically incompatible with each other, war, it would seem, must necessarily break out between the unnatural allies, albeit hopefully in another, less open and "hot" form. Hence the Cold War of the period 1946-1991. But before that war could begin, a seemingly final attempt had to be made to ensure peace, albeit between nations which from an ideological point of view had to be enemies. Hence *the United Nations*...

World War Two destroyed more lives and property than any conflict in history. This fact convinced many that the only way to have peace on earth was to create a supra-national government that would restrain national rivalries and impose its will on aggressive states. One of these was Albert Einstein, who wrote in 1946: "A world government must be created which is able to solve conflicts by judicial decision. This government must be based on a clear-cut constitution which is approved by the governments and nations and which gives it the sole disposition of offensive weapons."¹²

¹² Einstein, "Towards a World Government", in *Out of My Later Years: The Scientist, Philosopher* and Man Portrayed through his own Words, New York: Wing Books, 1956, p. 138.

Such an ideal goes back at least to Dante's *De Monarchia* and *Convivio* in the early fourteenth century.¹³ In 1625 Grotius published *On the Law of War and Peace*, which, as Sir Roger Scruton writes, "was an attempt to adapt principles of natural law to the government of affairs between sovereign states. Grotius laid the foundations for international law as we now know it."¹⁴

However, the origin of the idea of world government in its modern, secular expression must be sought in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and in particular in Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), which contained the following axiom: "The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states". According to John C. Lennox, Kant "suggested the formation of 'an *international state* (civitas gentium), which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth'. Yet Kant had strong reservations about a world monarchy. He thought that a federal union of free and independent states 'is still to be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy'.

"The reason for hesitation was: 'For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy.' Kant thought that a 'universal despotism' would end 'in the graveyard of freedom'."¹⁵

According to Scruton, "Kant can be taken only as partly endorsing transnational government as we now know it. His League of Nations could be a reality, he thought, only if the states united by it were genuinely sovereign, genuinely representative of their people and genuinely governed by law. This is manifestly not the case of a great many members of the UN today, and certainly not the case of those, like North Korea, which have posed the greatest threat to their immediate neighbours. Such states are not really sovereign bodies, but rather conscript armies in the hands of thugs. Power is exercised by these thugs not by representative governments, still less by law, but by the machinery of one-party dictatorship, supplemented by mafia clientism and family ties. Advocates of Kantian internationalism are therefore caught in a dilemma. If law is to be effective in the resolution of conflicts, all parties must be law-abiding members of the community of nations. What are we to do, then, with the rogue state? Are we entitled to depose its rulers, so as to change subjects into citizens, rulers to representatives and force to law? If not, are we to regard ourselves as *really* bound by laws and treaties by which the rogue state merely *pretends* to be bound? In which case, what guarantee do those laws and treaties offer of a 'perpetual peace'?"¹⁶

¹³ Dante thought that war could be eliminated "if the whole earth and all that humans possess be a monarchy, that is, one government under one ruler. Because he possesses everything, the ruler would not desire to possess anything further, and thus he would hold kings contentedly within the borders of their kingdoms, and keep peace among them" (*Convivio*, 169).

¹⁴ Scruton, *How to be a Conservative*, London: Bloomsbury, 2014, pp. 105-106.

¹⁵ Lennox, Against the Flow, Oxford: Monarch Books, 2015, p. 246.

¹⁶ Scruton, op, cit., p. 114.

The first attempt at incarnating a federation of states was the Congress System erected by Tsar Alexander I and the monarchs of Prussia and Austria after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. This never came to much more than a defensive alliance against the revolution, and of course it was a *monarchical* alliance, not the kind of alliance of representative republics or democracies that Kant had in mind (although he himself lived under a monarch-despot, Frederick the Great). It finally fell apart during the Crimean War of 1854-56. The idea was revived in a limited form by Tsar Nicholas II when he founded the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 1899. But this had little practical impact and did not prevent the outbreak of war in 1914.

In 1919 President Woodrow Wilson put forward the idea of a League of Nations. It was accepted, with reservations, by the other victorious powers, but was rejected by the American Congress and American public opinion, and failed to prevent the outbreak of war in 1939. However, the Second World War cured the Americans of isolationism more or less permanently. So the idea of the United Nations as a more powerful and realistic successor to the League of Nations was put forward by President Franklin Roosevelt. And this, unlike its predecessor, won the support of the American public. Thus "in a poll held in later 1947, as many as 82 per cent believed that it was 'very important that the UN succeed'; while 56 per cent wanted it converted into 'a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the United States'."¹⁷ Thus globalism really began with the UN in 1945, and with the United States as its main proponent...

*

"The first outline of the United Nations," writes S.M. Plokhy, "was drafted by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles on the basis of the covenant of the League of Nations. A creation of the Paris Peace Conference [of 1919], the League convened its first general assembly in Geneva in November 1920 and its last in April 1946, when representatives of its member nations voted to dissolve it. The League's activities had in fact come to a virtual halt in 1939, the first year of the war that it had failed to prevent and for whose outbreak it was universally blamed. The problem was that the League could neither adopt nor enforce its decisions: all resolutions had to be passed with the unanimous approval of its council, an executive body that included great powers as permanent members and smaller powers as temporary ones, as well as its assembly. The principle of unanimity was enshrined in the League's covenant, whose fifth chapter stated that 'decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.' This was virtually impossible to achieve, especially when matters under discussion involved the great powers.

¹⁷ Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2013, p. 50.

"The United States did not join the League. Woodrow Wilson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 for his role in its creation, but he failed to overcome Republican opposition and persuade an increasingly isolationist Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which would have led to American membership in the League. The American drafters of the United Nations Charter were mindful of the inevitable opposition that any international organization whose decisions would be binding on the United States would encounter in Congress. They also had to overcome a baleful precedent – the League's inability to influence the conduct of Germany and Japan after their departure from the organization in 1933. Italy would follow suit in 1937. The formation of the Axis by these three countries in 1940 met with no effective response.

"If the new organization was to do better, it would have to learn from its predecessor's mistakes. The drafters of its charter had the daunting task of reconciling what struck many as irreconcilable. Since August 1943, the principal drafter of the document at the State Department had been Leo Pasvolsky, the head of the department's Informal Agenda Group and Hull's former personal assistant. A fifty-year-old Jewish émigré from Ukraine, Pasvolsky was no stranger to the subject of international peace organizations. Back in 1919 he had covered the Paris Peace Conference for the New York Tribune, and later he had campaigned for the admission of the Soviet Union, whose brand of socialism he rejected, to the League of Nations.

"Pasvolsky's appointment as principal drafter of the charter was a testament of the triumph of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's vision over an alternative model championed by Sumner Welles. Hull favoured a centralized structure, while Welles wanted the great powers to bear primary responsibility for security in their respective regions. Welles's model followed FDR's thinking of the role of the 'four policemen' – the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China – in the postwar peace arrangement. By the fall of 1943, with Welles resigning in the midst of a homosexual scandal, Roosevelt had opted for the centralized model. FDR's decision was guided by the fact that his 'four policemen' would be permanent members of the UN Security Council..."¹⁸ And perhaps also by the fact that so many of his senior officials were in fact Soviet spies...

At Yalta, after much argument, Roosevelt finally achieved his principal goal, the agreement to found the United Nations. He conceded to the Soviets that Ukraine and Belorussia should have seats in the General Assembly alongside Soviet Russia, which violated the principle that only sovereign states should sit there. But he more or less got his way with the most important of the six major organs of the United Nations, the Security Council. It was to be composed of fifteen members with five permanent members - the Big Three, China and France (which Roosevelt had wanted to exclude, but Churchill insisted on including).

¹⁸ Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace, London: Penguin, 2010, pp. 118-119.

"Roosevelt had despaired of the original Wilsonian mechanisms for achieving universal peace and freedom (he dismissed the League of Nations as 'nothing more than a debating society and a poor one at that') and, more significantly, saw promise in the very principles and techniques which Wilson had renounced. If he did not actually favour secret treaties, he certainly believed in Great Power hegemony. After the war, he thought, responsibility for the happiness of the world would lie with those he called 'the Four Policemen' – the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China. [At Yalta, as we have seen, he was forced to include France in spite of his detestation of De Gaulle.] He once went so far as to tell Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, that all other countries should be disarmed. And he never wavered in his belief that agreement and co-operation between the Four Policemen were essential. That was why he was prepared to go to such lengths in wooing Stalin; and in spite of bursts of irritation at Russian boorishness he never gave up, even at the very end of his life..."¹⁹

Fortunately, Roosevelt died, and his plan of giving unprecedented power to the red beast, well beyond his "sphere of influence", did not come to fruition. While the western powers wanted the cooperation of the Soviets, they were not as enamoured of "Uncle Joe" as Roosevelt had been, and were determined to hold on to their veto power. For in 1945, there was very little appetite among the victor nations for anything that smacked of a world government or loss of national sovereignty; for one of the main motivations spurring them on to victory had been a renewed feeling of patriotism and a determination (at any rate, on the western side) to restore the sovereign rights of small nations in the face of Nazi imperialism. At the same time, the unparalleled destruction wrought by the war forced the politicians to return to more globalist ideas, while stopping short of the idea of a global government...

If the United Nations was Roosevelt's idea, its realization depended on his successor, Harry S. Truman. So who was the new American president?

*

After a hesitant start at the Potsdam summit in July, 1945, at which he displayed his predecessor's underestimation of Stalin²⁰, and an unnecessarily passive acceptance of the decision to drop the atom bomb on the Japanese, Truman acted decisively to stop Soviet expansion in Western Europe, Iran, Turkey and Greece, where he took the place of the exhausted and bankrupt British, thereby winning "the war of the British succession."²¹

¹⁹ Brogan, op. cit., p. 575.

²⁰ "In 1948, talking about the Potsdam conference, he told a reporter that he knew Stalin well and that 'I like old Joe'; the dictator, he maintained, was a decent sort who could not do as he wished because he was the Politburo's prisoner. Here we are, back to the hawks and doves, a notion that the Soviets would always know how to play on to extort one-way concessions" (Jean-François Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, p. 220). ²¹ Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 1.

President Truman owed his rise in politics before the war to "Boss" Tom Pendergast, who, as Victor Sebestyen writes, "controlled Kansas City business and the State of Missouri's elected offices. The Pendergast 'machine' was sophisticated. It went beyond stuffing ballot boxes and other vote-rigging tactics. It turned politics, prohibition, prostitution and gambling into thriving enterprises, the profits of which could be invested into more legitimate areas. Truman never took cash for favours, thus squaring his conscience, but he depended on the Pendergast machine to deliver, by hook or by crook, large lopsided majorities for 'his' candidates. Typically, Truman stayed loyal to Pendergast well after it was politically expedient to do so, and even after Pendergast was convicted of tax evasion and sent to Leavensworth jail Truman defended him. 'He has been a friend to me when I needed it,' he said. 'I am not one to desert a ship when it is about to go down, Besides, Truman admired Pendergast, '... even if he did own a bawdy house, a saloon and a gambling establishment, because he was a man of his word.'..."²² Here is the besetting sin of American politicians, which has gotten worse over time: a tendency to justify evil means by good ends, to choose sleazy and corrupt friends and allies to carry out well-intentioned goals.

"The path to hell is paved with good intentions", and this could be said particularly of American politics in the post-war era. So often good intentions such as freedom from oppression and prosperity for all were undermined by ill-chosen methods and allies, leading inevitably to charges of inconsistency and hypocrisy. Moreover, as time passed, the good ends became less good and even, as many argued, outrightly evil... Truman is not singled out here because he was any worse than very many before and after him. On the contrary, he was one of the best of American presidents, who did much to save western civilization at a particularly critical time of anarchy and chaos. But the deal he struck, and stuck to, with the unsavoury Pendergast is symbolic...

Truman was a regular church-goer. But at the same time he was a Freemason, whose god was the same god as that worshipped by the American business establishment – Mammon. At the higher levels of Masonry, Mammon merged into a still more sinister god, "Jah-Bul-On" – and Truman was not just a low-level, relatively inactive Mason (like Churchill), but a very high ranking one. Thus "In 1959, he was given a 50-year award by the Masons, recognizing his longstanding involvement: he was initiated on February 9, 1909 into the Belton Freemasonry Lodge in Missouri. In 1911, he helped establish the Grandview Lodge, and he served as its first Worshipful Master. In September 1940, during his Senate re-election campaign, Truman was elected Grand Master of the Missouri Grand Lodge of Freemasonry; Truman said later that the Masonic election assured his victory in the general election. In 1945, he was made a 33° Sovereign Grand Inspector General and an Honorary Member of the supreme council at the Supreme Council A.A.S.R. Southern Jurisdiction Headquarters in Washington D.C."²³

²² Sebestyen, 1946: The Making of the Modern World, London: Pan, 2014, p. 20.

²³ Sebestyen, 1946: The Making of the Modern World, London: Pan, 2014, p. 20.

So Truman's Masonry, by his own admission, assured his victory in the election. We may wonder how much it influenced and helped him in other parts of his political activity. For example, did the Jewish element in Masonry motivate his support for the creation of the state of Israel in 1948? Roosevelt had abandoned his Zionism towards the end of his life, and both the American State Department and Defense Department, as well as the oil companies, were strongly against it.²⁴ But the central myth of Masonry is the rebuilding of the Temple at Zion, so how could the Mason Truman have resisted the call to back Zionism?

It is this combination of (heretical) Christianity with anti-Christian Masonry, the worshippers of Mammon and controllers of most of the world's wealth, which would be the Achilles heel of post-war "Christian democracy" in America, ensuring that the victory over Communism attained in 1989-91 as the Iron Curtain fell would be incomplete and in fact illusory... The American empire – for that's what it was, albeit an unusually benign one - probably reached its peak in 1945 and the immediate post-war years. There then began a slow but steady decline that has continued to this day.

The decline could be said to have begun already in April, 1945, when the first secretary-general of the United Nations became the American Alger Hiss – a Soviet spy! The extraordinary danger of ideological penetration that the United States was in at this, the moment of its greatest triumph, is indicated by the fact that, as Andrew Roberts writes, "Had Roosevelt died six months before he did, and his [very leftist] Vice-President Henry Wallace had succeeded him, Hiss might well have become Under-Secretary of State, along with the NKVD agent Laurence Duggan as Secretary of State and Harry Dexter White as Secretary of the Treasury."²⁵

The Security Council convened for the first time on January 17, 1946; its However, in the atmosphere of the Cold War that developed very soon thereafter (Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech was delivered on March 5, 1946), it showed its virtual impotence to achieve justice and peace when the interests of one of the Great Powers was affected. The old politics continued; the world was divided into two vast spheres of influence, the Communist East and the Capitalist West; and with the explosion of two atomic bombs over Japan in the summer of 1945 the very real prospect beckoned of world war between the two blocs leading to the annihilation of mankind. Never before in the history of mankind had it been so urgently necessary to find a solution to the problems of international relations, peace and justice. But clearly the plan of locking the most evil power in history into a quasi-world government in which it had the power of veto not only did not solve the problem, but made the task of taming and neutralizing that power significantly more difficult...

²⁴ Paul Johnson, History of the Jews, London: Phoenix, 1987, pp. 524-525.

²⁵ Roberts, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, London: Penguin, 2014, p. 404.

The potential strangle-hold exerted over the United Nations by the Soviets was revealed as early as May, 1945, when the foreign ministers of the victor powers gathered in San Francisco to establish the organization's ground rules. Molotov, as Martin Gilbert writes, "told his American and British opposite numbers – Edward Stettinius and Anthony Eden – that sixteen members of the all-Party Polish Government in Warsaw, who had gone to Moscow at the request of the American and British governments to negotiate a peace treaty, were all in prison. In the *Daily Herald* a future leader of the British Labour Party, Michael Foot, who was in San Francisco as a journalist, described the impact on the conference of Molotov's announcement. The distressing news, wrote Foot, came 'almost casually' towards the end of an otherwise cordial dinner, Molotov 'could hardly have cause a greater sensation if he had upset the whole table and thrown the soup in Mr. Stettinius's smiling face.'"²⁶

Truman telegraphed Churchill to say that if they did not hold the line against the Soviets, "the whole fruits of our victory may be cast away and none of the purposes of a World Organization to prevent territorial aggression and future wars will be attained."²⁷ Churchill, of course, agreed...

"In San Francisco, on June 26, the United Nations Charter was signed. Even as bloody battles were being fought in the Pacific and the Far East, a blueprint for avoiding future war had been agreed upon by the victorious powers. But the power of the gun and the tank was still determining territorial change. Three days after the Charter was signed the new Czechoslovak government signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, ceding its eastern province of Ruthenia. The citizens of Ruthenia, having been annexed by Hungary during the war, became Soviet citizens, subjected overnight to the harsh panoply of Soviet Communism...^{"28}

In spite of this failure, the United Nations did much valuable humanitarian work for many decades after the war. Particular important for its work in Europe after VE Day was UNRRA (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). In fact, as Tony Judt writes, "there are actually many UNs, of which the political and military branches (General Assembly, Security Council, Peacekeeping Operations) are only the best known. To name but a few: UNESCO (the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, founded in 1945); UNICEF (the International Children's Emergency Fund, 1946); WHO (World Health Organization, 1948): UNRWA (the Relief and Works Agency, 1949); UNHCR (the High Commission for Refugees, 195), UNCTAD (the Conference on Trade and Development, 1963), and ICTY (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1993). Such international units don't include intergovernmental programs under the UN's aegis; nor do they cover the many field agencies established to address

²⁶ Gilbert, *A History of the Twentieth Century*, volume 2: 1933-1951, London: HarperCollins, 1998, pp. 682-683.

²⁷ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 686.

²⁸ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 694.

particular crises. These include UNGOMAP (the Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan that successfully oversaw the Soviet withdrawal there), UNAMSHIL (the Mission in Sierra Leone, 1999), UNMIK (the Mission in Kosovo, 1999) and many others before and since.

"Much of the work done by these units is routine. And the 'soft' tasks of the UN – addressing health and environmental problems, assisting women and children in crisis, educating farmers, training teachers, providing small loans, monitoring rights abuse – are sometimes performed just as well by national or nongovernmental agencies, though in most cases only at UN prompting or in the wake of a UN-sponsored initiative. But in a world where states are losing the initiative to such non-state actors as the EU or multinational corporations, there are many things that would not happen at all if they were not undertaken by the United Nations or its representatives – the UNICEF-sponsored Convention of the Rights of the Child is a case in point. And while these organizations cost money, we should recall that UNICEF, for example, has a budget considerably smaller than that of many international businesses.

"The United Nations works best when everyone acknowledges the legitimacy of its role. When monitoring or overseeing elections or truces, for example, the UN is often the only external interlocutor whose good intentions and rightful authority are acknowledged by all the contending parties. Where this is not the case – at Srebrenica in 1995, for example – disaster ensues, since the UN troops can neither use force to defend themselves nor intervene to protect others. The reputation of the UN for evenhandedness and good faith is thus its most important long-term asset. Without it the organization becomes just another tool of one or more powerful states and resented as such."²⁹

However, United Nations Agencies were not invulnerable, unsurprisingly, to penetration by globalist or even communist forces. For example, Ian Taylor writes: "In 1980 the general conference of UNESCO Belgrade adopted a resolution to include the principles of New World Information and Communications Order. Since that time there has been a coercive attempt to bring the free world's television and radio mass media under a single beneficent banner, purportedly with the objective of maintaining freedom of the press and information. However, the United States government perceived the real motives to be quite the reverse when it was suggested that journalists be licensed 'for their protection' and withdrew its membership in December 1983."³⁰

 ²⁹ Judt, "Is the UN Doomed?", in *When the Facts Change*, London: Vintage, 2015, pp. 257-258.
 ³⁰ Tayor, *In the Minds of Men: Darwin and the New World Order*, Minneapolis: TFE Publishing, 1999, p. 127.

<u>3. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS</u>

A quasi-global government like the United Nations is inconceivable without a global ideology. Such an ideology was expounded by the United Nations in its *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which was approved on December 9, 1948. It provided in essence a new moral code for the world, a code that has no religious base - unless atheism is considered to be a religion. However, this has not prevented the pseudo-Christian West from embracing it enthusiastically, considering it to be the culmination of Christian Capitalist culture in spite of the fact that its spiritual ancestor was clearly the anti-Christian *Declaration of Human Rights* of the French Revolution...

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has changed the world more radically and, on the whole, for the worse than any other change – political, economic, technological or cultural - in the seventy years or so since its publication. The changes have been most profound in Western Europe and North America, and from there they have spread to most of the rest of the world. "Most people in Europe in 1950," writes Ian Kershaw, "held views that seventy years later would be regarded as anothema [although the meaning of 'anathema', a Biblical term, has been largely forgotten now]... There was little popular understanding of what it [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] meant in practice. Racist views and blatant racist discrimination were widely accepted and scarcely seen as remarkable. Few people of skin colours other than white lived in European countries. Capital punishment was still in existence, and executions were routinely carried out for people found guilty of the worst crimes. Homosexuality remained a criminal offence. Abortion was illegal. The influence of the Christian churches was profound³¹, and attendance at church services still relatively high. By the time post-war children approached old age, human right were taken for granted (however imperfect the practice), holding racist views was among the worst of social stigmas (though less in Eastern and Southern than in Western Europe), multicultural societies were the norm, capital punishment had disappeared from Europe, gay marriage and legal abortion were widely accepted, and the role of the Christian churches had diminished greatly (though the spread of mosques, a feature of modern European cities almost wholly unknown in 1950, testified to the importance of religion among Muslim minorities)."32

Having said, there is no denying that certain part of the human rights ideology were useful in containing some of the most egregious aspects of contemporary collectivist ideologies, such as Communism. According to Martin Gilbert, "the voice of the individual as enshrined in 1948 in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, became the voice of dissent. The scrutiny carried out by organizations like Amnesty International brought the focus on human rights to a global public. Meeting in Geneva, the United

³¹ This judgement can be disputed. Christianity was already in deep and long-term decline. However, the decline has accelerated in the last seventy years. (V.M.)

³² Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, p. xxiii.

Nations Commission on Human Rights, and the Non-Governmental Organizations which represent specific minority interests at the Commission, cast a strong spotlight on human rights abuse. Two areas in which it was particularly active in the 1970s and 1980s were the inequalities and indignities of apartheid in South Africa, and the struggle of the Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union without harassment or imprisonment..."

The philosophy of human rights goes back a long way in western history – at least to Grotius in the seventeenth century and perhaps as far as the medieval scholastics. The French *Declaration of Human Rights* of 1789 located the source of human rights in the sovereign power of the nation. However, most human rights are universal, that is, they are framed in perfectly general terms that apply to all men and women; so to locate their obligatoriness, not in some supra-national or metaphysical sphere, but in particular nations or states that may, and often do, disagree with each other, would seem illogical.

The problem, of course, is that if we pursue this argument to its logical conclusion, it would seem to entail that all national states must give up their rights and hand them over to a world government, which alone can impartially formulate universal human rights and see that they are observed by all nations. This logic was reinforced by the first two World Wars, which discredited nationalism and led to the first international organizations with legal powers, albeit embryonic, over nation-states – the League of Nations and the United Nations.

One of the first to formulate this development was the Viennese Jew and professor of law, Hans Kelsen, in his work, *A Pure Theory of Law*. "The essence of his theory," according to Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "was that an obligation to obey the law does not stem from national sovereignty but from a fundamental norm. In practical terms, this led after the First World War to his advocacy of an Austrian constitutional court as part of the Austrian constitution and, after the Second World War, to support for the idea of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction as a key part of the framework of the United Nations." ³³

Another Austrian Jewish academic, Hersch Lauterpacht, in his dissertation "combined his interests in jurisprudence and Zionism with an argument about mandates granted by the League of Nations which implied that the mandate given to Britain to govern Palestine did not give Britain sovereignty. Rather, this rested, argued Lauterpacht, with the League of Nations...

³³ Pinto-Duschinsky, "The Highjacking of the Human Rights Debate", *Standpoint*, May, 2012, p. 36. "Central to the Pure Theory of Law is the notion of a 'basic norm (Grundnorm)' - a hypothetical norm, presupposed by the jurist, from which in a hierarchy all 'lower' norms in a legal system, beginning with constitutional law, are understood to derive their authority or 'bindingness'. In this way, Kelsen contends, the bindingness of legal norms, their specifically 'legal' character, can be understood without tracing it ultimately to some suprahuman source such as God, personified Nature or a personified State or Nation." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Kelsen).

"Despite the failure of the League of Nations to prevent Nazi aggression, the Second World War and the murder of his family in the Holocaust, Lauterpacht remained attached to notions of an international legal order. Before his early death in 1960, he served as a judge on the International Court at the Hague. Lauterpacht was devoted to the view that fundamental human rights were superior to the laws of international states and were protected by international criminal sanctions even if the violations had been committed in accordance with existing national laws. He advised the British prosecutors at Nuremburg to this effect. Together with another Jewish lawyer from the Lviv area, Raphael Lemkin, Lauterpacht had a major role in the passage by the United Nations General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Lauterpacht's publication in 1945, An International Bill of Rights, also had a formative influence on the European Convention of Human Rights drawn up in 1949 and ratified in 1953.

"Lauterpacht's public philosophy was based on the conviction that individuals have rights which do not stem from nation states. He was an internationalist who had a lifelong mistrust of state sovereignty which, to him, reflected the aggression and injustices committed by nation states and the disasters of the two world wars."³⁴

However, as Pinto-Duschinsky rightly points out, while "international arbitration may be a practical and peaceful way to resolve disputes between countries,... international courts which claim jurisdiction over individual countries do not coexist comfortably with notions of national sovereignty..."³⁵

In spite of that, and in spite of the terrible destruction caused by the idea of positive freedom in the period 1917 to 1945, in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood... Recognition of the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world". While this is anodyne enough, even a superficial reading of history since 1789 should have convinced those who drew up the Declaration to be more specific about the meaning of the words "freedom" and "rights" here. They should have known that very similar statements had served as the foundation of the French revolution, and almost every other bloody revolution right up to and including the Russian revolution, which at that moment was still destroying millions of souls in the name of "the spirit of brotherhood"... In any case, the Communists interpreted human rights in a very different way from the Capitalists. They saw in the theory merely a means of imposing the capitalist world-view. And there was some justification for this: the United Nations was, after all, the child of Roosevelt and his very American (but also leftist) world-view.

³⁴ Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

³⁵ Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., p. 37.

As John Gray writes, speaking of human rights in the context of global capitalism: "The philosophical foundations of these rights are flimsy and jerrybuilt. There is no credible theory in which the particular freedoms of deregulated capitalism have the standing of universal rights. The most plausible conceptions of rights are not founded on seventeenth-century ideas of property but on modern notions of autonomy. Even these are not universally applicable; they capture the experience only of those cultures and individuals for whom the exercise of personal choice is more important that social cohesion, the control of economic risk or any other collective good.

"In truth, rights are never the bottom line in moral or political theory – or practice. They are conclusions, end-results of long chains of reasoning from commonly accepted principles. Rights have little authority or content in the absence of a common ethical life. They are conventions that are durable only when they express a moral consensus. When ethical disagreement is deep a wide appeal to rights cannot resolve it. Indeed, it may make such conflict dangerously unmanageable.

"Looking to rights to arbitrate deep conflicts – rather than seeking to moderate them through the compromises of politics – is a recipe for a lowintensity civil war..."³⁶ For in fact there is no basis for human rights: one man's right is another man's abomination. A good example is the supposed "right" to practice homosexuality: the modern world considers it a universal right, while Christians regard it as an abomination against God and nature.

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More fundamentally, profound ethical questions cannot be resolved without reference to the ultimate arbiter and judge – Almighty God. But the knowledge of the will of God belongs only to those who know Him in the true faith. In other words, these questions are ultimately religious in nature. But by the middle of the twentieth century religion in both East and West had been wholly subordinated to secular concepts such as "human rights". Therefore for the men of this age they were and are insoluble...

The attempt to satisfy all desires on the basis of some kind of overarching "right to happiness" must lead in the end, not just to Sodom and Gomorrah, but to the collapse of all civilization. For "we then advance," writes C.S. Lewis, "towards a state of society in which not only each man but every impulse in each man claims *carte blanche*. And then, though our technological skill may help us survive a little longer, our civilization will have died at heart, and will – one dare not even add 'unfortunately' – be swept away..."

³⁶ Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*, London: Granta Books, 1999, pp. 108-109.

But, as Nicholas Berdiaev pointed out: "Neither 'human rights' nor 'the will of the people', nor both together can be the foundation of human society. For the one contradicts the other: 'the rights of the human personality', understood as the final foundations of society, deny the primacy of social unity; 'the will of the people', as an absolute social basis, denies the principle of personality. There can be, and in fact is, only some kind of eclectic, unprincipled compromise between the two principles, which witnesses to the fact that neither is the primary principle of society. If one genuinely believes in the one or the other, then one has to choose between the unlimited despotism of social unity, which annihilates the personality - and boundless anarchy, which annihilates social order and together with it every personal human existence."

In spite of the manifest failures of these extremes, modern man continues to search for some such foundation for his life. For although He does not believe in God, he does believe in morality. Even when committing heinous crimes he takes care to try and justify himself. But what he really wants is to be free to pursue the life he wants to lead, - the life which brings him the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, - without being interfered with by anybody else, whether God, or the State, or some other individual or group of individuals. However, he knows that in a society without laws, in which *everybody* is free to pursue the life he wants the life he wants to lead without any kind of restriction, he will not achieve his personal goal. For if everybody were completely free in this way, there would be anarchy, and life would be "nasty, brutish and short" – for everybody. So a compromise must be found.

The compromise is a kind of religionless morality. Let some powerful body – preferably the post-revolutionary State, certainly not God or the Church, because God is unpredictably and unpleasantly demanding – impose certain limits on everybody. But let those limits be as restricted and unrestrictive as possible.

And let there be a set of rules accepted by all States - preferably enforced by some World Government – that puts limits on the limits that States can place on their citizens. These rules we can then call "human rights", and they can be our morality. Thus "human rights" include *civil and political rights*, such as the right to *life* and *liberty*, *freedom of expression*, and *equality before the law*; *judicial rights*, like the right to a free trial, and freedom from torture and the death penalty; *sexual rights*, like the rights to have sex of any kind with any consenting adult, reproduce a child by any means, and then destroy it if necessary; and *economic*, *social and cultural rights*, like the right to *participate* in culture, to have food and water and healthcare, the *right to work*, and the *right to education*. This morality will be permissive in the sense that it will permit very many things previous, more religious ages considered unlawful. But it will not permit everything; it will not permit others to interfere with my life of pleasure so long as I don't interfere with theirs...

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The real problem with the post-war philosophy of human rights lies in the conjuring up of this multiplicity of new rights. For, from the time of the United Nations Declaration, as Sir Roger Scruton writes, "the search for liberty has gone hand in hand with a countervailing search for 'improvement'. The negative freedoms offered by traditional theories of human rights, such as Locke's, do not compensate for the inequalities of power and opportunity in human societies. Hence egalitarians have begun to insert more positive rights into the list of negative freedoms, supplementing the liberty rights specified by the various international conventions with rights that do not merely demand non-encroachment from others, but which imposed on them a positive duty. And in this they are drawing on the other root of the human rights idea – the root of 'natural law', which requires that every legal code conform to a universal standard.

Thus the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action declares: "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and related. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis".

"This is apparent in the UN Declaration of Human Rights which begins with a list of freedom rights and then suddenly, at Article 22, begins making radical claims against the state – claims that can be satisfied only by positive action from governments. Here is Article 22: 'Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.' There is a weight of political philosophy behind that article. Contained within this right is an unspecified list of other rights called 'economic, social and cultural' which are held to be indispensable not for freedom but for 'dignity' and the 'free development of personality'. Whatever this means in practice, it is quite clear that it is likely to involve a considerable extension of the field of human rights, beyond those basic liberties acknowledged in the American Declaration. Those basic liberties are arguably necessary for any kind of government by consent; the same is not true of the claims declared in Article 22 of the UN Declaration.

"The Declaration goes on in this vein, conjuring a right to work, to leisure, to a standard of living sufficient to guarantee health – and other benefits which are, in effect, claims against the state rather than freedoms from its encroachments.

"... Even if [those benefits were] rights, they are not justified in the same way as the freedom rights granted earlier in the Declaration. Moreover, they open the door to the 'rights inflation' that we have witnessed in recent decades, and to an interpretation of human rights that is prodigal of conflicts. When the 'right to a family life' declared by the European Convention of Human Rights enables a criminal who is also an illegal immigrant to escape deportation when the right to the traditional lifestyle of one's ethnic community declared by the European Court of Human Rights, is used to instal a park of mobile homes in defiance of planning law, so destroying property values all around; when the Court of British Columbia discovers a 'right that is not to be offended' violated by a stand-up comedian's response to a lesbian couple ostentatiously snogging in the front row of his show; when bankers claim their outrageous bonuses as a 'human right'; when the courts are burdened by these and similar cases, coming in at the rate of seven a day in Britain and at a cost of £2 billion a year for the taxpayer: we are entitled to ask whether the concept of a human right is after all securely founded and whether there is any valid argument that would enable us to distinguish the true from the false among the many contenders.

"The first point to note in response is that, as Dworkin puts it, 'rights are trumps'. That is, in a court of law, if you can show that your interest in the matter is also protected as a right, then you win the case against anyone whose interests, however great, are not so protected. (Rights provide 'exclusionary reasons', in Raz's plausibly way of putting it.)

"The second important point is that, unlike the solutions issued by a legislature, those issued by a court are not compromises: they are not attempts to reconcile the many interests involved in a situation, and the court does not see itself as formulating a policy for the good government of a community that is the task of a legislature, not a court. The court sees itself as resolving a conflict in favour of one of the parties. In normal circumstances, a dispute over rights is a zero-sum game, in which one party wins everything, and the other loses everything. There are no consolation prizes. Moreover, the doctrine of precedent ensures that the court's decision will punch a hole in any legislation designed to solve issues of the kind that come before it. And this is one of the dangers inherent in human rights' legislation - namely, that it places in the hands of the ordinary citizen a rod with which even the most vital piece of public policy can be overturned in favour of the individual, regardless of the common interest and the common good. Thus terrorists in Britain have been able to overthrow attempts to deport them by claiming that this or that 'human right' would be violated by doing so. Without a criterion enabling us to distinguish genuine human rights from the many imposters we will never be sure that our legal provisions, however wise, benevolent and responsible, will be secure against the individual desire to escape from them.

"The third important point is that the human rights declared by the various pieces of legislation, and the various decisions of the courts, are not obviously of the same philosophical, moral or political standing. A doctrine of human rights is entitled to the name only if the rights declared under it can be established *a priori*, in other words, as right established by philosophical reasoning rather than by the workings of a specific system of law. The attempt to do this, in the case of basic freedom rights, has been made by various writers – by Nozick, beginning from Kantian premises, by Finnis, beginning from Thomist premises, and so on. I think we can all see the force of the idea that

there are certain things that cannot be done to human beings – certain basic goods, including life itself, that cannot be taken away from them unless they in some way *forfeit* them. Life, limb and the basic freedom to pursue our goals undisturbed (comparable with a similar freedom enjoyed by others) are plausible candidates. You can see *how* the entitlement to these things lies at the heart of political cooperation: for without some guarantee that, in these respects at least, people are protected from invasion, there really could not be a system of law that enjoyed the free consent of those subject to it.

"Furthermore, we can understand those basic freedoms as rights partly because we can understand the reciprocal duty to respect them. My right to life is your duty not to kill me; and duties of non-encroachment and noninfliction and naturally upheld by morality and easily influence by the law. However, once we step outside this narrowly circumscribed area of basic freedoms, we enter a much more shady and conflicted territory. The case in which a park of mobile homes was allowed to destroy the amenities of a settled village depended upon the provision for 'non-discrimination' - a provision that steps outside the area of basic freedoms, into that of justice. And the striking thing is that this provision, meant to prevent one group of citizens from arbitrarily enjoying privileges denied to another, has been sued precisely to claim for the minority privileges that are legally denied to the majority - the minority in this case being those who could claim to be 'travellers', apparently entitled to consideration as an 'ethnic group'. Similar paradoxical consequences have emerged from the advocacy in America of 'positive discrimination', by which is meant a policy of giving to members of some disadvantaged group legal privileges designed to 'rectify' their position.

"The original purpose behind liberalism's invocation of natural rights was to protect the individual from arbitrary power. You held your right, according to Locke and his followers, as an individual, and regardless of what group or class you belonged to. These rights force people to treat you as a free being with sovereignty over your life, and as one who has an equal claim on others' respect. But the new ideas of human rights allow rights to one group that they deny to another: you have rights as the member of some ethnic minority or social class that cannot be claimed by every citizen. People can now be favoured or condemned on account of their class, race, rank or occupation, and this in the name of liberal values. The rights that form the substance of international declarations therefore reflect a profound shift in liberal philosophy. The rhetoric of rights has shifted from freedoms to claims, and from equal treatment to equal outcomes."³⁷

The United Nations was a part of the American World Order because: (a) it was the brainchild of successive American presidents – Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman; (b) its headquarters is in New York, built on land owned by that

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³⁷ Scruton, *How to be a Conservative*, London: Bloomsbury, 2014, pp. 70-73.

quintessentially American capitalist, Rockefeller; (c) the organization continues to be funded mainly by the United States; and (d) most of the Permanent Members of the Security Council were westernized powers dependent on the United States for their security and prosperity and basically in agreement with the American interpretation of human rights. However, in time the Americanness of the institution was weakened. The first major breach came in 1949 when China became communist and therefore not American-oriented. Fortunately, China did not immediately team up with Russia in order to form a united anti-American front in the United Nations. But the unanimity of the institution's governance – which was Roosevelt's dream and goal – was destroyed by such issues as the Israeli/Arab conflict and many battlefields of the Cold War from Vietnam onwards. A turning point came during the Second Iraq War of 2003, when the United States and Britain were outvoted. From that time, the American presidency, disillusioned with its own creation, turned increasingly against it. The consequences are as yet unclear...

<u>4. ANARCHY IN EUROPE</u>

The First World War had brought chaos and devastation in its wake. The chaos, devastation and anarchy in the wake of the Second World War was much greater... As the Second World War came to an end, writes Professor Richard J. Evans, "millions of former Nazis hid or burned their uniforms, and in the final days of the war, the Gestapo set fire to incriminating records all over the country. Many of the most fanatical Nazis did not survive: they either perished in the final conflagration or killed themselves, along with Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, and many others, in one of the greatest waves of mass suicide in history, unable to imagine anything beyond the all-encompassing world of the Third Reich, the only thing that gave their lives purpose and meaning.

"In stark contrast to the countries the Nazis had conquered during the war, Germany saw no resistance to the Allied occupation. As wartime gravestones frequently testified, many Germans had fought and died 'for Führer and Fatherland'. But with the Führer gone and the fatherland under enemy occupation, there seemed no point in fighting on. German cities had been reduced to rubble, and millions of Germans had died; as a result, everyone could see what Nazism had ultimately led to. The Allied occupation was vigilant and comprehensive, and it quickly suppressed even the slightest act of resistance. The Allies put in place an elaborate program of 'denazification', war crimes trials, and 're-education' measures that targeted not only former Nazi activists and fellow travellers but also the militaristic beliefs and values that the Allies believed had allowed the Hitler regime gain support and come to power in the first place. In 1947, to symbolize this forced reinvention of German political culture, the Allied Control Council, which governed Germany at the time, formally abolished the state of Prussia, which 'from early days had been a bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany', the council claimed.

"Germans by and large wanted to focus on the gigantic task of rebuilding and reconstruction and to forget the Nazi past and the crimes in which, to a greater or lesser extent, the vast majority of them had been involved. The year 1945, many of them declared, was 'zero hour' – time for a fresh start. However, politicians and intellectuals also reached back to older values in their quest to construct a new Germany...

"Yet post-war German efforts to forge a new identity could not just leap across the Third Reich as if it had not existed. Germans ultimately had to confront what the Hitler regime had done in their name. The process of doing so was halting and complicated by the country's division during the Cold War...

"There was a limit, as well, to what the Allies could achieve in encouraging or forcing the Germans to come to terms with what they had done. West Germans, the vast majority of the formerly united country's population, seemed to suffer from a generalized historical and moral amnesia in the postwar years; on the rare occasions when they spoke about the Nazi dictatorship, it was usually to insist that they had known nothing of its crimes and to complain that they had been unfairly victimized and humiliated by the denazification programs and the 'victors' justice' of the war crimes trials. Many still seethed with anger at the Allies' carpet-bombing of German towns and resented the expulsion of 11 million ethnic Germans by the postwar governments of Hungary, Poland, Romania, and other eastern European countries. An opinion poll carried out in West Germany in 1949 revealed that half the population considered Nazism to be 'a good idea, badly carried out'. In the East, the country's new Stalinist leaders wanted the public to identify with the memory of the communist resistance to Nazism, which had been real enough, but which the authorities massively exaggerated. As a result, East Germans were not really forced to face up to their involvement in the crimes of Nazism at all.

"In the 1960s, however, things began to change"³⁸ as prosperity returned...

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The general condition of Europe after 1945 was *anarchy*... In France, many Vichy collaborators were murdered, and women who had slept with Nazis were humiliated. The bitter debate over who was responsible for France's defeat and – with the honourable exception of De Gaulle's Free French – collaboration with Germany, continued for many years.

But the changes were greater further east. "With the exception of Germany," writes Tony Judt, "and the heartland of the Soviet Union, every continental European state involved in World War Two was occupied at least twice: first by its enemies, then by the armies of liberation. Some countries – Poland, the Baltic states, Greece, Yugoslavia – were occupied three times in five years. With each succeeding invasion the previous regime was destroyed, its authority dismantled, its elites reduced. The result in some places was a clean slate, with all the old hierarchies discredited and their representatives compromised. In Greece, for example, the pre-war dictator Metaxas had swept aside the old parliamentary class. The Germans removed Metaxas. Then the Germans too were pushed out in their turn, and those who had collaborated with them stood vulnerable and disgraced.

"The liquidation of old social and economic elites was perhaps the most dramatic change. The Nazis' extermination of Europe's Jews was not only devastating in its own right. It had significant social consequences for those many towns and cities of central Europe where Jews had constituted the local professional class: doctors, lawyers, businessmen, professors. Later, often in the very same towns, another important part of the bourgeoisie – the Germans – was also removed, as we have seen. The outcome was a radical transformation

³⁸ Evans, *The Third Reich at War*, London: Penguin Books, 2009.

of the social landscape – and an opportunity for Poles, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Hungarians and others to move up into the jobs (and homes) of the departed.

"This levelling process, whereby the native populations of central and eastern Europe took the place of the banished minorities, was Hitler's most enduring contribution to European social history. The German plan had been to destroy the Jews and the educated local intelligentsia in Poland and the western Soviet Union, reduce the rest of the Slav peoples to neo-serfdom and place the land and the government in the hands of resettled Germans. But with the arrival of the Red Army and the expulsion of the Germans the new situation proved uniquely well adapted to the more truly radicalizing projects of the Soviets.

"One reason for this was that the occupation years had seen not just rapid and bloodily enforced upward social mobility but also the utter collapse of law and the habits of life in a legal state. It is misleading to think of the German occupation of continental Europe as a time of pacification and order under the eye of an omniscient and ubiquitous power. Even in Poland, the most comprehensively policed and repressed of all the occupied territories, society continued to function in defiance of the new rulers: the Poles constituted for themselves a parallel underground world of newspapers, schools, cultural activities, welfare services, economic change and even an army – all of them forbidden by the Germans and carried on outside the law and at great personal risk.

"But that was precisely the point. To live normally in occupied Europe meant breaking the law: in the first place the laws of the occupiers (curfews, travel regulations, race laws, etc.) but also conventional laws and norms as well. Most common people who did not have access to farm produce were obliged, for example, to resort to the black market or illegal barter just to feed their families. Theft – whether from the state, from a fellow citizen or from a looted Jewish store – was so widespread that in the eyes of many people it ceased to be a crime. Indeed, with gendarmes, policemen and local mayors representing and serving the occupier, and with the occupying forces themselves practicing organized criminality at the expense of selected civilian populations, common felonies were transmuted into acts of resistance (albeit often in post-liberation retrospect).

"Above all, violence became part of daily life. The ultimate authority of the modern state has always rested *in extremis* on its monopoly of violence and its willingness to deploy force if necessary. But in occupied Europe authority was a function of force alone, deployed without inhibition. Curiously enough, it was precisely in these circumstances that the state lost its monopoly of violence. Partisan groups and armies competed for a legitimacy determined by their capacity to enforce their will in a given territory. This was obviously true in the most remote regions of Greece, Montenegro and the eastern marches of Poland where the authority of modern states had never been very firm. But by the end of World War Two it also applied in parts of France and Italy.

"Violence bred cynicism. As occupying forces, both Nazis and Soviets precipitated a war of all against all. They discouraged not just allegiance to the defunct authority of the previous regime or state, but any sense of civility or bond between individuals, and on the whole they were successful. If the ruling power behaved brutally and lawlessly to your neighbour – because he was a Jew, or a member of an educated elite or ethnic minority – then why should you show any more respect for him yourself? Indeed, it was often prudent to go further and curry pre-emptive favour with the authorities by getting your neighbour in trouble."³⁹

"The Ukraine," writes Niall Ferguson, "was perhaps the most blood-soaked place of all. In Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), egged on by the Germans, massacred between 60,000 and 80,000 Poles. Whole villages were wiped out, men beaten to death, women raped and mutilated, babies bayoneted... The internecine war in the Ukraine only grew more ferocious as the war progressed, with some Ukrainians fighting for the Axis, some for the Allies and others for an independent Ukraine.

"In the Balkans, too, there were multiple civil wars along ethnic, religious and ideological lines... Of the million or so people who died in Yugoslavia during the war, most were killed by other Yugoslavs. This included nearly all of Bosnia's 14,000 Jews. In Greece the German occupation was the cue for bitter conflict. There, as in Yugoslavia, a three-cornered war raged – between the foreign invaders and nationalists, but also between nationalists and indigenous Communists. When Bulgaria annexed northern Dobruja from Romania, tens of thousands of people were expelled from their homes on either side of the new border.

"Most empires purport to bring peace and order. They may divide in order to rule, but they generally rule in pursuit of stability. The Nazi empire divided the peoples of Europe as it ruled them – though, ironically, the divisions that opened up in Central and Eastern Europe had as much to do with religion as with race (most obviously in the conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians or between Croats and Serbs). But the 'skilful utilization of inter-ethnic rivalry' the Germans consciously practiced did not lead (in the words of one German officer) to the 'total political and economic pacification' of occupied territory. On the contrary, in many places their rule soon degenerated into little more than the sponsorship of local feuds, the institutionalization of civil war as a mode of governance..."⁴⁰

"At the conclusion of the First World War, it was borders that were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in peace. After 1945 what happened was rather the opposite: with one major exception [Poland]

³⁹ Evans, The Third Reich at War, London: Penguin Books, 2009.

⁴⁰ Ferguson, *The War of the World*, London: Penguin, 2006, pp. 455, 456-457.

boundaries stayed broadly intact and people were moved instead. There was a feeling among Western policymakers that the League of Nations, and the minority clauses in the Versailles Treaties, had failed and that it would be a mistake even to try and resurrect them. For this reason they acquiesced readily enough in the population transfers."⁴¹

Between 6 and 8 million former prisoners of war and slave labourers from the Nazi camps and factories were released to roam the German countryside, looting and taking revenge on civilians. Those were aiming to return, eventually, to their homes in the East. But then there were the Germans flowing from the East to the West... In Article XIII of the Potsdam Conference of 1945, the Victors authorized the transfer of vast numbers of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (which, while losing its eastern provinces to the Soviets, took over the former German provinces of Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia). This "ethnic cleansing" extended even further east. 700,000 Germans, for example, were expelled from Romania. It was accompanied by mass murder, torture and rape. As Victor Sebestyen writes: "The Germans were not wanted anywhere outside Germany. Vast populations had been forced to uproot in the biggest refugee crisis the world had ever seen. Hitler had dreamed of an ethnically pure Europe. Paradoxically, Germany's defeat ensured that by the end of 1946 his dream was, to a great extent, a reality..."42

"In all," writes Mark Mazower, "some twelve to thirteen million Germans were 'transferred', by far the largest such population movement in European history. The numbers who died en route must have been at least in the hundreds of thousands; some sources put the final tally as high as two million.

"The disappearance through expulsion or killing of east Europe's Germans and Jews formed part of a still vaster process of demographic turbulence and instability in the wake of the war. More than seven million refugees from other ethnic groups (mostly Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Ukrainians and Balts) were evicted from their homes and resettled. The result was the virtual elimination of many minorities in eastern Europe – falling from 32 per cent to 3 per cent of the population in Poland, 33 per cent to 15 per cent in Czechoslovakia, from 28 per cent to 12 per cent in Romania..."⁴³

In the Baltic States, hundreds of thousands took to the forests in the Baltic States to resist their "liberation" by the Red Army; tens of thousands died.

Losses were still greater further south, as Ukrainian "Banderites" fought the Soviets and Poles fought Ukrainians⁴⁴; there were large transfers of population

⁴¹ Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe after 1945, London: Pimlico, 2007, p. 27.

⁴² Sebestyen, 1946: The Making of the Modern World, London: Pan, 2014, p. 140.

⁴³ Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 211.

⁴⁴ The "Banderites" did indeed do bad things. For example, in 1942-43, they killed two Orthodox bishops. However, in view of the massive propaganda directed by the modern

in both directions across the Polish-Ukrainian border. In Belorussia an anti-Soviet resistance movement lasted from 1944 to 1956. In Yugoslavia Serbs massacred Croats in retaliation for the hundreds of thousands they had lost at the hands of the Ustashi in the war. In Greece, British soldiers and Greek monarchists killed communists and vice-versa. In many countries of Western Europe, especially Italy and France, collaborators were murdered, imprisoned or humiliated in public.⁴⁵

Nor did survivors of the Holocaust, in spite of their terrible experiences during the war, feel much safer at the end of it. Much of Eastern Europe had been virulently anti-semitic in the 1930s, and the same disease broke out now in pogroms such as that in Kielce in Poland in July, 1946. There was a particular new motive for this fresh outburst: the property of the Jews had been appropriated by new Gentile owners, who did not want to give it up. So Jews had to flee again. Ironically, many of them fled to the land of their former persecutors, Germany (63,387 between July and September, 1946⁴⁶); others – to Palestine...

As Sebestyen writes, "Millions of Hungarians, Poles and Romanians had benefited from the Holocaust – an entirely new middle class had been created in just a few years. State direction of the economy in Eastern Europe did not begin with Soviet-style post-war communism; it had happened under the authoritarian regimes in the 1930s, and was given a boost by the Nazis. The popular Polish magazine *Odrozdenie* noticed 'an entire social stratum – the newborn Polish bourgeoisie – which took the place of murdered Jews, often literally, and because it smelled blood on its hands, it hated Jews more strongly than ever.' The returning Jews were resented by the majority. People cursed their luck that of all the Jews who had 'disappeared' during the war, *their* Jews had to be the ones who came back..."⁴⁷

Russian media against the "Banderites", it is worth heeding the words of Professor Andrei Zubov: "This was a national liberation movement, an anti-communist one.

[&]quot;Stepan Andreyevich Bandera was born and lived in that part of the Ukraine which was part of Poland before 1939. And he saw all the Soviet horrors from peaceful and wealthy (by comparison with Soviet Ukraine) Galicia. He saw how, during the Great Ukrainian Famine [golodomor], people who were dying from hunger hurled themselves across the frontier onto Polish territory, how they were shot by Soviet border-guards. And for that he hated Soviet power.

[&]quot;Any nationalism is a terrible thing, especially with weapons in its hands. But Bandera was a hundred times less cruel than the NKVD of Beria and Abakumov when they fought against the Banderites.

[&]quot;Therefore any attempt to liberate them from this state was already an element of justice. And in this sense the Banderite movement was more justified from the point of view of morality than the Stalinist Soviet state." ("Banderovtsy – eto primer bol'shoj lzhi sovietskoj sistemy" (The Banderites are an example of the big lie of the Soviet system), *Nash Dom*, January 8, 2016, http://www.nashdom.us/home/public/publikatsii/banderovtsy---eto- primer-bolshoj-lzhi-sovetskoj-sistemy)

⁴⁵ Erich Hartmann, "Antisovietskoe partizanskoe dvizhenie Belarusi v 1944-1956g.", http://www.erich-hartmann.com/antisovetskoe-partizanskoe-dvizhenie.

⁴⁶ Judt, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴⁷ Sebastyen, op. cit., p. 287.

Some of the continuing conflicts in post-war Europe had an ideological character, such as the Greek civil war between the monarchists and the communists. Others were "wars of liberation" from the new totalitarian conquerors, the Red Army, mixed with nationalist motives, as in the Baltic States and Ukraine. But most of them were simply wars of vengeance against those who had collaborated, or the continuation of pre-war racial tensions.

In Yugoslavia, writes Ian Kershaw, "the immediate post-war violence – on a scale probably unparalleled anywhere else in Europe – was actually not directed to Germans, who had left the country, fighting their way westwards during April 1945. Instead it was directed towards the hated Croat Ustase and collaborationist Slovenes. And it was carried out not by rampant, uncontrolled mobs, but by organized bands of the victorious Partisan units, mainly Serbian communists. Numerous massacres took place. There were mass shootings and horrific savagery. Much of the killing was ethnically driven revenge for earlier atrocities. The most reliable estimates suggest that the victims – civilians as well as collaborationist troops – numbered around 70,000. Relative to the size of the population, that was ten times higher than the scale of the vengeance killing in Italy, twenty times as bad as in France..."⁴⁸

Fierce was the vengeance of the Czechs on the Germans, supervised by their impeccably democratic and civilized President Edvard Beneš, who "spoke on the radio on 12 May 1945 of the need to 'liquidate the German problem definitively', immediately prompting the eviction at a moment's notice of more than 20,000 men, women and children from Brno, some of whom did not survive the forced march to the Austrian border. The Christian Commandment 'to love thy neighbour' did not apply to Germans, declared a Catholic priest. They were evil and the time had come to settle accounts with them."⁴⁹

"In the two years after the war Beneš expelled more than two and a half million Germans from Czechoslovakia, often with no notice of any kind. Nor did he seem to care how many died in the process. He expropriated the property of the ethnic 'Sudeten' Germans, the majority of whom were from families who had lived in Czechoslovakia for generations. It was payback – not only for the barbaric Nazi years, but also because they had been of the ruling caste before independence in 1918. In 1943, while still in exile, Beneš had issued a chilling decree: 'We have decided to eliminate the German problem in our republic once and for all. The entire German nation deserves the limitless contempt of all mankind. Woe, woe, thrice woe to the Germans. We will liquidate you.'

"Later, back home in Prague, he called not only for a 'definitive clearance of the Germans from our country, but also a clearance of German influence.' At no point did the Allied powers express any disapproval. Churchill's Cabinet

⁴⁸ Kershaw, To Hell and Back, Europe 1914-1949, London: Penguin, 2014, p. 473.

⁴⁹ Kershaw, op. cit., p. 476.

accepted the expulsions as 'inevitable... even desirable', and in December, 1944 the Prime Minister told the House of Commons, 'Expulsion is the method which as far as we have been able to tell will be the most satisfactory and lasting. A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed at the prospect of the disentanglement of the people, nor am I alarmed by these large transfers.' Stalin encouraged Beneš, telling him, 'This time the Germans will be destroyed so that they can never again attack the Slavs.'"⁵⁰

The Western Allies did little to extinguish this flame of war that erupted over much of Western and Central Europe. They had too little sympathy for the mainly German victims, and were too occupied in providing minimal living conditions for those living in their zones of occupation and in "denazifying" them. For food was scarce, especially in the British zone of occupation.⁵¹

In the Soviet zone of occupation the East Germans had more food. But that was their only advantage. In Eastern Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia, 1.4 million German women had been raped by Soviet soldiers, most of them several times⁵², private property was pillaged, and most industrial plant was transported eastwards by the Red Army, together with luxury goods destined for the Soviet generals and millions of soldiers and former prisoners of war destined for the Gulag.

American diplomat George Kennan wrote that "the disaster which befell this area with the entry of the Soviet forces has no parallel in modern European experience. There were considerable sections of it where, to judge by all existing evidence, scarcely a man, woman or child of the indigenous population was left alive after the initial passage of Soviet forces... The Russians... swept the native population clean in a manner that had no parallel since the days of the Asiatic hordes."⁵³

Judt continues: "The situation in the newly liberated states of western Europe, then, was bad enough. But in central Europe, in the words of John McCloy of the US Control Commission in Germany, there was 'complete economic, social and political collapse... the extent of which is unparalleled in history, unless one goes back to the collapse of the Roman Empire.' McCloy was speaking especially of Germany, where the Allied Military Commission

⁵⁰ Sebestyen, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

⁵¹ In Britain itself rations had to be reduced in order to keep the Germans from starving. Judt writes: "The British were extracting at most \$29 million in reparations from Germany; but the occupation was costing London \$80 million a year, leaving the British taxpayer to foot the bill for the difference even as the British government was forced to impose bread rationing at home (an expedient that had been avoided throughout the war). In the opinion of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, the British were 'paying reparations to the Germans'" (op. cit., p. 123).

⁵² Evans, op. cit., pp. 710-711. Ferguson has a higher estimate of rapes: two million German women. "This should be compared with the 925 sentences for rape passed by US Army court martials in all theatres of war between 1942 and 1946" (op. cit., p. 581).

⁵³ Kennan, in Judt, op. cit., p. 19.

had to build everything from scratch: laws, order, services, communications, administration. But at least they had resources. In the east, things were worse...

"Thus it was Hitler, at least as much as Stalin, who drove a wedge into the continent and divided it. The history of central Europe – of the lands of the German and Habsburg Empires, the northern parts of the old Ottoman Empire and even the westernmost territories of the Russian Czars – had always been different in degree from that of the nation states of the West. But it had not necessarily differed in kind. Before 1939 Hungarians, Romanians, Czechs, Poles, Croats and Balts might look enviously upon the more fortunate inhabitants of France or the Low Countries. But they saw no reason not to aspire to similar prosperity and stability in their own right. Romanians dreamed of Paris. The Czech economy in 1937 outperformed its Austrian neighbour and was competitive with Belgium.

"The war changed everything. East of the Elbe, the Soviets and their local representatives inherited a sub-continent where a radical break with the past had already taken place. What was not utterly discredited was irretrievably damaged. Exiled governments from Oslo, Brussels or The Hague could return from London and hope to take up the legitimate authority they had been forced to relinquish in 1940. But the old rulers of Bucharest and Sofia, Warsaw, Budapest and even Prague had no future: their world had been swept aside by the Nazis' transformative violence. It remained only to decide the political shape of the new order that must now replace the unrecoverable past..."⁵⁴

In his book *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*, Timothy Snyder argues that the Holocaust took place, not so much because an evil state organized it, but because very many of the Jews who were killed were in effect stateless, and "one could do what one wanted with stateless people". So the real destroyer was not states but the absence of statehood, *anarchy*. Whatever the merits of this thesis with regard to the Holocaust⁵⁵, it certainly has merit in relation to the immediate post-war years in Europe, when the main fact for very many was simply anarchy, the destruction of all signposts from the past, all institutions, ideals and morality.

Moreover, this is equally applicable to the whole catastrophic period from the First World War to the death of Stalin (1914-53), with its vast Jewish and Gentile (especially Orthodox Christian) Holocausts covering most of Central and Eastern Europe. These were the results of the fall of the last multi-national empires of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs, which held back the tide of anarchy, but were then swept away by the anti-states of Hitler and Stalin, together with many millions of their former subjects...

⁵⁴ Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 39-40.

⁵⁵ In favour of Snyder's thesis is Victor Sebestyen, "The brutal mask of anarchy", *The Spectator*, 12 September, 2015, p. 47. Against it is Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Hitler's 'ecological panic' didn't cause the Holocaust", *Standpoint*, September, 2015, pp. 44-49.

It all points back to the first cause of the miseries of the twentieth century: the Russian revolution. Vladimir Putin called the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 "the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century". But only one who knows no history, or who secretly or not believes in communism could believe such a thing...

<u>5. FRENCH INTELLECTUALS</u>

As Tony Judt writes, the ravages of Hitler and Stalin may be seen as complementing each other in their destruction of pre-war bourgeois civilization, both Christian and Jewish: "Hitler's war amounted, *de facto*, to a major European revolution, transforming Central and Eastern Europe and preparing the way for the 'Socialist' regimes of the postwar years which built upon the radical change Hitler had brought about – notably the destruction of the intelligentsia and urban middle class of the region, first through the murder of the Jews and then as a result of the postwar expulsion of Germans from the liberated Slav lands."⁵⁶

But the destruction wrought by the nihilists Hitler and Stalin was only a first stage, according to Fr. Seraphim Rose. On the empty space created by this destruction the Antichrist wanted to build a new civilization. "The new age, which many call a 'post-Christian' age, is at the same time the age 'beyond Nihilism' – a phrase that expresses at once a fact and a hope. The fact this phrase expresses is that Nihilism, being negative in essence even if positive in aspiration, owing its whole energy to its passion to destroy Christian Truth, comes to the end of its program in the production of a mechanized 'new earth' and a dehumanized 'new man': Christian influence over man and over society having been effectively obliterated, Nihilism must retire and give way to another, more 'constructive' movement capable of acting from autonomous and positive motives. This movement... takes up the Revolution at the point where Nihilism leaves off and attempts to bring the movement which Nihilism began to its logical conclusion,"⁵⁷ – the worship of the Antichrist.

However, for the time being there was still something of the old Christian civilization left to destroy. And the main instrument of that destruction, in the wake of Nazism's defeat, was Stalinism. So the main task of the remaining civilized forces was to resist it...

In terms of party politics, however, the Communists made advances even in countries not occupied by the Red Army. Thus there were large communist parties in both Italy and France. And in Czechoslovakia in 1946 the Communists won 38.6 percent of the vote, making them the largest party.⁵⁸ A communist, Mauno Pekkala, became Prime Minister of Finland from 1946.⁵⁹ And a KGB spy, Einar Gerhardson, became Prime Minister of Norway from 1945 to 1949 and from 1955 to 1965.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe after 1945, London: Pimlico, 2007.

⁵⁷ Rose, Nihilism, p. 88.

⁵⁸ Kershaw, op. cit., p. 504.

⁵⁹ Kershaw, op. cit., p. 489.

⁶⁰ He was the first western leader to visit the Soviet Union after the war. See "Norvegi v shoke: 'otets natsii', 15 let vozglavliaiuschij kabinet, byl agentom KGB" (Norwegians in shock: 'the father of the nation', who led the cabinet for 15 years, was an agent of the KGB), December 25, 2015.

Among intellectuals also, there was a substantial increase in support for the Communist Party almost everywhere, but especially in France, where a rabidly Stalinist variant of the virus took root, taking credit for the wartime resistance and taking revenge on its non-communist enemies. It was as if the intellectuals had learned nothing from recent history; while happy to denounce the defeated Nazis, they hid from themselves the real nature of the Soviet regime, turning their eyes away from the barbaric progress of the Red Army through Central and Eastern Europe and the mortal threat it constituted to all civilization...

The Parisians were the latter-day successors of the pagan Athenians of the first century, of whom St. Luke said: "all the Athenians and the foreigners who were there spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing' (Acts 17.21). And the latest novelty in Paris was *Existentialism*, the pet theory of the most influential intellectual in Western Europe in this period, Jean-Paul Sartre; the main exposition of the theory was in his *Being and Nothingness* (1943).. In the 1930s and during the war, he had not adopted any particular political line. But his pseudo-profound existentialist philosophy, which became instantly fashionable among the intellectuals, placed a high value on commitment and action. So, together with his mistress Simone de Beauvoir, the feminist author of *The Second Sex*, he gradually drifted towards the Marxists, who, in France as elsewhere, were very committed to murder... However, this was paradoxical, to say the least; for Existentialism is based on the concept of freewill whereas Marxism is deterministic...

Ian Kershaw explains the apparent contradiction: "Sarte, already before the war much influenced in his thinking - though not in his political leanings - by the German existentialist (and admirer of Hitler) Martin Heidegger, argued that mankind's only distinguishing feature was 'to be conscious of the nothingness of its being'. Existence was absurd, without meaning. Only the individual could choose a meaning for his or her own life. Choice was crucial, the redeeming feature of the philosophy. The apparent despairing bleakness could be combated by freedom and choice through which the individual created his or her own values. The war had, however, in some ways refashioned Sartre's existentialist thought. What had begun as an individualist and non-political philosophy was reshaped into an activist force in which individual freedom meant a responsibility to work for the liberty of all. This implied nothing less than endeavouring to bring about the radical transformation of society. His thinking now led him to Marxism, the political philosophy of social transformation and struggle against bourgeois society. He lent his strong support to the French Communist Party (though did not join it), and to the Soviet Union. And he justified communist political violence in the interests of the goal of the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois society, seen as the ultimate guarantee of freedom..."61

⁶¹ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2917, London: Penguin, 2019, pp. 181-182.

"On 26 October 1945," writes Paul Johnson, "at the opening of the new ballet at the Theatre des Champs-Elysees, the drop curtain by Picasso was hissed by the packed high-society audience. That was the old Paris. Three days later, at the Club Maintenant, Jean-Paul Sartre delivered a lecture, 'Existentialism is a Humanism'. Here was the new Paris. This occasion, too, was packed. Men and women fainted, fought for chairs, smashing thirty of them, shouted and barracked. It coincided with the launching of Sartre's new review, Les Temps *Modernes*, in which he argued that literary culture, plus the *haute couture* of the fashion shops, were the only things France now had left - a symbol of Europe, really - and he produced Existentialism to give people a bit of dignity and to preserve their individuality in the midst of degradation and absurdity. The response was overwhelming. As his consort, Simone de Beauvoir, put it, 'We were astounded by the furore we caused.' Existentialism was remarkably un-Gallic, hence, perhaps, its attractiveness. Sartre was half-Alsatian (Albert Schweitzer was his cousin) and he was brought up in the house of his grandfather, Karl Schweitzer. His culture was as much German as French. He was essentially a product of the Berlin philosophy school and especially of Heidegger, from whom most of his ideas derived. Sartre had had a good war. Despite the surface enmities, there was a certain coming together of the French and German spirit. Paris was not so uncongenial a place for an intellectual to be, provided he could ignore such unpleasantnesses as the round-up of Jews, as most contrived to do without difficulty. As the Jewish intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy was later to point out, radical, proto-fascist forms of racialism were rarely repugnant to the French, not least to French intellectuals: he even called it 'the French ideology'.

"The Paris theatre flourished under the Nazis. Andre Malraux later snarled: 'I was facing the Gestapo while Sartre, in Paris, let his plays be produced with the authorization of the German censors.' Alber Bussche, theatre critic of the Nazi forces' newspaper, Pariser Zeitung, called Sartre's play Huis Clos 'a theatrical event of the first order'. He was not the only beneficiary of German approval. When a new play by the *pied-noir* writer Albert Camus, Le Malentendu, was presented at the Theatre des Mathurins on 24 June 1944, it was hooted by the French intellectual elite (then largely fascist) because Camus was known to be in the Resistance. Bussche found it 'filled with profound thoughts... a pioneering work'. Camus did not share Sartre's aloofness to the war: he was in fact one of only 4,345 Frenchmen and women who received the special Rosette of the Resistance medal. But his thinking reflected the growing contiguity of French and German philosophy which the Occupation promoted and which was an important strand in the post-war pattern. The most important influence in his life was Nietzsche, whom in effect, through his novels *L'Etranger* and *La Peste*, he gallicized for an entire generation of French vouth.

"Sartre and Camus came together in 1943-4, protagonists – and essentially antagonists – in a cult centred on St. Germain-des-Pres which sought to relate philosophy and literature in public action. Their caravanserai was the Café Flore, itself a symbol of the ambiguities of French intellectual life. St. Germain had been a haunt of Diderot, Voltaire and Rousseau, who had congregated in the old Café Procope. The Flore dated from the Second Empire, when it had been patronized by Gautier, Musset, Sand, Balzac, Zola and Huysmans, later by Apollinaire and later still by the circle of Action Francaise, led by Maurras himself: Sartre occupied his still-warm seat. Existentialism in its post-war presentation was derived from Kant's 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become though your will a general natural law'. Our positive acts, Sartre taught, created 'not only the man we should like to be ourselves' but also 'an image of man such as we think he ought to be'. Man could shape his own essence by positive political acts. He thus offered a rationalized human gesture of defiance to despair - what Karl Popper called 'a new theology without God'. It contained an element of German pessimism, characteristic of both Heidegger and Nietzsche, in that it placed exaggerate emphasis upon the fundamental loneliness of man in a godless world, and upon the resulting tension between the self and the world. But for young people it was magic. It was a form of Utopian romanticism with much the same attractions as the Romantic movement 150 years before. Indeed it was more attractive because it offered political activism too. As Popper complained, it was a respectable form of fascism which, needless to add, could easily be allied to forms of Marxism. Camus insisted he was never an Existentialist, and in 1951 he and Sartre quarrelled mortally over the latter's defence of various forms of totalitarian violence. But it was Camus's re-creation, in modern terms, of the solitary Byronic hero, who resists fate and an alien world by defiant acts, which brought the cult so vividly to life and gave it actual meaning to youth on both sides of the Rhine.

"Thus Existentialism was a French cultural import, which Paris then reexported to Germany, its country of origin, in a sophisticated and vastly more attractive guise. The point is worth stressing, for it was the first time since the age of Goethe, Byron and De Stael that young people in France and Germany felt a spontaneous cultural affinity, a shared *Weltanshauung*. It served, then, as a preparation for a more solid economic and political harmonization, for which circumstances were also propitious..."⁶²

"Some of the things Sartre did and said during the four years [1948-1952], when he consistently backed the Communist Party line almost defy belief. He, like Bertrand Russell, reminds one of the disagreeable truth of Descartes' dictum: 'There is nothing so absurd or incredible that it has not been asserted by one philosopher or another.' In July 1954, after a visit to Russia, he gave a two-hour interview to a reporter from the fellow-travelling *Liberation*. It ranks as the most grovelling account of the Soviet state by a major Western intellectual since the notorious expedition by George Bernard Shaw in the early 1930s. He said that Soviet citizens did not travel, not because they were prevented but because they had no desire to leave their marvellous country.' The Soviet citizens,' he insisted, 'criticise their government much more and much more effectively than we do.' Indeed, he maintained, 'There is total

⁶² Johnson, Modern Times, London: HarperPerennial, 1992, pp. 575-577.

freedom of criticism in the USSR.' Many years later he admitted his mendacity: 'After my first visit to the USSR in 1954, I wrote an article... where I said a number of friendly things about the USSR which I did not believe. I did it partly because I considered that it is not polite to denigrate your hosts as soon as you return home, and partly because I didn't really know where I stood in relation to both the USSR and my own ideas.' This was a curious admission from 'the spiritual leader of thousands of young people'; moreover it was just as deceptive as his original falsehoods, since Sartre was consciously and deliberately aligning himself with Communist Party aims at that time. In fact it is more charitable to draw a veil over some of the things he said and did in 1952-56..."⁶³

In France, pro-communism went with a despising of all things American, in spite of the fact that the Americans had liberated France and France's survival as an independent nation continued to depend on the American army. America's "coca cola culture" was scorned, and Hollywood films, though avidly watched and enjoyed by audiences all over the continent, were considered inferior to the high culture of French cinema - although Hitchcock's films were admired by France's "new wave" directors like Truffaut... Anti-americanism was to become a defining characteristic of French intellectual culture especially in the 1960s, when Servan-Schreiber's *Le Defi Americain* (1967) became almost the gospel of French culture.

As Judt writes, "Communism excited intellectuals in a way that neither Hitler nor (especially) liberal democracy could hope to match. Communism was exotic in locale and heroic in scale. Raymond Aron in 1950 remarked upon 'the ludicrous surprise – that the European Left has taken a pyramid-builder for its God.' But was it really so surprising? Jean-Paul Sartre, for one, was most attracted to the Communists at precisely the moment when the 'pyramidbuilder' was embarking upon his final, crazed projects. The idea that the Soviet was engaged upon a momentous quest whose very ambition justified and excused its shortcomings was uniquely attractive to rationalist intellectuals. The besetting sin of Fascism had been its parochial objectives. But Communism was directed towards impeccably universal and transcendent goals. *Its* crimes were excused by many non-Communist observers as the cost, so to speak, of doing business with History.

"But even so, in the early years of the Cold War there were many in Western Europe who might have been more openly critical of Stalin, of the Soviet Union and of their local Communists had they not been inhibited by the fear of giving aid and comfort to their political opponents. This, too, was a legacy of 'anti-Fascism', the insistence that there were 'no enemies on the Left' (a rule to which Stalin himself, it must be said, paid little attention). As the progressive Abbé Boulier explained to François Fejto, when trying to prevent him from writing about the Rajk trial: drawing attention to Communist sins is 'to play the imperialists' game'.

⁶³ Johnson, Intellectuals, pp. 243-244.

"This fear of serving anti-Soviet interests was not new. But by the early fifties it was a major calculation in European intellectual debates, above all in France. Even after the East European show trials finally led Emmanuel Mounier and many in his *Esprit* group to distance themselves from the French Communist Party, they took special care to deny any suggestion that they had become 'anti-Communist' – or worse, that they had ceased to be 'anti-American'. Anti-anti-Communism was becoming a political and cultural end in itself..."⁶⁴

And not only in Western Europe. As we shall see in more detail later, Lenin and Stalin had no small number of apologists, "useful idiots", in capitalist countries around the globe. As an example, we may take the Australian Anglophobe historian Charles Manning Hope Clark, who in his 1960 book *Meeting Soviet Man*, "described Lenin as 'Christ-like, at least in his compassion' and 'as lovable as a little child'..."⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Judt, op. cit., pp. 216-217.

⁶⁵ Andrew Roberts, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 535.

6. ANGLO-SAXON INTELLECTUALS

Not only on the continent, but also in Britain, Socialism was the flavour of the month after the Second World War; many intellectuals were leftists and admirers of the Soviet Union. But the brilliant anti-communist satire of George Orwell, and the talented Christian apologetics of C.S. Lewis, managed for the time being to hold up a conservative dam against the Leftist deluge.

The Soviets and their western agents were the masters of what George Orwell in 1984 called "doublespeak": "To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it."

Orwell's novel was published in 1949, when Eastern Europe finally fell under Soviet domination and intellectuals were beginning to wake up to the evils of communism in larger numbers. As Ian Kershaw writes, "the emerging criticism of Soviet Communism was linked to structural analysis of Nazism. The two systems were seen as separate manifestations of essentially the same phenomenon, and the evils of the dead Nazi regime were transposed to the threat from the Soviet Union. The concept of totalitarianism, though in existence since the 1920s, was now deployed in changed and devastating fashion to bracket together the gross inhumanity of both regimes. By the mid-1950s, in the climate of the Cold War, the publications of the American political scientist (of German origin), Carl Joachim Friedrich, would become central to the shift in usage.

"But already before then the crucial work – highly influential throughout the western world – was that of Hannah Arendt, a German-Jewish exile to the USA, ironically a former lover of Hitler's philosopher-king, Martin Heidegger, meanwhile a distinguished political theorist herself. By 1949 she was completing her outstanding analysis, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, which appeared two years later. The book was actually in the main an explanation of the rise to power of Nazism and focused in its first two sections on antisemitism and imperialism, themes with little relevance [!] to the nature of Soviet power. The damning comparison with the Soviet Union came in the third part, 'Totalitarianism', much of which appeared only in a later, much revised edition. This comparative section painted the bleakest picture of a 'radical evil', an entirely new political phenomenon whose essence is 'total terror', which destroys all basis of law, 'breaks down all standards that we know', and produces a system existing on 'factories of annihilation' in which 'all men have become equally superfluous'.

"It was a searing assessment of the collapse of civilization. In the eyes of many intellectuals, the path that Europe had taken since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, towards a civilized society based on principles of rationality and progress, lay in ruins. The very foundations of modern society itself had been condemned. The era of the Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno had already concluded in 1944, had perversely culminated in the 'self-destruction of reason'..."⁶⁶

As Anne Applebaum writes, it was "Hannah Arendt, who defined totalitarianism in her 1949 book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, as a 'novel form of government' made possible by the onset of modernity. The destruction of traditional societies and ways of life had, she argued, created the conditions for the evolution of the 'totalitarian personality', men and women whose identities were entirely dependent on the state. Famously, Arendt argued that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were both totalitarian regimes, and as such were more similar than different. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski pushed that argument further in *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, published in 1946, and also sought a more operational definition. Totalitarian regimes, they declared, all had at least five things in common: a dominant ideology, a single ruling party, a secret police force prepared to use terror, a monopoly on information and a planned economy. By those criteria, the Soviet and Nazi regimes were not the only totalitarian states. Others – Mao's China, for example – qualified too."⁶⁷

Anglo-Saxon thought had none of the angst-ridden bleakness of French thought, perhaps because the Anglo-Saxons had not experienced defeat and occupation in the war. In spite of the popularity of the Soviet Union in English political and cultural circles, the country enjoyed, according to George L. Mosse, a kind of "Christian renaissance". That description probably exaggerates a real, but short-lived phenomenon. Nevertheless, for a short period a number of intellectuals sincerely wrote and spoke of the possibility of reviving Western Christian civilization by returning to its roots in Christianity.

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Thus the philosopher C.E.M. Joad "confessed that the Nazis had turned his mind to religion.

"Joad's reasons for conversion point out the essence of the Protestant revival. The problem of human evil occupied his mind. This evil was so widespread that it could not merely be seen as a by-product of unfavourable social or political circumstances; a different approach was needed. For Joad, Christianity provided the answer; it enabled man to face the reality of evil and then to transcend it. Not unnaturally, the Protestant renaissance was deeply concerned with the sinfulness of man and the evil which resulted form this. Existential in orientation, it asked man to confront his sinful nature, to understand it, and to have faith in God."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 458-459.

⁶⁷ Applebaum, Iron Curtain, London: Penguin, 2013, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

⁶⁸ Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 402.

An Anglican intellectual of a traditionalist Christian bent was the Anglo-American poet T.S. Eliot, author of *Murder in the Cathedral* and *The Waste Land*. He wrote: "The world is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality. The experiment will fail; but we must be very patient in awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time: so that the Faith may be preserved alive through the dark ages before us; to renew and rebuild civilization, and save the world from suicide."⁶⁹

A Catholic intellectual with a similar message was Malcolm Muggeridge, one of the very few journalists who had told the truth about the Ukrainian famine in the 1930s. He was more pessimistic than Eliot: "So the final conclusion would surely be that whereas other civilizations have been brought down by attacks of barbarians from without, ours had the unique distinction of training its own destroyers at its own educational institutions, and then providing them with facilities for propagating their destructive ideology far and wide, all at the public expense. Thus did Western Man decide to abolish himself, creating his own boredom out of his own affluence, his own vulnerability out of his own strength, his own impotence out of his own erotomania, himself blowing the trumpet that brought the walls of his own city tumbling down, and having convinced himself that he was too numerous, labored with pill and scalpel and syringe to make himself fewer. Until at last, having educated himself into imbecility, and polluted and drugged himself into stupefaction, he keeled over - a weary, battered old brontosaurus - and became extinct."

Still more influential were the Oxford dons J.R.R. Tolkien, author of *The Lord* of the Rings, whose first instalment was published in 1954, and his friend C.S. Lewis, author of *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* (1950). Significantly, both these works were stories for children: only in this allegorical form, it would seem, could the old world and the old faith, with its clear distinction between good and evil, be celebrated with conviction. Tolkien's ambition, writes Tom Holland, "had been to communicate to those who might not appreciate them the beauties of the Christian religion, and its truth. The popularity of his novel suggested to him that he had succeeded. *The Lord of the Rings* would end up the most widely read work of fiction of the twentieth century, and Tolkien its most widely read Christian author..."⁷⁰

The works of Tolkien and Lewis remain very popular to this day, with successful film adaptations of their works. Lewis in particular remains a powerful force for conservatism in contemporary western theology, with a huge fan club especially in the United States.⁷¹ Just as Lewis's intellect was, as he affirmed, "baptised" by the pre-war Catholic lay theologian G.K. Chesterton, so his resort to fictional writing in order to convey his Christianity followed the example of Chesterton's "Father Brown" stories.

⁶⁹ T.S. Eliot, *Thoughts after Lambeth*.

⁷⁰ Holland, *Dominion*, London: Abacus, 2019, p. 470.

⁷¹ Leanne Payne, *Real Presence*, Wheaton, Ill.: Baker Books, 1995.

Bradley J. Birzer writes: "Clyde Kilby, an English professor from Wheaton College, worked with Tolkien in the summer of 1966, helping him to organize the manuscript for *The Silmarillion*. 'Tolkien was an Old Western Man who was staggered at the present direction of civilization,' Kilby recorded after a summer of conversations with Tolkien. 'Even our much vaunted talk of equality he felt debased by our attempts to "mechanize and formalize it."' Tolkien wrote that the saints living in the modern world were those 'who have for all their imperfections never finally bowed head and will to the world or the evil spirit (in modern but not universal terms: mechanism, "scientific" materialism, Socialism in either of its factions now at war).'...

"Like many Englishmen, [Tolkien] feared a world divided in two, in which the smaller peoples would be swallowed. Only fifteen years earlier, in reaction to the Teheran Conference, Tolkien had written: 'I heard of that bloodthirsty old murderer Josef Stalin inviting all nations to join a happy family of folks devoted to the abolition of tyranny and intolerance!' One would be blind to miss Tolkien's disgust. 'I wonder (if we survive this war) if there will be any niche, even of sufferance, left for reactionary back numbers like me (and you). The bigger things get the smaller and duller or flatter the globe gets. It is getting to be one blasted little provincial suburb.' Soon, he feared, America would spread its 'sanitation, morale-pep, feminism, and mass production' throughout the world. Neither 'ism' - corporate consumer capitalism or communism, both radical forms of materialism - seemed particularly attractive to Tolkien, a man who loved England (but not Great Britain!) and who loved monarchy according to medieval conventions, while hating statism in any form.

"In his politics, Tolkien greatly resembled his closest friend and fellow member of the Inklings (the famous Oxford literary group), C.S. Lewis. During England's darkest days of World War II, hope emerged from an unlikely source. An Oxford don - a professor of English literature, who would later be best known for a seven-part children's fantasy series - gave frequent public addresses to the English people. Their purpose was to bolster English spirits. In late February, 1943, he devoted three of his addresses to a philosophical rather than a theological question. These relatively heady lectures were entitled: 'Men without Chests,' 'The Way,' and 'The Abolition of Man.' In each, C.S. Lewis addressed the nature and the future of character in England. Rather than spending his address on buoying the optimism of the English during the war against the German National Socialists, Lewis decided to ask what the English were really fighting for. Freedom from Nazi brutality was good, of course, but not, he argued, if it merely led to the victory of the 'conditioners,' the democratic bureaucrats on the loose in England who served as an internal threat. The conditioners claimed to be liberating individuals from arbitrary restraints imposed by 'religious sanction, and inherited taboos, in order that "real" and "basic" values may emerge.' In other words, the conditioners needed to destroy history and faith, which they claimed as artificial shackles on the true, unadulterated self. Such debasement of tradition, Lewis argued, can only lead to the creation of man-made (and consequently, man-centered)

philosophies, ignoring the Natural Law. But, the Natural Law, Lewis cautioned, 'is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected.' Anything created outside of the Natural Law will simply be mere 'ideologies,' that is, finite systems created by finite minds, shadows of shadows of a complex and nuanced world. 'The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in,' Lewis concluded.

"Two years later, Lewis published his ideas on character, virtue, and the Natural Law in novel form, That Hideous Strength, part three of his renowned space trilogy. Published two years before Orwell's similar anti-totalitarian masterpiece, Lewis's novel is a theistic 1984. The story revolves around a group of academic and bureaucratic conditioners - known as the N.I.C.E. (National Institute for Coordinated Experiments), who take over a small but elite English college as a prelude to a takeover of Britain. To stop 'That Hideous Strength,' a new King Arthur emerges in the form of a philology professor, Dr. Ransom. With the aid of small group of friends, he awakens Merlin from a fifteencentury long sleep. Modernity perplexes Merlin. In a telling conversation, Merlin states: 'This is a cold age in which I have awaked. If all this West part of the world is apostate, might it not be lawful, in our great need, to look farther... beyond Christendom? Should we not find some even among the heathen who are not wholly corrupt? There were tales in my day of some such men who knew not the articles of the most holy Faith, but who worshipped God as they could and acknowledged the Law of Nature. Sir, I believe it would be lawful to see help even there. Beyond Byzantium.'

"Ransom responds: 'The poison was brewed in these West lands but it has spat itself everywhere by now. However far you went you would find the machines, the crowded cities, the empty thrones, the false writings, the barren books: men maddened with false promises and soured with true miseries, worshiping the iron works of their own hands, cut off from Earth their mother and from the Father in Heaven. You might go East so far that East becomes West and you returned to Britain across the great ocean, but even so you would not have come out anywhere into the light. The shadow of one dark wing is over all.'

"Lewis was virulently anti-Nazi and anti-communist, and, like Tolkien, he also knew that democracy has its own risks. The West has bred all three political/economic systems. As an ideology, man-made and man-centered, bureaucratic democracy may appear as a brightly-colored package, more pleasing to the eye than the grittiness of socialism, but it too desires to make man a means to an end, to make him a mere cog in a machine..."⁷²

⁷² Birzer, "How Did Lewis and Tolkien Defend the Old West?", *The Intelligent Conservative*, July, 2015, http://www.theimaginativeconservative.org/2015/07/how-did-lewis-and-tolkien-defend-the-old-west.html.

In spite of his being a democrat, Lewis was very perceptive about the evil uses to which the word "democracy" could be put. Thus his Screwtape (an imaginative incarnation of the devil) writes: "*Democracy* is the word with which you must lead them by the nose. The good work which our philological experts have already done in the corruption of human language makes it unnecessary to warn you that they should never be allowed to give this word a clear and definable meaning. They won't. It will never occur to them that *democracy* is properly the name of a political system, even a system of voting, and that this has the most remote and tenuous connection with what you are trying to sell them. Nor of course must they ever be allowed to raise Aristotle's question: whether 'democratic behaviour' means the behaviour that democracies like or the behaviour that will preserve a democracy. For if they did, it could hardly fail to occur to them that these need not be the same.

"You are to use the word purely as an incantation; if you like, purely for its selling power. It is a name they venerate. And of course it is connected with the political ideal that men should be equally treated. You then make a stealthy transition in their minds from this political ideal to a factual belief that all men *are* equal. Especially the man you are working on. As a result you can use the word *democracy* to sanction in his thought the most degrading (and also the most enjoyable) of all human feelings... The feeling I mean is of course that which prompts a man to say *I*'*m as good as you*. The first and most obvious advantage is that you thus induce him to enthrone at the centre of his life a good, solid, resounding lie.

"Now, this useful phenomenon is in itself by no means new. Under the name of Envy it has been known to the humans for thousands of years. But hitherto they always regarded it as the most odious, and also the most comical, of vices. Those who were aware of feeling it felt it with shame; those who were not gave it no quarter in others. The delightful novelty of the present situation is that you can sanction it - make it respectable and even laudable - by the incantatory use of the word *democracy*."⁷³

Lewis admits that "monarchy is the channel through which all the *vital* elements of citizenship - loyalty, the consecration of secular life, the hierarchical principle, splendour, ceremony, continuity - still trickle down to irrigate the dustbowl of modern economic Statecraft".⁷⁴ It is this old-fashioned attachment to monarchism and the hierarchical principle that continued to make England different from the Continent in the first two decades after the war. And even after that this cultural difference has continued to effect British politics as the prestige of the Royal Family, especially the Queen, greatly exceeds that of all elected politicians. What politician has ever received the accolade commonly accorded (whether justly or unjustly is not the point here): "She has never put a foot wrong...

⁷³ Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters*, pp. 190-191.

⁷⁴ Lewis, "Myth and Fact", in *God in the Dock: Essays on Theology*, edited by Walter Hopper, Fount Paperbacks, 1979.

Tolkien took a similar view: "I am not a 'democrat' if only because 'humility' and equality are spiritual principles corrupted by the attempt to mechanize and formalize them, with the result that we get not universal smallness and humility, but universal greatness and pride, till some Orc gets hold of a ring of power - and then we get and are getting slavery."⁷⁵

However, these traditionalist Western Christian critiques of contemporary civilization all suffered from a common defect: they failed to go back to the real source of European Christian civilization, the Orthodox so-called "Dark Ages", which ended with the Great Schism of 1054. This made their critiques insufficiently deep and radical, in spite of their undoubted insights.

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While Anglican writers such as Tolkien and Lewis in England, and Catholic ones like Maritain in France, represented a kind of retreating army of Christian soldier-writers, in the second half of the century the western democracies found themselves in the vanguard of the antichristian revolution, enjoying hardly less success than the anti-democratic totalitarian regimes, albeit in less violent ways.

The critical transitional period began in 1953, when, on the one hand, the violent, masculine phase of the revolution passed its peak with Stalin's death, and on the other hand the seductive, feminine phase began with the discovery of the contraceptive pill... 1953 was also the year of the discovery of DNA. Theoretically, this made possible the abolition of disease and old age, even the changing of human nature itself through manipulation of the human genome. Thus the Nihilist dreams of Nechayev and Nietzsche, which became nightmarish reality in the era of Stalin and Hitler, have given way to more peaceful visions of life without God (at least in any form recognizable to traditional monotheism). Thus our ideals now are not salvation or the Kingdom of heaven but education and clean water, human rights and robots (including, human rights for robots!⁷⁶), cloning and gene therapy.

The aim of this continuation of the revolution by non-violent means – its "positive", "creative" phase, as opposed to its "negative", "destructive" phase up to 1945 – is the same as before: to reconcile a renewed mankind to a completely this-worldly faith and hope. The first, violent, nihilist phase of the revolution was necessary in order to root out the old, other-worldly faith. In Lenin's famous phrase, "you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs." But now mankind can proceed to a new age of universal prosperity and happiness from which all sorrow and pain will have fled away and in which, consequently, the "opium" of traditional religion will no longer be necessary, being replaced by more this-worldly (but still "spiritual") opiates...

⁷⁵ The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien.

⁷⁶ Tom Utley, "Human Rights for Robots?", Daily Mail, June 24, 2016, p. 16.

These opiates are substances that raise the mood, such as serotonin. As Yuval Noah Harari writes: "Today, when we finally realize that the keys to happiness are in the hands of our biochemical system, we can stop wasting our time on politics and social reforms, putsches and ideologies, and focus instead on the only thing that can make us truly happy: manipulating our biochemistry. If we invest billions in understanding our brain chemistry and developing appropriate treatments, we can make people far happier than ever before, without any need of revolutions. Prozac, for example, does not change regimes, but by raising serotonin levels it lifts people out of their depression.

"Nothing captures the biological argument better than the famous New Age slogan: 'Happiness begins within.' Money, social status, plastic surgery, beautiful houses, powerful positions – none of these will bring you happiness. Lasting happiness comes only from serotonin, dopamine and oxyrocin.

"In Aldous Huxley's dystopian novel *Brave New World*, published in 1932 at the height of the Great Depression, happiness is the supreme value and psychiatric drugs replace the police and the ballot as the foundation of politics. Every day, each person takes a dose of 'soma', a synthetic drug which makes people happy without harming their productivity and efficiency. The World State that governs the entire globe is never threatened by wars, revolutions, strikes or demonstrations, because all people are supremely content with their current conditions, whatever they may be. Huxley's vision of the future is far more troubling than George Orwell's *1984*. Huxley's world seems monstrous to most readers, but it is hard to explain why. Everybody is happy all the time – what could be wrong with that?"⁷⁷

In October, 1949 Aldous Huxley, prophet of the "positive" phase of the revolution, wrote to his former pupil George Orwell, denouncer of the "negative" phase, after the publication of 1984: "It was very kind of you to tell your publishers to send me a copy of your book. It arrived as I was in the midst of a piece of work that required much reading and consulting of references; and since poor sight makes it necessary for me to ration my reading, I had to wait a long time before being able to embark on 1984.

"Agreeing with all that the critics have written of it, I need not tell you, yet once more, how fine and how profoundly important the book is. May I speak instead of the thing with which the book deals — the ultimate revolution? The first hints of a philosophy of the ultimate revolution — the revolution which lies beyond politics and economics, and which aims at total subversion of the individual's psychology and physiology — are to be found in the Marquis de Sade, who regarded himself as the continuator, the consummator, of Robespierre and Babeuf. The philosophy of the ruling minority in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is a sadism which has been carried to its logical conclusion by going beyond sex and denying it. Whether in actual fact the policy of the boot-on-the-

⁷⁷ Harari, Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind, London: Vintage, 2014, p. 456.

face can go on indefinitely seems doubtful. My own belief is that the ruling oligarchy will find less arduous and wasteful ways of governing and of satisfying its lust for power, and these ways will resemble those which I described in *Brave New World*. I have had occasion recently to look into the history of animal magnetism and hypnotism, and have been greatly struck by the way in which, for a hundred and fifty years, the world has refused to take serious cognizance of the discoveries of Mesmer, Braid, Esdaile, and the rest.

"Partly because of the prevailing materialism and partly because of prevailing respectability, nineteenth-century philosophers and men of science were not willing to investigate the odder facts of psychology for practical men, such as politicians, soldiers and policemen, to apply in the field of government. Thanks to the voluntary ignorance of our fathers, the advent of the ultimate revolution was delayed for five or six generations. Another lucky accident was Freud's inability to hypnotize successfully and his consequent disparagement of hypnotism. This delayed the general application of hypnotism to psychiatry for at least forty years. But now psycho-analysis is being combined with hypnosis; and hypnosis has been made easy and indefinitely extensible through the use of barbiturates, which induce a hypnoid and suggestible state in even the most recalcitrant subjects.

"Within the next generation I believe that the world's rulers will discover that infant conditioning and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging and kicking them into obedience. In other words, I feel that the nightmare of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is destined to modulate into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to that which I imagined in *Brave New World*. The change will be brought about as a result of a felt need for increased efficiency. Meanwhile, of course, there may be a large scale biological and atomic war — in which case we shall have nightmares of other and scarcely imaginable kinds."⁷⁸

Günther Anders suggested how the devil might recommend going about the reconditioning of humanity: "Don't act violently. Hitler's kind of methods are outdated. Just create a collective conditioning so powerful that the very idea of revolt will not even come to the mind of men anymore.

"The ideal would be to format individuals from birth by limiting their innate biological skills. Secondly, conditioning would be continued by drastically reducing education, to bring it back to a form of professional integration. An uneducated individual has only a limited horizon of thought and the more his thought is restricted to poor concerns, the less he can revolt. Access to knowledge must be made more difficult and elitist. Let the gap widen between

⁷⁸ "Huxley to Orwell: My Hellish Vision of the Future is Better Than Yours (1949)", in *Literature, Philosophy, Politics*, March 17, 2015

the people and science, let information for the general public be anaesthetized with any subversive content.

"Especially no philosophy. Again, persuasion should be used not direct violence: entertainment will be broadcast massively, via television, always flattering the emotional or instinctive. We'll occupy the minds with what's futile and playful. It is good, in a chatter and unceasing music, to stop the mind from thinking. We'll put sexuality at the forefront of human interests. Like social tranquilizer, there's nothing better.

"Generally, it will be done to ban the seriousness of existence, to deride everything that is of high value, to maintain a constant apology of lightness, so that the euphoria of advertising becomes the standard of human happiness and the model of freedom. Conditioning will thus result in such an integration itself, that the only fear - which must be maintained - will be that of being excluded from the system and therefore of not being able to access the conditions necessary for happiness.

"The mass man, thus produced, must be treated as he is: a calf, and he must be monitored as a herd should be. Anything that puts his clarity to sleep is socially good, what would threaten to awaken him must be ridiculed, suffocated, fought. Any doctrine involving the system must first be designated subversive and terrorist and those supporting it should then be treated as such."⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Anders, " The Obsolescence of Man ", 1956.

7. BRITISH ARISTOCRATIC SOCIALISM

Britain was only country that had fought Hitler for the whole six years of the Second World War. Therefore she had something to celebrate about on emerging from under its rubble, in spite of her battered and impoverished condition. Perhaps the best expression of that was a supremely virtuosic and sophisticated but beautiful piece of music by Benjamin Britten, *A Young Person's Guide to the Orchestra* (1945-46), which at the same time expressed a childlike confidence in the future that everything else around seemed to belie.

In Britain, more than any other European nation, the old ways and institutions remained, if not completely intact, at any rate fundamentally unchanged. Thus "the patrician lifestyle of the pre-war years had largely vanished. But there was little loss of status, while in England and Wales a mere 1 per cent of the adult population still owned half of the total capital buildings in 1946-7."⁸⁰

But the old faith, Christianity, was virtually dead, having expired some years, or even centuries, before. The Anglican church retained its privileged position as the state religion, but its servants, in films and novels, were figures of (affectionate) fun rather than inspiration. George Orwell wrote in 1941 that "the common people of England are without definite religious belief, and have been so for centuries... And yet they have retained a deep tinge of Christian feeling, while almost forgetting the name of Christ."⁸¹ This residual Christian feeling made post-war Britain a land of nostalgia, full of memories and monuments of the past which Britons tried to conserve with reverence, but not without awareness that they no longer believed as their ancestors believed.

The two things that made Britons feel that, perhaps, their former greatness had not completely evaporated were the monarchy and the empire. We shall study the collapse of the empire, from the independence of India in 1947 onwards, in later chapters.

As for the monarchy, on June 2, 1953 Queen Elizabeth II was crowned in a ceremony that marked a strange but endearing leftover of the age of imperialism. Rich in pageantry and nostalgia, it was almost the last splash of monarchical splendour in a world grown richer in a material sense, but poorer and drabber in almost every other way. "Complete with archbishop, sacred oil, orbs and sceptres, it was an extraordinary spectacle, watched by tens of millions on the relatively new black-and-white television sets. A film-maker of genius, Lindsay Anderson, remarked, later on, that the monarchy was a gold filling in a mouthful of rotten teeth. That fitted the England that emerged, a generation after the coronation. However, the early fifties were a good time. Western Europe was not yet quite competitive, British exports did well, and there were good markets in the old imperial area. Decolonization during the 1950s had been, at least in

⁸⁰ Ian Kershaw, To Hell and Back. Europe 1914-1949, London: Penguin, 2014, p. 423.

⁸¹ Orwell, in Scruton, *How to be a Conservative*, p. 180.

comparison with French experience, a success, and the new Queen became a considerable expert in it. At home, taxes on income were absurdly high, but there was no tax on fortunes made out of equities, and the banks were generous with overdrafts, charging a low rate of interest. The old England (and Scotland) had an Indian summer, and the great Victorian cities, with Glasgow in the lead, were still the great Victorian cities of industry and empire. But the later fifties showed that this could not last..."⁸²

As David Starkey and Katie Greening write: "Most of the great actors in the coronation ceremony – the peerage, the armed forces, the Church of England – are now pale shadows of themselves. Above all, we have lost the chief inspiration for the music of monarchy. Not, of course, the Queen, who happily is still with us. The difference is that today she is respected, rather than revered. The idea, alive and well in 1953, that monarchy has a sacred role and power, is gone..."⁸³

But this is too pessimistic: the idea of monarchy can never die completely; like the Kantian categories of substance, time and causality, monarchy, that is, sovereignty incarnate in one person, is an *a priori* concept of political life in all ages, even the age of the common man.⁸⁴ For, as President de Gaulle (of all people!) said to Queen Elizabeth when she asked him about her role in modern society: "In that station in which God called you, be who you are, Madam! That is to say, the person in relation to whom, by virtue of the principle of legitimacy, everything in your kingdom is ordered, in whom your people perceives its own nationhood, and by whose presence and dignity the national unity is upheld..."⁸⁵

On the same day as the coronation, a team of British and New Zealand and Nepalese mountaineers put a Union Jack on the world's highest mountain, Everest. The *Evening Standard* asked: "Is this achievement the product of an Empire that has seen its finest hour and can look forward only to increasing decrepitude and senility? Or is it an omen designed to show that with the Crowning of Elizabeth a new age begins?"

The Empire had indeed seen its finest hour, and we can see the coronation of 1953 as a fitting moment to look back on that old aristocratic world that was now about to vanish – probably for good. But "the new Elizabethan age", as many people saw the new reign to be (partly because of her own popularity as a conservative stabilizing influence) was not a complete fiction.

For, as A.N. Wilson writes, "Mysteriously, when all the other Continental countries, during the nineteenth century, abandoned the aristocratic principle of government, the British adapted it. Victorian society was enriched by commerce, industry, capitalism. But it always modelled itself on the old Whig agreement of 1689, that the country should be run by landed grandees. Those who enriched themselves, whether in professional or commercial life in the Victorian age, ended

⁸² Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2011, p. 309.

⁸³ Starkey and Greening, Music & Monarchy, London: BBC Books, 2013, p. 352.

⁸⁴ Copland's "Fanfare to the Common Man" inevitably sounds monarchical...

⁸⁵ De Gaulle, in Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 594.

up, very often, joining the peerage. Everything was determined by pedigree, adopted or otherwise.

"Such a bizarre phenomenon could hardly be expected to survive in the second half of the twentieth century, but strangely enough, in some respects, it did. Only in twenty-first century Britain did the hereditary peers cease to sit, as of right, in the second parliamentary chamber.

"In spite of the state socialism of Attlee's government, the House of Lords went on, the great bulk of land in Britain continued to be owned by the old landed classes, and the hereditary principle remained intact. Some people suppose that the hereditary principle is limited to the upper class. This is not true, as a visit to any part of Britain would have shown you in the years immediately after the Second World War. The local factory, unless one of the huge conglomerates such as ICI, would almost certainly be called Someone or Another and Sons. Most of the manufacturing base of Britain, until the growth of corporate and conglomerate firms in the 1960s, consisted of family businesses - the brewers, the bakers, the potters, the shoemakers were X and Sons. Most farms were handed down from father to son through the generations, and this continued well into the 1950s and beyond. Even professional firms - banks, law firms, accountants, publishers tended to be family-run, with one or another of the sons taking over the business when father grew too old or died. The vast majority of the clergy of the Church of England, until the 1950s, were sons of the clergy. Most doctors were doctors' children. The same was true of almost all the shops in any British high street. The hereditary principle was the basic structure of British life, and it was much more fundamental, or durable, than any political system or set of ideologies. It was, in short, what Francis Crick [one of the discoverers of DNA] called 'the secret of life'..."86

Britain's relationship with the United States was a complex one. By comparison with the enormously productive and dynamic economy of the New World, that of the Old Country was stagnant and under-performing, bogged down by debt and the restrictive practices of old-fashioned and overpowerful trade unions. While Britain felt old and decaying, America was still young and a land for the young; while Britain was prim, proper and introvert, America was brash and extravert; while Britain stood for tradition, America was the champion of modernity; while America was enormously powerful, Britain was weak and increasingly dependent on America to preserve what strength she still had. This inevitably created tensions between "Limeys" and "Yanks". And yet there was nothing like the intensity of anti-Americanism in Britain that there was in, for example, France. The British were grateful to the Americans for saving them in two world wars (which the French in general were not), and the commonly felt need to defend democracy against Communism around the globe kept the two nations close. For all their differences, America and Britain *did* have a special relationship, a relationship of complementarity between an old, fading but proud mother and a young, rebellious but powerful daughter. The two countries, so different in size and

⁸⁶ Wilson, After the Victorians, London: Hutchinson, 2005, p. 518.

power, but with a common ancestry in Anglo-Saxon culture, tradition and law, saw the world in a similar light and almost always stood together against the enemies of civilization, which they both perceived the Soviets to be.

Indeed, the historian Andrew Roberts has made a strong case for the thesis that it was essentially the unity of the English-speaking peoples – not only America and Britain, but also Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand (but not including Eire, still mired in hatred of Britain⁸⁷) – that saved civilization from the Soviet threat. Continental West Europe was still too weak in the early stages, and too ambiguous in its loyalties later on (cf. French Gaullism and German *Ostpolitik*). The very idea of a "third force" independent of both the Anglo-Saxon West and the Soviet East, which was especially the dream of the French, was a serious threat to the anti-Communist cause. And then the European Union with its leftist ideology came into being... But fortunately, NATO remained intact around its Anglo-Saxon core...

The only real threat to the unity of the English-speaking peoples was that one of them might turn socialist; and this is precisely what seemed to have happened when, in 1945, the British elected a socialist government by a landslide, expelling their war-leader, Winston Churchill, from office. The causes of this astonishing result were multiple: the memory, among the working classes, of the Depression of the 1930s and, before that, of the way in which they had been treated during the General Strike of 1926; the sympathy and admiration for the Soviets engendered by the wartime alliance; and the fact that the foundations for a socialist economy had been laid by the Beveridge Report of 1942 and had already been approved by the government at a time when the anti-socialist Churchill was occupied with military matters. This was fertile ground in which socialist ideas could spread and become rooted in an exhausted country that was forced to undergo continued rationing and poverty for several years after the war.

"When Attlee became prime minister in July 1945," writes Andrew Roberts, "between V-E Day and V-J Day, the greatest long-term threat to his country was that she would squander the opportunities she had won and thereby hamstring future generations of Britons. Over a quarter of her national wealth had been lost in the previous six years of war, so the vast sums of Marshall Aid that were being directed from America desperately needed to be spent rebuilding her industrial and transport infrastructure and making her economy competitive again. Instead of doing that, Attlee effectively wasted it on trying to build the utopian society which socialists in those heady days called 'the new Jerusalem'. Instead of copying Germany and investing Marshall Aid in the

⁸⁷ This attitude was by no means universal. Although Eire was officially neutral in the world war, many Irish had relatives in Britain and were not anti-British. Few were those who approved of Eire's Prime Minister, Eamon de Valera, sending formal condolences to Germany on Hitler's death in 1945 (Kershaw, op. cit., p. 387).

crucial tasks of rebuilding infrastructure and modernising industry – and Britain was the largest beneficiary of Marshall Aid in Europe, getting one-third more of it than Germany – Attlee instead spent much of it on the Welfare State...^{"88}

Britain's economy was also hampered by the costs of running an increasingly fractious empire. Large numbers of troops still needed to be kept in Palestine, for example, where containing the civil war between the Arabs and Jews was costly both in lives of British soldiers and in pounds sterling. Then there was the further costly decision to "go it alone" in building the British nuclear deterrent independently of the Americans. As the Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin put it: "We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs… We have got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it."

Britain's independent nuclear deterrent may have gained her some political advantages. But by the 1960s, crushed by the expense of it, Britain was again dependent on American nuclear armoury, having cut her own most promising defence projects and decided to buy America's Polaris missiles...

After the war, "Britain failed to cash in what might be seen as her 'peace dividend'. She was still spending ludicrously large amounts on defence, as much as 8% of her Gross National Product by 1950. In order to try to maintain the illusion of still being a Great Power on the scale of the other victors Russia and America, Attlee invested vast amounts in unnecessary status symbols such as a domestic civil aviation industry. Fourteen days after the Germans surrendered in May 1945, they had the Berlin bus system up and running again; that same day the London buses were on strike. The pusillanimity shown by the Attlee, Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and later Governments towards the trade unions until 1979 ensured that grossly restrictive industrial practices were preserved throughout the 1940s and into the long-term future, all to promote a myth of industrial consensus.

"Attlee constantly looked back to the problems of the Thirties – primarily unemployment – rather than trying to look forward to those of the Fifties and Sixties, such as falling productivity, widening trade gaps and declining competitiveness relative to Britain's economic rivals. Because 'full employment' had been such a shibboleth for William Beveridge and the other 'New Jerusalem' social reformers, especially Attlee, it was pursued as a goal regardless of the distortion it wreaked on other parts of the economy. Rigidity in the labour market, wage-induced inflation and tardiness in technological adaptation were the entirely predictable results.

"To add to the terrible problems that were loaded on to what Professor Correlli Barnett has described as 'a war-impoverished, obsolescent and secondrate industrial economy', Attlee introduced sweeping measures of nationalisation. Coal mines, railways, gas, electricity, civil aviation, road

⁸⁸ Roberts, op. cit., p. 396.

haulage, steel, cable and radio services, as well as the Bank of England, were taken into public ownership, ensuring that the management in these vital industries became almost completely inured to the danger that they might lose their jobs through inefficiency or incompetence.

"An inability to discern new markets was the first noticeable effect of nationalisation, but plenty of even worse ones followed. When nationalised industries turned into lame ducks, as almost all of them did over the following decades, they were subsidised by the taxpayer, often through the sale of longterm bonds. The last of these Attlee bonds was finally paid off by [British Chancellor] Gordon Brown in June 2002; the twenty-first century British taxpayer had thus been shouldering half a century later the debts blithely taken on by Attlee in his offer of a New Jerusalem.

"Of course as soon as the European economies could afford to, they also instituted comprehensive national health schemes, which have turned out to be in almost every case far superior to Britain's National Health Service. By then, however, they had established clear economic superiority. In 1950 under Attlee, Britain was investing only 9% of her GNP in industry and infrastructure, against Germany's 19%. Small wonder that once Germany had surged ahead, she was able to create a better health system that she could afford. By contrast Attlee had, in Barnett's words, built 'a lavish and expensive Welfare State in the aftermath of a ruinous war, on foreign tick, while paying huge defence costs on the back of an un-modernised industrial system.'^{"89}

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There was an upside to this depressing picture of British economic stagnation caused by its new socialist masters. The government, in keeping with British tradition, did not introduce fierce censorship; if industry was controlled, hearts and minds were not. Moreover, Britain remained a deeply conservative society, with the monarchy, the aristocracy, the army and the church still intact, if fraying at the edges. The elite still sent out officials to what remained of the empire and ruled "the natives" relatively well in general. And public morality, as captured in many films of the period, was still relatively strict. If the aristocratic ethos was satirized, it was done in an affectionate way, as in *Kind Hearts and Coronets* (1949). In some of them, such as *The Ladykillers* (1953) and *The Admirable Crichton* (1957), we see more than that: an argument for the ineradicability of the Hierarchical Principle from human society. Only in the 1960s, as in Joseph Losey's *The Servant* (1963), do we see some venom introduced into a critique of Britain's class structure...

In 1951 Churchill and the Conservatives returned to office. But there was no dismantling of the Welfare State, nor any major change in foreign policy. Official anti-Sovietism was here to stay. But so was a generally more leftist tendency in government and academe. And the Soviets created British spy

⁸⁹ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 398, 400-401.

rings – notably, Philby, Burgess and Maclean – out of the very elite of British society. The six-year spell of Socialism (1945-1951), building on the disillusion with Capitalism that was so common among European intellectuals in the 1930s, had sown the seeds that would eventually, in the 60s and 70s, when the Socialists returned to power, undermine and completely overturn this venerable time capsule, this Indian summer of British imperial civilization. But in the meantime, Britain was an exceptionally pleasant place to live in – if you had the money. And even if you did not, there many, many worse places in which to live. The secret was that in spite of its socialist government, Britain was a place in which there was very little rebelliousness, the people were patient in the face of continuing austerity, and deference was generally paid to age and rank.

<u>8. THE FALL OF THE BRITISH RAJ</u>

The British had had "a good war" relatively speaking; they had held on to, or recovered, all their colonies, and therefore were not inclined to relinquish them, whatever the Americans might want or say... But prestige, rather than profit, was the main motivation for holding on to colonies in the last phase of imperialism. "As many British statesmen had insisted throughout the nineteenth century, colonies were not a source of strength but of weakness. They were a luxury, maintained for prestige and paid for by diverting real resources. The concept of a colonial superpower was largely fraudulent. As a military and economic colossus, the British Empire was made of lath and plaster, paint and gilding..."⁹⁰

The British had many reasons, both selfish and altruistic, for holding on to at least some of the colonies for a few more decades. But they realized, earlier than the French, that on the whole it wasn't worth it, that the game was over...

"The end of British rule in India in 1947," writes John Darwin, "and the withdrawal two years later of Europe's navies from China marked the end of the 'Vasco da Gama' epoch in Asian history. The age of European dominance was over..."⁹¹

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The end of British rule in India marks probably the largest-scale act of decolonization in history, just as its maintenance for so long could be construed as the largest con-trick in history... For "throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries," writes Yuval Noah Harari, "fewer than 5,000 British officials, about 40,000-70,000 soldiers, and perhaps another 100,000 British business people, hangers-on, wives and children were sufficient to conquer and rule up to 300 million Indians."⁹² Such an enormous disparity between the numbers of the rulers and the ruled could not last forever, and the more perceptive on both sides understood this. Immediately a real movement for Indian independence arose, the British Raj was doomed.

Although the prestige of the British Empire had been severely damaged by the surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942, not only did India remain in the empire during the war: Indian soldiers had fought well, and in large numbers, on the British side on several fronts. Nevertheless, there had also been serious rebellions in India in favour of the Japanese in the hope that they would drive out the British. This had been the background to what Robert Tombs calls the Japanese army's greatest defeat in its history in 1944 at Imphal on the Burmese-Indian border "at the hands of General William Slim's Indian,

⁹⁰ Paul Johnson, *Modern Times*, New York: Harper Perennial, 1990, p. 161.

⁹¹ Darwin, After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 443.

⁹² Harari, *Homo Deus*, London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 335-336.

British and African Fourteenth Army. The Japanese had attacked to pre-empt a British offensive, and to commit their 'Indian National Army' in the hope of starting a revolt in India. Some Indian prisoners of war had been induced by the Japanese and Germans to form pro-Axis army units, usually with the promise of Indian independence, but most soon realized these promises were hollow. The Japanese failure at Imphal eventually became a rout, in which they lost 60,000 men – two-thirds of their total force – and all their heavy weapons."⁹³ This outstanding but largely forgotten victory, which was followed by the recapture of Burma and the expulsion of the Japanese from South-East Asia, may be called the last hurrah of the British empire, and largely wiped out the shame of the surrender of Singapore...

However, the movement towards Indian independence did not expire, and this fact, combined with financial and military considerations, convinced the British that it was time to leave – and quickly. Thus on September 1, 1945, Prime Minister Clement Attlee said: "Quite apart from the advent of the atomic bomb... the British Commonwealth and Empire is not a unit that can be defended by itself. It was the creation of sea power. With the advent of air warfare the conditions which made it possible to defend a string of possessions scattered over five continents by means of a Fleet based on island fortresses have gone..."⁹⁴

As late as the 1930s, it was assumed that the whole of British India would become a single sovereign state. (About a third of India was never under British rule, consisting of 560 princely states with their own internal laws.) All three of the Indian leaders, - Nehru and Gandhi (Congress Party) and Jinnah (Muslim League), - were British-trained lawyers, but that did not mean that they saw eye-to-eye. Nehru and Gandhi did not get on with Jinnah, and after an electoral defeat in 1937 Jinnah began to move from a policy of agitating for Muslim rights within a united state to the creation of a separate state for Muslims. Gradually this view became more popular, and Jinnah's promise to help the British in the incipient Cold War tipped the scale in favour of partition.

Nevertheless, there were still hopes that India might not have to be divided. "In 1946," writes Michael Wood, "Attlee's Labour government, through Viceroy Wavell, proposed a plan that might have delivered a united federal India. But it was not accepted by the majority Congress party under Nehru, fatefully pushing the Muslim League towards a separate country for Muslims. Wavell was removed and, in 1947, Mountbatten was sent to get Britain out of India as fast as possible, by summer 1948. Shocked by the complexity of the problem, and by growing Hindu-Muslim riots, Mountbatten took the fateful step of shifting the date forward to August, 1947, having failed to get Nehru and Jinnah to agree…"⁹⁵

⁹³ Tombs, *The English and their History*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, p. 747. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Slim,_1st_Viscount_Slim

⁹⁴ Attlee, in M.J. Cohen and John Major, *History in Quotations*, London: Cassell, 2004, p. 861.

⁹⁵ Wood, "'It is all too easy to latch onto a comforting view of terrible events'", *BBC History Magazine*, May, 2017, p. 21.

And so on August 15, 1947 the largest democracy in history came into being in India, while two large Muslim chunks of the British dominion became another new independent state - Pakistan.

But in spite of partition and an exchange of populations, there was bloodshed between Hindus and Muslims on a large scale.⁹⁶ "At least 300,000 died," writes Anatol Lieven. "Many of these deaths could have been avoided if the exchange had been properly supervised. Congress and the Muslim League promised that the rights of minorities would be respected after partition. But the violence was largely an upsurge of hatred and fear from below, by populations maddened by years of propaganda.

"The division of India and Pakistan has proved an enduring wound for the subcontinent, burdening it with hatred, wars and grotesque levels of military spending. All the same, it is hard to imagine that a united India would have been a better prospect. Would a constitutional compromise have lasted? The minimum demand of even moderate Muslims was for a loose federation and for some form of permanent guaranteed power-sharing at the centre. This would have led to a desperately weak and unstable state. Under the pressure of Islamist radicalism, Muslim population growth and Hindu nationalism, such a state would very probably have disintegrated. Such a disintegration would have been more chaotic, and perhaps even bloodier than the events of 1947. It might have led to the separation of still more states from India, and the descent of the region to west African levels of disorder and poverty. As it is, India has remained a rather successful constitutional federation, while its Muslim minority, although distrusted and sometimes attacked, is too small to provoke an overwhelming wave of Hindu fear and anger."⁹⁷

The three main leaders in the drama – the secular Nehru, the Muslim Jinnah and the Hindu Gandhi – had all, as Henry Kissinger points out, "studied in British schools (including at the London School of Economics, where India's future leaders absorbed many of their quasi-socialist ideas)"⁹⁸, and knew well the liberal values of the Empire they jointly overthrew. But their joint failure to obtain a peaceful transfer of power, or to preserve British India as a single state, demonstrated the limitations of those liberal values when faith or national sovereignty are felt to be at stake.

For, as Dominic Lieven perceptively writes, "a characteristic failure of the liberal mind (including most of the western left and the great majority of Americans)... clings to a basically optimistic view of human nature. Such a habit of mind finds it hard to grasp that certain nationalities really are implacably at odds over the control of ethnically-mixed territory. Instead, the

⁹⁶ This terrible story with all its contradictions is excellently told in the film *Viceroy's House* (2017).

⁹⁷ Lieven, "Divide and Survive", Prospect, May, 1999, p. 27.

⁹⁸ Kissinger, *World Order*, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 201. Similarly, many revolutionary leaders, such as Ho, acquired their revolutionary faith at the Sorbonne in Paris.

automatic belief is that the innocent masses have been led astray by evil individuals... - or for the left, by evil ruling classes. These in turn are not motivated by emotions of nationalism, pride or hate, but by 'rational' ones of the defence of their political or economic privileges."⁹⁹ For there is more to international relations than politics or economics; man does not live by bread alone, and he will not fight for bread alone, but also for pride, for revenge, for the "pure" desire to kill one's enemy.

"It had been Churchill's great fear, his principal reason for resisting rapid independence, that the lower castes would be its principal victims, just as the higher castes (especially Brahmins like the Nehrus) were its undoubted beneficiaries."¹⁰⁰

Again, "Churchill had warned of [bloodshed] in the 1930s and wanted Britain to retain sufficient powers to be able to influence moderation, and protect those who were the victims of the conflict. The Partition Council had worked to devise a geographic line that could be accepted by both Hindus and Muslims. In the weeks before independence, as it became clear that the Sikhs of Amritsar – their Holy City – would be coming under either Hindu or Muslim rule, there were violent clashes...

"The award of the Partition Council was announced two days after independence. With regard to the disputed cities on the margin of the Hindu-Muslim partition lines, India would receive Calcutta and Amritsar, and Pakistan would receive Lahore, as well as most of the area between the River Sutlej and the River Chenab. The two-day-old Government of Pakistan at once protested at what it claimed was the 'injustice' of the awards, under which, from the perspective of Pakistan, too large an area of the Punjab had been handed to India. The Sikhs, who remembered that they had been the rulers of the Punjab when the British took over, felt cheated of their own religious and national control.

"The communal violence which had begun in the weeks before independence, escalated. When Calcutta descended into bloodshed, Gandhi – who held no official position in the new Government of India – announced that he would fast 'to the death' unless the killings ceased. After three days the violence subsided. But in the Punjab it not only spread, but created a massive exodus of Hindus and Muslims moving in opposite directions, driven by fear. More than seven million people were on the move. Repeated butchery took place as they fled..."¹⁰¹

According to A.N. Wilson, "Much of the blame for the way that Partition was handled – its brusque haste, its insufficient policing, the genocidal carelessness with which the fine print and the borders were decided – must be

⁹⁹ Lieven, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁰⁰ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 572.

¹⁰¹ Lieven, op. cit., p. 23.

laid at the feet of [the last Viceroy of India] Louis Mountbatten. By his superficial haste, his sheer arrogance, his inattention to detail, and his unwillingness to provide the huge peace-keeping forces which could have protected migrant populations, Mountbatten was responsible for as many deaths as some of those who were hanged after the Nuremberg trials."¹⁰²

Gandhi's clever methods of non-violent protest had done much to drive the British out of India by embarrassing them in front of the whole world. But his philosophy of non-resistance to evil was naïve and ineffective in the face of real evil (he had advised the British to practice that philosophy in relation to Hitler!). And it failed utterly to bring peace to the souls of Indians now, when passions were running so high. And so he himself fell victim to the violence he so abhorred. "When an assassin tried to kill him with a bomb, Gandhi replied: 'This is not the way to save Hinduism. Hinduism can only be saved by my method.' But just as Tolstoy's reasonable Christianity had depended upon removing many of the faith's core elements - such as a belief in the miraculous, the Resurrection and so on - so for many Hindus, the Mahatma, with his wish to do away with the caste system and to pray with Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, was anathema. Figures such as Madan Lal and Nathuram Vinayak Godse, Hindu refugees from the Punjab, were incensed by Gandhi's willingness to have the Koran read at Hindu prayer meetings and by his urging upon the newly formed government of Nehru a policy of conciliation with the Pakistanis who had murdered or dispossessed so many of their co-religionists. Godse later testified: 'I sat brooding on the atrocities perpetrated on Hinduism and what is the appropriate response to Islam and its dark and deadly failure if left to face Islam outside and Gandhi inside.' Godse was facing up to a challenge which still haunts the world: what is the appropriate response to Islam in its militant and aggressive form? In common with many Western politicians today, he believed that Gandhi's policy of conciliation was essentially impossible. He said at his trial that he bore Gandhi no ill will. He took a small pistol, and waited for Gandhi to emerge, in the early morning of 30 January 1948, from his joint prayer meeting. He bowed to the Mahatma because he felt genuine reverence for a man who was visibly holy, and trying to do right. Then he fired. Gandhi's last word was Rama, one of the incarnations of the Hindu god Vishnu."103

The continuing existence of the caste system and the continuing worship of pagan gods – that is, demons – such as Vishnu and Shiva, remains a time-bomb placed at the foundations of the Indian state. Perhaps the biggest failure of the British in India was their failure to extirpate paganism. Instead through "apostles" such as the Beatles, Indian paganism, in new age and ecumenist form, has invaded and conquered their former conquerors culturally, just as the Greeks conquered their conquerors, Rome...

¹⁰² Wilson, After the Victorians, London: Hutchinson, 2005, p. 495.

¹⁰³ Wilson, op. cit., p. 498.

After Partition India emerged as a predominantly Hindu state with a stable democratic constitution owing much to its British inheritance. Thus "after independence Indians borrowed 250 articles from the Government of India Act (1935) for their new constitution, and chose to run their army, railways, press, broadcasting, judiciary and parliamentary system substantively on British lines. Prominent nationalist leaders extolled the virtues of British imperialism. Such sentiments affirming the apparent British 'genius for colonisation' do not marginalize the economic exploitation, racism and violence that resulted from British rule, but they do underline the need for a nuanced approach..."¹⁰⁴

Indeed, in an address at Oxford University in 2005, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized the continuity between the British Raj and modern India: "Our notions of the rule of law, of a Constitutional government, of a free press, of a professional civil service, of modern universities and research laboratories have all been fashioned in the crucible where an age-old civilization met the dominant Empire of the day... Our judiciary, our legal system, our bureaucracy and our police are all great institutions derived from British-Indian administration, and they have served our country exceedingly well. Of all the legacies of the Raj, none is more important than the English language and the modern school system. This is, of course, if you leave out cricket...The founding fathers of our Republic were also greatly influenced by the ideas associated with the age of enlightenment in Europe. Our Constitution remains a testimony to the enduring interplay between what is essentially Indian and what is very British in our intellectual heritage..."¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile, Pakistan, writes Tahir Kamran, "is the first of only two modern states [the other is Israel] to be created in the name of religion... At the end of the Second World War, with Europe's global empires collapsing, various new nation states emerged, founded on notions of territorial nationalism, language or ethnicity. Pakistan is, and remains, different because of the ideology that is its *raison d'être*: Islam and, to a lesser extent, the Urdu language. It is this difference that has made establishing a modern nation state difficult. As the historian of Pakistan, Ian Talbot, has written, the 70 years following Pakistan's creation have shown that 'language and religion, rather than providing a panacea for unity in a plural society, have opened a Pandora's box of conflicting identities.'

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"...Just as modern India does not mirror the vision of its founding inspiration, Gandhi", so "the Pakistan that emerged in 1949 was not foreseen by Jinnah".¹⁰⁶ Just a few weeks before partition, Jinnah had expressed the hope that "you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and

¹⁰⁴ Chandrika Kaul, BBC World Histories, N 3, April/May, 2017, p. 36.

¹⁰⁵ Singh, in Niall Ferguson, *Doom. The Politics of Catastrophe*, London: Allen Lane, 2021, p. 210. ¹⁰⁶ Kamran, "Pakistan: A Failed State?", *History Today*, September, 2017, pp. 26, 27.

Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State" of Pakistan. But it was not to be...

According to Daniel Goldhagen, the Pakistanis killed between 1 and 3 million people after partition.¹⁰⁷ Sectarian violence again broke out on a large scale in 1971, as East Pakistan felt increasingly oppressed by West Pakistan, from which it was separated by hundreds of miles of Indian territory. Pakistan's military government under General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan banned the Awami League, a Benghali Hindu nationalist party and oversaw a military crackdown, as Harold H. Saunders writes, "that involved the systematic massacre of some 200,000 defenseless citizens and sent more than six million Bengalis fleeing across the Indian border. Later in the year, India reacted by invading East Pakistan, winning a 13-day war that made East Pakistan's earlier declaration of independence as Bangladesh a reality." ¹⁰⁸

The common inheritance of Indians and Pakistanis in the English language and culture could soften their hostility to some extent. Thus during the 1971 war "the Indian Commander-in-Chief and the Pakistani commander in the east wing had been at the Sandhurst military academy together. The former sent the latter his ADC with a message: "My dear Abdullah, I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up to me and I'll look after you."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Goldhagen, Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, London: Abacus, 2009, p. 41,

 ¹⁰⁸ Saunders, "What Really Happened in Bangladesh", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2014, p. 36.
 ¹⁰⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 569.

9. THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The horrors of the Jewish Holocaust gave a great moral boost to the Zionist cause, and many thousands of survivors after the war decided to emigrate to what was shortly to become the Zionist state of Israel. "Between 1931 and 1945," writes Dominic Sandbrook, "the numbers of Jews in Palestine swelled to a staggering 608,000 people, accounting for about a third of the population."¹¹⁰ However, the British, who still controlled the Holy Land under a UN Mandate, and who had had extreme difficulties in preserving the peace between the Jews and the Arabs, were determined to stop this new exodus from Europe into the country. Illegal immigrants were prevented from landing, and were deported – usually to detention camps in Cyprus. The Zionists of course protested against this, and world opinion, appalled at the revelations of the Holocaust, was on the whole on their side.

But the problem went deeper than a simple refugee crisis. During the war, the British and Americans had agreed on a plan to give refuge to displaced Jews – some to their former countries of origin, and very many to prosperous countries around the globe. In August, 1945 America offered to take 100,000 Jews – an offer that was upped to 400,000 in 1947 in a bill put forward by Congressman William G. Stratton. But the Zionists would have none of it. To put displaced Jews anywhere other than Palestine would have endangered the plan of a Jewish state, for it would have eradicated the necessity for such a state. It also meant that there would be less money going from America to Israel – and the Jews there would have to live on remittances for the foreseeable future. So it could be argued that the real interests of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were sacrificed by Zionist Jews for the sake of the dream of a Zionist state.¹¹¹ Although they rejected the Americans' offer to allow them to emigrate en masse to America, the Zionist lobby in America was to prove crucial to the success of Zionism; for the Jews had let down deep roots in America.

"The first Jews to arrive in America," writes Andrew Roberts, had been "twenty-three refugees from Brazil, who stepped ashore at New Amsterdam [New York] in 1654. They were immediately distrusted by the colony's governor, Peter Stuyvesant, who suspected that they would live by 'their customary usury and deceitful trading with the Christians'. Yet by the time of the American Revolution, five Jewish communities were thriving in New York, Philadelphia, Rhode Island, Georgia and South Carolina.

"Large-scale Jewish immigration into America began in the 1820s from Germany and then continued from Eastern Europe through the rest of the nineteenth century... By the 1920s the community – based mainly on the cities of the east coast – was strong and thriving, contributing to almost every aspect of American life. *Fortverts* (later *Forward*), a Yiddish newspaper edited from New York's Lower East side, sold almost 200,000 copies daily...

¹¹⁰ Sandbrook, "A Century of Blood", Daily Mail, November 4, 2017, p. 19.

¹¹¹ Alfred M. Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection*, New York: Dodd, Mead & co., 1987, p. 57.

"Overall they thrived better in the English-speaking world than anywhere else before the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

"The twentieth-century Jewish contribution to finance, science the arts, academe, commerce and industry, literature, charity and politics in the English-speaking world has been astonishing, relative to their tiny numbers. Although they make up less than half of 1% of the world's population, between 1901 and 1950 Jews won 14% of all the Nobel Prizes awarded for Literature and Science, which increased to 29% between 1951 and 2000..."¹¹²

Doing so well in the West, it is not surprising that most Jews did not want to emigrate to Israel. However, the American Zionist lobby worked together with Zionist terrorism inside Palestine to undermine British resolve; and all Jews, whether Zionist or not, were pressurized to support the cause. Three future leaders of the Israeli state – David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir – at different times took up arms against the British in order to drive them out of their promised land and open the gates to unrestricted Jewish immigration. In July, 1946 Begin's Irgun blew up the King David hotel in Jerusalem, and Shamir's Stern Gang committed even worse atrocities against soldiers lying in their beds. The Zionist state of Israel would be brought into existence by Jewish terrorism against both British and Arabs...

Chaim Weitzmann and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, representing the mass of Palestinian Jewry, denounced the violence. But it worked... For, as the British Jewish historian Martin Gilbert writes, "the British will to rule had gone: Jewish terror and heightened national aspirations, and Arab determination not to allow a Jewish State to emerge, created a situation where the British Army could no longer maintain control. A severe economic crisis in Britain added to the determination of the government in London not to be saddled with a growing burden, involving extra troops, mounting expenditure, and the anger of the British public that the terrorists and the agitators were not being crushed or even curbed. If India and Burma could be given up, where Britain had been responsible for far greater numbers of people over a much longer period of time, and had been faced with problems on a much larger scale, then so could Palestine be given up. Attlee and his Cabinet decided to hand the problem to the United Nations.

"The British government in London had reached the end of its tether. Throughout [1947] there had been killings everywhere in Palestine which shocked both British and Jews... No more than 12,000 of the half million Jews in Palestine were believed to be members of the two terrorist organizations. But 100,000 British soldiers were employed searching for them. The Jewish Agency's own defence organization, the Hagana, also found itself in a series of

¹¹² Roberts, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples from 1900, London: Penguin, 2014, pp. 179-180.

confrontations with the British. For their part, British soldiers were frequently called upon to help Jews who were being attacked by Arabs..."

"In the end," writes Anita Shapira, "[British Foreign Secretary] Bevin despaired of finding a solution to the Palestine problem, and the British cabinet decided to return its Mandate to the United Nations (which had replaced the League of Nations). This change was announced in February 1947, and the UN set up a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to reexamine the question of Palestine. The committee visited Palestine in the summer of 1947 and witnessed some dramatic events, including the arrival of the illegal immigrant ship *Exodus* – whose passengers were deported back to Germany by the British... - and terror attacks by Jewish underground groups. UNSCOP recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, but the Arabs flatly rejected this recommendation and demanded the establishment of a majority state in Palestine.

"The UNSCOP recommendations were brought before the UN General Assembly at Lake Success, New York, where a two-thirds majority was needed for ratification." ¹¹³

The Zionists then put into motion "Operation Partition". Enormous pressure – not excluding bribes and threats – were put on UN member nations to vote "the right way". On November 29, after many delegates had been persuaded to change their votes, thirty-three nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet bloc, voted in favour of the plan. Thirteen nations were against, including all the Arab states and Greece, while Britain was among ten states that abstained...

The antisemitic Stalin's acceptance of the plan was surprising. His reason, writes Paul Johnson, "seems to have been that the creation of Israel, which he was advised would be a socialist state, would accelerate the decline of British influence in the Middle East... Thereafter the Soviet and American delegations worked closely together on the timetable of British withdrawal. Nor was this all. When Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948 and President Truman [propelled by his large Jewish constituency] immediately accorded it *de facto* recognition, Stalin went one better and, less than three days later, gave it recognition *de jure*. Perhaps most significant of all was the decision of the Czech government, on Stalin's instructions, to sell the new state arms. An entire airfield was assigned to the task of air-lifting weapons to Tel Aviv."¹¹⁴

In order to understand Stalin's decision, we should also remember the "dialectical" relationship between the two horns of the Jewish Antichrist, Israel and the Soviet Union, since their virtually simultaneous birth in November, 1917. The Bolshevik revolution was created mainly by atheist Jews who cared nothing for Jewish national aspirations. However, Zionist Jews came largely

¹¹³ Shapira, Israel. A History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2014, p. 92.

¹¹⁴ Johnson, *History of the Jews*, London: Phoenix, 1987, pp. 525, 526.

from the Soviet Union and shared its socialist ideals. Not that these East European Jews necessarily loved the Soviet Union – Begin was a survivor of the Gulag and the NKVD's torture chambers.¹¹⁵ But the spirit of hatred and revenge, which can exist with equal virulence in a nationalist or internationalist culture, was passed from the Pale of Settlement in the west to the Soviet Union in the north to the State of Israel in the south...

Although the vote at the UN had been passed in the Zionists' favour, the battle was not over. The Arabs indicated that they would invade the land immediately the Jewish state was proclaimed. Nor did Jewish terrorism stop. Thus in April, 1948 a joint Irgun-Stern operation massacred as many as 250 inhabitants of the Arab village of Deir Yassin. Begin crowed: "God, God, Thou hast chosen us for conquest."

Realizing that partition was unworkable, and would lead to war, as well as having many other consequences incompatible with the interests of the United States (the hostility of the oil-rich sheikhs, the intervention of the Soviet Union in the region), President Truman changed tack and spoke in favour of a temporary UN trusteeship in Palestine, while insisting that he was in favour of partition in the longer term. However, extreme pressure from Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist lobby, combined with worries that he could lose the Jewish vote at the November election, persuaded Truman to change tack again and recognize the Jewish state already on May 14. There was consternation at the United Nations, which was still working out the conditions for the internationalization of Jerusalem, and in the American foreign-policy establishment...

The injustice perpetrated by the partition is made clear in a few statistics. At the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 there had been 600,000 Arabs living in Palestine next to 80,000 Jews.¹¹⁶ Thirty years later, the proportional gap had narrowed but was still large: 1.3 million Arabs facing 650,000 Jews. As regards land, Israel received over 50% of Palestine under the partition as opposed to the 20% proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937. After the war of 1948, they would control 80% of Palestine. "Under the partition plan," writes Lilienthal, "56.4 percent of Palestine was given for a Zionist state to people who constituted 33 percent of the population and owned about 5.67 percent of the land... This is the 'original sin' which underlies the entire Palestinian conflict..."¹¹⁷

The Arabs invaded Israel immediately after her declaration of independence in May, 1948. Nine bloody months later, the Jews emerged victorious. "A truce, supervised by the United Nations, followed (during which a Zionist terrorist murdered the United Nations mediator). In 1949 the Israeli government moved to Jerusalem, a Jewish national capital again for the first time since the days of

¹¹⁵ Johnson, op. cit., p. 522.

¹¹⁶ J.M. Roberts, *History of the World*, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, p. 791.

¹¹⁷ Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 97.

imperial Rome. Half of the city [the old part] was still occupied by Jordanian forces, but this was almost the least of the problems left to the future. With American and Russian diplomatic support and American private money, Jewish energy and initiative had successfully established a new national state where no basis for one had existed twenty-five years before. Yet the cost was to prove enormous. The disappointment and humiliation of the Arab states assured their continuing hostility to it and therefore opportunities for great power intervention in the future. Moreover, the action of Zionist extremists and the far from conciliatory behavior of Israeli forces in 1948-9 led to an exodus of Arab refugees. Soon there were 750,000 of them in camps in Egypt and Jordan, a huge social and economic problem, a burden on the world's conscience, and a potential military and diplomatic weapon for Arab nationalists...."¹¹⁸

There has been much controversy over these events. "Drawing on documents from newly opened Israeli archives, Benny Morris, Tom Segev, Avi Schlaim and others contested the version of tiny, vulnerable Israel creeping gingerly into existence in the wake of the Nazi catastrophe only to face multiple invasions by Arab armies followed by regular assault from terrorists, blockades, and full-scale military attack. Woven into this narrative was the claim that the Arab population of Israel in 1948 fled as a result of incitement by Arab powers or the consequence of fighting that it brought on itself by hostile actions. According to this established narrative, Israel was not responsible for the festering Arab 'refugee question', and could justifiably treat the remaining Israeli Arabs with caution.

"The 'new historians' demonstrated that although there was no coherent, top-down strategy to expel Arabs from the territory designated for the State of Israel by the UN partition plan in 1947, there was a consensus that it would be better for the new state of Israel if it had fewer Arab. Morris uncovered a plethora of local military actions that resulted in massacres or violent dispossession..."¹¹⁹

In retaliation for the expulsion of Arabs from Israel, many Jewish refugees were driven out from other Arab lands: between May, 1948 and the end of 1967 about 567,000 of them fled to Israel.

"Between February and July 1949," writes Peter Mansfield, "the new UN mediator, the American Ralph Bunche, succeeded in securing separate armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt and the Arab states (except Iraq, which nevertheless withdrew its troops). It was broadly agreed to fix a temporary frontier where the lines had been at the start of the negotiations, while certain border areas were demilitarized. Jerusalem was divided between the Arab east and Jewish west. The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian administration.

¹¹⁸ J.M. Roberts, op. cit., p. 793.

¹¹⁹ David Caesarani, "Coming to Terms with the Past: Israel", *History Today*, February, 2004, p. 18.

"No peace treaty was signed. In December 1948 the UN General Assembly appointed a three-member conciliation commission to promote a final settlement and to arrange an international regime for Jerusalem, but all its efforts were frustrated. The Arab states refused to consider a peace treaty unless the Israeli government agreed to accept all Arab refugees wishing to return to Israel. Resolutions demanding that the refugees should be given the option of return or compensation for their property were constantly reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly, and it was on this basis that Israel was admitted to the UN on 11 May 1949. But Israel maintained that the future of the refugees could be discussed only as part of a general settlement. Moreover, Talmudic law prohibited any surrender of land to non-Jews. Thus Israel Shahak expresses the opinion that many Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have failed simply because 'displaying the flag of a 'non-Jewish state' within the Land of Israel contradicts the sacred principle which states that all this land 'belongs' to the Jews'.¹²⁰

The impasse was complete. Half of the Palestinian Arabs had become refugees. Neither the new state of Israel nor its Arab neighbours could expect even a minimum of security and stability..."¹²¹

*

What kind of state was the new Zionist Israel? Formally speaking, it was, and is, a democracy, which in its Declaration of Independence states that "the state of Israel will devote itself to the development of the country for the benefit of all its people; It will be founded on the principles of freedom, justice and peace, guided by the visions of the prophets of Israel; It will grant full equal, social and political rights to all its citizens regardless of differences of religious faith, race or sex; It will ensure freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture." Moreover, the government undertook "to pursue peace and good relations with all neighbouring states and peoples".

In essence, however, Israel was – and is today - an apartheid nationalist mini-empire that treats its Arab citizens as second-class citizens, an "ethnocracy" with international tentacles and underpinned by the Talmudic Jewish faith...

That the Talmudic Law should be such a seemingly ineradicable part of Jewish identity is a result of its two-thousand-year history without a homeland or a state, but with a law. As Sir Lewis Namier writes: "To every man, as to Brutus, the native land is his life-giving Mother, and the State raised upon the land his law-giving Father; and the days cannot be long of a nation which fails to honour either. Only one nation has survived for two thousand years, though

¹²⁰ Shahak, "Jewish History, Jewish Religion, Political Consequences", <u>http://www.ptimes.com/current/articles.html</u>. (V.M.)

¹²¹ Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, London: Penguin, 2003, pp. 237-238.

an orphan – my own people, the Jews. But then in the God-given Law we have enshrined the authority of a State, and in the God-promised Land the idea of a Mother-country; through the centuries from Mount Sinai we have faced Eretz Israel, our land. Take away either, and we cease to be a nation; let both live again, and we shall be ourselves once more."¹²²

Being founded on the anti-Christian Talmud, Israel could not fail to be strongly anti-Christian. Jews who become Christians often have to hide their faith, while the numbers of Orthodox Christian Palestinians has dropped sharply. This is in accordance with the anti-Christian position taken by the Jews in many Gentile lands. As Bishop Nikolai Velimirovič (+1956) wrote: "In the course of centuries those who crucified the Messiah, the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, have turned Europe into the main battlefield against God, for the devil. Europe is presently the main battlefield of the Jew and his father, the devil, against the Heavenly Father and His Only-Begotten Son, Born of the Virgin, and against the Holy Ghost.

"[The Jews'] first need to become legally equal with Christians in order to repress Christianity next, turn Christians faithless, and step on their necks. All modern European slogans have been made up by Jews, the crucifiers of Christ: democracy, strikes, socialism, atheism, tolerance of all religions, pacifism, universal revolution, capitalism, and communism. These are all inventions made by Jews, namely, by their father, the devil. All this has been done with the intention to humiliate Christ, to obliterate Him, and to place their Jewish Messiah on the Christ's throne, without being aware even today that he is Satan himself, their father, who has reined them in with his reins, and who whips them with his whip."¹²³

This is not to deny the reality of anti-Semitism, only to point out that much of what is called "anti-semitism" is in fact the reaction of Christians – not least in Israel itself – to the "anti-Gentilism" of the Jews and the hostility of the Israeli state to Christianity.

"It bears remarking," writes the Israeli musician Daniel Barenboim, "that the Zionist idea that gave birth to the state of Israel arrived, paradoxically, at a similar analysis of the Jewish problem in Europe as that of the anti-Semitic movement: namely, that the Jews had always been a foreign body and would remain so unless they abandoned their Jewishness. Assimilation had failed and integration was unacceptable in both parties. Wagner wrote in his pamphlet *Das Judentum in der Musik* (Jewry in Music), that the Jews were incapable of writing German music but nevertheless had such a significant cultural influence as to be damaging to the development of true German music. His conclusion – namely, that the Jews must disappear, either by emigration or by complete assimilation into German culture – is not far from the conclusion reached by the early Zionists. For they saw the situation of the Jews in Europe

 ¹²² Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution*, London: Macmillan, 1930, 1963, p. 18.
 ¹²³ Velimirovič, *Addresses to the Serbian People – Through the Prison Window*, chapter LXXVII.

not only as a social or religious problem, but as a political one as well, and dedicated themselves to finding a political solution. If one extrapolates the dialectic thought process between the anti-Semites and the Zionists, one arrives at the creation of the state of Israel."¹²⁴

It is this tragic irony of the common Fascist essence of Zionism, as well as of anti-Semitism, that is the real cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Paul Johnson has distinguished between four kinds of Jews: observant, assimilationist, Zionist and Non-Jewish Jews (non-nationalist atheists, socialists and Bolsheviks like Trotsky).¹²⁵ We can leave aside the assimilationists and Non-Jewish Jews, for whom their Jewishness was a matter of indifference, or even, sometimes, shame. The real question was: in what way did observant, religious Jewry differ from Zionist Jewry?

The leaders of Zionism were almost without exception East European Jews who had imbibed the socialist ideas of the Russian revolutionaries. However, they mostly came from religious families, and their Zionism required the familiar Biblical narrative of the chosenness, exile and return of the Jewish people as a justification for their violent acquisition of the land and refusal to share it on an equal footing with its Arab inhabitants. Whether they really believed in the stories of Abraham, Moses and Joshua is irrelevant (their attitude to them was often imbued with modernist scepticism common to most contemporary Europeans): the fact is that they needed to proclaim them for purely political reasons, and were prepared to make considerable concessions to the rabbis, the leaders of religious Jewry, for that purpose.

We see this especially in the Law of Citizenship, in the determination, as Shlomo Sand writes, of "who would be included among the authorized proprietors of the Jewish state that was being 're-established' after two thousand years in 'Israel's exclusive land'? Would it be anyone who saw himself or herself as a Jew? Or any person who became a Jewish citizen? This complex issue would become one of the main pivots on which identity politics in Israel would revolve.

"To understand this development, we must go back to the eve of the Proclamation of Independence. In 1947 it had already been decided that Jews would not be able to marry non-Jews in the new state. The official reason for this civil segregation – in a society that was predominantly secular – was the unwillingness to create a secular-religious split. In the famous 'status quo' letter that David Ben-Gurion, as head of the Jewish Agency, co-signed with leaders of the religious bloc, he undertook, inter alia, to leave the laws of personal status in the new state in the hands of the rabbinate. For reasons of his own, he

¹²⁴ Barenboim, *Everything is Connected: The Power of Music*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008, pp. 105-106.

¹²⁵ Johnson, op. cit., p. 455.

also supported the religious camp's firm opposition to a written constitution. Ben-Gurion was an experienced politician, skilled at getting what he wanted.

"In 1953 the political promise to bar civil marriage in Israel was given a legal basis. The law defining the legal status of the rabbinical courts determined that they would exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel. By this means, the dominant socialist Zionism harnessed the principles of the traditional rabbinate as an alibi for its fearful imaginary that was terrified of assimilation and 'mixed marriage'.

"This was the first demonstration of the state's cynical exploitation of the Jewish religion to accomplish the aims of Zionism. Many scholars who have studied the relations between religion and state in Israel have described them as Jewish nationalism submitting helplessly to the pressures applied by a powerful rabbinical camp and its burdensome theocratic tradition. It is true there were tensions, misunderstandings and clashes between secular and religious sectors in the Zionist movement and later in the State of Israel. But a close examination reveals that nationalism needed the religious pressure, and often invited it in order to carry out its agenda. The late Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz was more perceptive than most when he described Israel as a secular state in religious cohabitation. Given the great difficulty of defining a secular Jewish identity, and the highly uncertain boundaries of this impossible entity, it had no choice but to submit to the rabbinical tradition...

"Just as Israel was unable to decide on its territorial borders, it did not manage to draw the boundaries of its national identity. From the start it hesitated to define the membership of the Jewish *ethnos*. To begin with, the state appeared to accept an open definition that a Jew was any person who saw himself or herself as a Jew. In the first census, held on November 8, 1948, residents were asked to fill out a questionnaire in which they stated their nationality and religion, and these were what served as the basis for civil registration. In this way the young state managed quietly to Judaize many spouses who were not Jews. In 1950, newborn children were registered on a separate page without reference to nationality and religion – but there were two such forms, one in Hebrew and one in Arabic, and whoever filled out a Hebrew form was assumed to be a Jew.

"Also in 1950, Israel's parliament – the Knesset – passed the Law of Return. This was the first basic law that gave legal force to what the Proclamation of Independence had declared. This law declared: 'Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an *aleh* (immigrant)' unless he '(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or (2) is likely to endanger public health or the authority of the State.' Then in 1952 came the law that granted automatic citizenship on the basis of the Law of Return.

"Beginning in the late 1940s, the world rightly viewed Israel as a refuge for the persecuted and the displaced. The systematic massacre of the Jews of Europe and the total destruction of the Yiddish-speaking people drew widespread public sympathy for the creation of a state that would be a safe haven for the remnant. In the 1950s, provoked by the Israeli-Arab conflict but also by the rise of authoritarian Arab nationalism, semireligious and not especially tolerant, hundreds of thousands of Arab Jews were driven from their homelands. Not all were able to reach Europe or Canada; some went to Israel, whether or not they wished to go there. The state was gratified and even sought to attract them (though it viewed with unease and contempt the diverse Arab cultures they brought with their scanty belongings). The law that granted the right of immigration to every Jewish refugee who was subject to persecution on account of faith or origin was quite legitimate in these circumstances. Even today such a law would not conflict with basic principles in any liberal democracy, when many of the citizens feel kinship and a common historical destiny with people close to them who suffer discrimination in other countries.

"Yet the Law of Return was not a statute designed to make Israel a safe have for those who were persecuted in the past, present or future because people hated them as Jews. Had the framers of this law wished to do so, they could have placed it on a platform of humanist principle, linking the privilege of asylum to the existence and threat of anti-Semitism. But the Law of Return and the associated Law of Citizenship were direct products of an ethnic nationalist worldview, designed to provide a legal basis for the concept that the State of Israel belongs to the Jews of the world. As Ben-Gurion declared at the start of the parliamentary debate on the Law of Return: 'This is not a Jewish state only because most of its inhabitants are Jews. It is a state for the Jews wherever they be, and for any Jew who wishes to be here.

"Anyone who was included in 'the Jewish people'... was a potential citizen of the Jewish state, and their right to settle there was guaranteed by the Law of Return. A members of the 'Jewish nation' might be a full citizen with equal rights in some liberal national democracy, might even be the holder of an elected position in it, but Zionist principle held that such a person was destined, or even obliged, to migrate to Israel and become its citizen. Moreover, immigrants could leave Israel immediately after arrival, yet keep their Israeli citizenship for the rest of their lives..."¹²⁶

This extraordinary inclusivity in definition was combined with an extraordinary exclusivity that excluded any Jew who embraced any other faith than Talmudism. Thus "in 1970, under pressure from the religious camp, the Law of Return was amended to include, finally, a full and exact definition of who is an authentic member of the people of Israel: 'A Jew is one who was born to a Jewish mother, or converted to Judaism and does not belong to another religion.' After twenty-two years of hesitation and questioning, the instrumental link between the rabbinical religion and the essentialist nationalism was now well and truly welded..."¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People*, London: Verso, 2010, pp. 283-284, 286-287, 288.

¹²⁷ Sand, op. cit., pp. 289-90.

The State of Israel does not appear to fit into any usual categorization of statehood. It is neither autocratic, nor despotic nor democratic in the ordinary senses of these words. It is both secular and religious at the same time, both potentially inclusive of all Jews throughout the world yet perversely exclusive of those who have the greatest right to live on its territory. It is nationalist, and yet its nationalism is not defined by territory or blood (much as many Jews would like to define it thus), but by religion. The only remotely similar states, paradoxically, are its fiercest enemies, Wahhabist Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran. And yet neither the Arab nor the Iranian states have any Law of Return, any truly comparable myth of exile and return and redemption...

For fuller understanding, therefore, it will be worth examining what this single apparent exception to the main development of human history can mean, from the only point of view that would seem capable of comprehending it - the religious-eschatological. A clue to our search may be found in the Abrahamic Covenant, in the relationship revealed at the very beginning of Jewish history between God and the sons of Abraham, Isaac and Ishmael. Isaac was the ancestor of the spiritual Israel, the Church of Christ, and Ishmael the ancestor of the carnal Israel, the people that fights God. Although the spiritual Israel is blessed, while the carnal Israel is accursed, still an important promise is given to the carnal Israel: that it will *live* in accordance with Abraham's petition: "Let this Ishmael live before Thee" (Genesis 17.18). This life cannot be spiritual, because that is promised only to the spiritual Israel. So it must be carnal – physical survival and worldly power. At the same time, St. Ambrose admits, Abraham's powerful petition could win spiritual life for some of the Jews - but only, of course, if they cease to belong to the carnal Israel and join the spiritual Israel through faith in Christ. For "it is the attribute of the righteous man [Abraham] to intercede even for sinners; therefore, let the Jews believe this too, because Abraham stands surety even for them, provided they will believe..."128

The promise of physical life has certainly been fulfilled in the extraordinary tenacity of the Jews, their survival in the face of huge obstacles to the present day, and - since their gradual emancipation from the ghetto in the nineteenth century, - their domination of world politics, business, art and science in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Moreover, since the carnal Israel is promised physical life and power, it is no wonder that since the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and especially since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, it has regained power over the land of Israel, driving out most of the Christians in the process, and may well recapture all the land from the Nile to the Euphrates, as was seemingly promised in the Abrahamic Covenant. But it is important to understand that such a re-conquest, if it takes place, will not be by virtue of the Jews being the *chosen* people, as they and their Evangelical allies believe, but by virtue of the exact opposite: of their being the *accursed* people –

¹²⁸ St. Ambrose, On Abraham, 88.

Ishmael rather than Isaac.¹²⁹ For of the two covenant peoples the people that is carnal is given physical gifts that are appropriate to its carnal desires.

For the truth may be, as an anonymous Russian writer has suggested, "that the very preservation up until now of the Jewish people is a result not of their being 'chosen', but as a result of their apostasy". For, having renounced their birth-right, the Kingdom of God, they have received a "mess of pottage" instead - the promise of physical survival and worldly power. "If the Jews, having repented of the crime committed on Golgotha, would have become Christian, then they would have made up the foundation of a new spiritual nation, the nation of Christians. Would they have begun to strive in this case to preserve their nationality and government? Would they not have dispersed among other nations as the missionaries of Christianity just as the Apostles? Would they not have been strangers in a foreign land, not having a fatherland, like unto Abraham, but in this case with a higher spiritual meaning? All this happened with the Jews, that is, they became wanderers, not in a positive spiritual sense, but due to a curse, that is, not of their own will, but due to the will of chastising Providence since they did not fulfil that which God intended for them. Would they not have been exterminated en masse during persecutions as the main preachers of Christianity? Would they not have been assimilated among other peoples, so that the very name 'Jew', 'Hebrew', as a national name, would have disappeared and would have only remained in the remembrance of grateful nations as the glorious name of their enlighteners? Yes, and the very Promised Land and Jerusalem were given to the Hebrews not as a worldly fatherland, for which they are now striving, but as a prefiguration of the Heavenly Kingdom and the Heavenly Jerusalem, as a token of which Abraham and through him all the Hebrew nation coming out of Haran, renounced their earthly fatherland. For this reason the very significance of Jerusalem and the idea as a prefigurement would have passed away for the Jews, as soon as the Kingdom of God and the Heavenly Jerusalem would have become obtainable for them and would have become for them, as they are now for us, Christian holy places."130

¹²⁹ So great have been the worldly successes of the Jews that many Evangelical Protestants have been tempted to ascribe them, not to God's promise to *Ishmael*, but to his promise to *Isaac*. Reversing the interpretation of the Apostle Paul, they have made of the carnal Israel "the chosen people", "the blessed seed" - and this in spite of the fact that this "chosen people" has been the foremost enemy of those who believe in Christ for the last two thousand years! By elevating the carnal Israel into the spiritual Israel, the Protestants fill up a major spiritual and emotional gap in their world-view; for, having rejected both the *concept* of the Church, and the *reality* of it in Orthodoxy, they have to find a substitute for it somewhere else. And so we have the paradoxical sight of the State of Israel, one of the main persecutors of Christianity in the contemporary world, which forbids conversions of Jews to Christianity and has driven out the majority of the Orthodox Christian population, being ardently supported by the Evangelical Protestants of the Anglo-Saxon countries. There have even been several attempts by Evangelicals to blow up the mosque of the Dome of the Rock, in order to make it possible for the Jews to build their Temple again – the Temple of the Antichrist!

¹³⁰ "How to understand the Jews as being a chosen people", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 41, no. 4, July-August, 1991, pp. 38-41.

Tragically, however, it was not to be: the Jews remain unconverted to this day. Even many Orthodox Jews believe that the foundation of the Zionist State of Israel was a grave sin. Religious parties such as Mizrachi and Agadah, were routinely accused of treachery when they entered into relations with the Zionist state.

"The Agudah viewpoint was set out as follows (10 October 1952): 'The world was created for the sake of Israel. It is the duty and merit of Israel to maintain and fulfil the Torah. The place where Israel is destined to live and, therefore, to maintain the Torah is Israel. This means that the *raison d'être* of the world is the establishment of the regime of the Torah in the land of Israel. The foundation of this ideal has been laid. There are now Jews living in the homeland and fulfilling the Torah. But completion has not yet been achieve, for all Israel does not yet live in its land and (not even) all Israel is yet fulfilling the Torah.' In short, Agudah pledged itself to us Zionism to complete the ingathering and transform the result into a theocracy.

"Just as Mizrachi's compromises produced Agudah's, to Agudah's in turn produced a rigorist group which called itself the Guardians of the City ('Neturei Karta'). This broke away from Agudah in 1935, opposed the foundation of the state root-and-branch, boycotted elections and all other state activities, and declared that it would rather Jerusalem were internationalized than run by Jewish apostates. The group was comparatively small and to the secular mind extreme. But the whole history of the Jews suggests that rigorous minorities tend to become triumphant majorities. Like Judaism itself, moreover, its members exhibited (granted their initial premise) strong logical consistency. The Jews were 'a people whose life is regulated by a supernatural divine order... not dependent on normal political, economic and material successes of failures.' The Jews were not 'a nation like any other nation', subject to the factors 'which cause all other nations to rise and fall'. Hence the creation of the Zionist state was not a Jewish re-entry into history, a Third Commonwealth, but the start of a new and far more dangerous Exile, since 'full licence has now been given to tempt through the success of the wicked'. They frequently quoted the statement of a group of Hungarian rabbis who, on their arrival at Auschwitz, acknowledged the justice of their punishment from God for their too feeble opposition to Zionism. The Zionist masqueraders, pretending to represent the people of Israel, were incinerating Jewish souls, whereas Hitler's ovens only burned their bodies and released their souls for eternal life. They deplored alike the Sinai and the Six Day Wars as calculated, by their glamorous success, to lure Jews to Zionism and so to eternal destruction. Moreover, such victories, being the work of Satan, would merely culminate in colossal defeat. The Guardians rejected the 'deliverance and protection' of Zionism, together with its wars and conquests. 'We do not approve or any hatred or hostility, and above all any fighting or war in any form against any people, nation or tongue, but the reverse. If, through our many sins, we are apparently joined in the destiny of these rebels [against God] Heaven forbid! All we can do is pray to the Holy One, blessed be Her, that He may release us from their destiny and deliver us.' The Guardians saw

themselves as a 'remnant' who 'refused to bow the knee to Baal' as in 'the time of Elijah', or to 'dine at Jezabel's table'. Zionism was 'a rebellion against the King of kings' and it was implied in their theology that the Jewish state would end in a catastrophe worse than the Holocaust."¹³¹

So must we conclude that the foundation of the State of Israel be necessarily evil – and its crowning glory the enthronement of the Antichrist?...

Before jumping to this conclusion, let us recall Alain Dieckhoff's interpretation of the thought of the nineteenth-century "Forerunners of Zion": "In Jewish tradition there was only one true remedy for sin: repentance (teshuva), i.e. explicit renunciation of evil and adoption of behaviour in accordance with the Law. The idea of inner repentance was so essential that it was supposed to have coexisted with the Law before the proclamation on Mount Sinai, and even to have existed before the creation of the world. This was above all of an individual nature in Talmudic literature, but took on a collective dimension from the sixteenth century, under the impetus of the Kabbala of Isaac Luria. After that the return to a life of holiness ensured not only the salvation of the individual soul, but also restored the original fullness of the world. Teshuva was no longer limited solely to the existential level, within the narrow confines of the individual; it also concerned the historic level of the national group, and beyond that the cosmic level of mankind. Alkalai went so far as to consider, differing from the classical idea, that collective repentance must necessarily precede individual repentance. There remained the final question: what did this general teshuva involve?

"It involved physical re-establishment of the Jews in the Land of Israel to recreate the national community. Playing on the double meaning of the word teshuva, which strictly means return, Kalischer stated that collective repentance meant a geographical return to Zion and not, at least not directly, a spiritual return. So Jews who returned to Palestine were not breaking the religious Law, since in the first instance their return was a purely material one. It was only later, when they were gathered in Zion, that by the grace of God the truly supernatural redemption would start, bringing with it the individual repentance of every Jew and union with God..."¹³²

In other words, *perhaps the return of the carnal Jews to their carnal homeland is a preparation, in God's plan, a springboard, as it were, for their return to the spiritual Israel, the Church of God, as St. Paul prophesied in <u>Romans</u> 9-11...*

¹³¹ Johnson, op. cit., pp. 549-550.

¹³² Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation*, London: Hurst and Company, 2003, pp. 16-19.

<u>10. ORTHODOXY AND THE WORLD COUNCIL OF</u> <u>CHURCHES (1)</u>

Emerging at the same time as, and as a religious complement to, the United Nations, was the World Council of Churches. The closeness, even identity of aims of these two international organizations, one secular and the other supposedly ecclesiastical, is demonstrated by the UNESCO Declaration on the Principles of Tolerance: "Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and our ways of being human." On which Frank Furedi comments: "UNESCO toleration becomes an expansive and diffuse sensibility that automatically accepts and offers unconditional appreciation of different views and cultures."¹³³

In August-September, 1948, in Amsterdam, two movements, "Faith and Order" and "Life and Work", were united into a new organization, the World Council of Churches, the ecclesiastical equivalent of the United Nations. Being the only Orthodox Church that had not participated in the council of Moscow that condemned ecumenism, Constantinople was the only Orthodox jurisdiction besides the Cypriot Church present at this essentially Protestant assembly.¹³⁴ Moscow was invited, but declined, seeing in the WCC a plot by the Vatican and the western imperialists. Metropolitan (and MGB agent) Nicholas of Krutitsa berated his ecclesiastical opponents, expressing the hope that the World Council of Churches would not count as representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church either those Russian Orthodox believers who were under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, or the Russian "schismatic" groups led by Metropolitan Theodosius in America and Metropolitan Anastasy in Munich, who had nothing in common with the true Russian Orthodox Church.¹³⁵ In view of this, it is not surprising that ROCOR, too, was not invited. She would in any case have declined because "we do not participate in the ecumenical movement".136 This decision was in line with a gradual disillusion by ROCOR with the ecumenical movement experienced in the inter-war years, culminating in the words of the Second All-Diaspora Council in 1938: "Resolutions of ecumenical conferences often suffer from vagueness, diffusiveness, reticence and a nuance of compromise..."137

¹³³ Furedi, *Tolerance*, London: Continuum, 2011.

¹³⁴ Fr. George Macris, *The Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement*, Seattle: St. Nectarios Press, 1986, pp. 12-14.

¹³⁵ "The Moscow Patriarchate and the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches", *The Ecumenical Review*, 12, Winter, 1949, pp. 188-189; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 133-134.

¹³⁶ Archive of the Hierarchical Synod, delo 5-48; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 133. This remark was made by the Synod of Bishops on February 21, 1948 in response to a request from Professor M.V. Zyzykin that they participate in the Amsterdam Congress (Andrew Psarev, "The Development of Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia's Attitude Toward Other Local Orthodox Churches", http://www.sobor2006.com/printerfriendly2.php?id=119_0_3_0, p. 6).

¹³⁷ Quoted in Ludmilla Perepiolkina, *Ecumenism – A Path to Perdition*, St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 13. Cf. Archimandrite Kiprian (Kern) in 1947: "The state of 'ecumenical' meetings today is deplorable, noisy gatherings of all manner of activists lacking in theological authority, who meet without any common language of tradition or criteria, or any single plan or program.

A.V. Soldatov has chronicled the progressive weakening in the Orthodox position: "At the conference [of Faith and Order] in Geneva in 1920 the spirit of extreme Protestant liberalism gained the upper hand. It came to the point that when the Orthodox Metropolitan Stephen of Sophia noted in his report: 'The Church is only there where the hierarchy has apostolic succession, and without such a hierarchy there are only religious communities', the majority of the delegates of the conference left the hall as a sign of protest. At the next conference on Faith and Order [in Lausanne] in 1927, victory again went to the extreme left Protestants. The Orthodox delegation, experiencing psychological pressure at this conference, was forced to issue the following declaration: 'in accordance with the views of the Orthodox Church, no compromises in relation to the teaching of the faith and religious convictions can be permitted. No Orthodox can hope that a reunion based on disputed formulae can be strong and positive... The Orthodox Church considers that any union must be based exclusively on the teaching of the faith and confession of the ancient undivided Church, on the seven Ecumenical Councils and other decisions of the first eight centuries.' But the numerous speeches of the Orthodox explaining the teaching of the Church on the unity of the Church seemed only to still further increase the incomprehension or unwillingness to comprehend them on the part of the Protestant leaders of Ecumenism. This tendency was consistently pursued by the Protestants at the conferences in 1937 in Oxford and Edinburgh. Summing up this 'dialogue' at the beginning of the century, Fr. Metrophanes Znosko-Borovsky remarks: 'The Orthodox delegates at Edinburgh were forced with sorrow to accept the existence of basic, irreconcilable differences in viewpoint on many subjects of faith between the Orthodox East and the Protestant West.'

"After the Second World War, the World Council of Churches was created. It is necessary to point out that the movements 'Faith and Order' and 'the Christian Council of Life and Work' were viewed by their organizers as preparatory stages in the seeking of possible modes of integration of 'the Christian world'. The World Council of Churches differed from them in principle. It set out on the path of 'practical Ecumenism' for the first time in world history, declaring that it was the embryo of a new type of universal church. The first, so to speak founding conference of the WCC in Amsterdam chose as its motto the words: 'Human disorder and God's house-building'. At it, as Archbishop Vitaly remarks, 'every effort was made to destroy the teaching on the One, True, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church'. The leading

Attendees are people who are totally diverse in every way, placed on the same level—a Greek metropolitan, a liberalizing professor with a priestly title or simply a layman, an amateur church publicist lacking any claim to theological training, young students from Anglican colleges, young girls from nameless and mysterious world organizations, and official reviewers from the Intelligence Service. And all of them traveling at someone's expense in sleeping cars and airplanes, staying in the best hotels, and announced by posters, brochures, speeches, meetings, etc. These meetings conclude with resolutions of some sort, premature recognitions of hierarchy and ordinations on the part of the Romanian Church or a liberalizing theologian from the Balkans—and all this in an atmosphere of international tension, a desire to guarantee one's own boundaries and hastily acquired territories, a lust for oil and markets, and so on and so on."

theological minds of the Protestant world made a series of reports at the Amsterdam conference, in which they focused with particular clarity the whole depth of the dogmatic and theological disintegration of the Protestant faith and, in particular, ecclesiology. The conclusion of the report of Gustav Aulen became the basic, single dogma of the organization being created: 'The Church is as it were a synthesis of all churches.' Another speaker, Clarence Craig, somewhat deepened the arguments of his colleague with the help of a suggested variant translation of the word 'catholic' (or 'conciliar' in the Slavonic translation of the Symbol of Faith) as 'integral'. But of particular interest for us was the speech at this conference of the Orthodox priest, noted theologian and Church historian [of the Ecumenical Patriarchate], Fr. Georges Florovsky. Having noted that 'the Bible, dogmatics, catechesis, Church discipline, Liturgy, preaching and sacrament have become museum exhibits', Fr. Georges concluded: 'the only salvation in the work of reviving the Church is in the ecumenical movement'. He affirmed that 'the Church has not yet defined herself, has not worked out her own theological school definition, does not have her own definition, has not yet recognized herself."

According to the rules agreed in Amsterdam, an applicant to the WCC must "recognize the essential interdependence of the churches, particularly those of the same confession, and must practise constructive ecumenical relations with other churches within its country or region. This will normally mean that the church is a member of the national council of churches or similar body and of the regional ecumenical organisation." (*Rules of the WCC*) And article I of the WCC Constitution reads: "The World Council of Churches is a *fellowship of churches* which confess the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour according to the scriptures (*sic*) and therefore seek to fulfil together their common calling to the glory of the one God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit."¹³⁸

The Constitution also declares that the primary purpose of the fellowship of churches in the World Council of Churches is to call one another to "visible unity in one faith and in one eucharistic fellowship, expressed in worship and common life in Christ, through witness and service to the world, and to advance towards that unity in order that the world may believe".

Further, according to Section II of the WCC Rules, entitled *Responsibilities of Membership*, "Membership in the World Council of Churches signifies faithfulness to the Basis of the Council, fellowship in the Council, participation in the life and work of the Council and commitment to the ecumenical movement as integral to the mission of the church."

Acceptance of these terms clearly entailed a Protestant ecclesiology that includes in the "Church" almost every conceivable variety of "Christian" belief. In fact, as time went on, the WCC became the home of almost every heresy and religion. In 1968, before inter-Christian ecumenism had graduated to inter-

¹³⁸ Soldatov, "Pravoslavie i Ekumenizm" (Orthodoxy and Ecumenism), *Mirianin* (Layman), July-August, 1992, p. 8.

religious ecumenism, the famous Serbian theologian and Archimandrite Justin Popovich counted 263 heresies confessed by the WCC!¹³⁹ Thus Amsterdam, the home of the WCC, earned its description by the English Catholic poet Andrew Marvell in his poem "The Character of Holland" (1653):

Hence Amsterdam, Turk-Christian-Pagan-Jew, Staple of Sects and Mint of Schism grew; That Bank of Conscience, where not one so strange Opinion but finds Credit, and Exchange In vain for Catholicks ourselves we bear; The universal church is onely there.

But the universal Church – the One, Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church – is only there where there is no heresy; and there is no salvific Grace outside the One Church. For, as Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev) of Boguchar declared at a Pan-Orthodox Congress of the Orthodox Churches in Moscow in July, 1948: "According to the teaching of the Holy Fathers, the Grace of the Holy Spirit is manifest in two forms: firstly, as an external, providential Grace, which acts in and throughout the lives of everybody, enabling anyone to accept the True Faith; and, secondly, as an internal, salvific Grace, which revivifies, redeems, and functions solely in the Orthodox Church."¹⁴⁰

Archbishop Seraphim said: "...From this, it is obvious who really stands behind the ecumenical movement: Freemasons, longtime foes of the Orthodox Church. It is also clear to what end the ecumenical movement, at all of its gatherings since its inception, has striven: not a dogmatic union of all so-called "Christian churches" with the Orthodox Church, but a commixture of both, achieved by means of the falling away of the Orthodox from their Faith through an ecumenical familiarity with heretics, especially with Protestants. This commixture is equivalent to the destruction of Orthodoxy. Ultimately, when dealing with the ecumenical question, we must recognize that, going back to the very origin of ecumenism, there stands before us, not only the age-old enemies of our Orthodox Church, but the father of lies and ruin himself – the Devil. In former centuries, he sought to destroy the Holy Church by assaulting Her with all sorts of heresies, specifically, by trying to mix Orthodox with heretics. And he is doing this now by using ecumenism and its inexhaustible Masonic capital."¹⁴¹

Therefore the struggle between the truly universal Church and the ecumenist World Council of Churches became the most important struggle on the planet in the second half of the twentieth century. For, as Fr. Justin Popovich put it, bewailing the Serbian Church's participation in the World Coundil of Churches: "We are renouncing the Orthodox Faith of the God-Man Christ, and

¹³⁹ A Time to Choose, Libertyville, Ind.: Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 1981, p. 53.

¹⁴⁰ Archbishop Seraphim, in Schemanun Seraphima, *Saint Seraphim of Sophia*, Etna, Ca., 2008, pp. 96-97.

¹⁴¹ http://www.dep.church/downloads/StSeraphimEcumenism.pdf.

organic ties with the God-Man and His Most Holy Body: we are repudiating the Orthodox Church of the holy apostles, the Fathers, and the Ecumenical Councils – and we wish to become 'organic members' of a heretical, humanistic, humanized and man-worshipping club, which consists of 263 heresies – every one of which is a spiritual death.

"As Orthodox Christians we are 'members of Christ.' 'Shall I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute?' (<u>I Corinthians</u> 6.15). We are doing this by our organic union with the World Council of Churches, which is nothing other than the rebirth of atheistic man, of pagan idolatry.

"The time has finally come for the patristic Orthodox Church of Saint Sabbas, the Church of the holy apostles and Fathers, of the holy confessors, martyrs and new-martyrs, to stop mingling ecclesiastically and hierarchically with the so-called 'World Council of Churches', and to cast off forever any participation in joint prayer or services, and to renounce general participation in any ecclesiastical dealings whatsoever, which are not self-contained and do not express the unique and unchangeable character of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church – the Orthodox Church – the only true Church that has ever existed."¹⁴²

Protopresbyter Michael Pomazansky writes: "If one combines the various Christian confessions which are weak in faith, weak in spirit, and weak in their influence on social life, then, in our age of religious scepticism, a power will be created, a power which would be able to oppose the anti-Christian powers of the world ... In terms of ecumenism, what does 'the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth' mean? It means the social erection of the future world on earth. The new world must replace the former, old, decrepit, and supposedly destined-for-wreckage, social structure on earth. Now all attention, all strivings of Christianity, must be directed towards the idea, not of the personal salvation of each person, not concerning one's soul, not about the future eternal life, but of building a society on new foundations. From this it is determined that the church of our time is the 'serving church,' dienende Kirche, i.e., is to serve social aims. Even before the formation of ecumenical organizations these ideas were born in the minds of those active in Protestantism ... There can be no doubt but that the ecumenical movement is being joined and supported by, if not directed by, secret and overt world organizations who are alien to religious tasks, and perhaps even inimical to them. Finally, while there is expressed a hope that ecumenism may help to oppose the advance of godlessness and anti-Christian forces in the world struggle, the USSR sends its own people to the ecumenical council and the World Council of Churches, as if in the name of the Soviet Church. A permanent representative from this church has been dispatched to Geneva as a member of the secretariat of the World Council of Churches (Archpriest Borovoy). In such a manner the Soviets will control all the activities of the

¹⁴² Popovich, in A Time to Choose, op. cit., p. 53.

World Council of Churches. It is evident that participation of representatives from the Soviet Church was expressed at the ecumenical assemblage at New Delhi, and likewise at the Orthodox gathering on the island of Rhodes, in that no one had the right to raise a voice concerning a struggle with atheism. Red Moscow, according to the directives of Lenin, utilizes such doubtful coalitions until it sees benefit for itself, in the conviction that such a doubtful ally can easily be discredited, discarded, and destroyed at the opportune time ... What a difference in interpretation of the Kingdom of God in the above understanding, and there in modern Christianity! Well, well! - they interrupt us - to hand over the earth to blind and evil forces, and think only for the salvation of one's own soul! This is what you continue to call for... - No, we answer. We continue merely by indicating the words of Christ: Seek ye first of all the Kingdom of God and His righteousness and all these things will be added to you, seek the heavenly and the earthly will be added. For Christians the heavenly kingdom begins already here, bright and blessed, a pledge of the future eternal life. It blesses earthly life, not only individual life, but also the life of Christian communities. It orders it, lightens it, makes it blessed. It introduces brotherly relations into society and transforms the most difficult experiences in life into light ones, as it already has been tested through numerous examples in the history of Christianity ... This earthly reflection of heaven may indeed take on broader dimensions, spreading to the life of the society and the state. But for this there must be faith and prayer in the first place. Nothing of this sort will be attained if we turn our gaze away from heaven and towards the earth. Without faith and prayer, let life even be happy and without sorrow, yet it will not be the Kingdom of God. Why does ecumenism, for the sake of the idea of building the Kingdom of God on earth, abandon Christian teaching concerning the salvation of the soul? For the reason that faith in external life has completely weakened it, if not caused it to be lost altogether, because their total view of reality is limited to earthly life."

<u>11. THE SOVIET OLD WORLD ORDER</u>

"Even before the Third Reich had collapsed," writes Paul Kennedy, "Stalin was switching dozens of divisions to the Far East, ready to unleash them upon Japan's denuded Kwantung Army in Manchuria when the time was ripe; which turned out to be, perhaps unsurprisingly, three days after Hiroshima. The extended campaign on the western front more than reversed the disastrous post-1917 slump in Russia's position in Europe... Russian territorial boundaries expanded, in the north at the expense of Finland, in the centre at the expense of Poland; and in the south, recovering Bessarabia, at the expense of Rumania. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into Russia. Part of East Prussia [around Königsburg, now Kaliningrad] was taken, and a slice of Eastern Czechoslovakia (Ruthenia, or Subcarpathian Ukraine) was also thoughtfully added, so that there was direct access to Hungary. To the west and southwest of this enhanced Russia lay a new cordon sanitaire of satellite states, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and (until they wriggled free) Yugoslavia and Albania. Between them and the West, the proverbial 'iron curtain' was falling; behind that curtain, Communist party cadres and secret police were determining that the entire region would operated under principles totally at variance with [American Secretary of State] Cordell Hull's hopes. The same was true in the Far East, where the swift occupation of Manchuria, North Korea, and Sakhalin not only avenged the war of 1904-05, but allowed a linkup with Mao's Chinese Communists, who were also unlikely to swallow the gospel of laissez-faire capitalism."143

However, there is little evidence that Stalin was planning to extend his conquests westwards, beyond East Germany, in 1945; he was not ready (yet) for world war, especially while he did not have his own atomic bomb¹⁴⁴, and needed time to digest his newly-acquired empire in Central and Eastern Europe. "We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years," he said; "and then we'll have another go at it."¹⁴⁵ His only sign of renewed aggression outside the Far East was in creating an Azerbaijani puppet state in Iran, which the West vigorously – and successfully - resisted. His demands for Turkish territory and control of the Black Sea Straits were also foiled.

¹⁴³ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: William Collins, 1988, pp. 465-466. ¹⁴⁴ "As early as June 1942 the NKVD instructed its agents in New York and London to 'take whatever measures you think fit to obtain information on the theoretical and practical aspects of the atomic bomb projects, on the design of the atomic bomb, nuclear fuel components, and on the trigger mechanism'. In short order, Soviet agents succeeded in penetrating the Manhattan Project. By the spring of 1945 there were three Soviet agents inside the Los Alamos complex in New Mexico where the first bomb was built, each unaware that the others were spies. It only heightened the subsequent security panic that the scientist in charge of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer, was a fellow-travelling Communist, if not actually a Party member. In February 1943 Stalin authorized work to begin on a Soviet bomb. But in the end the first Soviet bomb was a carbon copy of the US bomb tested at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945; an achievement of espionage as much as of science" (Ferguson, op. cit, pp. 575-576). ¹⁴⁵ Robert Dallek, *The Lost Peace*, New York, 2010, p. 184.

Stalin even hesitated to impose communism fully and immediately on his European conquests – although it was already clear that he had no intention of fulfilling the promises he had made at Yalta to introduce democracy there.

But this was only a transitional phase: Stalin's belligerent rhetoric against the West remained unchanged. Thus in a speech in the spring of 1946 when he said that the Second World War had been inevitable "because of the emergence of global economic and political factors that were implicit in the concept of modern monopolistic capitalism". Again, Beria's deputy, Minister of State Security Victor Abakumov, told an audience of SMERSH officers at NKVD Headquarters in occupied Europe near Vienna in the summer of 1945: "Comrade Stalin once said that if we don't manage to do all these things very guickly the British and Americans will crush us. After all they have the atom bomb, and an enormous technical and industrial advantage over us. They are rich countries, which not been destroyed by the war. But we will rebuild everything, with our army and our industry, regardless of the cost. We Chekists are not to be frightened by problems and sacrifices. It is our good fortune... that the British and Americans in their attitudes towards us, have still not emerged from the post-war state of calf-love. They dream of lasting peace and building a democratic world for all men. They don't seem to realize that we are the ones who are going to build a new world, and that we shall do it without their liberal-democratic recipes. All their slobber plays right into our hands, and we shall thank them for this, in the next world, with coals of fire. We shall drive them into such dead ends as they've never dreamed of. We shall disrupt them and corrupt them from within. We shall lull them to sleep, sap their will to fight. The whole 'free western' world will burst apart like a fat squashed toad. This won't happen tomorrow. To achieve it will require great efforts on our part, great sacrifices, and total renunciation of all that is trivial and personal. Our aim justifies all this. Our aim is a grand one, the destruction of the old, vile world."146

This speech demonstrated that the old satanic hatred of the Leninist-Bakuninite revolution for the whole of "the old, vile world" continued unabated. That meant that no "normal" relations would be possible with the Soviet Union. For it was in fact an anti-state determined to destroy all normal statehood throughout the world.

For now, having defeated the Nazis, Stalin returned unambiguously to Leninist internationalism; he had no more use for the Russian nationalist mask he had assumed to garner support in the Second World War. There was, of course, a victory parade in Red Square. But the hero of that parade, Zhukov, was exiled to the provinces, and the victory celebrations were suspended after 1946: Stalin did not allow the quasi-religion of Victory that developed in later Soviet and Putinist times.

¹⁴⁶ Abakumov, in Nikolai Tolstoy, *Stalin's Secret War*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1981, p. 329.

It could be dangerous to remember the Tsarist and Orthodox era too much. Russian nationalism was okay – but in small, controlled doses. For, as Catherine Merridale writes, "This kind of patriotic fervour soon became unwise. National history, having served its term, was downplayed from the summer of 1944. In its place, loyal communists were supposed to rally round their ideology and leaders. Though the Party itself had instigated the talk of jubilees, its Moscow committee resolved that the celebration of the city's foundation should primarily be military. One of its members even ordained that Russians needed 'more politics and less history'....

"Outside the Kremlin,... the historical elements of Moscow's 1947 jubilee were diluted with large doses of Stalinist propaganda. A monumental new statue of the city's legendary founder was fine because it echoed current views about Stalin himself, for instance, but real academic history could be dangerous. When Petr Sytin, the Moscow historian, produced a celebratory tome that included a scholarly reference to the probable Finnish origins of the name 'Moscow', a derivation that had once been mentioned by Zabelin, he found himself in trouble. Only a traitor, it was ruled, could link the Russian capital with a defeated foe. Nostalgia, too, was deemed suspect, for this romantic sort of history could easily dissolve into a tale of princes and foreigners and even the church..."¹⁴⁷

However, while returning to world revolution, Stalin was cautious¹⁴⁸, and not yet ready for further military expansion. The future British foreign secretary Denis Healey asserted that "all that the Red Army needed in order to reach the North Sea was boots." But it was not quite as simple as that.

As Eric Hobsbawm writes, "Except in the Balkan guerrilla strongholds, the communists made no attempt to establish revolutionary regimes. It is true that they were in no position to do so anywhere west of Trieste even had they wanted to make a bid for power, but also that the USSR, to which their parties were utterly loyal, strongly discouraged such unilateral bids for power. The communist revolutions actually made (Yugoslavia, Albania, later China) were made *against* Stalin's advice. The Soviet view was that, both internationally and within each country, post-war politics should continue within the framework of the all-embracing anti-fascist alliance, i.e. it looked forward to a long-term coexistence, or rather symbiosis, of capitalist and communist systems, and further social and political change, presumably occurring by shifts within the 'democracies of a new type' which would emerge out of the wartime coalitions. This optimistic scenario soon disappeared into the night of the Cold War, so completely that few remember that Stalin urged the Yugoslav communists to keep the monarchy or that in 1945 British communists were opposed to the break-up of the Churchill wartime coalition, i.e. to the electoral campaign

¹⁴⁷ Merridale, *Red Fortress*, New York: Picador, 2013, pp. 331, 332-33.

¹⁴⁸ As Boris Souvarin put it in a 1948 article: "Stalin's policy is made up of caution, patience, intrigue, infiltration, corruption, terrorism, exploitation of human weaknesses. It only moves to frontal attack when it cannot lose, against an adversary of its choice who is defeated in advance" (in Revel, op. cit., p. 97). (V.M.)

which was to bring the Labour government in power. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Stalin meant all this seriously, and tried to prove it by dissolving the Comintern in 1943, and the Communist Party of the USA in 1944..."¹⁴⁹

The reason for this was that, as Mark Mazower writes, the communists had to "obtain the ascendancy from a position of domestic weakness. In most countries, the Party membership at liberation was tiny. State repression and public indifference in the inter-war era had kept the communist movement small; Stalin's purges in the 1930s had made it even smaller. Now the survivors were hurled into the spotlight. How should they act?

"The obvious revolutionary option was to seize power as soon as possible. The paradox is that this only happened where the Red Army was *not* in control – in Yugoslavia where Tito, backed by his partisans, installed a one-party state within a year of liberation, and in his satellite, Albania. The idea appealed to many communists outside Yugoslavia, but Tito was the one communist leader in a position to ignore Stalin's wishes, and Stalin clearly had other tactics in mind which would be more compatible with his evident desire not to alienate his wartime Allies. For as Molotov later recalled: 'It was to our benefit to stay allied with America.'

"During the war, the Department of International Information of the Soviet Communist Central Committee had publicized the path ahead: cooperation with other democratic forces, not communist revolution. Eastern Europe, it decreed, was not ready for socialism. Rather the residues of feudalism must be swept aside, and the abortive bourgeois revolution of 1848 aborted. There would be elections, in which workers and peasants would have a new voice. Not surprisingly, many communist cadres apart from Tito found it hard to take such advice seriously.

"Thus in defeated Germany, Stalin and his henchmen were furious with the old-time sectarian communist cadres who went around shouting 'Heil Moskau!', hanging red flags or painting the hammer and sickle on requisitioned cars. From Moscow's point of view, bloodthirsty declarations of imminent revolution, preaching dictatorship of the proletariat, tearing down statues of Luther and erecting monuments to Lenin – all implied a complete misreading of the situation. It showed that pre-war communists had learned nothing, and would only disturb the administration of the country. As early as 10 June, and with bewildering speed, the Soviet Military Administration issued an order permitting the creation of other parties and trade unions; the German Communist Party's own manifesto explicitly ruled out the idea of 'forcing the Soviet system on Germany' and called for the establishment of a parliamentary democracy.

¹⁴⁹ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century* (1914-1991), London: Abacus, 1994, pp. 168-169.

"All this indicated that from Stalin's perspective in 1945, other parties should be tolerated and parliamentary elections would be held. The model for eastern Europe was to be the Popular Front of the mid-1930s not the Leninist revolutionary elite of 1917. Fascism's triumph between the wars, according to Moscow's theorists, had showed the necessity for unifying progressive forces under the banner of a broad anti-Fascist coalition, winning over the masses by a gradualist programme of land reform (not collectivization), expropriation of the elites and state-led economic controls. But even the theory itself was not so important as it would later become. The situation was, in fact, highly fluid. It is a striking reflection of the improvised character of Soviet attitudes, that not until early 1947 did there appear any official interpretations of the meaning in Marxist theory of People's Democracy, and only in December 1948 was it identified unambiguously with the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact was that until this point Soviet policy was focused upon the question of creating a friendly Germany and there was no overall strategy for eastern Europe."¹⁵⁰

Why this apparent restraint? Because not only was communism as yet not well established in Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union itself was vulnerable in many ways...

"In the West," writes Nikolai Tolstoy, "Russian heroism and wartime propaganda had combined to exaggerate the formidable strength of the Red Army. A prescient few already saw it as a potent threat to Western Europe. To Stalin matters appeared in a rather different light. True, his armies had, with unheard-of gallantry and sacrifices, hunted down 'the Nazi beast in his lair'. But he also knew better than most how very near at times they had been to defeat, and also how much his conquests had owed to lend-lease supplies and American and British strategic bombing. Now the United States, with an industrial capacity and military resources dwarfing those of Germany at the height of her power, faced him in the heart of Europe....

"In 1945 the USSR still possessed no strategic air force, and there can be no doubt that Stalin regarded the awesome striking power under Eisenhower's command with apprehension. In April 1944 he had warned his Chiefs of Staff against any idea that the defeat of Germany would be the end of their problems. There would be other dangers, equally great; notably the exposure of the Red Army to populations hostile to Communism, and stiffening relations with the Allies in the West. Meanwhile, in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic States, nationalist partisans were fighting the Red Army and NKVD units on a scale recalling the bitterest days of the Civil War. Stalin was clearly fearful that the Western Allies would have the wit to play that card the purblind Germans had thrown away: the opposition of the Russian people to the regime. The extent of his fear may be gauged by his absolute refusal to consent to British arming of Russian sentries in prisoner-of-war camps or even enrolling them in a purely nominal 'armed Allied unit'. He feared this might provide cover for the levying of a new 'Vlasov' army.

¹⁵⁰ Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, London: Penguin, 1999, pp. 257-258.

"Fear of military confrontation with the Anglo-Americans, revolt inside the Soviet Union¹⁵¹, or contamination of the Red Army in occupied Europe effectively inhibited Stalin from any rash ventures in 1945. There were points on which he would not give way, but they were points on which the Anglo-Americans had no effective means of bringing pressure to bear. The new Soviet-Polish frontier, the annexation of the Baltic States, the refusal to implement Churchill's illusory 'percentages' agreement: all these moves took place safely behind Red Army lines, and the worst the democracies could do was affect not to recognize their legitimacy.

"Caution was everything. It was still hard to believe that the West was sincere in its belief in the possibility of genuine post-war cooperation between the two irreconcilable systems. The results of the Teheran Conference had seemed almost too good to be true (Stalin returned to the Kremlin 'in a particularly good frame of mind') and after Potsdam a Soviet official noted that 'the Soviet diplomats won concessions from the Western Allies to an extent that even the diplomats themselves had not expected'. After the defeat of Germany Stalin had been fearful that the Americans might not pull back to the demarcation line, and remained convinced that Eisenhower could, had he chosen, have taken Berlin. Still, the Allies were co-operating, for whatever reason, and as Roosevelt had irresponsibly announced at Yalta that the United States forces would withdraw from Europe within two years of victory, there was every incentive for a policy of 'softly, softly'.

"Despite the overwhelming Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, Stalin was careful for some time to maintain the pretence and even, to a limited, fast diminishing extent, the reality of tolerating non-Communist institutions and political parties. In Romania it was announced that there was no intention of altering the country's frontiers or social system. It was more than two years before King Michael was obliged to leave the country. Similarly, in Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary the shades of independent institutions were permitted to linger on until election results proved that the most extreme efforts of intimidation and propaganda could not induce populations voluntarily to accept Communist domination. Czechoslovak 'independence' survived a little longer, as a result of Stalin's confidence in the pliability of Dr. Beneš and his colleagues.

"Postponement of the full establishment of the Soviet 'New Order' in Eastern Europe was clearly due to several factors. If the new regimes could gain power by constitutional and legal means, this would facilitate the task of Communist Parties in Western Europe, and it was essential, too, not to jettison chances of securing a settlement in Germany favourable to Soviet expansion.

¹⁵¹ "Banderites" were still waging a guerrilla was in Western Ukraine. And in 1948 "a revolt of camp inmates at Igarka was suppressed. As many as 2,666 escaped towards the Urals. They were bombed from the air and nearly all were killed or captured" (Martin Gilbert, *The Dent Atlas of Russian History*, London: Dent, 1993, p. 111). (V.M.)

"In any case, Stalin was by no means so confident as hindsight would suggest. In Poland the carefully-planned abduction and trial of sixteen leaders of the Home Army resistance movement in March 1945 suggest that in his view effective Polish armed resistance to the imposition of Soviet rule posed sufficient threat to make it worth risking the inevitable outcry that would arise in the West.

"All over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the NKVD and SMERSH stretched their enormous resources to cauterize resistance. Soviet propaganda had tended for ideological reasons to exaggerate the role played by partisan and 'people's' armies in defeating Nazism, and they clearly were now taking no chances. Suspect elements of occupied countries were dispatched in an unceasing shuttle of trainloads to the GULAG camps, which continued to underpin Soviet economic production until after Stalin's death.

"About five and a quarter million Soviet citizens were recovered from Western and Central Europe. All had to be elaborately screened, after which the majority were assigned to forced labour in GULAG camps and elsewhere. At the same time deportations from the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Ukraine, the Baltic States and other regions of the USSR continued unabated. As if this were not enough, the hard-pressed NKVD apparatus had to absorb millions of Germans, Japanese, Romanian and Hungarian prisoners-of-war.¹⁵²

"The eight years between VE Day and Stalin's death saw the dictator become increasingly jealous, vengeful and vindictive. Fear of the Soviet and Sovietdominated people, mistrust of the power of the United States, apprehension at the onset of old age with all its dangerous frailties, and recurring bouts of paranoiac suspicion concurred to cause him to double and redouble precautions deemed necessary for his survival and that of the regime.

"Danger loomed everywhere. The USSR was sealed in a quarantine more hermetic even than before the war. The tentacles of the NKVD uncoiled to crush incipient dissent even before its practitioners were aware of their own intentions. Jews, heretical biologists, bourgeois composers, critics of Lysenko's eccentric genetic theories, supporters of Marr's still odder philological speculations... all, all were engaged in conspiracies so dark that only the Leader could penetrate the Arcanum... But Stalin was not mad, not even at the end when death interrupted the unfolding of the notorious 'doctors' plot'. As Adam Ulam writes, 'the madness lay in the system that gave absolute power

¹⁵² "At least half a million people are estimated to have been deported from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the period from 1944 to 1949. Between 140,000 and 200,000 were arrested in Hungary and deported to the Soviet Union, most of them in the Gulag. Large numbers of those suspected of fascist sympathies or anti-communist activity – usually seen as synonymous – were imprisoned. In Romania the number of political prisoners rose to 250,000 by 1948 – as much as 2 per cent of the entire population. By then the line between armed collaboration and actions deemed 'counter-revolutionary' by designated 'class enemies' had long since become blurred." (Kershaw, op. cit., p. 479) (V.M.)

to one man and allowed him to appease every suspicion and whim with blood.' His formative years had been spent in an entirely conspiratorial atmosphere. Roman Malinovsky, one of Lenin's ablest colleagues, had proved to be a Tsarist spy. And now NKVD records contained the names of innumerable highly-placed men and women in capitalist countries who had outwitted the formidable British and American security services in order to betray their class and country. As Stalin chuckled at the blindness of his enemies, the uncomfortable corollary must have recurred as frequently: how many of *his* people were secreted leagued with 'the gentlemen from the Thames'? What if one of his closest cronies – Molotov, Mikoyan or Voroshilov – for example – were an English spy or assassin?

"It is clear that the Soviet Union for internal reasons sought to put a distance between itself and the West. The absurd and cruel policy of refusing to allow Soviet war brides of US and British servicemen to leave the country betrayed the extent of Stalin's fears. War had stretched the resources of the police-state to their limits – limits now being tested further by the herculean task of reimposing totalitarian controls within the USSR, and extending them to the conquered territories beyond. The military power of the Western Allies was daunting enough, but the danger to Soviet morale seemed still greater."¹⁵³

"Stalin hated 'Westerners' in the same way Hitler hated Jews, using the same term: 'cosmopolitanism'. This explains the extraordinary thoroughness and venom with which, in 1945-6, he destroyed or isolated in camps all those who had been in contact with non-Soviet ideas: not only prisoners of war but serving officers, technicians, journalists and party members whose wartime duties had taken them abroad. The number of foreigners permitted to visit, let alone live in, Russia was reduced to an inescapable minimum, and their contacts limited to those employed by the government and secret police. All other Russians learnt from experience that even the most innocent and casual contact with a foreigner risked engulfment in the Gulag."¹⁵⁴

Whatever Stalin's problems, he never abandoned espionage in the West. The "Cambridge five" of British spies were the most famous and damaging, but there were also spies in the US government. Large numbers of Communists and fellow-travellers (including Soviet agents) had joined the government during the New Deal and still more during the war. As Kennan put it, 'The penetration of the American governmental services by members or agents (conscious or otherwise) of the American Communist Party in the late 1930s was not a figment of the imagination... it really existed; and it assumed proportions which, while never overwhelming, were also not trivial."

Roosevelt, with his Communist sympathies, did little about the problem. But "Truman was more active. In November 1946 he appointed a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, and in the following March he acted on its

¹⁵³ Tolstoy, op. cit., pp. 351, 352-355.

¹⁵⁴ Paul Johnson, *Modern Times*, New York: Harper Perennial, 1990, p. 452.

recommendations with Executive Order 9835, which authorized inquiries into political beliefs and associations of all federal employees. Once this procedure got going, in 1947, it was reasonably effective.... The moles were being dug out as the Cold War grew more intense and the follies of the past were scrutinized."¹⁵⁵

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Even without the western threat, Soviet morale was low enough. In spite of stripping Eastern and Central Europe of vast resources – reparations far greater than had been agreed at Yalta – the country was still desperately poor. Thus "I is hard to exaggerate the extent of the physical destruction that the war had left behind in the western parts of the Soviet Union. Entire regions were desolate. The ravages of the fighting, or wilful destruction by the retiring Wehrmacht, had destroyed 1,710 towns and no fewer than 70,000 villages. Around 25 million people were homeless. Grain production had fallen by two thirds; industrial production for civilian needs by well over a third. It took an extraordinary fear of reconstruction to recover from such devastation."¹⁵⁶

Between 1947 and 1953 prices on basic foodstuffs dropped between 1.3 and 3 times. As John Darwin writes, "Harvest failure in 1946 brought large-scale famine... Ferocious work discipline, conscripted labour, and the heavy reliance on slave or semi-slave labour were used even more widely than before the war against a cowed, ill-fed and exhausted population. Perhaps 10 per cent of industrial output came from the Gulag..."¹⁵⁷

What resources that existed were spent on the army, the secret services and building the atom bomb, while millions starved – quietly and without protest. For only in the concentration camps was there a measure of protest. There Christians of many kinds together with writers like Solzhenitsyn (who was imprisoned for criticizing Stalin in 1945) nurtured their internal freedom in conditions of total slavery, where they had nothing but their chains to lose.

Besides, open rebellion continued in the west of the country: according to Kirill Alexandrov, "The famine of 1947 and the armed struggle with the rebels in the western provinces of the USSR took away no less than one million lives."¹⁵⁸

As Martin Gilbert writes, "an element of lawlessness also perturbed the apparently settled routine of Soviet life. In 1946 Stalin was told that the security police had arrested 10, 563 pupils who had run away from Factory Training

¹⁵⁵ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 457, 458.

¹⁵⁶ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 87.

¹⁵⁷ Darwin, After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 473.

¹⁵⁸ Alexandrov, "Stalin i sovremennaia Rossia: vybor istoricheskikh otsenok ili vybor budushchego?" (Stalin and contemporary Russia: a choice of historical estimates or a choice of the future?), report read at the Russian Centre, San Francisco, February 3, 2017.

Schools, as well as from trade and railway schools. According to a report from the Minister of the Interior, S.N. Kruglov, 'Many crimes had been committed, including robbery and gangsterism', by students from the schools. Kruglov also gave Stalin the reason. 'The living conditions in the schools are unsatisfactory,' he explained. 'They are unsanitary and cold, and often without electric light.'

"It was not only the discipline of trainees that Stalin sought to tighten. Disciplining the intelligentsia was another task that he set himself. The instrument of his will was A.A. Zhdanov, his lieutenant on the ideological front, who called a special conference of writers, artists and composers – including Shostakovich, Prokofiev, and Khachaturian – to warn them of the folly of independent thought, in music as much as in writing and art. The Soviet Writers' Union met with Stalin's particular anger for what he saw as repeated attempts at independent expression of opinion. The poet Anna Akhmatova was described by Zhdanov a "half nun, half whore", and was among those expelled from the Union in 1946. Such expulsion meant an end to the right to publish – a writer's means of livelihood."¹⁵⁹

In February, 1948, "the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a decree on music, accusing Shostakovich, Prokofiev and Khachaturian of 'losing touch with the masses' and of falling victims to 'decadent bourgeois influences'. The three made an immediate confession of their 'errors' and promised to mend their ways – and amend their music – in future.¹⁶⁰ Newspapers also fell under the displeasure of the most rigorous ideological scrutiny. The satirical magazine *Krokodil* was censured by the Central Committee for its 'lack of militancy' in portraying the evil ways of capitalism. The Academy of Social Sciences, which had been established after the war, was reorganized to provide a more rigorous ideological training for Party and State officials.

"With Stalin's personal sanction, a ferocious newspaper campaign was launched against two declared enemies of Soviet Communism, 'bourgeois nationalism' and the 'survival of religious prejudice'. Some indication of how deeply religious feeling must have survived after thirty-one years of Communist rule was seen in the calls in *Pravda* for a more vigorous anti-religious propaganda..."¹⁶¹

Science also suffered... "In the research institutes 'cosmopolitan' tendencies were rooted out. In the Institute of Linguistics, N.Ia. Marr was dismissed for teaching that all human languages had a common root and would one day reintegrate in the proletarian internationalist society. Stalin had decided that

¹⁵⁹ Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: 1933-1951, London: HarperCollins, 1998, pp. 769-770. See also Sir Isaiah Berlin, "Conversations with Akhmatova and Pasternak", in *The Proper Study of Mankind*, London: Pimlico, 1998, pp. 525-552.

¹⁶⁰ Thus Shostakovich responded to the criticism by writing an ode to Stalin's Forestry Plan! (V.M.)

¹⁶¹ Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 821-822.

only Russian was worthy to be the international language of the future: he implied that language was a permanent feature of a nation's culture, more or less impervious to social change. In short, for Stalin proletarian internationalism and Russian imperialism had finally become indistinguishable.

"In genetics a 'barefoot scientist', Trofim Lysenko, with party support, gained the ascendancy over established and reputable scientists. Contrary to accepted biological theory, he taught that in living organisms characteristics derived from the environment could be passed on genetically. He deduced from his theory proposals on how plant-breeding could be improved. The academic establishment mostly resisted his ideas as poorly attested hypotheses, but he was able to gain control of the Institute of Plant Breeding, and from there to dominate genetics and much of biology for more than a decade.

"in all these cases, party stooges in the institutes and creative unions were testing their control of the nomenklatura personnel lists to promote their own candidates and eliminate their opponents. This was a form clientelism against which there was no appeal. The penalty for resisting was no longer arrest and execution, as it would have been in the 1930s, but usually dismissal, with its accompanying demotion into the ranks of the unprivileged, living in communal apartments and queuing up in poorly stocked state shops. It was a price which few were prepared to pay. Most scholars and scientists reoriented their work along the lines which their bosses and ideologists expected of them, or retreated into fields free of any ideological implications. Shostakovich, for example, seriously contemplated suicide, but then withdrew into an ideologically neutral zone and composed a complete set of preludes and fugues on the model of Bach..."¹⁶²

¹⁶² Hosking, Russia and the Russians, London: Penguin, 2012, pp. 527-529.

12. TRUMAN, STALIN AND THE MARSHALL PLAN

In 1945, just after the war's end, President Truman did not understand the truly desperate plight of the Europeans. Lend-lease was halted after VE Day, and even the Americans' closest allies, the British, were almost denied a desperately needed loan. Some loans were provided to some nations – but only as stop-gaps to save the starving, not as the basis for a real revival of the European economy. The Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 had envisaged such a revival of the European economies as part of a new system of convertible currencies and international free trade. But in the beginning America, the world's only economic super-power, which "by the spring of 1945 accounted for half the world's manufacturing capacity, most of its food surpluses and virtually all international financial reserves"¹⁶³, was not willing to provide the cash that alone could kick-start such a revival.

However, the president was persuaded to change course by a variety of factors: the withdrawal of the British from Greece (for mainly financial reasons), the terrible winter of 1946-47 and the real threat of starvation and anarchy hanging over large areas of Western Europe; the threat this posed of the coming to power of communist regimes in France and Italy.

Above all, he was persuaded by his own eye-opening experience of dealing with Stalin at Potsdam in July, 1945. For "a large number of agreements were reached... - only to be broken as soon as the unconscionable Russian dictator returned to Moscow."¹⁶⁴ One example of such a broken agreement related to reparations from Germany. "Between 1945 and 1946 the Soviet Union took half a billion dollars worth of factories and equipment from its zone in war reparations. The skilled technicians and managers of the plants were taken to Russia too. Under the Potsdam Agreement Stalin was allowed 10 per cent of the war reparations taken from the Allies' zone in return for sending coal, wood and food from the bread-basket areas of East Germany.

"In 1946 Stalin stopped delivering coal and agricultural goods to the West..." 165

Although he was inexperienced in foreign affairs, and came to power little known and not highly rated by comparison with his famous predecessor, Truman was a quick learner. Thus he rapidly realized, writes Burleigh, "that the Soviets were bent on taking 'here a little, there a little, they are chiseling from us'. Not long after becoming president he lectured Molotov on Soviet bad faith. In Truman's recollection, Molotov said, 'I have never been talked to like that in my life.' 'Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that,' Truman snapped back." ¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, London: Vintage Books, 2010, p. 105.

¹⁶⁴ Sara Moore, *The Fourth Reich?* Jollies Publishing, 2016, p. 223.

¹⁶⁵ Moore, op. cit., p. 224.

¹⁶⁶ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 52.

"It was Stalin's brand of intransigent diplomacy, conducted through Molotov, which brought matters to a head at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in December 1945. There, Ernest Bevin, Britain's new Foreign Secretary, bluntly called Molotov's arguments 'Hitlerite philosophy'; and James Byrnes, Secretary of State, said Russia was 'trying to do in a slick-dip way what Hitler tried to do in domineering smaller countries by force.' When Byrnes reported back on 5 January 1946, Truman made his mind up: 'I do not think we should play compromise any longer... I am tired of babying the Soviets.' [He also said: 'Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand: "How many divisions have you?"']."¹⁶⁷

He was no doubt recalling Stalin's well-known quip: "How many divisions has the Pope?"

And as if to confirm Truman's assessment, Stalin delivered a speech in Moscow on February 9, 1946, in which he declared: "The development of world capitalism proceeds not in the path of smooth and even progress but through crisis and the catastrophes of war" – a good summary of the path, not of capitalism, but of communism.

This was followed, on March 5, by Winston Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, Truman's home state, in which he warned that "an 'iron curtain' had descended on the European continent. Behind that curtain was a 'Soviet sphere', encompassing Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. On March 10, ten days after Churchill's lecture, George Orwell wrote in the *Observer* that 'after the Moscow conference last December, Russia began to make a "cold war" on Britain and the British Empire.'"¹⁶⁸

"Stalin continued to draw the Americans deeper into Cold War. In March 1946 he missed the deadline for the withdrawal of his troops from Iran, and finally did so only after an angry confrontation at the new United National Security Council. In August the Yugoslavs shot down two American transport planes and the same month Stalin began putting pressure on Turkey. The Americans responded accordingly. The prototype of the CIA was set up, and at a White House party to celebrate, Truman handed out black hats, cloaks and wooden daggers, and stuck a fake black moustache on Admiral Leahy's face. America and Canada formed a joint air and anti-submarine defence system. The British and US air forces began exchanging war plans; their intelligence agencies resumed contact. By midsummer the Anglo-American alliance was in unofficial existence again. Truman undertook a purge of his Administration to eliminate the pro-Soviet elements. The last of the New Dealers in the cabinet was Henry Wallace, Agriculture Secretary, a profound admirer of Stalin,

¹⁶⁷ Paul Johnson, Modern Minds, New York: Harper Perennial, 1990, p. 437.

¹⁶⁸ Niall Ferguson, Kissinger. 1923-1968: The Idealist, New York: Penguin, 2016, p. 193.

Anglophobic, anti-Churchill: 'nothing but a cat-bastard', as Truman put it. In July he sent the President a 5,000-word private letter, advocating unilateral disarmament and a massive air-and-trade programme with Russia, then leaked it. Truman confided to his diary: 'Wallace is a pacifist 100 per cent. He wants us to disband our armed forces, give Russia our atomic secrets and trust a bunch of adventurers in the Kremlin Politburo... The Reds, phonies and the parlour pinks seem to be banded together and are becoming a national danger. I am afraid they are a sabotage front for Uncle Joe Stalin.' The next day he sacked Wallace; not a mouse stirred. By October Churchill was able to claim: 'What I said at Fulton has been overpassed by the movement of events.'"¹⁶⁹

At about the same time, the famous atheist mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell began advocating a preventative war against the Soviets. "Unlike most members of the left, Russell had never been taken in by the Soviet regime. He had always rejected Marxism completely. The book in which he described his 1920 visit to Russia, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920), was highly critical of Lenin and what he was doing. He regarded Stalin as a monster and accepted as true the fragmentary accounts of the forced collectivization, the great famine, the purges and the camps which reached the West. In all these ways he was quite untypical of the progressive intelligentsia. Nor did he share the complacency with which, in 1944-45, they accepted the extension of Soviet rule to most of Eastern Europe. To Russell this was a catastrophe for Western civilization. 'I hate the Soviet government too much for sanity,' he wrote on 15 January 1945. He believed that Soviet expansion would continue unless halted by the threat or use of force. In a letter dated 1 September 1945 he asserted: 'I think Stalin has inherited Hitler's ambition to world dictatorship.' Hence, when the first nuclear weapons were exploded by the US over Japan, he immediately resurrected his view that America should impose peace and disarmament on the world, using the new weapons to coerce a recalcitrant Russia. To him it was a heaven-sent opportunity which might never recur"¹⁷⁰ insofar as America was still at that time (and until 1950) the world's only nuclear power and so could impose - by the threat of nuclear annihilation, if need be - a single world government.

In a talk to the Royal Empire Society on 3 December 1947 Russell "proposed an alliance – adumbrating NATO – which would then dictate terms to Russia: 'I am inclined to think that Russia would acquiesce; if not, provided this is done soon, the world might survive the resulting war and emerge with a single government such as the world needs.' 'If Russia overruns Western Europe,' he wrote to an American disarmament expert, Dr. Walter Marseille, in May 1948, 'the destruction will be such as no subsequent reconquest can undo. Practically the whole educated population will be sent to labour camps in north-east Siberia or on the shores of the White Sea, where they will die of hardship and the survivors will be turned into animals. Atomic bombs, if used, will at first have to be dropped on Western Europe, since Russia will be out of reach. The

¹⁶⁹ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 438.

¹⁷⁰ Paul Johnson, *Intellectuals*, London: Harper Perennial, 1988, 2007, pp. 204-205.

Russians, even without atomic bombs, will be able to destroy all the big towns of England...'''^{171}

"I have no doubt," continued Russell, "that America would win in the end, but unless Western Europe can be preserved from invasion, it will be lost to civilization for centuries. Even at such a price, I think war would be worthwhile. Communism must be wiped out, and world government must be established."

"Russell constantly stressed the need for speed: 'Sooner or later, the Russians will have atom bombs, and when they have them it will be a much tougher proposition. Everything must be done in a hurry, with the utmost celerity.' Even when Russia exploded an A-bomb, he still pressed his argument, urging that the West must develop the hydrogen bomb. 'I do not think that, in the present temper of the world, an agreement to limit atomic warfare would do anything but harm, because each side would think that the other was evading it.' He then put the 'Better Dead than Red' argument in its most uncompromising form: 'The next war, if it comes, will be the greatest disaster that will have befallen the human race up to that moment. I can think of only one greater disaster: the extension of the Kremlin's power over the whole world.'"¹⁷²

However, Russell's proposal to wipe out Communism and establish a world government was rejected, and in January, 1947 Truman replaced the bellicose Byrnes with the more statesmanlike General George C. Marshall, who chose the strategy of "containment" that had been suggested by the American diplomat George Kennan in his famous "Long Telegram" sent from the Moscow embassy on February 22, 1946.

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Kennan argued that the West had to wield a big stick against the "expanding totalitarian state" of the Soviet Union because "Soviet power is impervious to the logic of reason, and is highly sensitive to the logic of force". According to Kennan, "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies ... Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvers of Soviet policy,

¹⁷¹ Johnson, op. cit., pp. 205-206. It was not in fact true that Russia was out of reach of American bombers, and in June 1946 Truman stiffened up his military doctrine, declaring his determination to prevent Soviet expansion into Western Europe. A plan was drawn up by General Curtis LeMay (who had firebombed Tokyo in 1945) to drop 292 nuclear bombs on 104 Soviet cities in the event of war. And in September Secretary of State Byrnes declared in Germany that American troops would stay there as long as they were needed – an implicit reversal of Roosevelt's promise that they would be recalled home within two years. ¹⁷² Johnson, op. cit., p. 206.

but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence." However, the US was to act, in Kennan's opinion, "only in cases where the prospective results bear a satisfactory relationship to the expenditure of American resources and effort".¹⁷³

Kennan, writes Niall Ferguson, "warned that 'Nothing short of complete disarmament, delivery of our air and naval forces to Russia and resigning of powers of government to American Communists' would allay Stalin's 'baleful misgivings'. Truman drew his own conclusion from Kennan's warning in his address to a joint session of both houses of Congress on March 12, 1947: 'It must be the policy of the United States,' he declared, 'to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.'"¹⁷⁴

In this speech which came to be called "the Truman doctrine", Truman argued that free peoples had to be assisted "to work out their own destinies in their own way". The assistance was to be primarily economic. He argued that money should be given to Greece and Turkey, with civil and military experts, to counter Soviet aggression: "Totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States... At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedom. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¹⁷⁵

Truman's speech was supported by two-to-one majorities in both Houses,

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But the biggest problem for the Anglo-Americans was the comatose European economy, which depended critically on its traditional power-house, Germany. The Anglo-Saxons merged their two military zones of German occupation into one "Bizone" and unilaterally increased output there. But the German economy needed a stronger stimulant than that. The country had been gradually separating into two separate countries, with Eastern Germany being slowly but inexorably turned into a communist country. This, writes Brogan, "was a quite unintended result of the war, and came about because Russia and

¹⁷³ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 52, 53.

¹⁷⁴ Ferguson, Colossus, London: Allen Lane, 2004, pp. 78-79.

¹⁷⁵ David Reynolds, America. Empire of Liberty, London: Penguin, 2010, pp. 379-380.

her allies found it impossible to agree on the government of the defeated country. It was possible to set up a tribunal at Nuremburg which tried and sentenced the surviving Nazi leaders; all other matters were divisive. Stalin was determined to... squeeze the utmost in reparations out of the Germans. Unfortunately, the reparations policy, unacceptable to Western statesmen on economic grounds (they clearly remembered what trouble reparations had caused between the wars), soon became indistinguishable from one of wholesale plunder; and Soviet security seemed to demand the permanent subjugation of Germans and the establishment by brutal means of communist governments, backed by the Red Army, everywhere else. In Central Europe only Czechoslovakia held out for a time; in South-Eastern Europe, only Greece – and there a civil war was raging between the government and communist guerrillas."¹⁷⁶

Being occupied by the armies of the four Great Powers, Germany could not be treated like any other European country. Both France and the Soviet Union feared German revanchism. France wanted reparations and control of the coalproducing regions of the Ruhr, while the Soviets wanted more reparations from the Western zone (they had already grabbed what they wanted from the East) and the single administrative system and economy over the whole of Germany which would enable them to obtain that.

However, the Anglo-Americans no longer feared German revanchism, and in general wanted, instead of reparations and a very thorough denazification programme that would inevitably hinder economic recovery, a swift recovery of the German economy that would benefit all.

Not that the economy had been completely destroyed. Of course, writes Sara Moore, "the human tragedy of the war in Germany was immense: bombed-out cities, millions of homeless, sickness, hunger and despair.¹⁷⁷ Yet, William I. Clayton had reported to the US Senate that there had been a 'flight of capital in anticipation of defeat' and that the Nazis 'have made strenuous efforts to move abroad assets of all kinds,' while Senator Kilgore asserted darkly that Germany not only was 'the third largest industrial economy', but also was 'better prepared to implement her plot for world conquest than she was at the end of World War I'. German industrial capacity was estimated to be 11 per cent higher in 1947 than in Hitler's Reich in 1936. When German industry's funds were finally repatriated they could help power Germany to greatness again.

"Daimler-Benz, which employed thousands of slave labourers during the war, had been shattered by Allied bombing, but Volkswagen had suffered only surface damage and Krupp was poised to export household goods.

¹⁷⁶ Brogan, op. cit., p. 590.

¹⁷⁷ Thus "the devastation in Cologne was almost indescribable. Public transport was nonexistent. Electricity and gas supplies had broken down. The navigation channel of the Rhine, one of the main arteries of communication, was completely blocked. The sewers were open. Thousands of Germans were starving. Hundreds of thousands were moving on the roads" (Brigadier Sir John Barraclough). (V.M.)

"In 1937 Volkswagen had the largest press shop in Europe and 2,700 of the finest specialised tools. Three Allied bombing raids against the strategically vulnerable Volkswagen plan in Wolfsburg had resulted in only superficial damage. A clever scheme in which the roof was deliberately damaged in non-essential areas to give the aerial appearance of destruction, deceived the Allies. With the help of British military engineers, it was soon in production again, and was allowed to become the sole supplier of vehicles to the occupation authorities..."¹⁷⁸

Nevertheless, in spite of these promising beginnings, it was clear that the economy needed a massive external stimulus, which only the Americans could provide. The critical change in American thinking came, according to Yanis Varoufakis, on September 6, 1946, "when James F. Byrnes, the US secretary of state, travelled to Stuttgart to deliver his Speech of Hope – a significant restatement of America's policy on Germany... Byrnes's speech was the first postwar sign the German people were given of an end to the revanchist deindustrialization drive that, by the end of the 1940s, had destroyed 706 industrial plants. Byrnes heralded a major policy reversal with the statement that 'the German people [should] not... be denied to use... [such] savings as they might be able to accumulate by hard work and frugal living to build up their industries for peaceful purposes.'...

"A speech on 18 March 1947 made by Herbert J. Hoover, President Roosevelt's predecessor, flagged up America's new policy on Europe. 'There is an illusion,' Hoover said, 'that the New Germany... can be reduced to a pastoral state. It cannot be done unless we exterminate or remove 25 million people out of it.'"¹⁷⁹

And so in August, 1947 "the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive ICS 1067 (the 'Morgenthau plan') was replaced by JCS 1779 which formally acknowledged the new American goals: economic unification of the western zone of Germany and the encouragement of German self-government. For the Americans especially, Germans were rapidly ceasing to be the enemy..."¹⁸⁰

By contrast, the French were always very wary of any increase in German power. They had some reason to be worried. After all, the Germans had not at first taken well to the "denazification" programme that the Allies had imposed on them. Nor had true justice been done on the surviving Nazi leaders. Thus, as Anne Applebaum writes: "In the years after the Second World War, West Germany brought 85,000 Nazis to trial, but obtained fewer than 7,000

¹⁷⁸ Moore, op. cit., p. 225. A "British official, Ivan Hirst, sent to the Volkswagen tank factory, supposedly bombed to pieces, was ordered to dismantle and sell what was left. Ford of America declared it 'not worth a dime'. Within weeks Hirst was making cars and by 1946 was producing 1,000 a month." (Simon Jenkins, *A Short History of Europe*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2018, p. 271)

¹⁷⁹ Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer What They Must?, pp. 47, 49.

¹⁸⁰ Judt, Postwar, p. 125.

convictions. The tribunals were notoriously corrupt, and easily swayed by personal jealousies and disputes. The Nuremberg Trial itself was an example of 'victors' justice' marred by dubious legality and oddities, not the least of which was the presence of Soviet judges who knew perfectly well that their own side was responsible for mass murder too."¹⁸¹

Nevertheless, under American pressure, the French finally came round to the idea of relaunching the German economy provided Germany could be "hooked" into a European framework that would neutralize her militarily, and in which "French administrators would run a unified Central Europe (from Paris and from Brussels), while French banks would handle the flow of capital and German profits within and outside this entity."¹⁸²

Only the incorrigibly anti-American De Gaulle among the leading Europeans rejected this plan, and so he resigned and went into the political wilderness for another ten years...

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However, the decisive act in rescuing Europe came in June, 1947, when Truman approved his new Secretary of State's European Recovery Program. This was the "Marshall Plan", which was almost as important as American troops in saving the West from Soviet tyranny. Marshall announced that "our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos". There was only one condition attached to the aid: that it would be available only to countries with an "open-market capitalist system".

He was as good as his word: "In four years from 1948 the United States provided \$13 billion [\$210 billion in early twenty-first-century prices] of aid to Western Europe. During that same period the Soviet Union took out roughly the same amount from eastern Europe."¹⁸³

America also wrote off all Germany's sovereign debt. That is, the Allies wrote off 93 per cent of the German pre-1945 debt, and postponed collection of the rest of it for nearly fifty years.

So "Germany's pre-war debt amounted to 22.6 billion marks including interest. Its post-war debt was estimated to be 16.2 billion. The sums demanded were slashed to 7.5 billion and 7 billion, and America and the Allies were only allowed to enforce payment if the German economy was growing."¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Applebaum, Gulag: A History, London: Penguin, 2004, p. 507.

¹⁸² Varoufakis, op. cit., p. 52.

¹⁸³ Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

¹⁸⁴ Moore, op. cit., pp. 237-238.

That was not all... According to the London debt agreement of February, 1953, the German debt, which was about 12 per cent of GDP in the 1950s, much higher than that of the victorious allies, was completely wiped out. The Germans needed to be reminded of that during the European financial crisis of 2009, when they refused to remit the debts of struggling Greece.

Richard Palmer writes: "Historically, the conqueror bleeds the vanquished dry. Not the U.S. Under the Marshall Plan, the United States poured into Western Europe the equivalent of \$130 billion in today's money, much of it going to West Germany. If America were to give the same share of its economy today, it would amount to over \$800 billion. And it gave this while its economy was shrinking. Secretary of State George C. Marshall called this plan to rebuild Germany a 'calculated risk.'"¹⁸⁵

"Between 1945 and 1953 total global US aid was \$44 billion, of which \$12.3 billion was pumped into European economies after 1948. This permitted European governments an extended range of policy choices while lubricating recovery that was often already under way. All wished to introduce welfare states, but there were wide divergences in how US aid was used in each national case, with the French and Germans making most intelligent use of these funds. If the strictly economic impact of the Marshall Plan is contentious, it undoubtedly contributed to the consolidation of the West as an Atlantic political entity. No similar effect was achieved in Asia, where equally vast sums were invested, but not under a similar unifying plan... In former Axis countries, where nationalism was under a cloud, productivity became a consensus-building vocation, a miraculous *Wunder* as the Germans called it. The rapid revival of West Germany in turn accelerated French efforts to contain it, which took the form of intra-European institutions..."¹⁸⁶

Marshall Aid was also offered to Eastern Europe – in fact, all the European countries except Franco's Spain. "Soviet participation was out of the question since it would mean revealing the economic reality of Soviet weakness through data Stalin would never share. Stalin also realized that such a plan would undermine the Soviets' lock on their satellites, if they were enticed into the orbit of the powerful sun that was the US economy.

At first, writes Jean-François Revel, "instead of lambasting American generosity, as it later did, pretending to see the plan as a satanic manoeuver by Western imperialism and its 'trusts', the USSR showed great interest in the offer. Stalin even sent Vyacheslav M. Molotov to Paris to discuss it with the British and French Foreign Ministers. But he quickly realized that acceptance of Marshall Plan aid would hamper the process of absorption and consolidation then nearing fulfilment in satellite Europe and might even shake

¹⁸⁵ Palmer, "A Relationship Formed in the Aftermath of World War Two Has Hit Hard Times. Is it Over?" *The Trumpet*, August, 2018, https://www.thetrumpet.com/17414-europe-and-america-theyve-lost-that-loving-feeling?
¹⁸⁶ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 64.

Burleign, op. cit., p. 64.

the totalitarian Soviet system. For an American condition to granting credits was that the beneficiary countries coordinate their reconstruction and harmonize their economies. This was the embryo of the future Common Market. To the Communist leadership, this meant creation of a pan-European network of consultation and exchanges, an imbrication of economies and interpenetration of societies that would in any case have shattered totalitarian power in the satellites and put even Moscow's on shaky ground. How could Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, East Germany have resisted the attraction of a Western Europe that, in 1950, was about to embark on the most vigorous economic expansion in its history? To force them to remain in the Soviet orbit, to put up with the pervasive beggary of daily life that marks socialist economies, Moscow had to separate them forcibly and totally from the West. So the Soviet Union refused Marshall Plan aid for itself and obliged its satellites to do the same. An ultimatum from Stalin barred Czechoslovakia, which maintained its hopes until the last minute, from accepting American assistance."187

Already before the Aid started pouring in, the Americans had succeeded in keeping Western Europe in their sphere when the Communists came critically close to electoral victory in France and Italy. For "in December 1945 the Italian Communists had 1.8 million members and gained 19 per cent of the popular vote in free elections. The French Communist party had nearly a million members. In November, 1947, at the instigation of Stalin's Cominform, two million workers struck throughout France. Similar strikes paralysed Italy..."¹⁸⁸

"Truman showed great dexterity in determining which of the Western European leftist parties could become U.S. allies. He correctly concluded that Italy's Communists and Socialists were monolithic: they were united in supporting the Soviet Union and opposing the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan. Truman instead cultivated the Christian Democrats, helping them win a crucial election in 1948. In France, however, Truman recognized that the Socialists opposed communism and struck a deal with them, allowing France to become an honorary but genuine U.S. partner."¹⁸⁹

The unprecedented act of enlightened self-interest that was the Marshall Plan – Ernest Bevin called it "generosity beyond belief" - did the trick: the Western European economy spluttered into life. And so, by the Providence of God, President Truman and his team played the decisive role in shoring up the Western world against Stalin, the most evil and powerful dictator in history, fulfilling the vital role, if not of "him who restrains" the coming of the Antichrist (for that could be played only by an Orthodox Autocrat), at any rate of "world provider" and "world policeman". For that, the whole world should be grateful to them and to the American people.

¹⁸⁷ Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, p. 102.

¹⁸⁸ Niall Ferguson, Kissinger. 1923-1968: The Idealist, New York: Penguin, 2016, p. 593.

¹⁸⁹ John M. Owen IV, "From Calvin to the Caliphate", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 2015, vol. 94, no. 3, p. 84.

Indeed, there can be no doubt that in a secular sense America saved humanity in the immediate post-war era. It is sufficient to imagine what the world would have been like if Stalin had not had in the Americans a powerful and determined opponent, or how many millions would have starved to death if America had not "fed the world" in accordance with the 1911 prophecy of St. Aristocles of Moscow. In fact, the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall Plan, the London debt agreement and other American-sponsored initiatives and investments around the globe, formed the basis for the greatest rise in prosperity in the whole of world history.

The paradox is that this vast increase in prosperity, though sponsored and driven by America, was carried out in a very un-American way, through the activity of *the State* rather than private business. For in the conditions of Europe's post-war anarchy and devastation, a recovery of the European economy was possible only through the massive intervention of the State – both the American State and the European States. For at that time there were no private resources capable of accomplishing the massive work of survival and reconstruction; the private sector could, of course, help, but the initiative had to be taken by the State, as it had done, successfully, at the time of Roosevelt's New Deal (and Hitler's rearmament programme) in the 1930s.

But, as Mark Mazower explains, these were "two very different policy environments. The world of the post-war welfare state was one of full employment, fast population growth and relative internal and external peace inside Europe. Inter-war social policy, by contrast, had been made against a backdrop of mass unemployment, fears of population decline, revolution, political extremism and war. In both eras, the state took the lead, but whereas before 1940 it aimed to secure the health of the collectivity, the family, and above all, the nation, after the war it acted chiefly in order to expand opportunity and choices for the individual citizen. Each epoch reacted against its predecessor: post-1918 against the individualism of mid-nineteenth century liberalism, post-1945 against inter-war collectivism..."¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 303.

<u>13. AMERICA AND JAPAN</u>

Perhaps Truman's greatest achievement in his overall strategy of "saving the world for democracy" was turning Japan into a peaceful and prosperous country. He chose the authoritarian General MacArthur as supremo, in spite of the fact that the Japanese jokingly called him "the Supreme Being". Truman didn't like him, and later fired him for disrespect, calling him "a dumb son of a bitch". Nevertheless, the choice, paradoxical thought it was, of choosing an authoritarian leader to impose democracy was successful, and served as a model for the Americans' choosing authoritarian leaders in other parts of the world, if not to impose democracy, at any rate, to keep communism at bay...

For MacArthur, writes Brogan, "had a deep understanding of what the historical moment required of his country and repudiated the imperialist tradition. America would lose a golden opportunity, he said, if she used her immense new influence 'in an imperialistic manner, or for the sole purpose of commercial advantage... but if our influence and our strength are expressed in terms of essential liberalism, we shall have the friendship and the co-operation of the Asiatic people far into the future.' Time would eventually destroy these hopes; but meanwhile, MacArthur ruled with huge success. He comported himself very much as a new Shogun (the Mikado Hirohito had kept his title but been shorn of his divinity and political power) and at his command the Japanese set about turning themselves into democrats and rebuilding their shattered country. They were startlingly successful in both respects, to the gratification of the Americans. Reconciliation was hastened by the triumph of the communists in China in 1949, an event equally displeasing to the Japanese and the United States, and by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. A formal peace treaty was negotiated, and signed in September 1951, at the same time as one committing the Americans to undertake the defence of Japan against any foe, since the Japanese were forbidden to have any armed forces themselves."191

Japan's economic success did not come quickly or easily. Norman Stone writes: "Initially American policy in Japan was muddled and naively punitive. Japan sank into a morass of epidemic, starvation, black marketeering and crime that was worse than Germany's: inflation reached 700 per cent in so far as there were goods with prices to be inflated. Then, in 1948, the American learning curve made its usual advance: Japan would have to be run not according to American New Deal principles, but according to her own patterns. Besides, there was a serious enough Communist presence in Japan, and by 1948 there was an even more serious Communist presence just over the water, in China. An equivalent of Konrad Adenauer, Yoshida Shiegeru, emerged in politics, with a clean record, and the Americans cooperated. In December 1948 Dean Acheson, Marshall's successor, saw that Japan would have to be the American industrial 'powerhouse', now that China was falling to the Communists, and he sent a banker, Joseph Dodge, to produce a (rough) equivalent of Ludwig

¹⁹¹ Brogan, A History of the USA, pp. 589-590.

Erhard's plans for West Germany: currency stabilization, resistance to union wage demands, trade credits and a very low exchange rate for the yen against the dollar. The Korean War, breaking out a few months later, created a demand for Japanese goods and services, and injected \$5,500 million into the economy. As with Germany, the new programme went together with relaxation of war criminals' imprisonment; some were quietly rehabilitated and restored to the bureaucracy, and one (Shegemi-tsu Mamoru) even became foreign minister. All of this needed a regularization of Japan's international position, i.e. a peace treaty, and discussion of this was in the air in 1950 (although formal negotiation only started in 1951, ending that same year with a San Francisco Treaty that not only gave the Americans several bases, but also foreshadowed Japanese rearmament)."¹⁹²

"For more than six years", writes John Darwin, "[MacArthur's] approval was needed for any major decision. Japan's sovereignty was suspended; Japanese were forbidden to travel abroad; no criticism was allowed of the occupation regime. A raft of reforms was designed to root out what were seen as the sources of Japan's militaristic imperialism. Women were enfranchised and the voting age was lowered, more than doubling the electorate. A new constitution prescribed by the occupiers barred the armed forces from a seat in the government and renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The great family-ruled business combines or *zaibatsu* were broken up. Land reform reduced the power of the landlords and doubled the proportion of those who farmed their own land to some 60 per cent. Trade unions were encouraged. New textbooks were written, and the educational syllabus was democratized. So fierce an assault upon the pre-war order might have provoked a hostile reaction, since the civilian elite with whom the Americans dealt remained deeply conservative. In fact it formed part of a remarkable bargain. When their fears about China led them to 'reverse course', the Americans accepted the need for a strong Japanese state with an industrial economy. They made their peace with the powerful bureaucracy. They had the tacit support of the Japanese emperor, whose role as a figurehead had been carefully preserved."193

In fact, the Emperor Hirohito, still the nominal leader of the defeated Japanese, was granted immunity from having to stand trial for war crimes in exchange for declaring that he was not a god, but human after all. Now Hirohito was probably guilty as charged.¹⁹⁴ However, his support was important in the eventual acceptance of the constitution – a document composed exclusively by MacArthur's men.

¹⁹² Stone, The Atlantic and its Enemies, London: Penguin, 2011, p. 96.

¹⁹³ Darwin, After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, London: Penguin, 2007, p 448.

¹⁹⁴ As Montefiore writes, "The Japanese archives show that Emperor Hirohito was not the pawn of the militarists but enthusiastically supported and directed them. Hirohito must share some of the responsibility shouldered by [Prime Minister] Tojo for Japan's war crimes."

As Sebestyen writes, "MacArthur had ordered the Japanese to come up with a new 'modern, democratic framework guaranteeing freedom for all'. As the US Constitution was so central to the American way of life, he told the Japanese to prepare a comparable document. Many weeks later, the deeply conservative ministers and courtiers of the Royal Household produced a draft in which the Emperor was 'supreme' and sovereign, offered no votes for women and no universal suffrage, and kept power in the hands of the nobility. MacArthur rejected it, along with a not-so-veiled threat in saying that there were Allied nations, and many people in Washington, who wanted to remove the Emperor and put him on trial. He himself, he said, 'was not omnipotent' - a rare admission for MacArthur - and if the Japanese politicians were not 'more cooperative', the other Allies might get their way, even against SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers]'s wishes. They had ten days to make up their minds or he would produce a 'radical' new constitution. At the same time he ordered his second-in-command, General Courtney Whitney, to prepare a team of Americans to write a new document under which the Emperor would become a constitutional monarch, and American-style individual freedoms would be enshrined in law.

"The Japanese Government thought MacArthur was bluffing. At 10 a.m. on the day of the deadline, 13 February, accompanied by his senior officers, General Whitney went to the home of the Foreign Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, who was waiting with his own aides and the man who had written the preferred Japanese version of the constitution, the Professor of Jurisprudence, Juji Matsumoto. According to Whitney's own vivid account, the Japanese delegation began to explain why they wouldn't change their draft. Whitney interrupted, pushed aside the Matsumoto document, and said: 'The draft... you submitted to us the other day is wholly unacceptable to the Supreme Commander as a document of freedom and democracy.' He drew out fifteen copies of the American draft and left them on the table. Then at ten past ten he left the room and walked 'into the sunshine of the garden... fortuitously, just at that moment an American plane passed overhead.' Fifteen minutes later, Jiro Shirasu, one of the Professor's aides, went outside to ask Whitney a question. The Colonel [sic] observed that 'we are here enjoying the warmth of atomic energy'. It was a deliberately unsubtle comment and resulted in 'an important psychological shift'.

"At 11 a.m. Whitney went back inside the house and told the Japanese clearly what would happen next if they did not immediately accept SCAP's terms. The position of the Emperor 'would be reviewed' and the Americans would put their draft constitution to a referendum. As MacArthur was at that time far more popular in Japan than the governing class that had taken the people into a disastrous war – the very people in the room – the people were bound to vote yes. It was a brutal tactic but it worked. The Japanese delegation accepted, but not before asking 'if they were about to be taken outside and shot'..."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Sebestyen, op. cit., pp. 355-356.

And so, writes Johnson, while "Japan's pre-war constitution was a shambles and its whole system of law primitive and unstable, the Occupation, under which America has sole power, in effect vested in an autocrat, General MacArthur, proved a decisive blessing. He was able to play the role of enlightened despot, and impose on Japan a revolution from above, like the Meiji Restoration of the 1860s which launched the Japanese as a modern nation. The 1947 constitution, drawn up in MacArthur's headquarters, was not an inter-party compromise, representing the lowest common denominator of agreement, but a homogeneous concept, incorporating the best aspects of the British and US constitutions and (like de Gaulle's) steering a skilful median between executive and legislature and between central and devolved power. Taken in conjunction with other Occupation laws creating free trade unions, a free press and devolved control of the police (the armed forces as such were abolished), the constitution, and the 'American era' which it epitomized, succeeded in destroying the mesmeric hold the state had hitherto exercised over the Japanese people. The American occupation of Japan was probably the greatest constructive achievement of American overseas policy in the whole post-war period, and it was carried through virtually single-handed. And, as with Britain's creation of a model trade union movement for West Germany, it raised up a mighty competitor.

"What the constitutional reforms essentially did was to persuade the Japanese that the state existed for its citizens, and not vice-versa. It laid the foundations of a new and healthy individualism by encouraging the emergence, as an alternative centre of loyalty to the state, of the family and of the many Japanese institutions which embody the family metaphor. As in postwar Germany and Italy, the family, both in its biological and its extended forms, provided the natural antidote to the totalitarian infection. This was assisted by a highly effective land reform, which gave freehold tenure to 4.7 million tenant farmers and raised the proportion of owner-farmed land to over 90 per cent. Local government reform completed the process of creating strong, democratic, property-owning local communities, as in Christian Democrat West Europe. The independence of the judiciary and an American-style Supreme Court underwrote individual property rights and civil liberties at the expense of the state and the collective. On these foundations was raised an exceptionally stable parliamentary structure, run by a liberal-conservative alliance (eventually called the Liberal Democratic Party), whose internal factions, modelled on extended families, provided flexibility and change, but whose external unity gave the country's economy a consistent free enterprise framework. The Liberal Democrats thus provided the same cohesion as the Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy, and the Gaullist-Independents in Fifth Republic France. The parallel went further. MacArthur's post-war purges made possible the emergence of an elderly political genius who, like Adenauer,

de Gasperi and de Gaulle, had been in opposition under the pre-war regime. Yoshuda Shigeru was a former diplomat and thus from the background closest to Anglo-Saxon traditions of democracy and the rule of law. He was sixty-seven when he became Prime Minister for nearly nine years, as one observer put it 'like a veteran *bonsai* [plum tree], of some antiquity, on whose gnarled branches white blossoms flower year by year'. He carried the new system through from adolescence to maturity, and by the time he retired in 1954 the pattern of stability was set not only for the 1950s but for the next quarter-century and beyond.

The Americans left Japan after six-and-a-half years' occupation, leaving it as a stable and prosperous democracy, apparently cured of its fascist-totalitarian tendencies. This was undoubtedly the greatest achievement of the Pax Americana. But there is something very paradoxical about this achievement. For a stable and prosperous democracy was achieved, not through democratic elections, but through an "enlightened despotism", the despotism of MacArthur. The Japanese had been "forced to be free", to use Rousseau's phrase, which was contrary to the principle of the Atlantic Charter agreed by Roosevelt and Churchill that all the peoples of the world should be free to choose their form of government. It would not be the first time that American power would enforce freedom on largely unwilling peoples around the globe... Clearly, however, if the choice was between being forced to be free by the Americans and being forced to be slaves by the Soviets, then the Japanese made the right choice in deciding to surrender to the American Navy rather than to the Red Army... But the contradiction with liberal theory was evident. And this contradiction between ends and means, liberal theory and liberal practice has continued to haunt the West to the present day.

From this paradoxical fact we come to a paradoxical but very important conclusion: that the best things are given, not by pressure from below, but *by command from on high*.

14. CHINA FALLS TO COMMUNISM

If the establishment of a stable, prosperous Japan was America's greatest overseas achievement, then "the loss of China", as it was quickly called, to Maoist Communism was her greatest failure.

From the beginning, Chinese Communism was mixed with nationalism, on the one hand, and the promise of democracy, on the other (a not uncommon mixture in communist movements). The pretence of democracy was, of course, a standard Communist ploy; the nationalist appeal became the hallmark of Asian, as opposed to European, Communism. Thus, as Frank Dikötter writes, while (somewhat desultorily) fighting a guerrilla war against the Japanese, Mao and Chen Boda published "On New Democracy, a pamphlet published in January 1940 that portrayed the communist party as a broad front striving to unite all 'revolutionary classes', including the national bourgeoisie. Mao promised a multi-party system, democratic freedoms and protection of private property. It was an entirely fictitious programme, but one that held broad popular appeal."196 But by the time he had achieved victory over both the Japanese and the Chinese nationalists, Mao was emphasising the superiority of the Middle Kingdom and a firm rejection of all Western concepts of international order. Thus on October 1, 1949, the birthday of the People's Republic of China, he declared: "The Chinese people have stood up"...

But if the flavour was nationalist, the methods and aims were traditionally Stalinist. Thus from 1942, he launched a so-called "Rectification Campaign", in which "thousands of suspects were locked up, interrogated, tortured, purged and occasionally executed. The spine-chilling howls of people imprisoned in caves could be heard at night.

"When the campaign came to an end, more than 13,000 alleged enemy agents and spies had been unmasked. Mao had allowed the terror to run amok, assuming the role of a self-effacing, distant yet benevolent leader. Then he stepped in to curb the violence, letting [his henchman] Kang Sheng take the fall. Those who had managed to survive the horror turned to Mao as a saviour...

"On 1 July 1943, the twenty-second anniversary of the founding of the party, Mao announced that the Rectification Campaign had 'guaranteed ideological and political unanimity in the party'. This was the green light for an unlimited cult of personality. All had to acclaim Mao Zedong, and all had to study Mao Zedong Thought, a term coined four days later by Wang Jiaxiang, a Soviettrained ideologist. Foremost among his hagiographers was Liu Shaoqi, who hailed Mao as a 'great revolutionary leader' and 'master of Marxism-Leninism'. Liu's praise was the signal for others to rally around their leader, referring to him as the 'great revolutionary helmsman', a 'saving star', a 'genius strategist' and a 'genius politician'. The panegyrics were 'nauseatingly slavish', observed

¹⁹⁶ Dikötter, Dictators, London: Bloomsbury, 2019, p. 99.

Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, two American journalists. When Mao spoke, hardened men tempered by years of guerrilla warfare would studiously take notes 'as if drinking from the fountain of knowledge'.

"The party's mouthpiece, *Liberation Daily*, overseen by Mao, used giant headlines proclaiming 'Comrade Mao Zedong is the Saviour of the Chinese People!' By the end of 1943 portraits of Mao were everywhere, prominently displayed next to those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Badges bearing his head circulated among the party elite, while his profile appeared in gold relief on the façade of a huge auditorium. People sang to his glory: 'The East is Red, the Sun is Rising; China has Brought Forth a Mao Zedong; He seeks the People's Happiness'.

"In April 1945, after a seventeen-year interval, a party congress was finally convened. Hundreds of the delegates had been persecuted during the Rectification Campaign, some of them replaced by men loyal to Mao. All of them hailed their leader, who was elected Chairman of the top organs of the party. Mao Zedong Thought was enshrined in the party constitution. In his opening report, Liu Shaoqi mentioned the Chairman's name more than a hundred times, referring to him as 'the greatest revolutionary and statesman in all of Chinese history' as well as 'the greatest theoretician and scientist in all of Chinese history'. Mao, at long last, had turned the party into an instrument of his own will.'...

"When Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 Mao controlled 900,000 troops in rural pockets across the north of China. A few days earlier Stalin had declared war on Japan, sending close to a million troops across the Siberian border to occupy Manchuria and the north of Korea, where they waited for their Allied counterparts to join them on the 38th parallel. Mao had grandiose plans to incite a rebellion in faraway Shanghai, but Stalin's immediate concern was to ensure the departure of the American troops from China and Korea. In order to achieve this goal, he recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of a united China in a Sino-Soviet treaty.

"Soviet troops in Manchuria, however, quietly handed over the countryside to the communists, who began pouring into the region from Yan'an. The Soviets helped Mao transform his raging army of guerrilla fighters into a formidable fighting machine, opening sixteen military institutions, including air force, artillery and engineering schools. Some Chinese officers went to the Soviet Union for advanced training. Logistical support also arrived by air and by rail. In North Korea alone a full 1,000 wagonloads were allocated to the task."¹⁹⁷

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¹⁹⁷ Dikötter, Dictators, pp. 99-102.

It has been persuasively argued by Stephen Kotkin that it was Roosevelt, not Truman, who really "lost China", making it the first and biggest "domino" to fall in the Cold War. For at Yalta in 1945, where China was a major subject of the negotiations, Roosevelt could have insisted that Stalin abandon Mao's communists in favour of Chiang-kai-shek (whom Stalin in any case recognized officially) in exchange for the major territorial concessions granted the Soviets in the Kurile islands, Sakhalin and China. Truman reinforced Roosevelt's error.

"Three months before Potsdam [July 1945]," write Philip Darrell Collins and Paul David Collins, "Truman was advised by fifty top Army intelligence officers through General George C. Marshall against just such an action. They stated: 'The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill-effects of which would be felt for decades to come... [It] would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic. If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose her independence, to become the Poland of Asia; Korea, the Asiatic Romania; Manchukuo, the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal China will exist after the impact of the Russian armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may have to depart and a Chinese Soviet government may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recognize. To take a line of action which would save few lives now, and only a little time at an unpredictable cost in lives, treasure, and honor in the future – and simultaneously destroy our ally China, would be an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for peace a tragic farce. Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to destroy China.'

"Instead of listening to the intelligence team, Truman allowed himself to fall under the influence of Owen Lattimore, whose concepts made up U.S. policy concerning post-war China. Lattimore would later be identified by an investigating Senate Subcommittee as a communist subversive..."¹⁹⁸

"On the day after Japan's surrender," writes Martin Gilbert, "from his base in Yenan, Mao Tse-tung had ordered his troops to advance 'on all fronts' and to disarm all Japanese troops they encountered. He was determined not only to establish a Chinese Communist presence in Manchuria, but to extend Communist authority as widely as possible beyond the areas of China already under Communist control. So successful was he in overrunning large areas of northern China that the Nationalist troops [of Chiang Kai-Shek] could only be moved by air between the cities they controlled. At the end of August, Mao Tse-tung went to Chungking to negotiate with the Nationalists. But although some form of negotiations continued for a year and a half, it soon became clear that there would no outcome, no solution, and no prospect but that of civil war..."¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Collins and Collins, *The Ascendancy of the Scientific Dictatorship*, New York: iUniverse, 2005, p. 134.

¹⁹⁹ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 713.

Norman Stone writes: "As soon as Mao was back in Yenan in October 1945 he started operations in Manchuria. At the turn of 1945-6 matters did not go well for the Communists - Chiang Kai-Shek's troops had had experience of fighting the Japanese and once they came north gave a good account of themselves, thousands of Communist troops deserting. The Soviets left Manchuria in early May 1946, and Mao made an initial error of trying to hold the cities, whereas his real strength lay with the peasants. The Nationalists did well, chasing the Communists to the north; at one stage Mao even planned to give up Harbin and retreat into Siberia. But in Jonathan Spence's account the rush into Manchuria was a mistake; Chiang should have concentrated on building up China south of the Great Wall, not on a complicated adventure into territory where the Communists had ready Soviet support. However, Chiang was desperately anxious for victory, and at the same time unwilling to use his tanks and heavy weaponry; he neglected the countryside and mismanaged Manchuria when he ran it in 1946-7. Kuomintang finances went into an inflationary spiral, and even the Shanghai business people were alienated, while troops deserted for want of proper pay.

"The Communists were in effect also saved by the Americans. President Truman did not want a fight over China, would grant dollars, would help with shipping, but believed he could insist on the Chinese co-operating. He sent George C. Marshall in December 1945..., who had some knowledge of the country from service there in the twenties. He took against Chiang Kai-shek because of his relatives' corruption and his own dissolute doings (although Chiang had become a Methodist and a reformed character), and a subsequent American envoy, though more sympathetic, was a buffoon. To the American professionals, Mao and Chou had little difficulty in portraying themselves as efficient popular-front democrats, and Marshall himself was impressed when he saw them at work in Yenan, in March 1946. In any case, at this moment the Americans had enough on their plate. Europe was by far the largest problem, but in Asia they faced one conundrum after another: what *were* they to do with Japan; the Philippines had to be sorted out; Korea was a muddle; the British, still influential, feared what a Nationalist government might do in Hong Kong. The last thing the Americans wanted to see was a Chinese civil war, and for a time Marshall accepted what Mao told him. He stopped the Nationalists at a decisive moment. Chiang might have destroyed the Communists in Manchuria but on 31 May Marshall told him not to go on: Chiang Kai-shek was getting American aid - \$3bn in all - and he was in no position to defy Marshall. Truman wrote to Chiang, admonishingly, and under American pressure the Nationalists set up an assembly that wasted time and attracted endless criticism for sharp practice... A truce was proclaimed, just as Mao prepared to abandon Harbin and the railway link to Siberia.

"The upshot was that the Communists were left in control of Manchuria, an area twice the size of Germany, and they used these four months to consolidate their hold over it, using Japanese weaponry supplied by the Russians (as well as Japanese prisoners of war who even served as flight instructors). They took over 900 aircraft, 700 tanks, 1,700 guns and much else, together with 200,000 regular soldiers, and North Korea, which the Russians had occupied, was also a useful asset for Mao. In June 1946, when matters were going badly, he was able to send his wounded and his reserve materiel there, and when the Nationalists split Manchuria in two, North Korea was the link between the Communists in the north and the south, who would otherwise have been divided. The other decisive Soviet contribution was the remaking of the railway, which was linked up with Russia again in spring 1947.... Soviet help was decisive, though it came at a grotesque price: the export of food from a starving country.

"When Marshall imposed his ceasefire in June 1946 the Nationalists were greatly superior, with over 4 million troops to Mao's 1.25 million; and they expelled the Communists from most of their strongholds in China proper, with Nangking again the capital. In October 1946 Chiang Kai-shek did attack Manchuria but by then the Red bases had become too strong and Mao's chief general, Lin Biao, proved to have too much military talent (it was the harshest winter in living memory, and his troops were made to carry out ambushes in fearful cold, at -40 degrees: they lost 100,000 men from frostbite). In January 1947 Marshall left China and it was the end of American efforts at mediation."²⁰⁰

On January 7, 1947, General Marshall's report on his mission to China was published. He had tried, but failed, to force the Communists under Mao into a coalition with the Nationalists under Chiang. The reason, he said, was the distrust between the two sides, and in particular the Nationalists' belief that "co-operation by the Communist Party in the Government was inconceivable, and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue". ²⁰¹ Of course, Communist propaganda also played its part in the American withdrawal: Mao successfully deceived the American public through gullible journalists that he was more a social democrat or Robin Hood character than a real Communist...

The Civil War of 1945-9, writes Paul Johnson, "was the culmination of the war-lord period of instability introduced by the destruction of the monarchy. Success was determined throughout by the same factors: control of the cities and communications, and the ability to hold together armies by keeping them paid, supplied and happy. In the circumstances of the post-war period, Mao proved a more successful war-lord than Chiang, chiefly by keeping his armies out of the urban economy. If any one factor destroyed the KMT it was inflation. Inflation had become uncontrollable in the last phase of the Japanese Empire, of which urban China was a salient part. In 1945 in Japan itself, paper money became worthless and a virtual barter-economy developed. The disease spread to the Chinese cities and up the great rivers. Chiang's regime, when it took over in the last months of 1945, inherited an underlying hyper-inflation and failed to take adequate steps to kill it. The Americans were generous in money and

²⁰⁰ Stone, op. cit., pp. 87-90.

²⁰¹ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 773.

supplies. Chiang had been eligible for Lend-Lease and got it in considerable quantities. He received a \$300 million economic stabilization loan and a total of \$2 billion in 1945-9. But once the Civil War began in earnest and brought the hyper-inflation to the surface again, American assistance proved irrelevant. Chiang's government was not only incompetent; it was also corrupt. Inflation created military weakness and military failure produced yet more inflation.

"Chiang compounded the problem by denying it existed. His strength declined slowly in 1947, rapidly in the first half of 1948. In Peking prices multiplied five times from mid-September to mid-October. The Peiping Chronicle recorded Chiang's comment: 'Press reports of recent price increases and panic buying were greatly exaggerated... during his personal inspection of Peiping, Tientsin and Mukden he saw nothing to support these allegations.' Yet in Manchuria and North China inflation had brought industry to a virtual standstill. Many workers were on hunger strike, provoked by a chronic ricefamine. The American consul-general in Mukden reported: 'Puerile efforts have been made towards price control and to combat hoarding... the results... have been largely to enforce requisitioning of grain at bayonet-point for controlled prices and enable the resale of requisitioned bread at black market prices for the benefit of the pockets of rapacious military and civil officials.' In Shanghai commodity prices rose twenty times between 19 August and 8 November 1948, and on the latter date alone, rice jumped from 300 Chinese dollars per *picul* (133 pounds) in the morning to 1,000 at noon and 1800 by nightfall. Hundreds died in the street every day, their bodies being collected by municipal refuse trucks. Chiang put his son, General Chiang Ching-kuo, in charge as economic dictator. His 'gold-dollar' currency reform - there was nothing gold about it - changed hyper-inflation into uncontrolled panic, and he alienated one of Chiang's most faithful sources of support, Shanghai's gangster community, by squeezing £5 million (US) out of them for his own 'war chest'.

"Granted the principles of war-lordism, the economic collapse was reflected in army strengths. In summer 1948, in secret session, the KMT parliament was told that in August 1945 their army had been 3.7 million strong with 6,000 big guns. The CCP forces had then numbered 320,000, of which no more than 166,000 were armed. But Red units were accustomed to live off the land, and scour the towns. KMT troops were paid in paper which, increasingly, did not buy enough food to feed them. So they sold their personal weapons and any other army equipment they could obtain. The officers were worse than the men and the generals worst of all. By June 1948 the KMT army was down to 2.1 million; the CCP army had risen to 1.5 million, equipped with a million rifles and 22,800 pieces of artillery, more than the KMT (21,000); virtually all these weapons had been bought from government troops. The Americans, who had supplied Chiang with \$1 billion worthy of Pacific War surplus, thus equipped both sides in the conflict..."²⁰²

²⁰² Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 445-446.

"In 1948," continues Dikötter, "the communists began laying siege to cities in Manchuria, starving them into surrender. Changchun fell after 160,000 civilians died of hunger. Unwilling to undergo the same fate, Beijing capitulated soon afterwards. Like dominoes, other cities fell one after the other, unable to resist the war machine built up by the communists. [Shanghai fell in May, 1949 and on December 10] Chiang Kai-shek and his troops fled to Taiwan. By the end of 1949, after a long and bloody military conquest, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed.

"The moment the red flag fluttered over Beijing, a hastily sketched portrait of Mao Zedong went up over the main gate of the Forbidden City. Over the following months portraits of the Chairman appeared in schools, factories and offices, often with precise instruction on how they should be displayed. His distinctive wart soon became a trademark and was affectionately touched in like a Buddha figure. The study of Mao Zedong Thought became compulsory, as adults from all walks of life had to go back to class, poring over official textbooks to learn the new orthodoxy. Revolutionary songs, including 'Mao Zedong is our Sun' or 'Hymn to Chairman Mao' were belted out daily by schoolchildren, soldiers, prisoners and office workers. These tunes were also blasted from loudspeakers, installed on street corners, railway stations, dormitories, canteens and all major institutions. Carefully choreographed parades, tanks and armoured cars were reviewed by the Chairman on top of a rostrum in Tiananmen Square.

"With the cult of personality came a harsh regime modelled on the Soviet Union. 'The Soviet Union Today is our Tomorrow' was the slogan of the day. Mao emulated Stalin, seeing the key to wealth and power in the collectivisation of agriculture, the elimination of private property, all-pervasive control of the lives of ordinary people and huge expenditures on national defence.

"The promises made in *On New Democracy* were broken one by one. The regime's first act was to overthrow the old order in the countryside. This was done in the guise of land reform, as villagers were forced to beat and dispossess their own leaders in collective denunciation meetings, accusing them of being 'landlords', 'tyrants' and 'traitors'. Some did it with relish, but many had no choice as they risked being targeted themselves. Close to two million people were physically liquidated, many more stigmatised as 'exploiters' and 'class enemies'. Their assets were distributed to the perpetrators, creating a pace sealed in blood between the poor and the party.

"In the cities every individual was given a class label (*chengen*) based on their loyalty to the revolution: there were 'good', 'wavering' and 'hostile' people. A class label determined a person's access to food, education, health care and employment. Those marked as 'hostile' were stigmatised for life and beyond, since the label was passed on to children.²⁰³

"A Great Terror followed from October 1950 to October 1951, as the regime turned against 'counter-revolutionaries', 'spies', 'bandits' and others standing in the way of the revolution. Mao fixed the killing quota at one per thousand, but in some regions two or three times as many were killed, often killed at random The following yar former government servants were subjected to a massive purge, while the business community was brought to heel..." ²⁰⁴

In the first two years of Communist rule, according to Kenneth Scott Latourette, between 3 and 5 million people were executed. "Most of this was by shootings in large groups which the public were encouraged or required to attend. In despair untold thousands had committed suicide. Many suffered from mental breakdown. Class consciousness was created and nurtured and with it class hatred. Mass hysteria was fomented. A strict censorship of the printed page and the radio was enforced."²⁰⁵

Could the Americans have prevented the catastrophe by placing "boots on the ground" on the Nationalists' side? Unlikely... They were already overstretched in Asia, and still had many divisions tied down in Europe. Moreover, the Soviets supported Mao, and were supplying him with weapons captured from the Japanese in Manchuria. True, Stalin still officially recognized Chiang - the Soviet ambassador was the only representative of the major powers to see him off from Canton into exile in Taiwan. But it is unlikely that Stalin would ever have allowed Mao to be defeated completely: his strategy was to keep the Chinese communists dependent on him for their survival, while weakening the Americans in a long and fruitless war in China similar to that in which they were later mired in Vietnam.

The mention of Vietnam, where a nationalist form of communism eventually triumphed over capitalism, leads us to perhaps the most important reason why China eventually fell to the communists. Already before the end of the Second World War, it was becoming clear that a powerful reaction against the old colonial powers – Britain, France and Holland – was setting in. Their victory in 1945 temporarily stabilized their power, but not for long. India was liberated from the British in 1947, and Indochina and Indonesia from the French and Dutch respectively – but not before bitter nationalist wars. This nationalist wave was no less powerful in China, which had been humiliated and exploited by the western colonial powers since the early nineteenth century, leading to the fall of the Chinese Empire in 1911. The KMT, though officially "nationalist", was still closely linked with the West and infected with the western diseases...

²⁰⁴ Dikötter, *Dictators*. pp. 102-103.

 $^{^{203}}$ China's contemporary social credit system is essentially a more sophisticated, digitalised variation on this system. (V.M.)

²⁰⁵ Latourette, in Martin Gilbert, *Challenge to Civilization*. A History of the Twentieth Century 1952-1999, London: HarperCollins, 1999, p. 75.

As Kennedy writes, "the shock to the United States of the 'loss' of China was altogether more severe than these challenges further south. From the time of American missionary endeavours in the nineteenth century onward, enormous amounts of cultural and psychological (much less financial) capital had been invested by the United States in that large and populous land; and this had been blown up to even greater proportions by the press coverage of Chiang Kai-shek's government during the war itself. In more than the religious sense, the United States felt it had a 'mission' in China. And while the professionals in the State Department and the military were increasingly aware of the Kuomintang's corruption and inefficiency, their perceptions were not generally shared by public opinion, especially on the Republican right, which by the late 1940s was beginning to see world politics in rigidly black-and-white terms."²⁰⁶

However, if anything was appropriately described in black-and-white terms, then it was the loss of the world's most populous state to the world's most evil ideology. The decades to come would demonstrate this beyond doubt as the Chinese people suffered immensely from the Communist dragon. And at the time of writing, the still-Communist Chinese empire represents the gravest threat to the freedom and survival of independent statehood throughout the world...

On October 1, 1949 Mao, claiming the mantle of victor and liberator of the nation, proclaimed in Tiananmen Square in Beijing that "the Chinese people have stood up". Just two months later, during a visit to Moscow to celebrate Stalin's seventieth birthday, Mao showed exactly what he meant – that he was now going to stand up to Stalin, too. Thus he said to him: "Dear comrades and friends! I am glad to have been presented this opportunity of visiting the capital of the world's first great socialist state. There is a profound friendship between the peoples of the two great states, China and the USSR. After the October socialist revolution, the Soviet government, following the politics of Lenin and Stalin, has first of all annulled the unequal treaties imposed on China during the period of imperialist Russia."

This was a bold thing to say to Stalin, the head of a country that was at that time far more powerful than China and which had by no means rejected the Tsars' claims on parts of Siberia, "unequal" and unjust though the Chinese might consider them to be. But Mao saw himself as the heir of the Chinese empire that had existed for thousands of years; he was the last emperor in a long imperialist tradition. And as such, he saw his country as superior to all others, including the white barbarians of Northern Asia, who had taken ancestral lands in Siberia away from China at the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1860. This "unequal" treaty, Mao gave Stalin to understand, had now been annulled, and those lands belonged by right to China. Stalin did not, of course, accept

²⁰⁶ Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 491-492.

this interpretation (he could stand up for the Tsarist imperialists when he had inherited their empire), and it was not until Gorbachev that Russia made substantial concessions to China in this regard (Putin continues these concessions). But the very fact that Mao was able to make these claims only two months after coming to power showed, not only the ambitions of China, but also the limits of Soviet power in the longer term...²⁰⁷

Kissinger elaborates on the meaning of "The Chinese people have stood up": "Mao elaborated this slogan as a China purifying and strengthening itself through a doctrine of 'continuous revolution' and proceeded to dismantle established concepts of domestic and international order. The entire institutional spectrum came under attack: Western democracy, Soviet leadership of the Communist world, and the legacy of the Chinese past. Art and monuments, holidays and traditions, vocabulary and dress, fell under various forms of interdict - blamed for bringing about the passivity that had rendered China unprepared in the face of foreign intrusions. In Mao's concept of order - which he called the 'great harmony', echoing classical Chinese philosophy - a new China would emerge out of the destruction of traditional Confucian culture emphasizing harmony. Each wave of revolutionary exertion, he proclaimed, would serve as a precursor of the next. The process of revolution must be ever accelerated, Mao held, lest the revolutionaries become complacent and indolent. 'Disequilibirum is a general, objective rule,' wrote Mao: 'The cycle, which is endless, evolves from disequilibrium to equilibrium and then to disequilibrium again. Each cycle, however, brings us to a higher level of development. Disequilibrium is normal and absolute whereas equilibrium is temporary and relative. In the end, this upheaval was designed to produce a kind of traditional Chinese outcome: a form of Communism intrinsic to Chine, setting itself apart by a distinctive form of conduct that swayed by its achievements, with China's unique and now revolutionary moral authority again swaying 'All Under Heaven'.

"Mao conducted international affairs by the same reliance on the unique nature of China. Though China was objectively weak by the way the rest of the world measured strength, Mao insisted on its central role via psychological and ideological superiority, to be demonstrated by defying rather than conciliating a world emphasizing superior physical power. When speaking in Moscow to an international conference of Communist Party leaders in 1957, Mao shocked fellow delegates by predicting that in the event of nuclear war China's more numerous population and hardier culture would be the ultimate victor, and that even casualties of hundreds of millions would not deflect China from its revolutionary course. While this might have been partly bluff to discourage countries with vastly superior nuclear arsenals, Mao wanted the world to believe that he contemplated nuclear war with equanimity..."²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Andrei Piontkovsky, "Echo minuvshej vojny. Andrei Piontkovsky – o kitajskom voprose" (Echoes of a past war. Andrei Piontkovsky on the Chinese question), *Radio Svoboda*, June 30, 2018.

²⁰⁸ Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

Mao's China soon showed that it was a chip off the old block of Leninism-Stalinism. Thus the Chinese built their own Gulag, the Laogai. Daniel Goldhagen writes: "The communist Chinese built at least one forced labour camp in each of more than two thousand counties during the 1950s. During the regime's first few years, from 1949 to 1953, they eliminated ten million to fifteen million people by confining them in these lethal institutions. In central and southern China, they supplied their victims with about eighteen ounces (five hundred grams) of food a day. Estimates of the labour camp death toll during

As for the Leninist-Stalinist hatred of Christianity and religion, Mao was an eager imitator...

this period are, as with practically all of the Chinese's mass murdering, wildly

divergent, yet a conservative estimate is more than two million."²⁰⁹

But first an excursus to the Chinese traditional attitude to Christianity, which first made considerable inroads into China after the Opium Wars in the nineteenth century. In spite of the anti-western Boxer rebellion if the year 1900, which was essentially an anti-Christian rebellion, the spread of Christianity and the erosion of traditional Chinese paganism continued after the revolution of 1912.

Thus Ian Johnson writes: "Christianity held a powerful appeal for modernizing reformers who often looked to the West for inspiration and were impressed by the religion's apparent compatibility with modern states there. Some reformers, including the Nationalist Party leader Chiang Kai-shek, even converted to Christianity. But most important was the decision by almost all Chinese modernizers to adopt what they saw as a Protestant-style distinction between religion and superstition. They concluded that only religious practices that resembled Christianity were 'real' and should be allowed to survive; the rest were more superstitious and should be banished.

"The religious cleansing that followed unfolded haphazardly, often through individual actions. A telling example involves Sun Yat-sen, who would eventually help overthrow the Qing dynasty and establish the Republic of China in 1912. One of his first acts of rebellion involved storming into the local temple in his hometown in Xianshan County and smashing its statues. When Sun's Nationalist Party took power, the pace of change picked up, and Chiang, who succeeded Sun in 1926, launched the New Life Movement to cleanse China of its old ways. Along with trying to eradicate opium abuse, gambling, prostitution, and illiteracy, the Nationalists launched a 'campaign to destroy superstition'. In the period between the end of imperial rule and the

²⁰⁹ Goldhagen, Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, London: Abacus, 2009, p. 116.

Communists' victory in the civil war in 1949, half of the one million temples that had dotted China at the turn of the century were destroyed.

"Following their takeover, China's Communists initially handled religion as they did other noncommunist elements of society, through co-optation. The party set up associations for the five groups that had emerged out of the wreckage of the old system: Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants. These five were allowed to run their surviving temples, churches, and mosques. Everything was firmly guided by the party, but religion wasn't banned.

"That system lasted only a few years. In the late 1950s, Mao Zedong began to suppress most religious activity, and by the time he launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the Chinese Communist Party had begun one of the most furious assaults on religion in world history. Virtually every place of worship was closed, and almost all clergy were driven out. In the Catholic stronghold of Taiyuan, in Shanxi Province, the central cathedral was turned into a 'living exhibition' to demonstrate the backwardness of religion: its priests and nuns were held in cages, and local residents were ordered to troop by and observe the. Across the country, Buddhist, Taoist, and Catholic clerics who had taken vows of chastity were forced to marry. Family shrines were dismantled. Temples were gutted, torn down, or occupied by factories or government offices; zealous Maoist cadres pitched the temples' sacred statues into bonfires or smuggled them to Hong Kong to be sold off through antique dealers. (This is one reason why so many temples in China today lack the great works of art that characterize ancient places of worship elsewhere around the world.)

"In response to such repression, religion went underground. Church-goers began meeting in secret, and Buddhists and Taoists tried to save their scriptures and ritual manuals by burying them or committing them to memory. Authorities forbade the open practice of physical forms of spiritual cultivation, such as meditation and many martial arts. In public, the only form of worship the party allowed to thrive was the cult of Mao..."²¹⁰

²¹⁰ Johnson, "China's Great Awakening", Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2017, pp. 86-88.

II. THE COLD WAR BEGINS (1949-1953)

15. THE COLD WAR SUMMARISED

"From its inception," writes Stephen Kotkin, "the Soviet Union had claimed to be an experiment in socialism, a superior alternative to capitalism, for the entire world. If socialism was not superior to capitalism, its existence could not be justified. In the inter-war period, during Stalin's violent crusade to build socialism, capitalism had seemed for many people to be synonymous with world imperialism, the senseless slaughter of the First World War, goosestepping militarism, and Great Depression unemployment. Against that background, the idea of a non-capitalist world – with the same modern machines but supposedly with social justice – held wide appeal.

"But in the Second World War fascism was defeated, and after the war the capitalist dictatorships embraced democracy. Instead of a final economic crisis anticipated by Stalin and others, capitalism experienced an unprecedented boom, which made the Depression a memory and homeownership a mass phenomenon. Economic growth in the United States, after a robust 1950s, hit a phenomenal 52.8 percent in the 1960s; more significantly, median family income rose 39.7 percent over the decade. In Japan and West Germany, losers in the Second World War, economic 'miracles' led to revolutions in mass consumption. New media technologies, such as cinema and radio, which had seemed so convenient for inter-war dictatorships seeking to spread propaganda, turned out to be conditions of a commercial mass culture impervious to state borders. Finally, all leading capitalist countries embraced the 'welfare state' – a term coined during the Second World War – stabilizing their social orders and challenging socialism on its own turf. In short, between the 1930s and the 1960s, the image and reality of capitalism changed radically. Affordable Levittown houses, ubiquitous department stores, overflowing with inexpensive consumer goods, expanded health and retirement benefits, and increasingly democratic institutions were weapons altogether different from Nazi tanks."211

How was the Soviet Union to react to this major improvement in "the image and the reality" of the Capitalist West? On the way to and from Berlin, the Red Army had seized most of Central and Eastern Europe. But it could not go further for fear of eliciting a hot war it could not win. It had to entrench itself and dig in in a war of attrition known as the Cold War, which contained many proxy hot wars around the globe but none between the superpowers.

In retrospect, we can see that the two decisive events that elicited the emergence of the NATO alliance were Stalin's rejection of Marshall Aid for Eastern Europe and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, which put paid to the last hopes of a peaceful evolution of the Communist East into a non-communist system that could compete with the West on a level playing-field.

²¹¹ Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted. The Soviet Collapse* 1970-2000, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 19-20.

In reality, a cold war had existed between the Communist East and the Capitalist West since the early 1920s. Essentially, war had been declared on all "normal" governments by Lenin in 1917, and Stalin had faithfully followed the Leninist line throughout his "reign" except for the short period of the Popular Fronts in the late 1930s and the wartime alliance of 1941-45. So 1948-49 simply marked a return to the norm with regard to the relationship of normal governments to the profoundly abnormal anti-state of the Soviet Union. Only now, thanks to the firmness and generosity of the American leaders (selfinterested it also was, but this did not mean it was ungenerous), Western Europe was on the road to economic recovery without the temptations of communism and fascism that had so weakened it in the 1930s, while Eastern Europe, more firmly enslaved than ever, was by the 1960s falling further and further behind economically. Thus was the huge advantage gained by Stalin after his victory in the Second World War gradually whittled away... However, silent disillusion in the "Second World" homelands of Communism was balanced by hordes of new converts to Marxism in the Third and even the First Worlds. And so the West faltered in the late 1960s and 1970s while the Soviets recovered, only to surrender finally in the late 1980s.

Harari summarizes these swings in the pendulum as follows: "The Soviet Union entered the war as an isolated communist pariah. It emerged as one of the two global superpowers and the leader of an expanding international bloc. By 1949 eastern Europe became a Soviet satellite, the Chinese communist party had won the Chinese Civil War, and the United States was gripped by anticommunist hysteria. Revolutionary and anti-colonial movements throughout the world looked longingly towards Moscow and Beijing, while liberalism became identified with the racist European empires. As these empires collapsed they were usually replaced by either military dictatorships or socialist regimes, not liberal democracies. In 1956 the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, confidently boasted to the liberal West that 'Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you!'

"Khrushchev sincerely believed this, as did increasing numbers of Third World leaders and First World intellectuals. In the 1960s and 1970s the word 'liberal' became a term of abuse in many Western universities. North America and western Europe experienced growing social unrest as radical left-wing movements strove to undermine the liberal order. Students in Cambridge, the Sorbonne and the People's Republic of Berkeley thumbed through Chairman Mao's Little Red Book and hung Che Guevara's heroic portrait over their beds. In 1968 the wave crested with the outbreak of protests and riots all over the Western world. Mexican security forces killed dozens of students in the notorious Tlatelolco Massacre, the students in Rome fought the Italian police in the so-called Battle of Valle Giulia, and the assassination of Martin Luther King sparked days of riots and protests in more than a hundred American cities. In May students took over the streets of Paris, President de Gaulle fled to a French military base in Germany, and well-to-do French citizens trembled in their beds, having guillotine nightmares. "By 1970 the world contained 130 independent countries, but only thirty of these were liberal democracies, most of which were crammed into the northwestern corner of Europe. India was the only important Third World country that committed to the liberal path after securing its independence, but even India distanced itself from the Western bloc and leaned towards the Soviets.

"In 1975 the liberal camp suffered its most humiliating defeat of all: the Vietnam War ended with the North Vietnamese David overcoming the American Goliath. In quick succession communism took over South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. On 17 April 1975 the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, fell to the Khmer Rouge. Two weeks later people all over the world watched on TV as helicopters evacuated the last Yankees from the rooftop of the American Embassy in Saigon. Many were certain that the American Empire was falling. Before anyone could say 'domino theory', in June Indira Gandhi proclaimed the Emergency in India, and it seemed that the world's largest democracy was on its way to becoming yet another socialist dictatorship.

"Liberal democracy increasingly looked like an exclusive club for ageing white imperialists who had little to offer the rest of the world or even to their own youth. Washington hailed itself as the leader of the free world, but most of its allies were either authoritarian kings (such as King Khaled of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco and the Persian shah) or military dictators (such as the Greek colonels, General Pinochet in Chile, General Franco in Spain, General Park in South Korea, General Geisel in Brazil and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan).

"Despite the support of all these kings and generals, militarily the Warsaw Pact had a huge numerical superiority over NATO. In order to reach parity in conventional armaments, Western countries would probably have had to scrap liberal democracy and the free market, and become totalitarian states on a permanent war footing. Liberal democracy was saved only by nuclear weapons. NATO adopted the MAD doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction), according to which even conventional Soviet attacks would be answered by an all-out nuclear strike. 'If you attack us,' threatened the liberals, 'we will make sure nobody comes out alive.' Behind this monstrous shield liberal democracy and the free market managed to hold out in their last bastions, and Westerners got to enjoy sex, drugs and rock and roll, as well as washing machines, refrigerators and televisions. Without nukes there would have been no Beatles, no Woodstock and no overflowing supermarkets. But in the mid-1970s it seemed that nuclear weapons notwithstanding, the future belonged to socialism...

"And then everything changed. Liberal democracy crawled out of history's dustbin, cleaned itself up and conquered the world. The supermarket proved to be far stronger than the gulag. The blitz-krieg began in southern Europe where the authoritarian regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal collapsed, giving way to democratic governments. In 1977 Indira Gandhi ended the

Emergency, re-establishing democracy in India. During the 1980s military dictatorships in East Asia and Latin America were replaced by democratic governments in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan and South Korea. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the liberal wave turned into a veritable tsunami, sweeping away the mighty Soviet empire and raising expectations of the coming end of history. After decades of defeats and setbacks, liberalism won a decisive victory in the Cold War, emerging triumphant from the humanist wars of religion, albeit a bit worse for wear...^{"212}

And yet this is an over-simplification. It is true that of the three forms of humanism – liberal, socialist and evolutionary (fascist) – that fought for supremacy in the period 1914 to 1991, it was the liberal form that emerged triumphant in 1991. But its main rival from 1945, socialist humanism, was never defeated in war, and in the absence of a real refutation of humanism itself (something that liberal humanism by its very nature is unable to provide), there was nothing to prevent socialism re-emerging in new and subtler guises – as, for example, in the European Union. Nor was there anything to prevent the loser in 1991 from mutating into a new kind of evolutionary humanism – which is what has happened in Putin's present-day Russian Federation. Nor is liberal humanism itself immune from corruption and mutation in a socialist direction, as it seems to be doing at the time of writing (2021). A root-and-branch elimination of humanism can only come about through a revival of the true faith, which did not take place in this period...

As stated above, the Cold War involved almost no shots fired in anger between the United States and the Soviet Union (except in the air over Korea). It was conducted in other countries through proxy armies. As such, it recalls the imperialist rivalries between European countries such as Britain and France in the nineteenth century, in which one country would try and steal a march on another, and create alliances against the other, but which did not lead to direct warfare between the two.

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There are indeed similarities, but the differences are more important. The British and French may have believed in the glories of their own civilization – but these civilizational benefits to the colonies were secondary to the commercial gains to themselves. The Americans and the Soviets, on the other hand, were truly fighting for the liberal and socialist varieties of humanism respectively; their war was ideological – which is not to say that other motives were not also involved. But these other motives – mainly commercial – were usually subordinated to the interests of the ideological and military struggle.

Moreover, the dynamics of the two anti-imperialist empires were very different from the Cold War contestants. The old European empires, with the blessing of America, proceeded to free their former colonies, hoping to install

²¹² Harari, Homo Deus, London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 3-7-311.

in their place the ideology of liberal democracy – with varied success, as we shall see. The Soviets, on the other hand, not only did not liberate any part of the former Russian empire, but imposed a yoke far harsher than those of the nineteenth century empires on Eastern Europe, taking care that the same totalitarian cruelty should reign there as in the "mother country".

As Revel wrote in 1983, "Since 1945 the two imperialisms have moved in exactly the opposite directions. Since the Second World War, the major excolonial powers that make up today's capitalist world have abandoned, willingly or not, the territory they had annexed over the centuries. Spain long ago lost its vast American possessions. Since then, the former overseas holdings of Britain, Holland, France, Belgium and Portugal have become a crowd of independent nations. In some cases, decolonization went ahead with speed and intelligence, in others slowly and stupidly, with terrible carnage, but in the end it was done everywhere. It is interesting to note that the colonial powers that tried to resist the trend were disapproved of by the other capitalist countries; they were isolated even among their allies and forced to give in. Just how much real independence many of these new Third World states have is a matter of considerable debate. The fact remains, however, that aspiration and accession to independence on the part of any group with even the slightest claim to statehood is one of the great postwar historical phenomena.

"At a time, then, when territorial annexation, once considered a legitimate reward for military superiority, has given way to peoples' right to selfdetermination and national status, only the Soviet Union continues to grow by means of armed conquest. In the 1940-80 period of decolonization, when the old empires were restoring independence to or conferring it on the territories they had subjugated over the centuries, the Soviet Union was moving the other way, appropriating a number of foreign countries by trick or by force.

"I would hesitate to weary the reader with a list he should be able to find in the encyclopaedias and history books if it were not that most of these reference books, reflecting Europe's cultural Finlandization, shamelessly gloss over the brilliant achievements of Soviet expansionism.

"By what right, for example, did the USSR cling after the war to the countries Germany ceded to it as payment for its neutrality under the Hitler-Stalin treaty sharing out a dismembered Europe? This is how the Soviets acquired the Baltic states, eastern Poland, southern Finland and part of Romania (Bessarabia and southern Bukovina). I grant that it was Germany that later broke the treaty and invaded the Soviet Union, which, it is worth recalling, would have liked nothing better than to go on enjoying its fruitful cooperation with the Nazis. Involuntarily and oh how regrettably, Moscow had no choice but to switch camps. Indeed, it *was switched* by Hitler.

"Was this any reason for the democracies not to reconsider what Hitler had bestowed on Stalin? Fighting alongside the Allies in the second phase of the war of course gave USSR the right, as it did to all the victors, to recover its own territory intact. But this did not authorize it to expand, as it alone did, at the expense of other martyred countries and certainly not to keep the proceeds of its collusion with the Nazis. Yet not only did the Allies fail to challenge these ill-gotten acquisitions, but they even threw in a few gifts, such as East Prussia, Ruthenia (a part of Czechoslovakia), the Kurile Islands, and the southern part of Sakhalin Island (in the Sea of Okhotsk, north of Japan). No popular vote, no referendum or plebiscite was organized or even contemplated through which to ask all these Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, Letts, Romanians, Slovaks, Germans and others if they wanted to become Soviet subjects. The Allies shut their eyes firmly to these annexations, a disconcerting application of the principles guiding their destruction of nazism. Absorption of these countries into Soviet territory, so prodigiously contrary to the principles of that period of decolonization, revived the practices of a monarchist Europe that died two centuries ago. It constituted what may be called the first wave of imperialism and the first zone of national annexation.

"The second wave led to the creation of a second imperial zone, that of the satellite countries.

"Just how Eastern and Central Europe were subjugated is too well known to need repeating here. The technique used in this form of colonialism is to set up the façade of an ostensibly independent state. Administration of this state is entrusted to loyal nationals who function as provincial governors and who are allowed only a few minor departures from the Soviet system, as long as they don't tamper with its essentials. In practice, the democracies very quickly recognized the Soviet Union's right to quell by force any disturbances arising out of demands for genuine independence in the European satellites. In other words, they soon agreed to view the European satellites as appendices to Soviet territory, a de facto situation that the Helsinki pact would legitimize in 1975.

"The third wave and third zone of Soviet territorial conquest covered more distant countries that have been annexed or subjected to Soviet control since 1960. Some of these countries, including Cuba and Vietnam, are satellites in the strict sense; another, South Yemen, has been working since 1982 to destabilize the neighbouring state of North Yemen. For, driving by unflagging effort, the Soviet advance never stops.

"Then came the African satellites: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Benin, Guinea, and other, lesser prey, often colonized by mercenaries from other satellites – Cubans or East Germans. These are more fragile protectorates, subject to the sort of accidents that caused the fall in Equatorial Guinea (the former Spanish Guinea) of dictator Francisco Macias Nguema, who, with the help of Soviet advisers, had exterminated or exiled a good third of his country's population in only a few years. "Fragile though they are, these distant protectorates must nevertheless be considered satellites insofar as their policies, armies, police, transport, and diplomacy are in the hands of Soviets or Soviet agents..."²¹³

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It is fashionable now – as it was fashionable as long ago as the John le Carré film *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (1965) – to consider Communism and Capitalism as equally evil.²¹⁴ In their long-term effects, such a case could be argued, based on the fact that both ideologies have their roots in the same anti-Christian philosophy of the Enlightenment, so that both ultimately lead to the Antichrist. But in the short- and medium-term the idea of a moral equivalence between them is manifestly false, even absurd.

The historian Neil Ferguson has argued this point well in his voluminous biography of Henry Kissinger: "The Cold War, which was the defining event of Henry Kissinger's two careers as a scholar and as a policy-maker, took many forms. It was a nuclear arms race that on more than one occasion came close to turning into a devastating thermonuclear war. It was also, in some respects, a contest between two great empires, an American and a Russian, which sent their legions all around the world, though they seldom met face-to-face. It was a competition between two economic systems, capitalist and socialist, symbolized by Nixon's 'kitchen debate' with Khrushchev in Moscow in 1959. It was a great if deadly game between intelligence agencies, glamorized in the novels of Ian Fleming, more accurately recorded in those of John le Carré. It was a cultural battle, in which chattering professors, touring jazz bands, and defecting ballet dancers played their parts. Yet at its root, the Cold War was a struggle between two rival ideologies, the theories of the Enlightenment as encapsulated in the American Constitution, and the theories of Marx and Lenin [also based on the (Rousseauist) Enlightenment] as articulated by successive Soviet leaders. Only one of these ideologies was intent, as a matter of theoretical principle, on struggle. And only one of these states was wholly unconstrained by the rule of law.

"The mass murderers of the Cold War were not to be found in Washington, much less in the capitals of U.S. allies in Western Europe. According to the estimates in the *Black Book of Communism*, the 'grand total of victims of Communism was between 85 and 100 million' for the twentieth century as a whole. Mao alone, as Frank Dikötter has shown, accounted for tens of millions, 2 million between 1949 and 1951, another 3 million by the end of the 1950s, a staggering 45 million in the man-made famine known as the 'Great Leap Forward', yet more in the mayhem of the Cultural Revolution. According to the lowest estimate, the total number of Soviet citizens who lost their lives as a

²¹³ Revel, op. cit., pp. 56-58.

²¹⁴ Since then, there have been many films exploring this theme, such as some of the more recent James Bond films and *Atomic Blonde* (2017), encouraging the idea that the two sides in the Cold War were equally evil.

direct result of Stalin's policies was more than 20 million, a quarter of them in the years after World War II. Even the less bloodthirsty regimes of Eastern Europe killed and imprisoned their citizens on a shocking scale. In the Soviet Union, 2.75 million people were in the Gulag at Stalin's death. The numbers were greatly reduced thereafter, but until the very end of the Soviet system its inhabitants lived in the knowledge that there was nothing but their own guile to protect them from an arbitrary and corrupt state. These stark and incontrovertible facts make a mockery of the efforts of the so-called revisionist historians, beginning with William Appleman Williams, to assert a moral equivalence between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War.

"All Communist regimes everywhere, without exception, were merciless in their treatment of class enemies, from the North Korea of the Kims to the North Vietnam of Ho Chi Minh, from the Ethiopia of Mengistu Haile Mariam to the Angola of Agostinho Neto. Pol Pot was the worst of them all, but even Castro's Cuba was no workers' paradise. And Communist regimes were aggressive, too, overtly invading country after country during the Cold War. Through which foreign cities did American tanks drive in 1956, when Soviet tanks crushed resistance in Budapest? In 1968, when Soviet armour rolled into Prague, U.S. tanks were in Saigon and Hue, their commanders little suspecting that within less than six months they would be defending those cities against a massive North Vietnamese offensive. Did South Korea invade North Korea? Did South Vietnam invade North Vietnam?

"Moreover, we now know from the secret documents brought to the West by Vasili Mitrokhin just how extensive and ruthless the KGB's system of international espionage and subversion was. In the global Cold War, inextricably entangled as it was with the fall of the European empires, the Soviet Union nearly always made the first move, leaving the United States to retaliate where it could. That retaliation took many ugly forms, no doubt. Graham Greene had it right when he mocked The Quiet American, whose talk of a 'third force' sounded just like imperialism to everyone else. But in terms of both economic growth and political freedom, it was always better for ordinary people and their children if the United States won. The burden of proof is therefore on the critics of U.S. policy to show that a policy of nonintervention of the sort that had been adopted by the Western powers when the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy took sides in the Spanish Civil War, and again when the Germans demanded the breakup of Czechoslovakia - would have produced better results. As Kissinger pointed out to Oriana Fallaci, 'the history of things that didn't happen' needs to be considered before we may pass any judgement on the history of things that did happen. We need to consider not only the consequences of what American governments did during the Cold War, but also the probable consequences of the different policies that might have been adopted.

"What if the United States had never adopted George Kennan's policy of containment but had opted again for isolationism after 1945? What, conversely, if the United States had adopted a more aggressive strategy aimed at 'rolling back' Soviet gains, at the risk of precipitating a nuclear war? Both alternatives had their advocates at the time, just as there were advocates of both less and more forceful policies during Kissinger's time of office. Anyone who presumes to condemn what decision-makers did in this or that location must be able to argue plausibly that their preferred alternative policy would have had fewer American and non-American casualties and no large second-order effects in other parts of the world..."²¹⁵

²¹⁵ Ferguson, Kissinger. 1923-1968: The Idealist, New York: Penguin, 2016, pp. 21-24.

16. THE BERLIN AIRLIFT AND THE CREATION OF NATO

In February, 1948, Stalin abandoned his policy of allowing East European communist parties to take part in democratic elections (where they didn't do very well), and blessed the Czech party to launch a coup d'état. His action here was very similar to Lenin's in January, 1918 when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly. Communism will go along with the democratic process if it yields the results the communists want; if not, then the democratic process has to be destroyed.

In the election of 1946 the Communists had emerged as the largest party. However, they "still had only minority support and even less backing in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. The new Prime Minister, Klement Gottwald, a long-standing Stalinist newly returned from wartime exile in Moscow, faced widespread opposition, even if from a range of parties divided among themselves. The popularity of the Communist-dominated government waned in 1947 as economic difficulties mounted, as the issue of relative autonomy for the Slovaks remained unresolved, and as the country was pressurized by Stalin to reject American economic aid, thereby being forced into the emergent Soviet bloc in eastern Europe. The Communists had reluctantly conceded new elections, to be held in May 1948. Their prospects of increasing their vote were poor. But when a number of non-Communist ministers foolishly resigned from the coalition government in February in protest at Communist measures to extend control over the police, it triggered a full-scale political crisis. The Communists organized mass demonstrations of support for their demands. The pressure on all waverers mounted. The Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, son of the first President of Czechoslovakia, was found dead on the pavement below his office window – a case of suicide, according to the official version, but most people thought he had been murdered by agents of the regime. Nothing less than a Communist coup was under way. The elections in May were controlled entirely by the Communists, who dominated the new parliament. The hapless President, Edvard Benes, was compelled to appoint a new government, still under Gottwald as Prime Minister but now completely dominated by Communists..."²¹⁶

The successful coup – crowned by Gottwald replacing the sick Benes in June - accelerated the deterioration of relations between East and West. By March, the system of joint Allied occupation of Germany had collapsed, and was superseded by a Communist East Germany and a Capitalist West Germany. On April 1, the Soviets cut off all transport links from the West to West Berlin (a distance of 110 miles of Soviet-controlled territory), offering to lift the ban if the West withdrew the newly-introduced Deutschmark from West Berlin. The West refused. "We stay in Berlin," said Truman. "We will supply the city by air as a beleaguered garrison…"

This was the beginning of the Cold War.

²¹⁶ Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 504-505.

However, as David Reynolds writes, a Berlin airlift "seemed a very tall order. Many pundits believed it impossible to keep 2 million people supplied by air but the Americans and British mounted 'Operation Vittles', as the Americans called it (the RAF code-name was 'Operation Plain Fare'). Against all the odds the airlift continued all through the winter; at its height a plane landed every thirty seconds, carrying essentials such as food, coal and clothing."²¹⁷

"At the height of the airlift," writes Andrew Roberts, "planes landed at Berlin's Templehof Airport every three minutes forty-three seconds, delivering 4,000 tons of food and other essentials per day. Twenty thousand Berliners built a third airport, virtually 'with their bare hands'. There was severe hardship, of course, but ultimately the West proved that Stalin would not starve West Berlin into surrender. The airlift continued until September, as supplies needed to be stockpiled. The last flight was the 276,926th, flown by Captain Perry Immel. In total, the 321 days of the operation had transported 227,655 people in and out of Berlin, and delivered 2,323,067 tons of (mostly food and coal) at a cost of \$345 million to America, £17 million to Britain and 150 million Deutschmarks to the Germans. Seventy-five American and British lives were lost in the operation. As a result of the crisis, and the message it sent about Soviet assumptions and intentions, the United States began to build up her nuclear arsenal massively: in 1947 she had only thirteen bombs, in 1948 fifty, but by 1949 no fewer than 250."²¹⁸

On May 12th 1949, the Soviets climbed down... Forty years later, Henry Kissinger asked the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, "how, in light of the vast casualties and devastation it had suffered in the war, the Soviet Union could have dealt with an American military response to the Berlin blockade. Gromyko replied that Stalin had answered similar questions from subordinates to this effect: he doubted the United States would use nuclear weapons on so local an issue. If the Western allies undertook a conventional ground force probe along the access routes to Berlin, Soviet forces were ordered to resist without referring the decision to Stalin. If America were mobilizing along the entire front, Stalin said, 'Come to me'. In other words, Stalin felt strong enough for a local war but would not risk general war with the United States..."²¹⁹

We may wonder, however, whether the Soviets would have dared any kind of hot war at that point. Revel argues that if the Americans had made a determined effort to enforce their agreements with the Soviets over Berlin, it is possible that they could have achieved, not just the relief of West Berlin, but the reunification of Germany: "It was not only in 1952 [when Stalin dangled the prospect of the reunification of Germany before the West] that the West let a

²¹⁷ Reynolds, op. cit., p. 383.

²¹⁸ Roberts, op. cit., p. 403.

²¹⁹ Kissinger, World Order, London: Penguin, 2015, pp. 281-282.

chance go by to negotiate a German reunification treaty, which would have eliminated one of the most glaring weaknesses in the democratic camp and one of Moscow's most effective means of blackmail. Truman fumbled a first opportunity during the 1948 Berlin blockade when he refused to send an armored train from West Germany to Berlin to see if the Soviets would dare to attack it. Whether they did or not, they were beaten and the United States could have capitalized on their blunder to demand clarification of the German situation. Instead, the American airlift eluded the blockade, in a sense, without really breaking it. Washington was unable to follow up its prestige victory with a diplomatic victory. When the blockade was lifted in 1949, the Allies, as usual, returned to their old stances, as shaky militarily as they were confused juridically. Under the elementary rules of diplomacy, the Allies should have demanded that, in reparation for the Soviet treaty violation, Moscow negotiate an immediate German peace treaty. Their failure to do so is proof of their diplomatic incompetence. That the Allies failed to press the advantage granted them by the Soviet setback during that brief period when the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb, which gave it an absolute superiority unprecedented in history, has no rational explanation, however blind we may think Western leaders were at the time – an estimate we need not be tender about. There certainly would have been nothing immoral about using our atomic monopoly to force Stalin to agree to a German peace treaty, since we would have been using our military superiority not to make war but to eliminate a cause of future war or, at least, of permanent friction and of fundamental Western weakness."220

The Berlin blockade spurred the West into creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949, which, writes Burleigh, "was one of the great achievements of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who therewith dodged a solely European defensive alliance. NATO bolted the US into Europe's defence, in a sort of 'empire by invitation'; and in 1955 locked in West Germany too, frustrating Soviet gambits for a neutral unified Germany. It was sold to Congress as a new kind of alliance, allegedly directed against 'armed aggression' in general, rather than any specific enemy. It was a precedentsetting novelty in US foreign policy, a cardinal tenet of which had always been to avoid 'foreign entanglements'. Together these confident policies hugely benefited centrist Christian Democrat, Liberal (meaning free-market) and Social Democrat politicians, marginalizing Stalin's West European Communist puppets..."²²¹

NATO's real aim was to defend its members – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States – against Soviet aggression. "The best summary of NATO's original purpose," writes James Sheehan, "was the comment attributed to its first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, suggesting that the alliance existed to 'keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the

²²⁰ Revel, op. cit., pp. 251-252.

²²¹ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

Germans down'. For forty years it succeeded in those three objectives: the United States remained committed to European security, the Soviet Union did not expand into western Europe, and West Germany, though economically powerful and rearmed, did not become a threat to its neighbours."²²²

The defensive nature of the alliance was underlined by its doctrine of "containment"; the aim was not to destroy the Soviet Union but to contain it within certain limits. The most critical part of its constitution was Article 5, which began with the words: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

However, as Reynolds has pointed out, "each nation was allowed to 'take such action as it deems necessary' to honour that obligation: there was no automatic commitment to use force."²²³

According to Kershaw, NATO was "in reality a fig-leaf. Soviet ground forces outnumbered those of the western Allies by 12 to 1; and only two of the latter's fourteen divisions stationed in Europe were American.

"Very soon European security had in any case to be rethought. On 29 August 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb at a test site in modernday Kazakhstan. It was a shock to the West. The Americans had imagined that their nuclear superiority would last for much longer. Instead, the two military superpowers glowered at each other across the Iron Curtain that now framed Europe's great divide. With a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal on both sides, the Cold War now froze quickly into two great antagonistic power-blocs. It would remain that way for the next four decades..."²²⁴

Fig-leaf or not, NATO succeeded in its aim of containing Soviet power and protecting the West. If the Marshall Plan and the European Economic Community brought *prosperity*, it was NATO that provided *peace* and the *protection* of that prosperity.

"NATO," writes Kissinger, "was a new departure in the establishment of European security. The international order no longer was characterized by the traditional European balance of power distilled from shifting coalitions of multiple states. Rather, whatever equilibrium prevailed had been reduced to that existing between the two nuclear superpowers. If either disappeared or failed to engage, the equilibrium would be lost, and its opponent would become dominant. The first was what happened in 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet Union; the second was the perennial fear of America's allies during the Cold War that America might lose interest in the defence of Europe. The

²²² Sheehan, "Is the Future of NATO under threat?" *BBC World Histories*, April/May, 2017, p. 10.

²²³ Reynolds, "Security in the New World Order", *New Statesman*, March 29 – April 4, 2019, p. 31.

²²⁴ Kershaw, op. cit., p. 518.

nations joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided some military forces but more in the nature of an admission ticket for a shelter under America's nuclear umbrella than as an instrument of local defense. What America was constructing in the Truman era was a unilateral guarantee in the form of a traditional alliance..."²²⁵

In April 1950 a document called "National Security Council 68" authorizing America to spend up to 20 per cent of her GDP on the military was approved. "It represented a historic reversal of traditional American policy towards the world. Gradually it produced military commitments to forty-seven nations and led American forces to build or occupy 675 overseas bases and station a million troops overseas..."²²⁶

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However, writes Kershaw, "it was plain to American leaders from the start that NATO's armed strength was inadequate. And they felt European countries needed to contribute more to their own defence costs; that the United States, starting to see itself as the world's policeman, could not continue to carry a hugely disproportionate burden of European defence. Each of NATO's partners accordingly increased defence expenditure. West Germany, prohibited from the manufacture of arms but producing military machinery, tools and vehicles in ever greater numbers, benefited greatly from the demand for steel, increasing output by over 60 per cent between 1949 and 1953 – a boost to its burgeoning 'economic miracle'. Expenditure had to be turned into military strength. So at a NATO meeting in Lisbon in 1952, members determined to raise at least ninety-six divisions within two years.

"However, the elephant in the room could not be ignored for much longer. Strengthening NATO could make little progress without the rearming of West Germany. Such a short time after it had taken a mighty alliance to crush Germany's military power, once and for all it was thought, the prospect of a resurgent German militarism not surprisingly held scant appeal for her European neighbours (as well, understandably, as terrifying the Soviets). The Americans had raised the question of West German rearmament already in 1950, not long after the outbreak of the Korean War. They continued to press, and Western European NATO partners had to acknowledge that there was logic in their case. Why should the Americans continue to foot the lion's share of the bill for the defence of Europe if the Europeans were prepared to do so little? From the European point of view, there was always the lingering fear that the United States might even retreat from Europe, as it had done after 1918 and had initially been envisaged following the end of the Second World War. And there was also the need to ensure that West Germany remained bound to the Western alliance, something that Stalin was prepared to test with an overture in 1952 - rejected outright by Western leaders - that dangled before

²²⁵ Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 282-283.

²²⁶ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 443.

German eyes the inducement of a unified, neutral Germany. Stalin's initiative was interpreted in the West as an attempt to press the Americans to leave Europe. It also plainly aimed to head off the closer incorporation of the Federal Republic in the Western alliance (which the West German government, under its Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was keen to attain). This was by now closely bound up with the question of a West German armed force.

"Already in 1950 a proposal that appeared to offer a potential break-through in the conundrums of how to make West Germany a military power while not alienating European countries vehemently opposed to such a step had, surprisingly perhaps, come from the French. The French proposal, advanced in October 1950 by the Prime Minister Rene Pleven, was intended to avoid the accession of West Germany to NATO, the step sought by the Americans, by the formation of a European defence organization that would incorporate but control German involvement. It envisaged a European army that would include a West German component under European, not German, command (ensuring, in effect, French supervision). This proposal was the basis of what became by May 1952 a treaty to establish a European Defence Community (EDC).

"The title was misleading. The envisaged EDC did not even extend to all the countries in Western Europe. From the outset it encountered the fundamental problem that would bedevil all steps towards European integration over subsequent decades: how to create supranational organizations while upholding the national sovereignty of individual members. The Schuman Plan of 1950 (named after the French Prime Minister, Robert Schuman) had formed the basis of the European Coal and Steel Community. Its members were France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. But Great Britain chose to remain aloof. The EDC, built on a similar model, with the same membership. But Great Britain, possessing alongside France the largest armed forces in Europe, while welcoming the EDC, and pledging its closest cooperation through its membership of NATO, was not part of it. Britain was not prepared to commit troops indefinitely to the defence of Europe or to participate in a project whose aim, according to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in 1952, was 'to pave the way for a European federation'. The diminution of national sovereignty that membership of a supranational EDC would have entailed could not be contemplated. Scandinavian members of NATO took a similar view. So the EDC was confined, as indeed was initially intended, to the countries that were starting to converge on economic policy. But the treaty had to be ratified. And here it came to grief in the country that had proposed it in the first place. The issue of national sovereignty was, here too, the decisive issue. When EDC ratification came before the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954, it was resoundingly rejected. With that the EDC was dead..."227

²²⁷ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 6-8.

However, in May 1955 West Germany became a sovereign state and joined NATO; in the same month the Warsaw Pact of the Communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was formed; and in July the occupation of Austria ceased, and the country became a sovereign state, but belonging to no alliance. The architecture, as it were, of the Cold War in Europe, was complete...

The strengthening of Western European defence went together with a consolidation of democratism in the region. Spain and Portugal were gradually brought into the democratic consensus, not least because they were strategically important. In 1949, "ten countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, all apart from Sweden members of NATO) came together in the Council of Europe, established to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law (building on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...). Within little more than a year they had been joined by Greece, Turkey, Iceland and West Germany. By the mid-1960s membership had been extended to Austria (1956), Cyprus (1961), Switzerland (1963) and Malta (1965). The first major step taken by the Council of Europe was to establish in 1950 (ratified in 1951) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which set up that same year the European Court of Human Rights..."²²⁸

Social democratism was especially strongly rooted in Scandinavia, where "a relatively low population size (no more than a total of around 20 million citizens in the whole of Scandinavia in 1950) and a small number of major urban and industrial centres were conducive to promoting social cohesion. But above all, the model worked. Although the internal development of Sweden, Norway and Denmark varied, the compromise that underlay consensual politics helped to turn the Scandinavian countries from a relatively poor part of Europe into one of its most prosperous regions. A stepping stone along the way was the establishment in 1952 of the Nordic Council, allowing citizens free movement without passports and providing the framework for a common labour market (joined by Finland in 1955). As elsewhere, Scandinavian prosperity benefited from the extraordinary economic growth throughout Europe in the post-war years. A hallmark of the Scandinavian development (with national variations) was, however, the extensive network of social services and welfare provision, paid for by high taxation, carried through by stable governments dominated not by Conservatives, as was more common in post-war Europe, but by Social Democrats..."229

²²⁸ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 51.

²²⁹ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, pp. 45-46.

17. THE SORROWS OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY

The apparent revival of Christianity in Europe after the war was superficial. The West was already plunged too deep into atheism, and in the East the Communist Party and its subservient institutions kept a firm lid on all dissident thought – Orthodox Christian thought particularly. But many young people knew that they were being lied to. "A communist education," writes Mazower, "far from brainwashing them, had left them with a deep mistrust of ideology and critical of a political system which treated them 'like babies' and deprived them of information. Unlike their elders, they did not compare their lives with the pre-war or war years but rather with their contemporaries in the West.

"They developed lifestyles which alarmed their parents and the Party – based around a private world of transistor radios, cassette players and the dream of Western affluence and autonomy. While some young idealists were attracted to the reform communism of the New Left or aimed a Maoist critique at the tired cadres around them, far more 'had embraced materialism with a vengeance'. They tended to be both nationalistic (i.e. anti-Russian) and 'cosmopolitan'. The Romanian politburo were not alone in criticizing their youth for their 'servitude to the cultural and scientific achievements of the capitalist countries'. Parties around the region sponsored endless teams of sociologists to research the 'youth problem'."²³⁰

But what about the old religion of Russia and Eastern Europe – Orthodoxy? What had become of it, and were the young people drawn to it at all?

The only real resistance to Stalin's rule in the 20s and 30s came from the Russian Orthodox Church. From 1927 his task in destroying and/or subduing the Church had been made much easier when the senior hierarch, Metropolitan Sergei (Stragorodsky) of Nizhni-Novgorod, who became Patriarch of Moscow in 1943, more or less surrendered the freedom of the Church into the hands of the Bolsheviks in his notoriously pro-Soviet "Declaration". However, the battle was not over; for many hierarchs and priests, and several hundreds of thousands of believers fled into the catacombs to form the so-called Catacomb or True Orthodox Church. After very severe persecutions their numbers had been decimated; but in 1945 the Church still survived, living in the conditions of the greatest secrecy. Moreover, they were supported by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), with its headquarters in Munich and then New York, which became a beacon of anti-communist resistance for Orthodox Christians in the free world and a lodestone of hope for all true believers inside the Union.

ROCOR, writes Serhii Shumilo, "publicly declared its spiritual unity with the Catacomb Church in the USSR not only in frequent articles, but also through official conciliar church statements both under Metropolitan Anastasii (Gribanovskii) and his successor Metropolitan Filaret (Voznesenskii). This can

²³⁰ Mazower, op. cit., p. 285.

be clearly seen in the encyclicals of the ROCOR Synod and Councils both from the 1950s and from later years.

"In an encyclical from 1965, the First Hierarch of the ROCOR Metropolitan Filaret emphasises that the ROCOR 'has never broken its spiritual and prayerful connection to the Catacomb Church in the motherland.' At the same time he draws attention to the fact that after the Second World War, among the new wave of *émigrés* from the USSR were quite a number of former parishioners of the Catacomb Church who had joined the ROCOR. In this way, in his words, 'the link between these two churches has been further strengthened.' This is precisely the explanation for the fact that, after the Second World War, the catacomb church began to be spoken about more actively within the ROCOR. Moreover, the Metropolitan underlines that this link between the ROCOR and the catacombers behind the Iron Curtain 'is maintained to this very day.'"²³¹

The lot of the True Russian Church was even more difficult in the post-war years than before the war. Pastors were now even rarer, and they had to hide even deeper in the underground. As Archbishop Lazarus (Zhurbenko) said: "The catacomb believers feared the Moscow Patriarchate priests even more than the police. Whenever a priest came for some reason or other, he was met by a feeling of dread. The catacomb people would say, 'A red detective has come.' He was sent deliberately, and he was obliged to report everything to the authorities. Not infrequently, hierarchs and priests told the people outright, directly from the ambon, 'Look around, Orthodox people. There are those who do not come to church. Find out who they are and report to us; these are enemies of the Soviet regime who stand in the way of the building of Socialism.' We were very much afraid of these sergianist-oriented priests."²³²

Only in the central regions of Tambov, Lipetsk, Tula, Ryazan and Voronezh was there an increase in catacomb activity. Many young people took leading positions in the movement.²³³ And in the 1950s there were still quite a few wandering catacomb priests and a few holy bishops, such as Anthony (Galynsky), Peter (Ladygin) and Barnabas (Belyaev).

But if there were few priests, there were many confessors. For example, in November, 1950, three nuns arrived at the dreaded Arctic camp of Vorkuta. They were assigned to a plant which bricks for construction work throughout the Russian Arctic. Some have said that these nuns came from Shamordino, since it is known that in the 1930s some Shamordino nuns adopted a similarly uncompromising attitude towards Soviet power.

²³¹ Shumilo, "Clandestine Connections between the ROCOR and Catacomb Communities in the USSR from the 1960s to the 1980s", *ROCOR Studies*, October, 2021, <u>https://www.rocorstudies.org/2021/11/03/9405/</u>

²³² Lazarus, "Out from the Catacombs", Orthodox America, June, 1990, pp. 5-6.

²³³ Shkarovsky, *Iosiflianstvo: techenie v Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi*, St. Petersburg: "Memorial", 1999, pp. 192-197.

However, the author of the following account, the American John Noble, indicates that he does not know where they came from. He simply says: "At Vorkuta these women were referred to as *veruiushchie* or believers, the term applied to the Christians in Russia who still carry on personal devotions in secret, not unlike the Christians who met underground in the catacombs and defied the persecutions of Nero.

"When the nuns were first taken to the brick factory, they told the foreman that they regarded doing any work for the communist regime as working for the devil, and, since they were the servants of God and not of Satan, they did not propose to bow to the orders of their foreman despite any threats he might make.

"Stripped of their religious garb, the nuns' faith was their armour. They were ready to face anything and everything to keep their vow and they did face their punishment, a living testimony of great courage. They were put on punishment rations, consisting of black bread and rancid soup, day after day. But each morning when they were ordered to go out to the brick factory, into the clay pits, or to any other back-breaking assignment, they refused. This refusal meant, of course, that they were destined to go through worse ordeals. Angered by their obstinacy and fearing the effect upon the other slave labourers, the commandant ordered that they be placed in strait jackets. Their hands were tied in back of them and then the rope with which their wrists were bound was passed down around their ankles and drawn up tight. In this manner, their feet were pulled up behind them and their shoulders wrenched backward and downward into a position of excruciating pain.

"The nuns writhed in agony but not a sound of protest escaped them. And when the commandant ordered water poured over them so that the cotton material in the strait jackets would shrink, he expected them to scream from the pressure on their tortured bodies but all that happened was that they moaned softly and lapsed into unconsciousness. Their bonds were then loosed and they were revived; in due course, they were trussed up again, and once more the blessed relief of unconsciousness swept over. They were kept in this state for more than two hours, but the guards did not dare let the torture go on any longer, for their circulation was being cut off and the women were near death. The communist regime wanted slaves, not skeletons. They did not transport people all the way to Vorkuta in order to kill them. The Soviet government wanted coal mined. Slave labourers were expendable, of course, but only after years of labour had been dragged out of them. Thus the commandant's aim was to torture these nuns until they would agree to work.

"Finally, however, the commandant decided that he was through trying. The nuns were either going to work or he was going to have to kill them in the attempt. He directed that they again be assigned to the outdoor work detail and, if they still refused, that they be taken to a hummock in the bitter wind of the early Arctic winter, and left to stand there immobile all day long to watch the other women work. They were treated to this torture, too, When the pale light of the short Arctic day at last dawned, they were seen kneeling there and the guards went over expecting to find them freezing, but they seemed relaxed and warm.

"At this, the commandant ordered that their gloves and caps be removed so that they would be exposed to the full fury of the wind. All through the eighthour working day they knelt on that windy hilltop in prayer. Below them, the women who were chipping mud for the brick ovens were suffering intensely from the cold. Many complained that their feet were freezing despite the supposedly warm boots they wore. When in the evening other guards went to the hill to get the nuns and take them back to the barracks, they expected to find them with frostbitten ears, hands and limbs. But they did not appear to have suffered any injury at all. Again the next day they knelt for eight hours in the wind, wearing neither hats nor gloves in temperatures far below zero. That night they still had not suffered any serious frostbite and were still resolute in their refusal to work. Yet a third day they were taken out and this time their scarves too were taken away from them.

"By this time, news of what was happening had spread throughout all the camps in the Vorkuta region. When at the end of the third day, a day far colder than any we had yet experienced that winter season, the bareheaded nuns were brought in still without the slightest trace of frostbite, everyone murmured that indeed God had brought a miracle to pass. There was no other topic of conversation in the whole of Vorkuta. Even hardened MVD men from other compounds found excuses to come by the brick factory and take a furtive look at three figures on the hill. The women working in the pits down below crossed themselves and nervously mumbled prayers. Even the commandant was sorely disturbed. If not a religious man, he was at the least a somewhat superstitious one and he knew well enough when he was witnessing the hand of a Power that was not of this earth!

"By the fourth day, the guards themselves were afraid of the unearthly power which these women seemed to possess, and they flatly refused to touch them or have anything more to do with them. The commandant himself was afraid to go and order them out onto the hill. And so they were not disturbed in their prayers, and were taken off punishment rations. When I left Vorkuta four years later, those nuns were still at the brick factory compound and none of them had done a day's work productive for the communist regime. They were regarded with awe and respect. The guards were under instructions not to touch them or disturb them. They were preparing their own food and even making their own clothes. Their devotions were carried on in their own way and they seemed at peace and contented. Though prisoners, they were spiritually free. No one in the Soviet Union had such freedom of worship as they.

"What their example did to instil religious faith in thousands of prisoners and guards there at Vorkuta, I cannot begin to describe. Later on, when I had the opportunity as a locker-room attendant for the MVD men to talk with some of the more hardened Russian communists about religion, not one of them failed to mention the Miracle of the Nuns. With a puzzled expression, each would ask my opinion of it. How could such a thing happen, they would say. How could God have saved these women from freezing on that hill!

"I could not answer, except in terms of my own experience with prayer and with faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. I told them how I was saved from starvation and said that evidently the nuns had found the same strength through prayer. They were visibly moved by this additional demonstration of the fact that God's power exists.

"The rationalist looks in vain for an explanation of such an event. God showed His hand in a miracle on that hill in the Arctic wastes of Russia and by that miracle brought faith to Vorkuta. Thousands of prisoners were buoyed up in their resistance to Communism. Many communists themselves were touched and an unadmitted hunger in their hearts for religious faith was thereby brought to light..."²³⁴

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After the war, ROCOR entered a very difficult period of her existence as bishops and communities joined Moscow in the throes of a pseudo-patriotic passion for "the Soviet motherland". One of those who resisted this temptation was Archimandrite Philaret, later first-hierarch of ROCOR, who had already suffered torture at the hands of the Japanese conquerors of Manchuria. In 1945 the Soviet armies defeated the Japanese army; later the Chinese communists took control of Manchuria. In the first days of the "Soviet coup" the Soviets began to offer Russian émigrés the opportunity to take Soviet passports. Their agitation was conducted in a skilful manner, very subtly and cleverly, and the deceived Russian people, exhausted from the hard years of the Japanese occupation during which everything Russian had been suppressed, believed that in the USSR there had now come "complete freedom of religion", and they began to take passports en masse.

At this time Fr. Philaret was the rector of the church of the holy Iveron icon in Harbin. There came to him a reporter from a Harbin newspaper asking his opinion on the "mercifulness" of the Soviet government in offering the émigrés Soviet passports. He expected to hear words of gratitude and admiration from Fr. Philaret, too. "But I replied that I categorically refused to take a passport, since I knew of no 'ideological' changes in the Soviet Union, and, in particular, I did not know how Church life was proceeding there. However, I knew a lot about the destruction of churches and the persecution of the clergy and believing laypeople. The person who was questioning me hastened to interrupt the conversation and leave..."

²³⁴ Noble, *I Found God in Soviet Russia*, London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1960, pp. 113- 117, 174-176.

Soon Fr. Philaret read in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate that Lenin was the supreme genius and benefactor of mankind. He could not stand this lie and from the ambon of the church he indicated to the believers the whole unrighteousness of this disgraceful affirmation in an ecclesiastical organ, emphasising that Patriarch Alexis (Simansky), as the editor of the JMP, was responsible for this lie. Fr. Philaret's voice sounded alone: none of the clergy supported him, and from the diocesan authorities there came a ban on his preaching from the church ambon, under which ban he remained for quite a long time. Thus, while still a priest, he was forced to struggle for church righteousness on his own, without finding any understanding amidst his brothers. Practically the whole of the Far Eastern episcopate of the Russian Church Abroad at that time recognised the Moscow Patriarchate, and so Fr. Philaret found himself involuntarily in the jurisdiction of the MP, as a cleric of the Harbin diocese. This was for him exceptionally painful. He never, in whatever parish he served, permitted the commemoration of the atheist authorities during the Divine services, and he never served molebens or pannikhidas on the order of, or to please, the Soviet authorities. But even with such an insistent walling-off from the false church, his canonical dependence on the MP weighed on him "as a heavy burden, as an inescapable woe", and he remained in it only for the sake of his flock. When the famous campaign for "the opening up of the virgin lands" was declared in the USSR, the former émigrés were presented with the opportunity to depart for the Union. To Fr. Philaret's sorrow, in 1947 his own father, Archbishop Demetrius of Hailar, together with several other Bishops, were repatriated to the USSR. But Fr. Philaret, on his own as before, tirelessly spoke in his flaming sermons about the lie implanted in the MP and in "the country of the soviets" as a whole. Not only in private conversations, but also from the ambon, he explained that going voluntarily to work in a country where communism was being built and religion was being persecuted, was a betraval of God and the Church. He refused outright to serve molebens for those departing on a journey for those departing for the USSR, insofar as at the foundation of such a prayer lay a prayer for the blessing of a good intention, while the intention to go to the Union was not considered by Fr. Philaret to be good, and he could not lie to God and men. That is how he spoke and acted during his life in China.

Such a firm and irreconcilable position in relation to the MP and the Soviet authorities could not remain unnoticed. Fr. Philaret was often summoned by the Chinese authorities for interrogations, at one of which he was beaten. In October, 1960 they even tried to kill him...

As he himself recounted the story, at two o'clock on a Sunday morning Fr. Philaret got up from bed because of a strange smell in his house. He went to the living-room, in the corner of which was a larder. From under the doors of the larder there was coming out smoke with a sharp, corrosive smell. Then he went to the lavatory, poured water into a bowl, returned to the larder and, opening the doors, threw the water in the direction of the smoke. Suddenly there was an explosion and a flash. The fire burned him, while the wave of the

explosion lifted him up and hurled him with enormous force across the whole length of the living-room and against the door leading out. Fortunately, the door opened outwards: from the force of his flying body the bolts were broken, and he fell on the ground deafened but alive. On coming to, he saw the whole of his house on fire like a torch. He understood that the explosion had been caused by a thermal bomb set to go off and burn down the house at a precise time.

During this night, at about midnight, a certain Zinaida Lvovna, one of the sisters of the church of the House of Mercy, came out of her house, which was situated opposite the church across the street, and saw some fire engines in the street near the church – but there was no fire. This unusual concourse of fire engines surprised her. About two hours later, when the sound of the bomb awoke her, she immediately went out into the street and saw the fire, which the fire-fighters had already managed to put out. Fr. Philaret was standing on the threshold of the church shaking from the cold and suffering from burns and concussion. Zinaida Lvovna immediately understood that the fire had been started by the communists with the purpose of killing Fr. Philaret. She quickly crossed the street and invited him to enter her house.

But the Chinese firemen, on seeing Archimandrite Philaret alive, accused him of starting the fire and wanted to arrest him. However, the quick-witted Zinaida Lvovna quickly turned to the chief fireman and said: "It looks like you put your fire engines here in advance, knowing that a fire was about to begin. Who told you beforehand that about the fire?" The fire chief was at a loss for words and could not immediately reply. Meanwhile, Zinaida Lvovna and Fr. Philaret went into her house. She put him in a room without windows because she knew that the communists might enter through a window and kill him.

The next day, some young people came early to the Sunday service, but the church was closed, and the house in which Fr. Philaret lived was burned to the ground. The twenty-year-old future pastor, Fr. Alexis Mikrikov came and learned from Zinaida Lvovna what had happened during the night. He asked to see Fr. Philaret. Immediately he saw that the saint was extremely exhausted and ill. His burned cheek was dark brown in colour. But the look in his eyes was full of firm submission to the will of God and joyful service to God and men. Suddenly Fr. Alexis heard him say: "Congratulations on the feast!" as he would say "Christ is risen!" Tears poured down the face of Fr. Alexis in reply. He had not wept since his childhood, and here he was, a twenty-year-old man, on his knees before the confessor, weeping and kissing his hand.

As a consequence of the interrogations and burns he suffered, for the rest of his life Fr. Philaret retained a small, sideways inclination of his head and a certain distortion of the lower part of his face; his vocal chords also suffered.

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Another ROCOR confessor was Bishop John of Shanghai, the famous wonderworker, who led his Russian émigré flock to safety out of Mao's China. Ajay Kamalakara writes: "As the winds of change blew across civil war-ridden China in 1948, the community of 'White Russians,' emigrants who fled Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, grew increasingly uneasy over the political developments in their adopted country. Forces loyal to the Communist Party of China were winning the civil war against theKuomintang-led government.

"The Russian community, comprising mainly of the members of the intelligentsia, thrived for more than 25 years in cites such as Harbin, Beijing and Shanghai. As the Chinese communists, backed by the Soviet Union, started defeating the government forces, they began to forcibly repatriate Russians to the USSR. 40,000 Cossacks were sent back to the Soviet Union, only to be marched off to labor camps in the Russian Far East. The community of 6,000 'White Russians' in China appealed to several countries for help through the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which later became the United National High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

"Many countries, including the U.S., responded sympathetically, but only one gave the reply they desperately needed – the then very new Republic of the Philippines, led by President Elpidio Quirino, says Kinna Kwan, Senior Researcher at the President Elpido Quirino Foundation. Close to 6,000 anti-Communist refugees left China [in 1949] on rusty ships to land in the small Philippine island of Tubabao (a four-hour boat ride away from the city of Guiuan). They were evacuated with the help of the IRO, according to Kwan. For the next four years, the community lived on the Philippine island."²³⁵

Bishop John not only led his people, like a new Moses, out of Communist China to Tubabao was Bishop John of Shanghai, but also protected them from the typhoons that frequently ravaged the island. "When the fear of typhoons was mentioned by one Russian to the Filippinos, they replied that there was no

²³⁵ Kamalakara, "When the Philippines Welcomed Russian Refugees", *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, July 7, 2015. "For the locals on the island, 'these four years comprise a very interesting period they fondly refer to as the *Tiempo Ruso*, or the Time of the Russians,' wrote Kwan in an article titled 'The Philippines and Asylum: A Historical Perspective lecture by UNHCR Representative to the Philippines entitled <u>*Tiempo Ruso*</u>.'

[&]quot;The typhoon-ravaged island, which was a receiving station for personnel working for a U.S. Naval base during the Second World War, had a small population of fishing families and a handful of concrete structures.

[&]quot;The 'White Russian' community had an active social life. According to Kwan, the resourceful refugees comprising of teachers, doctors, engineers, architects, ex-military officers, lawyers, artists, performers, and priests, used their professional skills and knowhow to improve living conditions and even achieve a sense of normalcy on the island.

[&]quot;The camp eventually grew to be a thriving "little Russian city," divided into 14 main districts with democratically-elected leaders, and with organized communal kitchens, power stations, Russian schools, a hospital and a dental clinic, an arbitration court, a police force and a little jail, and several churches for different faiths—including a wooden Russian Orthodox church built from an abandoned church left by the Americans,' Kwan wrote in the article for the UNHCR.

reason to worry, because 'your holy man blesses your camp from four directions every night.' They referred to Vladika John; for no typhoon struck the island while he was there. After the camp had been almost totally evacuated and the people resettled elsewhere (mainly in the U.S.A. and Australia), and only about 200 persons were left on the island, it was struck by a terrible typhoon that totally destroyed the camp.

"Vladyka himself went to Washington, D.C., to get his people to America. Legislation was changed and almost the whole camp came to the New World – thanks again to Vladyka."²³⁶

²³⁶ Fr. Seraphim Rose and Abbot Herman, *Blessed John the Wonderworker*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1996, pp. 32-33.

18. THE SORROWS OF EAST EUROPEAN ORTHODOXY

Similar tactics to the KGB's repression of the Russian Orthodox Church were used in other East European countries...

<u>1. Romania</u>. In Romania the communists took over in 1944, but there was strong opposition to them (there had been little support for Communism, as opposed to Fascism, in Romania before 1944), and it was only after King Michael was forced to emigrate in 1948 that the persecution began in earnest.

"In November 1947, King Michael travelled to London for the wedding of his cousins, Princess Elizabeth (later Queen Elizabeth II) and Prince Philip of Greece and Denmark, an occasion during which he met Princess Anne of Bourbon-Parma (his second cousin once removed), who was to become his wife. According to his own account, King Michael rejected any offers of asylum and decided to return to Romania, contrary to the confidential, strong advice of the British Ambassador to Romania.

"Early on the morning of 30 December 1947, Michael was preparing for a New Year's party at Peleş Castle in Sinaia, when [Prime Minister[Groza summoned him back to Bucharest. Michael returned to Elizabeta Palace in Bucharest, to find it surrounded by troops from the Tudor Vladimirescu Division, an army unit completely loyal to the Communists. Groza and Communist Party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej were waiting for him, and demanded that he sign a pre-typed instrument of abdication. Unable to call in loyal troops, due to his telephone lines allegedly being cut, and with either Groza or Gheorghiu-Dej (depending on the source) holding a gun on him, Michael signed the document.

"Later the same day, the Communist-dominated government announced the 'permanent' abolition of the monarchy, and its replacement by a People's Republic, broadcasting the King's pre-recorded radio proclamation of his own abdication. On 3 January 1948, Michael was forced to leave the country, followed over a week later by Princesses Elisabeth and Ileana, who collaborated so closely with the Soviets that they became known as the King's 'Red Aunts'. He was the last monarch behind the Iron Curtain to lose his throne.

"According to Michael's own account, Groza had threatened him at gun point and warned that the government would shoot 1,000 arrested students, if the king did not abdicate. In an interview with *The New York Times* from 2007, Michael recalls the events: 'It was blackmail. They said, "If you don't sign this immediately we are obliged" – why obliged I don't know – "to kill more than 1,000 students' that they had in prison.' According to *Time*, Groza threatened to arrest thousands of people and order a bloodbath unless Michael abdicated."²³⁷

²³⁷ Nun Alexandra (Spector), Facebook, December 17, 2017.

After the fall of communism in 1990, King Michael returned to rule Romania as a constitutional monarch until his death in 2017.

As Fr. George Calciu writes, "they began to create the same situation that was in Russia. The majority of the political counsellors and Securitate were Russian. They had come from Russia to transmit their experience to the young Romanian communists."²³⁸

Fr. George himself passed through the hell of the prison of Piteşti, which experience "altered our souls and hearts, and little by little, one by one, we fell. Namely, we came to deny God and to sever ourselves from our families. We came to forget all that was good in our hearts. Fortunately, this experiment lasted only about three years..."²³⁹

In his biography of Valeriu Gafencu (+1952), Monk Moise writes: "Among the many prisons of Communist Romania, Piteşti is a particular one. It became famous for the horrible atrocities that happened there as a result of the implementation of that satanic experiment known as re-education...

"In the first part of the year 1948, following an order from Bucharest, the prisoners were grouped according to their age at the time of arrest. All university students were sent to Piteşti. In the first phase, the prisoners, most of them Legionnaires, lived under a rather lax regime. In short time, however, things changed and [what can be identified as] a program of extermination was initiated. The guards became very strict, doling out harsh punishments to the prisoners for perceived offenses. The quality of food deteriorated and they were given just enough food to keep them alive. Beatings, cold and hunger lowered their physical and moral resistance. All of these measures represented only the preparatory phase, so that when re-education was later unleashed, exhausted prisoners would be that much easier to subdue.

"A group of prisoners was brought to Piteşti from Suceava, led by Eugen Ţurcanu. Ţurcanu was to become famous for crimes and tortures committed at Piteşti and later at Gherla. Eugen Ţurcanu and the other Suceava prisoners had gone over to the Communist side and they were identified by prison administration as the tool by which re-education would be implemented. It must be stated from the beginning that re-education was conceptualized at a high level, by leadership in the Ministry of the Interior, Ţurcanu and his group being their instruments, essentially. When the experiment was called off, they were executed by the very Communist government they had served, while those who were truly guilty, those in the shadows, went unpunished.

²³⁸ Calciu, *Christ is Calling You!*, Forestville, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1997, pp. 95-96.

²³⁹ Calciu, op. cit., p. 96.

"At first, the Suceava prisoners were scattered throughout the cells, mixed in with the others. They succeeded in gaining the others' trust with their wellmeaning attitude. After some time, at the beginning of December, 1949, the Suceava prisoners, together with other prisoners who were purposefully selected, were brought back together, to inhabit the same cell. One day, Turcanu and his group announced to the others that they had changed their ideas, that they had given up Legionnairism and had been re-educated, adopting communist ideology. When they recommended to the others that they do the same, there was objection and laughter. Turcanu and his followers attacked. They began beating the others, armed with broomsticks and wooden clubs hidden ahead of time under mattresses. Soon thereafter, the prison leadership - director, officers, guards - joined Turcanu, severely beating the others [who wouldn't renounce Legionnairism]. This moment marked the beginning of the re-education program, which meant continuous beatings and torture. The prisoners, closely supervised by Turcanu's group, were subjected to a regime of constant terror without the possibility of escaping or committing suicide.

"The torture was well-planned; it stopped only when the prisoner was about to die. There were various kinds of torture: beatings, hunger, being forced to maintain the same position 17 hours a day – legs extended horizontally, hands on knees, chest at 90 degrees – and at the slightest wavering, the supervisor would respond with a club. The prisoners were forced to drink urine and to eat excrement from buckets that served as toilets in the cells. They were forced to drink highly-salted water and then left to dry out from thirst; these were some of the may other tortures devised by the sick minds of the torturers. Those who caved [in] were required to 'unmask', i.e., to reveal everything they had not confessed at their interrogation, to betray those prisoners who had helped them in prison or those guards who had treated them humanely. Likewise, in order for the destruction to be complete, each one of them was required to profane the memory of whatever had been most important to him in front of everyone in his cell. For example, perhaps someone loved his mother or wife very much. In front of everyone, he was required to denounce them, to make the most obscene and absurd statements about them. Whatever was bright and good in the mind of the one being tortured had to be slandered and dirtied.

"Theological students and those who were devout – 'mystical bandits', as they were called – were forced to apostasize, to deny God, to curse everything that had to do with the Christian faith. At Christmas and Pascha, they were forced to sing carols or well-known religious hymns with altered words which profaned Christ and the Virgin Mary. They were forced to participate in blasphemous processions and to celebrated 'liturgies' using human waste from buckets in the prison cells, and were then forced to swallow it as 'Communion'. Some of them were 'baptized' in tubs full of excrement. I believe that these things provide sufficient proof of the satanic nature of re-education.

"After the prisoner 'unmasked' himself, in order to prove that he had been re-educated, he was required to become a torturer himself and to convince

others to give up 'all bourgeois rottenness' and to accept communist ideology. Through the use of terror, the prisoners were truly brainwashed. The tortured, no longer able to endure the incessant torment, unable to commit suicide, always closely supervised, finally gave in and were transformed into robots, their hearts turned to stone and, from being victims, they became executioners. Not even after being re-educated did they escape the terror for, at the slightest sign of solidarity with their victims, they were subjected to torture themselves. And thus, living in a state of constant terror, always suspicious of one another, they broke down completely, foregoing the possibility of returning to a normal state. Dumitru Bordeianu, who experienced this experiment, described the experience in his book Mărturisiri din Mlaștina Disperării (Confessions from the Mire of Despair). He says that at a given moment a demonic 'communion' was created between the torturer and the one tortured. For example, if Jurcanu asked him what he was thinking, he was unable to lie because Turcanu would have sensed it immediately. From this came the fear of even thinking something which could be considered bad by Turcanu: You couldn't hide anything if you were questioned, while telling the truth was punished.

"Another Satanic aspect of re-education was that everything that one had hidden at the interrogation and that represented a point of support on the path of internal collapse began to torment him so much that he himself requested to 'unmask', feeling afterwards a sense of relief like that after sacramental confession, even though the things he confessed were held against him. A strange process occurred, resulting in mutations to the personality of the one tortured, who came to disavow his former beliefs and to accept whatever Turcanu imposed upon him with the conviction that he was doing good. In the process of brainwashing, 'his mind was enlightened', he experienced a sense of relief, he 'understood' everything that he had previously rejected and he set out, in full confidence, to bring others into the same state of 'enlightenment'. For those of us who have not passed through similar demonic states, these things are incomprehensible.

"Most of those who tortured others did so under the dominion of terror, without experiencing the mutations I referred to above. The system was planned in such a way that, as a result of the continual torture, very few were able to hold out to the end. In general, most of them compromised, some of them more, some less, according to the structure and stamina of each.

"From Piteşti, the system was extended to Gherla and the Canal, but due to the fact that word leaked out and there were international protests, the reeducation experiment was stopped. If the secrecy had been maintained, reeducation would have been applied to every prison in the country.

"Looking at re-education from a spiritual perspective, both those who directed this experiment from the shadows and those who applied it were nothing but instruments of the devil in the destruction of souls. Father Gheorghe Calciu, who went through Piteşti, said, 'In order to understand what Piteşti was, we must remain above the facts and get at the roots of this evil, try to see the internal mechanisms of perversion and its metaphysical dimension. I believe that Piteşti was a diabolical experiment. What occurred there was a struggle between good and evil, in which the executioners and the victims were simply instruments. It was a diabolical experiment that took place in our country more than in any other place in the world.'

"The satanic character of re-education was clearly seen in the words of Jurcanu, preserved in the memory of one political prisoner: 'If Christ had passed through my hands, He never would have made it to the cross. He would not have been resurrected. Christianity, that great lie, would never have existed, and the world would have lived peacefully! I am Jurcanu! The first and the last! No one has ever been born who could replace me. No one can lie to me the way that I lie to you fools. I am the true Gospel! I am writing it now. I have something to write on – your carcasses. What I write is true, it's not a bedtime story for children.'

"Although the devil may have imagined that he won the battle through terror, he had few decisive victories among those who compromised, some more, some less. After the torture stopped, most of those who acquiesced gradually returned to God. Considering the subsequent evolution of the reeducated, the devil won a battle at Piteşti, but not the war. According to Father Calciu, most of them returned to Christ more vehemently than before their trial by fire..."²⁴⁰

As for the Romanian patriarchate, it offered no opposition to the State. As Lucian Boia writes, "the 'struggle against mysticism and superstition' featured prominently in the Party's ideological arsenal. An aggressive atheism was put into practice. In the 1950s, children were kept in school on Easter Night, so that they could not go to church! Many Romanians (especially those 'well placed') were afraid to be seen at church; it would not have been good for their careers. In public, professions of atheist conviction were frequent. And yet the churches remained open and were always full. In the theological seminaries, the number of candidates for the priesthood actually increased. Thus the Orthodox Church was left in peace, on condition that it did not overstep its bounds. It even received a precious gift: the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1948 and the return of the Uniates to the fold. After all, until everyone actually became atheist, a national Orthodox Church was better than a Greek Catholic Church, dependent on the Pope, on Rome, on the West! Such gestures of goodwill were not without a price, however. The Church was not actually asked to promote atheistic propaganda, but it was expected to urge its members to respect authority and the new political order. The Church was enrolled in the 'struggle for peace', one of the cleverest slogans launched by the Communists (and one which caught the imperialist, 'warmongering' West off guard: who would dare to praise war?). Nothing could be more natural than that the Church should have upheld this noble and Christian message! All in all, there were no crises between the Communist regime and the Church. Each gathered its own

²⁴⁰ Monk Moise, The Saint of the Prisons, Sibiu: Agnos, 2009, pp. 107-113

believers. And between the two categories of believers, in the Party and in God, there was a broader category of practitioners of doublethink (Orwell, in 1984, says all there is to say about this kind of thought.) Communism taught people to survive and to lie. This is one of the heaviest of its legacies."²⁴¹

<u>**2. Bulgaria.**</u> After the death of Tsar Boris III in 1943, his brother, Prince Cyril, became regent and continued the same anti-Communist policy. But after the Soviet troops entered Bulgaria he was arrested and shot on "Bloody Thursday", February 3, 1945.²⁴²

Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev), who between the world wars had been in charge of ROCOR's flock in Bulgaria, recognized the election of Patriarch Sergei, accepted Soviet citizenship and joined the MP, remaining there until his death in 1950. According to M.V. Shkarovsky, he "did not want to leave Bulgaria for the West and already within a few months expressed the desire to join the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. This is only partly explained by his desire to preserve the Russian emigrants left in Bulgaria from repressions: the indicated step corresponded to the inner conviction of the archbishop."²⁴³

However, to the present writer it seems very unlikely that this step corresponded to the archbishop's "inner conviction", and much more likely that he sacrificed his reputation for the sake of protecting his flock. According to his spiritual daughter, Abbess Seraphima (Lieven), he continued to call the Soviet power "satanic" and to oppose the infiltration of communist influence into the Bulgarian Church. The archbishop strove to protect his clergy and flock from the communists. For most of his priests were former White officers, and, as Ivan Marchevsky writes, "after assuming power, associations of priests controlled by the communist were infiltrated into the Church of Bulgaria, and the communists began to destroy the clergy: a third of the 2000 members of the clergy was killed. Then they began to act in a different way: Vladykas appointed 'from above' ordained obedient priests."²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Boia, *Romania*, London: Redaktion, 2006, p. 117.

²⁴² Tsankov, Protopriest S. "Pokojnij Tsar Boris, kak religiozno-nravstvennaia lichnost" (The Reposed Tsar Boris as a Religio-Moral Personality), *Pravoslavnaia Rus*' (Orthodox Russia), N 18 (1495), 15/28 September, 1993; David Horbury, "Prince Kyril - Time to Restore History's Victim", *Royalty*, 1996, vol. 14, N 5, pp. 64-71.

²⁴³ Shkarovsky, *Istoria Russkoj Tserkovnoj Emigratstii* (A History of the Russian Church Emigration, St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2009, p. 80). "In the spring of 1946, during the visit to Bulgaria of a church delegation led by Patriarch Alexis I, Archbishop Seraphim expressed his attitude to the Moscow Patriarchate and his unity with it: 'For twenty-five years we were in disunity with our Mother, the Church of Russia. But this disunity was a purely external phenomenon, for in our hearts there was complete unity with you and with all our brothers in our homeland, and with those recognize the Patriarchal Church in Russia.'

[&]quot;However, on leaving the Russian Orthodox Church abroad, Vladyka Seraphim did not begin 'to throw stones at her', as certain other hierarchs who joined the Moscow Patriarchate did. Besides, even after 1945 the archbishop sometimes pronounced sharply anti-soviet declarations..." (op. cit., p. 81)

²⁴⁴ Marchevsky, in *Pravoslavnaia Rus*' (Orthodox Russia), N 1 (1454), January 1/14, 1992, p. 15.

Archbishop Seraphim sharply criticized the ecumenical activity of the Bulgarian Church. Thus on April 26, 1949, he wrote to Patriarch Alexis: "All the metropolitans are convinced followers of ecumenism. Both before the Moscow conference of 1948 and after. It is in the ecumenical direction of the Bulgarian hierarchy, in their evident condescension to the ecumenical activity of the professors of the theological faculty and their negative attitude towards Orthodoxy, that we must seek one of the main reasons for the emergence of a great evil here – the priests' union. The latter strives to destroy the power of the episcopate in the person of the Synod, and to be the main distributer of all church property, to allow a married episcopate and the second marriage of clergy, in the end – to form in Bulgaria a living or renovationist church, just as it was in Russia, with the aim of overthrowing the canons and dogmas of the whole Orthodox Church..."²⁴⁵

In he 1948 council of the Moscow Patriarchate, Archbishop Seraphim delivered two reports against ecumenism and the new calendar...

In 1952 the Moscow Patriarchate closed its deanery in Bulgaria, and all the Russian churches in the country were transferred to the Bulgarian patriarchate except the church of St. Nicholas in Sophia.

<u>3. The Uniate Churches.</u> The timing of the Council of Moscow in 1948 was clearly aimed at upstaging the First General Assembly of the World Council of Churches, which was also taking place at the same time. In line with Stalin's foreign policy, the delegates denounced the West and the Vatican and condemned the ecumenical movement.²⁴⁶ Moscow's hostility to the Vatican was determined especially by its desire to eliminate uniatism in Eastern Europe – that is, churches serving according to the Eastern Orthodox rite but commemorating the Pope.

A start had been made already towards the end of the war, when it was suggested to the uniate episcopate in Western Ukraine that it simply "liquidate itself". When all five uniate bishops refused, in April, 1945, they were arrested. Within a month a clearly Soviet-inspired "initiative movement" for unification with the MP headed by Protopresbyter G. Kostelnikov appeared.²⁴⁷ By the spring of 1946 997 out of 1270 uniate priests in Western Ukraine had joined this movement, and on March 8-10 a uniate council of clergy and laity voted to join the Orthodox church and annul the Brest unia with the Roman Catholic Church of 1596. Central Committee documents show that the whole procedure was controlled by the first secretary of the Ukrainian party, Nikita Khrushchev, who in all significant details sought the sanction of Stalin.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Sobolev, in Shkvarovsky, op. cit., p. 86.

²⁴⁶ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 128-131.

²⁴⁷ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 81.

²⁴⁸ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 105-106.

In October, 1948 the 1,250,000 uniates of Romania (the Romanian unia had taken place at Blaj in Transylvania in 1697) were united with the Romanian Patriarchate.²⁴⁹ Then, in April, 1950, a council took place at Prešov in Slovakia attended by 820 delegates, at which it was agreed to revoke the Uzhgorod unia of 1649 and return to Orthodoxy. The "converted" uniates formed a new, East Slovakian diocese of the Czech Orthodox Church. ²⁵⁰

However, as Archbishop Tikhon of Omsk writes, the merger of the uniates into the MP harmed both the uniates and the MP. It infected the MP, which drew a large proportion of its clergy from the Western Ukraine, with the false asceticism and mysticism of the Catholics. And the uniates, "on being merged into the unorthodox patriarchate, did not come to know the grace-filled 'taste of True Orthodoxy'. The fruits of this 'union' are well known to all today."²⁵¹

<u>**4. Poland.**</u> In August, 1948, Metropolitan Dionysius of Poland petitioned the MP to be received into communion, repenting of his "unlawful autocephaly". In November, the MP granted the Polish Church autocephaly – again. However, because of his "sin of autocephaly", and because he had accepted the title of "His Beatitude", Dionysius was not allowed to remain head of the Church.²⁵² Another reason may have been his participation in the creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war.

This decision remained in force despite a plea on Dionysius' behalf by Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople in February, 1950.²⁵³ In 1951, at the Poles' request, the MP appointed a new metropolitan for the Polish Church.²⁵⁴ From now on the Polish Church, though with the new calendar, returned to Moscow's orbit.

<u>5. Albania.</u> The Stalinist dictator Enver Hoxha took power in Albania in 1944 with the help of Tito's partisans. However, he broke with Tito in 1949, following Moscow until his death in 1985, and creating one of the most repressive communist regimes in the world, "the North Korea of Europe".

"Behind his Balkan curtain," writes Montefiore, "Hoxha embarked on a Stalinist-style exercise in social engineering. He sought the creation of an urban working class worthy of the name (hitherto, Albania had been a clan-based peasant society) and the socialization of national life. Forced industrialization followed, while agriculture was re-organized on the Soviet collective-farm model. At the same time, all of Albania gained access to electricity for the first

²⁴⁹ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 137-138.

²⁵⁰ K.E. Skurat, *Istoria Pomestnykh Pravoslavnykh Tserkvej* (A History of the Local Orthodox Churches); Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 2.

²⁵¹ Archbishop Tikhon, "Tiazhkij Iudin grekh pered vsem Russkim narodom" (The terrible sin of Judas before the whole Russian people), http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=page&pid=779.

²⁵² Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 3, pp. 138-139.

²⁵³ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, pp. 1-2, 4.

²⁵⁴ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, pp. 11-12.

time, life expectancy rose, and illiteracy rates plummeted. Yet the human cost of this social revolution was enormous.

"Hoxha's secret police, the Sigurimi, were brutal and ubiquitous: hundreds of thousands were tortured and killed. Hoxha's prime minister Mehmet Shehu spoke openly at a party congress about their methods: 'Who disagrees with our leadership in some point, a bullet into his head.' Out of three million Albanians, one million were at some point either arrested or imprisoned in his perpetual terror...

"After the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, Hoxha allied himself with Beijing against Khrushchev's Soviet Union, which he believed to be abandoning the true path towards socialism laid down by Comrade Stalin. This realignment led to a precipitous decline in Albanian standards of living, as the country had been highly dependent on Soviet grain, and on the USSR as its principal export market. To quell any possible dissent, Hoxha decided to emulate his new Chinese friends and launched an Albanian Cultural Revolution. From 1967, Albania was officially declared an 'atheistic' state with all its mosques and churches closed and clerics arrested. All private property was confiscated by the state, and the number of arrests increased exponentially."²⁵⁵

Long before that, however, in 1948, the head of the Albanian Orthodox Church, Archbishop Christopher of Tirana, was deposed and imprisoned by the communist government for "hostile activity in relation to the Albanian people".²⁵⁶ Then, from February 5 to 10, 1950, a Local Council of the Albanian Church took place in Tirana. A new constitution was worked out in which it was declared that the elections of the clergy should take place with the participation of the laity.

A pseudo-patriotic note was sounded in article 4: "Parallel with the development of religious feeling, the Orthodox Autocephalous Albanian Church must instil into believers feelings of devotion to the authorities of the people of the People's Republic of Albania, and also feelings of patriotism and of striving for the strengthening of national unity. Therefore all the priests and co-workers of the Church must be Albanian citizens, honourable, devoted to the people and the Homeland, enjoying all civil rights." The episcopate had to pronounce the following oath: "I swear by my conscience before God that I will preserve the faith and dogmas, canons and Tradition of the Orthodox Church, and faithfulness to the people of the Albanian People's Republic and its democratic principles, as prescribed by the Constitution."²⁵⁷

On March 5 the new head of the Albanian Church, Archbishop Paisius, gave a speech in front of the All-Albanian conference in defence of peace in which he said: "In agreement with the great ideals of love, brotherhood and peace

²⁵⁵ Montefiore, *Titans of History*, London: Quercus, 2012, pp. 564-565.

²⁵⁶ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 141.

²⁵⁷ Skurat, op. cit., in Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 1.

throughout the world on which the Church is based, we will struggle for the holy affair of the liberation of the whole of mankind from hostile encroachments on its peaceful life. This task must be unanimously accomplished by all our clergy, as preachers of peace who are bound to direct the will of the flock to the struggle for peace... We preach peace, but we know that peace is not given *gratis*, therefore we bless the struggle for the final victory over those who are stirring up war...^{"258}

²⁵⁸ Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 8, 1951; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 2.

<u>19. THE YUGOSLAV WAY</u>

By the end of the 1940s the whole of Central and Eastern Europe was controlled by Stalin through the Red Army and the KGB. Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin write: "Communist-controlled security services, set up in the image of the KGB and overseen – except in Yugoslavia and Albania – by Soviet 'advisers', supervised the transition to so-called 'people's democracies'. Political development in most east European states followed the same basic pattern. Coalition governments with significant numbers of non-Communist ministers, but with the newly founded security services and the other main levers of power in Communist hands, were established immediately after German forces had been driven out. Following intervals ranging from a few months to three years, these governments were replaced by bogus, Communist-run coalitions which paved the way for Stalinist one-party states taking their lead from Moscow.

"The German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht announced to his inner circle on his return to Berlin from exile in Moscow on 30 April 1945: 'It's got to look democratic, but we must have everything under our control.' Because a democratic façade had to be preserved throughout Eastern Europe, the open use of force to exclude non-Communist Parties from power had, as far as possible, to be avoided. Instead, the new security services took the lead in intimidation behind the scenes, using what became known in Hungary as 'salami tactics' – slicing off one layer of opposition after another. Finally, the one-party people's democracies, purged of all visible dissent, were legitimized by huge and fraudulent Communist majorities in elections rigged by the security services.

"During the early years of the Soviet Bloc, Soviet advisers kept the new security services on a tight rein. The witch-hunts and show trials designed to eliminate mostly imaginary supporters of Tito and Zionism from the leadership of the ruling Communist Parties of Eastern Europe were orchestrated from Moscow. One of the alleged accomplices of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, László Rajk, in the non-existent Titoist plot for which Rajk was executed in 1949, noted how, during his interrogation, officers of the Hungarian security service 'smiled a flattering, servile smile when the Russians spoke to them' and 'reacted to the most witless jokes of the [MGB] officers with obsequious trumpetings of immoderate laughter'."²⁵⁹

"Soviet links with the new Communist States," writes Martin Gilbert, "were maintained by the presence of large numbers of Soviet troops, and were strengthened by formal agreements. On February 4 [1948], during the signature of a Soviet-Roumanian Treaty, Molotov – who had concluded his semieponymous treaty with Ribbentrop nine years earlier – spoke of how important the new treaty was 'at a time when the new war-mongers in the imperialist camp are patching together military-political blocs directed against the Soviet

²⁵⁹ Andrews and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, London: Allen Lane, 1999, pp. 322-323.

Union'. Considerable stress was laid on the threat to the Soviet Union of American military might, assisted by various 'lackeys of imperialism', of whom Britain was usually portrayed as the second – and sometimes even as the principal – villain.

"The Soviet treaties with her neighbours were quickly extended – Hungary signed on February 18 and Bulgaria on March 18. Poland was already signed up. On April 6 non-Communist Finland signed a treaty with the Soviet Union promising to repel any direct aggression on Finland by Germany or any State allied to Germany. One wartime ally and associate of the Soviet Union had begun, however, to resist the pressures from Moscow: President Tito of Yugoslavia. His partisan forces had been as instrumental as the Soviet Army – if not more so – in driving the Germans from his country."²⁶⁰

As Tony Judt explains, Tito had been a problem for Stalin since 1945: "The Yugoslav efforts to acquire parts of Austrian Carinthia and the Istrian city of Trieste were an embarrassment to Stalin in his dealings with the Western allies, and an impediment to the domestic progress of the Italian Communists especially. Tito's initial support for the Greek Communists was similarly embarrassing, since Greece fell unambiguously into the Western 'sphere'. Yugoslav ambitions to create and lead a Balkan Federation incorporating Albania and Bulgaria ran afoul of Stalin's preference for maintaining his own direct control over each country in his sphere of influence. And the unabashedly revolutionary domestic politics of the Yugoslav Party - which held power without the constraint of alliances with 'friendly' parties and was thus far more radical and ruthless than other East European Communists – risked putting in the shade the Soviet model. In matters of revolution, Tito was becoming more Catholic than the Soviet pope."²⁶¹

Moreover, "According to Milovan Djilas, Tito's colleague who accompanied him on a number of visits to Moscow, all the Yugoslav leaders were repelled by Stalin's duplicity, cynicism, and arrogance: 'He knew that he was one of the cruellest, most despotic figures in human history. But this did not worry him a bit, for he was convinced that he was carrying out the will of history.' Personal relations between the two leaders became extremely frosty."²⁶²

"Stalin seems to have decided to put his Eastern European Empire in order in the summer of 1947, after the Marshall Plan was announced. He held the first meeting of the Cominform in Belgrade, to show that Yugoslavia was an integral part of the system. But its object was in fact to replace local Communist leaders with some national standing by ones who owed everything to Stalin and Russian backing. The Czech *coup* of February 1948 was part of this process. Stalin also planned to destroy Tito, whom he had never forgiven for a rude

²⁶⁰ Gilbert, op. cit.

²⁶¹ Judt, "How the Cold War Worked", in *When the Facts Change. Essays* 1995-1010, London: Vintage, 2015, p. 72.

²⁶² Sir Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians, London: Penguin, 2012, p. 511.

wartime message: 'If you cannot help us at least don't hinder us by useless advice.' The same month as he was swallowing the Czech leadership, Stalin had gathered in Moscow Dmitrov, the Bulgarian Communist leader, whom he humiliated, and Edward Kardelj and Milovan Djilas from Yugoslavia, one of whom, if pliable enough, he intended to make Tito's replacement. He ordered them to knock Yugoslavia and Bulgaria together into an economic federation on the lines of Benelux, which he thought consisted of Belgium and Luxembourg. Told that it also included the Netherlands, he denied it and shouted angrily, 'When I say it means no!' Then, switching to bribery, he offered the Yugoslavs the bait of Mussolini's little victim: 'We agree to Yugoslavia swallowing Albania', he said and made a gesture of sucking the forefinger of his right hand.

"When Tito got a report of the meeting he smelt a *putsch* against himself. Like Stalin, he was an experienced political gangster familiar with the rules of survival. His first act was to cut off information from Yugoslavia's inner party organs, police and army, to their counterparts in Moscow. On 1 March he brought the crisis to the boil by having his Central Committee throw out Stalin's proposed treaty.."²⁶³

On March 27, 1948, writes Gilbert, "Stalin sent Tito a letter, signed by himself and Molotov, warning of the dangers of the breach. At the heart of it was the sentence: 'We think Trotsky's political career is sufficiently instructive.' But Tito would not allow himself or his country to be browbeaten. At a meeting of the Cominform in Budapest in June, which Yugoslavia declined to attend, the senior Soviet representative told the other Eastern European and Western Communist delegates: 'We possess information that Tito is an imperialist spy.'

"On June 28, reflecting the exchange of letters between Tito and Stalin, the Cominform published a resolution calling on the people of Yugoslavia either to force their government to support the Soviet Union, or to form a new government that would do so. Vladimir Dedjer, who had fought at Tito's side throughout the war, and whose wife Olga, herself a partisan, had been killed in action against the Germans, later recalled how the Cominform resolution was received in Belgrade:

"The great majority, which had not been conversant with the letters, simply could not believe their eyes. There were people who cried from despair in the streets that morning. But was the first reaction. After the first pain came a wave of indignation, and pride. The whole country united as one man. Feelings rose high. Men in the street were proud of their country. The air was charged with feeling as before, during the greatest events in the modern history of Yugoslavia.

²⁶³ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 448-449.

"'From many parts of Yugoslavia cables reported: "People feel as they did on March 27, when Yugoslavia broke the Axis yoke and challenged Hitler.""²⁶⁴

Tito acted swiftly to purge the Yugoslav party, army and police of suspected pro-Moscow elements – 8.400 were thrown into prison. "Stalin imposed economic sanctions, held manoeuvres on Yugoslavia's borders and, from 1949, mounted show-trials in the satellites with Tito as the arch-villain. But Tito's ability to hold his party together around a nationalist line ('no matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his own country less') persuaded Stalin that he could not topple the regime without an open invasion by the Red Army and large-scale fighting, possibly involving the West. Tito never formally moved under the Western umbrella, but the safeguard was implicit. When he visited London in 1953, Churchill (again Prime Minister) told him: 'should our [wartime] ally, Yugoslavia, be attacked, we would fight and die with you.' Tito: 'This is a sacred vow and it is enough for us. We need no written treaties.'"²⁶⁵

Yugoslavia's defiance of Stalin was an important example, even inspiration. "Tito was not to be daunted by threats [from Stalin]. A note found in Stalin's desk after his death read: 'If you don't stop sending killers, I'll send one to Moscow, and I won't have to send a second" ²⁶⁶

Impressive economic growth was followed by "financial aid from abroad -\$553.8 million between 1950 and 1953 – as the United States, in particular, viewed Yugoslavia as a wedge to split communism still further. By the beginning of the 1960s the beginnings of mass foreign tourism in Europe started to swell Yugoslavia's coffers still further and the extended liberalization of the system made it in Western eyes the most appealing form of communism. Already in the early 1960s, however, economic growth was slowing, and by the middle of the decade unemployment, inflation and a trade deficit were starting to rise – a harbinger of greater problems in the 1970s...

"Popular support for Yugoslavian communism in the 1950s probably exceeded that for any of the Soviet satellites. Apart from a higher level of commitment that emanated from somewhat more democratic forms of government, two unique factors conditioned the relative success of Yugoslavian communism. One, certainly in the early years, was the unifying impact of the threat from Stalin. Fear of invasion fostered cohesion, producing 'negative integration' among the different peoples of Yugoslavia. More positively, a sense of identity was built around the figure of Josip Broz Tito himself. The creation of a Tito cult portrayed the leader as the personification of the new socialist Yugoslavia and the embodiment of the partisan heroism that had created the country..."²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 823-824.

²⁶⁵ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 449.

²⁶⁶ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, p. 102.

²⁶⁷ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, p. 103.

20. THE POST-WAR SERBIAN CHURCH

However, it must not be thought that Yugoslav Communism was *essentially* different from the Stalinist variety. It was still a one-party state with the Communist Party allowing no dissent – thousands died in "re-education" camps. Tito was not about to betray his long-held convictions and Muscovite training, but kept a tight rein on everyone though the secret service chief Ranković. And we see this especially in relation to the Serbian Orthodox Church...

The Serbian King Peter remained in exile in England after the war, trying to help the resistance to Communism in his homeland from outside. With him was Bishop Nikolai Velimirović, who, on being released from Dachau, he chose not to return to communist Yugoslavia, where he had been branded as a traitor, but eventually emigrated to the United States. In 1951 he settled as a lecturer, then rector, of the American Metropolia's St. Tikhon monastery. He reposed in 1956 in very suspicious circumstances...

As Bishop Akakije (Stankević) of Uteshiteljevo writes: "During the Second World War and until 1946, since the German Nazis had imprisoned the Serbian Patriarch Gabriel (Dočić) and later put him into the Dachau concentration camp because of his anti-Nazi statements, the administration of the Serbian Church was taken over by Metropolitan Joseph (Tsvijić) of Skopje, who was parted from his diocese after the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia. Together with the Patriarch they imprisoned Bishop Nikolai of Ziča, who was the most respected and best loved Serbian bishop among the people, and whose opinion was considered important among the bishops, priests, monks and people. In that period, a number of Serbian hierarchs did not understand the real meaning of the evil of communism that was spreading fast throughout Serbia. Such a soft and inadequate attitude on the part of the Serbian Church towards communism is astonishing when we know that the Synod of the Russian Church Abroad had been in Sremski Karlovtsy even before the beginning of the war, for more than twenty years, and throughout that period it had been warning everyone, explaining the diabolical nature of the communist and sergianist hell... through which their country, Russia, had passed and from which they had been forced to flee for that reason. Also, those frightening warnings began to come true at the very beginning and during the war through all those monstrous evil deeds against the Serbian people, kingdom and Church that were committed by the communist bands in Serbia.

"At that time, the justified position existed that it was not necessary to waste strength and men by confronting the large power of Nazi Germany and her allies (let us remember that at that time there was an order that for every German soldier killed 100 Serbs be killed)..., but that we should turn ourselves exclusively to the internal problem of communism, which was coming over Serbia like a dark shadow. Inspired by this idea, at the beginning of the war, the prime minister of the Serbian government in occupied Serbia, General Milan Nedić, requested from the Synod of the Serbian Church to condemn in the name of the Church the communists and the leader of the liberation movement, the so-called Chetniks, Colonel Dragoliub Mikhailović, who together with the communists started the guerrilla struggle against the German occupation army. The Synod replied to this appeal of General Nedić: 'The Church is above parties, Dragoliub Mikhailović, Ljotić and the communists.' By the way, the unnatural companionship mentioned above was broken very soon because Mikhailović's national forces soon became completely at odds with the army organized by the communist party of Yugoslavia led by Joseph Broz Tito. Colonel, later General Mikhailović continued to fight the Germans, but on a much smaller scale, and he forced the communists to leave the territory of Bosnia, and because of that General Nedić was unofficially helping him.²⁶⁸

"Such a soft position was not only a result of a misunderstanding of the evil, God-fighting nature of communism, but in some places it was open sympathy with those forces, even communist bands, who were fighting against the Germans. The result of those positions was a very strong anti-German feeling, and contrary to that, great sympathy for the English side among many of the Serb hierarchs. How different was the position of the Russian Patriarch Tikhon towards the communists from the flexible position of the Serbian hierarchs. He was completely trapped by the Bolshevik revolution in 1918 but anathematized the communists and all those who cooperate with them.

"Most of the official church statements during the war were vague. For that reason in 1942 the Serbian patriot and politician Dmitrij Ljotić wrote in his article 'Neither Hot nor Cold': "We heard the message of our paternal hierarchs gathered in the Synod and around it. They call on the people to have peace, love and unanimity... They simply called the citizens to peace and unity and love, taking good care how to gain peace, unanimity and love. And to make that position even more visible, they cared very much not to use a single word to explain who are those people in our country who disturb peace, unanimity and love, who kill the priests and other peaceful citizens and insult the Church....

"... The communists, on account of Red Moscow, want sabotage, disorder, rebellion, which leads to national destruction. General Nedić doesn't want any of these three because if we avoid them then the Serbian people will live. Even those who were lucky enough to run away to London send us messages to preserve peace, and that people should keep away from sabotage and rebellion.

²⁶⁸ Draza Mikhailović was executed by the communists on July 4/17, 1946. Some doubt whether Mikhailović was a true martyr, accusing him of practising "ethnic cleansing" against Muslims during World War II (Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*, Texas A&M University Press, 1995, pp. 18-19). However, Norman Malcolm argues (op. cit., p. 179) that there is no definite evidence for this. Tim Judah agrees (*The Serbs*, London: Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 120-121). See also K. Glazkov, "K 50-letiu raspravy nad Dragoliubom-Drazhej Mikhailovichem" (To the 50th Anniversary of the Execution of Draza-Dragoliuboj Mikhailovich), *Pravoslavnaia Rus*' (Orthodox Russia), N 17 (1566), 1/14 September, 1996, p. 5. (V. M.)

"'Church representatives pass over all this and speak about peace, love and unanimity, not saying a single word about which course is better: that of General Nedić, or that of the communists. If the message were necessary, it would have been necessary to tell that, too, to the people. If they didn't want to say that, it would have been more glorious and wiser to keep silent.

"'If our hierarchs could not choose which of these two courses is better, how could they find a way to move themselves from their God-saving dioceses and hide here in Belgrade? Why didn't they wait for the communists there?'

"By the end of 1944 Soviet troops started to come into Serbia, and in October, 1944 they entered Belgrade together with the Yugoslav communist army. Many of the national forces and the clergy who were aware of the hell awaiting them in Serbia under these rulers, left Serbia together with the defeated Germans, and retreated towards Slovenia. Bishop Nikolai Velimirović was the only one to understand how tragic the situation was, so in Slovenia he gave his blessing to the gathering of all the national anti-communist forces who were grouped there and were retreating before Tito's troops and the Red Army. Several hundred thousand Serb četniks, the Ljotić volunteers, the Nedić national guard, Slovenian nationalists loyal to the kingdom of Yugoslavia and some Russian White Guards were ready to stand together against oncoming communism. Even General Vlasov with his 400,000 soldiers headed towards Slovenia, as the only ray of hope, the last chance for the communists to be driven away from the borders of Yugoslavia, as they had been in neighbouring Greece. Unfortunately, the allies played the most important role. General Vlasov was stopped by the 'Allies' and handed over together with his army to be killed by the Soviets²⁶⁹, while the national forces in Slovenia were cheated by the Americans and English, deprived of their arms, and handed over to Tito's partisans, who in a short period of time and in the most monstrous ways tortured, killed and burned bodies and put into mass graves several hundred thousand men. Just in one day, the partisans killed 62 Serbian priests from Montenegro, who found themselves in Slovenia with the leftovers of Djurishić's Montenegrin national forces, which had already been reduced to one tenth of their former number by the partisans and Croatian Ustaše while they were passing through Bosnia. A small number of nationalists succeeded in fleeing through Italy and so the killing by the communists did not affect them. In this way, again with the help of the 'Allies', Tito's assumption of power was guaranteed. Bishop Nikolai stayed firm in the United States, where he continued his fight for the liberation of the Serbian Church and State from the communists.

"Some sources report that Metropolitan Joseph [Tsvijović] and the bishops who stayed in the country (Nectarije Krul, Jovan Ilić, Arsenije Bradvarević, Emilian Piperković) openheartedly greeted the Soviet troops and Yugoslav partisan troops. In October, 1944 Metropolitan Joseph delivered a message to the people in which he called the liberation of Belgrade and Serbia the

²⁶⁹ This is highly disputable statement. (V.M.)

'dawning'. On November 12, 1944 in the Saborna church in Belgrade a pannikhida was held for all those killed in the struggle for the liberation of Belgrade. The service was celebrated by Metropolitan Joseph... The priesthood of Belgrade was collecting donations for wounded Soviets and partisans. In the Nativity Epistle of the Holy Synod, they spoke with delight about the new situation arising from the expulsion of the enemies from the country (the occupiers and the liberation of the country)...

"The next big deviation from the pre-war position was the relationship of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the Soviet Moscow Patriarchate, with which the Serbian Church got in touch immediately after Soviet troops entered Serbia. A delegation from the Moscow Patriarchate headed by Bishop Sergei of Kirovgrad came to Belgrade in 1944.

"In March 1945 Metropolitan Joseph accompanied by Bishop Jovan of Niš and Bishop Emilian of Timočki travelled, at the request of the authorities, to Moscow, where they attended the false Council and the Soviet theatrical enthronement of the new patriarch, Alexis I.

"Tito's communists, taking over power with the help of America, England and the Soviet Union, at the very beginning showed their openly anti-Christian character. Very fierce anti-Church laws were enforced, and an agrarian reform was made whereby the Church was deprived, right from the beginning, of 70,000 hectares of land, 1,180 church buildings, a printing plant and a pension fund for the clergy. State donations to the Church were stopped, the catechism was thrown out of the schools, the authorities created big problems for the theological schools, the Church had to deliver all the registration books to the State registration offices, etc., etc.

"Right from the beginning, persecutions and killings of clergy began. The first martyr was Metropolitan Joanikije [Lipovac] of Montenegro, who was tortured by Tito's communists for several months in prison.²⁷⁰ Partisan Major Kovačević brought him a chalice filled with the fresh blood of murdered Chetniks (that's how he explained it), and he made the metropolitan commune in that blood. The metropolitan stayed firm, and was killed and burned in Arandzelovats during the night between the 8th and 9th of September, 1945. In this period of the consolidation of their revolutionary authority, the communists were helped by the 'Allies', English and Soviet. In 1944 and 1945 there were shootings without trial of all those priests who, as they believed, were unable to adapt to collaboration with the communists. According to incomplete information, the communists in those years killed 98 Serbian priests.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ Things got worse in 1947 when Tito placed a Catholic at the head of the Commission for Religious Confessions (Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 3, pp. 122-123). (V.M.)

²⁷¹ 70 of Metropolitan Joanikije's priests died with him (The Diocesan Council of the Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese of the U.S.A. and Canada, *A Time to Choose*, Third Lake, Ill.: Monastery of the Most Holy Mother of God, 1981, p. 10). According to Norman Malcolm (*Bosnia. A Short History*, London: Papermac, 1996, p.193), up to 250,000 people [of all the nations

"After all these events, and finally losing trust in the Allies, who at the end, on the orders of Tito, even bombed a lot of Serbian cities and turned them into ruins, Metropolitan Joseph finally took an openly anti-communist position. He started to criticise the actions of the communist authorities in public, but his acts did not influence other bishops to take the same position towards the new godless authorities.

"Since he took such a fearless position towards the communists, Metropolitan Joseph found himself in a very difficult position and he was under a number of pressures. Several times the new authorities organized 'spontaneous demonstrations' with red flags, banners and shouts of 'Down with Joseph!' During one such anti-religious event, when a large number of demonstrators stopped in front of the patriarchal building, and started to shout the well-known words, 'Down with Joseph! Down with Joseph!' the metropolitan came out onto the balcony and in the strong voice with which he usually spoke to thousands of the faithful, shouted as if he did not understand: 'Down with Joseph? Which Joseph? Broz or Stalin?'²⁷²

"Just after the end of the war, he rejected the request of the federal minister of internal affairs, Vlade Zečović, to send a message to the clergy that they should not commemorate the king's name in the Divine services. In rejecting this, he said: 'The king's name will be commemorated until the state organization is decided.' Having seen the firm position of Metropolitan Joseph, the communists changed their threats and tactics. In 1946 he began to receive official delegations from the authorities, bringing him messages that 'Tito is regretting that he didn't have the honour of meeting the representative of the Serbian Church, and he is expressing his sincere wish to do this as soon as possible'. The same year Metropolitan Joseph delivered a speech in the patriarchal chapel in which he said: 'Such a shame and disaster the Serbian people have not undergone since the Turks. Let everyone know that many have broken their teeth attacking the Church. So will the communist beast. Endure, Serb, and don't be afraid.' The Soviet Patriarch Alexis I, during his visit to Bulgaria (in June, 1946) expressed the wish to visit the Serbian Church. That message he sent through Bishop Irinaeus Cilić who was in Bulgaria attending the celebration of the 1000-year anniversary of the repose of St. John of Rila the Wonderworker. Metropolitan Joseph did not reply to Patriarch Alexis. After the war, while sending one of his priests to a parish in a village, he gave him a cross and asked him: 'Do you remember how the Spartan mother saw off her son to the battle, giving him the spear? I give you the cross of Christ, and am sending you to the terrible war with the godless. Here, my son, is the cross and the vow with it or on it.'

of Yugoslavia] were killed by Tito's mass shootings, forced death marches and concentration camps in the period 1945-6. (V.M.)

²⁷² Archbishop Averky of Jordanville recounts the same anecdote in *Sovremennost' v svete Slova Bozhia* (The Contemporary World in the Light of the Word of God), *Sermons and Speeches*, vol. I (1951-1960), Jordanville, 1975, St. Petersburg, 1995, p. 255. (V.M.)

"Metropolitan Joseph began to criticize the MP's subordination to the communists. For example, in a conversation with the American ambassador Harold Schantz he declared that the MP was an extended arm of the Kremlin, which was trying to Bolshevize the Serbian Orthodox Church. {However,} he still did not completely understand the deep meaning of handing over the freedom of the Church to the militant Godfighters, which is sergianism; he didn't in the name of the Serbian Church stop giving the Soviet church communion in prayer and sacraments as well as other support for it.²⁷³

"The political orientation of the Serbian bishops at that time, from a strictly Orthodox point of view, was not equal to the seriousness of the historical situation in which Serbia and the Serbian Church found themselves. They didn't attach enough importance to the political system in Serbia, such as the Orthodox autocracy-monarchy, but the tendency was towards modern political options, to the democratic organization of the State, which, as is wellknown, is, together with communism, just one of the sides of the Judaeo-Masonic coin... In the above-mentioned discussion of Metropolitan Joseph with the American ambassador he made the contradictory declaration that Stalin had taken over the position of Tsar Nicholas II. According to him, it [communism] was the same type of rule – authoritarian and undemocratic - as tsarism was. He claimed that he was against every type of totalitarian regime, both right and left. Metropolitan Joseph, like all other Serbian bishops, was actually in favour of the system of the liberal democratic kingdom that was enforced in the kingdom of Yugoslavia before the war.

"In the Church and among the people everybody wanted Patriarch Gabriel to return to Yugoslavia, who had been released from German imprisonment [in Dachau] at the end of the war, and still did not come back. Since Metropolitan Joseph rejected many of their requests, the communists had the idea of inviting Patriarch Gabriel, who was temporarily in Italy, to come back to the country, to which, after a time, he agreed.²⁷⁴ He adopted a more modest

²⁷³ Moreover, on May 19-20, 1946 a Hierarchical Council of the Serbian Church allowed the Church in Czechoslovakia to enter the MP. This decision was confirmed on May 15, 1948 (Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 3, p. 110). (V.M.)

²⁷⁴ He had been waiting for the return to the country of King Peter. However, in the autumn of 1946 Archbishop Eleutherius (Vorontsov) of the MP persuaded Patriarch Gabriel to change his mind. In a report to the Central Committee on February 14, 1947, G. Karpov remarked that Archbishop Eleutherius 'at the command of Patriarch Alexis has conducted a series of conversations with Gabriel and persuaded him of the necessity of returning to Yugoslavia and working with the democratic government of Tito, abandoning hopes of the restoration of the monarchy. In December, 1946 the Serbian patriarch declared that he remains faithful to the traditional friendship with Russia and categorically rejects an orientation towards the West. Patriarch Gabriel also expressed the thought of the necessity of the gathering in Moscow of representatives of all the Orthodox Churches. At the Pan-Slavic Congress in Belgrade in December, 1946, Patriarch Gabriel expressed that which we in Moscow have been impatiently waiting for him to say: '... he considers that the seniority in the Orthodox world should belong to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Russian Church should become the Mother for the Slavic churches.' Developing this thought and noting the anti-Slavic and anti- Soviet 'undermining' work of the Vatican, Patriarch Gabriel said: 'That is why we need to be together with the Russian people and the Russian Church, in order to oppose all the snares and enemy intrigues

position than Joseph. He considered that, with the help of 'diplomacy', more coordination with the authorities and keeping away from conflicts, he would save the Serbian Church from total disaster, so he started to declare loyalty to the authorities, although he often criticized their representatives, even Tito himself, concerning their actions against the Church, always declaring he was against the actions, but not the authorities themselves. He managed to avoid enforcing many requests of the communists, likewise the recognition of the communist clergy association, the foundation of the so-called Macedonian Church, as well as the condemnation and defrocking of the hierarchs abroad whose removal was requested by the authorities.

"But he did take part in the Pan-Slavic Congress in Belgrade in 1946 in which he declared gratitude to 'Mother Russia' for preserving the unity of the Slavs, repeating the words that Metropolitan Joseph had said at the liberation of Belgrade. On the same occasion he welcomed Tito and Stalin, whom he named 'the Great'.

"In the year 1948, at the request of the authorities, he attended, in the name of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the false council hosted by the MP in Moscow, even though before that he had for a long time tried not to do so. Still, he did not fulfil many requests of the MP and the communists by which they tried to subordinate the Serbian Church to the MP.

"When Patriarch Gabriel came back to Serbia in 1946, Metropolitan Joseph naturally became his closest associate in ruling the Serbian Orthodox Church. Regardless of the fact that he still openly criticized the communist authorities, he participated, together with Patriarch Gabriel, in all public events and in the MP council of 1948.

"After the repose of Patriarch Gabriel [in 1950], it was clear to all the faithful that the only natural heir should be Metropolitan Joseph. But of course, the godless authorities that were fighting with the Church all the time would not allow Metropolitan Joseph to be elected as Serbian patriarch. Before the election of the patriarch... the UDBA [Yugoslav secret police] arrested Metropolitan Joseph in Belgrade, beat him up, and forced him into a monastery in Bosnia, where they imprisoned him in order to stop his influence on the hierarchs. He was arrested several times, and was banned from living in Belgrade, so he found shelter sometimes in the monastery of Žiča, and sometimes in Ljubostinja. Each time he was already very ill, so he was allowed to go back to Belgrade, to the monastery of the Entrance of the Mother of God into the Temple, but without the freedom to go anywhere else. As a political prisoner, abandoned by his brother hierarchs, he reposed there on July 3, 1957."²⁷⁵

of the whole of the West headed by the Pope of Rome and his supporters." (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 407, l. 27; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 114). (V.M.)

²⁷⁵ Akakije, in V. Moss, *Letopis Velike Bitke* (The Chronicle of a Great Battle), Belgrade, 2007, pp. 339-345.

21. THE SORROWS OF GREEK ORTHODOXY

In the immediate post-war period, while the Greek True Orthodox increased in numbers, the divisions among them continued and intensified. Metropolitan Chrysostom of Florina and his two fellow bishops, called the "Florinites", continued to argue that the new calendarists were potentially rather than actually schismatics, while the followers of Bishop Matthew, the "Matthewites", insisted that they were already outside the Church.

On August 26, 1948, an assembly of the Matthewites decided "that our most Reverend Bishop Matthew of Bresthena should proceed to the consecration of new bishops, insofar as the other pseudo-bishops of the True Orthodox Christians neither understand nor confess Orthodoxy, nor unite with us, nor even agree to make consecrations. We grant him the authority to proceed both to the election of people and to their immediate consecration, in accordance with the divine and sacred canons and the opinions of our canon law experts, and in accordance with the practice of the whole Church of Christ, which has accepted, in case of necessity (as is the case today) such a dispensation, as we have just heard from our Protosynkellos, Protopriest Eugene Tombros, who explained the validity of the consecration of one Bishop by one Bishop in accordance with the law of our Orthodox Church."²⁷⁶

In September, Bishop Matthew, after warning Metropolitan Chrysostom and Bishop Germanus of what he was about to do, consecrated Spyridon of Trimithun (Cyprus), and then, with Spyridon, Demetrius of Thessalonica, Callistus of Corinth and Andrew of Patras. By this time Bishop Matthew was half-paralyzed, so that his paralyzed right hand had to be lowered onto the head of the ordinand in the altar by Abbess Mariam! Strictly speaking, this consecration was uncanonical, not only because it was carried out by one bishop only, contradicting the First Apostolic Canon, but also because Matthew himself was a vicar-bishop – and vicar bishops can ordain nobody higher than a deacon without the permission of their metropolitan (Canon 10 of Antioch). However, the Matthewites argued that it was permissible by condescension because Bishop Matthew was the only true bishop in Greece at that time. This was rejected by the other Old Calendarist bishops.

On October 29, 1948, Metropolitan Chrysostom abandoned his previous ambiguity on the question of grace and declared unambiguously that the new calendarists had "separated themselves from the Unique Body of Orthodoxy… We consider and believe that the official Church of Greece is schismatic and that the services celebrated by its clergy are deprived of Divine grace."²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ Bishop Andrew, Matthaios (Matthew), Athens, 1963, p. 82.

²⁷⁷ Metropolitan Calliopius, *Nobles et Saints Combats des Vrais Chrétiens Orthodoxes de Grèce* (Noble and Holy Struggles of the True Orthodox Christians of Greece), vol. I, Lavardac, p. 144.

This convinced another Old Calendarist Bishop, Germanus of the Cyclades, who had been in prison from January, 1948 to January, 1950, to re-enter communion with Metropolitan Chrysostom.

The Florinites and the Matthewites now had an identical confession. But no union took place because the Matthewites considered that Chrysostom had fallen away from Orthodoxy through his vacillations... "Although Bishop Matthew's integrity, personal virtue and asceticism were admitted by all," write the monks of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, "his course of action only widened the division between the 'Matthewites' and 'Florinites'.

"The 'Florinites' and the 'Matthewites' made many attempts at reconciliation, but all were unsuccessful. Stavros Karamitsos, a theologian and author of the book, The Agony in the Garden of Gethsemane, describes as an eyewitness the two instances in which Metropolitan Chrysostom of Florina personally attempted to meet with Bishop Matthew. Unfortunately, on both occasions - the first, which had been planned to take place on January 19, 1950, at the Matthewite Convent in Keratea at the invitation of [the Matthewite] Bishop Spirydon of Trimythus, and the second, which actually did take place at the Athens Metochion of the Keratea Convent - the abbess and senior nuns of that convent, at the prompting of the Matthewite protopresbyter Eugene Tombros, intervened and would not allow Metropolitan Chrysostom to speak with Bishop Matthew. On the second occasion, in May of 1950, when Bishop Matthew was on his deathbed and had been unconscious for three days, Metropolitan Chrysostom arrived at Bishop Matthew's quarters and approached his bedside. Standing at his side, Metropolitan Chrysostom bowed down and quietly asked him, 'My holy brother, how are you feeling?' To the astonishment of all present, Bishop Matthew regained consciousness and opened his eyes. When he saw the Metropolitan, he sought to sit up out of deference and began to whisper something faintly. At that very moment, the Abbess Mariam of the Convent of Keratea entered the room with several other sisters and demanded that all the visitors leave. Only a few days later, on May 14[/27], 1950, Bishop Matthew died."278

On May 26, 1950, Metropolitan Chrysostom reiterated his return to the confession of 1937. Together with Bishop Germanus, he sent the following encyclical both to the State Church and to the Matthewites: "In the year of our Saviour 1935 we proclaimed the Church of the innovating new calendarists to be schismatic. We reiterate this proclamation and in consequence ordain the enforcement of the First Canon of St. Basil the Great that the sacraments celebrated by the new calendarists, in that the latter are schismatics, are deprived of sanctifying grace. Therefore no new calendarist must be received into the bosom of our Most Holy Church or be served without a prior confession by which he condemns the innovation of the new calendarists and proclaims their Church schismatic. As regards those who have been baptized

²⁷⁸ The Struggle against Ecumenism, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, 1998, pp. 64-66.

by the innovators, they should be chrismated with Holy Chrism of Orthodox origin, such as is found in abundance with us.

"We take this opportunity to address a last appeal to all the True Orthodox Christians, calling on them in a paternal manner to come into union with us, which would further our sacred struggle for patristic piety and would satisfy our fervent desire.

"In calling on you, we remove the scandals which have been created by us through our fault, and to that end recall and retract everything written and said by us since 1937, whether in announcements, clarifications, publications or encyclicals, which was contrary and opposed to the Principles of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ and the sacred struggle for Orthodoxy conducted by us, as proclaimed in the encyclical published by the Holy Synod in 1935, without any addition or subtraction, and including the scientific definition 'Potentiality and Actuality'."²⁷⁹

This humble and thoroughly Orthodox statement persuaded a large number of Matthewites to rejoin Metropolitan Chrysostom. However, it did not satisfy the Matthewite hardliners. What disappointed them was that Chrysostom did not confess that he had been a schismatic since 1935 and turn to the Matthewites to be readmitted into the Church, but rather called on them to be reunited with him. In any case, they did not want to be subject to a hierarch who refused to act as the head of an autocephalous Church and consecrate bishops, thereby threatening the survival of the Church. However, Chrysostom was not a schismatic. He had not returned to the new calendarists, nor had he been tried or defrocked by any canonical Synod. And he still retained the support of the majority of the bishops and clergy, 850 parishes and about a million laypeople.²⁸⁰ Although he had wavered on the question of grace, this was neither heresy nor schism, and certainly not automatic apostasy. For, as Metropolitan Makary (Nevsky) of Moscow, who was himself unlawfully removed from his see in 1917, said: "The Holy Church cannot allow an incorrect attitude towards its first-hierarchs, she cannot remove them from their sees without a trial and an investigation."281 Contrary to Matthewite teaching, not every division in the Church constitutes a full-blown schism leading to the loss of sacramental grace of one of the parties. The Apostle Paul speaks of "quarrels" and "differences of opinion" within the one Church of the Corinthians (I Corinthians 1.10-14, 11.19); and St. John Chrysostom says that these quarrels took place "not because of difference in faith, but from disagreement in spirit out of human vanity".282

²⁷⁹ Hieromonk Amphilochius, *Gnosesthe tin Alitheian* (Know the Truth), Athens, 1984, p. 21.

²⁸⁰ Bishop Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia, letter to the author, February 5, 1991.

²⁸¹ Makary, cited by Bishop Arseny (Zhadanovsky), *Vospominania* (Reminiscences), Moscow: St. Tikhon's Theological Institute, 1995, p. 210.

²⁸² St. Chrysostom, in Michael Podgornov, "Otpal li Arkhiepiskop Andrej (Ukhtomskij) v staroobriadcheskij raskol?" (Did Archbishop Andrew (Ukhtomsky) Fall Away into the Old Ritualist Schism?), *Russkoe Pravoslavie* (Russian Orthodoxy), N 2 (11), 1998, p. 20, footnote 16.

Again, Protopriest Michael Pomazansky writes: "The unity of the Church is not violated because of temporary divisions of a non-dogmatic nature. Differences between Churches arise frequently out of insufficient or incorrect information. Also, sometimes a temporary breaking of communion is caused by the personal errors of individual hierarchs who stand at the head of one or another local Church; or it is caused by their violation of the canons of the Church, of by the violation of the submission of one territorial ecclesiastical group to another in accordance with anciently established tradition. Moreover, life shows us the possibility of disturbances within a local Church which hinder the normal communion of other Churches with the given local Church until the outward manifestation and triumph of the defenders of authentic Orthodox truth. Finally, the bond between Churches can sometimes be violated for a long time by political conditions, as has often happened in history. In such cases, the division touches only outward relations, but does not touch or violate inward spiritual unity."²⁸³

The extreme Matthewite position leads to the following *reductio ad absurdum*. Let us suppose that Chrysostom was automatically defrocked in 1937 for calling schismatics Orthodox. It follows that all the bishops in the history of the Orthodox Church who transgressed in the same way were also automatically defrocked. Therefore Metropolitan Dorotheus and the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were also automatically defrocked in 1920 for embracing the western heretics. Moreover, all those who remained in communion with Dorotheus were also automatically defrocked. But that included the Eastern Patriarchs, the Patriarchs of Russia and Serbia and in general the whole of the Orthodox Church! But then we must conclude, in accordance with strict Matthewite reasoning, that the Church of Christ ceased to exist in 1920! But, of course, the Matthewites do not draw this logical conclusion from their own premises. Therefore their reasoning must be considered to be inconsistent.

In June, 1950 the new calendarist Archbishop of Athens Spyridon Vlachos wrote to the Greek government that the Old Calendar movement was a form of pan-Slavism more dangerous to the nation even than communism! This was followed by a fierce persecution of the Old Calendarists, both Florinites and Matthewites. This community in persecution is a powerful argument that both factions communed of the True Body and Blood of Christ. And there were prominent Old Calendarists who refused to take sides. Thus on being asked which faction he belonged to, Hieromonk Jerome of Aegina replied: "I am with all the factions!"²⁸⁴

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²⁸³ Pomazansky, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, Platina: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1997, p. 235.

²⁸⁴ Peter Botsis, *Gerontas Ieronymos o Isykhastis tis Aiginas* (Elder Jerome the Hesychast of Aegina), Athens, 1991.

The renewal of persecution against the True Church was clearly imminent in 1949, when, "the State Church elected Archbishop Spyridon to the primacy; he was to prove the fiercest persecutor yet of the Old Calendarists. Immediately after his election, he required his Bishops to submit details about Old Calendar clergy, parishes, and monasteries in their dioceses. The theological schools were forbidden in the future to accept Old Calendarist students (this order is still in effect, though heretics of various persuasions are not debarred). Finally, on January 3, 1951, at the request of the Holy Synod of the State Church, a decree was issued by the Council of Ministers as follows: '... It is decided that: 1) Old Calendarist clergy who do not have canonical ordination by canonical Bishops of our Orthodox Church, and who wear clerical dress, should be deprived thereof; 2) monks and nuns following the Old Calendar should be arrested and confined to monasteries, and those who bear the monastic dress uncanonically should be deprived thereof and prosecuted; 3) the Churches which have been illegally seized by the Old Calendarists should be returned to the official Church, as also the monasteries they possess illegally and capriciously; 4) the execution of the above be entrusted to the Ministries of Public Order, Justice, Religion, and Education.'

"The above plan was put into immediate effect. In a short while, the basement of the Archdiocese in Athens and other towns was filled with the clerical robes of the True Orthodox clergy who were taken there, shaved, often beaten, and then cast out into the street in civil dress; many Priests underwent this process a number of times, while others were arrested and sent into exile. One aged Priest, Father Plato, was beaten to death by the police in Patras, and then hastily buried in a field to cover up the crime. All the Churches in Athens were sealed and their vessels taken, and a few Churches in other parts of Greece were even demolished. Soon no True Orthodox Priest could circulate undisguised, and even monks and nuns were not immune to these profane attacks.

"The first victim was Bishop Germanos of the Cyclades, who died in the greatest grief when under house arrest on March 24, 1951, and was buried by the Faithful²⁸⁵; by the personal order of Archbishop Spyridon, they were not

²⁸⁵ According to other sources, he was in hospital. "Spyridon Vlachos forbade his ecclesiastic burial and, deeming himself a worthy successor of Caiaphas, he ordered that the body of the deceased be guarded by gendarmes at the Clinic of Saint Helen in the Athenian suburb of Sepolia (where he was transferred from jail while breathing his last) in order to prevent the reading of a burial service by a Genuine Orthodox priest. God, however, arranged otherwise. During the same period, the Archimandrite Chrysostomos Kiousis [the future archbishop] was secretly in hiding to avoid capture and stripping by the police, and celebrated the Divine Liturgy in country chapels and in the houses of faithful Christians that had been transformed into catacombs, moving about only at night with great caution. In March of 1951, in one of those catacombs, he celebrated the Vigil of the Annunciation of the Theotokos along with the ever-memorable Archmandrite Petros Astyfides (later, Bishop of Astoria), deeply grieved by the news of the passing of the ever-memorable Bishop Germanos. A white cloth with paper icons pinned to it separated the Holy Altar from the rest of the room. Two tables assumed the role of the Altar and the Table of Oblation. They celebrated the liturgy in this manner when suddenly at two o'clock in the morning there was a knocking on the door! Fortunately, it was

permitted to take the body to a Church, and no Priest was allowed to assist; even so, many were arrested at the cemetery. Soon the orphanage of the TOC was seized by the State Church. There is no space here, unfortunately, to describe all the heroic struggles of the Old Calendarists at this time, the demonstrations attended by thousands in the squares of Athens, the catacomb Church services and so forth, which are the glory of our Church.

"The eighty-one-year-old Metropolitan Chrysostom was arrested in February, 1951, and after repeated attempts to change his views, was exiled to the Monastery of St. John in Lesbos, situated on a remote 2,500-foot crag, where he was to remain for over a year. The monks of the monastery behaved sympathetically, but conditions were very hard for an infirm, elderly man. The Metropolitan, however, constantly expressed his joy at being found worthy to suffer for his Faith, and his satisfaction at the resistance and perseverance of the Faithful in the face of persecution. We have a precious proof of his holiness from this bitter time: the police officer whose duty it was to guard him, looked into the Bishop's cell one evening and, to his amazement, saw him standing in prayer with his hands raised, surrounded by a blinding heavenly light. The guard fell at his feet to ask forgiveness and subsequently became one of his most faithful spiritual children.²⁸⁶

"Passion Week of 1952 saw fearful scenes of impiety perpetrated on the TOC, but it was rapidly becoming clear to all that the persecution was producing merely public disorder and complaint, and was achieving nothing in the way of 're-uniting' the Faithful to the State Church; indeed, rather the opposite. Finally, in June, 1952, through the intervention of the new Prime Minister, Plastiras, Metropolitan Chrysostom and the other Bishops were released. Slowly the pressure was relaxed, much aided by the constant protests of Patriarch Christopher of Alexandria, a supporter of the Old Calendarists from the beginning, and eventually two Churches were permitted to function

not the police but rather members of N.E.O.S., the youth organization of the Genuine Orthodox Church, who were seeking a priest to secretly conduct a burial service, having convinced the gendarme guarding the body of Bishop Germanos to 'look the other way.' While Fr. Petros continued the Vigil, Fr. Chrysostomos went to read the funeral of the reposed hierarch. As the funeral approached its end the gendarme, who was following the service piously, warned that the time had come for him to be relieved. As Fr. Chrysostomos and his entourage were heading for their car, the oncoming gendarmes spotted him. A chase ensued. However, Pericles, the priest's experienced driver, drove through the maze of Athenian streets and managed to escape, thus keeping Fr. Chrysostomos from being captured and stripped. The new calendarists placed guards over the dying confessor to see that no Old Calendarist priest was able to chant the funeral service over him. However, with the aid of a sympathetic guard, Hieromonk Chrysostom (Kiousis), later archbishop of the True Orthodox Church of Greece, was able to do just that. When a new shift of guards arrived, Fr. Chrysostom was forced to flee, and a car chase ensued through the streets of Athens" (http://www.ekklisiastikos.co; http://www.ecclesiagoc.gr/pegeng/h005/pegint.dll?faq0011.peg | 14).

²⁸⁶ During this period of exile, Metropolitan Chrysostom's former deacon, now Patriarch Athenagoras, proposed that he return to the new calendarists and be "reinstated". The metropolitan refused (*Agios Kyprianos* (St. Cyprian), N 298, September-October, 2000, pp. 350-351, 354. (V.M.)

in the city of Athens.... However, it was not until 1954 that the violent measures finally came to an end and the Churches could be safely re-opened."²⁸⁷

The saints helped the Old Calendarist confessors during this persecution. Thus the priest Constantine Papanoniou "was arrested, violently stripped of his clerical garb, and was thrown into the 'Chatzikostas' Prisons in Athens. His Presbytera Catherine was left alone and helpless to nourish her (then) three children. Presbytera's parents, being New Calendarists, tried to persuade her to go to jail and pressure Fr. Constantine to accept the New Calendar innovation that he may be freed from prison. They told her the usual: 'Have pity on your children. How will they live?'

"In the end, she was persuaded and acted according to the bad counsel of her parents. Fr. Constantine, hearing Presbytera's words concerning the danger for his children, although he was sorrowful he did not answer her immediately, asking for a little time to think about it. It was the eve of St. Anthony the Great's Feast Day according to the Patristic Calendar, and at evening he prayed, supplicating St. Antony to enlighten him as to what he should do.

Falling asleep that night he saw St. Anthony who said to him: 'Remain where you are and I will get you out of prison!'

"On the next day, a certain unknown man paid Fr. Constantine's bail. Once he was freed, Fr. Constantine met with that unknown man and asked him what his parents' names are so he can commemorate them. The unknown man did not answer. Then Fr. Constantine sought to learn at least his name so he can commemorate him. The unknown man answered: 'Anthony' and he disappeared!

"Since then, Fr. Constantine served a Vigil each year on the Feast of St. Anthony the Great: the Wonderworker. He used to tell his spiritual children: 'I am with the Patristic Calendar because of St. Anthony!"²⁸⁸

It is perhaps no accident that the persecutions against the True Orthodox in Greece took place when the Greek civil war and the great political turmoil of the previous decade had come to an end. Freed from external enemies, the State Church could now return to "the enemy within". Even some former communist hierarchs were re-employed in the struggle against the True Orthodox, such as Metropolitan Anthony of Elia, who joined the party in 1944 was deposed in 1946, but returned to his see after the amnesty of 1952.²⁸⁹

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²⁸⁷ Archimandrite Chrysostomos, Hieromonk Ambrose and others, *The Old Calendar Orthodox Church of Greece*, Etna, Ca.: Center for Traditionalist Studies, 1986, pp. 15-18. The new calendarists did not allow any True Orthodox priests to bury Bishop Germanus.

²⁸⁸ https://goctoronto.org/the-miracle-of-st-anthony-the-great-which-confirms-our-sacred-struggle/?fbclid=IwAR3swMbWZ4ZChwoDMs-

²⁸⁹ Metropolitan Calliopius, *Saint Joseph de Desphina* (St. Joseph of Desphina), Lavardac: Orthodox Monastery of St. Michael, 1988, p. 70, footnote 17.

By 1949, however, the communist threat had receded and Greece was firmly back within the sphere of western influence. The time was ripe for the State Church to go forward to full union with the western heretics – but only if its rear could be secured from snipers of the True Orthodox Church. Hence the significance of the election of the persecutor Archbishop Spyridon, who was entrusted with removing this, the main obstacle to the further development of Ecumenism in the western world.

In this period, Metropolitan Chrysostom again wavered in relation to the new calendarists. On December 11, 1950 he declared in the newspaper Vradini (Evening) that the Old Calendarists were "a living artery through which clean Orthodox blood flowed into the heart of the Church", and that the Old Calendarists had condemned the State Church as schismatic only because the State Church had done the same to them (in 1926). And in the same month he declared in the official organ of the Church, I Phoni tis Orthodoxias (The Voice of Orthodoxy): "In spite of the cruel persecution that the innovating Church has organized against us, we avoided, at the beginning out of respect for the significance of the Church, to pronounce her schismatic in an ecclesiastical encyclical, at the same time that she declared us to be schismatics in court, condemning our bishops of Megara and Diauleia, in order to justify their decision to depose them. But when we saw that the ruling Synod had decided, contrary to all the holy canons and the age-old practice of the Church, to consider the sacraments of us, the true Orthodox, to be invalid, then we, too, in defence issued this encyclical, so as to calm the troubled conscience of our flock, and not for the sake of acquiring the property of the monastery in Keratea..."290

In March, 1951 the Greek Minister of Internal Affairs Bakopoulos issued the following statement concerning the negotiations between Metropolitan "The Chrysostom and the newcalendarist Archbishop Spirvdon: negotiations... are going well and have reached the point that the former Bishop of Florina has completely recognized his error... The official Church has exceeded all limits in the concessions it has made. In time it would have rehabilitated the Old Calendar bishops, and ordained their priests... and recognized the sacraments accomplished by them as valid, and churches would have been offered for those who would want to celebrate according to the old calendar. Both the former Bishop of Florina and the other bishops (Germanos of the Cyclades, Christopher of Megara and Polycarp of Diauleia) agreed with all this, and, according to our information, their representatives, distinguished lawyers, had to formulate a corresponding act... Unfortunately, at the last moment irresponsible activists from the lay estate interfered... and influenced the weak character of the former Bishop of Florina, who rejected all that he had said earlier..."291

²⁹⁰ Monk Benjamin (Gomareteli), *Letopis' tserkovnykh sobytij Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi nachinaia s* 1917 *goda* (Chronicle of Church Events, beginning from 1917), www.zlatoust.ws/letopis.htm, vol. 4, p. 9.

²⁹¹ Ethnikos Kirikas (National Herald), March 9, 1951; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 10.

One of the conditions of union with the official Church was the commemoration of the newcalendarist Archbishop Spirydon, on which Metropolitan Chrysostom commented: 'Oldcalendarism in its essence is an invincibly strengthened protest... The only power which could review this protest and bring a final decision for or against the calendar innovation is a Pan-Orthodox Council... Our movement is not being stubborn... Our opinions differ from those of the leadership of the Autocephalous Church of Greece... The second reason for the failure is the strange and imprudent hastiness of the competent people to force any kind of decision on us. Thus they suggested that within three or six days the Old Calendarists should agree to commemorate the new calendarist metropolitan in their churches. We, for brevity's sake, will omit all the other reasons which the making of this suggestion made unacceptable, and ask the Greek people: how is it possible for an Old Calendarist to change his psychological presuppositions so quickly as to consider as his president the metropolitan whom to this day he has considered to be his real enemy and persecutor, and from whom he has suffered much? We, at any rate, have not found this magic wand..."292

Metropolitan Chrysostom was inconsistent, but he remained faithful to Orthodoxy and much beloved by his flock. The same could be said (without the charge of inconsistency) of Bishop Germanos of the Cyclades, who died as a confessor on March 24, 1951. However, the other three bishops wavered in the faith, resigning from their pastoral duties on November 6, 1952, "until a final resolution of the calendar question by a Pan-Orthodox Council".²⁹³ This decision elicited demonstrations in the streets by the Florinites, which led Metropolitan Chrysostom to withdraw his resignation. However, Bishops Christopher and Polycarp remained as simple lay members of the True Orthodox Church until February, 1954, when they returned to the State Church and were received in their existing rank.²⁹⁴

"As a result of this, Chrysostom of Florina remained alone as the head of the larger group of the True Orthodox Church until his death. Several candidates for the episcopacy were presented to him. Bishop Nikolai (Velimirovich) of the Serbian Church, who was then residing in the United States, offered to help him consecrate new bishops. However, Chrysostom declined the suggestion.²⁹⁵ In answer to the pleas of his flock for bishops, he directed that they come to terms with the bishops Matthew had consecrated and have them somehow regularized according to the canons."²⁹⁶

²⁹² Ethnikos Kirikas (National Herald), March 9, 1951; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 10-11.
²⁹³ Hieromonk Amphilochius, *Gnosesthe Aletheian* (Know the Truth), Athens, 1984, pp. 33-36; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 17-19.

²⁹⁴ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 19-20.

²⁹⁵ Lardas, "The Old Calendar Movement in the Greek Church", Holy Trinity Monastery, Jurdanville, 1983 (unpublished thesis), p. 16. However, in the opinion of Joachim Wertz (personal communication), it is very unlikely that Bishop Nikolai, though always sympathetic to the Old Calendarists, actually offered his help in this matter. (V.M.)

²⁹⁶ Holy Transfiguration Monastery, *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 73-74.

"The death of the Metropolitan, which occurred on the Feast of the Nativity of the Mother of God, September 7, 1955 (old style), again permits us to glimpse his sanctity behind the veil of great modesty and privacy which he always maintained in his contacts even with his closest assistants. The Bishop, foreseeing his death, summoned his confessor, the Athonite Archimandrite John, on the night before, and made an hour-long general confession. Returning home that evening, he instructed his attendant to spread his bed with new white sheets and coverings. In the morning he was found with his hands crossed on his chest, reposed in the Lord, with no sign of illness. His will reveals that he had no money or possessions to dispose of. The funeral, held in the Church of the Transfiguration at Kypselli, Athens, was attended by tens of thousands who came in grief to venerate the body of their leader, which according to Byzantine tradition was seated in the center of the Church during the funeral; afterwards, the police had to drive back the crowds to permit the body to be taken to the place of burial, the Dormition Convent on Mount Parnes. By a curious coincidence, the bells of all the Churches in Greece were ringing mournfully as he went to his place of rest - the Synod of the State Church having so ordered as a sign of grief at the recent anti-Greek riots in Constantinople. When after six years, as is the custom in Greece, the bones of the Metropolitan were exhumed, the fragrance they produced filled the entire convent for several days, and is still often perceptible."297

In spite of his inconsistencies Metropolitan Chrysostom never entered into communion with the new calendarists. And there are other proofs of his Orthodoxy. Thus Abbess Euthymia of the Dormition Convent writes: "When we buried the ever-memorable hierarch Chrysostom, since he was buried in our Monastery, the whole place was fragrant and the builders who were building the foundation of the church came down from there and asked our elder: 'Father, what is this fragrance which we can smell where we're working?' And they saw the exhumation and understood. I was the one who washed the bones of his Beatitude, and my hands were fragrant the whole night. And this fragrance was perceptible in our Monastery for forty days.

"One nun who had been in the Monastery since the age of seven... said that she had not been baptized... When the Bishop of Florina fell asleep, she sat for forty days at his tomb and besought him to enlighten the elder to baptize her. Then in her sleep she saw him sitting on a throne, and he told her that she was unbaptized and that the elder should look at the holy *Rudder*. And indeed they found that when there are doubts people should be baptized. And there was a consumptive girl who came and took some oil from the lamp of the tomb and smeared her breast with it and was healed."²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ Archimandrite Chrysostomos, Hieromonk Ambrose, op. cit., pp. 19-20. According to Holy Transfiguration Monastery, the grave was opened in 1958, when the remains were found to be fragrant. "In fact, the fragrance was so strong that lay workers came to ask what the source was of this sweet aroma that had filled the entire surrounding area" (op. cit., p. 74).

²⁹⁸ Karamitsos, *O Synkhronos Omologitis tis Orthodoxias* (The Contemporary Confessor of Orthodoxy), Athens, 1990, pp. 73-74.

Summarizing the discords between the bishops in this period, the words of the Athonite Elder Damascene, who shared a cell with Bishop Matthew in the 1920s but joined the "Florinites" in 1982, wrote: "The three ever-memorable Hierarchs Chrysostom of Florina, Germanos of the Cyclades and Matthew of Bresthena struggled for the traditions of the Fathers. But as men wearing flesh and living in the world they fell into error while in this life. However, the three finished their lives in the good Confession and passed away in repentance. And if someone wishes to represent one or other of the three as having been quite without reproach, and that he alone held the truth without any deviation, that man is, in the words of the divine Chrysostom, an erring scoffer, a deceiver and a base flatterer. That is, when he praises everything, both the good and the bad."²⁹⁹

In Cyprus, most of the Orthodox had accepted the new calendar in 1924.³⁰⁰ The centre of resistance to the innovation was the ancient monastery of Stavrovouni, where Hieromonk Cyprian and a few disciples continued to follow the Orthodox Calendar. In 1944, these monks were expelled, scattered round the island and founded some hermitages. But they had no bishops... In 1946 Bishop Matthew sent five monks to Cyprus, and a little later, the *protosynkellos* of his Church, Fr. Eugene Tombros. In 1948, as we have seen, he consecrated Bishop Spyridon, a Greek, for the True Orthodox of Cyprus.³⁰¹

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Galaktotrophousa monastery, near Larnaka, was the first monastery of the Cypriot True Orthodox and had been built at the direct command of the Mother of God. Monk Paul of Cyprus tells the story: "When the monastery was being built – in a poor way, like all the monasteries of the True Orthodox Christians, with mud bricks and straw – one of the monk-builders, a pious and very simple man, but 'a bird of passage', was thinking of going elsewhere. While he was relaxing under a tree at midday, the All Holy [Mother of God] appeared to him in majesty, as he told the story, and said: 'Don't go.' He said to her: 'Why are you standing in the sun? Go into the shade.' But she said to him again: 'Stay and build a church and cells for me, and I will bring my treasures here and will live here because they are persecuting me from all sides with their new calendar.' And then she disappeared."³⁰²

²⁹⁹ "Peri sykophantias" (On Slander), *Agios Agathangelos o Esphigmenites* (St. Agathangelos of Esphigmenou), July-August, 1982, pp. 12-15.

³⁰⁰ However, the leading innovator, Archbishop Cyril, had a vision of angels on his deathbed which convinced him that he had committed a fatal error (Abbot Chrysostom of Galaktotrophousa monastery, Cyprus, personal communication, January, 1981).

³⁰¹ "Histoire de l'Eglise des Vrais Chrétiens Orthodoxes de Chypre" (A History of the Church of the True Orthodox Christians of Cyprus), *Foi Transmise et Sainte Tradition* (Transmitted Faith and Holy Tradition), Lavardac, N 21/23, numéro special.

³⁰² Monk Paul, "I Panagia eis tin Kypron" (The All-Holy on Cyprus), *Agios Agathangelos Esphigmenites* (St. Agathangelos of Esphigmenou), N 125, May-June, 1991, p. 26.

Bishop Spyridon, after only nine months on Cyprus, was imprisoned and sent back to Greece by the British at the instigation of the new calendarists. While in prison, he told Abbot Chrysostom of Galactotrophousa monastery to go with him to Greece, where he would be consecrated bishop in his stead. However, the authorities denied him a visa. But in 1957 Monk Epiphanios arrived in Greece and was consecrated Bishop of Kition – which consecration, however, was not recognised by Bishop Spyridon.³⁰³ This caused a schism in the Cypriot Church, and Abbot Chrysostom, who remained faithful to Bishop Spyridon, was defrocked by the Matthewite Synod in Greece. However, the schism was healed, and Abbot Chrysostom was reinstated, in the 1980s.³⁰⁴

As regards the new calendarist Church of Cyprus, it was British policy to hinder the consecration of new bishops on Cyprus. After the newcalendarist Archbishop Cyril III died in 1933, and until 1947, the British colonial government did not allow the election of a new first-hierarch. By this time all the metropolitans on the island had been exiled except Leontius of Paphos. In 1950 the new metropolitan became Archbishop Macarius III, who also became the head of the Cypriot government. In September, 1952 there began a struggle for national liberation from the British, and in 1959 independence for the island was achieved, although the British remained in possession of some military bases.

³⁰³ Abbot Chrysostom, personal communication, January, 1981.

³⁰⁴ On being exhumed, Abbot Chrysostom's body was found to be partially incorrupt (Fr. Sotirios Hadjimichael, personal communication).

22. THE KOREAN WAR

Immediately after signing the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, the Soviet bloc countries showed their complete contempt for any such rights by increasing the cruel and relentless repression of all independent thought in Eastern Europe, raising the numbers of prisoners in the Soviet Gulag to five million...

But it was on the foreign threats posed by Stalin that the new U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose to emphasize when he gave the Commencement Address at Harvard University on June 22, 1950 to that year's new set of graduates (which included the future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger). Acheson's political stance had become more hawkish of late, which was a response, according to Niall Ferguson, "more to Stalin's conduct than to McCarthy's pressure. Indeed, his Commencement address consisted largely of a recitation of hostile Soviet moves since 1945. According to Acheson, the Soviet Union had 'renewed intimidating pressure' on Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, assisted 'Communist-dominated guerrillas in Greece' 'Sovietized[d] the Eastern zone of Germany', 'consummated [its] control of Hungary' and attempted 'to block the political and economic recovery of France and Italy by strikes and other disruptive activities.' It was this behavior that had persuaded the Truman administration to send aid to Greece and Turkey and then to Western Europe in 1947. The subsequent Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia had persuaded the United States to go still further by signing the treaty of mutual defence that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Acheson proudly likened to the Magna Carta or the American Declaration of Independence. His peroration was unequivocal. 'Until the Soviet leaders do genuinely accept a 'live and let live' philosophy, then no approach from the free world, however imaginative, and no Trojan dove from the Communist movement, will help to resolve out mutual problems.' Yet – perhaps because the mixed metaphor was so clumsy – it was not the 'Trojan dove' phrase that attracted the most attention. For Acheson also added, perhaps as a sop to the pacifist demonstrators outside, 'War is not inevitable.'

"Less than three days later, as dawn broke on Sunday, June 15, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel. The Korean War had begun..."³⁰⁵

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"On August 9, 1945, [Stalin] had sent a vast force of 1.7 million troops into Japanese-controlled Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurils. Fighting in this forgotten campaign had been heavy; the Japanese suffered very serious casualties as they fought tenaciously against Soviet amphibious landings along the Korean coast. This, perhaps, was the war the Japanese should have fought; one which, had it broken out in 1941, might have dealt the Soviet Union a fatal

³⁰⁵ Ferguson, *Kissinger.* 1923-196: *The Idealist*, New York: Penguin, 2016, pp. 248-249.

blow from behind. But by 1945 their forces lacked the material means to prevail. The logical next step for Stalin was to make the Russian presence in Manchuria and Korea permanent – the pre-revolutionary Russian strategy that had been thwarted by the Japanese forty years before. The hasty American response was to divide the country into two provisional zones of occupation, leaving Stalin all the territory south of the somewhat arbitrarily selected 38th parallel. Thus, as in Europe, the end of the war in Asia meant an improvised partition of contested territory.

"It was not so much that Stalin had a premeditated plan for Asian empire; rather, the Americans underestimated the extent to which nationalist movements in East Asia would run out of their control. The notion that Korea could be placed in some kind of international trusteeship proved completely unrealistic as indigenous politics burst into life after the Japanese defeat..."³⁰⁶

And so, as Henry Kissinger writes, "The northern half of the Korean Peninsula was occupied by the Soviet Union, the southern half by the United States. Each established its form of government in its zone before it withdrew, in 1948 and 1949, respectively."³⁰⁷

"Rival regimes emerged," writes Norman Stone. "A leathery Methodist, Syngman Fhee, was promoted in the South, while the Communist North Korea formally became independent in 1948 under Kim Il Sung, a figure (also with a Protestant background) who emerged from Chinese shadows and had trained for a time at Khabarovsk in Siberia. Kim had megalomaniac qualities (he eventually proclaimed himself 'President for Eternity') and went to Moscow in March 1949, as Mao was winning in China. He wanted help to seize the South, where consolidation, with a small American presence, was ramshackle (as happened in Japan, there was a considerable enough Communist element there). That was refused: Stalin's hands were full with the Berlin blockade. However, Mao was less discouraging, though he wanted action only 'in the first half of 1950', by which time he would control the whole of China. He even said that Chinese soldiers might be sent in, because the Americans would not be able to tell them apart..."³⁰⁸

Although Stalin was not willing – yet – to help the Chinese in Korea, they did sign a Sino-Soviet treaty in February 1950 which, as Max Hastings writes, "seemed to create a real threat of a Red Asia. The American conservative Michael Lind has written in his revisionist study of Vietnam: 'On the evening of February 14, 1950, in a Kremlin hall in the Kremlin, three men whose plans would subject Indochina to a half-century of warfare, tyranny and economic stagnation, and inspire political turmoil in the United States and Europe, stood

³⁰⁶ Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 589-590.

³⁰⁷ Kissinger, World Order, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 288.

³⁰⁸ Stone, The Atlantic and its Enemies, London: Penguin, 2011, p. 95.

side by side: Stalin, Mao Zedung, and Ho Chi Minh... There was an international conspiracy and Ho Chi Minh was a charter member of it."³⁰⁹

Already, the Americans were more or less paying for the French colonialists' war against Ho in Vietnam. Soon they would be involved more directly against the communists in Korea...

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On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, their border with South Korea. Their tanks were Soviet, as were their planes and some of their pilots. Why had the normally ultra-cautious Stalin allowed himself to be persuaded by the North Korean leader Kim-Il-Sung into approving the invasion (in April, 1950) and committing Soviet equipment, if not men, to help him? Probably for two reasons: first because now the Soviets had the H-bomb, and secondly because, since October of that year, China had finally been conquered by the Maoist communists. World Communism was on the crest of a wave, and since Stalin believed that a Third World War was in any case inevitable, he probably reasoned that if risks had to be taken, now was the time to take them. But he advised Kim to turn to the Chinese for help...

Moreover, he almost certainly knew from his British spies in London and Washington Philby, Burgess and Maclean, that the Americans had ruled out the use of nuclear weapons. "Maclean's deputy on the American desk, Robert Cecil, later concluded that the Kremlin must have found the documents provided by Maclean 'of inestimable value in advising the Chinese and the North Koreans on strategy and negotiating positions."³¹⁰ So with Soviet weaponry, and vast numbers of Chinese soldiers to help them, the North Koreans probably had a good chance of beating the Americans, whose lines of supply were, of course, far longer than those of the communists.

Henry Kissinger adds another reason: Stalin "had learned from the defection of Tito two years earlier that first-generation Communist leaders were especially difficult to fit into the Soviet satellite system that he thought imperative for Russia's national interest. Starting with Mao's visit to Moscow in later 1949 – less than three months after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed – Stalin had been uneasy about the looming potential of China led by a man of Mao's dominating attributes. An invasion of South Korea might divert China into a crisis on its borders, deflect America's attention from Europe to Asia, and, in any event, absorb some of America's resources in that effort. If achieved with Soviet support, Pyongyang's unification project might give the Soviet Union a dominant position in Korea and, in view of the historical suspicions of these countries for each other, create a kind of counterbalance to China in Asia. Mao followed Stalin's lead – conveyed to him

³⁰⁹ Hastings, *Vietnam*, London: William Collins, 2019, pp. 28-29.

³¹⁰ Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive. The KGB in Europe and the West*, London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999, p. 203.

by Kim II-sung in almost certainly exaggerated terms – for the converse reason; he feared encirclement by the Soviet Union, whose acquisitive interest in Korea had been demonstrated over the centuries and was even then displayed in the demands for ideological subservience Stalin was making as a price for the Sino-Soviet alliance..."³¹¹

But Stalin had miscalculated. He did not realize that the American president was in his own way a man of steel – and some cunning also. On hearing the news of the invasion, President Truman, who was in his home state of Missouri, thought that World War III was about to begin. But on reaching Washington, he "told one of those who met him at the airport, 'By God, I am going to let them have it.' The United Nations Security Council, meeting that day, passed a resolution by nine votes to nil demanding the withdrawal of North Korean forces. There was no Soviet veto, as the Soviet delegate, Yakov Malik, had walked out of the Security Council five months earlier in protest at his colleagues' refusal to give Communist China the Chinese Nationalist place on the Council..."³¹²

Since the invasion took place outside Europe, it did not become the first test of the solidity of the NATO alliance. But it did have a positive effect on NATO: "during the winter of 1950-51, the United States decided to commit four divisions to western Europe and it also established a proper command structure under a Supreme Allied Commander Europe – who would always be an American. As Averill Harriman observed, the Korean crisis 'put the "O" in Nato' turning it from a paper pact into a military alliance."³¹³

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However, it was not America but the United Nations that took on the responsibility of resisting Communist tyranny. And it has to be said that. Although the main burden fell on the Americans, the international organization passed the test with flying colours as several nations gave troops in what was truly a war to defend freedom. Neither before nor since has the United Nations done so well in coordinating an effective resistance to totalitarian evil.

The fortunes of war swung wildly from one side to the other. In the early months, the UN forces were nearly forced to evacuate the whole peninsula. But then in a brilliant flanking movement at Inchon, the UN Commander General MacArthur drove the North Koreans towards the border with China, the Yalu river. Having reached the border, however, MacArthur now, on November 25, encouraged a ferocious counter-attack from 300,000 Chinese guerrillas, who

³¹¹ Kissinger, op. cit.

³¹² Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 865-866. This blunder was Stalin's fault. As Robert Service writes, he had "repudiated the advice of his Ministry of External Affairs to drop the boycott so as to prevent the Americans and their allies from landing with the legitimacy conferred by the sanction of the United Nations" (*Stalin*, London: Pan, 2004, p. 554).

³¹³ Reynolds, "Security in the New World Order", New Statesman, April 4, 2019 p. 32.

rose out of the snow in their white suits and sent the American and South Korean troops reeling southwards. It was a foretaste of how effective guerrilla tactics could be when the terrain suited them – as it was to do again in Vietnam in the 1960s...

"On Christmas Eve 1950," writes Burleigh, "MacArthur submitted a targeting list that required twenty-six nuclear weapons, sixteen of which were to be used against Chinese industrial and military targets. The prospect of nuclear escalation brought a large British contingent to Washington, led by Attlee and Bevin. They insisted that they should have a say in the use of nuclear weapons, while underlining that they regarded a widening of the war as disastrous, not least for their outpost of Hong Kong. They were also angling for a US subsidy towards their £3,800 million rearmament programme, but that is another story.

"In fact, US policy-makers realized that select nuclear strikes would probably not impact much on China's overall ability to wage war in Koreas, while courting the real risk of the Soviets coming to the aid of their ally, in Europe rather than in Asia. Unilateral use of nuclear weapons would also turn the UN against the US, while alienating European (and Japanese) allies. This led US policy-makers to favour a local draw, but none of his titular superiors had to courage to inform MacArthur of this major change of policy, a moral lapse that slightly mitigated his future conduct."³¹⁴

Andrew Marr gives a slightly different interpretation to the Americans' refusal to use nuclear weapons: "It could hardly have been the threat of a swift Soviet reprisal. We know now that Russian pilots were present over the skies of Korea, and the Russians had had a bomb of their own thanks to their spies in the West since the previous year, though they were not yet in a position to effectively challenge in a nuclear exchange. It was rather because the US did not want to set a precedent; the bomb was not to be used lightly, or merely to even the score in a conflict that did not touch America's future. If it were to be used in this way, the Russians would eventually do the same."³¹⁵

MacArthur placed General Matthew Ridgway in charge of the US Eighth Army in Korea. "On arrival in Korea, Ridgway spent time acquainting himself with the troops and with battlefields he surveyed from a small plane. He quickly decided that he could expect little of the ROK [South Korean] army; but his own men were cold and demoralized, mainly because they did not know what they were fighting for. They regarded Truman's euphemism of a 'police action' as a bad joke – this was a very real war. Ridgway took care of their creature comforts and addressed a rousing message to them on 21 January 1951:

³¹⁴ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 156.

³¹⁵ Marr, A History of the World, London: Pan, p. 523.

"The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat Communism: whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens and deride the dignity of man, shall replace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred, whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world."³¹⁶

Surprisingly perhaps, such a specifically religious justification for the war, as a struggle between faith in God and godlessness, was rare among Western leaders. It certainly helped to reverse the situation now.

³¹⁶ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

23. CHINA JOINS THE WAR

Since Mao, writes Maria Hsia Chang, "was essentially ignorant of the doctrines of Marx and Engels, whatever knowledge of Marxism he had was that given currency by Lenin and Stalin. From Lenin he inherited a perspective of Marxist class struggle generalized to include entire countries. The world was divided into two adversarial camps: On one side were the 'progressive' socialist states led by the Soviet Union; on the other were the 'decadent' capitalist-imperialist countries with the United States at the fore. In the global struggle that was to culminate in the inevitable collapse of capitalism, China must 'lean to one side' by joining the socialist camp with the Soviet Union as its mentor. From Stalin, Mao adopted the model of the command economy. The state would determine production, control costs, fix wages, and set prices; capital assets would be autarkically generated through forced savings by the Chinese people. The preponderance of those assets would be funnelled into heavy industrial development rather than agriculture or consumer industries.

"To these ideas of Lenin and Stalin Mao appended his own notions concerning the persistence of the class struggle and the imperative for a 'continuous revolution' in which all must participate. Both turned on his inversion of Marx's conceptualization of the relationship between the base and the superstructure.

"Instead of the classic Marxist dictum that the economic base determines the superstructure, Mao was convinced that superstructural elements of willpower and mass enthusiasm would transform the Chinese economy. Detached from the base, the elements of the superstructure became infinitely malleable, so that 'class' became redefined by Mao as a state of mind – a decided departure from its original Marxian meaning. An individual could become a 'capitalist' simply because s/he entertained 'capitalist' thoughts (whatever that meant), despite neither owning the means of production nor exploiting the labor of others. Given his new definition of class and class membership, Mao could argue that the installation of a socialist state in China with the attendant abolition of private property had failed to eliminate all noxious class elements. On the contrary, so long as capitalism remained in the world, its pernicious influence could seep into socialist China to contaminate the masses, resulting in 'antagonistic contradictions' between the unpolluted 'people' and the infected 'enemies of the people'. Toward those enemies, the ranks of whom could include even leading members of the vanguard Communist Party, the state could employ 'dictatorial' means for their eradication. Society and the state therefore must be constantly vigilant since corruption of the self and of others was a perpetual possibility. There would have to be regular and periodic campaigns to purify and instruct the masses. All of which meant that the revolution brought the CCP to power in 1949 would have to be continuous and unceasing.

"Indeed, for as long as Mao was in power, China would lurch from one political campaign to another. In the 1950s there were the Land Reform, Three-

and Five-Anti, Hundred Flowers, Anti-Rightist, and the Great Leap Forward campaigns. The 1960s were caught in the convulsion of the Cultural Revolution, followed in the 1970s by a bewildering succession of campaigns that included the Anti-Confucian and Water Margin campaigns. Punctuating all these were the periodic 'rectification' (*zhengfeng*) campaigns within the Communist Party to purge itself of impure elements.

"The first years of the People's Republic began with the 'socialist transformation' of the Chinese economy, in which feudal remnants and rudimentary capitalism were eradicated to make way for socialism. In 1950-52, land was confiscated from its owners and distributed to the heretofore landless peasants, in the course of which 1 to 15 million landlords were executed. In the cities, a process of deprivatization and demarketization began, aided by Soviet technicians and planners. Around a core of 130 industrial plants supplied by the Soviet Union, a Stalinist economy was constructed. The state rationed raw materials, maintained a monopoly of traded items, supplied producer goods, and established output quotas. By 1956, all of China's industries had come under state control, accounting for 93 percent of total national output and 97 of all retail sales.

"The early years of socialist transformation coincided with China's involvement in the Korean War. Convinced that their national sovereignty and security were imperilled by the activities of the United Nations forces in the Korean peninsula, millions of Chinese 'volunteers' went into battle to aid the North Koreans. The ill-equipped Chinese divisions were thrown into a mismatched conflict that exacted a devastating toll. By the time the war ended with an armistice in 1953, China had sustained about a million battlefield casualties."³¹⁷

"Mao used the Korean War to whip up nationalist hysteria in China to consolidate Chinese rule. Few regimes in history - other than the one in North Korea – have so completely mobilized hysterical levels of enthusiasm or hatred, as well as enthusiastic hate too. Pride in China would lead to pride in Mao's regime, a tactic the Communist Party has exploited ever since. The paradox of a 'social imperialist' war wrapped in the slogans of anti-imperialism is not often remarked by left-wing commentators, who invariably accuse regimes that do not pretend to be socialist of waging war for domestic political purposes. Mao was also the ultimate back-seat driver, constantly interfering in tactical decisions. An army trained for guerrilla warfare, and in which institutionalized command structures took second place to charismatic personalities, was not best suited to the needs of war against a well-equipped modern army. PVA troops could sustain a ferocious paced in battle for about three days, but after that failures of supply and support would lead to collapse. Lower-level officers and NCOs were forbidden to use their own initiative and lacked the authority to call in such support as was available - unlike their opponents, who could

³¹⁷ Chang, *Return of the Dragon*, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001, pp. 143-145.

call in almost unlimited artillery and, when weather permitted, terrifying air attacks.

"While Ridgway worked out how to achieve a draw, the seventy-one-yearold MacArthur was determined to close out his career with an unambiguous victory. On 30 December 1950 he lobbied the Republicans in Washington to be allowed to blockade the Chinese mainland, even though most PVA supplies came overland. He wanted to bomb China's strategic defence industries, even though the results of such blitzkrieg during the Second World War had been questionable. He wanted Chinese Nationalist troops to be sent to Korea as reinforcements and to launch diversionary attacks on the Chinese mainland from Taiwan, apparently unaware that Chiang Kai-shek's forces lacked amphibious capacity. He was also not slow to ventilate is belief that the war in Korea was being fought half-heartedly, dismissing Ridgway's approach as 'an accordion war' in which the combatants seesawed back and forth.

"Truman set his staff to investigate the analogous precedent of General George McClellan, whom Abraham Lincoln had sacked during the American civil war for blaming his military failure on the political direction of the war. Their findings confirmed what the amateur historian Truman believed already. The trouble was that in the popular mind MacArthur was more like the victorious Ulysses Grant than the hapless McClellan. But in the end it was intolerable that a serving officer should be conspiring with the political opponents of the administration. MacArthur's wild talk of extending the war to China threatened the international backing the US enjoyed in Korea and invited Soviet retaliation in Europe, but the sacking point was his flagrant attempts to seize the power of his constitutional Commander-in-Chief. Truman summarily dismissed MacArthur in April 1951, a decision so unpopular that supporters of the President were ordered out of taxis by irate taxi drivers and married couples ended up in jail after brawling over it.³¹⁸

"Three months before this melodrama unfolded, Ridgway had to deal with the second Chinese onslaught that took Seoul but then ran into well-prepared UN defensive positions at the intersection of the main east-west and northsouth rail and road routes that quartered Korea. PVA losses in the battles of Chipyongni and Wonju were catastrophic, and to add to his troubles [the Chinese commander] Peng now had to guard against being cut off by a second Inchon landing. Seoul was untenable and the war settled down to a struggle along what Ridgway called the 'Main Line of Resistance' around the 38th parallel. Ferocious battles still occurred, the doomed stand of the 1st Battalion of the British Gloucestershire Regiment on the Imjin River taking place at the end of April. Peng returned to Beijing, where he took his life in his hands by interrupting Mao's sleep to argue the folly of further massed offensives. Mao was already halfway persuaded that the political gains from the PVA

³¹⁸ As Winston Groom writes, "Truman relieved MacArthur for insubordination when he refused to follow Truman's doctrine seeking a limited [i.e. non-nuclear] war" ("The Making of MacArthur", *National Geographic History*, January-February, 2016, p. 86). (V.M.)

intervention were sufficient and agreed to a new strategy of 'fighting while negotiating', with the exhausted Chinese troops permitted to create strong defensive positions as arrangements were made for them to be rotated back to China. Once Stalin had endorsed it, Kim was compelled to accept it."³¹⁹

A heavily fortified demilitarized zone now separated the combatants for decades to come. As David Reynolds writes, "the Americans lost 33,000; the Chinese perhaps half a million, including one of Mao's sons; and the overall Korean death toll was maybe 2.5 million, a 10th of the population..."³²⁰

Stalin claimed that the failure of the Americans to conquer Korea had shown up their weakness. In hindsight, however, we may see the Korean War as the beginning of the decline of *Soviet* power. For the two communist powers had failed to dislodge the Americans, even though the Americans had forsworn their huge advantage in nuclear weapons and were thousands of miles from home. This was largely Stalin's fault. By throwing in his own troops and planes, he could almost certainly have swung the war in the communist direction. But he wanted to manipulate Mao and Kim-II-Sung just as he manipulated his own European and Russian satraps. And so he insisted that the Chinese help the North Koreans, while he provided only military equipment – not the air power that the Chinese so desperately needed. Nor did he agree to a peace treaty in the peninsula; he preferred a war of attrition in which the North Koreans would have to continue fighting indefinitely, because, as he told Chou-En-Lai, "they lose nothing *except for their men*".³²¹

But in manipulating his allies in this way, Stalin made another serious strategic error: it sowed seeds of distrust between the two communist powers. Already at their first meeting, during Stalin's 70th birthday celebrations in Moscow in December, 1949, Stalin had snubbed Mao. It was not that Stalin did not appreciate Mao's achievement in making the world's most populous state communist. Nor did he deny that China would now have to take the lead in the communist movement in the Far East. But he demanded veneration of himself as the high-priest of the movement, and – now in his 70s – he could not abandon the cunning and manipulative ways of his youth, which might be effective against Capitalist foes such as Churchill or Roosevelt but were less so with Communists hardly less cunning than himself such as Tito or Mao.

The Lord said that since the kingdom of Satan is divided against itself, it must fall (<u>Matthew</u> 12.26) And already before the death of Stalin, and in spite of the unparalleled power of his repressive apparatus, the communist movement was divided against itself. The differences between Stalin and Mao during the Korean War presaged the more serious split between the two powers in the 1960s - and the complete reversal of roles that we see today, when in spite of its bluster and posturing Putin's Russia is clearly the junior partner

³¹⁹ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

³²⁰ Reynolds, "Nuclear fall-out", BBC History Magazine, July, 2016, p. 43.

³²¹ Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar, London: Phoenix, 2004, p. 623.

to the enormous and continually rising power of still-communist and only superficially pro-Russian China...

The Korean War, writes Kennedy, "led to significant changes in American policy elsewhere in China. By 1949, many in the Truman administration had given up support of Chiang Kai-shek in disgust, viewed the 'rump' government in Taiwan with contempt, and were thinking of following the British in recognizing Mao's Communist regime. Within another year, however, Taiwan was being supported and protected by the US fleet, and China itself was regarded as a bitter foe, against which (at least in MacArthur's view) it would be necessary to use atomic weapons to counter its aggression. In Indonesia, so important for its raw materials and food supplies, the new government would be given aid to fight the Communist insurgents; in Malaysia, the British would be encouraged to do the same; and in Indochina, while still pressing the French to establish a more representative form of government, the United States was now prepared to pour in arms and money to combat the Vietminh. No longer convinced that the moral and cultural appeal of American civilization was enough to prevent the spread of Communism, the United States turned increasingly to military-territorial guarantees, especially after Dulles became secretary of state. Even by August 1951 a treaty had reaffirmed US air- and naval-base rights in the Philippines and American commitments to the defence of those islands. A few days later, Washington signed its tripartite security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. One week later, the peace treaty with Japan was finally concluded, legally ending the Pacific war and restoring full sovereignty to the Japanese state - but on the same day a security pact was signed, keeping American forces both in the home islands and in Okinawa. Washington's policy towards Communist China remained unrelentingly hostile, and toward Taiwan increasingly supportive, even over such minor outposts as Quenmoy and Matau..."322

However, this was only a temporary setback. Mao boasted that the Chinese could withstand a nuclear war better than any other nation because of their huge population. By 1964 they had created its own nuclear bomb – and without the help in this project that they had asked from the Soviets and which the Soviets had refused...

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But for North Korea, the result of the war was the darkest tragedy; for, as if it existed in a time warp, until the present day (2021) the country has continued as the last surviving relic of old-style Stalinism. Massive famines are frequent in a country that cannot feed itself but which prides itself on its nuclear weapons. Thus between 2 and 2.5 million died from famine between 1995 and 1998.³²³

³²² Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 493-494.

³²³ Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 54.

In conditions of the strictest repression, perhaps 2 million have been killed from other causes than famine since the regime's inception.³²⁴

As Jieun Baek writes, "the power of *juche*, North Korea's official ideology,... emphasizes the country's self-sufficiency and venerates the rulers of the Kim dynasty as quasi deities whose judgment and wisdom may never be questioned. In 1974, Kim Jong II sought to systematize *juche* by issuing a list called 'Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System'; most of the principles involved acknowledging the absolute authority of the supreme leader and pledging total obedience to the state. Kim demanded that all North Korean citizens memorize the principles and adhere to them in their daily lives, an order enforced through weekly 'self-criticism' sessions and peer surveillance. This practice continues today. During weekly meetings in classrooms, offices, and factories, citizens recite the ten principles and are called on to criticize themselves and one another for failing to live in perfect accordance with *juche*. North Koreans begin participating in these sessions around the time they enter first grade."³²⁵

In fact, as the *New World Encyclopedia* explains, North Korea's *juche* is probably the closest modern equivalent to the god-king cults of ancient paganism: "Kim Jong-II has explained that the doctrine is a component part of Kimilsungism, after its founder and his father, Kim II-sung. The core principle of the Juche ideology since the 1970s has been that 'man is the master of everything and decides everything'...

"Juche literally means 'main body' or 'subject'; it has also been translated in North Korean sources as 'independent mind' and the 'spirit of self-reliance'.

"Juche theory is a type of political ideology, but it is built upon the deification and mystification of Kim Il-sung (1912-1994). Its religious or pseudo-religious characteristics distinguish juche ideology from all other forms of Marxism, including Marx-Leninism of the former Soviet Union, European Neo-Marxism, Maoism, and even Stalinism. Juche ideology characterizes Kim as the 'eternal head of state', a Messianic liberator of humankind, and describes North Korea as a chosen nation, and North Koreans as a chosen people who have a mission to liberate the world. While fear and terror are used to externally dominate the masses in a totalitarian state, Juche Ideology is a tool for the internal domination of their minds..."

³²⁴ Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 53.

³²⁵ Baek, "The Opening of the North Korean Mind", Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2016.

24. McCARTHY AND HEMINGWAY

Britain was not the only country with Soviet spies in high places: America also was full of them. Socialism did not penetrate America through elections of openly socialist candidates to political office. But the same leftist, even communist tendencies that had gained such an ascendancy among West European and, to a lesser extent, British intellectuals since the war, had become fashionable also among American intellectuals since the 1930s. And that in spite of the ever-increasing evidence for Soviet treachery in the post-war years – the period when the Gulag reached its peak. However, these tendencies were more concealed (at this stage) in the United State because official America, both Republican and Democrat, remained fiercely conservative and anti-Socialist. So when the extent of Soviet penetration of government began to be revealed, there was an over-reaction, called "McCarthyism", after the leading spycatcher, Senator Joseph McCarthy.

J.R. Nyquist writes: "The history of Communist subversion is no fantasy. It is an old story. Robert Morris, a lawyer who served as special counsel for the U.S. Senate in the 1940s and 50s, wrote a memoir titled *No Wonder We Are Losing*, originally published in 1958. Prior to working for the Senate, Morris had been involved in early investigations of Communist infiltration of the public schools in New York and New Jersey. After the war, the Senate investigated eighty 'distressing' cases of subversion in American higher education. Morris catalogued the schools that were being infiltrated: 'Harvard, Colombia, Williams, Rutgers, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, New York University, Vermont, Queens, Hunter, Brooklyn and the City College of New York.'

"These universities were gradually becoming hubs for subversive Communist activity. What could be done about it? The Senate gathered stacks of evidence, yet the Justice Department and the universities would not act. As Morris stated, 'I have watched the papers in vain for any news of these universities dismissing ... Communists from their staffs.' But then something happened. 'The hearings on Interlocking Subversion ... struck a more responsive chord,' noted Morris. The Senate Committee 'began to call in witnesses whom the evidence showed to have been ... directors, as it were, of the Communist underground.' (p. 165)

"Elizabeth Bentley, 'an official of the United States Service and Shipping [company], Inc. New York City, came into the New York Office of the Bureau [FBI] and stated that for the past eleven years she had been actively engaged in Communist activity and Soviet espionage.' Bentley worked as a courier for Jacob Golos, the head of World Tourists, Inc., which was being used as a Soviet front. She carried messages between Golos and Earl Browder, head of the American Communist Party. Bentley said the espionage groups she worked with consisted of employees of the U.S. Government 'stationed in Washington, D.C.' The head of the most important spy ring was N. Gregory Silvermaster, 'at one time an employee of the Department of Labour' who transferred to the Treasury Department. 'Another member of this group' said Bentley, 'is William L. Ullman, a major in the United States Army Air Forces stationed at the Pentagon...' There was also 'George Silvermaster, a civilian employee of the War Department; Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of monetary research and foreign funds control....' There was also 'Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President; and other lesser figures.'

"There was also another espionage group operating in Washington, D.C., headed by Victor Perlo of the War Production Board. This group included 'John Abt, general counsel for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, in New York City. The individuals in this group include Charles Kramer, an investigator for Senator Kilgore's committee in the United States Senate; Henry Magdoff, of the War Production Board; Edward Fitzgerald, formerly of the Treasury Department and then with the War Production Board; Donald Wheeler, of the Office of Strategic Services [forerunner of the CIA]; Mary Price, formerly employed by Walter Lippmann in Washington, D.C. and now working for the United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, in New York City; Maj. Duncan Lee, of William Donovan's law firm in New York City who is also in the Office of Strategic Services.'

"Bentley knew these people were Communists because she had worked directly with them. In addition, she had been told that Alger Hiss 'had taken Harold Glasser, of the Treasury Department, and two or three others' to form an espionage group. Bentley's allegations about Hiss were supported by the testimony of another famous witness, Whittaker Chambers, who was further supported by Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko, who claimed that 'an assistant to the Secretary of State' was a Soviet agent.

"A further list of Communist conspirators included Robert Talbot Miller, III, of the State Department; 'Maurice Halperin of the Office of Strategic Services; Julius J. Joseph, of the Office of Strategic Services; Helen Tenney, of the Office of Strategic Services; Willard Park, of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-America affairs; Michael Greenberg, of the Foreign Economic Administration; William Remington, formerly of the War Production Board and subsequently inducted into the Navy; Bernard Redmont, also with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs."

T.J. Roberts writes: "From Isadora Duncan, Lincoln Steffens, John Dewey, Jane Addams, to a vast conglomerate of labor unions, Communist Sympathizers were everywhere. But perhaps the most egregious story was of one of the most trusted newspapers of the time, *The New York Times*, intentionally covering up Stalin's genocide against the Ukrainians. Walter Duranty was the Moscow Bureau Chief from 1922 to 1936 for the New York Times. He was assigned with the task of reporting on the inner workings of the Soviet Union, and went on to receive a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting.

"But of course his reporting was not honest. Despite the clear evidence, Duranty reported 'no famine or actual starvation nor is there likely to be' in the Soviet Union in November of 1932. At this point, millions had been deliberately starved in Ukraine by Stalin. This reporting only continued for the remaining four years Duranty spent in the Soviet Union. Years later, there were calls to revoke Duranty's Pulitzer Prize. Those calls were, of course, ignored...

"Things get worse when one considers the fact that the communists had successfully become a part of the US Government... With the revealing of these cases, one could see the immense power of the war McCarthy waged to keep communists and agents of the Soviet Union out of the US Government. Much of the information provided here is readily accessible through the 1995 declassified Venona Project files.

"The Venona files are Soviet messages US intelligence intercepted throughout the 1940s. As of now, it is confirmed that at least 350 Americans played an active role in Soviet espionage. This is an extremely conservative estimate since only about one in ten messages have been decoded. With this in mind, we could assume that more names are listed in the still encrypted messages. In addition, no one knows how many messages the US government failed to intercept. Ultimately, no one knows how many American communist sympathizers actively worked with the Soviet Union to bring about Communism in the US, but we can be certain that at least 350 were. But here are the stories of a few of the communists who managed to infiltrate the US Federal Government and impose policies that brought America closer to Communism.

"Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of Treasury, was a Soviet agent who used the code name 'Jurist.' Not only was White the Assistant Secretary of Treasury, but he was instrumental in founding the World Bank, and was the first director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). White brought the Soviets one step closer to the establishment of world-wide communism through globalist central planning.³²⁶

³²⁶ Ben Steil has discovered an unpublished essay of White's, in which " White describes a postwar world in which the Soviet socialist model of economic organization, although not supplanting the American liberal capitalist one, would be ascendant. 'In every case,' he argues, 'the change will be in the direction of increased [government] control over industry, and increased restrictions on the operations of competition and free enterprise.' Whereas White believed in democracy and human rights, he consistently downplayed both the lack of individual liberty in the Soviet Union ('The trend in Russia seems to be toward greater freedom of religion. . . . The constitution of [the] USSR guarantees that right') and the Soviets' foreign political and military adventurism ('The policy pursued by present day Russia [is one] of not actively supporting [revolutionary socialist] movements in other countries').

[&]quot;In the essay, White argues that the West is hypocritical in its demonization of the Soviet Union. He urges the United States to draw the Soviets into a tight military alliance in order to deter renewed German and Japanese aggression. But such an alliance, White lamented, faced formidable obstacles: 'rampant imperialism' in the United States, hiding under 'a variety of patriotic cloaks'; the country's 'very powerful Catholic hierarchy, 'which might 'well find an alliance with Russia repugnant'; and groups 'fearful that any alliance with a socialist country cannot but strengthen socialism and thereby weaken capitalism.'

[&]quot;After sweeping away internal politics, religion, and foreign policy as honest sources of Western opposition to the Soviet Union, White concludes that the true foundation of the

"Alger Hiss, attendant of the Yalta Convention and legal assistant to the Nye Committee, was also convicted of perjury in connection to acts of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. The Nye Committee was another organization that was fully dedicated to the establishment of international governing organizations upon the end of WWII. Hiss ultimately played an instrumental role in the establishment of entities such as the UN.

"Laurence Duggan, code named 'Frank' and '19,' was in charge of US relations with South America during WWII and was the president of the Institute for International Education. Duggan was a Soviet spy from the 30s until his death."³²⁷

In February, 1950 the initiative in these necessary investigations was unfortunately taken up by a demagogue, Senator Joseph McCarthy.

The emergence of McCarthyism was facilitated by the traumatic event, for the American political consciousness, of the loss of China to the Communists. As Hugh Brogan writes, "China had a special place in the outlook of all too many citizens. According to legend, the doctrine of the Open Door had saved the country from the clutches of European imperialism; Sun Yat-Sen's revolution of 1911 had appeared to be very much an American affair, inspired by the American ideology; American missionaries and doctors (often the roles were combined) had poured into the country to do it good, to Christianize it, to Westernize it; the fateful dream of profit still haunted many American businessmen; and many American soldiers and airmen had served in China during the war. Finally, Mao Tse-tung was seen as just another Russian puppet. These factors in themselves would have been enough to make it exceedingly difficult for many Americans to accept the communist victory, or to endorse Dean Acheson's assurance that 'the unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States.' Unfortunately their state of mind, that of believers in American omnipotence, to whom, as Acheson observed in his memoirs, every goal unattained was explicable only by incompetence or treason, was to be inflamed and sustained by comparatively accidental matters. The Republicans, for example, saw a heaven-sent opportunity to embarrass the Truman administration: they could accuse it of 'losing China' by weakness and negligence, if not by outright treason. Henry Luce [editor of *Time* and *Life*] had been born in China and was devoted to Chiang Kai-shek, and perhaps even more to his wife, Madame Chiang, adroit, beautiful and American-educated.

conflict must be economic ideology. 'It is basically [the] opposition of capitalism to socialism,' he writes. 'Those who believe seriously in the superiority of capitalism over socialism' – a group from which White apparently excluded himself – 'fear Russia as the source of socialist ideology.' He then ends his essay with what, coming from the U.S. government's most important economic strategist, can only be described as an astounding conclusion: 'Russia is the first instance of a socialist economy in action. And it works!'" ("Why a Founding Father of Postwar Capitalism Spied for the Soviets", *Foreign Affairs*, August 15, 2021) (V.M.)

³²⁷ Roberts, "McCarthy Was Right: There Were Communist Infiltrators in America!", *Liberty Hangout*, May 30, 2017.

Luce had for years propagated the myth that the incompetent Chiang was his country's George Washington, and now he became the lynch-pin of the 'China lobby', a pressure group which dedicated itself wholeheartedly to the task of protecting Chiang from further defeat and, eventually, to the overthrow of 'Red China'. As if all this did not create difficulties enough for the administration, in January 1950 a former State Department official, Alger Hiss, was convicted in the courts of perjury for having denied under oath before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) that he had once been a Russian agent who had sent copies of confidential state documents to the Soviet Union..."

The exposure of Hiss as a Soviet spy elicited some wide-ranging questions. "Had not Hiss been present at Yalta? Had he not helped to set up the United Nations, in whose Security Council Russia wielded a veto? Was it not probable that he, or some as yet undiscovered traitor, had been responsible for 'the loss of China'? A series of hostile and extremely damaging investigations into the State Department was launched by Congress..."³²⁸

However, McCarthy's list of communists in government was constantly changing. Many of his charges were trumped up. He descended particularly heavily on Hollywood - although this persecution can hardly be compared to the cultural persecution that was taking place at the same time in the Soviet Union.³²⁹

The result was a fight-back by the leftists, led by actress Olivia de Havilland. In the longer-term, the real injustices McCarthy had committed led to a disparagement of the anti-communist cause and a continuing and deepening penetration of the institutions, especially the cultural and educational institutions, if not by professional spies, at any rate by fifth columnists. However, the year of McCarthy's death, 1957, produced a superb Hollywood film directed by Steven Spielberg, *Bridge of Spies*, that was a well-balanced and profound analysis both of Soviet spying in America and of the reactions and over-reactions to it.

In 1954, Henry Kissinger wrote to Arthur Schlesinger, exposing the flaw in democracy that McCarthyism revealed, and which could lead to the emergence of what he called "totalitarian democracy": "There can be no doubt we are living at a critical juncture. We are witnessing, it seems to me, something that far transcends McCarthy, the emergence of totalitarian democracy. It is the essence of a democratic system that the loser can accept defeat with relative grace. It is the essence of a totalitarian system that the victor assumes the right to proscribe his opponents... When the risks of electoral defeat are so fearful, campaigns will be fought with a bitterness which must erode the democratic

³²⁸ Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*, London: Penguin, 2019.

³²⁹ "McCarthy's own crude attempt to restrict artistic expression fortunately only blighted the lives of those relatively few people it affected for half a decade, whereas in the USSR all forms of artistic expression were subjected to the state for nearly three-quarters of a century. This did not prevent a recent CNN series on the Cold War likening the sufferings of the Hollywood communists under McCarty to 'torture by the Inquisition'." (Roberts, op. cit., p. 419).

process. When the issue becomes juridical instead of political, political contests will take on the characteristics of a civil war... even if physical conflict is temporarily delayed. That most people, and particularly the conservative element, believe this cannot happen here is a sign of internal strength but at the same time an asset to the totalitarian movement. It took some of the best elements in Germany six years after Hitler came to power to realize that a criminal was running the country which they had been so proud of considering a moral state, so much that they were unable to comprehend what had in fact happened..."³³⁰

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In the same year of 1954, the most famous of all American writers, Ernest Hemingway (1899-1961), received the Nobel Prize for Literature. McCarthy and Hemingway represent two opposite poles of the American character in the post-war period. McCarthy represents the ideological, anti-communist pole, with a tendency to persecute dissenters in defence of what is perceived to be the traditional American way of life and morality. The atheist Hemingway, by contrast, was a rebel against traditional American Protestantism and represented the sensual, anti-traditional, outdoor, sporting, drinking, macho side of American life. He supported the Communist Party during the 1930s, and had an enormous influence in a more subliminal way through his novels.

As Paul Johnson writes, "He transformed the way in which his fellow Americans, and people throughout the English-speaking world, expressed themselves. He created a new, personal, secular and highly contemporary ethical style, which was intensely American in origin, but translated itself easily into many cultures. He fused a number of American attitudes together and made himself their archetypal personification, so that he came to embody America at a certain epoch rather as Voltaire embodied France in the 1780s or Byron's England in the 1820s."

Hemingway's mother "wanted him to be a conventional Protestant hero, non-smoking, non-drinking, chaste before marriage, faithful within it and at all times to honour and obey his parents, especially his mother.

"Hemingway rejected his parents' religion in toto and with it any desire to be the sort of son they wanted. In his teens he seems to have decided quite firmly, that he was going to pursue his genius and his inclination in all things, and to create for himself a vision both of the man of honour and of the good life which was his reward. This was a Romantic, literary and to some extent an ethical concept, but it had no religious content at all. Indeed Hemingway seems to have been devoid of the religious spirit. He privately abandoned his faith at the age of seventeen when he met Bill and Katy Smith (the latter to become the wife of John Dos Passos), whose father, an atheist don, had written an ingenuous book 'proving' that Jesus Christ had never existed. Hemingway

³³⁰ Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger.* 1923-1968: *The Idealist*, New York: Penguin, 2016, p. 285.

ceased to practise religion at the earliest possible moment, when he went to work at his first job on the Kansas City Star and moved into unsupervised lodgings. As late as 1918, when he was nearly 20, he assured his mother: 'Don't worry, or cry or fret about my being a good Christian. I am just as much as ever, and pray every night and believe just as hard.' But this was a lie, told for the sake of peace. He not only did not believe in God but regarded organized religion as a menace to human happiness. His first wife, Hadley, said she only saw him on his knees twice, at their wedding and at the christening of their son. To please his second wife, Pauline, he became a Roman Catholic, but he had no more conception of what his new faith meant than did Rex Mottram in Brideshead Revisited. He was furious when Pauline tried to observe its rules (e.g. over birth control) in ways which inconvenienced him. He published blasphemous parodies of the Our Father in his story 'A Clean, Well-Lighted Place' and of the Crucifixion in *Death in the Afternoon;* there is a blasphemous spittoon-blessing in his play, The Fifth Column. Insofar as he did understand Roman Catholicism, he detested it. He raised not the slightest protest when, at the beginning of the Civil War in Spain, a place he knew and said he loved, hundreds of churches were burnt, altars and sacred vessels desecrated, and many thousands of priests, monks and nuns slaughtered. He abandoned even the formal pretence of being a Catholic after he left his second wife. All his adult life he lived, in effect, as a pagan, worshipping ideas of his own desiring..."³³¹

In earlier, more innocent days the Americans would never have accepted such a debauchee and blasphemer. But America was changing – and not for the better. By the time Hemingway blew his brains out with a shotgun in 1961, America had already launched into perhaps the most critical decade of her history. In the 60s and 70s the very moral identity of America came under threat, and only the American religious right stood up to defend American values against the spiritual children of Hemingway. Fortunately, under Reagan in the 80s a partial recovery took place – just long enough for the other, external threat of Soviet power to crumble and disappear...

³³¹ Johnson, Intellectuals, London: Harper Perennial, 1988, 2007, pp. 143, 144-145.

25. ORTHODOXY AND THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (2)

In 1949 there flew into Constantinople – on President Truman's personal plane, "Air Force One" – the second Meletius Metaxakis, the former Archbishop of North and South America Athenagoras. In order to make way for Athenagoras, who was a Mason of the 33rd degree³³², Patriarch Maximus V was forced into retirement by his Synod on grounds of mental illness (although he was completely sane). The real reason for his removal of Maximus was his opposition to ecumenism. When they asked him in 1965 what had been the reason for his deposition, he replied: "It's not worth commenting on how they deposed me." ³³³It was not only in the Soviet Union that psychiatry was used to get rid of dissenters...

In 1919 Athenagoras had been appointed secretary of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece by Metaxakis himself.³³⁴ By an extraordinary coincidence Athenagoras was a former spiritual son of Metropolitan Chrysostom of Florina, so that the leaders of the opposing sides in the Church struggle in the early 1950s were, like David and Absalom, a holy father and his apostate son. On landing in the City Athenagoras immediately laid a wreath at the Ataturk monument, and later exchanged his American passport for a Turkish one, visited Muslim monuments and prayed in a mosque.

He was very respectful of mosques, even when they had once been Orthodox churches. Thus on July 12, 1952 he told the American ambassador that he was embarrassed at the recent actions of a Greek editor in demanding that the St. Sofia be returned to the Orthodox Church. He referred to an earlier statement of his own, which has recently been requested in connection with the article referred to, in which he had praised Ataturk for having made St. Sofia into a museum, a solution he considers very appropriate. He himself would not accept St. Sofia for the Church even if it were offered.³³⁵

But Athenagoras' ecumenism went still further: in his enthronement speech he proclaimed the dogma of 'Pan-religion', or "super-ecumenism", declaring: "We are in error and sin if we think that the Orthodox Faith came down from heaven and that the other dogmas [i.e. religions] are unworthy. Three hundred million men have chosen Mohammedanism as the way to God and further

³³² Probably because they were both Masons. Bernarch Heyraud, a Mason, witnesses that, like Metaxakis, he was initiated into the 33rd degree of the Ancient Scottish and Accepted Rite (Marco Tosatti, "Patriarch Athenagoras, the Pope, and Freemasonry", *OnePeterFive*, November 12, 2019).

³³³ Agios Agathangelos Esphigmenites (St. Agathangelos of Esphigmenou), No 138, July-August, 1993.

³³⁴ *Pravoslavie ili Smert*' (*Orthodoxy or Death*), N 1, 1997, p. 6.

³³⁵ Matthew Namee, "Athenagoras Didn't Want the Hagia Sophia Returned to the Church", *Orthodox History*, February 26, 2020.

hundreds of millions are Protestants, Catholics and Buddhists. The aim of every religion is to make man better."³³⁶

This astonishing apostasy from the Orthodox Faith roused hardly a murmur of protest from the autocephalous Orthodox Churches... And so Athenagoras continued... On February 6, 1952 he wrote mendaciously to all the Local Churches: "In accordance with its constitution, the WCC is trying only to unite the common actions of the churches, so as to develop cooperation in the study of the faith in a Christian spirit, in order to strengthen ecumenical thinking among the members of all the churches, and support a wider spreading of the Gospel, and finally to preserve, raise and regenerate spiritual values for humanity within the limits of general Christian standards... We, the members of the Orthodox Church, must take part in this common-Christian movement because it is our duty to share with our heterodox brothers the wealth of our faith, Divine services and Typicon, and our spiritual and ascetic experience..."³³⁷

In accordance with this instruction, the Orthodox delegates to the Faith and Order conference in Lund in 1952 declared: "We have come here not in order to condemn the other Churches, but to help them see the truth, in a fraternal way to enlighten their thoughts and explain to them the teaching of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, that is, the Greek Orthodox Church, which has been preserved without change since apostolic times."³³⁸

This supposed justification of the ecumenical movement – missionary work among the heterodox – has been repeated many times to the present day. But participation in such ecumenical organizations as the WCC not only has not helped Orthodox missionary work: it has quenched it. A clear proof of this was the statement of all the heads of the Local Orthodox Churches in Constantinople in 1992 *renouncing* missionary work among Western Christians...

The Orthodox ecumenists seemed to forget that one cannot hold the fire of heresy in one's bosom and not be burned, and that the Protestants could use the ecumenical movement for their own missionary work among the Orthodox ... Thus in 1955 the Faith and Order Working Committee of the WCC proposed an Orthodox consultation with the ultimate aim that, as Dr. M. Spinka put it, "at some future time of the hoped-for spiritual 'Big Thaw', when these communions have had a chance to think it over in a repentant or chastened mood, they might perhaps join us!"³³⁹

³³⁶ Hieromonk Theodoretus, Palaion kai Neon (The Old and the New), Athens, 1991, p. 21.

 ³³⁷ Archbishop Iakovos Koukoujis, "The Contribution of Eastern Orthodoxy to the Ecumenical Movement", *The Orthodox Church in the Ecumenical Movement: Documents and Statements, 1902-1975*, Geneva: The World Council of Churches, 1978, p. 216; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 14.

³³⁸ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 19.

³³⁹ Fr. George Macris, *The Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement*, Seattle: St. Nectarios Press, 1986, p. 16.

In other words, the Orthodox had to "repent" of their insistence that the Orthodox Church is the Church, in order to become worthy of entering the new pseudo-Church with the Protestants!

Nevertheless, until the late 1950s, the participation of the Orthodox Churches in the ecumenical movement was hesitant and strained. Athenagoras himself put restrictions on Orthodox participation in his 1952 encyclical: "Orthodox clergy must refrain from joint concelebrations with non-Orthodox, since this is contrary to the canons, and blunts consciousness of the Orthodox confession of faith."³⁴⁰ Again, at the Second General Assembly at Evanston (1954) the Orthodox delegates declared: "We are bound to declare our profound conviction that the Holy Orthodox Church alone has preserved in full and intact the Faith once delivered to the saints."³⁴¹

Again, at the Faith and Order conference at Oberlin (1957), which was centred on the theme, "The Unity we Seek", the Orthodox declared: "'The Unity we Seek' is for us a given Unity which has never been lost, and, as a Divine gift and an essential mark of Christian existence, could not have been lost... For us, this Unity is embodied in the Orthodox Church."³⁴²

The Orthodox Churches were restrained especially by the fear that the Western Christians would use the ecumenical movement to achieve by peaceful means what they had failed to achieve by force (for example, in Serbia in 1941). In the case of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, the fear of losing the holy places to the Catholics and Protestants played an important role. And so widespread and whole-hearted participation of the Orthodox in the ecumenical movement had to wait until, on the one hand, the KGB masters of the East European Churches decided that their vassals' participation in the movement was in the interests of world communism, and on the other, the Catholics themselves began to recognize the Orthodox as "equal partners" in the Second Vatican Council (1959-1964).³⁴³

Athenagoras began to make feelers towards Rome. Thus on March 17, 1959, at the request of Athenagoras, Archbishop Iakovos of North America, a Freemason of the 33rd degree, met Pope John XXIII, the first such meeting for 350 years. The archbishop said: "Your All-Holiness, my patriarch had entrusted me to inform you that the sixth verse of the first chapter of the Gospel of John speaks about you. He is convinced that the man sent from God is precisely you, and the seventh verse explains the meaning of his embassy – 'he came for a witness, to witness about the light, that all should believe through him'. And

³⁴⁰ Macris, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 15.

³⁴¹ Macris, op. cit., p. 10.

³⁴² Macris, op. cit., p. 11.

³⁴³ The ground for this was being prepared already in 1952, when Pope Pius XII issued an Apostolic Epistle declaring (falsely) that before the council of Florence in 1439 there had been no break between the Russian Church and the Papacy (Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 15).

so you were elected for this end, although in your essence you are not the light, but you were raised to the Roman see 'to witness to the light'."³⁴⁴

In April, 1961, Iakovos began to develop a new theology of ecumenism, declaring: "We have tried to rend the seamless robe of the Lord – and then we cast 'arguments' and 'pseudo-documents' to prove – that ours is the Christ, and ours is the Church... Living together and praying together without any walls of partition raised, either by racial or religious prejudices, is the only way that can lead surely to unity."³⁴⁵

In April, 1963, Iakovos said: "It would be utterly foolish for the true believer to pretend or to insist that the whole truth has been revealed only to them, and they alone possess it. Such a claim would be both unbiblical and untheological... Christ did not specify the date nor the place that the Church would suddenly take full possession of the truth."

This statement, which more or less denied that the Church is, as the Apostle Paul said, "the pillar and ground of the Truth" (<u>I Timothy.</u> 3.15), caused uproar in Greece and on Mount Athos.

However, Athenagoras supported Iakovos, calling his position "Orthodox".³⁴⁶ "Let the dogmas be placed in the store-room," he said. "The age of Dogma has passed."³⁴⁷ From this time on, the two Masons went steadily ahead making ever more flagrantly anti-Orthodox statements. There was some opposition from more conservative elements in the autocephalous Churches. But the opposition was never large or determined enough to stop them...

At a meeting of the Faith and Order movement in Montreal in 1963, a memorandum on "Councils of Churches in the Purpose of God" declared: "The Council [WCC] has provided a new sense of the fullness of the Church in its unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity. These marks of the Church can no longer be simply applied to our divided churches, therefore." Although this memorandum was not accepted in the end because of Fr. Georges Florovsky's objections, it showed how the WCC was encroaching on the Orthodox Church's understanding of herself as the One Church.

Indeed, it could be argued that the Orthodox participants had already abandoned this dogma. For as early as 1950 in Toronto, 1950 the WCC's Central Committee had agreed that an underlying assumption of the WCC was that the member-churches "believe that the Church of Christ is more inclusive than the membership of their own body".³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴ *Information*, N 1, 1994 (Vatican); Monk Benjamin, http://www.zlatoust.ws/letopis4.htm, part 4, p. 33.

³⁴⁵ "The Unity of Christian Churches", cited in Macris, op. cit., p. 23.

³⁴⁶ Macris, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

³⁴⁷ Hieromonk Damascene, op. cit., p. 395.

³⁴⁸ Ulrich Duckrow, *Conflict over the Ecumenical Movement*, Geneva: The World Council of Churches, 1981, pp. 31, 310.

At the Second Pan-Orthodox Conference in Rhodes in 1963, the sending of observers to the Second Vatican Council was discussed. There was much disagreement, and eventually a compromise was reached: every Local Church should make the decision independently.³⁴⁹ It was unanimously agreed that the Orthodox should enter into dialogue with the Catholics, provided it was "on equal terms". In practice, this meant that the Catholics should abandon their eastern-rite missions in Orthodox territories. The Catholics have never shown much signs of wishing to oblige in this, but they did help to make a dialogue easier by redefining the Orthodox, in Vatican II's decree on Ecumenism, as "separated brethren" rather than "schismatics".

By this time the Orthodox had ceased to issue separate statements at ecumenical meetings outlining the ways in which the Orthodox disagreed with the majority Protestant view. "As Father Georges [Florovsky] put it, American Protestants were not alone in seeking within the World Council to stress common elements and to discount the issues that divide. There were also respected Orthodox leaders under the sway of the spirit of adjustment. Certainly on the Russian side there were roots for another approach. As Alexander Schmemann has said of the development of Russian theology in the emigration, in the 1920s and 1930s there had arisen two different approaches to the very phenomenon of the Ecumenical Movement and to the nature of Orthodox participation in it. On the one hand we find theologians who acknowledge the Ecumenical Movement as, in a way, an ontologically new phenomenon in Christian history requiring a deep rethinking and reexamination of Orthodox ecclesiology as shaped during the "non-ecumenical" era. Representative names here are those of Sergei Bulgakov, Leo Zander, Nicholas Zernov, and Pavel Evdokimov. This tendency is opposed by those who, without denying the need for ecumenical dialogue and defending the necessity of Orthodox participation in the Ecumenical Movement, reject the very possibility of any ecclesiastical revision or adjustment and who view the Ecumenical Movement mainly as a possibility for an Orthodox witness to the West. This tendency finds its most articulate expression in the writing of Florovsky."350

Meanwhile, as it continued to chastise the West for its supposed political sins, and opposing the WCC as a capitalist conspiracy (which, in a sense, it was – a by no means secret conspiracy against God and the Orthodox faith), the MP did not cease to glorify Stalin in the most shameful way, having truly become "the Soviet church", the State Church of the Bolshevik regime. Already during the war, the cult of Stalin, probably the greatest persecutor in the history of the Church, reached idolatrous proportions. He was "the protector of the Church",

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³⁴⁹ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 13.

³⁵⁰ Andrew Blane, *Georges Florovsky*, Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993, pp. 124-125.

"the new Constantine". The first issues of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, as we have seen, were filled with oleaginous tributes to the "God-given Supreme Leader". And yet Stalin never changed his basic hostility to the Church. In 1947 he wrote to Suslov: "Do not forget about atheistic propaganda among the people". And the bloodletting in the camps continued...³⁵¹

Together with the cult of Stalin went the enthusiastic acceptance of communist ideology and studied refusal to contemplate the vast scale of its blasphemies and cruelties. Thus just after the war the MP expressed itself as follows concerning the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: "On this day in all the cathedrals, churches and monasteries of our country there will be offered the bloodless Sacrifice, whose beginning was laid by Him Who brought into the world the ideas of love, justice and equality. Deeply moved church-servers will come out onto the ambons and bless their children to hurry from the churches to the voting urns. They will bless them to cast their votes for the candidates of the bloc of communists... They themselves will cast their votes... The ideal of such a person is – Stalin..."³⁵²

However, the apotheosis of the Moscow Patriarchate's cult of Stalin came on the occasion of his birthday in 1949, when a "Greeting to the Leader of the peoples of the USSR" was addressed to him in the name of the whole Church.³⁵³

"Without the slightest hesitation," write Fr. Gleb Yakunin and a group of Orthodox Christians, "we can call this address the most shameful document ever composed in the name of the Church in the whole history of the existence of Christianity and still more in the thousand-year history of Christianity in Rus'."³⁵⁴

³⁵¹ Nikolai Savchenko, in *Vertograd-Inform*, September, 1998, Bibliography, pp. 1, 2.

³⁵² *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 1, 1946; quoted in *Obnovlentsy i Moskovskaia Patriarkhia: preemstvo ili evoliutisia?* (The Renovationists and the Moscow Patriarchate: Succession or Evolution?), Suzdal, 1997, p. 13.

³⁵³ Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii (The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 12, 1949.

³⁵⁴ Cited in Potapov, *What is False is also Corrupt*, p. 223. Cf. *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii*, 1949, N 12, pp. 5-11; Babkin, op. cit., pp. 3-5; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 144-145. No less odious was the letter of congratulation sent by Catholicos Kallistrat of Georgia to Stalin: "On the day of your seventieth birthday, we, the believers and clergy of the Georgian Catholicosate, send you, our near and dear Joseph Vissarionovich, our ardent and heart-felt congratulations and wishes that your health remain unbroken and that you have a long life for the good of the whole of humanity. In the course of the first seventy years of your life, through unceasing activity and that immortal creation, your Constitution, you have strengthened in the hearts of the workers of the whole world the evangelical behests of brotherhood, unity and freedom, which elicits disagreement in those who consider themselves guides of the blind, light for those in darkness and instructors of the ignorant, and who try to suppress the consciousness that has awakened in men of their lofty human dignity.

[&]quot;Knowing firmly that it is difficult to kick against the pricks, we hope that in the first years of your second seventy years, the opponents of truth and justice will recover their sight and say: you are right, Joseph Vissarionovich most wise, and righteous are your judgements..." (*Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii*, N 1, 1950.

Both ROCOR and the Catacomb Church condemned the MP's cult of Stalin.³⁵⁵

Thus in response to the MP's description of Stalin as "the chosen one of the Lord, who leads our fatherland to prosperity and glory", Metropolitan Anastasy, first-hierarch of ROCOR, wrote that this was the point "where the subservience of man borders already on blasphemy. Really – can one tolerate that a person stained with blood from head to foot, covered with crimes like leprosy and poisoned deeply with the poison of godlessness, should be named 'the chosen of the Lord', could be destined to lead our homeland 'to prosperity and glory'? Does this not amount to casting slander and abuse on God the Most High Himself, Who, in such a case, would be responsible for all the evil that has been going on already for many years in our land ruled by the Bolsheviks headed by Stalin? The atom bomb, and all the other destructive means invented by modern technology, are indeed less dangerous than the *moral disintegration* which the highest representatives of the civil and church authorities have put into the Russian soul by their example. The breaking of the atom brings with it only physical devastation and destruction, whereas the corruption of the mind, *heart and will* entails the *spiritual death* of a whole nation, after which there is *no* resurrection."356

³⁵⁵ According to Bishop Ambrose von Sievers (admittedly, a dubious source), it was anathematized by a Council of the Catacomb Church in Chirchik, near Tashkent, in the autumn of 1948. It also anathematized the patriarchate's 1948 council, and declared the canonical leader of the Russian Church to be Metropolitan Anastasy, first-hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad. This Council, which confirmed the decisions of the supposed "Nomadic Council" of 1928, was attended by thirteen bishops or their representatives, and was organized by Fr. Peter Pervushin, who had also played a major role in the 1928 Council ("Katakombnaia Tserkov': Tainij Sobor 1948g." (The Catacomb Church: Secret Council of 1948), Russkoe Pravoslavie, N 5 (9), 1997, pp. 12-27). In response to the increase in the infiltration of spies and provocateurs into the ranks of the True Church, the Chirchik Council passed the following canon: "We used to accept sergianist 'priests' and on the basis of the 19th canon of the Council of Nicaea we even ordained some of them with the true ordination. But now we see that they all turned out to be agents of the antichristian power or traitors who destroyed a multitude of Christians. From now on we forbid this; whoever dares to violate our decision - let him be anathema." (ibid., pp. 17-18). This decision was confirmed by a larger Catacomb Council at the Nikolsky Council in Bashkiria in 1961 (Bishop Ambrose (von Sievers), "Katakombnaia Tserkov': Tainie Sobory 1961-81gg." (The Catacomb Church: Secret Councils, 1961-1981), Russkoe Pravoslavie, 1998, N 1 (10), pp. 25-26).

³⁵⁶ I.M Andreyev, *Is the Grace of God present in the Soviet Church?* Wildwood, Alberta: Monastery Press, 2000, pp. 32-33 (with some changes in the translation).

26. STALIN'S LAST YEARS

During the early fifties the Soviet Union appeared to enter a kind of paralysis. GDP was growing healthily: the command economy was producing more goods, especially heavy industrial machines; and the Soviet "militaryindustrial complex" did not lack funds. But for ordinary people, the situation hardly improved: living standards were very low; agriculture was still in deep depression, and goods produced by the factories were of shabby quality.

Meanwhile, the Gulag was filled to overflowing with slave labourers. Solzhenitsyn believed that the Gulag reached its peak in 1952. "From 1929," writes Applebaum, "when the Gulag began its major expansion, until 1953, when Stalin died, the best estimates indicate that some eighteen million people passed through the massive system. About another six million were sent into exile, deported to the Kazakh deserts or the Siberian forests. Legally obliged to remain in their exile villages, they too were forced labourers, even though they did not live behind barbed wire."³⁵⁷ "Coming as it did after the release of the war years," writes Oliver Figes, "this new wave of terror must have felt in some ways more oppressive than the old [in the thirties]; to try to survive such a thing the second time around must have been like trying to preserve one's very sanity..."³⁵⁸

Sir Geoffrey Hosking estimates that "5-6 million people, mostly peasants, died in the worst famine years of 1932 and 1933, and excess deaths during the 1930s as a whole were in the range of 10-11 million. After 1940 it becomes impossible to distinguish victims of terror from those of war.

"After 1939 the population of *zeki* [Gulag inmates] mushroomed, with the deportation first of Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Balts from the territories annexed in 1939-40, then of Germans, Chinese, Tatars, and North Caucasian Muslims during and after the war. One must add to this prisoners captured from the Axis armies and Soviet soldiers repatriated from German captivity. A probable estimate of the number of zeks in January 1941 is 3.5 million and for January 1953 5.5 million.

"These figures are lower than the estimates many Western historians made when no archive information was available. But they are still horrifying. There must have been few families, especially among the peasantry and the intelligentsia, who did not have at least one member behind barbed wire or in barren and hopeless exile at some time between 1930 and 1953, constantly in danger of disease, disablement, and death. If one imagines the worry, grief, and physical suffering which lie behind these figures, then one has to see the Soviet peoples during those two and a half decades as a population in torment."³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ Applebaum, Gulag. A History, London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 4-5.

³⁵⁸ Figes, op. cit., p. 509.

³⁵⁹ Hosking, op. cit.

The only new phenomenon of Stalin's last years was his persecution of the Jews. Stalin "had always hated Jews; he often told anti-Semitic jokes. Khrushchev said he encouraged factory workers to beat up their Jewish colleagues. Stalin's last spasm of anti-Semitic fury was provoked when the arrival of Golda Meir to open Israel's first Moscow embassy was greeted with a modest display of Jewish enthusiasm. Yiddish publications were immediately banned. Wall Street bankers in Soviet cartoons suddenly sported 'Jewish' features. The Jewish actor [and chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC)] was murdered in a fake car accident."³⁶⁰

"The murder of Mikhoels [in January,1948] was linked to the arrest of several dozen leading Jews accused of taking part in an American-Zionist conspiracy organized by the JAFC against the Soviet Union. The JAFC had been established on Stalin's orders in 1941 to mobilize Jewish support abroad for the Soviet war campaign. It received enthusiastic support from the left-wing Jewish community in Palestine, so much so that Stalin even thought he might turn the new state of Israel into the main sphere of Soviet influence in the Middle East. But Israel's growing links with the USA after 1948 unleashed Stalin's lifelong hatred of the Jews."³⁶¹

A full-blown persecution of Jewry began in September. "It was signalled by an Ilya Ehrenburg article in Pravda - Stalin often made Non-Jewish Jews the agents of his anti-Semitism, rather as the SS used the Sonderskommandos denouncing Israel as a bourgeois tool of American capitalism. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was disbanded, [its organ] Aynikayt closed and the Yiddish schools shut down. Then began a systematic attack on Jews, especially writers, painters, musicians and intellectuals of all kinds, using terms of abuse ('rootless cosmopolitanism') identical with Nazi demonology. Thousands of Jewish intellectuals, including the Yiddish writers Perez Markish, Itzik Fefer and David Bergelson, were murdered, as was any Jew who happened to catch Stalin's eye, such as Lozowsky. The campaign was extended to Czechoslovakia, where on 20 November 1952 Rudolf Slansky, the Czech party general secretary, and thirteen other leading Communist bosses, eleven of them Jews, were accused of a Trotskyite-Titoist-Zionist conspiracy, convicted and executed. Supplying arms to Israel in 1948 (actually on Stalin's own orders) formed an important element in the 'proof'. The climax came early in 1953 when nine doctors, six of them Jews, were accused of seeking to poison Stalin in conjunction with British, US and Zionist agents. This show trial was to have been a prelude to the mass deportation of Jews to Siberia, as part of a Stalinist 'Final Solution'.

³⁶⁰ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 454-455. Cf. Tatu Gutmacher, "Solomon Mikhoels: Po Priamomu Prikazu Stalina" (Solomon Mikhoels: On the Direct Orders of Stalin), http://www.sguschenka.com/160114-mihoels; "'Neschastnij sluchaj': smert' Solomona Mikhoelsa 70 let spustia" ('An accident': the death of Solomon Mikhoels 70 years ago), *BBC Russkaia Sluzhba*, January 14, 2018.

³⁶¹ Orlando Figes, *Natasha's Dance*, London: Penguin, 2002, p. 507.

"Stalin died before the doctors came to trial and the proceedings were quashed by his successors. The plot for a mass deportation came to nothing..."³⁶²

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On March 5, 1953 the greatest persecutor of Christians in history, was dying. "His face was discoloured," wrote his daughter Svetlana, "his features becoming unrecognizable... He literally choked to death as we watched. The death agony was terrible... At the last minute, he opened his eyes. It was a terrible look, either mad or angry, and full of the fear of death."

"Suddenly," continues Simon Sebag Montefiore, "the rhythm of his breathing changed. A nurse thought it was 'like a greeting'. He 'seemed either to be pointing upwards somewhere or threatening us all...' observed Svetlana. It was more likely he was simply clawing the air for oxygen [or pointing at the demons coming for his soul]. 'Then the next moment, his spirit after one last effort tore itself from his body.' A woman doctor burst into tears and threw her arms around the devastated Svetlana..."³⁶³

In his secret speech to the Communist Party in 1956 Khrushchev condemned Stalin's "cult of personality". Unfortunately, the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate paid little heed to this admonition – although it obeyed the Communist Party in all other things. Let us look at the stages of this church cult.

From at least the time of the Second World War, the MP did not cease to glorify Stalin in the most shameful way, having truly become "the Soviet church", the State Church of the Bolshevik regime. The cult of Stalin, probably the greatest persecutor in the history of the Church, reached idolatrous proportions. He was "the protector of the Church", "the new Constantine", "the genius of geniuses". The first issues of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* were filled with oleaginous tributes to the "God-given Supreme Leader". And yet Stalin never changed his basic hostility to the Church. In 1947 he wrote to Suslov: "Do not forget about atheistic propaganda among the people". And the bloodletting in the camps continued...³⁶⁴

Together with the cult of Stalin went the enthusiastic acceptance of communist ideology and studied refusal to contemplate the vast scale of its blasphemies and cruelties. Thus just after the war the MP expressed itself as follows concerning the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: "On this day in all the cathedrals, churches and monasteries of our country there will be offered the bloodless Sacrifice, whose beginning was laid by Him Who brought into the world the ideas of love, justice and equality. Deeply moved church-

³⁶² Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews, London: Phoenix, 1995, p. 570.

³⁶³ Montefiore, Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar, London: Phoenix, 2004, pp. 663-664.

³⁶⁴ Nikolai Savchenko, in *Vertograd-Inform*, September, 1998, Bibliography, pp. 1, 2.

servers will come out onto the ambons and bless their children to hurry from the churches to the voting urns. They will bless them to cast their votes for the candidates of the bloc of communists... They themselves will cast their votes... The ideal of such a person is – Stalin..."³⁶⁵

However, the apotheosis of the Moscow Patriarchate's cult of Stalin came on the occasion of his birthday in 1949, when a "Greeting to the Leader of the peoples of the USSR" was addressed to him in the name of the whole Church.³⁶⁶

"Without the slightest hesitation," write Fr. Gleb Yakunin and a group of Orthodox Christians, "we can call this address the most shameful document ever composed in the name of the Church in the whole history of the existence of Christianity and still more in the thousand-year history of Christianity in Rus'."³⁶⁷

Both ROCOR and the Catacomb Church condemned the MP's cult of Stalin. Thus in response to the MP's description of Stalin as "the chosen one of the Lord, who leads our fatherland to prosperity and glory", Metropolitan Anastasy, first-hierarch of ROCOR, wrote that this was the point "where the subservience of man borders already on blasphemy. Really - can one tolerate that a person stained with blood from head to foot, covered with crimes like leprosy and poisoned deeply with the poison of godlessness, should be named 'the chosen of the Lord', could be destined to lead our homeland 'to prosperity and glory'? Does this not amount to casting slander and abuse on God the Most High Himself, Who, in such a case, would be responsible for all the evil that has been going on already for many years in our land ruled by the Bolsheviks headed by Stalin? The atom bomb, and all the other destructive means invented by modern technology, are indeed less dangerous than the *moral disintegration* which the highest representatives of the civil and church authorities have put into the Russian soul by their example. The breaking of the atom brings with it only physical devastation and destruction, whereas the corruption of the mind,

³⁶⁵ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 1, 1946; quoted in *Obnovlentsy i Moskovskaia Patriarkhia: preemstvo ili evoliutisia?* (The Renovationists and the Moscow Patriarchate: Succession or Evolution?), Suzdal, 1997, p. 13.

³⁶⁶ Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii (The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 12, 1949.

³⁶⁷ Cited in Potapov, *What is False is also Corrupt*, p. 223. No less odious was the letter of congratulation sent by Catholicos Kallistrat of Georgia to Stalin: "On the day of your seventieth birthday, we, the believers and clergy of the Georgian Catholicosate, send you, our near and dear Joseph Vissarionovich, our ardent and heart-felt congratulations and wishes that your health remain unbroken and that you have a long life for the good of the whole of humanity. In the course of the first seventy years of your life, through unceasing activity and that immortal creation, your Constitution, you have strengthened in the hearts of the workers of the whole world the evangelical behests of brotherhood, unity and freedom, which elicits disagreement in those who consider themselves guides of the blind, light for those in darkness and instructors of the ignorant, and who try to suppress the consciousness that has awakened in men of their lofty human dignity.

[&]quot;Knowing firmly that it is difficult to kick against the pricks, we hope that in the first years of your second seventy years, the opponents of truth and justice will recover their sight and say: you are right, Joseph Vissarionovich most wise, and righteous are your judgements..." (*Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 1, 1950.

heart and will entails the *spiritual death* of a whole nation, after which there is *no resurrection.*"³⁶⁸

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On March 5, 1953, Stalin was dying. "His face was discoloured," wrote his daughter Svetlana, "his features becoming unrecognizable... He literally choked to death as we watched. The death agony was terrible... At the last minute, he opened his eyes. It was a terrible look, either mad or angry, and full of the fear of death."

"Suddenly," continues Simon Sebag Montefiore, "the rhythm of his breathing changed. A nurse thought it was 'like a greeting'. He 'seemed either to be pointing upwards somewhere or threatening us all...' observed Svetlana. It was more likely he was simply clawing the air for oxygen [or pointing at the demons coming for his soul]. 'Then the next moment, his spirit after one last effort tore itself from his body.' A woman doctor burst into tears and threw her arms around the devastated Svetlana..."³⁶⁹

And therein lay the tragedy for Russia and the world: that so many still loved this most evil of men. For in the days that followed millions poured into Moscow to mourn over the destroyer of their country and their Church. The hysteria was so great that hundreds were crushed to death. Their grief was genuine – and therefore the punishment of the land continued. To this day the wrath of God over the Russian land continues unassuaged...

Chingiz Aitmatov tells the following story in partial explanation: Stalin called together his closest comrades-in-arms. "I understand you're wondering how I govern the people so that every last one of them … thinks of me as a living god. Now I'll teach you the right attitude toward the people." And he ordered a chicken brought in. He plucked it live, in front of them all, down to the last feather, down to the red flesh, until only the comb was left on its head. "And now watch," he said, and let the chicken go. It could have gone off where it wished, but it went nowhere. It was too hot in the sun and too cold in the shade. The poor bird could only press itself against Stalin's boots. And then he tossed it a crumb of grain, and the bird followed him wherever he went. Otherwise, it would have fallen over from hunger. "That," he told his pupils, "is how you govern our people." ³⁷⁰

Of course, there were many around the world, fellow-travellers who had made a good career out of Stalinism, who may not have loved him, but were not inclined to rejoice at his death. One such was the famous German playwright Bertolt Brecht, who, as Paul Johnson writes, "always, and often

³⁶⁸ I.M Andreyev, *Is the Grace of God present in the Soviet Church?* Wildwood, Alberta: Monastery Press, 2000, pp. 32-33 (with some changes in the translation).

³⁶⁹ Montefiore, *Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar*, London: Phoenix, 2004, pp. 663-664.

³⁷⁰ Cited in Potapov, What is False is also Corrupt, p. 223. Cf. JMP, 1949, N 12, pp. 5-11.

publicly, supported all Stalin's policies, including his artistic ones... When Stalin finally died, Brecht's comment was: 'The oppressed of all five continents...must have felt their heartbeats stop when they heard that Stalin was dead. He was the embodiment of their hopes.' He was delighted in 1955 to be awarded the Stalin Peace Prize. Most of the 160,000 roubles went straight into his Swiss account. But he went to Moscow to receive it and asked Boris Pasternak, apparently unaware of his vulnerable position, to translate his acceptance speech. Pasternak was happy to do this, but later - the prize having been renamed in the meantime - ignored Brecht's request that he translate a bunch of his poems in praise of Lenin. Brecht was dismayed by the circulation of Khrushchev's Secret Session Speech on Stalin's crimes and strongly opposed to its publication. He gave his reasons to one of his disciples: 'I have a horse. He is lame, mangy, and he squints. Someone comes along and says: but the horse squints, he is lame and, look here, he is mangy. He is right, but what is that to me? I have no other horse. There is no other. The best thing, I think, is to think about his faults as little as possible...'"371

One of the few who did not lament Stalin's death was Lavrenty Beria, the terrible Georgian executioner and head of the security services. It is possible that he killed Stalin, perhaps to save himself (Stalin had begun to suspect that he was a Jew). According to Molotov, Beria actually said: "I did away with him, I saved you all."³⁷² Certainly, he openly rejoiced in Stalin's death, while even Molotov, whose beloved wife Polina was still in prison when Stalin died, genuinely mourned him. Ironically, Beria may have been the one satrap who really did not believe in communism – after all, he wanted his grandchildren to go to Oxford University! (If he had wanted them to deepen their knowledge of Marxism, he would have preferred Cambridge University, the main nest of Stalin's spies, or the London School of Economics.)

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The Moscow Patriarchate was quite different: it showed no let-up in its worship of Stalin, even after his death. Thus in *Izvestia* on March 10, 1953, there appeared Patriarch Alexis' letter to the USSR Council of Ministers: "In my own name and in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church I express my deepest and sincerest condolences on the death of the unforgettable Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, the great builder of the people's happiness. His death is a heavy grief for our Fatherland and all the peoples who dwell in it. His death has been taken with deep grief by the whole of the Russian Orthodox Church, which will never forget his benevolent attitude towards the needs of the Church. His radiant memory will never be erased from our hearts. Our Church intones 'eternal memory' to him with a special feeling of unceasing love."³⁷³

³⁷¹ Johnson, *Intellectuals*, London: Harper Perennial, 1988,2007, p. 191.

³⁷² Stone, *Europe*, p. 103.

³⁷³ The text of the patriarch's speech at Stalin's funeral on March 9 can be found here: <u>http://leontjev-danila.livejournal.com/10723.html</u>. No less odious was the letter of congratulation sent by Catholicos Kallistrat of Georgia to Stalin: "On the day of your seventieth birthday, we, the believers and clergy of the Georgian Catholicosate, send you, our near and

And in 1955 Alexis declared his church's continued loyalty to Stalin's successors: "The Russian Orthodox Church supports the totally peaceful foreign policy of our government, not because the Church allegedly lacks freedom, but because Soviet policy is just and corresponds to the Christian ideals which the Church preaches."³⁷⁴

In very sharp contrast, the Hierarchical Synod of ROCOR declared: "The death of Stalin is the death of the greatest persecutor of the faith of Christ in history. The crimes of Nero, Diocletian, Julian the Apostate, and other wicked ones pale in the face of his terrible deeds. No one can compare with him either in the number of victims, or in cruelty to them, or in deceit in achieving their goals. All satanic malice seemed to be embodied in this man, who, even more than the Pharisees, deserves the title of *the son of the devil*.

"The Orthodox person is especially shocked by his truly satanic, cruel and crafty policy towards the Church.

"First, an attempt to destroy it both through the murder of prominent pastors and believers, and through internal decomposition of it with the help of artificially created schisms. Then forcing the artificially selected leaders of it to bow to him and all the godless system led by him. And not only to worship, but also to praise the persecutor of the Church, as if it were her benefactor, in the face of the whole world, calling black white and satanic God.

"When this most vicious persecutor of the Church was praised by the archpastors and pastors who fell under the weight of persecution during his lifetime, it was a sign of the greatest humiliation of the Church. The consolation for us could be that this lie was put to shame by the feat of countless fearless martyrs and secret Christians who rejected all the temptations of Satan.

"Ancient persecutions also caused the fall of both hierarchs and laity. And in those days there were people who, being unable to withstand the torment for Christ, either explicitly reckoned from Him, or pretended to offer sacrifice to idols, in a roundabout way receiving certification in the offering of a sacrifice

dear Joseph Vissarionovich, our ardent and heart-felt congratulations and wishes that your health remain unbroken and that you have a long life for the good of the whole of humanity. In the course of the first seventy years of your life, through unceasing activity and that immortal creation, your Constitution, you have strengthened in the hearts of the workers of the whole world the evangelical behests of brotherhood, unity and freedom, which elicits disagreement in those who consider themselves guides of the blind, light for those in darkness and instructors of the ignorant, and who try to suppress the consciousness that has awakened in men of their lofty human dignity.

[&]quot;Knowing firmly that it is difficult to kick against the pricks, we hope that in the first years of your second seventy years, the opponents of truth and justice will recover their sight and say: you are right, Joseph Vissarionovich. Most wise, and righteous are your judgements..." (*Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), N 1, 1950)

³⁷⁴ Quoted in Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1999, p. 635.

that they did not actually bring (<u>libellatici</u>). The Church condemned not only the first, but also the second for their crafty cowardice and denial of Christ, if not in their hearts, then before people.

"But the history of the Church does not know of another example of the creation of an entire church organization, led by the Patriarch and the Council, which would be based on kneeling down before an obvious enemy of God and glorifying him as a supposed benefactor. The blood of millions of believers cries out to God, but the hierarch who calls himself the Patriarch of All Russia does not seem to hear this. He humbly thanks their murderer and defiler of countless churches.

"Stalin's death brought this temptation to its highest blasphemous manifestation. Newspapers reported, not only about the worship of Patriarch Alexei to the ashes of the godless enemy of Christ, but also about the performance of memorial services for him. Can you imagine anything more blasphemous than a memorial service for Stalin?

"Is it possible to pray unhypocritically that the greatest persecutor of faith and the enemy of God from the ages will be put by the Lord 'in paradise, where the faces of the saints and the righteous ones shine like lights.' Indeed, this prayer into sin and lawlessness, not only in essence, but also formally, for Stalin, along with other People's Commissars, was excommunicated by His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon and Patriarch Alexei himself, no matter how he bowed to Stalin, never dared to announce removing this anathema from him.

"A prayer for the repose of an unrepentant sinner excommunicated from the Church with the saints is a blasphemous heresy, for it is a confession that one can allegedly acquire the Kingdom of God in heaven, driving and exterminating his sons on earth in the name of destroying faith in God itself. This is the confusion of the Kingdom of God with the kingdom of darkness. This is no less a sin than a clear denial of Christ, faith in Whom thus. confessed as optional for admission to His Kingdom.

"In this act of the Moscow ecclesiastical authority the most vivid manifestation of that underlying sin, which has so convincingly distinguished our confessors in Russia since 1927 and to this day denounces our Church abroad."³⁷⁵

The MP's worship of Stalin, which extended from the Second World War to the last days of communism and beyond, is perhaps the clearest demonstration of its gracelessness.

³⁷⁵ *Tserkovnaia Zhizn'*, 1953, NN 3-4, pp. 63-65.

27. SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE: (1) BIOLOGY

After its bloody beginning, the era that is the subject of this book settled into an age of relative peace and prosperity – and, above all, of *science*. Science was (is) the god of the age. It was practised on a scale never attained before, by all the major powers, who devoted increasingly vast sums to it, and with some startling results, of which putting a man on the moon was probably the most spectacular.

But together with the advancement of true science, and in spite of it, we also see a deepening of what Dostoyevsky in *The Devils* called the religion of "half science", or *pseudo-science* in the three main sphere of biology, physics and psychology. Several of the greatest minds of the twentieth century, such as Bishop Nikolai Velimirovich and C.S. Lewis, warned against a future dictatorship of science, of "scientism" that does not know the bounds of true science and for which "nothing is sacred". Malcolm Muggeridge, a Catholic journalist who was one of the few to accurately report the truth of Stalin's collectivization in the 1930s, commented that "science can be as dogmatic as any Church, and with less justification, and its devotees as bigoted as any country parson."³⁷⁶

In the first half of the twentieth century, the major scientific discoveries had been made in the physical sciences and mathematics. In the second half, it was the turn of the biological sciences. For, as Eric Hobsbawm writes, "within ten years of the Second World War, the life sciences were revolutionized by the astonishing advances of molecular biology, which revealed the universal mechanism of inheritance, the 'genetic code'.

"The revolution in molecular biology was not unexpected. After 1914 it could be taken for granted that life had to be, and could be, explained in terms of physics and chemistry and not in terms of some essence peculiar to living beings. Indeed, biochemical models of the possible origin of life on earth, starting with sunlight, methane, ammonia and water, were first suggested in the 1920s (largely with anti-religious intentions) in Soviet Russia and Britain, and put the subject on the serious scientific agenda. Hostility to religion, by the way, continued to animate researchers in this field: both Crick and Linus Pauling are cases in point. The major thrust of biological research had for decades been biochemical, and increasingly physical, since the recognition that protein molecules could be crystallized, and therefore analysed crystallographically. It was known that one substance, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) played a central, possibly the central role in heredity: it seemed to be the basic component of the gene, the unit of inheritance. The problem of how the gene 'caused the synthesis of another structure like itself, in which even the mutations of the original gene are copied', i.e. how heredity operated, was already under serious investigation in the later 1930s. After the war it was clear that, in Crick's words, 'great things were just around the corner'. The brilliance

³⁷⁶ Muggeridge, The Earnest Atheist, London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1936, p. 221.

of Crick and Watson's discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA [in 1953] and of the way it explained 'gene copying' by an elegant chemicomechanical model is not diminished by the fact that several workers were converging on the same result in the early 1950s.

"The DNA revolution, 'the greatest single discovery in biology' (J.D. Bernal), which dominated the life-sciences in the second half of the century, was essentially about genetics and, since twentieth-century Darwinism is exclusively genetics, about evolution. Both these are notoriously touchy subjects, both because scientific models are themselves frequently ideological in such fields - we remember Darwin's debt to Malthus - and because they frequently feed back into politics ('social Darwinism'). The concept of 'race' illustrates this interplay. The memory of Nazi racial policies made it virtually unthinkable for liberal intellectuals (which included most scientists) to operate with this concept. Indeed, many doubted that it was legitimate even to enquire systematically into the genetically determined differences between human groups, for fear that the results might provide encouragement for racist opinions. More generally, in the Western countries the post-fascist ideology of democracy and equality revived the old debates of 'nature v. nurture', or heredity v. environment. Plainly the human individual was shaped both by heredity and environment, by genes and culture. Yet conservatives were only too willing to accept of society of irremovable, i.e. genetically determined inequalities, while the Left, committed to equality, naturally held that all inequalities could be removed by social action: they were at bottom environmentally determined. The controversy flared up over the question of human intelligence, which (because of its implications for selective or universal schooling) was highly political. It raised far wider issues than those of race, though it bore on these also. How wide they were, emerged with the revival of the feminist movement, several of whose ideologists came close to claiming that all mental differences between men and women were essentially culturedetermined, i.e. environmental. Indeed, the fashionable substitution of the term 'gender' for 'sex' implied the belief that 'woman' was not so much a biological category as a social role. A scientist who tried to investigate such sensitive subjects knew himself to be in a political minefield. Even those who entered it deliberately, like E.O. Wilson of Harvard (b. 1929), the champion of 'sociobiology', shied away from plain speech..."³⁷⁷

However, the discovery of DNA had a far deeper effect than these debates: it *completely undermined the theoretical basis of Darwinism itself* (which was already very flimsy). For it revealed an information-based mechanism for the transmission of the genome that could not possibly have come into existence by chance, but must have been created by an intelligent designer – in other words, God. For information is a concept that makes no sense without a mind possessing it....

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³⁷⁷ Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, London: Abacus, 1994, pp. 552-554.

"Initially," writes Stephen Meyer, "scientists thought purely chance interactions between molecules in the earth's oceans or some favorable environment could explain the origins of the information in DNA. Since the late 1960s, however, few serious scientists have supported this view. Since molecular biologists began to understand how the digital information in DNA directs the construction of proteins in the cell, many calculations have been made to determine the probability of formulating functional proteins or nucleic acids (DNA or RNA molecules) at random. Even assuming extremely favorable pre-biotic conditions (whether realistic or not) and theoretically maximal reaction times, such calculation have invariably underscored the implausibility of chance-based theories. These calculations have shown that the probability of functionally sequenced, information-rich biomacromolecules at random is, in the words of physicist Ilya Prigogine and his colleagues, 'vanishingly small... even on the scale of... billions of years.'...

"In short, it is extremely implausible to think that even a single protein would have arisen by chance on the early earth even taking into account the probabilistic resources' of the entire universe over its 13.8-billion-year history. And a single protein, keep in mind, does not a living cell, with its many hundreds of specialised proteins, make..."³⁷⁸

As regards the complexity of DNA, Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, says that DNA is like computer code – only much more complex and sophisticated than any computer code created by man. And Raymond G. Halvorson writes: "The human body contains some 100 million cells, with the DNA divided into forty-six chromosomes. The total length of the entire DNA in one cell is about three feet. The total DNA content in a human body is estimated to span the solar system. In terms of an analogy, human DNA is like a very large encyclopaedia of forty-six volumes, with each one having 20,000 pages. Every one of the 100 million cells in a human body contains this entire library.

"As scientists began to decode the human genome they found it to be approximately three billion DNA base pairs long...

"David Coppedge, a systems administrator for the Cassini Mission to Saturn and Titan at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA, made the following observation: 'Life on the molecular level is incredibly complex. A symphony of proteins, enzymes and DNA work in harmony to permit rapid and precisely controlled chemical reactions. At least 239 proteins are required for the simplest conceivable living cell. The change of getting even one of these proteins, even under ideal conditions, is less than one in 10-161 (10 followed by 161 zeros). To get the simplest reproducible cell is one in 10-40,000. Anything less likely than 1 in 10-50 is virtually impossible, anywhere in the whole universe.'...

³⁷⁸ Meyer, The Return of the God Hypothesis, New York: HarperOne, 2021, pp. 174-175.

"Coppedge calculated the probability that the 200 trillion molecules arranged in perfect order within the walls of a cell *would take trillions and trillions of years* to generate spontaneously. That is well beyond the actual age of the earth. The immense complexity of a single cell precludes all possibility of life ever happening by chance..."³⁷⁹

There can be no question about it: the immensity and complexity of DNA proves the existence of God; for no natural or chance process could have produced it. So 1953, the year in which Stalin, the greatest persecutor of the faith in history and the champion of the pseudo-biology of Lysenko, died, also saw the birth of a new science that, more than any other, glorified God – if only the scientists could see it!

"Neo-Darwinism" is an attempt to reconcile Darwinism with modern genetics. It argues that evolution works mainly through genetic mutations and that natural selection operates on the variations produced by genetic mutation. Its most well-known champion today is Richard Dawkins, who famously mixed morality with science by talking about "the selfish gene".

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However, the neo-Darwinists, no less than the earlier Darwinists, fail to understand that the discovery of DNA destroys the atheist concept of the universe and revives the teleological concept, the cosmological argument that infers the existence of a Designer from the manifold evidences of design.

As Fr. Job Gumerov writes, "William Paley (1743-1805), in *Natural Theology* (1802) formulates it as follows:

"'If you found a watch in an open field, then, based on the obvious complexity of its construction, you would come to the inevitable conclusion about the existence of a watchmaker.'

"A modern scientist, a specialist in molecular biology, Michael Denton, states:

"'Paley was not just right in saying that there is an analogy between a living organism and a machine; he turned out to be a visionary, realizing that the technical idea implemented in living systems far exceeds all human achievements.'

"Each cell of the human body contains more information than in all thirty volumes of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. According to the famous physicist, Nobel Prize laureate Fred Hoyle, the probability of a helical DNA molecule arising from a mixture of ready-made nucleotides and sugars, is as close to zero

³⁷⁹ Halvorson, *Evolution. The World's Fourth Great Religion*, Colorado Springs: Dawon Media, 2011, pp. 19, 105.

as the probability that a tornado in a garbage dump will spontaneously cause the emergence of a brand-new car.

"Scientists using the mathematical apparatus of probability theory have proved the impossibility of evolution. What is the probability of accidental nucleation of one living cell from non-living elements? Prominent scientist Marcel E. Golay [Marcel E. Golay, 'Reflections of a Communications Engineer,' Analytical Chemistry, Vol. 33, (June 1961), p. 23], on the basis of mathematical calculations, estimates the probability of random construction of particles in a self-generating system (even if we allow 30 billion years for it to take place) as 1:10 to 450 degrees. This degree of probability is equivalent to *zero*, according to professional mathematicians."

Darwinists have traditionally attempted to get round these problems by positing an almost infinite period of time in which evolution can take place. "Evolutionists," continues Gumerov, "are free, without sufficient scientific justification, to introduce timelines of millions and billions of years. For their conceptual constructs, time is vital. It replaces the role of the Creator. This argument is not scientific. Time is a duration, and does not possess any creative power. This argument is psychological in nature. It is suggested to the reader that everything is possible in millions and billions of years...

"Existing dating methods are extremely unreliable. A.V. Lalomov, Candidate of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences, gives examples of the radiometric dating of objects whose age was known in advance. The results were paradoxical. Radiometric dating gave results suggesting that the shells of *living* molluscs were 2000 years old, that *modern* New Zealand lavas were 1-3.5 million years old, that the dacite in the lava dome of the San Helen volcano (1986 eruption) was 0.34–2.8 million years old, and that the Quaternary basalts of the Colorado Plateau were 117 – 2600 million years old. According to generally accepted practice, inconvenient data is discarded under a plausible excuse, or even without it. After obtaining the false results from the Quaternary lavas, the unsuitability of using the K-Ar method for dating olivine was substantiated. Other radioisotope methods are also not faultless, from both theoretical and practical points of view."³⁸⁰

Darwinism supposes that life is getting more and more complex, over time. But the idea of such increasing complexity, and therefore decreasing entropy, actually contradicts the laws of physics. For, as Gumerov explains, "Science not only does not know such a law, but affirms the exact opposite of this. The second law of thermodynamics proves the impossibility of evolution. This fundamental law was discovered in the first half of the 19th century. Its scientific development belongs to the French mathematician N.L.S. Karno (1824), German physicist R. Clausius (1850), and English physicist W. Thomson (Kelvin) (1851). The wordings given by these scientists are considered

³⁸⁰ Gumerov, "The Orthodox Church Rejects Evolution & Accepts Genuine Science", *Russian Faith; Science as a Confirmation of the Biblical Doctrine of Creation*, Samara, 2001, p.26-27.

equivalent. The essence of the second law of thermodynamics is as follows: *In a closed system, entropy can only increase or remain constant.* In other words, any isolated system (and evolutionists do not recognize anything outside this physical universe) tends to degrade, because entropy gradually increases within it.

"This law is universal. It is used in biology, physics, chemistry, geology, and other sciences. All the changes we study occur in the direction of increasing entropy, *i.e.* degradation, deterioration, and decline. My dear friend, if you recognize evolutionism as a science, then you should forget about the laws of thermodynamics, because their statements stand in opposition to evolution. Moreover, the second law of thermodynamics proves that once there was a perfect order (in scientific terms - the optimal state of the system), and the current state of the world is the result of an increase in entropy, *i.e.* gradual degradation. Thus, the world in its present form must have a beginning. This is fully consistent with biblical teaching."

"An essential, falsifiable prediction of Darwinian theory, therefore, is that *functional information must, on average, increase over time.*

"Interestingly, a prediction of intelligent design science is quite the opposite. Since information always degrades over time for any storage media and replication system, intelligent design science postulates that the digital information of life was initially downloaded into the genomes of life. It predicts that, on average, genetic information is steadily being corrupted by natural processes. The beauty of these two mutually incompatible predictions in science is that the falsification of one entails verification of the other. So which prediction does science falsify, and which does science verify?

"Ask computer programmers what effect ongoing random changes in the code would have on the integrity of a program, and they will universally agree that it degrades the software. This is the first problem for neo-Darwinian theory. Mutations produce random changes in the digital information of life. It is generally agreed that the rate of deleterious mutations is much greater than the rate of beneficial mutations. My own work with 35 protein families suggests that the rate of destruction is, at a minimum, 8 times the rate of neutral or beneficial mutations.

"Simply put, the digital information of life is being destroyed much faster than it can be repaired or improved. New functions may evolve, but the overall loss of functional information in other areas of the genome will, on average, be significantly greater. The net result is that the digital information of life is running down.

"The second series of falsifying observations is indicated by actual organisms we have studied most closely. First, the digital information for the bacterial world is slowly eroding away due to a net deletional bias in mutations involving insertions and deletions. A second example is the fruit fly, one of the most studied life forms in evolutionary biology. It, too, shows an ongoing, genome-wide loss of DNA across the entire genus.

"Finally, humans are not exempt. As biologist Michael Lynch points out in a paper in *PNAS*, 'Rate, molecular spectrum, and consequences of human mutation':

"'Consideration of the long-term consequences of current human behaviour for deleterious-mutation accumulation leads to the conclusion that a substantial reduction in human fitness can be expected over the next few centuries in industrialized societies unless novel means of genetic intervention are developed.'

"We continue to discover more examples of DNA loss, suggesting that the biological world is slowly running down. Microevolution is good at fine-tuning existing forms within their information limits and occasionally getting something right, but the steady accumulation of deleterious mutations on the larger scale suggests that mutation-driven evolution is actually destroying biological life, not creating it.

"This is hardly a surprise, as every other area of science, except for evolutionary biology, grants that natural processes degrade information, regardless of the storage media and copying process. For neo-Darwinian macroevolution to work, it requires something that is in flat-out contradiction to the real world."³⁸¹

As Gumerov writes: "Scientific studies have shown that damage to the genome is constantly monitored and corrected by a special mechanism, because the body has a large number of enzymes, each with its own functions. Their coordinated and sequential actions eliminate 99 to 99.9% of mutations, according to the estimates of the evolutionists themselves. But the most important thing is that, according to statistics, the vast majority of mutations - if they occur - lead not to improvement, but to degradation. It was experimentally found that most phenotype mutations so violate the structure and physiology of the body that they destroy it — they are *lethal* mutations. The rest, in one way or another, reduce the viability of the body. And only a negligible share, a tiny fraction of a percent, can perhaps increase the adaptive properties of the body to some extent."

The conclusion is simple: mutation, being a destructive process, cannot explain the creation of new forms of life.

³⁸¹ Kirk Durston, "An Essential Prediction of Darwinian Theory Is Falsified by Information Degradation", *Evolution News*, July 9, 2015, https://evolutionnews.org/2015/07/an_essential_pr/

Darwinists trying to explain the origins of life come up against another insuperable obstacle: the fact that many of the physical and chemical conditions necessary for the emergence of life must be present within very narrow parameters. One obvious condition is the existence of water. Again, in 1961, physicist Robert H. Dicke claimed that certain forces in physics, such as gravity and electromagnetism, must be perfectly fine-tuned for life to exist in the universe. Fred Hoyle also argued for a fine-tuned universe in his 1984 book *The Intelligent Universe*. "The list of anthropic properties, apparent accidents of a non-biological nature without which carbon-based and hence human life could not exist, is large and impressive", Hoyle wrote.³⁸²

There are so many of these parameters, and their range of possible values so narrow if life is to be possible, that their emergence by chance seems impossibly improbable. It is as if some Intelligent Designer, or God, has "fine-tuned" these value in order to make life possible.

Jay W. Richards writes: "'Fine-tuning' refers to various features of the universe that are necessary conditions for the existence of complex life. Such features include the **initial conditions and "brute facts"** of the universe as a whole, the **laws of nature or the numerical constants present in those laws** (such as the gravitational force constant), and **local features** of habitable planets (such as a planet's distance from its host star).

"The basic idea is that these features must fall within a very narrow range of possible values for chemical-based life to be possible.

"Some popular examples are subject to dispute. And there are some complicated philosophical debates about how to calculate probabilities. Nevertheless, there are many well-established examples of fine-tuning, which are widely accepted even by scientists who are generally hostile to theism and design. For instance, Stephen Hawking has admitted: 'The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers [the constants of physics] seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life.' (*A Brief History of Time*, p. 125) Here are the most celebrated and widely accepted examples of fine-tuning for the existence of life:

"Cosmic Constants:

"(1) Gravitational force constant (2) Electromagnetic force constant (3) Strong nuclear force constant (4) Weak nuclear force constant (5) Cosmological constant

³⁸²

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_universe.

"'Initial Conditions and 'Brute Facts':

(6) Initial distribution of mass energy

(7) Ratio of masses for protons and electrons (8) Velocity of light

(9) Mass excess of neutron over proton

"'Local' Planetary Conditions:

(10) Steady plate tectonics with right kind of geological interior (11) Right amount of water in crust

- (12) Large moon with right rotation period
- (13) Proper concentration of sulfur
- (14) Right planetary mass
- (15) Near inner edge of circumstellar habitable zone
- (16) Low-eccentricity orbit outside spin-orbit and giant planet resonances
- (17) A few, large Jupiter-mass planetary neighbors in large circular orbits
- (18) Outside spiral arm of galaxy
- (19) Near co-rotation circle of galaxy, in circular orbit around galactic center
- (20) Within the galactic habitable zone
- (21) During the cosmic habitable age."383

New discoveries keep being made that are incompatible with Darwinism.

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For example, Eric Metaxas writes: "The Darwinian mechanism of mutation and natural selection explains everything about life, we're told—except how it began. 'Assume a self-replicating cell containing information in the form of genetic code,' Darwinists are forced to say. Well, fine. But where did *that* little miracle come from?

"A new discovery makes explaining even that first cell tougher still. Fossils unearthed by Australian scientists in Greenland may be the oldest traces of life ever discovered. A team from the University of Wollongong recently published their findings in the journal *Nature*, describing a series of structures called 'stromatolites' that emerged from receding ice.

"'Stromatolites' may sound like something your doctor would diagnose, but they're actually biological rocks formed by colonies of microbes that live in shallow water. If you visit the Bahamas today, you can see living stromatolites.

"What's so special about them? Well, they appear in rocks most scientists date to 220 million years older than the oldest fossils, which pushes the supposed date for the origin of life back to 3.7 billion years ago.

³⁸³ Richards, "List of Fine-Tuning Parameters".

"This, admits the *New York Times*, 'complicate[s] the story of evolution of early life from chemicals...' No kidding! According to conventional geology, these microbe colonies existed on the heels of a period when Earth was undergoing heavy asteroid bombardment, making it virtually uninhabitable. This early date, adds *The Times*, 'leaves comparatively little time for evolution to have occurred...'

"That is an understatement. These life forms came into existence virtually overnight, writes David Klinghoffer at *Evolution News and Views*. 'genetic code, proteins, photosynthesis, the works.'

"This appearance of fully-developed life forms so early in the fossil record led Dr. Abigail Allwood of Caltech to remark that 'life [must not be] a fussy, reluctant and unlikely thing.' Rather, 'it will emerge whenever there's an opportunity.'

"Pardon me? If life occurs so spontaneously and predictably even under the harshest conditions, then it should be popping up all over the place! Yet scientists still cannot come close to producing even a single cell from raw chemicals in the lab.

"Dr. Stephen Meyer explains in his book *Signature in the Cell* why this may be Darwinism's Achilles heel. In order to begin evolution by natural selection, you need a self-replicating unit. But the cell and its DNA blueprint are too complicated by far to have arisen through chance chemical reactions. The odds of even a single protein forming by accident are astronomical. So Meyer and other Intelligent Design theorists conclude that Someone must have designed and created the structures necessary for life."³⁸⁴

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Meyer also writes about another important problem for Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism, relating to the fact that "the fossil record on our planet documents the origin of major innovations in biological form and function. These episodes – if we take the fossil record at face value [and accept the conventional dating] – often occur abruptly or *discontinuously*, meaning the newly arising forms bear little resemblance to what existed earlier. In my book *Darwin's Doubt*... I wrote about one of the most dramatic of these discontinuous events, the Cambrian explosion. During this event, beginning about 530 million years ago, most major groups of animals first appear in the fossil record in a geologically abrupt fashion."³⁸⁵

The problem for Darwinists is that according to their theory there are only two possible explanations for the eruption of this vast new amount of genetic

 ³⁸⁴ Metaxas, "New discovery makes Darwinists' case even harder to make", *LifeSiteNews*, September 14, 2016, https://www.lifesitenews.com/opinion/evolutions-can-opener
 ³⁸⁵ Meyer, *The Return of the God Hypothesis*, p. 189.

information: natural selection and mutation. But natural selection only operates on pre-existing material; it does not bring new material into existence. As for mutation, Meyer demonstrates that the chances of it bringing into being functional new DNA sequences that help to build up a new animal or plant species, even given very large periods of time, are so small as to constitute a statistical impossibility. In any case, the vast majority of mutations are *nonfunctional;* they injure rather than enhance the functionality of the new life form. This is hardly surprising; for if the DNA sequence is compared to computer code or sentences in the English language, then random changing of a letter is much more likely to destroy than enhance the intelligibility of the text. Meyer continues: "Since the Cambrian explosion of animal life and other similar explosions represent explosions of information as well as of biological form, this raises a question. Is it possible that the dramatic increases of biological information at periodic episodes throughout the history of life not only pose a difficulty for materialistic theories of biological evolution, but also provide positive evidence for intelligent design? Could this unexplained (from a materialistic point of view) appearance of design point to actual intelligent design?"386

With the discovery of DNA, Darwinism became *a statistical impossibility* manifestly unable to explain the appearance of new life forms. Unfortunately, however, the world has continued as if nothing had happened. Darwinism remains still, at the time of writing, the corner-stone, not only of biological science, but of the whole modern world-view...

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At the same time, one of the (very few) encouraging signs about the world today is the stubborn resistance to this corner-stone of the modern world view even among highly educated people.

Thus Harari writes: "According to a 2012 Gallup survey only 15 percent of Americans think that Homo sapiens evolved through natural selection alone, free of all divine intervention; 32 percent maintain that humans may have evolved from earlier life forms in a process lasting millions of years, but God orchestrated the whole show; 46 percent believe that God created humans in their current form sometime during the last 10,000 years, just as the Bible says. The same survey found that among BA graduates, 46 percent believe in the biblical creation, whereas only 14 percent think that humans evolved without any divine supervision..."³⁸⁷

So there are some grounds for optimism: materialist science is on the retreat, at least since the 1960s and increasingly as more evidence for the falseness of Darwinism has poured in...

³⁸⁶ Meyer, op. cit., p. 209.

³⁸⁷ Yuval Noah Harari, *Homo Deus*, London: Vintage, 2015, p. 119.

The problem with Darwinism does not consist solely in its noncorrespondence with the empirical and mathematical facts. As Fr. Seraphim Rose pointed out, it is *not falsifiable*, and therefore *not science* at all. Darwin admitted as much when he said, in 1856: "*I am quite conscious that my speculations are quite beyond the bounds of true science*." The most recent biography of Darwin calls him a "mythmaker".³⁸⁸ He created a "consolation myth" for the thrusting capitalist class of Victorian Britain, convincing them that they were the result of an upward progression from primitive, barbarian origins to their present glory. Modern men have the same need and so adhere to the same myth...

Darwinism is in fact a *religion* – a modern, sophisticated form of paganism. It is like the pagan worship of Fortune, or Meni (Tyche among the Greeks), that was condemned by the Prophet Isaiah (65.11). Paganism believes in the spontaneous generation of higher life-forms, even gods and goddesses, out of lower forms, as if by magic. So does Darwinism.

Tom Bethell writes: "Natural selection functions in the realm of philosophy, not science." He quotes staunch Darwinian Richard Lewontin of Harvard: "For what good is a theory that is guaranteed by its internal logical structure to agree with all conceivable observations, irrespective of the real structure of the world? If scientists are going to use logically unbeatable theories about the world, they might as well give up natural science and take up religion. Yet is that not exactly the situation with Darwinism?" ³⁸⁹

"Bethell began his journey as a Darwin sceptic by pondering the circular reasoning inherent in selection theory. Is there any way of deciding what is 'fit' other than seeing what survives?" he asks in the Introduction (p. 11). 'If not, maybe Darwin was arguing in a self-confirming circle: the survival of the survivors.' Throughout his journey, as he documents in the book, he found leading Darwinists admitting to this core flaw in the logic of natural selection..."

The word "creationism" has begun to be dropped in favour of the less religious-sounding "intelligent design"³⁹⁰, whose adherents are as firmly

³⁸⁸ A.N. Wilson, *Charles Darwin, Victorian The Mythmaker*, London: Harper, 2017.

³⁸⁹ "No Controversies about Darwinism? Try this one", *Evolution News*, May 30, 2017; Lewontin, "Testing the Theory of Natural Selection," *Nature* 236, no. 543 (1972): 181-182, cited in Bethel, p. 65.

³⁹⁰ Of course, there were still some old-fashioned, but formidable scientists who preferred to talk about God. Thus the Nobel Prize winner in Physics, Paul Dirac, whom Einstein considered a genius, said in 1971: "It could be that it is extremely difficult to start life. It might be that it is so difficult to start life that it has happened only once among all the planets... Let us consider, just as a conjecture, that the chance life starting when we have got suitable physical conditions is 10–100. I don't have any logical reason for proposing this figure, I just want you to consider it as a possibility. Under those conditions ... it is almost certain that life would not have started. And I feel that under those conditions it will be necessary to assume the existence of a god to start off life. I would like, therefore, to set up this connexion between the existence of a god and the physical laws: if physical laws are such that to start off life involves an excessively small

opposed to evolution as the creationists, but they do not declare that the author of Intelligent Design is a Creator God, for then they might lose their jobs. So they say only that they believe in "intelligent design" – which comes to the same thing. For who could have intelligently designed the universe if not God?

Jim Holt provides some examples of "intelligent design" thinking. "Michael Behe attacks Darwinism at the molecular level. If you peer inside a cell, Behe says, you see intricate little machines, made out of proteins, that carry on the functions necessary for life. They are so precisely engineered that they exhibit what he calls 'irreducible complexity': alter a single part and the whole thing would grind to a halt. How could such machinery have evolved in piecemeal fashion through a series of adaptations, as Darwinism holds?

"Alwin Plantinga makes a philosophical assault on Darwinism, claiming that it is self-undermining. Suppose the Darwinian theory of evolution were true – our mental machinery, having developed from that of lower animals, would be highly unreliable when it came to generating true theories. (Darwin himself once confessed to the same doubt: 'Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind?') In other words, if our belief in Darwinism were true, then none of our theoretical beliefs would be reliable – including our belief in Darwinism. But theism escapes this difficulty: if we are made in the image of God, he can be counted on to have supplied us with reliable cognitive faculties.

"William Dembski bases his anti-Darwinian argument on what he calls 'the law of conservation of information'. Our DNA contains a wealth of complex information, he observes. How did it get there? Natural causes can't be responsible. Chance and necessity cannot create information. Therefore, the origin of genetic information 'is best sought in intelligent causes'."³⁹¹

These are powerful arguments, and the creationist or intelligent design movement shows no signs of decline. Many thousands of Ph.D. scientists now reject Darwinism, and to many the arguments of leading evolutionists such as Richard Dawkins are no longer convincing. We come back to the question: if DNA is a code, and all known codes are created by intelligent designers, who created the code of DNA?

chance, so that it will not be reasonable to suppose that life would have started just by blind chance, then there must be a god, and such a god would probably be showing his influence in the quantum jumps which are taking place later on." (Helge Kragh, ("The purest soul". *Dirac: A Scientific Biography*. Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 56–257). Of course, if the extreme improbability of the emergence of life is enough to make the existence of God probable, the existence of DNA makes it far more probable!

³⁹¹ Holt, *Why Does the World Exist?* London: Profile, 2017.

28. SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE: (2) PHYSICS

Apart from the discovery of DNA in 1953, which radically undermined the Darwinist theory of evolution, the most significant development in twentiethcentury science was the discovery, in the 1920s, that the galaxies are flying away from each other – that is, that the universe is expanding. This undermined the idea, accepted by almost all scientists, that the universe is in a "steady state", with no beginning. For if the galaxies are accelerating away from each other, then if we extrapolate backwards, according to the laws of physics, especially General Relativity, there must have been an initial starting point, a beginning from which all matter and energy, space and time emerged together, insofar as matter and energy, space and time are inter-connected in one pan-cosmic unity, according to Einstein. At the end point of this reverse extrapolation, a tiny mass of super-heated dust, compressed by extreme gravitational forces to a tiny speck of space-time, explodes in all directions, creating all the galaxies, and all the matter, space and time of the universe. This explosive beginning is the so-called "Big Bang". But then the question arises: where did the Big Bang come from? Since space and time are now known not to be independent of matter, the origin of being must be *outside* space-time and beyond any known laws of physics, which come into existence only together with space, time and matter. But what is such a timeless and immaterial "cause" of the universe if not God, Whom the Word of God has defined simply as "He Who Is" (Exodus 3.14), "the Beginning of every beginning" (I Chronicles 29.12)," without Whom "nothing was made that was made" (John 1.3). Human thought, both scientific, common-sensical and religious, sees the history of the universe as going back to a first cause. For if there were no first cause, there would be nothing to set the spatio-temporal causal nexus going. However, the first cause must be outside this causal nexus taken as a whole; and so it must itself be uncaused (and immaterial and non-spatiotemporal). Otherwise, if it were part of the causal nexus, it would itself require a causal explanation. This is recognized by all true religious thought. But modern cosmological thought cannot accept this. If it accepts a first cause, that can only be the big bang. It cannot accept that the big band itself must have, not a spatio-temporal cause, but an origin that is beyond space, time and matter completely...

Atheist scientists have tried hard to escape this inescapable conclusion that there is an Uncaused Cause – that is, God. Thus Stephen Hawking argued that the universe owes its origin to a chance quantum fluctuation, which "exploded" into existence 13.8 billion years ago. In a book on Hawking, David Wilkinson, a physicist and Methodist minister, writes that the universe arose by "a chance quantum fluctuation from a state of absolute nothing... Quantum theory deals with events which do not have deterministic causes. By applying quantum theory to the universe, Hawking is saying that the event that triggered the Big Bang did not have a cause. In this way, science is able not only to encompass the laws of evolution but also the initial conditions."³⁹²

³⁹² Wilkinson, *God, Time and Stephen Hawking*, London: Monarch Books, 2001, p. 104.

However, there are huge problems with this idea. First, there is the metaphysical or meta-psychological fact, demonstrated by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that it is impossible to reason in the "phenomenal" world – that is the world of empirical experience, - without the category of causality. Secondly, if in the beginning there was only a wave function, a spectrum of possibilities, then someone had to observe it if that wave function was to collapse and bring a single objective reality – our universe – into being. Who could that "someone" have been if not God? After all, did not the great Newton himself talk about space being God's *sensorium*? Thirdly, the idea that the whole, vast, infinitely varied, infinitely complex and highly organized universe should come from a chance quantum fluctuation is unbelievable (and strictly undemonstrable). Still less believable, fourthly, is the idea that the quantum fluctuation itself should come out of nothing. This is positing nothing as the cause of everything, an obviously nonsensical proposition. For, as King Lear tells the Fool, "Nothing can be made of nothing" (*King Lear* IV, 4, 126).

Wilkinson continues: "Many people find difficulty in imagining where the matter of the universe comes from to begin with. Surely, they say, there must be an amount of matter or a 'primeval atom' with which to go bang? As Einstein's famous equation E=mc² implies that energy (E) is equivalent to mass (m) multiplied by the square of the speed of light (c), the question can be translated to where does the energy come from?

"Now energy has the property that it can be either positive or negative. Two objects attracted by the force of gravity need energy to pull them apart, and therefore in that state we say that they have negative gravitational energy.

"It turns out that the energy in matter in the universe is the same amount as the negative energy in the gravitational field of the universe. Thus the total energy of the universe is zero. In this way you can have something from nothing in terms of the matter in the universe. No problem here for the Big Bang..."³⁹³

But this is simply attempting to "solve" the problem by sleight of hand. Positive energy *is* something, and negative energy is something. They are not *numbers* that cancel each other out as in the equation: 1-1=0. They are *things*, and the existence of things needs to be explained. And something cannot come out of nothing except through the creative energy of "Him Who is" (Exodus 3.14) supremely and in the first place, God. Actually, some of the most famous physicists of our time, while not endorsing the idea that God created the heavens and the earth, nevertheless admit that the concept of God is not entirely irrelevant here. Einstein famously said that God does not play with dice. And even Stephen Hawking wrote: "It is difficult to discuss the beginning of the Universe without mentioning the concept of God. My work on the origin of the Universe is on the borderline between science and religion, but I try to stay on the scientific side of the border. It is quite possible that God acts in ways

³⁹³ Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 83-8

that cannot be described by scientific laws. But in that case one would just have to go by personal belief."³⁹⁴

However, it is not "just" personal belief but common sense that dictates the conclusion that the Origin of space, time and matter acts in ways that cannot be described by the laws of space, time and matter and therefore cannot be known by science. The Lawgiver is not confined by His own laws; He created those laws, and so must be above and beyond them. All we can do is stand before the mystery in awe as Moses stood before the burning bush, admitting simply that He *is*, or "*He Who Is*", absolute, ineffable, unknowable, indescribable Being.

David Berlinski perceptively describes how intellectual pride prevented – and prevents – the clever scientists from accepting the glaringly obvious truth: "The universe, orthodox cosmologists believe, came into existence as the expression of an explosion – what is now called the Big Bang. The word *explosion* is a sign that words have failed us, as they so often do, for it suggests a humanly comprehensible event – a *gigantic* explosion or a *stupendous* eruption. But this is absurd. The Big Bang was not an event taking place at a time or in a place. Space and time were themselves created by the Big Bang, the measure along with the measured...

"If the Big Bang expresses a new idea in physics, it suggests an old idea in thought: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*. This unwelcome juxtaposition of physical and biblical ideas persuaded the astrophysicist Fred Hoyle, an ardent atheist, to dismiss the Big Bang after he had named it. In this he was not alone. Many physicists have found the idea that the universe had a beginning alarming. 'So long as the universe had a beginning,' Stephen Hawking has written 'we could suppose it had a creator.' *God forbid!*.

"For more than a century, physicists had taken a manful pride in the fact that theirs was a discipline that celebrated the weird, the bizarre, the unexpected, the mind-bending, and the recondite. Here was a connection that any intellectual primitive could at once grasp: The universe had a beginning, thus something must have caused it to happen. Where would physics be, physicists asked themselves, if we had paid the slightest attention to the obvious?...

"If both theory and evidence suggested that the universe had a beginning, it was natural for physicists to imagine that by tweaking the evidence and adjusting the theory, they could get rid of what they did not want [God]. Perhaps the true and the good universe – the one without a beginning – might be reached by skirting the Big Bang singularity, or bouncing off it in some way? But in the mid-1960s, Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking demonstrated that insofar as the backward contraction of the universe was controlled by the equations of general relativity almost all lines of conveyance came to an end.

³⁹⁴ Hawking, in Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 26.

"The singularity was inescapable.

"This conclusion encouraged the theologians but did little to ease physicists in their own minds, for while it strengthened the unwholesome conclusion that Big Bang cosmology had already established, it left a good deal else in a fog. In many ways, this was the worst of all possible worlds. Religious believers had emerged from their seminars well satisfied with what they could understand; the physicists themselves could understand nothing very well.

"The fog that attended the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorems (there is more than one) arose spontaneously whenever physicists tried to determine just what the singularity signified. At the singularity itself, a great many physical parameters zoom to infinity. Just what is one to make of infinite temperature? Or particles that are no distance from one another? The idea of a singularity, as the astronomer Joseph Silk observed, is 'completely unacceptable as a physical description of the universe... An infinitely dense universe [is] where the laws of physics, and even space and time, break down.'"³⁹⁵

"In his book *The Grand Design*... Hawking argues that 'Because there is a law such as gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist.' Thus, for Hawking, 'It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going.'

"[Stephen] Meyer points out, though, that Hawking's statement betrays a kind of category error – a philosophical misunderstanding of what the laws of nature do. Meyer notes that 'the laws of nature describe how matter and energy in different states or configurations interact with other material entities. They do not tell us where matter and energy (or space and time) came from in the first place.^{"396}

In other words, the idea of "spontaneous generation" from gravity or whatever, is a nonsense. *C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la science!*

The Big Bang theory posits a beginning state of the universe that is contrary to the laws of physics. In other words, it is physically impossible. This is an enormous problem for atheist physics, which assumes the law-governed nature of all things, while rejecting a Law-giver, but not for traditional religious thought, which recognizes a Law-giver as well as the law. For if God is the Cause of the entire spatio-temporal universe, then the causality joining God to the universe, as it were, must itself be beyond space and time and not subject

³⁹⁵ Berlinski, *The Devil's Delusion: Atheism and its Scientific Pretensions*, New York: Basic Books, 2009, pp. 69, 70-71, 78-79.

³⁹⁶ "'Spontaneous Creation': Meyer on Stephen Hawking's Category Error", *Evolution News*, March 23, 2018.

to physical laws. For this is not the link between a material cause and a material effect, which expresses a physical law, but the link between the Creator and the whole of His physical creation, that is, all material causes and effects taken together as a single system. In fact, the "causality" that brought the heavens and the earth into being is not *empirical* causality at all, but more like the causality that every rational being experiences every time he exercises his free will, when he opens his mouth to speak, or his eyes to see. Thus "He spake, and they came to be; He commanded, and they were created" (Psalm 149.5).

Berlinski argues that the fact that "causes in nature come to an end" shows that "the hypothesis of God's existence and the facts of contemporary cosmology are *consistent*."³⁹⁷

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However, in order for God's existence and the supposed facts of contemporary cosmology to be consistent, a form of non-empirical causality, *free will*, must be admitted: the freewill of God or whatever other name, such as "Intelligent Designer", we choose to give him.

For "having free will," writes Meyer, "– familiar to us all because of our own introspective awareness of the powers of our own minds – means that our decisions or acts of mind can alter material states of affairs without being fully determined by a prior set of necessary and *sufficient* material conditions.

"Moreover, it is at least reasonable to consider positing the action of a free agent as the explanation for the beginning of the universe. Most people already accept the reality of their own free will and think that their choices can cause new material states of affairs to occur... But this implies that people at least have an intuitive understanding of the concept of free will. Thus, the concept of a freely chosen decision does not represent an exotic, *ad hoc*, or arbitrary explanatory postulation, but rather one that we routinely employ to explain other changes of state or states of affairs.

"Indeed, positing the action of a free agent gives a perfectly cogent account of how the universe could have begun to exist consistent with our own experience of possessing free will. After all, free agents cause things to exist that did not exist before..."³⁹⁸

In fact, we must posit both the free will of God in creating and continuing to uphold the universe, and the free will of men in choosing to believe or not to believe in that fact. And surely any sane physicist would not deny that he is free in this sense. Otherwise, if all their words and thoughts are just the determined or undetermined products of fate or chance, why should we believe

³⁹⁷ Berlinski, op. cit., p. 80.

³⁹⁸ Meyer, Return of the God Hypothesis, pp. 253-254.

Another attempt to get round the fact that the universe has a beginning in time and therefore a Creator Who is beyond time, is the so-called "multiverse" theory. This is the idea that all the possibilities in the original wave function actually exist in other universes. Frank Close, professor of physics at Oxford University, explains that the idea of the "multiverse" is, together with string theory, one of the "two leading theories that attempt to explain the most fundamental characteristics of the physical world".³⁹⁹ But Close readily admits that it has one or two problems...

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The first is that it is *untestable*, which makes it, strictly speaking, *not science at all*. "As there is no possibility of communication between us and other universes, there is no empirical way to test the multiverse theory. George Ellis makes the point explicitly: 'In a general multiverse model, everything that can happen will happen somewhere, so any data whatever can be accommodated. Hence it cannot be disproved by an observational test at all.' By implication, the multiverse concept lies outside science.'"⁴⁰⁰

So one of the two main mega-theories of contemporary physical science is not science at all. (Close thinks that the situation is a little better with the other mega-theory, string theory, but only just!) Physics was meant to exclude the need for metaphysics, untestable philosophy. But it seems that metaphysics is making a come-back!

And this is not the only problem. According to Close, the different universes of the "multiverse" can "implement different laws of physics", with the consequence that "if such diverse regions of space exist, then the 'universe' as we've defined it is not the whole of reality... Ellis and his cosmologist colleague Joe Silk, a professor at the Université de Pierre et Marie Curie in Paris, call this 'a kaleidoscopic multiverse comprising a myriad of universes'. They, as proxy for many physicists, then pose the basic challenge: the suggestion that another universe need not have the same fundamental constants of nature as ours inspires the question of what determines the values in our universe. Of the variety of universes that could exist, the conditions for the narrow range of parameters for which intelligent life could exist are trifling. The odds that we exist are therefore so vanishingly small, that multiverse theory claims that there is a 'landscape' of universe 'out there' in which all possible values of these parameters exist. Thus one universe will exist somewhere with conditions just right for life, and we are the proof..."⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁹ Close, "The Limits of Knowledge", Prospect, June, 2015, p. 64.

⁴⁰⁰ Close, op. cit., p. 65.

⁴⁰¹ Close, op. cit., p. 65.

This reveals what is perhaps the main motivation for multiverse theory *in physics*: to help out evolution theory *in biology* in what should be the very first and easiest step in the ladder of evolution: *the origin of life*. The problem is that, as the physicist Close readily admits, – most biologists are much less sincere, – "the odds that we exist are vanishingly small" because the odds on the existence of all of the ten major constants that make life on earth possible (for example, the distance of the earth from the sun) are also "vanishingly small". So in order to help out their biological colleagues in their little difficulty (of course, this is only the beginning of the vast difficulties faced by Darwinist theory), the physicists are forced to resort to the fantastical theory that all possible universes exist somewhere in the "multiverse" – including our own fantastically unlikely universe with its life-bearing planet, the Earth.

The Lord said that with God all things are possible. But He did not say that all possibilities will in fact become actual. In fact, He definitively excluded certain possibilities: for example, that falsehood should finally triumph over truth, or good over evil, or that the world will not be brought to an end by His Second Coming. God can do anything – except contradict His own all-holy will. It is His will that decrees which possibilities become reality, and which will never be fulfilled – in any universe.

The concept of *free will* – Divine, human or angelic - is crucial here. For what is an act of will if not the elimination of a range of possibilities in favour of *one reality*? As I write these words, I am excluding all other verbal possibilities from being actualized. Thus freedom to will this as opposed to that is the freedom to create reality out of mere possibility. As I write these words I am not simply banishing the things I am *not* writing to some other universe in which they exist on equal terms with what I *am* writing: I am excluding the very possibility of their being written anywhere.

If, on the other hand, I assert, as the multiverse theorists seem to be asserting, that I am writing an infinite number of other versions of this chapter in an infinite number of other universes, the very concept of "I", of personal identity, seems to disappear. Physicists have become reconciled to the idea – enormously paradoxical though it is - that a sub-atomic particle can exist in two places at the same time. But this paradox is as nothing by comparison with the idea that there is an infinity of universes in which I write an infinite number of different versions of this chapter. Some of these alternative versions will be gibberish, or represent something completely different from what I actually believe. How, then, can they be said to be what *I* write? Will they not in fact be the products of completely different people? Indeed, if different universes comprise different possibilities that cannot communicate with each other, and which may obey completely different laws of nature, what basis is there for saying that the I who am writing this chapter in this universe am the same as any of the Is who are writing it in other universes?

Let us remind ourselves of the first difficulty Close finds in multiverse theory: that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of any other universe than our own – that is, the one single concatenation of events in space and time that all human beings with the exception of some contemporary physicists consider to be *reality* and not mere possibility. Indeed, not only is there no empirical evidence for other universes: even theoretically there cannot be any such evidence. For if there were, it would show that those other universes were interacting with our own and therefore formed part of *our reality*. As for there being an *infinity* of other universes, this is even more out of the question. For as the German mathematician David Hilbert says: "Although infinity is needed to complete mathematics, it occurs nowhere in the physical universe."⁴⁰²

Scientists used to pride themselves on their hard-headedness, on their insistence on *facts*, facts that can be empirically seen, heard or touched. Now, however, they deal, not in facts, but in *possibilities*, infinite numbers of them, none of which is more real than any other. They have become other-worldly to the most extreme degree, indulging in fantasies about other universes no less real – or unreal - than our own but with which we can have no communication with and about which we can have no information whatsoever.

The idea of multiple universes is an old one: we find it in Hinduism, and we find it in the dualistic religions of the Middle East.

Just as the idea is old, so is its refutation. As early as the second century, the Holy Fathers rejected the idea put forward by the heretic Marcion that there are two universes, one ruled by a good God and the other by a bad one, each universe following different laws. C.S. Lewis discerns in all forms of the dualistic (and by inference, multiverse) error two major difficulties, one metaphysical and the other moral. The metaphysical difficulty consists in the fact that neither of the two worlds "can claim to be the Ultimate. More ultimate than either of them is the inexplicable fact of their being there together. Neither of them chose this *tête-à-tête*. Each of them therefore is *conditioned* – finds [itself] willy nilly in a situation; and either that situation itself, or some unknown force which produced that situation, is the real Ultimate. Dualism has not yet reached the ground of being. You cannot accept two conditioned and mutually independent beings as the self-grounded, self-comprehending Absolute." In trying to understand the dualistic multiverse in pictorial terms, we cannot avoid "smuggling in the idea of a common space in which they can be together, and thus confessing that we are not yet dealing with the source of the universe but only with two members contained in it. Dualism is a truncated philosophy."403

⁴⁰² Hilbert, in Close, op. cit., p. 66.

⁴⁰³ Lewis, "Evil and God", in *Faith, Christianity and the Church,* London: HarperCollins, 2002, p. 94.

The moral difficulty is similar. It consists in the fact that if one universe has one system of values, which we from our point of view would call good, and the other a completely different, or contradictory one, which we would call bad, there is no basis on which to judge between the two. "In what sense can one party [or universe] be said to be right and the other wrong? If evil has the same kind of reality as good, the same autonomy and completeness, our allegiance to good becomes the arbitrarily chosen loyalty of a partisan. A sound theory of value demands something very different…"⁴⁰⁴

It does indeed. However, physicists do not generally concern themselves with moral questions, or the origins of morality; so one might argue that this consequence of their theory is irrelevant to physical truth. But this would be disingenuous; for physical, cosmological theories are so ambitious that they quite unashamedly claim to be "Theories of Everything" (TOEs). Everything is everything. You cannot claim to have a theory of everything if "everything" *excludes life*, consciousness, conscience, art and morality...

The theologians say that God created the universe out of nothing; the physicists say that it "emerged" from nothing. The first explanation is more plausible than the second, for while we cannot know how God created everything out of nothing, the idea itself is nevertheless comprehensible - first because the idea of a Creator Who is incomprehensible to His creatures is in itself quite comprehensible (and logical), and secondly because God is at any rate something and not nothing. Besides, it provides plausible answers to the question "Why?" in the sense of "For what purpose?" We can say, for example, that God created the universe because his nature is love, and He wants creatures to exist in order to share in His love.

The second explanation, however, not only provides no conceivable answer to the questions "How?" and "Why". It is itself nonsensical. For out of nothing nothing can come... And so: "Quantum cosmology is a branch of mathematical metaphysics. It provides no cause for the emergence of the universe, and so does not answer the first cosmological question [how?], and it offers no reason for the existence of the universe, and so does not address the second [why?]. If the mystification induced by its modest mathematics were removed from the subject, what remains does not appear appreciably different in kind from various creation myths in which the origin of the universe is attributed to sexual congress between primordial deities."⁴⁰⁵

For modern cosmology appears to have veered off towards a sophisticated form of Hinduism, whose creation myth tells of a quasi-sexual explosion of multiple seeds of universes through the union of Brahma, "the germ of all being", with his consort Saraswathi. For is not "the sea of indeterminate probability" or "wave function of the universe" a kind of modern version of "the germ of all being", which explodes out of potential being into a multitude

⁴⁰⁴ Lewis, op. cit., p. 94.

⁴⁰⁵ Berlinski, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

of actual universes after coming into contact with an observer? (But who could this observer be if not a God who is not Brahma?) It looks as if the physicists, who so pride themselves on their rationality, have regressed even further into the mists of magical, pre-scientific paganism.

There is only one philosophy that truly embraces everything: Orthodox Christianity. One of the early Christian martyrs, St. Justin the philosopher, said: "Only Christianity is a reliable and useful philosophy. Only thus and for this reason can I be a philosopher." Modern science has reverted to a way of thinking that recalls many non-Christian religions and heresies, but is essentially simply a stubborn refusal to accept the "many infallible proofs" (Acts 1.3) of the existence of the invisible God from His visible creation – for which unbelief, as St. Paul says, "there is no excuse" (Romans 1.20). It has fulfilled the prophecy of St. Nilus the Myrrh-Gusher (+1596) about the twentieth century: "[The Antichrist], the dishonourable one, will so complete science with vainglory that it will lose its way and lead people to unbelief in the existence of the God in three Persons."

St. Nilus points to vainglory as the motive of this pseudo-science (Dostoyevsky called it "half science" in The Devils) because leaving God out of every equation enables the scientists to demonstrate the brilliance of their own minds, to earn the plaudits of their colleagues and receive the glory of a world that craves the gold of wisdom but receives only the husks of "the profane and idle babblings and contradictions of what is falsely called science" (I Timothy 6.20). Therefore the way back to true knowledge and wisdom can only be through humility, through submitting to "the Power of God and the Wisdom of God", the Lord Jesus Christ (I Corinthians 1.24), "in Whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Colossians 2.3) - but Who enlightens only those who ask him in humility. So let the model for the scientists be the humility of Solomon, the wisest of men, who said: "I am Thy slave and the son of Thy handmaid, a man who is weak and short-lived, with little understanding of judgement and laws; for even if one is perfect among the sons of men, yet without the wisdom that comes from Thee he will be regarded as nothing... For a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind. We can hardly guess at what is on earth, and what is at hand we find with labour. But who has traced out what is in the heavens, and who has learned Thy counsel, unless Thou give him wisdom, and send Thy Holy Spirit from on high?" (Wisdom of Solomon 9.5-6, 15-17)

29. SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE: (3) PSYCHOLOGY

If Stalinist Russia was hell on earth, then America in the early fifties must have seemed to many immigrants from the East like paradise, a land of happiness, opportunity, prosperity, freedom. But such a perception was deceptive. America in this period probably did indeed represent the highest point of worldly, material well-being yet achieved in history. But as the Lord said, "It is hard for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of heaven". And beneath the glamour and optimism purveyed by the Hollywood film industry there was a darker side to American life, a side that was closely linked to the great popularity of the new science of psychology.

America's constitution decreed that "the pursuit of happiness" was an inalienable human right, and Americans pursued this goal in two distinct ways, which may be called the liberal, left-wing way and the conservative, right-wing way. The liberal way was typified by the famous singer Frank Sinatra, a liberal in his politics and a libertine in his life, reputed to be a draft-dodger, a womaniser who regularly spent whole nights drinking and gambling in Las Vegas night clubs mixing with stars and Mafia criminals and presidents, and preferred to do things *his* way. He pursued happiness with enormous energy and ambition, but remained unhappy to the end.

The conservative, right-wing way was typified by another actor, John Wayne, who also managed to avoid the draft, but compensated for this in the rest of his life through his ultra-patriotic films and activities. The average American of this period was more likely to be conservative than liberal: hard-working and honest, a church-goer and a fierce anti-communist, a faithful family man who loved his country, looked up to the president and the army and believed in "motherhood and apple pie". The idealism and optimism and generosity that fuelled America's vast overseas missions (military and otherwise) were characteristic of these small-town conservatives (typified in the movies by the character played by James Stewart in *A Wonderful Life* (1946)). If they were Baptists from the Deep South, they were likely to be fiercely opposed to the liberalism and atheism of people like Sinatra – but also to be racist.

Such was the situation between the wars and in the first two decades or so after the Second World War. However, important negative changes in faith and morality took place in North America after the war that were linked with the increasing popularity of psychology and psychotherapy as substitutes for faith among unbelieving liberals and semi-believing ministers of religion. Thus the Jewish rabbi Joshua Liebman, whose book *Peace of Mind*, published in 1946, topped the *New York Times* bestseller list for 58 weeks, a record, compared analysis and the confessional, and came to the conclusion that analysis was superior in producing peace of mind. "'The confessional only touches the surface of a man's life,' he said, while the spiritual advice of the church throws

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no light on the causes that lead someone to confession in the first place. Moreover, priestly strictures about confessants showing more 'willpower' were 'ineffective counsels'.

"On the other hand, psychotherapy was, Liebman said, designed to help someone work on his (or her) own problems without 'borrowing' the conscience of a priest, and 'offers change through self-understanding, not selfcondemnation'. And this was the unique way to inner peace. The human self, Liebman insisted, was not a gift from God, as traditionally taught, but an achievement.

"The religion of the future, he declared, must poach from the psychotherapist's armoury. He told his readers that henceforth it should not be 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' but 'Thou shalt love thyself properly and then thou wilt be able to love thy neighbour'."

We see here the beginning of that "psychology of self-worship" and selfobsession that became so dominant in the therapeutic culture of the 1960s and 70s. Liebman is as wrong as it is possible to be. First of all, it is the therapist, not the priest, who only touches the surface of a man's life. Deep in man, deeper even than his passions, is his God-given conscience, which is not a socially indoctrinated construct, but the eye of God in the soul of man. When a man transgresses his conscience he feels guilt, and no amount of psychotherapy can relieve him of that guilt but only the confession of his sins before God and a priest (whose conscience he does not "borrow", although he may occasionally check his conscience against the priest's).

Secondly, it is precisely *self-condemnation*, and not simply "selfunderstanding" that alone can relieve the penitent of his guilt, for "he who condemns himself will not be judged" – neither by his own conscience, not by God. Liebman regards the light of consciousness and rational discussion as the means of destroying the darkness of neurotic suffering. But the Christian regards the healing power to be the light of *God* Who alone forgives men their sins and grants them healing. The analyst does not heal so much as help the patient to heal himself by becoming conscious of his inner state. But for the Christian, consciousness of his inner state is not enough: he must also *condemn* that which is sinful in that state, *repent* of it, and ask God to *destroy* it.

By 1950, as Peter Watson writes, "thanks to Liebman's lead, four out of five theological schools had psychologists on their staff. 117 centres for clinical pastoral psychology had been established.

"At first the church showed resistance to, in particular, psychoanalysis. Ministers condemned it as an 'unsatisfactory mix of materialism, hedonism, infantilism and eroticism' and, in contrast to the confessional, therapy gave no norms or standards. This intransigence didn't last, however, because in February 1954 Pope Pius XII gave pastoral psychology a tentative go-ahead. "Other churches followed, and so one can say that the mid-1950s really marks the point at which a secular psychological model of 'fulfilment', 'wholeness' and 'self-realisation' in this life, began to outweigh a religious concept of 'salvation' in an afterlife. And it was this sanctioning of psychology by religious institutions that, as much as anything, encouraged the 'therapy boom' that blossomed in the 1960s. Psychotherapy was now proliferating internationally. It epitomized new ways of living and, for many, it replace religion.

"As the number of clergy plummeted – so much so that some people were predicting the extinction of the Anglican church within a generation – the ranks of counsellors snowballed. In fact, by the end of the 20th century, the profusion of therapies constituted what the sociologist Frank Furedi identified as 'therapy culture'.

"But therapy was only one of these developments that, for many people, replaced the role of religion following the Second World War. The other two were drugs and music – in particular, rock and roll. These together comprised what was called the counter-culture.

"It is worth pointing out that roughly one in four people born in the west after the Second World War has used illegal drugs – it is not a fringe activity. And it was against this background that, in 1960, Timothy Leary first ingested *Psilocybe Mexicana*, the mysterious magical mushroom of Mexico. As a result, Leary, a psychology lecturer at Harvard University, came to the view that these mushrooms – whose active ingredient was from the same family as LSD – could 'revolutionise' psychotherapy, bringing with it the 'possibility of instantaneous self-insight'."⁴⁰⁶

Now if therapy could take the place of religion, it was logical that therapy could also *become* a religion. Thus in 1950 L. Ron Hubbard published *Dianetics:* The Modern Science of Mental Health, "considered the seminal event of the century by Scientologists", which later metamorphosed (perhaps for financial reasons) into the "religion" of Scientology... "Dianetics uses a counselling technique known as *auditing* in which an auditor assists a subject in conscious recall of traumatic events in the individual's past. It was originally intended to be a new *psychotherapy* and was not expected to become the foundation for a new religion. Hubbard variously defined Dianetics as a spiritual healing technology and an organized science of thought. The stated intent is to free individuals of the influence of past traumas by systematic exposure and removal of the *engrams* (painful memories) these events have left behind, a process called *clearing*. Rutgers scholar Beryl Satter says that 'there was little that was original in Hubbard's approach', with much of the theory having origins in popular conceptions of psychology. Satter observes that in 'keeping with the typical 1950s distrust of emotion, Hubbard promised that Dianetic treatment would release and erase psychosomatic ills and painful emotions,

⁴⁰⁶ Watson, "D-Day for God?", BBC History Magazine, February, 2014, p. 46.

thereby leaving individuals with increased powers of rationality.' According to Gallagher and Ashcraft, in contrast to psychotherapy, Hubbard stated that Dianetics 'was more accessible to the average person, promised practitioners more immediate progress, and placed them in control of the therapy process.' Hubbard's thought was parallel with the trend of humanist psychology at that time, which also came about in the 1950s. Passas and Castillo write that the appeal of Dianetics was based on its consistency with prevailing values. Shortly after the introduction of Dianetics, Hubbard introduced the concept of the 'thetan' (or soul), which he claimed to have discovered. Dianetics was organized and centralized to consolidate power under Hubbard, and groups that were previously recruited were no longer permitted to organize autonomously."⁴⁰⁷

Even more ambitious and power-seeking than Hubbard was Ewen Cameron, Scottish-born president of the American Psychiatric Association, president of the Canadian Psychiatric Association and President of the World Psychiatric Association. Such a man might have been expected to insist on strictly human and humanitarian standards for his own work. But it was precisely Cameron who introduced *torture* into psychiatry, making Canada, after the Soviet Union and China, the pioneer in the use of psychiatry as an instrument of torture and brain washing in peacetime. If there is an excuse for his behaviour, it is that he was trying to understand the practice of brainwashing used by the Communists on American prisoners in the Korean War. This also explains the CIA's funding of his work.⁴⁰⁸

Nevertheless, his therapeutic methods can in no way be called beneficial for the patient; for, as Naomi Klein writes, "his ambition was not to mend or repair the patients but to re-create them using a method he invented called 'psychic driving'.

"According to his published papers from the time, he believed that the only way to teach his patients new behaviours was to get inside their minds and 'break up old pathological patterns'. The first step was 'depatterning', which had a stunning goal: to return the mind to a state when it was, as Aristotle claimed, 'a writing tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written, a "tabula rasa". Cameron believed he could reach that state by attacking the brain with everything know to interfere with its normal functioning – all at once. It was 'shock and awe' warfare on the mind."⁴⁰⁹

Cameron's favoured methods were electric shock and drugs. Thus in order to "depattern" his patients, he "used a relatively new device called the Page-Russell, which administered up to six consecutive jolts instead of a single one. Frustrated that his patients still seemed to be clinging to remnants of their

⁴⁰⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientology.

⁴⁰⁸ By "coincidence" the CIA also took an interest in Hubbard's Dianetics. For Scientology's links with the CIA, see Alexander Dvorkin's "Scientology and the CIA", *Espionage History Archive*, February 27, 2016.

⁴⁰⁹ Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 31.

personalities, he further disoriented them with uppers, downers, hallucinogens, chlorpromazine, barbiturates, sodium amotal, nitrous oxide, desoxyn, Seconal, Nembutal, Veronal, Melicone, Thorazine, largactil and insulin. Cameron wrote in a 1956 paper that these drugs served to 'disinhibit him [the patient] so that his defenses might be reduced.'

"Once 'complete depatterning' had been achieved, and the earlier personality had been satisfactorily wiped out, the psychic driving could begin. It consisted of Cameron playing his patients tape-recorded messages such as 'You are a good mother and wife and people enjoy your company'. As a behaviourist, he believed that if he could get his patients to absorb the messages on the tape, they would start behaving differently.

"With patients shocked and drugged into an almost vegetative state, they could do nothing but listen to the messages – for sixteen to twenty hours a day for weeks; in one case, Cameron played a message continuously for 101 days.

"In the mid-fifties, several researchers at the CIA became interested in Cameron's methods. It was the start of Cold War hysteria, and the agency had just launched a covert program devoted to researching 'special interrogation techniques'. A declassified CIA memorandum explained that the program 'examined and investigated numerous unusual techniques of interrogation including psychological harassment and such matters as "total isolation" as well as 'the use of drugs and chemicals'. First code-named Project Bluebird, then Project Artichoke, it was finally renamed MKUltra in 1953. Over the next decade MKUltra would spend \$25 million on research in a quest to find new ways to break prisoners suspected of being Communists and double agents. Eight institutions were involved in the program, including forty-four universities and twelve hospitals."⁴¹⁰

Since publication of these methods would have caused a scandal, the CIA preferred to work with Canadian researchers, meeting them at the Ritz hotel in Montreal. One of these was Dr. Donald Hebb, director of psychology at McGill University, who had been given a research grant by Canada's Department of National Defense "to conduct a series of classified sensory deprivation experiments. Hebb paid a group of sixty-three McGill students £20 a day to be isolated in a room wearing dark goggles, headphones playing white noise and cardboard tubes covering their arms and hands so as to interfere with their sense of touch. For days, the students floated in a sea of nothingness, their eyes, ears and hands unable to orient them, living inside their increasingly vivid imagination. To see whether this deprivation made them more susceptible to 'brainwashing', Hebb then began playing recordings of voices talking about the existence of ghosts or the dishonesty of science – ideas the students said they found objectionable before the experiment began.

⁴¹⁰ Klein, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

"In a confidential report on Hebb's findings, the Defense Research Board concluded that sensory deprivation clearly caused extreme confusion as well as hallucination among the student test subjects and that 'a significant temporary lowering of intellectual efficiency occurred during and immediately after the period of perceptual deprivation.' Furthermore, the students' hunger for stimulation made them surprisingly receptive to the ideas expressed on the tapes, and indeed several developed an interest in the occult that lasted weeks after the experiment had come to an end. It was as if the confusion from sensory deprivation partially erased their minds, and then the sensory stimuli rewrote their patterns..."⁴¹¹

These developments in North America paralleled developments in the Communist world, where psychological techniques of "brainwashing" and the planting of conditioned sleeper agents were revealed during the Korean War (as popularized in the 1962 film *The Manchurian Candidate*). This was another indication of the surprising similarities between the Communist and Capitalist worlds, especially in their use of science...

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It is well known that the main schools of psychoanalysis tended to see the root cause of all human unhappiness in neurosis – specifically, sexual neurosis caused by repression. This view was supported by the "scientific" research of Alfred Kinsey on sexual behaviour. Jonathan von Maren writes: "He is known as 'The Father of the Sexual Revolution,' and if you've ever taken a university course on 20th century history, you'll have heard his name: Alfred Kinsey.

"Kinsey was not only the 'father' of the Sexual Revolution, he set the stage for the massive social and cultural upheaval of the '60s, '70s and '80s with his 1948 *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* and his 1953 *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female.*

"These books revealed to a shocked and somewhat titillated population things they had never known about themselves: That between 30-45% of men had affairs, 85% of men had had sex prior to marriage, that a staggering 70% of men had slept with prostitutes, and that between 10 and 37% of men had engaged in homosexual behaviour.

"Much less talked about were his other disturbing 'findings' - an in-depth study on the 'sexual behaviour' of children, as well as claims that nearly 10% of men had performed sex acts with animals (as well as 3.6% of women), and that this number rose to between 40-50% based on proximity to farms. **Got that?**

"Kinsey's research portrayed people as amoral and sex-driven, and is credited as fundamentally changing the way our culture views sex.

⁴¹¹ Klein, op. cit., p. 34.

"But was he right?

"To begin with, the integrity of much of his work has long since been called into question: among his questionable practices, Kinsey encouraged those he was working with to engage in all types of sexual activity as a form of research, misrepresented single people as married, and hugely over represented incarcerated sex criminals and prostitutes in his data.

"But beyond this is the simple fact that Kinsey himself was a pervert and a sex criminal.

"For example, where did he get all of his data on the "sexual behaviour of children"? The answer is nothing short of chilling. Dr. Judith Reisman (whose research has since been confirmed time and time again) explained in her ground-breaking work *Sex, Lies and Kinsey* that Kinsey facilitated brutal sexual abuse to get his so-called research:

"Kinsey solicited and encouraged paedophiles, at home and abroad, to sexually violate from 317 to 2,035 infants and children for his alleged data on normal 'child sexuality.' Many of the crimes against children (oral and anal sodomy, genital intercourse and manual abuse) committed for Kinsey's research are quantified in his own graphs and charts...

"Kinsey's so-called research was simply a quest to justify the fact that he himself was a deeply disturbed man. Dr. Reisman writes, 'Both of Kinsey's most recent admiring biographers confessed he was a sadistic bi/homosexual, who seduced his male students and coerced his wife, his staff and the staff's wives to perform for and with him in illegal pornographic films made in the family attic. Kinsey and his mates, Wardell Pomeroy, Clyde Martin and Paul Gebhard, had 'front' marriages that concealed their strategies to supplant what they say as a narrow pro-creational Judeo-Christian era with a promiscuous 'anything goes' bi/gay paedophile paradise.'

"Got that? The Father of the Sexual Revolution was a sado-masochistic bisexual sex criminal who facilitated the sexual torture of infants and children. His goal was not just to engage in scientific research in order to see where the data took him, but rather, as one of his prominent biographers Michael Jones notes, to launch a crusade to undermine traditional sexual morality. He did so to wild success – Kinsey's influence on sex education and law in the Western world is absolutely staggering..."⁴¹²

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⁴¹² Von Maren, "Alfred Kinsey was a pervert and a sex criminal", *Life Site*, August 25, 2014, https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/alfred-kinsey-was-a-pervert-and-a-sex-criminal.

It is not difficult to see that the sexual and therapeutic revolutions in North America in the 1950s were leading to a new concept of man as a mere animal whose mental life could be erased and recreated at will by men in white coats. Men like Kinsey, Leary, Hubbard, Cameron and Hebb were the high priests of a new atheist religion that sexually abused, drugged and tortured their "patients", all in the name of science and the further "progress" of the human race.

Not coincidentally, in this period the extraordinarily primitive science of psychological behaviourism became dominant in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The whole emotional life of man was reduced to reflexes of an instinctual or learned kind. The high priest of psychological behaviourism was the American B.F. Skinner, whose book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (1971) drastically demeaned the freedom and dignity of man. For determinism was the new orthodoxy. Man was determined by learned reflexes and brain physiology.

Except, of course, the scientist himself. He must be a conditioner and controllers, and not conditioned and controlled, one of the "few conditioners who stand themselves outside morality". As a character in his novel, *Walden Two*, says: "I've had only one idea in my life – the idea of having my own way. 'Control' expresses it – the control of human behavior."⁴¹³

But does this not sound very communist? Indeed, it does. And it should therefore not surprise us to hear Skinner expressing the following sentiment: "Russia after fifty years is not a model we wish to emulate. China may be closer to the solutions I have been talking about, but a Communist revolution in America is hard to imagine..."⁴¹⁴

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And yet the root cause of this move to a purely atheist, animalian anthropology lay, not in science as such, but in profound *religious* changes in Western society as a whole...

For, as Joel J. Miller writes in his 2009 book *The Permissive Society*, "historian Alan Petigny makes the case that the upheavals of the sixties were just manifestations of religious changes from the forties and fifties...

"Petigny describes what he calls the Permissive Turn, a liberalization of values that happened following World War II. Some of it came down to a 'renunciation of renunciation.' The war had demanded a great deal of austerity and self-sacrifice. But with Germany and Japan subdued, it was time to live it up. Americans plowed their prosperity into material self-gratification. But there was more.

⁴¹³ Skinner, in Philip Darrell Collins and Paul David Collins, *The Ascendancy of the Scientific Dictatorship*, New York: iUniverse, 2004, p. 183.

⁴¹⁴ Skinner, in Collins and Collins, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 183.

"At the same time, the culture witnessed a shift in the way we viewed human nature. We swapped the traditional American view, grounded in a certain pessimism inherited from the Protestant understanding of original sin, for the newly refurbished and Americanized psychotherapy.

"Freud was no fan of faith, and the rivalry was both hot and clear in Europe. Not so in America, where advocates such as Joshua Liebman, Carl Rogers, Benjamin Spock, and others presented the benefits of psychotherapy without the thorny, antireligious aspects inherent to Freud's vision. The effect was pronounced. Just two decades after WWII, sociology professor Philip Rieff could *look back* and talk about the *'triumph* of the therapeutic' (emphasis added).

"No such triumph was obvious at the outset. In November 1949, Irving Kristol pointed to the incompatibility of psychotherapy and religion in an article for *Commentary*. The controversy was topical enough—and Kristol's opinion notable enough—that *Time* magazine actually covered his article.

"How could Americans, particularly religious Americans, take psychotherapy's rose and avoid the thorn? The answer, said Kristol, was to shift the conversation away from ultimate questions of truth and toward temporal questions of health and happiness:

"Most clerics and analysts blithely agree that religion and psychoanalysis have at heart the same intention: to help men 'adjust,' to cure them of their vexatious and wasteful psychic habits (lasting despair and anxiety), to make them happy or virtuous or productive. In so far as religion and psychoanalysis succeed in this aim, they are 'true.'

"What's the problem with that? We made truth a question of outcomes. Does *x* make you happy? Then it's probably good. Does *y* make you anxious? Then it's probably bad.

"John Crowe Ransom argued in *God Without Thunder* (1930) that most Americans had already traded away the traditional view of God and replaced it with varying degrees of enthusiasm about science, progress, and the like. Here was the most definitive proof of his thesis. Religion, morality, *even reality* were now questions of self-fulfilment—making truth subjective and traditional truth claims irrelevant and meaningless.

"Over the course of his book, Petigny shows how this mind-set swept the country, the culture, and the churches through the 1950s. 'Americans,' he says, 'were coming to view the self as a boundless reservoir of inherent goodness and potentiality. . . .' According to the new and prevailing view, '[T]he perspective of people who look inward to their hearts for moral guidance provides us with the best hope for the future of mankind.'

"Once self-fulfilment becomes the end towards which individuals are moving, then there is no longer any fixed council or direction to govern any particular individual's choice—only what a person claims will lead to his personal betterment, as only he is entitled to determine. Individual autonomy and self-indulgence trump all else..."⁴¹⁵

With "the gospel of self-fulfilment" as the end, it remained only to decide on means to that end. And the answer was: science, the science of psychology. Psychology told you that you were just an animal, that God, conscience and sin, including original sin, were myths; and that if you couldn't get satisfaction, you simply had to be "reprogrammed"!

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The hunt for the means to "reprogramme" human beings was on...

One of the most alarming aspects of the contemporary sciences, not only of psychology and psychiatry, but also of physics and biology, is that they appear *to rule out the possibility of freewill*. Psychology is unique in denying the existence of its own object, the *psyche* or soul – and therefore, of course, freewill. We have seen how the post-war science of behavioural psychology and psychiatry made a determined effort to reduce all human behaviour to conditioned reflexes, denying the existence of an autonomous inner world of the mind. Combined with biological determinism, it presented a picture of man as a machine, a highly complex but purely material mechanism.

In order to understand the origin of such a fundamental error, we have to distinguish three types of causality: *empirical, human* and *Divine*... Let us begin with *empirical* causality, which is the weakest, most insubstantial form of causality. For we never actually *see* an empirical causal bond. What we see is events of class A being regularly followed by events of class B. We then *infer* that there is something *forcing* this sequence of events, or *making it happen;* and this we call *causality*. But, as David Hume pointed out, we never actually *see* this force, this putative bond uniting A and B.⁴¹⁶

In fact, our only direct experience of causality is when we cause *our own actions*. Thus when I decide to open the door, I have a direct experience of myself making my hand go towards the door-knob and turning it. This experience of causality is quite different from watching events of class A

⁴¹⁵ Miller, "Why the gay marriage debate was over in 1950," June 29, 2015, https://blogs.ancientfaith.com/joeljmiller/why-the-gay-marriage-debate-was-over-in-1950/ ⁴¹⁶ To say that A *causes* B is to take a blind leap of faith. For it posits *an invisible something* that connects A with B. For, as C.S. Lewis writes, "the assumption that things which have been conjoined in the past will always be conjoined the future is the guiding principle not of rational but of animal behaviour. Reason comes in precisely when you make the inference 'Since always conjoined, therefore probably connected' and go on to attempt the discovery of the connection. When you have discovered what smoke is you may then be able to replace the mere expectation of fire by a genuine inference" (*Miracles*, London: Collins, 2012, p. 30).

"causing" events of class B in empirical nature. I do not see the exercise of my will being constantly followed by the opening of doors. I know by direct, irrefutable, non-sensory (what the philosophers call *phenomenological*) experience that the cause of that door opening was *I*. This is the second type of causality, human causality; and our knowledge of it, unlike our knowledge of any empirical causality, is both direct and *certain*. Moreover, I know that my decision to open the door was *uncaused* in the scientific, empirical sense. Even if a man were standing behind me with a gun and ordering me to open the door, this would not take away from the uncaused nature of my action. It might explain *why* I decided to open the door at that moment; but, as the philosophers have demonstrated, to give *the reasons for an action* is not the same as describing the causes of an event; to confuse reasons with causes is a "category mistake". Only if the man with a gun took away my power of decision – that is, hypnotized me to open the door, or took hold of my hand and placed it on the door-knob and then turned my hand, would it be true to say that my action was caused. Or rather, then it would no longer be my action, for my action can only be the free result of *my* will: it would be the action of another person: *he* would be the cause (the uncaused cause) of the action.

Both human and empirical causality are caused by God, Who brings all things, both rational and irrational, into being. Thus it is the Divine Causality which causes events of type A to be followed always (or almost always – the exception is what we perceive to be miracles) by events of type B: He is the Cause of all empirical causation. But Divine Causality is closer to human causality, in Whose image it was made, insofar as It, too, is (a) empirically uncaused, and (b) personal, whereas every empirical cause is (a) empirically caused (because God has caused it to be so), and (b) impersonal.

We experience Divine Causality in moments of grace. It has this effect on human causality that it does not violate the latter's free and uncaused nature; It informs it without compelling it. Thus when a saint speaks under the influence of God's grace, he retains complete control over his own words while submitting to the influence of God's Word. This is incomprehensible within the scientific world-view. But since the scientists cannot see even the empirical causes they postulate, why should this concern us?...

One of the very few Orthodox thinkers who attempted really to come to grips with these issues was the Serbian Bishop Nikolai Velimirovich, who died in exile in America in 1956. A polymath with several doctoral degrees in Western universities, he was well qualified to challenge the underlying assumptions of western thought. One of his most important essays was on the nature of causality; in it he demonstrated that empirical causality as scientists understand it is insubstantial by comparison with the only true, *personal* causality, which belongs only to God, men and the angelic world:-

"One of the fundamental points of doctrine in which our Orthodox Faith differs from all the philosophical systems as well as from some non-Orthodox denominations is the conception of causality, i.e., of causes. Those outside are prompt to call our faith mysticism, and our Church the Church of mystics. By the unorthodox theologians we have been often rebuked on that account, and by the atheists ridiculed. Our learned theologians neither denied nor confirmed our mysticism, for we never called ourselves mystics. So, we listened in wonderment and silence, expecting the outsiders to define clearly their meaning of our so-called mysticism. They defined it as a kind of oriental quietism, or a passive plunging into mere contemplation of the things divine. The atheists of our time, in Russia, Yugoslavia and everywhere do not call any religion by any other name but mysticism which for them means superstition. We listen to both sides, and we reject both definitions of our orthodox mysticism, which is neither quietism nor superstition.

"It is true, however, that contemplative practice - not quietism though - is a recommendable part of our spiritual life, but it is not an all embracing rule. Among the great Saints we find not only the contemplative Fathers of the desert and seclusion, but also many warriors, benefactors, missionaries, sacred writers, sacred artists, and other persons of great activities and a sacrificial mode of Christian life. . . And what is our answer to the atheists who call our mystical Faith superstition? Least of all they have the right to call it superstition since, by denying God and the soul and all the higher intelligences, they are indeed bearers of a thoughtless and nefarious superstition which never existed in the history of mankind, at least not on such a scale and with such fanaticism. Now, while those who speak of our mysticism are unable to give a satisfactory explanation of this word, let us ourselves look to it and explain to them from our point of view how should they understand our so-called mysticism. Our religious mysticism is nothing misty, nothing nebulous, nothing obscure or mystified. It is our clear and perennial doctrine of causality. If we have to call this doctrine by an ism, we may call it personalism.

"Every day and everywhere people talk of causes. They say: 'This is caused by that, and that is caused by this.' That is to say: the next preceding thing, or event, or fact, or accident is the cause of the next succeeding one.

"This is indeed a superficial and short-sighted notion of causality. We don't wonder about this superficiality of some ignorant persons, especially of the busy people of great cities who have little time for deep and calm thinking. But we are astonished to find the same superficiality with the learned and philosophically minded, as the materialists, naturalists and even deists. And because we call their theory of causes naive and fatalistic, they call us mystics. We consider that all those persons, be they ignorant or learned, who believe in natural and physical causes as definite, are fatalists. Both naturalism and materialism are teaching a blind fatalism without a smallest door of escape or a smallest window for sunshine. We Orthodox Christians must resist this blind fatalism, as all Christians should do, and defend our intelligent doctrine of personal causality of and in the world.

"This doctrine means that all causes are personal. Not only the first cause of the world is personal (as the deists think), but personal are all the causes of all things, of all facts, of all happenings and changes in all the world. When we say personal, we mean intelligent, conscious and intentional. Yes, we mean that some sort of personal beings are causing all, or better to say, are the causes of all. That is what personal means. I know that at this my first statement some non-Orthodox would remark: 'That doctrine you are probably drawing from your copious Orthodox tradition, for which we do not care, and not from the Holy Scripture, which we take as the only infallible source of all truths.' To this I answer: no, not at all; this doctrine is so evident in the Holy Scripture, from the first page to the last, that I have no need this time to quote our tradition at all.

"On the first pages of the sacred Bible a personal God is specified as the First cause, or better to say the First Causer of the world visible and invisible. That God the Creator is personal, this is a professed and upheld dogma not only by all Christian denominations, but by some other religions too. We Christians, however, are privileged to know the inner being of God, i.e., God as Trinity in persons and Oneness in essence. We have learned to know this mystery through the momentous revelation in the New Testament. The dogma of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost means that God is trebly personal, yes supremely personal.

"But not God alone is personal. Personal are also the angels, personal is Satan with his perverse hosts of demons, and finally personal are men. If you carefully read the Bible, without the prejudices of so-called 'natural laws' and the supposed 'accidental causes', you will find three causal factors, and all the three personal. They are: God, Satan and Man. They are, of course, not equal in personal attributes, and there is no parity among them. Satan has lost all his positive attributes of an angel of light, and has become the chief enemy of God and Man, but still he has remained a personal being, bent though to do evil. Man, since the original of sin, has darkened his glory and deformed God's image in himself; yet, he has remained a personal being, conscious, intelligent and purposefully active, wavering between God and Satan, with his free choice to be saved by the first or destroyed by the second.

"God is activity itself. Not only does he interfere now and then with His wonders and miracles in the life of men and nations, but He is constantly and unceasingly active in supporting and vivifying His creation. 'Being near to everyone of us', (Acts 17.27) and 'knowing even the thoughts of man' (Psalm 94.11) He eagerly acts and reacts in human affairs: gives or withholds children, gives or withholds good harvest, approves or threatens, grants peace to the faithful and excites war against the devil worshippers. He commands all the elements of nature, fire and water, hail and storms, either to aid the oppressed righteous or to punish the godless. He calls the locust, caterpillars and worms 'my great army' (Joel 2.25), which He orders to devour the food of the sinners. He 'is able to destroy both soul and body in hell' (Matthew 10.28) He knows 'the number of our hairs', and 'not a sparrow shall fall on the ground' without His will and His knowledge. All this is testified by many instances in the Bible. And this is not all. There is no page in the Scripture which does not refer to

God, yea a personal God, His will and His diverse activities. The whole Bible affirms that God is not only the First Causer of the world but also that He is all the time the personal All-ruler - Pantokrator - of the world, as we confirm in the first article of our Creed.

"Another causal factor is Satan, God's adversary, with his hosts of fallen spirits. He is the personal causer of all evil. Ever since his fall as Lucifer from the glory of 'an anointed cherub (Ezekiel 28, Isaiah 14) to the dark pit Hell', he is unceasingly trying to infiltrate evil and corruption into every part of God's creation, specially into man. Envious of God and man, he is the hater of both. Christ called him 'a murderer from the beginning' (John 8.44) and also 'a liar and the father of it [lies]'. He is a mighty ruler of evil and darkness, but still subordinate, unwillingly though, to the all-powerful God. Only with God's permission is he able to harm men and to cause illness, confusion, pain, discord, death and destruction. But the more a person or a people sin against God, the greater power Satan gets over that person or that people. At the Advent of our Lord Jesus Christ the whole world was lying in evil because of Satan's terrible grasp over the bedevilled mankind. The world then was teeming with evil spirits as never before. Therefore, Satan dared to offer Christ all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them as his own. A robber and liar!

"The third causal factor in this world, according to the Bible, is man. With all his littleness and weaknesses man is the greatest prize for which Satan is relentlessly and desperately fighting, and for which God from the beginning was ready to die. Staggering between God and. Satan, man is supported by God and beguiled by Satan, vacillating hither and thither, groping for light, life and happiness in his short span of existence on this planet. Yet, with all his seeming insignificance in this mammoth universe, man is able to change it by his conduct. Confucius said: 'The clouds give the rain or give it not according to men's conduct'. Much more valid is this observation in Christianity with its belief in a personal God, the Giver of rain.

"By his faith and virtues, specially by his obedience to God, man regains the dominion over all the created nature which God in creating him entrusted to him. But by his apostasy and corruption he dethrones himself and comes under the dominion of physical nature and becomes its slave. Instead of commanding he is obeying the mute nature, and fighting it for his mere existence, as you see it still now happening in our own generation. And instead of having God as his only Master, he got two masters over himself, Satan and nature, both tyrannizing him... By his faith and virtue, man could have removed the mountains, tamed the wild beasts, defeated the aggressor, shut the heaven, stopped calamities, healed the sick, raised the dead. And by his sins and vices, specially by his apostasy from God, his only loving and powerful Friend, he could have caused the destruction of cities and civilizations, the earthquakes, floods, pestilence, eclipse of the sun, famine and all the innumerable evils, pleasing Satan and saddening God. Thus, following God man becomes god, and following the devil, he becomes devil. But be he with God or with God's adversary, man has been from the beginning and is now the focus point of this planet and one of the three most important causes of events and changes in the world. And thus, whatever happens on this world's stage, it happens either by God's benevolent will, or by Satan's evil will, or by man through his free choice between good and evil, right and wrong.

"Now, when we mention only these three causal factors: God, Satan, and Man, you should not think of mere three persons, but of terrific forces behind each of them. Behind God - a numberless host of angels of light, so much so that each man and nation has its own angel guardian; behind Satan - a horrible locust swarm of evil spirits, so much so that a whole legion of them are used to torment one single man, that one of Gadara; behind Man, since Christ's emptying of Hades and His Resurrection, there are by now billions of human souls who, from the other world, from the Church Triumphant, by their intercession and love, are helping us, the many millions of Christ's faithful; they are still fighting against the Satanic forces for Christ and our own salvation. For our chief fight in this world is not against natural and physical adversities which is by comparison a small fight befitting animals rather than men, but as the visionary Paul says: 'Against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world' (Ephesians 6.12) i.e., the satanic forces of evil. And we Christians have been, and always shall be, victorious over these satanic forces through Jesus Christ our Saviour. Why through Him? Because love is a greater power than all other powers, visible and invisible. And Christ came to the earth and went down below to the very hellish nest of the satanic hosts to crush them in order to liberate and save men for sheer love of men. Therefore, He could at the end of His victorious mission say: 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth' (Matthew 28, 18) When He says 'all power', He means it literally, all power - in the first place the power over Satan and his satanic forces, then the power over sinners, sin and death. First of all over Satan, the causer of sin and death. 'For this purpose the Son of God was manifested that He might destroy the works of the devil' (I John 3.8) Therefore, we rejoice in our belief that our Lord Jesus Christ is the irresistible Lord. We are acknowledging this belief in every liturgy by stamping the sacred bread for the Holy Communion with the words IC-XC-NI-KA.

"Read and reread the Gospel as much as you like, you will find in Christ's words not the slightest suggestion of natural and physical causes of anything or any event. Clear as the shining sun is Christ's revelation and teaching, that there are only three causal factors in this world: God, Man and Satan. His chief obedience was to His heavenly Father; His chief loving work was the healing of men's bodies and soul, and His chief dispute with the Pharisees was about His power of driving the evil spirits out of men and the forgiving of sins. As to nature and the so-called natural order and laws, He showed an unheard-of absolute dominion and power. He vigorously impressed His followers that they were 'not of the world', but, said He, 'I have chosen you out of the world' (<u>John</u> 15.19). Now, since the Christians are not of this world, they certainly cannot accept the theory of the men of this world about the impersonal, unintelligent and accidental causes of the process of things and events. Also in our liturgical book you find the same three personal causal

factors as in the Gospel. The same in the Life of Saints too. The same in the conviction and consciousness of the masses of our Orthodox people.

"Therefore, whoever speaks of impersonal causes of things, happenings and changes in this world, is limiting God's power, ignoring the powers of darkness, and despising the role and significance of man. The Scripture does not know, and does not mention any impersonal and blindly accidental cause of anything in the world. The Bible teaches us quite clearly, that the causes of all things, facts, events and changes, come from higher personal beings and personal intelligences. And we stick to this teaching of the Holy Book. Therefore we make no concessions to the secular, or scientific theories about impersonal, unintelligent, unintentional or accidental causality in the world. When I say we, I do not think only of the great Fathers of the Church, nor of the Doctors of Divinity, nor of the learned teachers of religion, but also of the masses of our Orthodox people all over the world. Our Orthodox people would not say: a wolf caused the death of somebody's sheep; nor: a falling stone caused the injury of a boy; nor: a tornado was the cause of the destruction of somebody's house; nor: good weather was the cause of an abundant crop. Our people look through the screen of the physical world into a spiritual sphere and there seek the true causes of those events. They always seek a personal cause, or causes. And though this is in accord with the Bible's teaching, some outsiders call us mystics, and our Faith mysticism or superstition. In fact, our mysticism is nothing else than a deeper insight into the spiritual realities, or intelligences, which are personally causing whatever there is or happens, using the natural things and elements only as their instruments, tools, channels, symbols, or signals.

"All this leads us to the following conclusions. First of all, Christianity is a religion not so much of principles, rules and precepts, but primarily and above all of personal attachments, in the first place an affectionate attachment to the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, and through Him to other members of His Church, the living and the dead.

"Secondly, our Orthodox doctrine of personal causality on the whole range of nature and world's history is beyond any doubt the biblical doctrine. It was wholly adopted and explained by the Fathers of the Church, and it is kept lucidly in the consciousness of the Orthodox people.

"The benefits we draw from such personalism in the doctrine of causality are manifold. By it we stir our mind to pierce through the visible events into the realm of the invisible intelligences that caused and dominate the whole drama of the world. It sharpens more than anything else our thinking power, our own intelligence. By it we are constantly made aware of the presence of our Friend, Christ the Saviour, to whom we pray, and also of our arch-enemy, Satan, whom we have to fight and avoid. It helps us enormously towards educating and forming strong personal, or individual, characters. It inspires us with spirit of optimistic heroism in suffering, in self-sacrifice, and in the endurance of martyrdom for Christ's sake beyond description, as testified by our Church history.

"All these and other benefits are not possessed by the follower of the doctrine of impersonal causality; not even the greatest of all benefits - the knowledge of the truth."⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁷ Velimirovich, "The Orthodox Doctrine of Causality", https://stvladimirs.ca/the-orthodoxdoctrine-of-causality-by-bishop-nikolai-velimirovich/?fbclid=IwAR1alp1uJODs-KCH4IXqwmRGzU_0k0eH34OPwiaHlCGmgmvWznKRAmEunn4; http://www.atlantaerbs.com/learnmore/library/TheOrthodoxDoctrineofCausality.html.

III. THE WINDS OF CHANGE (1953-1960)

<u>30. THE SUCCESSORS OF STALIN</u>

"In their first communiqué," writes Revel, "on March 6, 1953, Stalin's successors declared their support for a policy that could guarantee 'the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic.' Why those two words? A month and a half earlier, the Eisenhower-Dulles team had come to office in Washington brandishing the rollback [as opposed to containment] policy they had proclaimed during the election campaign. Stalin's heirs did not know much about the 'imperialists' facing them, and they had forgotten Lenin's observations on the 'deaf-mutes' in the West. Except for Molotov, they had had almost no personal contact with Western political figures. But they did know how fragile the situation was within the Soviet system, including its satellites. They readily perceived how disadvantaged they were by the conjunction of three factors:

• the overall balance of power favoured the West;

• the new team in the White House was calling for a rollback of communism;

• Stalin's death had created a situation of weakness in the Communist sphere, both at the party summit (as witness the trial and execution of First Deputy Premier Lavrenty P. Beria) and among the subject peoples (the East German uprising in June 1953)."⁴¹⁸

The eventual victor in the power struggle that followed Stalin's death was Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, "a flamboyant and tempestuous character, derided by his opponents as boorish, overbearing, and inclined to make blunders. [He] was born in 1894 to a poor peasant family and had only four years of schooling. He worked in mines and factories before joining the Red Army and the Party in the Civil War. His was a typical career path of so many Bolsheviks who hitched themselves to Stalin during the 1920s. Khrushchev rose through the Party ranks as a loyal executioner of Stalin's policies. He was deeply implicated in the mass repressions of the 1930s, first as Moscow Party boss, and then in Ukraine, where he was responsible for the arrest of a quarter of a million citizens."⁴¹⁹

But the early leader in the contest was Beria, who as KGB head since 1938, knew the fragility of the Soviet empire well. He it was who probably initiated the "tidal wave of reforms", in Robert Service's words, that "crashed over Stalin's policies in the USSR in the first week of March 1953. His successors were posthumously opposing him after decades of obedience. No member of the Party Presidium favoured the total conservation of his legacy; even communist conservatives like Molotov and Kaganovich approved some sort of innovation. Changes frustrated by Stalin at last became possible. Yet debate did not flood out into society. It was not allowed to. The last thing the ascendant party leaders wanted was to let ordinary Soviet citizens, or even the lower functionaries of the state, influence what was decided in the Kremlin.

⁴¹⁸ Revel, op. cit., p. 286.

⁴¹⁹ Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, 1891-1991, London: Pelican, 2019, p. 347.

"Molotov and Kaganovich could not prevent the reform projects of Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. Malenkov wanted to increase payments to collective farms so as to boost agricultural production [the peasants had starved since the war]; he also favoured giving priority to light-industrial investment. Khrushchev wished to plough up virgin lands in the USSR and end the decades-old uncertainty about supplies of bread. Malenkov and Beria were committed to making overtures to the USA for peaceful coexistence; they feared that the Cold War might turn into a disaster for humanity. Beria desired a rapprochement with Yugoslavia; he also aimed to withdraw privileges for Russians in the USSR and to widen the limits of cultural self-expression. Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev agreed that public life should be conducted on a less violent and arbitrary basis than under Stalin. They supported the release of political convicts from the labour camps. Quietly they restrained the official media from delivering the customary grandiose eulogies to Stalin. If his policies were to be replaced, it no longer made sense to go on treating him as a demigod..."420

However, reversing the work of "the greatest genius of all times and all nations" is not so easy. In June, 1953 Beria was arrested by his colleagues and after six months' interrogation – shot, paradoxically, "for *'liberalism'* [there were, unforgivably, no executions, no torture, no foreign or domestic state assassinations, no fabricated cases under Beria between April and June 1953], which threatened to wreck the ship of state"...⁴²¹ In July, 1953 Malenkov proposed unmasking Stalin's cult of personality.⁴²² But he was supported only by Khrushchev... Nor, in spite of (highly unLeninist) references to "coexistence" with the West did the successors of Stalin hint at a renunciation of their faith. "If someone believes," said Khrushchev in 1955, "that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle..."⁴²³

Certainly, there was no change in the cruelty of the Communist system, or its indifference to the value of human life. Thus in September, 1954, during military exercises in Orenburg province under the direction of Marshal Zhukov, an atomic bomb was dropped, causing 43,000 military and 10,000 civilian deaths.⁴²⁴

⁴²⁰ Service, *Stalin*, London: Pan, 2004, p. 591.

⁴²¹ Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia, London: Reaktion, 2012, p. 366.

⁴²² Nikolai Nad, "Kto nizverg Stalina. Razvenchanie kul'ta lichnosti nachal ne Khrushchev" (Who overthrew Stalin. The unmasking of the cult of personality was not initiated by Khrushchev), *Argumenty i Fakty*, 21 August, 2013. http://www.aif.ru/society/history/kto_nizverg_stalina_razvenchanie_kulta_lichnosti_nach al_ne_hruschev?utm_source=Surfingbird&utm_medium=click&utm_campaign=Surfingbird. According to another account, he was condemned as a British spy.

⁴²³ Khrushchev, in M.J. Cohen and John Major, *History in Quotations*, London: Cassell, 2004, p. 881.

⁴²⁴ Oleg Leusenko, "Bolee poluveka nazad SSSR sbrosil atomnuiu bombu na svoikh grazhdan: pogibli 43,000 sovietskikh soldat" (More than half a century ago the USSR threw an atomic

(It must be admitted, however, that a similar cruelty was displayed during western atomic tests. The most notorious was probably the British nuclear test on Christmas Island in 1957. An army unit was deliberately placed on the island, some with protective suits and some not. The resultants illnesses and cancers also affected the future children of the soldiers, who were being used as guinea-pigs to study the effects of radiation...⁴²⁵)

In January, 1954, Khrushchev promoted an important development in nationalities policy, when, as Serhii Plokhy writes, he "launched his first major public initiative, a lavish celebration of the tercentenary of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's acceptance of Russian suzerainty. The accompanying ideological campaign illustrated that there were limits to how much the Russian imperial narrative could be combined with the non-Russian national narratives under the banner of Marxist rhetoric and Soviet-style 'friendship of peoples'. The Pereiaslavl Council of 1654, at which the Ukrainian Cossack officers had decided to accept the protectorate of the Muscovite tsar, was now to be officially commemorated, as the *Theses on the Reunification of Ukraine and Russia*, endorsed that year by the Central Committee in Moscow made clear...

"They read: 'By linking their destiny forever with the fraternal Russian people, the Ukrainian people freed themselves from foreign domination and ensured their national development. On the other hand, the reunion of Ukraine and Russia helped considerably to strengthen the Russian state and enhance its international prestige. The friendship between the working people of Russia and Ukraine grew firmer and stronger in the joint struggle against the common enemies – stardom, the serf-owning landlords, the capitalists, and foreign invaders.'

"Thus, an event condemned by Soviet historians as absolutely evil in the 1920s because of its role in strengthening tsardom, and then recast as a lesser evil within the discourse of Russian statism in the 1930s, was now declared wholly positive. By acquiring new territories, the tsars had unwittingly strengthened the ties between the Russian and non-Russian working masses. Soviet propagandists had managed to square the circle: Russian imperialism had finally found a way to use class-based discourse to justify its reappearance in the Soviet Union."⁴²⁶

Plokhy here begs the question whether Soviet imperialism was merely the reappearance of tsarist imperialism and not something radically different. It may be true that Khrushchev was trying to reconcile pre-revolutionary Russian

⁴²⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/mobile/uk/8083327.stm

bomb on its own citizens: 43,000 Soviet soldiers died), *Retrans*24, http://retrans24.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/43-000.html?m=1.

⁴²⁶ Plokhy, Lost Kingdom, London: Allen Lane, 2017, pp. 281-282.

tsarist aims with post-revolutionary Soviet ones in a manner reminiscent of what Putin is trying to do today. But quite the opposite of what Putin was to do sixty years later was the step that Khrushchev now took – the handing over of Crimea from Russia to the Ukraine.

For "the anniversary celebrations were accompanied by a lavish gift presented by the Moscow leadership on behalf of one fraternal people to another – the transfer of the Crimean Peninsula from the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation to that of the Ukrainian republic. On the symbolic level, the transfer was supposed to manifest the level of trust that now existed between the two nations. In practical terms, it means that the authorities in Moscow did not take the differences between them too seriously and believed that ethnocultural issues could and should be subordinated to administrative and economic considerations. The Crimea, which had had difficulty recovering from the devastation of World War II and the Soviet deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944, would benefit from administrative integration with the mainland republic on which it depended for most of its industrial and agricultural resources [notably water]."427

⁴²⁷ Plokhy, op. cit., p. 283.

31. INDIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

According to Henry Kissinger, Nehru's policy of nonalignment between the Capitalist and Communist blocs "was different from the policy undertaken by a 'balancer' in a balance-of-power system. India was not prepared to move toward the weaker side – as a balancer would. It was not interested in operating an international system. Its overriding impulse was not to be found formally in either camp, and it measured its success by not being drawn into conflicts that did not affect its national interests.

"Emerging into a world of established powers and the Cold War, independent India subtly elevated freedom of manoeuvre from a bargaining tactic into an ethical principle. Blending righteous moralism with a shrewd assessment of the balance of forces and the major powers' psychologies, Nehru announced India to be a global power that would chart a course manoeuvring between the major blocs. In 1947, he stated in a message to the *New Republic*, 'We propose to avoid entanglement in any blocs or groups of Powers realizing that only thus can we serve not only [the] cause of India but of world peace. This policy sometimes leads partisans of one group to imagine that we are supporting the other group. Every nation places its own interests first in developing foreign policy. Fortunately, India's interests coincide with peaceful foreign policy and co-operation with all progressive nations. Inevitably India will be drawn closer to those countries which are friendly and cooperative to her.'

"In other words, India was neutral and above power politics, partly as a matter of principle in the interest of world peace, but equally on the grounds of national interest..."⁴²⁸

In time, however, India became less neutral, as was already evident at a conference of Non-Aligned nations held in Bandung, Indonesia in May 1955. As Darwin writes, "The host was Sukarno, the Indonesian president and hero of the anti-colonial revolution. Delegates came from more than twenty-five countries, including the Gold Coast and Cyprus, then both still colonies. Egypt was represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The presence of Nehru and of Chou En-lai, the prime ministers of India and China, lent an added authority to the conference proceedings. The meeting had no formal agenda, but its implicit purpose was to assert the claims of the non-Western world in international politics. Conference resolutions called for more Afro-Asian members in the United National Security Council, denounced all forms of race discrimination, and declared colonialism an evil 'which should speedily be brought to an end'. In a notably conciliatory speech, Chou En-lai insisted that China had no expansionist aims [which was soon shown to be mendacious by China's invasion of Tibet] and was ready to negotiate with the United States. Nehru denounced entry into an alliance with the West as 'an intolerable humiliation for an Afro-Asian country', and NATO as 'one of the most powerful protectors

⁴²⁸ Kissinger, World Order, pp. 202-203.

of colonialism'. Africa and Asia should remain neutral in the conflict of East and West: 'why should we dragged into their quarrels and wars?'

"Behind the speeches of Nehru and Chou En-Lai was a vision of an Asia and Africa in which outside influence would exist only on sufferance... The Asian states would take up the struggle to free the remaining colonized peoples..."429 Such presumption was possible because "the Third World," writes Paul Johnson, "had not yet publicly besmirched itself by invasions, annexations, massacres and dictatorial cruelty. It was still in the age of innocence when it was confidently believed that the abstract power of numbers, and still more of words, would transform the world. 'This is the first inter-continental conference of coloured people in the history of mankind,' said Sukarno in his opening oration. 'Sisters and brothers! How terrifically dynamic is our time!... Nations and states have awoken from a sleep of centuries!' The old age of the white man, which had ravaged the planet with its wars, was dying; a better one was dawning, which would dissolve the Cold War and introduce a new multiracial, multi-religious brotherhood, for 'All great religions are one in their message of tolerance.' The coloured races would introduce the new morality: 'We, the people of Asia and Africa... far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilize what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace.' After that striking phrase, a Lucullan feast of oratory followed. Among those overwhelmed by it all was the black American writer Richard Wright: 'This is the human race speaking,' he wrote..."430

It was perhaps natural for India and China, who between them comprised more than half of the world's population, to seek some kind of "third way" for the Asian nations. But of course neutrality between Communism and Capitalism was impossible... China was firmly in the Communist camp, Nasser was an anti-Western nationalist, Tito remained a communist in spite of his quarrel with Moscow, and most of the Asian nations were tending towards some kind of collectivist, authoritarian system.

India, meanwhile, was making a slow transition from neutrality in the Cold War to becoming pro-Soviet, especially after its 1962 border war with China, while Pakistan grew closer to China. "In 1971, Moscow signed a twenty-five year treaty of peace, friendship, and co-operation with India, and agreed to provide economic, technological and military support."⁴³¹

Jean-François Revel writes: "Between the first conference of nonaligneds in Belgrade in 1961, when the genuinely nonaligned position of Nehru prevailed, and their sixth conference in Havana in 1979, the adjective 'nonaligned' had plenty of time to degenerate into a lie. Just as the choice of Havana as the 1979 conference site and the election of Fidel Castro, Moscow's number-one field executive, as the movement's chairman showed how distorted the ideal of

⁴²⁹ Darwin, op. cit., p. 444.

⁴³⁰ Johnson, *Modern Times*, New York: Harper Perennial, 1990, p. 477.

⁴³¹ Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads*, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 441.

nonalignment had become. At that sixth conference, Marshal Tito, a few months before his death, fought his last battle to block the Sovietization of the movement of which he and Nehru had been the founding fathers. It was a lost fight; with the collapse of the last independent hold-outs, the nonaligned lined up behind the Soviet Union..."⁴³²

Thus, as Montefiore writes, Nehru was a Fabian socialist who "practiced state planning on a scale that paralysed and crippled the economy for decades. In foreign policy, his non-aligned movement, claiming neutrality between the USA and USSR, played into Soviet hands, bringing India far too close to the Soviets, who remained major funders of the Nehru/Congress family well into the 1970s: their KGB station in Delhi was the largest in the world."⁴³³

Nevertheless, India never joined the communist bloc unequivocably. The victory of China in the war of 1962, soon followed by the death of the Socialist Nehru, may have helped this. And in spite of severe strains during the time of the Gandhi dynasty, India has remained the world's largest democracy, firmly within the western sphere of influence. Much as some Indian nationalists may resent this, India's successful rejection of the totalitarian temptation may have been owing in part to its British inheritance.

The same may be said of Pakistan, which has shared in that British inheritance and has remained firmly in the western camp from the beginning – although Pakistan has preferred strong military rulers to India's weak parliamentary system.

Melvyn Bragg writes: "As India approached independence in 1947, many nationalists regarded the English language as the central fact and symbol of oppression. They wanted rid of it and the end of the Raj was supposed to bring the slow death of English in India. The new constitution assumed that it would continue to be used as an official language only until 1965 and then it would be replaced by Hindi.

"It did not happen.

"There are many reasons given for this. Non-Hindi speakers objected to the proposed primacy of Hindi. There were riots in the streets – to reject Hindi and retain English. And, pragmatically, the English language had dug deeply into systems of advancement and status. English gave access to the world; best seen in literature where, since independence, Indian novelists writing in English have made a tremendous contribution not only in India and Britain but in America and throughout the old Commonwealth and been translated all over the world. Yet it is still not straightforward even today. The young novelist Amir Chandhuri, born in Calcutta and brought up speaking Bengali, writes his fiction in English.

⁴³² Revel, How Democracies Perish, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, p. 197.

⁴³³ Montefiore, op. cit., p. 505.

"I think that English has played a double role [he says]. Yes, it has been a language of unification. It has also been the language through which people in India became more self-conscious, and therefore conscious of their differences – from one another, from the English, so it has played this dual role. The English themselves mustn't take too much credit because they didn't know this was happening. It's entirely to the credit of Indians that they used this in this way. In modern Indian history English has been very much at the heart of change. It's a lingua franca but it's also more than that, it's a part of the growth of the indigenous languages, and the modern forms as well. So it has also increasingly been a part of that self-expression of difference – of different identities – which is also very vital to what India is.'

"English absorbed much from India. But India absorbed the whole of English as another of its languages. Today it is spoken fluently by four or five per cent of the population, all of whom speak at least one other language just as fluently and often flick from one to the other scarcely noticing the join. Four to five percent may seem a small proportion, but in a country of India's size this means forty or fifty million people, what Lord Curzon, the viceroy, would have described as the better educated. Beyond that it has been estimated that upwards of three hundred millions have some contact with it and some knowledge of it.

"The Times of India, in English, has trebled the sales of *The Times* of London. Calcutta is garlanded with signs in English. India's writers use it with authority on the world stage in many disciplines: scientific, artistic, political, sociological.

"The Raj quit India more than fifty years ago. English remains and thrives..."434

Englishness – not the language only, but also the culture - remains and thrives, especially the competitive and meritocratic spirit of Victorian England. For India today, having shed most of her socialist baggage, is one of the most competitive, innovative and meritocratic societies in the world (although the problem of lowest caste of the untouchables remains), with well-founded ambitions to become one of the world's great super-powers on a par with China. Paradoxically, India has become more English than the British Raj in the sense that the meritocracy and competitiveness which the British introduced into the Indian civil service has now been extended after the removal of the invisible "glass ceiling" to ambition represented by British control of the highest reaches of the meritocratic ladder.⁴³⁵

 ⁴³⁴ Bragg, *The Adventure of English*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2003, pp. 263-264.
 ⁴³⁵ See Dinesh D'Souza's remarks on this in

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zBVMHtVLNcI.

32. ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE SUEZ CRISIS

As we have seen, in 1953 the CIA worked with the British to overthrow the Iranian nationalist Mossadegh, the Prime Minister of Iran under the Shah. In 1956 a similar situation was brewing in Egypt. The exorbitant profits of the Anglo-French Suez Canal (only \$3 million of the company's annual profits of \$100 million went to the Egyptian government⁴³⁶) elicited a nationalist reaction and the threat of a takeover. Again the Americans intervened. Only this time it was not for, but against the British...

Until the Suez crisis of 1956 it was the British, rather than the Americans, who had made the running in the region, being based in the Canal Zone. As Tombs writes: "Whitehall's ambitions to retain preponderant influence in the Middle East and a degree of leadership in South Asia depended on the military presence in Egypt conceded by a 1936 defence treaty. This gave Britain military bases in the Suez Canal Zone – a territory the size of Wales, with stores, maintenance facilities and airfields, from which they could even, if necessary, bomb southern Russia. Britain had treated Egypt shamefully: not even a colony or a member of the Commonwealth, it was a nominally independent country bullied into submission and used as a mere convenience...."⁴³⁷

Egypt had been an important bone of contention between Britain and Germany in the Second World War. The Nazi Admiral Raeder tried to convince Hitler to seize Gibraltar, which would have given Germany control of the Mediterranean, Egypt, and the Middle East's oil. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler ignored this advice.

After the war Egypt retained its importance for the British, although it was not part of the empire. But the winds of change were blowing in the Arab world...

In 1945 the Arab League was formed with British backing. "The British," writes John Darwin, "intended the League to be a channel of their influence, a way of keeping the Arab states together under a British umbrella. But it might also serve as a vehicle for Arab cooperation to exclude or contain the influence of outside powers. The new geopolitical scene in which Soviet and American power was seen to balance (if not outweigh) that of Britain made this far less unlikely than it would have been before 1939. To many young Arabs, there seemed reason to hope that the post-war world would be a new 'national age'.

⁴³⁶ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 292.

⁴³⁷ Tombs, op. cit., p. 779. Andrew Roberts has a more appreciative opinion of Britain's role in Egypt: "Nowhere, apart from India, was her colonial record brighter. Since 1882,the British protected the Egyptian people from Ottoman oppression, French financial rapacity, Muslim fundamentalist uprisings, corrupt Khedives, Sudanese invasions, attempted military coups and, most recently, Erwin Rommel's Afrika Corps. Modern Egypt was largely created by Lord Cromer, and in every constitutional arrangement made between 1882 and 1954, the Suez canal was treated differently from the rest of the country" (*A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900*, London: Penguin, pp. 60-62).

The false dawn of freedom from Ottoman power after 1918 – which had led instead to Britain's regional overrule – might at last give way to the glorious morning of full Arab nationhood.

"Almost immediately the barriers piled up. The British rejected the 'logic' of withdrawal: instead they dug themselves in. Arguments of strategy... and heavy dependence on oil (still mainly from Iran) made retreat unthinkable. The strategic vulnerability and economic weakness with which Britain had entered the peace (London hoped they were temporary) ruled out the surrender of imperial assets unless (as in India) they had become untenable. In the Middle East, the British still believed that they had a strong hand. Their position was founded on their alliance with Egypt, the region's most developed state, with more than half the population of the Arab Middle East - 19 million out of some 35 million. The long-standing conflict between the Egyptian monarchy and the landlord class gave them enormous leverage in the country's politics. If more 'persuasion' was needed, they could send troops into Cairo from their Canal Zone base in a matter of hours. To improve relations after the strains of war, they now dangled the promise of a smaller military presence. They assumed that sooner or later the Wafd or the king would want to come to terms, because Egypt's regional influence, like its internal stability, needed British support. So, when negotiations stalled, the British stayed put, intending to wait until things 'calmed down'. They could afford to do so - or so they thought. For they could also count on their close political friendship with the Hashemite monarchies in Iraq and Jordan. It was well understood that the cohesion of both states (demarcated by the British in the early 1920s) and the survival of their monarchs (installed by the British at much the same time) rested on the promise of British assistance against internal revolt as much as external attack. To the south and east lay the Persian Gulf, still a 'British lake'. Along its Arab shore lay a string of small states from Kuwait to Oman bound to the British by the promise of protection against their potentially predatory neighbours. At Arabia's southern tip lay an old British base at Aden, and a coastal strip under loose British rule. As if all this was not enough, the British were laying plans for bases in Libya, taken from the Italians and scheduled for self-rule under a British-backed king. It went without saying that the British exerted a prescriptive right to regulate the politics of the whole Middle East region. Diplomatic support in a quarrel between states, the offer of aid, and refusal to do business with an 'unfriendly' government were the classic techniques of quasi-imperial control. The British had played this game for a generation or more. Driving them out was bound to be difficult, divisive and perhaps even bloody.

"To more radical Arabs the solution was obvious. The imperial juggernaut could be beaten only by the collective force of pan-Arab nationalism. A vision of shared Arab nationhood would discredit the bargains the British had made with the rulers and 'big men' in the Arab states. I would challenge the complacency of the landed elite and improve the social conditions that kept Arab life expectancy on a level with Indian. But as yet Arab unity was a distant dream. Ethnic, religious and social divisions – the legacy in part of Ottoman

and European rule - were deeply entrenched. Pan-Arab nationalism had to compete with the endemic hostility between the region's ruling elites. Nationalists in Egypt felt little in common with the other Arab states ('a collection of zeroes', sneered Saad Zaghlul in the 1920s). They dwelt on Egypt's pharaonic glory (encouraged by the great Tutankhamun finds in the 1920s) and regarded themselves as the true custodians of Arab nationalism and culture in their highest form. Egyptian opinion dismissed the Hashemite rulers in Iraq and Jordan as puppets and parvenus, and their claims to leadership of the Arab world as absurd and impudent. The Hashemite kings were equally certain of their historic claim to head the Arab cause: it was they, after all, who had led the rising after 1916 and proclaimed an Arab nation. Their long-standing ambition was a great Hashemite state uniting Syria (lost to the French in 1920) and Palestine with Iraq and Jordan. Their fiercest enmity, returned with interest, was towards the house of Saud. It was the Saudi monarch who had seized the holy places of Mecca and Medina from their Hashemite guardian, and turned Hashemite Hejaz into a province of what became 'Saudi' Arabia. Much of the rivalry between Egypt, the Hashemites and the Saudis was focused on Syria, whose religious and regional conflicts made it a battle ground for influence from outside."438

An important factor in stirring up pan-Arab nationalism was the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies at the hands of Israel in 1948 and, still more, the Palestinian refugee crisis it caused. This brought to the fore the first real leader of the movement, Gamal Nasser.

Earlier, during the Second World War, writes Simon Sebag Montefiore, "hoping for a Nazi victory to overthrow British rule in Egypt, [Nasser] and [his friend] Amer worked to put together a group of like-minded officers. Faced with the UN plan to partition Palestine between Jewish and Arab states, Nasser was tempted to fight on the Arab side and finally got his chance when King Farouk of Egypt, obese, incompetent and debauched, joined the other countries of the Arab League in an attack on the nascent state of Israel. The Egyptians, including Nasser, advanced into the Negev but the young officer witnessed the ineptitude of the king and his officers as well as the lack of equipment and absence of proper preparation.

"By August 1948, Nasser was the deputy commander of Egyptian units surrounded by the Israelis in the so-called Falluja Pocket. It was a formative experience: Nasser was humiliated by the disastrous war effort and on his return he formed with his friend Amer and others the Association of Free Officers. Nasser consulted with the Muslim Brotherhood, but concluded early on that their Islamic programme clashed with his own Arab nationalism. The Free Officers selected General Muhammed Neguib to be their front man.

⁴³⁸ Darwin, op. cit., pp. 453-455.

"When Nasser heard in May 1952 that Farouk was planning to arrest the Free Officers, he launched an almost bloodless coup d'état, allowing the king to depart from Alexandria in his yacht with full honours. The revolutionaries were unsure whether to create a democracy or a military regime. Since Nasser was only a lieutenant-colonel, Neguib became president of the new Egyptian Republic, but real power was in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council, which was effectively controlled by Nasser in his role as deputy chairman.

"In 1954, as Nasser pushed land reforms and demanded that the alarmed British should leave the Suez Canal, he clashed with the more moderate Neguib. But he asserted his confidence by taking real power as prime minister. Nasser's passionate and elegant oratory was already captivating Egyptian audiences. In October, as Nasser addressed a large crowd in Alexandria, a young Muslim Brother tried to assassinate him, but Nasser defiantly and courageously continued his speech...

"On his return to Cairo, Neguib was deposed. Nasser became the unrivalled president, a position he retained for the next fifteen turbulent years. He appointed his crony Amer commander-in-chief of the army before launching a massive crackdown on communists and, above all, the Muslim Brotherhood. He arrested 20,000 of their members and had their leader and ideologue Sayyid Quth executed.

"Henceforth Nasser, with his tall good looks and superb oratory, was immensely popular, but it was his embrace of pan-Arabist nationalism that excited not just Egyptians but the entire Arab world, which was emerging from a century of foreign domination. Nonetheless, he ruled an effective one-party state with the aid of a growing and brutal secret police, backed by an ever more corrupt and oligarchical military junta who swiftly became rich (though he himself had no interest in material matters)..."⁴³⁹

Nasser joined the Non-Aligned (but increasingly Soviet-aligned) Movement. His regime was now viewed with increasing alarm by the West as a threat to vital oil supplies from the Middle East. And both the British and the French Prime Ministers, Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet, saw him as "an Arab Hitler" who must on no account be appeased as Hitler had been appeased...

In 1954 Britain had reluctantly agreed to evacuate her troops from Suez, and in July they left the canal zone. "On 19 July the Americans, increasingly angered by Nasser's attempts to play them off against the Soviets, withdrew funding, which had always seemed highly likely to be forthcoming, for the building of the Aswan dam on the Nile, a major construction project important for national prestige and vital for Egyptian water supplies. The following week Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal..."⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁹ Montefiore, *Titans of History*, pp. 581-583.

⁴⁴⁰ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 73.

The legal and moral arguments over the nationalization of the Canal, which was 40 percent owned by the British, were finely balanced, but there is no doubt that it was a serious blow to the economic, political and military interests, not only of Britain, but of the West as a whole. "Whitehall believed British power in the Middle East was at stake, and with it their Great Power strategy and their supply of cheap oil paid for in sterling, for the Middle East was in the Sterling Area. Whitehall estimated that if Middle Eastern oil had to be bought in dollars, it would cost the economy another \$500m-\$700m annually. Gold reserves would disappear, the Sterling Area would disintegrate, and the defence budget would be unsustainable – 'a country that cannot provide for its own defence is finished,' warned the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office."⁴⁴¹

Robert Blake writes, "In 1955, 14,666 ships passed through the canal; threequarters of them belonged to NATO countries and one-third of them was British. Annually, 70 million tons of oil came through from the Gulf, of which 60 million were in western Europe, constituting two-thirds of the area's total oil imports. It would require twice the tonnage of tankers to bring it round the Cape. In these circumstances western alarm was understandable. Both Britain and France had further reason for perturbation. Nasser's coup would give pan-Arabism a boost everywhere. In Algiers where France was fighting a bitter colonial war fuelled by Egyptian supplies and propaganda, the destruction of Nasser came more and more to be seen as a precondition of victory. Nasser's success also threatened the Baghdad Pact and the remaining pro-British regimes in the Middle East, especially Iraq. The French and British positions were, however, different in one important respect. France had cut her links with the Arab world and was on the very closest terms with Israel..."⁴⁴²

After negotiations and an international conference failed, Britain decided to put the matter to the Security Council. The Russians vetoed the resolution. The British and French now decided on military action together with the Israelis, who were worried by the Soviet-supplied build-up of arms in Syria and Egypt. The result was a disaster, largely because the Americans, as always hostile to European colonialism, pulled the rug from under the feet of the British and French. There was no subterfuge about this: the Americans had been very clearly and consistently warned against the invasion from the beginning. They also refused to help the Israelis: the American-Israeli client relationship did not develop until the late 1960s.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹ Tombs, op. cit., p. 780.

⁴⁴² Blake, The Decline of Power, 1915-1964, London: Granada, 1985, pp. 366-367.

⁴⁴³ Alex von Tunzelmann writes: "It had been widely expected in Britain, France and Israel that the US would not go against Israel in public, but in fact they did – extremely strongly. This was all happening in the week leading up to Dwight D. Eisenhower's second presidential election, too, and it was assumed that he wouldn't stamp on Israel because he would lose the election if he lost Jewish votes in the US. But actually Eisenhower was very clear that he didn't mind

America's attitude to British and French colonialism had changed over the years. It had undoubtedly been sharply negative at first, as Churchill experienced to his chagrin in his conversations with Roosevelt during the war. However, as the Cold War developed and the new colonial powers of the Soviet Union and China threatened Europe and Asia respectively, the Americans came to see the need to keep the British and French on side. So they softened their anti-colonial zeal and decided to help them in some regions. But as the anti-colonialist tide grew stronger, their irritation (to put it no more strongly) with the British and French returned. This was particularly important in the Suez Crisis, when the American refusal to help them led to the destruction of British influence in the Middle East and increased difficulties for the French in Algeria.

But it started well for the western coalition. As Norman Stone writes, "The Israelis staged a very clever operation, carried out with panache. Four Mustangs, flying only twelve feet from the ground, cut Egyptian telephone connections, and a few hundred paratroops secured the essential desert pass. By 5 November the Israelis were on the Canal, occupying also the entrance to the Gulf of Agaba from which their shipping had been banned. It no doubt helped that, on 31 October, the British bombed Egyptian air bases. The day before, Eden had told the House of Commons that the Israelis and Egyptians would be told to stop while an Anglo-French force occupied the Canal Zone. He even tried to claim that this was not 'war', but 'armed conflict', and of all absurdities suspended deliveries of arms to Tel Aviv. Almost at once, problems emerged. The dollar reserves were declining, and in any case mobilization was a very slow business: the British had put resources into nuclear weaponry, and had run down the effectiveness both of their army and of their navy. They could not get troops to the Suez area inside a month, and though they did have troops at a base in Libya, they shrank from using these, for fear of offending wider opinion. In fact, the Chiefs of Staff objected to an immediate action, threatening resignation: they were just not ready. A British force did eventually leave from Malta and Cyprus - bases both too far distant, given that speed was so essential: the world, confronted by the fact on the ground of an immediate occupation, might have accepted it (as Dulles [the American foreign secretary] later said, 'Had they done it quickly, we'd have accepted it' and Eisenhower shook his head: 'I've just never seen Great Powers make such a complete mess'). Four days' delay occurred, while British and American diplomats had a public wrangle. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Mountbatten, showed his usual instinct for the possible, and was only narrowly stopped from resigning as he sensed the unfolding fiasco. The Americans became incensed at being told such obvious lies by men whom they imagined they could absolutely trust, and as the Anglo-French force steamed forth, the American fleet in the area disrupted its radio communications and used submarines to shadow it. Then disaster went ahead. The Canal was blocked by the Egyptians,

about losing the election, he just wanted to do the right thing" (BBC History Magazine, September, 2016, pp. 66-67).

and oil imports dwindled, prices rising. Junior Foreign Office people threatened mass resignation. The Americans at the United Nations denounced the expedition, and that body produced a resolution in which all countries but a faithful few condemned the British and French: Eden even received a letter from Moscow 5 November, vaguely threatening retaliation, just as the paratroops at last landed. That was bluster, but a further move was not bluster. The pound sterling was an artificially strong currency, and now the Americans refused to support the pound. It fell - reserves dropping by \$50m in the first two days of November, and by 5 per cent of the total in the first week. At that rate, there would be none left by the early weeks of 1957. The end was humiliating, as the American Secretary of State told the United Nations that he could not support his allies. Just as he said so, the landings at Port Said finally occurred on 5 November, but by then it was far too late, and a ceasefire had to follow by the evening of the next day. The broken Eden retired ill to the house on Jamaica where Ian Fleming wrote his James Bond books - one imperial fantasy meeting another. The conclusion at once drawn in London was that never again would the Atlantic link be risked..."444

There were major consequences for the French also. They had joined in the assault on Nasser largely because he was stirring up Arab nationalism in their Algerian and North African colonies. Now they faced a full-scale insurrection in Algeria. This was only brought to an end eight years later, when a new president, General de Gaulle, using a new constitution, recognized Algeria's independence, leading to the exodus of one million French settlers. The war in Algeria had cost 30,000 French lives (the war in Vietnam, which ended in a similar way in 1954, had cost 90,000 lives).

Some commentators, such as Kissinger, strongly criticized the American decision. The failure to drive out Nasser not only meant the sharp decline of Western influence in the Middle East, but also its replacement by Soviet influence and arms...

Again, the pro-Eden historian Andrew Roberts has pointed out that "If the Suez operation had succeeded, Nasser would probably have fallen as many discredited anti-Western adventurers have before and since. This would not have preserved Britain's status indefinitely, but it would have slowed the scuttle of the Western colonial powers from Africa and Asia. Over-hasty decolonisation, which brought vicious civil wars and dictatorships to much of Africa over the next three decades, might have been avoided. Had the 'informal empire' system, by which American and British companies shepherded the Arab oil economies towards mutually beneficial co-operation, not been dealt such a blow at Suez, the vicious oil price hikes which did so much to dislocate the Western economies in 1973 might have been blunted or even prevented. In October 1973, a barrel of oil cost \$3.02; by December, it was \$11.65, because OPEC suddenly quadrupled oil princes virtually overnight. The result was a

⁴⁴⁴ Stone, op. cit., pp. 141-142. Churchill had advised Eden on leaving the premiership in 1955: "Never be separated from the Americans."

huge economic downturn to the West, and disastrous ripple effects for the rest of the world.

"There was nothing inevitable about Muslim fundamentalist and Arab nationalist victories in Iran, Iraq and Libya in the Sixties and Seventies. Britain had regularly put down such revolts, such as those of Arabi and Khalifa, ever since Gladstone's original invasion of Egypt in 1882. Yet after 1956 she was in a far weaker position to protect Arab rulers from revolution. The coup in Baghdad on 14 July 1958 saw the murders of both King Faisal II and Nur-es-Said, within two years of their advice to Eden to 'hit Nasser hard and quickly'. The subsequent history of Iraq, and especially her recent history, would have been very different if Nasser had been toppled.⁴⁴⁵

"There is even the tantalising possibility that the Eisenhower Administration privately wanted Nasser overthrown and was only criticising Britain and France in public because of electoral considerations and what was happening in Hungary. On 18 November, only days after Eden had called off the military operation, Selwyn Lloyd and the British Ambassador to Washington visited Dulles in hospital, who asked him: 'Selwyn, why did you stop? Why didn't you go through with it and get Nasser down?' Lloyd, with commendable restraint under the circumstances, answered: 'If you had so much as winked at us we might have gone on.' Yet wink had come there none."⁴⁴⁶

Darwin writes: "Suez signalled the end of British ambition to manage the politics of the whole Arab world. It created a vacuum of great-power influence. It was the moment to forge a new Middle East order. Nasser stood forth as an Arab Napoleon. His prestige was matchless: he was the *rais* (boss). With its large middle class, its great cities and seaports, its literature and cinema, its journalists and teachers, Egypt was the symbol of Arab modernity. Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism (formally inscribed in Egypt's new constitution) chimed with a phase of sharp social change in most Middle Eastern states. To the new urban workers, the growing number of students, the expanding bureaucracy, the young officer class, it offered a political creed and a cultural programme. It promised an end to the Palestinian grievances, through the collective effort of a revitalized nation. Within less than two years of his triumph at Suez, Nasser drew Syria into political union, to form the United Arab Republic. The same year (1958) saw the end of Hashemite rule in Iraq. Nasser still had to reckon with American power (the United States and Britain intervened jointly to

⁴⁴⁵ Thus when the nationalist revolution took place in Iraq in 1958, "plans for dealing with Baghdad were drawn up, with a committee appointed in the US to look at 'overt or covert means' of avoiding 'a Communist takeover in Iraq'. Limitations in the source material make it difficult to know how much involvement, if any, the CIA has in an attempted coup to remove Qasim, the nationalist Prime Minister who had deposed the Iraqi monarchy, that was staged towards the end of 1959. One of those involved, who grazed his shin during the confusion, later used his participation to near-mythical effect to show his resolve and personal bravery. His name was Saddam Hussein..." (Frankopan, *Silk Roads*, p. 429) (V.M.)

⁴⁴⁶ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 431-432.

prevent the overthrow of Jordan and Lebanon by pro-Nasser factions⁴⁴⁷). But American fears of rising Soviet influence and Nasser's opposition to Communism allowed a wary rapprochement. It looked indeed as if Nasser had achieved a stunning double victory. He had displaced the British as the regional power in favour of a looser, more tolerant American influence. He had made himself and Egypt the indispensable partners of any great power with Middle East interests. Pan-Arab solidarity under Egyptian leadership (the new Iraqi regime with its Communist sympathies had been carefully isolated) opened vistas of hope. It could set better terms with the outside powers. It could use the oil weapon (oil production was expanding extremely rapidly in the 1950s). It might even be able to 'solve' the question of Palestine.

"But, as it turned out, the Middle East's decolonization fell far short of this pan-Arab ideal. Nasser might have hoped that the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf (especially Kuwait) would embrace his 'Arab socialism' and throw off their monarchs. But the British hung on in the Gulf and backed its local rulers against Nasser's political challenge. Secondly, the pan-Arab feeling on which Nasser relied faced a powerful foe. In the early post-war years the new Arab states seemed artificial creations. The educated Arab elite moved easily between them. So did their ideas. State structures were weak, and could be easily penetrated by external influence. By 1960 this had begun to change. New 'local' elites began to man the states' apparatus. Every regime acquired its *mukhabarat* – a secret police. The sense of national differences between the Arab states became clearer and harder: the charismatic politics of Nasser' pan-Arabism faced an uphill struggle. His union with Syria broke up after three years. Thirdly, the Israeli state proved much more resilient than might have been hoped, and its lien on American sympathy showed no sign of failing: if anything, it was growing steadily stronger by the early 1960s. Fourthly (and largely in consequence), the pan-Arabist programme could not be achieved without help from outside. The search for arms, aid and more leverage against Israel (and their own local rivalries) drew the Arab states into the labyrinth of Cold War diplomacy. Lastly, a twist of geological fate placed the oil wealth of the region in the states least inclined to follow Cairo's ideological lead: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Britain's Gulf protectorates. Nor did oil become (as coal had once been for Britain) the dynamo of social and industrial change. In fact Arab prosperity (or the prospect of it) seemed grossly dependent on an extractive industry over which real control lay in foreign hands - the 'seven (multinational) sisters' who ruled the world of oil. The second catastrophe of the 1967 Six Day War, fought between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria, was a savage reminder that mineral wealth was not the same as power, and that oil dollars did not mean industrial strength. By 1970, the year of Nasser's premature death, the promise of post-imperial freedom had become 'the Arab predicament'."448

⁴⁴⁷ Britain also intervened in Oman in 1959 and Kuwait in 1961. (V.M.)

⁴⁴⁸ Darwin, op. cit., pp. 458-460.

33. DECOLONIZATION: (1) FRENCH AND DUTCH COLONIES

Decolonization turned out to be a much more ambiguous affair than the optimists, imbued with "the Bandung spirit", expected. "The coming of political independence," writes Niall Ferguson, "has brought prosperity only to a small minority of former colonies. And although the former imperial powers no longer fight one another, decolonization has in many cases been followed by recurrent conflict between newly independent states and, even more often, within them. This has been the great double disappointment of the sixty years since the end of World War II. Nor has the disappointment ended there. Self-determination was supposed to go hand in hand with democracy. But decolonization has often led not to democracy but, after the briefest of interludes, to indigenous dictatorship. Many of these dictatorships have been worse for the people living under them than the old colonial structures of government: more corrupt, more lawless, more violent. Indeed, it is precisely these characteristics that explain why standards of living have actually worsened in many sub-Saharan countries since they gained their independence..."449

The great opportunity for the anti-colonialists came with the end of World War Two, as colonial subjects in many regions saw their chance to liberate themselves. Among these were the Indians in British India, the Algerians in French Algeria, the Vietnamese in French Indo-China, and the Javanese in the Dutch East Indies.

However, the colonialists surrendered power with different degrees of willingness.

Thus, as Mark Mazower writes, "Being subjected to Nazi violence appears to have made [the French] more rather than less inclined to inflict imperial violence of their own: French forces killed up to 40,000 Algerians in the aftermath of the Setif uprising in May 1945, and left perhaps as many as 100,000 dead in Madagascar in 1947.⁴⁵⁰

"Decolonization, for all the efforts of the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, remained off the European political agenda until forced back as nationalists raised the costs of hanging on to the colonies."⁴⁵¹ For outside, no less than inside Europe, there could be no return to the political status quo ante the war: the nationalist forces determined to throw them out were simply too strong. When the colonialist powers finally understood this, decolonization proceeded at a rapid rate.

⁴⁴⁹ Ferguson, *Colossus*, London: Allen Lane, 2004, p. 173.

 ⁴⁵⁰ R.T. Howard, "Revolt in Madagascar, 70 Years On", *History Today*, April, 2017, pp. 4-5.
 Johnson (*Modern Times*, New York: Harper Perennial, 1990, p. 507) gives 80,000 deaths. (V.M.)
 ⁴⁵¹ Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century*, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 213.

And so "the long age of empire," continues Mazower, "begun by Portugal and Spain in the fifteenth century, came to an end in the middle of our own. After the Second World War, itself a defeat for German imperial ambitions, the remaining European powers reluctantly divested themselves of their colonies too. The speed varied, but overall the process of decolonization was incredibly fast – a matter of decades – set against the lengthier rhythms of imperial conquest and consolidation. Whatever Marxist theorists of neo-imperialism may have felt – and it is true that Western economic influence did *not* in general decline after decolonization – the political act of dismantling empires was an act of tremendous significance.

"Explaining the causes of decolonization – and especially its speed – has occupied historians ever since. Several points have become clearer. First, empire did not, on the whole, pay; to be more specific, while it offered huge profits to some individuals and companies, it burdened the treasuries of most imperial powers. Thus the exploitation of colonial peoples are not incompatible with net losses to taxpayers at home. Second, imperial powers were rarely forced to retreat as a direct result of military insurrection – Algeria was the exception not the rule. Insurgencies could usually be squashed; the problem was at what cost in lives and money. Nationalist historians like to argue that brave resistance fighters threw off the shackles of imperial rule; in practice, the warders in Whitehall and Paris usually decided when to close down (or unlock) the prison and retire.

"Their decision was a compound of considerations – financial, military, and politico-ideological. Imperial powers always had a choice whether or not to resort to force to uphold their rule. When they did – like the French in Algeria and Vietnam or the Portuguese in southern Africa – they often ended up jeopardizing political stability at home. Increasingly, in the post-war era, they chose not to do so. One reason, of course, was that they came to realize that military domination was an expensive and clumsy way of getting what they wanted. Another for the Western powers was that their continued grip on empire suited neither their patron, the United States, not their own domestic publics, who were chiefly concerned about prosperity inside a new Europe. The glamour of empire looked increasingly tarnished, its morality and rationality thrown into question..."⁴⁵²

"The result," writes Ferguson, "was a leap in the number of independent states in the world, which more than doubled. In 1920 there were 69 sovereign states in the world. By 1950 the number had risen to 89, and in 1995, by which time the Russia [Soviet] empire had finally fallen apart, there were 192, with the two biggest increases coming in the 1960s (mainly Africa, where no fewer than 25 new states were formed between 1960 and 1964) and the 1990s (mainly Eastern Europe)."⁴⁵³

⁴⁵² Mazower, op. cit., pp. 382-383.

⁴⁵³ Ferguson, *Colossus*, p. 173.

The first to surrender were the Dutch. J.M. Roberts writes: "The grant of representative institutions by the Dutch in Indonesia before 1939 had not checked the growth of a [Javanese] nationalist party, and a flourishing communist movement had appeared by then, too. Some nationalist leaders, among them one Achmed Sukarno, collaborated with the Japanese when they occupied the islands in 1942. They were in a favourable position to seize power when the Japanese surrendered, and did so by proclaiming an independent Indonesian republic before the Dutch could return. Fighting and negotiation followed for nearly two years until agreement was reached for an Indonesian republic still under the Dutch Crown; this did not work. Fighting went on again, the Dutch pressing forward vainly with their 'police operations' in one of the first campaigns by a former colonial power to attract the full blast of communist and anti-colonial stricture at the United Nations. Both India and Australia (which had concluded that she would be wise to conciliate the independent Indonesia which must eventually emerge) took the matter to the Security Council. Finally the Dutch gave in. The story begun by the East India Company of Amsterdam three and a half centuries before thus came to an end in 1949 with the creation of the United States of Indonesia, a mixture of more than a hundred million people scattered over hundreds of islands, of scores of races and religions. A vague union with the Netherlands under the Dutch Crown survived, but was dissolved five years later..."454

"The Dutch left, taking 83 per cent of the mixed races with them. The Chinese became an unrepresented and increasingly persecuted minority. The non-Javanese majority, many of them in primitive tribal confederations, found themselves colonial subjects of a Javanese empire named 'Indonesia'.

"Sukarno had no more moral mandate to rule 100 millions than Nehru had in India; rather less in fact. He too was devoid of administrative skills. But he had the gift of words. Faced with a problem, he solved it with a phrase. Then he turned the phrase into an acronym, to be chanted by crowds of well-drilled illiterates. He ruled by *Kontseptsi*, concepts. His party cadres painted buildings with the slogan 'Implement President Sukarno's Concepts'. His first concept in 1945 was Pantja Sila, or the Five Fundamental Principles: Nationalism, Internationalism (Humanitarianism), Democracy, Social Prosperity, Belief in God. These were 'the Essence of the Indonesian Spirit'. The cabinet was NASIROM, uniting the three main streams of the 'revolution': Nasionalisme, Agama (religion), and Komunisme. The constitution was USDER. His political manifesto was MANIPOL. A cabinet coalition was *gotong-rojong*, 'mutual help'. Then there were *musjawarah* and *mufakat*, 'Deliberation leading to Consensus' and 'functional representation' (his term for corporatism). Dissatisfied with party government, he made a 'Bury the Parties' speech, followed by the introduction of what he termed 'guided democracy' or Demokrasi Terpimpin.

⁴⁵⁴ Roberts, *History of the World*, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, pp. 789-790.

This introduced a 'Guided Economy' or *Ekonomi Terpimpin* which expressed 'Indonesian identity', *Kepribadian Indonesia*. He felt himself called to do the guiding or, as he put it, 'President Sukarno has called on Citizen Sukarno to form a government'.

"As Sukarno's internal difficulties mounted in the 1950s, he spent more time and words on foreign matters. He spoke of 'Free and active neutralism'; then of the dichotomy of 'old established' and 'new emerging forces'; then of the 'Djakarta-Phnom-Penh-Peking-Pyonyang Axis'. He harassed his Chinese subjects. He attacked the International Boy Scout movement. One of his axions was 'A Nation Always Needs an Enemy'. So he introduced another Kontsepsi, 'Greater Indonesia', which meant expansion into Dutch New Guinea, which he re-christened West Irian, Malaysia, Portuguese Timor and the Australian territories. For this purpose he invented the term 'confrontation', coined the phrase Ganjang Malaysia, 'Crush Malaysia' and developed a technique of staging 'controlled demonstrations' outside foreign embassies, occasionally letting them become 'over-enthusiastic' (as in 1961 when the British Embassy was burned down). The crowd was given a slogan for every occasion. For foreign abuse there was NEKOLIM ('Neo-Colonialism, Colonialism and Imperialism'). When foreign aid was cut off or he was criticized by the UN there was BERDIKARI ('standing on one's own feet'). 1962, when he got hold of West Irian, was 'the year of triumph'; 1943, when he failed with Malaysia, was 'the year of living dangerously'. The last, Tahun Vivere Peridoloso, and his stock RESOPIM ('Revolution, Indonesian socialism, natural leadership') reflect the curious amalgam of Dutch Indonesian, French, Italian and English words (and ideas) with which Sukarno kept his tottering empire going.

"If anyone believed in living dangerously, it was the talkative, hyperactive, pleasure-loving Sukarno. Practising multiracialism, he acquired a notably varied collection of wives and mistresses, and extended his research still further on his numerous foreign jaunts. The Chinese secret police filmed him in action and so preserved his sexual Kontsepsi for posterity. Khrushchev, already briefed in this respect by private Tass reports, was still deeply shocked, on his visit in 1960, to see the President chatting gaily with a naked woman. But as the 1960s progressed, the Indonesian economy moved closer to collapse. The virtual extinction of the Chinese minority destroyed the internal distribution system. Food rotted in the countryside. The towns starved. Foreign investment vanished. Apart from oil, which still flowed, industry was nationalised and slowly subjugated under a rapacious bureaucracy. By autumn 1965 foreign debt amounted to over \$2,400 million, and credit was exhausted. Sukarno had run out even of slogans. Not knowing what to do, Sukarno appears to have given the go-ahead to a *coup* by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

"The *putsch* took place in the early hours of 1 October. The plan was to destroy the leadership of the armed forces. General Abdul Yam, the Army Chief of Staff, and two other generals were shot on the spot. The Defence Minister, General Nasution, escaped by climbing over the wall of his house,

though his daughter was murdered. Three other generals were capture and then tortured to death, in ritual fashion, by the women and children of the PKI: their eyes were gouged out and their genitals sliced off, then their bodies thrown into the Lubang Buaja, the Crocodile Hole. The events were later investigated by a special military tribunal, whose voluminous transcripts leave no doubt about Communist guilt. But the movement, termed Gestapu, was a failure. General Suharto, the Strategic Reserve Commander, took over. A fearful retribution followed. The revenge killings began on 8 October when the PKI Djakarta headquarters was burned. The massacres were organized in the local collective fashion, so that all were equally involved in responsibility, and entire families explated the guilt. It was one of the great systematic slaughters of the twentieth century, the age of slaughter. The toll may have been as high as 1 million though the consensus of authorities puts in the region of 200,000 to 250,000. Sukarno, under house arrest in his palace, repeatedly but impotently called for an end to the killing, for the dead were essentially his supporters. But he was ignored and his offices gradually stripped from him by a process of slow political torture. At each progressive stage in his degradation, one of his wives left him, and only one remained when he died, of kidney disease, on 21 June 1970, forgotten and speechless..."⁴⁵⁵

A slightly different take on Sukarno, highlighting his position in the Cold War, is given by Naomi Klein, who calls him "the Hugo Chavez of his day (though minus Chavez's appetite for elections). Sukarno enraged the rich countries by protecting Indonesia's economy, redistributing wealth and throwing out the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which he accused of being facades for the interests of Western multinationals. While Sukarno was a nationalist, not a Communist, he worked closely with the Communist Party, which had 3 million active members. The U.S. and British governments were determined to end Sukarno's rule, and declassified documents show that the CIA had received high-level directions to 'liquidate President Sukarno, depending upon the situation and available opportunities'.

"After several false starts, the opportunity came in October 1965, when General Suharto, backed by the CIA, began the process of seizing power and eradicating the left. The CIA had been quietly compiling a list of the country's leading leftists, a document that fell into Suharto's hands, while the Pentagon helped out by supplying extra weapons and field radios so Indonesian forces could communicate in the remotest parts of the archipelago. Suharto then sent out his soldiers to hunt down the four to five thousand leftists on his 'shooting list' as the CIA referred to them; the U.S. embassy received regular reports on their progress. As the information came in, the CIA crossed names off their lists until they were satisfied that the Indonesian left had been annihilated. One of the people involved in the operation was Robert J. Martens, who worked for the U.S. embassy in Jakarta. 'It really was a big help to the army,' he told the journalist Kathy Kadane twenty-five years later. 'They probably killed a lot of

⁴⁵⁵ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 478-480.

people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.'

"The shooting lists covered the targeted killings; the more indiscriminate massacres for which Suharto is infamous were, for the most part, delegated to religious students. They were quickly trained by the military and then sent into villages on instructions from the chief of the navy to 'sweep' the countryside of Communists. 'With relish,' wrote one reporter, 'they called out their followers, stuck their knives and pistols in their waistbands, swung their clubs over their shoulders, and embarked on the assignment for which they had been hoping. In just over a month, at least half a million and possibly as many as 1 million people were killed, 'massacred by the thousands', according to *Time*."⁴⁵⁶

In 1975 Suharto invaded and annexed East Timor, Indonesia's eastern neighbour. Some calculate that over the next two decades as many as 200,000 people died as a direct or indirect result of the invasion.

Independence under UN supervision was restored to East Timor in 1999.457

The coup in Indonesia was relevant to the war in Vietnam, which was taking place at the same time. They demonstrated, first, that the "domino effect" did not operate if the leader of the country was strong and ruthless enough. And secondly, they were a timely reminder that the war against Communism, while necessary, was no simple conflict between good and evil, but without very wise and careful planning could very well come to stain the hands and consciences of the anti-communists no less than those of the communists...

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"For a time the French in Indo-China seemed to be holding on better than the Dutch. That area's wartime history had been somewhat different from that of Malaysia or Indonesia because although the Japanese had exercised complete military control there since 1941 French sovereignty was not formally displaced until early 1945. The Japanese had amalgamated Annam, Cochin-China and Tongking to form a new state of Vietnam under the Emperor of Annam and as soon as the Japanese surrendered, the chief of the local communist party, the Viet Minh, installed himself in the government place at Hanoi and proclaimed the Vietnam republic. This was Ho Chi Minh, a man with long experience in the communist party and also in Europe [one of the founders of the French Communist Party]. The revolutionary movement quickly spread. It was soon evident that if the French wished to re-establish themselves it would not be easy. A large expeditionary force was sent to Indo-China and a concession was made in that the French recognized the republic of

⁴⁵⁶ Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 67. Cf. Christopher Hale, "Indonesia's Killing Fields", *History Today*, August, 2018, pp. 104-105.

⁴⁵⁷ https://www.britannica.com/place/East-Timor. In 1995 the Clinton administration welcomed Suharto as "our kind of guy".

Vietnam as an autonomous state within the French Union. But now there arose the question of giving Cochin-China separate status and on this all attempts to agree broke down. Meanwhile, French soldiers were sniped at and their envoys were attacked. At the end of 1946 there was an attack on residents in Hanoi and many deaths. Hanoi was relieved by French troops and Ho Chi Minh fled.

"Thus began a war in which the communists were to struggle essentially for the nationalist aim of a united country, while the French tried to retain a diminished Vietnam which, with the other Indo-Chinese states, would remain under the French Union. By 1949 they had come round to including Cochin-China in Vietnam and recognizing Cambodia and Laos as 'associate states'. But new outsiders were now becoming interested. The government of Ho Chi Minh was recognized in Moscow and Peking..."⁴⁵⁸

France's desire to hold on to her colonies, writes Max Hastings, "derived in significant measure from its humiliation in the Second World War... 'Without the empire [said a black delegate from Guyana, Gaston Mannerville], France today would be no more than a liberated country... Thanks to her Empire, France is a victorious county.' Successive revolving-door governments of the Fourth Republic proved feeble in everything save a willingness to deploy force in France's overseas possessions, with a ruthlessness seldom matched by the Soviets..."⁴⁵⁹

The French Empire in Indo-China, writes Brogan, "was destroyed beyond possibility of restoration by the Japanese conquest in the Second World War. This was so clear at the time to men on the spot, and was so much in accord with the repeatedly affirmed policy of Franklin Roosevelt, who disliked all European imperialisms, that the American representatives in Indo-China collaborated quite openly with Ho Chi Minh at the end of the war, in the expectation that he would soon be recognized as the ruler of an independent Vietnam. The French, however, deemed otherwise. National vanity and national obstinacy bred in them the illusion that they could repossess Indo-China, and General de Gaulle, the head of the French government at the time (1944-6), committed his country to the attempt, which was persisted in even when after the General's sudden abdication in January 1946. His successors immediately came up against the problem which should have made them abandon the policy: France, shattered by the Second World War and its aftermath, was simply not strong enough to subdue her former subjects; nor was it clear what the French people would gain even if the impossible undertaking succeeded. Not for nine years, however, was any French government brave enough to acknowledge the inevitable. Instead ministers looked about for ways of entangling the United States, with its apparently limitless resources, in their enterprise."460

⁴⁵⁸ Roberts, *History of the World*, p. 790.

⁴⁵⁹ Hastings, *Vietnam*, London: William Collins, 2019, p. 14.

⁴⁶⁰ Brogan, A History of the United States, p. 647.

They succeeded in this by convincing them that Indo-China was the next "domino" about to fall to the international communist conspiracy. To what extent was this true?

Ho Chi Minh, there is no doubt, was a communist – and not just recently. He was present at Lenin's funeral in 1924 and was a member of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in the same year. Moving to China, he founded the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League. In 1930 he went to Hong Kong, where he founded the Vietnamese Communist Party. Put on trial by the British, he fled to Moscow, where he remained until 1938.⁴⁶¹

But he was never a pawn of either the Soviets or the Chinese, however much he enjoyed their military and diplomatic support. For Ho and his men, having first defeated the French colonial masters of his country (in 1954), went on to repeat this feat against the Americans (in 1975) to a significant degree *on their own*, without the direct participation of the troops of either Communist superpower, thereby proving that the world revolution could sustain itself anywhere provided there were sufficient local grievances. Thus the Chinese, who controlled Vietnam until 938 and periodically thereafter, did not intervene in this conflict, unlike in the Korean War, until the Vietnamese had won.

Ho was able to do this by a first appealing to the nationalist feelings of the Vietnamese against all foreign occupying powers and then exercising the most brutal terror within the territories he controlled – the same formula that had carried the Soviets to victory in 1917-22.

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For, as Revel writes, "the Communists excel in converting ingrained feelings, such as nationalism, and such humanitarian causes as combating racism into instruments for furthering totalitarian expansion, although when they are in power they respect neither the national independence of the countries they control, nor human rights."⁴⁶² So whether Ho was primarily a communist or a nationalist was in a sense immaterial: the end result in either case was terror and death on a massive scale. But for the Americans the distinction was important, and they decided to support the French against Ho because they believed (rightly) that he was part of the international communist conspiracy.

An important ideological weapon successfully employed by Ho was his exploitation of the West's hypocrisy in relation to its own ideals. Thus in 1945 he quoted the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of Human Rights as "undeniable truths".

⁴⁶¹ Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2013, pp. 29-31.

⁴⁶² Revel, How Democracies Perish, 1985, p. 144.

"Nevertheless," he went on, "the French imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fellow citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice. In the field of politics, they have deprived our people of every democratic liberty..."⁴⁶³ This was true, and so long as the western colonial powers clung on to colonies which they had stolen from the native peoples, the communists retained an important propaganda advantage.

The hypocrisy of the French position, and its incompatibility with the antiimperialist ideology of the United States, made an impact on a young American senator visiting Vietnam called John F. Kennedy. He recommended that the Americans should not get too involved on the French side. Nevertheless, after being elected as president on an anti-communist ticket in 1960, it was he who sent the first American troops to Vietnam... This was not hypocrisy of the French type insofar as the Americans genuinely did not want Vietnam as a colony, but were fighting a truly ideological war against the most evil of enemies. Nevertheless, insofar as the means they employed towards the good end were often themselves evil, involving deceit and self-deception on a large scale, it was bound to fail – especially in the context of a democratic system of governance in which large-scale deceit cannot be sustained for long.

Ho's men were very harsh to the Vietnamese under their control in the north. The French despised the Vietnamese and treated them badly. But the Vietnamese communists treated them even worse - which casts doubts on the thesis that this was a war of national liberation; for only communists treat the people they are liberating so badly. Thus during the war with the French, writes Max Hastings, "an official Party history admitted later that 'not a few innocent people had been killed'. Simple country folk serving the Vietnimh assumed that any man who affected blue trousers and a white shirt with a tailor's label must be a French spy. Whereas the Mafia employed the euphemism of sending an enemy to 'sleep with the fishes', in the equally watery words of Vietnam's communists he was dispatched 'to search for shrimps'. Killings were conducted with maximum brutality and publicity: Vietnimh death squads favoured burying victims alive or eviscerating them in front of assembled neighbours. 'Better that a possible innocent dies than that a guilty man escapes,' ran a Party catchphrase. In the 'liberated zones' the Vietnimh established notorious punishment camps..."464

The French war to hold on to Vietnam had always been unpopular in France itself. In May 1954, after losing their flagship fortress Dien Bien Phu, they lost their stomach for the fight. The new French Prime Minister Mendès-France resolved to bring it to an end.

⁴⁶³ Martin Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: 1933-1951, London: HarperCollins, 1998, pp. 769-770, pp. 715-716.
⁴⁶⁴ Hasting of Wistory and 22

"The day after the fall of Dien Bien Phu," as Burleigh writes, "formal peace talks opened in Geneva with delegations from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Britain, the Soviet Union, China and the US, as well as representatives of [the South Vietnamese leader] Bao Dai and the Laotian and Cambodian monarchies, Though the Vietnimh appeared to hold all the cards after Dien Bien Phu, they had not reckoned on the overriding concern of the Soviets to keep the US from filling the vacuum left by the departing French. [Perhaps the American's successful testing of a hydrogen bomb at this time influenced them.] Zhou Enlai and Molotov closely co-ordinated their negotiating strategy, and imposed it on Pham Van Dong, the Vietnimh negotiator.

"Pham wanted independence for the whole of Indochina and elections which the Viet Minh believed they would win. Molotov and Zhou Enlai favoured the division of Vietnam between the Democratic Republic and Bao Dai's southern government, and rejected Pham's wish to include the Laotian Pathet Lao and Cambodian Khmer Rouge in the talks, calculating that neutralist monarchies would be enough to keep the Americans from intervening.

"They were almost right. President Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, brother of Allen Dulles, believed that, with the French out of the way, the US could economically bolster Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam as bulwarks against the further spread of Communism in Asia, without getting involved too deeply and incurring the taint of colonialism. Together with Burma, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaya, Indochina was also vital for Japanese economic recovery, functioning collectively as substitutes for the vast lost market in China. American-sponsored reforms would ensure that Vietnamese nationalism would rally to South Vietnam, its prosperity discrediting the 'false' colonialism peddled by Ho Chi Minh. This was a momentous shift in US policy in Indochina since it meant commitment to the survival of the southern regime.

"The French went home, having lost 93,000 soldiers killed since 1945. The Vietnamese were given three hundred days in which to decide whether they wanted to live in the north or the south. About a million people, mainly Roman Catholics, poured into the south, fleeing the brutal communist regime. Some thousands of communists were repatriated north."⁴⁶⁵

According to Brogan, the Geneva Accords were "a splendid opportunity for the Americans to cut their losses like the French. Unfortunately John Foster Dulles [Eisenhower's Secretary of State] did not see the occasion in those terms. He was depressed and indignant at the French admission of defeat, and at one time hoped to send in American troops as a replacement, or just to stiffen morale. The idea got no support from anyone except the more brutal American admirals and generals, and Dulles was reduced to an attempt to wreck the Geneva conference by a spectacular sulk (he even refused to shake hands with

⁴⁶⁵ Burleigh, op. cit.

the Chinese premier, Chou En-Lai). The composure of the other participants (Britain, Russia and China, as well as the belligerents) survived his tantrums, and agreement was reached after a month of hard bargaining. To this agreement (known as the Geneva Accords) Dulles refused to put his name. He accepted it as a *fait accompli*, but thereafter lost no opportunity of sabotaging it..."⁴⁶⁶

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Algeria, according to Paul Johnson, "was not so much a French colony as a Mediterranean settlement. In the 1830s there were only 1.3 million Arabs there, and their numbers were dwindling. The Mediterranean people moved from the northern shores to the southern ones, into what appeared to be a vacuum: to them the great inland sea was a unity, and they had as much right to its shores as anyone provided they justified their existence by wealth-creation. And they did: they expanded 2,000 square miles of cultivated land in 1830 to 27,000 by 1954. These *pieds noirs* were only 20 per cent French in origin (including Corsicans and Alsacians). They were predominantly Spanish in the west, Italian (and Maltese) in the east. But rising prosperity attracted others: Kabyles, Chaouias, Mzabite, Mauritanians, Turks and pure Arabs, from the mountains, the west, the south, the east. And French medical services virtually eliminated malaria, typhus and typhoid and effected a prodigious change in the non-European infant mortality rates. By 1906 the Muslim population had jumped to 4.5 million; by 1954 to 9 million. By the mid-1970s it had doubled again. If the French population had risen at the same rate, it would have been over 300 million by 1950. The French policy of 'assimilation', therefore, was nonsense, since by the year 2000 Algerian Muslims would have constituted more than half the French population, and Algeria would have 'assimilated' France rather than the reverse.

"By the 1950s there were not enough *pieds noirs* for long-term survival as a dominant class or even an enclave. Only a third of Algiers' 900,000 inhabitants were Europeans. Only in Oran were they in a majority. Even in the most heavily settled parts, the Mitidja, the farms were worked by Muslim labour. In 1914 200,000 Europeans had lived off the land; by 1954 only 93,000. By the 1950s those *pieds noirs* had ordinary, poorly paid city jobs Arabs could do just as well. The social structure was an archaeological layer-cake of race prejudice: 'the Frenchman despises the Spaniard, who despises the Italian, who despises the Maltese, who despises the Jews; all in turn despise the Arabs.' There was no pretence at equality of opportunity: in 1945 1,400 primary schools catered for 200,000 European children, 699 for 1,250,000 Muslims. Textbooks began: 'Our ancestors, the Gauls...'

"More serious, however, was the fraudulence of the electoral system. Either the reforms passed by the French parliament were not applied at all, or the votes were cooked by the local authorities themselves. It was this which cut the

⁴⁶⁶ Brogan, op. cit., p. 648.

ground beneath the many well-educated Muslim moderates who genuinely wanted a fusion of French and Muslim culture. As one of the noblest of them, Ahmed Boumedjel, put it: 'The French Republic has cheated. She has made fools of us.' He told the Assembly: 'Why should we feel ourselves bound by the principles of French moral values... when France herself refused to be subject to them?' The elections of 1948 were faked; so were those of 1951. In such circumstances, the moderates had no effective role to play. The men of violence moved forward...

"There was a foretaste in May 1945, when the Arabs massacred 103 Europeans. The French reprisals were on a savage scale. Dive-bombers blew forty villages to pieces; a cruiser bombarded others. The Algerian Communist Party journal *Liberte* called for the rebels to be 'swiftly and pitilessly punished, the instigators put in front of the firing squad'. According to the French official report, 1,020 to 1,100 Arabs were killed; the Arabs claimed 45,000. Many demobilized Arab soldiers returned to find their families dead, their homes demolished. It was these former NCOs who formed the leadership of the future Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). As the most conspicuous of them, Ahmed Ben Bella, put it: 'The horrors of the Constantine area in May 1945 persuaded me of the only path: Algeria for the Algerians.' The French commander, General Duval, told the *pieds noirs*: 'I have given you peace for ten years.'

"That proved to be entirely accurate. On 1 November 1954, the embittered NCOs were ready: Ben Bella, by now an experienced urban terrorist, linked forces with Belkacem Krim, to launch a national rising. It is important to grasp that the object, from start to finish, was not to defeat the French Army. That would have been impossible. The aim was to destroy the concept of assimilation and multi-racialism by eliminating the moderates on both sides. The first Frenchman to be murdered was a liberal, Arabophile schoolteacher, Guy Monnerot. The first Arab casualty was a pro-French local governor, Hadi Sakok. Most FLN operations were directed against the local Muslim element: employees of the state were murdered, their tongues cut off, their eyes gouged out; then a note, "FLN', pinned to the mutilated bodies. This was the strategy pioneered by the Mufti in Palestine. Indeed many of the rebel leaders had served him. The ablest, Muhammed Said, commander of 'Wilaya 3' in the Kabyle mountains, had joined the Mufti's 'Muslim SS legion', had parachuted into Tunisia as an Abwehr agent, and declared: 'I believed that Hitler would destroy French tyranny and free the world.' He still wore his old SS helmet from time to time. His disciples included some of the worst killers of the twentieth century, such as Ait Hamouda, known as Amirouche, and Ramdane Abane, who had sliced off breasts and testicles in the 1945 massacres, read Marx and *Mein Kampf* in jail, and whose dictum was: 'One corpse in a suit is always worth more than twenty in uniform.' These men, who had absorbed everything most evil the twentieth century had to offer, imposed their will on the villages by sheer terror; they never used any other method. Krim told a Yugoslav paper that the initiation method for a recruit was to force him to murder a designated 'traitor', mouchard (police spy or informer), French gendarme or colonialist: 'An assassination marks the end of the apprenticeship

of each candidate.' A pro-FLN American reporter was told: 'When we've shot (the Muslim victim) his head will be cut off and we'll clip a tag on his ear to shows he was a traitor. Then we'll leave the head on the main road.' Ben Bella's written orders included: 'Liquidate all personalities who want to play the role of *interlocuteur valable.'* 'Kill any person attempting to deflect the militants and inculcate in them a *bourguibien* spirit.' Another: 'Kill the *caids...* Take their children and kill them. Kill all those who pay taxes and those who collect them. Burn the houses of Muslim NCOs away on active service.' The FLN had their own internal *reglements des comptes*, too: the man who issued the last order, Bachir Chiham, was accused (like Roehm) of pederasty and sadistic sexmurders, and chopped in pieces within sight of his lovers. But it was the Muslim men of peace the FLN killers really hated. In the first two-and-a-half years of war, they murdered only 1,035 Europeans but 6,352 Arabs (authenticated cases; the real figure was nearer 20,000). By this point the moderates could only survive by becoming killers themselves or going into exile... "467

"Historians have estimated that between 30,000 and 150,000 Harkis [native Muslim Algerians who served as auxiliaries in the French Army] and their dependants were killed... The FLN used hit and run attacks in Algeria and France as part of its war, and the French conducted severe reprisals.

"The war led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Algerians and hundreds of thousands of injuries. Historians... state that the actual number of Algerian Muslim war dead was far greater than the original FLN and official French estimates but was less than the 1 million deaths claimed by the Algerian government after independence. Horne estimated Algerian casualties during the span of eight years to be around 700,000.¹ The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians.

"Some estimates put the Algerian death toll during the French colonial rule at over 10 million...." 468

The worst thing about the Algerian Civil War was the terrorism of one side corrupted the other. "White terrorism, the OAS (*Organization de l'Armee Secrete*)... operated at full blast for over a year, using bombs, machine-guns and bazookas, killing over 12,000 civilians (mainly Muslims) and about 500 police and security men. It illustrates the fearful power of political violence to corrupt. Indeed, in many ways it was the mirror-image of the FLN...

"Nor did the corruption stop at the OAS. For in order to beat them and to protect de Gaulle himself (twice nearly murdered), the state built up its own official terror units, which murdered and tortured prisoners with impunity, and on a wide scale. In this case, neither liberal France nor the international community raised a whisper of protest. OAS terrorism finally killed the idea of

⁴⁶⁷ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 495-498.

⁴⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria#French_colonization_(1830-1962)

a white settlement. At the end of 1961 de Gaulle's closest advisor, Bernard Tricot, reported back from Algiers: 'The Europeans... ae so hardened in opposition to everything that is being prepared, and their relations with the majority of the Muslims are so bad, that... the essential thing now is to organize their return.'

"The end came in March 1962, in an orgy of slaughter..."469

"The number of European *Pied-Noirs* who fled Algeria totalled more than 900,000 between 1962 and 1964. The exodus to mainland France accelerated after the Oran massacre of 1962, in which hundreds of militants entered European sections of the city, and began attacking civilians."⁴⁷⁰ About 1,380,000 people (including some Muslims) left in all. By 1963, of a large and historic Mediterranean community, only about 30,000 remained..."⁴⁷¹

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"Remarkably," writes Ian Kershaw, "at the height of the dirty war in Algeria, de Gaulle was liquidating French colonialism throughout almost all of the rest of Africa. The constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958 had replaced the 'French Union' with the 'French Community', which gave overseas territories extensive rights of self-government though it stopped short of granting them full independence. Only French Guinea initially rejected attachment to the Community. But this set an example, one rapidly to be followed by other former colonies. The wind of anti-colonialism was blowing strongly by the end of the 1950s, and Algeria was hardly a glowing advertisement for French rule. De Gaulle had offered overseas territories the right to choose. They chose. Between 1958 and the end of 1960 as many as fifteen French colonies (Madagascar, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Middle Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, Ubangu-Shari, Cameroun, Togo, Mali, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta and Ivory Coast) followed Guinea into independence. By 1961 the French Community had dwindled into near obsolescence. The contrast is stark between the swift winding-up of empire elsewhere in recognition of the obviously unstoppable desire for independence and the tortured acceptance of the inevitable in Algeria was the essential difference. It took de Gaulle's statesmanship and realism to end the largely nominal integration into France of what, despite the official denials, had in reality all along been a colony resting on discrimination against the nine million indigenous inhabitants by a million settlers.

"By the mid-1960s only fragments of the once-mighty French and British empires were left. The age of empire was over."⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 503-504.

⁴⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria#French_colonization_(1830–1962)

⁴⁷¹ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 504.

⁴⁷² Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, pp. 84-85.

One major fragment was the Central African Republic. "When the French gave the colony independence [in 1960] they put in a hand-picked professional politician, David Dako, as president. Ineffectually he tried to balance the head of the police, Izamo, against Bokassa, who led the army, and Bokassa proved the most agile of the trio. From 1965 Bokassa was life President and from 1977 Emperor, holding an elaborate coronation ceremony in December attended by 3,500 foreign guests and featuring an eagle-shaped throne, a crown with 2,000 diamonds and regalia modelled on Napoleon's coronation. It cost \$30 million, a fifth of the country's meagre revenues. His friendship with the expansive President Giscard d'Estaing of France, to whom he gave diamonds, was not the least of the factors which buttressed the regime. He celebrated his first anniversary by sacking and exiling his eldest son, Prince Georges, for antipaternal remarks. Two months later, in January 1979, he slaughtered forty schoolchildren who rioted when forced to buy uniforms made in Bukassa's factory. In April, between thirty and forty more children were murdered in the Ngaragba prison, apparently in Bukassa's presence and partly by him, a fact established by a commission of Francophone lawyers under Youssoupha Ndiara of Senegal. When Giscard, alarmed by the publicity, sent out his adviser on African affairs, Rene Journiac, to ask the Emperor to abdicate, he was whacked on the head by the imperial sceptre. In retaliation Giscard landed troops at Bangui on 23 September 1979, with Dako in their luggage as replacement-president. Bukassa was given asylum in the Ivory Coast at Giscard's request, and was later condemned to death *in absentia* for murder, cannibalism, 'intelligence with Libya' and fraud in gold and diamonds..."473

⁴⁷³ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 532. Since 2012 the state has been immersed in civil war.

34. DECOLONIZATION: (2) BELGIAN AND SPANISH COLONIES

No matter how much African politics was represented as being exclusively a struggle, or negotiation, between the former colonizers and the colonized, Cold War passions and proxy wars invariably got involved. As the Europeans gradually liberated their colonies, the Soviets rushed in to fill the void – while the Americans did their best to stop them. The result for this, the poorest continent, which was suffering particularly from drought conditions and, from the 1970s, a steep rise in the price of oil, was catastrophic in terms of economies ruined and lives lost.

The United Nations was an ardent agent of decolonization, and, in the spirit of Bandung, it was adept in letting the Soviets take the place of the retreating colonial power.

Thus on June 30, 1960 the Belgians were persuaded to pull out of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC), giving place to a civil war in which rival Congolese politicians fought with each other in an atmosphere of vicious anti-white anti-colonialism. "Belgium had run this vast and valuable though primitive region with excessive paternalism but, from 1920 onwards, with increasing economic success. The returns of heavy industrial investment began to come in during the 1950s. The index of industrial production rose, 1948-58, from 118 to 350.

"Within a week [of independence], the country dissolved into anarchy after the army mutinied. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba threatened the nationalisation of foreign businesses, and looked to the Soviet Union for assistance. Soviet and Warsaw Pact aircraft, arms and 'advisors' were flown in to prop up his government. United Nations (UN) secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold feared the imminent 'communisation' of the Congo, despite the dispatch of UN peacekeepers.

"There was alarm in Washington, where CIA director Allen Dulles suspected that Lumumba was 'a Castro or worse', and the CIA moved in, supplied with dollars and a hitman instructed to assassinate Lumumba with poisoned toothpaste. The money secured the loyalty of Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu (who later renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko), a ruthless, ambitious and venal chancer whom the CIA believed to be 'childish' and easily led. He moved in America's direction, used its cash to pay his soldiers, deployed them to expel the Soviet and detained Lumumba, who was murdered soon afterwards. The upshot was that the country's resources remained an asset of the west, and the DRC endured five years of civil war. Welcomed by President John Kennedy in 1963, Mobutu was America's man. Following a coup in 1965, he stayed in power until 1997 and amassed a personal fortune estimated at several billion dollars by siphoning off the nation's wealth..."⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷⁴ James, op. cit., pp. 78, 81.

According to Paul Johnson, much of the blame for the terrible civil war in the Congo rests on the shoulders of Hammarskjold, who hindered efforts to control the racist Lumumba, who "chose the independence ceremonies to make a rabble-rousing attack on white rule; five days later on 5 July the garrison in Leopoldville, the capital, mutinied and threw out its white officers, prior to surging forth to loot, rape and kill Europeans and Africans alike. The Belgians waited for five days, while the terror spread and increased, and while Hammarskjold, at UN headquarters in New York, did nothing, though his own UN staff in the Congo were thrown out of their hotel rooms at gunpoint by the exultant mutineers. Only on 10 July did the Belgians send in their own troops to restore order. Immediately Hammarskjold saw his chance, turned angrily and decisively on the Belgians, and on 13 July, in front of the Security Council, denounced their troops as a threat to peace and order. The Secretary-General had been looking for an opportunity to expand the UN's role, and to ride to world government on a swelling tide of Third World emotions... He believed that the UN was to be the catalyst of the new Africa... In the affairs of Afro-Asia, he said, 'Only the UN, of which they are themselves members, breaks the colonial spell, and puts the matter outside the order of the Cold War.' If Hammarskjold had done nothing and allowed Belgium to restore order, the crisis might have been quickly resolved, with the minimum of bloodshed. Tshombe [premier of Katanga], to extract the Katanga mining industry from the chaos, had declared the province independent on 11 July. This problem, too, might have been resolved by negotiation. Instead the Secretary-General immediately set about creating and deploying a UN army, taken not from the Security Council powers (as the Charter clearly intended) but from the 'nonaligned' states from whom Hammarskjold drew his following. Moreover, he sought to use this expeditionary force not merely to restore order, which the Belgians were far more capable of doing, but to reunited Katanga to the Congo by violence. He saw himself as king-maker, and Lumumba as the king. Nor is it difficult to see why he backed Lumumba, who seems to have had little following, and that purely tribal, among the Congolese themselves, but whose rhetoric appealed to Pan-African intellectuals and to the Afro-Asian leaders to whom the Secretary-General looked for backing.

"In this forlorn endeavour, Hammarskjold paid scant regard to the lives, black or white, he was risking. Cold, detached, consumed by an overwhelming ambition masquerading as an ideal, he thought in terms of a political abstraction, not human beings. He formulated what became a characteristic UN double-standard: that whereas the killing of Africans by whites (or of whites by Africans, or of Asians by Africans or all three races by Africans) was a purely internal matter outside the purview of the UN. Thus the UN became identified with a form of inverted racism, which was to cost an incalculable number of African lives over the next two decades. Even in Hammarskjold's time the toll was heavy. His UN army became a source of further instability rather than the reverse. Hia protégé, Lumumba, tried to set up his own secessionist state, fell into the hands of the Congolese army, now controlled by a former NCO, 'General' Mohutu, was tossed to the Katangese and murdered, 17-18 January 1961. The eclipse of this worthless scoundrel, responsible for the deaths of thousands, was described by Hammarskjold as 'a revolting crime against the principles for which this Organization stands'. In fact, it was no more than a meaningless incident in a long power struggle. The Secretary-General lost his emotional detachment and became obsessed with the need to revenge the death of the king he had failed to make by using his UN troops to expel the whites from Katanga and change its regime, the first instance of what might be termed imperialism by international bureaucracy. But in the process he made the error of leaving the abstract make-believe world of his UN offices and descending into the real world of the Congo basin. It cost him his life when his aircraft hit a tree near Ndola in September 1961..."⁴⁷⁵

"Strategic defeat in the Congo and disappointing results in Guinea and Ghana inclined the Russians to look elsewhere for a foothold in sub-Saharan Africa, in the troubled colonies of Angola and Mozambique to which the aged dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar clung like grim death..."⁴⁷⁶

However, it did not need specifically Communist influence to turn what had been comparatively flourishing colonies under European rule into totalitarian horror-stories spiced with witchcraft and pre-colonial paganism. "Once the tyrannies began to appear in the early 1960s, they swiftly graduated from the comparatively sophisticated (and bloodless) despotisms of Nyerere's Tanzania to resurrected horrors from Africa's darkest past. The gruesome comedy Evelyn Waugh had fabricated in *Black Mischief* became fact. On 'Kenyatta Day', October 1965, the President of Kenya, once termed by the British governor 'the leader of darkness and death', now called by relieved white settlers 'the old man', held a 'Last Supper', to commemorate the meal before his arrest as a Mau Mau terrorist. In Malawi, Dr. Hastings Banda, known as 'Conqueror' and 'Saviour', used witchcraft to sacralize his rule. In Zaire, Joseph Mobutu banned Christian names and re-named himself Monum Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, freely translated as 'the cock that leaves no hen alone'. President Bongo of Gabon banned the word pygmy (he was under five feet tall) but kept a bodyguard of giant German ex-Foreign Legionnaires, whose delight was to sign the *Horst Well Lied* at the main hotel. As the 1960s progressed, violence struck the new African elites with increasing frequency. Two Prime Ministers of Burundi were murdered in quick succession. The 1966 Nigerian coup cost the lives of the Federal Foreign Minister and two of the three regional premiers. Would-be Caudillos died too: in the Congo People's Republic an executed brasshat was displayed dead on TV, his mouth crammed with collars. Rulers showed and inclination to carry out retribution personally. The President of Benin (formerly Dahomey) murdered his Foreign Minister when he found him in bed with the Presidential wife. Another Foreign Minister, this time in Equatorial Guinea, was clubbed to death by his own head of state.

⁴⁷⁵ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 515-516.

⁴⁷⁶ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan Books, 2014, pp. 410-411.

"This last incident was one of the innumerable crimes committed by President Francisco Macias Nguema. In the poorer African states, of which there are nearly thirty, rulers set ups one-party states and in theory disposed of absolute authority. But in practice they tended to have little power to influence intractable events or even to arbitrate tribal quarrels. All they could do was to tyrannize, usually by personal violence. Macias was a case in point. He was born in the Spanish colony in 1924, served in the administration, became President on independence in 1958 and made himself President for life in 1972. During the next seven years he turned the country into a virtual prison-camp: many of its inhabitants simply fled for their lives. A Spanish-mounted *coup* overthrew him on 3 August 1979, and he was tried for 'genocide, treason, embezzlement and systematic violation of human rights'. His execution was carried out by a Moroccan firing-squad flown in when local troops complained his spirit was too strong for mere bullets and would return 'as a tiger'."⁴⁷⁷

By the end of the 1960s there was still a large bloc of colonies in Portuguese hands, notably Angola and Mozambique. Their "liberation" had to wait until the "Carnation revolution" in Portugal in 1974...

⁴⁷⁷ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 531-532.

35. DECOLONIZATION: (3) BRITISH COLONIES

In spite of their official anti-colonialism, the Americans tolerated them for two reasons: first, that the colonialist regimes were foci of stability in an unstable world, and would likely be replaced by communist dictatorships in many places, and secondly, that the prosperity of some important allies, notably the British, would be threatened if they were forced to give up certain of their colonies too abruptly.

The two goals of prevention of communism and preservation of profit often reinforced each other. A good example is Malaya, where the British waged a successful counter-insurgency war against mainly Chinese Maoist communists from 1948 until the proclamation of Malayan independence in 1960. "The outbreak of the Korean War [in 1950]," writes Michael Burleigh, "helped the British in two ways. Firstly, it brought increased demand for Malayan rubber and tin, which meant that counter-insurgency efforts were virtually selffinancing. In 1949 the Malayan colonial government had received \$28.1 million in duty on rubber and \$31.1 million on tin. A year later, the rubber duties were \$89.3 million, and those on tin \$50.9 million, and by 1951 the figures were \$214.1 million and \$75.2 million. The cost of fighting the insurgency rose from \$82 million in 1948 to \$296 million in 1953, virtually all of it deferred from tax receipts on these two commodities. Secondly, when the Americans might otherwise have regarded a sordid little colonial war designed to benefit British commercial interests could be depicted as part of a wider crusade against Communism, mirrored by eager British participation in the UN coalition fighting Communism in Korea..."478

However, after the Suez fiasco of 1956 "the British government realized that the game was up. Britain could no longer afford to sustain its military presence in many parts of the globe. It has to accept that colonialism belonged to the past, that the most important consideration for the future was to establish friendly relations with the new independent states that would emerge from the end of the imperial era. Once this fundamental reassessment was made, the end of empire came rapidly – and with remarkably little lamentation within Britain. Sudan's independence in January 1956 had in fact preceded Suez. Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) gained its independence in March 1957. Malaya, the most economically valuable colony that remained, became independent in July 1957. In Cyprus independence (with British retention of military bases) was declared in August 1960, though in this case only after a violent and superficially resolved internal struggle between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Between 1960 and 1966 a further nineteen former colonies (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Western Samoa, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Malta, Singapore, Gambia, the Maldives and British Guiana) attained their independence.

⁴⁷⁸ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2013, p. 168.

"Harold Macmillan captured the mood as well as stating the obvious in Cape Town in 1960 when he spoke of 'the wind of change' blowing through the African continent..."⁴⁷⁹

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Ghana became the first African country to receive independence from Britain. "A low-level Soviet delegation," writes Burleigh, "attended independence celebrations in Accra in March 1957; the US sent Nixon. [The pan-Africanist leader of Ghana, [Kwame] Nkrumah wanted to dash for industrialization and modernization, his key project being the River Volta dam, and to that end tracked back and forth between the US and USSR in opportunistic fashion. A Soviet embassy opened and a trade deal was concluded, involving the Russians taking 20,000-30,000 tons of cocoa beans. Attempts to widen commerce failed since the Soviets were unfamiliar with credit, payment on instalment or the need to display and explain their wares at local trade fairs. As Soviet farm managers could not turn a profit from giant agricultural collectives at home, what hope was there to do the same in Ghana?

"The Americans regarded Nkrumah's close relations with the Soviets, central planning and various crackbrained socialist experiments with suspicion. But they nonetheless loaned him \$37 million, with a further \$97 million for the private consortium that was studying the feasibility of the dam. Like [former French colony] Guinea, Ghana refused the Soviets landing and refuelling rights during the Cuban Missile Crisis." ⁴⁸⁰

Ghana was persuaded to remain in the western camp by the visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Ghana in 1961. ...

But the British made a poor choice in Nkrumah, who was not only a slippery and ruthless politician but also a megalomaniac - a common combination, unfortunately, in Africa in the age of decolonialization. Thus "it was not long after he returned from Bandung [in 1955] that Nkrumah began to allow his followers to refer to him as Osagyefo, 'the Redeemer'. The corruption set in rapidly; a form of bastardized Stalinism made its appearance. In 1960 an authorized biography recorded: 'He is our father, teacher, our brother, our friend, indeed our life, for without him we would no doubt have existed but we would not have lived... What we owe him is greater even than the air we breathe, for he made us as surely as he made Ghana.' The Redeemer began to believe this nonsense himself. 'All Africans know,' he said in 1961, 'that I represent Africa and that I speak in her name. Therefore no African have an opinion that differs from mine.' It was against this background that Nkrumah crushed opposition and wrecked the rule of law. The charisma held for a time, especially at international conferences. But even there, as the 1960s progressed, newer, more up-to-date and fashionable figures arose and became the

⁴⁷⁹ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 75.

⁴⁸⁰ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan Books, 2014, pp. 410-411.

cynosure. Nkrumah lost his lustre. At home, the very fact of arrogating to himself quasi-divine powers made him vulnerable when the gradual, then rapid, fall in living standards proved the magic did not work. But by the mid-1960s there was no constitutional means of removing the Redeemer. He fell to a military *coup* in February 1966, and died in exile in 1972."⁴⁸¹

The Soviets discovered Nkrumah had been squirreling away their subsidies, while the CIA dismissed him as "a vain opportunist and playboy" before engineering the coup that overthrew him. He went into exile with 1600 of his Soviet advisors.

"The collapse of black Africa's first and model state into military rule was a distressing blow, more particularly since its huge near-neighbour, Nigeria, had itself lapsed from constitutionalism into militarism the month before. Nigeria's population made it by far the most important of the black states and, during the 1960s, the development of oil made it economically the most secure. It, too, had emerged from a long process of preparation for self-rule, beginning with the first elected Africans in 1922-3. It was the masterpiece of Lord Lugard's 'dual mandate' system, the most conscientious and high-minded exercise in colonial administration ever devised. Internal tensions between the dominant tribes, the Hausa and Falani of the north, the Ibo of the east and the Yoraha of the west, long antedated British sovereignty. Despite the most elaborate efforts to devise a fool-proof system, they survived it. Nigeria's history, indeed, illustrates the essentially superficial and ephemeral impact of colonialism. A far bigger impact, indeed, was made by the arrival of nationalism, in its Afro-Asian form, with its emphasis on the 'rights' of each ethnic community. If all these had been conceded, Nigeria would have had to be a federation of some 200 states. The assertion of 'rights' to the point of fracture made Nigeria unworkable by the normal processes of democratic debate and compromise. Breakdown nearly came in 1964, only four years after independence, and finally in 1966, and military rule in turn led to the secession of the east, which termed itself 'Biafra', on 30 May 1967, followed by two years' civil war and immense loss of life.

"The tragic conflict divided Africa. Only Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast backed Biafra. The other African states supported the Nigerian military regime, most of them because they feared similar secessions which they calculated would work to the advantage of the 'imperialists'. But if Balkanization was an imperial aim, why had the colonial powers striven so hard to create unitary states or, that failing, viable federations; and why did all the great powers (as it happened) support Nigeria against the secessionists, the chief reason why Biafra was crushed? There were no answers to these questions. The political philosophy of African nationalism was based upon a theory of colonialism which was not merely false but fundamentally and systematically misleading..."⁴⁸²

⁴⁸¹ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 513.

⁴⁸² Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 513-514.

It is a difficult question whether the interests of the liberated peoples were in fact served by decolonization and the subsequent largesse bestowed upon them by the superpowers, or not. Usually, if there was a benefit, it went to the rulers rather than the ruled. Thus "the United States offered Africa's new rulers what they needed to keep power: modern security systems. It has been reported that between 1962 and 1969 the United States Agency for International Development spent US \$3.3m delivering radios and small arms to African police forces and instructing them in strike-breaking, riot control and investigating sedition. The one-party states that replaced colonial administrations were handed the apparatus of domestic coercion. By 1969 President Julius Nyerere [of Tanzania], a self-declared 'African socialist', had accepted equipment worth US \$640,000 from the US for his police force, all of whom were members of the ruling African National Union Party. But he also accepted Soviet weapons for his army. This was prudent: at this stage there was no knowing who would win the Cold War."483

The pros and cons of European colonization have been the subject of intense controversy. We must distinguish two, or perhaps four, issues in this debate: first the question whether the original colonization process was (a) moral, and (b) beneficial for the colonized peoples, and secondly, the question whether the later *de*colonization process was (a) moral, and (b) beneficial for them. Another important question is: did the process of colonization benefit or harm the colonizers themselves? Clearly this is a vast and highly complex topic, about which only a few relevant points can be made here.

First, from the point of view of many of those who had been colonized, the benefits derived from colonization were by no means negligible. Thus the Nigerian author Chinua Achebe has written: "Here is a piece of heresy. The British governed their colony of Nigeria with considerable care. There was a very highly competent cadre of government officials with a high level of knowledge of how to run a country. This was not something that the British achieved only in Nigeria; they were able to manage this on a bigger scale in India and Australia. The British had the experience of governing and doing it competently. I am not justifying colonialism. But it is important to face the fact that British colonies were, more or less, expertly run."⁴⁸⁴

Again, Andrew Roberts points to the example of Uganda: "An African country of nearly 94,000 square miles with a population in 1955 of just over five million, including 48,000 Asians and 5,600 Europeans, might have been considered hugely difficult to police; those who seek to portray the British

 ⁴⁸³ Lawrence James, "Africa's Proxy Cold War", *BBC World Histories*, April/May, 2017, p. 78.
 ⁴⁸⁴ Achebe, *There was a Country* (2012), quoted by Bruce Gilley, "How the Hate Mob Tried to Silence Me", *Standpoint*, December, 2017 / January, 2018, p. 42.

Empire as a tyranny need to explain why places like Uganda produced so little insurgency against British rule.

"It is certainly not enough to argue that the native people lived in fear of reprisals from the single battalion of the King's African Rifles, led by some two dozen British officers, ten British senior NCOs and 850 Ugandan soldiers and NCOs stationed there. Far more likely is that they recognised the benefits that British rule brought. As early as December 1901, the Great Ugandan Railway was built; this huge four-and-a-half year project involved constructing a railroad 550 miles into the heart of Africa, from Mombasa on the coast to the source of the Nile itself, at Lake Victoria. The last spike was driven into the earth by Florence Preston, the wife of the railway's engineer, at the town that used to bear her name, Port Florence.

"In 1962, the incoming Prime Minister, Dr. Milton Obote, asked Sir Walter Coutts, the last governor, to stay on as Governor-General after independence, eloquent testament to the friendliness of the handover. The Spanish-born American philosopher and Harvard professor, George Santayana, wrote of the 'sweet, just, boyish masters' who ruled the British Empire in its final phase. In Uganda, men like Coutts and his private secretary Alan Forward tried their best to rule some twenty different peoples, derived from three racial groupings speaking some twenty different languages, who lived in four kingdoms and ten districts. That they managed to achieve this without more Britons than poor Harry Galt [the acting subcommissioner murdered in 1905] being killed is an astonishing tribute to their incorrupt, beneficial and just ideals.

"Since Uganda became independent in 1962, it has not enjoyed one single peaceful transfer of power. Even so much as a glance at the disastrous postindependence history of Uganda – Obote's self-appointment as president, the military coup and subsequent dictatorship of Idi Amin, the border war against Kenya, Amin's expulsion of the Ugandan Asians, the vicious fifteen-year civil war between 1971 and 1986, the Tanzanian invasion, the economic collapse, the insurrection of the Lord's Resistance Army terrorists, and so on and so horrifically on – will convince an objective person that the brief period of British rule constituted a far happier time for ordinary Ugandans than any before or since...

"The experience of Sudan was not unlike Uganda. Between her conquest by General Kitchener in 1898 and independence on New Year's Day 1956, she was governed by a tiny elite of British administrators, called the Sudan Political Service. As a reporter wrote from Omdurman, the capital of Sudan, in April 2005, 'Many Sudanese have affectionate memories of their colonial past... The men from the Sudan Political Service were chosen from Oxbridge colleges for their sporting and academic prowess, prompting the quip that Sudan was a nation of 'blacks ruled by Blues'. In the 1930s there were only 130 of them – governing one million square miles of Africa's largest country. Sudan still depends on their achievements. As early as 1916 the country had one of Africa's best railway networks, stretching from Port Sudan on the Red Sea to El Obeid

in the deserts of the Kordofan. According to Gordon Obar, a columnist of the independent daily newspaper, the *Khartoum Monitor*, 'Wherever you go, people still remember the name of the British district commissioner in their area: 'They were seen as working for the good of the people.' Jibril Abdullah Ali, a local historian, points out the buildings in the capital of North Darfur, al-Fasher, that were originally built by the British army engineers; they include the first school, a hospital, law courts, army barracks, an airport and other governmental institutions that use the same buildings half a century later..."⁴⁸⁵

But there were undoubtedly black spots. One was Kenya. "After losing India, the empire's 'crown jewel', in 1947," writes Daniel Goldhagen, the British "were desperate to hold on to Kenya when, in 1952, the Mau Mau liberation movement challenged their draconian rule. Given that Mau Mau enjoyed the allegiance of most Kikuya, whom the fifty thousand British settlers had been systematically dispossessing of their land, the British, in order to secure their colonial position, decided to eliminate Mau Mau and its bearers, which meant eliminating the Kikuyu population as effective claimants to their own land and to self-determination. They constructed an extensive and murderous camp system - so murderous that the common view was that their purpose was to kill Kikuyu, as they starved them, refused to let them farm their lands, and denied them medical treatment. This system was eventually differentiated with several categories of camps, the British assigning individual Kikuyu to camps of varying severity designed to incarcerate, break, warehouse, or kill them. The British incarcerated perhaps 1.5 million Kikuyu, a good portion of the people, and killed tens of thousands (estimates vary from 50,000 to 300,000)."486

In spite of its benefits, the colonization process must be seen as in the main a major evil insofar as the colonies were, if not always in a legal sense (there were various pretexts for their acquisition, some better than others), at any rate in a moral sense, *stolen land*. And however painful the reverse process was for the former colonial masters, it was good for them, too, both economically, in that, having been freed from the "white man's burden", they were able to develop economically at a quickened pace, and also culturally and spiritually, in that the arrogant racist and exploitative attitudes of the past were now recognized for what they were and, however partially and imperfectly, repented of.

However, there was also a very important negative consequence of decolonization that is less often remarked upon: the *missionary* aims of the colonialists, which had been prominently touted as a justification of imperialism from the conquest of the Americas by the Spanish conquistadors until at least the Indian Mutiny of 1857, were now dropped. This is not to say that Christian mission ceased altogether. But it was not often actively

⁴⁸⁵ Roberts, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900, London: Penguin, 2014, pp. 56-58.

⁴⁸⁶ Goldhagen, Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Onslaught on Humanity, London: Abacus, 2012, pp. 402-403.

supported either by national governments or by international organizations such as Unesco, which, far from believing that the gods of the heathen were demons, were more inclined to protect their worship as a precious part of the cultural inheritance of the nations, whose enlightenment was now seen as coming through the provision of democracy and free trade, clean water, vaccines and contraceptives, rather than the Gospel of Jesus Christ...

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An excellent summary of the pros and cons of British colonization has been made by Robert Tombs: "English justification of the empire from the early nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth drew on Enlightenment ideas of civilization and the Whig idea of progress. Imperial apologists, from celebrated writers such as Macaulay and Seeley to junior district officers, were predominantly 'colonialist', believing that Europe embodied a more advanced stage of civilization whose values were universal and could and should be introduced into less developed societies. There was certainly racism too, in the sense of believing that certain races were not merely 'backward', but inherently inferior. This was a minority view, however, at least among the educated, and was usually considered un-Christian. Authoritarian rule over India and other dependent colonies justified itself by the claim that backward peoples - 'half devil and half child', in Kipling's notorious phrase - were being protected, including from themselves, and advanced. The claim involved some hypocrisy, notably a deep ambivalence about advancement in practice. Those among the subjects of the empire who accepted its claims and cooperated, whether by clinging to approved traditional cultures (for example, Indian princes or Sikh soldiers) or by embracing certain English values (most obviously Christianity), were to varying degrees privileged and respected: there was no objection to the sons of native potentates going to Eton, and the Gurkhas still command wide public affection. Those who were most disliked and despised by colonial authority were those who in fact genuinely embraced British values and used them against the empire, of whom the greatest example was Gandhi, meaningfully dismissed by Churchill as 'a seditious Middle Temple lawyer.'

"Law and order, honest government, free trade, and the suppression of slavery, internal warfare and barbarous practices – these were the justifications, and pretexts, for colonial rule. The logic was that in due course the whole empire would follow the white settler colonies towards self-government, though this was seen as remote. When hasty decolonization did come in the 1950s and 1960s, it was presented as a successful change from empire to Commonwealth. A generally positive view of the empire and its history – that it included crimes and flaws but was well-meaning and on the whole politically and economically beneficial both to colonizers and to colonized – remained the orthodoxy in England until at least the 1960s.

"The historical boot is now on the other boot: recent opinion emphasizes the violence of conquest, the universality of racial disdain, the destructiveness of settlement, the harshness of imperial government, the arrogance of the

practitioners and the sterility of its legacy. There have always been many critics of imperial rule, from Edmund Burke onwards. William Pitt apologized for England's involvement in slavery two centuries before Tony Blair did so, and in far more heartfelt terms, calling for 'an atonement for our long and cruel injustice'. Recent historians emphasize the injustice and uncover the cruelty, as in the case of the Mau-Mau. When many former colonies shed Westminsterstyle government, the idea of a progressive legacy seemed hollow. More fundamentally, critics rejected the 'progressive' history of empire root and branch: the means could never be justified, and the ends were never achieved. Hence, Niall Ferguson's argument that the British Empire created the modern world provoked an outcry.

"This transformation of attitudes has several sources. One is a desire to focus on the history of the poor and oppressed. Another is nationalism, the main impulse for anti-imperialism in all colonies and former colonies, democratic or dictatorial, non-white or white: rejection of empire is the core of many national foundation myths. Another source is anti-capitalism, one of the oldest and newest forms of anti-imperialism. Another still is moral revulsion against all pretensions to racial or cultural superiority. The influential work of Edward Said, powerful in argument and brilliant in presentation, accused European imperialism, unlike earlier empires, of imposing intellectual and cultural domination, and spattered European culture in general with the mire of imperialism.

"The empire and its rulers have thus come under withering scrutiny by highly motivated historians from every continent; perhaps only Nazi Germany has been subject to comparable investigation. Moreover, 'fabulously detailed ' colonial archives leave every blemish exposed: 'You would be hard pushed to get similar evidence of fierce internal debates, admissions of failure or even hard statistics from, say, United Nations organisations' records today.'

"The British Empire is too recent to be regarded by most commentators with the detachment that can be applied to older empires such as the Ottoman or the Mughal. When the latter used violence against their subject peoples, they can be said to have carried out 'stabilizing operations': but when the British did so, they committed 'war crimes', even 'genocide'. This may be poetic justice for people who prided themselves on spreading civilization, but it makes their record difficult, if not impossible, to assess. Perhaps no one really wants to assess it, because comparison with preceding or succeeding regimes is taboo, especially when independent states are more oppressive and incompetent than the British were. Few today are interested in assessing 'good quiet work' in forestry, or in combating locust swarms or the tsetse fly. By what criteria could one judge the effects, for example, of missionary education on headhunters in Borneo? If the empire is regarded as 'wholly without any redeeming features', only denunciation is required. It is therefore possible to denounce both imperial strength and imperial weakness, both what it did and what it failed to do. Some established practices that the British tried to stop - cannibalism, headhunting, tribal warfare, witchcraft, widow-burning, systematic sexual abuse – cannot easily be defended today. They can, however, be played down, their existence minimized or dismissed as colonialist fantasy. Alternatively, the sincerity and effectiveness of British policy can be criticized: they had ulterior motives, failed to make much difference, and anyway had no right to interfere. The question of whether outsiders have the right to intervene by force in the name of 'universal' humanitarian principles is no less controversial today.

"It is true that humanitarian aims were only one part of the complex motivations for empire, that they often camouflaged political ambition and financial greed, and that they often went hand in hand with cultural and racial arrogance and hypocritical double standards. And yet there was slavery; there were human sacrifices; there was endemic warfare; and to ignore this is to belittle the humanity of those who suffered in pre-colonial societies, which were not idyllic Gardens of Eden spoiled only by the imperial serpent. It is common to stress the humiliations imposed by colonial rule, and the damage it did to indigenous cultures. But the rule of conquering Mughals, Asante or Zulus was violent and humiliating for their subordinates too. Should we sympathize, for example, with the humiliation of those Zulu elders who lamented in 1900 that under British rule they had 'practically lost control over girls and women'? The weakening of traditional elites and cultures was for many a liberation. The adoption of Christianity brought by missionaries often means self-emancipation, especially for the young, poor and female. What did freed slaves, women escaping forced marriage, or people spared from human sacrifice feel about their colonial masters?

"Imperial rule was not – it simply could not be – all powerful. It was 'a global mosaic of almost ungraspable complexity and staggering contrasts' made up of literally hundreds of units, including self-governing Dominions, internally autonomous protectorates, dependent territories linked by treaty and directly administered Crown Colonies. Its total military manpower was usually less than the United States recently found necessary to control merely Iraq. As George Orwell (an anti-imperialist former colonial policeman) put it, over 'nearly a quarter of the earth, there were fewer armed men than would be found necessary by a minor Balkan state.' So the acquiescence of most and the cooperation of many was essential for it to work at all. This too can be criticized, because the empire often ruled by confirming the power of existing elites or creating new ones, and hence was often a force not for progress but for conservatism. Even then, there were gainers. Sometimes the experience of empire was 'essentially one of sympathy and congruence'. There emerged dynamic processes of economic, cultural and social change, which the British sometimes facilitated, sometimes failed to stop, and often simply acquiesced in. In such new metropolises as Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Toronto, Shanghai (much of it run by British officials), Cape Town, Singapore, Sydney and Hong Kong, people took what advantages they could from the empire - travel, trade, education, employment, law and order.

"The empire was thus a bargain, or a series of bargains and accommodations, sometimes unspoken, sometimes formal (as with treaties of protection), and always changing. One party to the bargain was to provide protection, security, honest government, arbitration between conflicting groups and access to global trade. The other parties were to give obedience, taxes, labour, even loyalty, and many exercised subordinate authority as princes, chiefs, officials, soldiers and policemen – many of their descendants today govern the independent successor states. Neither side ever really fulfilled the bargain, and it worked out better in some places than others: better in Malta than Jamaica; better in New Zealand than Australia; better in Malaya than India. Not all colonial subjects were included in the bargain, or not to the same extent. For some people it offered more: to princes more than to peasants; to settlers more than to aboriginals; to slaves more than to slave-owners. Some lost more than they gained. Some lost everything...^{"487}

⁴⁸⁷ Tombs, op. cit., pp. 784-787.

36. THE BEGINNING OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The old idea of European integration, or at any rate *Western* European integration, began to be raised very soon after the war, and accelerated as the colonial powers shed their colonies. Tariff unions had been common since the Prussian *Zollverein* of 1834, and in 1948, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands had adopted a common external tariff "and a 'harmonization process' of internal tariffs beginning 15 October 1949".⁴⁸⁸ It was as if, having shed (or being about to shed) the burden of their overseas colonies, the Europeans were freed to begin to think of uniting amongst themselves. The question was: would the result be a new type of imperialism? Or an old type of hegemony?

Much would depend on a solution to the German question...

On August 15, 1949, following elections to the constituent assembly, Konrad Adenauer, a Catholic former mayor of Cologne who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, was made first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and head of a centre-right coalition government. In the East, the German Democratic [but in fact Communist] Republic was created on October 7. With the German question settled, if not satisfactorily at any rate stably for the time being, Western Europe entered upon an extraordinary period of peace and prosperity.

This was conditioned by five facts: (1) American military protection and economic investment, (2) an implicit agreement by the major political parties to eschew extremism (Fascism on the Right, Marxism on the Left)⁴⁸⁹, (3) an implicit agreement on all sides to use the State to expand the welfare state, (4) a common commitment to full or nearly full employment (this would also remove the attraction of communism, which briefly threatened to take power in France and Italy), and (5) the beginning of trust and even integration between the European States (especially France and Germany).

One of the first European statesmen to call for integration was the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who, as Robert Tombs writes, "had continental, indeed global ambitions, a 'Western Union' centred on Franco-British partnership, eventually taking in the Benelux countries, Scandinavia and a democratic Germany, and building links with British, French and Belgian colonies and the Commonwealth. This, he believed, would create a 'Third Force' equal with the United States and the Soviet Union. He hoped in four or five years to have the Americans 'eating out of our hands'.

⁴⁸⁸ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 591.

⁴⁸⁹ This led to some remarkably durable coalition governments, as in Austria, where a grand coalition of Right and Left lasted from 1945 to 1966 (Mazower, op. cit., p. 295).

"The first step was the Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) with France, followed by the Treaty of Brussels (1948) bringing in the Benelux countries. The treaty aimed at 'harmonisation' in economic matters, and common social and cultural policies. But this strategy was derailed by the beginning of the Cold War, which made Western Europe more dependent on its security on the United States..."⁴⁹⁰

"It was Washington," according to Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "that drove European integration in the late 1940s, and funded it covertly under the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.

"While irritated at times, the US has relied on the EU ever since as the anchor to American regional interests alongside NATO.

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"There has never been a divide-and-rule strategy..."491

The first step towards integration was proposed in 1950 by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. His brainchild was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a supra-national organization with a non-elected "high authority" that was to manage Europe's steel and coal industries. The Plan also advocated a council of ministers, a court and an assembly.

The ECSC was founded at the Treaty of Paris in April, 1951. It had been presented to the British in May, 1950 as a *fait accompli*; they were given 48 hours to think about joining. They refused. For, as Tombs writes, Bevin "was suspicious of supranationality - 'a Pandora's box full of Trojan horses', in his attributed phrase. Labour's recent nationalization of coal and steel meant that government and unions were unwilling to hand control to an unaccountable body in Luxembourg - as Herbert Morrison, Bevin's successor at the Foreign Office, put it, 'the Durham miners won't wear it'. Because of the Great Depression, the Second World War and the devastation of Europe, British trade had moved elsewhere, especially to the 'Old Commonwealth' countries, from which it imported cheap food and to which it exported manufactured goods. In retrospect, and even for some at the time, it is clear that this was an unusual and temporary circumstance. It is nevertheless understandable that Labour backed colonial development and Commonwealth ties, for reasons both of sentiment and of self-interest. In 1950 Europe took only 10 percent of British exports. Australia was economically as important to Britain as 'The Six' (members of the Coal and Steel Community) combined, and New Zealand more important than Germany. As Keynes put, 'What suits our exporters is to have the whole world as their playground'."492

 ⁴⁹⁰ Tombs, "The Reluctant Europeans", *BBC History Magazine*, September, 2016, p. 52.
 ⁴⁹¹ Evans-Pritchard, "The European Union always was a CIA Project, as Brexiteers Discover", *The Daily Telegraph*, business section, April 27, 2016.

⁴⁹² Tombs, The English and their History, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014, p. 805.

Schumann worked closely with Jean Monnet, a banker, head of the French Planning Board and long-time advocate of European integration. On a visit to Washington in 1947, Monnet wrote Schuman stating "a 'deeply rooted conviction' of what was needed to cement the European relationship with the United States and to counter the danger threatening the West. 'Western European countries' efforts have to become a true European effort. And only a Western Federation is able to achieve this.' But Monnet did not see the pooled sovereignty as eclipsing France's national standing. On the contrary: Monnet saw European integration as a vehicle to restore French political and economic dominance in continental Europe. After the war he put French interests first in proposing that France take over the crucial German coalfields of the Saarland and the even more vital coal and steel of the Ruhr, with a view to greatly strengthening the French economy, while also leaving Germany permanently weakened..."⁴⁹³

So French nationalist ambitions were at the origin of the anti-nationalist project, while according to Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "the tone of Franco-German reconciliation... was cooked up by the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a meeting in Foggy Bottom. 'It all began in Washington,' said Robert Schuman's chief of staff.

"It was the Truman administration that browbeat the French to reach a modus vivendi with Germany in the early post-War years, even threatening to cut off US Marshall aid at a furious meeting with recalcitrant French leaders... in September 1950.

"Truman's motive was obvious. The Yalta settlement with the Soviet Union was breaking down. He wanted a united front to deter the Kremlin from further aggrandizement after Stalin gobbled up Czechoslovakia, doubly so after Communist North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded the South.

"For British eurosceptics, Jean Monnet looms large in the federalist pantheon, the *eminence grise* of supranational villainy. Few are aware that he

⁴⁹³ Ian Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster. Europe* 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 157. "It was Monnet," write Lynn Picknett and Clive Prince, "who had secured the Allies' backing for General de Gaulle against Roosevelt's opposition, and in return, de Gaulle gave him responsibility for rebuilding the French economy and industry – a position he used to achieve his great dream, laying the foundations for the EEC.

[&]quot;The 'Schuman Declaration' was the result of intrigue, trickery and subterfuge by Monnet, his most audacious trick being to get French and West German governments to set up a *supranational* organisation to co-ordinate their industries without realising exactly what they had signed up to. This radical new concept, of an organisation with control over individual nations' industries but with its own, outside autonomy, laid the foundation for all that came after. Unsurprisingly, Monnet became president of the new body, called – with a chillingly Orwellian tone – the High Authority. Schuman became the first president of the European Parliament in 1958." ("Synarchy: The Hidden Hand behind the European Union", *New Dawn*, Special Issue 18, http://www.newdawnmagazine.com/articles/synarchy-the-hidden-handbehind-the-european-union.) See also Alan Sked, "How A Secretive Elite Created The EU To Build A World Government", *Sunday Times Style Magazine*, 28 November, 2015.

spent much of his life in America, and served as the war-time eyes and ears of Franklin Roosevelt.

"General Charles de Gaulle thought him an American agent, as indeed he was in a loose sense. Eric Roussel's biography of Monnet reveals how he worked hand in glove with successive administrations.

"General Charles de Gaulle was always deeply suspicious of American motives...

"Nor are many aware of declassified documents from the State Department archives showing that US intelligence funded the European movement secretly for decades, and worked aggressively behind the scenes to push Britain into the project.

"... One memorandum dated July 26, 1950, reveals a campaign to promote a full-fledged European parliament. It is signed by General William J. Donovan, head of the American wartime Office of Strategic Services, precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The key CIA front was the American Committee for a United Europe (ACUE), chaired by Donovan. Another document shows that it provided 53.5 per cent of the European movement's funds in 1958. The board included Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles, CIA directors in the Fifties, and a caste of ex-OSS officials who moved in and out of the CIA.

"Bill Donovan, legendary head of the war-time OSS, was later in charge of orchestrating the EU project... The US acted astutely in the context of the Cold War. The political reconstruction of Europe was a roaring success."⁴⁹⁴

If the US acted within the context of the Cold War, wishing to build up European unity against the Soviet enemy, the motivation of French Eurocrats like Monnet was quite different and more sinister. They were true federalists, enemies of the nation-state, with the ultimate aim of making France the dominant power in the supra-national state of the European Union. This inevitably involved some deception of the European peoples. As Monnet wrote in 1952: "The nations of Europe must be guided towards a Superstate without their peoples understanding what is happening. This can be carried out in successive stages, each camouflaged as having an economic goal, but which will end up by leading them irreversibly into a federation."

"The ECSC having proved a success," writes Jurgen Tampke, "the partners agreed to widen their economic co-operation through the formation of a customs union. On 23 March 1957, the six ECSC member nations signed the Treaty of Rome, giving birth to the European Economic Community. Although

⁴⁹⁴ Evans-Pritchard, "The European Union always was a CIA Project, as Brexiteers Discover", *The Daily Telegraph*, business section, April 27, 2016.

the treaty laid emphasis on common economic policies, hope was expressed that eventually there might also be political integration..."⁴⁹⁵

The key phrase was "ever-increasing integration"...

As Yanis Varoufakis points out, however, the ECSC was in fact a *cartel*, and therefore "a remarkable departure from American principles of governance, which since President Theodore Roosevelt had included a healthy dose of cartel busting. However, America's global plan could not fly in Europe unless it made its peace with the *Mitteleuropa-Paneuropa* ideology intimately associated with Central Europe's cartels.

"Making their peace with Central European corporatism, American policymakers had to swallow not only the idea of building the new Europe on a cartel of big business but also the unsavoury political agenda that went with it. Corporatists like Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet were bent on constructing the Brussels-based bureaucracy as a democracy-free zone. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi put it succinctly in one of his speeches when he declared his ambition for Europe to 'supersede democracy and for it to be replaced by a 'social aristocracy of the spirit'. As always happens when a technocracy harbouring a deep Platonic contempt for democracy attains inordinate power, we end up with an antisocial, dispirited, mindless autocracy...

"From the viewpoint of its official ideology, the European Union sounded very similar to the United States, even to liberal Britain. Free-market liberalism seemed to be the order of the day, and a single market free of state patronage the union's objective. And yet, remarkably, the European Union began life as a cartel of coal and steel producers which, openly and legally, controlled prices and output by means of a multinational bureaucracy vested with legal and political powers superseding national parliaments and democratic processes. Indeed, the inaugural task of the Brussels bureaucracy was to fix the price of steel and coal products and remove all restrictions on their movement and trading among the cartel's member states. Curiously perhaps, this made perfect sense: what would be the point of cross-border cartel if its products were stopped at the borders, taxed and generally impeded by national government officials? The equivalent in the United States would have been a Washington bureaucracy, operating without a Senate or a House of Representatives to keep the bureaucrats in check, able to overrule state governments on almost anything and bent on fixing prices at levels higher than the market would have selected.

"The next step was obvious too: once tariffs on coal and steel were removed, it made sense to remove all tariffs. Except that French farmers, who always exerted exceptional influence on France's political system, did not like the idea of untrammelled competition from imported milk, cheese and wine. So to coopt French farmers, the so-called Common Agricultural Policy was established.

⁴⁹⁵ Tampke, op. cit., p. 235.

Its purpose? To secure the farmers' consent to a European free trade zone by handing over to them a chunk of the cartel's monopoly profits.

"By the end of the 1950s a fully-fledged European Union (then known as the European Economic Community) which had evolved from the European Coal and Steel Community) had sprung from the multinational heavy industry cartel and its political incarnation in Brussels. Dollarized by the United States, it soon began to create large surpluses, which funded postwar Central European prosperity in the stable world environment provided by the Bretton Woods system, which was itself constantly stabilized by a United States ready and willing to recycle to Europe a large chunk of America's surpluses. A golden age dawned, brimming with high growth, non-existent unemployment and low inflation, spawning a new Europe of shared prosperity. It was an American triumph that Europe's elites were determined to portray as their own..."⁴⁹⁶

The fifth factor underpinning European integration, the beginning of the restoration of trust between the French and the Germans, was facilitated by a new, more "eirenic" view of twentieth-century history, with less anti-German sentiment. However, according to Tampke, there was a disturbing over-reaction in the opposite direction. "Economic prosperity and political stability fostered a widespread sense among Germans that the nation had 'come good', and that harping on the past was pointless. In fact, many of the generation that grew up after the Second World War had little knowledge of some of the darker aspects of Germany's recent history. Surveys of young people in the late 1970s and early 1980s revealed that more than half had little or no knowledge of Hitler."⁴⁹⁷

Of course, the selective forgetting or ignorance of the dark pages of recent history is by no means confined to Germany. In Japan, to the intense annoyance of the Chinese, the history of Japanese atrocities in the Second World War is not taught; while in Russia today, anybody who contests the official whitewashing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and other Stalinist crimes risks a prison sentence. It goes to show that true history is second only to Orthodox theology as the most important cultural resource of a people...

The restoration of trust between France and Germany was greatly aided by the development of friendship between their leaders, de Gaulle and Adenauer. De Gaulle "perceived in Adenauer... another *homme providential* like himself, whose fortunate tenure of power provided an opportunity for France which might never recur. Adenauer, he wrote, was a Rhinelander, '... imbued with a sense of the complementary nature of the Gauls and the Teutons which once fertilized the presence of the Roman Empire on the Rhine, brought success to the Franks and glory to Charlemagne, provided the rationale for Austria, justified the relations between the King of France and the Electors, set Germany

⁴⁹⁶ Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer What They Must? London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 58-60.

⁴⁹⁷ Tampke, op. cit., p. 238.

aflame with the flame of the Revolution, inspired Goethe, Heine, Madame de Stael and Victor Hugo, and in spite of the fierce struggles in which the two peoples were locked, continued to seek a path gropingly through the darkness.' That was the spirit in which de Gaulle summoned Adenauer to his chateau at Colombey-les-deux-eglises on 14 September 1958 for what he termed 'the historic encounter between this old Frenchman and this very old German.'

"The meeting was an unqualified success. De Gaulle warmed to der Alte when he was told he would regain his youth in office, 'as has been the case with myself'. Adenauer approved of the Frenchman: 'so clearly upright, correct, moral'. This was the first of forty meetings between the two men which took place in growing amity until Adenauer retired in 1962. They laid the foundations of the Franco-German axis, which endured until the early 1980s. It was based upon downgrading the supranational aspects of the EEC while at the same time making its economic aspects work superlatively by the mutual interlocking of the French and German economies. Thus the balanced bargain, on which the success of the EEC depended, was turned into working reality by these two old-fashioned conservative Catholics, whose politics pre-dated the era of Christian Democracy, whose views of the world had been formed before 1914, but who had remained astonishingly alert to the changes and opportunities which the tragic events of their lifetimes had brought about. It was a genuine friendship, and an example of the way in which personalities and, still more, personal relationships, radically affect the course of international affairs..."498

By the late 1960s "the 'European project' could point to some successes. Institutionally and administratively, there was some streamlining when, in 1965, it was agreed to merge the EEC, Euratom and the Economic Coal and Steal Community. And economic advances, if at times stuttering, had certainly been made, particularly in liberalizing trade. The last internal customs were eliminated in 1968 and a unified external duty was introduced. The liberalization of trade, together with greater investment and technology transfer, increased competition, and economies of scaled added an estimated 1 per cent to European growth rates. On the debit side, the Common Agricultural Policy [which raised prices, helping inefficient French farmers] remained a headache and deliberations in 1969 to try to move towards monetary union proved abortive, given the disparity in strength of national currencies (not least between the French franc and the German mark). Politically, however, union seemed as distant a goal as ever. Integration on all fronts had progressed since 1950 in a sort of European foxtrot: two steps forward, one to the side, and one back. In fact, from the outset moves towards integration had been overwhelmingly driven by national motives - initially to ensure French domination, then as a platform to re-establish a German nation state. The aim of ever-closer union had in practise bolstered the system of nation-states..."499

⁴⁹⁸ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 598.

⁴⁹⁹ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*. *Europe* 1950-2017, p. 164.

37. AMERICAN CORPORATISM AND LATIN AMERICA

If the world was beginning to be united politically through the European Union and the United Nations, then economically it was coming together through American corporate capitalism... On January 20, 1953 Dwight D. Eisenhower became US president. His two terms, lasting until 1960, mark the golden age, as it were, of Americanism, a period of peace and prosperity in which the relative power of America – militarily, politically, economically and culturally - came to its peak.

In the military sphere, the United States took a big lead, with the Soviet Union struggling to keep up. In the domestic political sphere, "Ike", who called himself a "progressive conservative", did not cut Social Security Benefit and preserved all of Roosevelt's New Deal programmes. Although strongly opposed to Communism, he quickly brought the Korean War to an end through an armistice between North and South that has lasted without a peace treaty to the present day. At the same time he abandoned Truman's policy of "containment" for a more aggressive and interventionist policy of "roll-back" that was administered by the two brothers John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and Allen Foster Dulles, CIA Director.

"Ever more outrageous claims by Senator McCarthy were failing to maintain the red scare, and with Ike and Dulles in power and the compromised Democrats out, much of the heat went out of the domestic foreign policy debate. Although the competition is fierce, John Foster Dulles may be the American statesman most tendentiously vilified and misrepresented by leftists on both sides of the Atlantic. The reason is not hard to identify: he had strong Christian views and uncompromisingly condemned Communism as evil... Dulles believed 'there is a moral law which, no less than physical law, undergirds our world'. This was not exclusive to Christianity but common to many religions, as he had found when dealing with people of other faiths. Nevertheless, he believed that with its God-given [as he believed] form of government, the US had a unique mission to extend the values it incarnated to the rest of the world. A spiritually robust America would operate as a moral force, breathing life into such international organizations as the United Nations through overseas aid and by the promotion of individual freedom and human rights.

"Dulles had strong ethical objections to the survival of Woodrow Wilson's progressive spin on 'racial segregation', if only because it undermined the US case in the struggle with Soviet anti-imperialists. He discussed the difficult ethical choices he had to make with his high-level contacts in the American Churches, to which he also appealed to mobilize popular support for the administration's foreign policy. He recruited the evangelist Billy Graham, a confidant and supporter of the President, as a roving US ambassador, notably in darkest Britain. Dulles's relations with Church leaders were not without frictions, particularly over the issue of nuclear weapons, with the religious supporting disarmament and Dulles insisting on the necessity of maintaining

a massive nuclear deterrent. The *Time-Life* journalist and presidential speechwriter Ernest Hughes judged that Dulles's greatest failing as a statesman was that he thought and spoke like a lawyer, engaged in prosecuting the Soviet Union in a long-drawn-out case in the court of history. He was absolutely invested in his case, 'quickly excited by small gains, suddenly shaken by minor reverses, and ever prone to contemplating the drastic remedy of the massive retort'.

"Although Dulles was the more cerebral of the two, Ike had the edge in a key respect, for as a former general he was calmer in the face of minor setbacks, never allowing the detail to obscure the big picture. Religious faith was important in cementing their relationship. A day before his inauguration, Eisenhower was baptized into the National Presbyterian Church by a pastor, Edward Elson, who had served as a military chaplain in occupied Germany. Ike personally insisted on preceding his inauguration speech with a prayer of his own devising. He opened his first cabinet session with a prayer, and the practice was institutionalized at the urging of his Mormon Secretary for Agriculture. The President also held regular National Prayer Breakfasts, where religious leaders mixed with the powerful, as well as, from 1954 onwards, a National Day of Prayer. 'In God We Trust' became the national motto and henceforth appeared on US banknotes. The Pledge of Allegiance was intended to include the phrase 'one nation under God'.

"The symbolic celebration of an older civic religion was important in a nation whose global enemy marched under the banner of materialist atheism. Americans of the 1950s may have been 'about' McDonald hamburgers, Holiday Inns, Levittown suburbs, Lucille Ball, Elvis, Marlon, Marilyn and James Dean, but it also witnessed an astonishing religious revival. 'I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy, a system... that ascribes to the individual a dignity accruing to him because of his creation in the image of the supreme being,' wrote Ike to a friend in 1947. The US may have been a deeply commercial society itself, but it deprecated the Soviets' obsession with technology, secure in the knowledge that the US was, and would remain, far ahead without having to make the sacrifices that the Soviet leadership imposed on their people. When the Soviet scored a major propaganda coup in launching the first space satellite in October 1957, which did little more than emit beeps to radio hams, Ike responded by helping raise \$20 million to build a new National Presbyterian Church in Washington, while continuing to invest quietly in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and in the long-term development of a spy satellite system to replace the interim U-2 spy plane..."500

On leaving office, Ike warned of the dangers of "the military-industrial complex", the mammoth private corporations that prospered on government arms contracts.

⁵⁰⁰ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2013, pp.258-259.

But it was the pernicious power of non-military American multinational corporations such as United Fruit that constituted the greater long-term threat. Already in the 1950s we see how the interests of these companies, if not dictated, at any rate strongly influenced American policy... This was not an entirely new phenomenon: the interests of the British East India Company had had a similarly powerful influence over British foreign policy in the nineteenth century. But British power even at its greatest extent could not compare with American power after 1945.

American prestige was being seriously undermined by the behaviour of the multinationals, whose interests successive American governments faithfully served... They also intervened to prop up other corporations whose continued existence was deemed essential to American business interests. Thus in 1953 the Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq threatened to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was extracting massive profits in an outrageous way from the Iranians.⁵⁰¹ The CIA intervened to help MI6 to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadeq, supposedly in support of the young Shah, but in fact in support of American business interests.

We see this in the eventual division of the Iranian oil industry: "An international consortium called the National Iranian Oil Company took over the industry, with BP (the rebrand of the AIOC) and a group of five American majors both owning 40 per cent and the rest split between Royal Dutch Shell and others. Oil revenues were divided 50:50 with the Iranian government, in line with the earlier Aramco deal with Riyadh. These arrangements were brokered by Sullivan & Cromwell, Foster Dulles's old firm..."⁵⁰²

So the Iranians eventually got something, but at the cost of a coup that killed many people and still left Anglo-Saxon business interests well served. The pattern would be repeated many times, notably in the Second Iraq War of 2003... Not the least benefit of the coup was that it brought Iran firmly onto the western side in the Cold War in 1955 through the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact, which created a broad tier of countries – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan – that received arms and various kinds of aid from the United State in exchange for remaining in the western sphere of influence. The only major Middle Eastern country that was still not firmly in that sphere was Egypt, which did not have oil but did have the Suez Canal on its territory. The next major international crisis would be the Suez Canal crisis...

As the first Republican president for a generation, Ike presided over a return to the traditionally pro-business bias of the "Grand Old Party" (GOP), which was reflected in his choice of big-businessmen and corporate lawyers for the great offices of state. "His cabinet consisted of 'eight millionaires and a plumber' – a token and useless trade unionist."⁵⁰³

⁵⁰¹ Ray Takeyh, "What Really Happened in Iran", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2014, pp. 2-12. ⁵⁰² Burleigh, op. cit., p. 282.

⁵⁰³ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 256.

Of course, Mammon, money, has always been important in world history as being "the root of all kinds of evil" (<u>I Timothy</u> 6.10). But we may be so bold as to say that it was only in this period that Mammon became the *decisive* factor in life. For up to about the year 1500, "most people," writes Ian Morris, "made the equivalent of £800 in today's money, insofar as such conversions made sense. By 1800, the average crept up to £1000, but in the 19th century it doubled, and in the 20th century it more than quadrupled to about £9000."⁵⁰⁴

This huge increase transformed the world in many ways, physically, psychologically and spiritually. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto writes: "The biggest – but barely noticed – indicator of accelerating change has been consumption, which increased twentyfold per capita worldwide over the 20th century. World population – an area of growth that excited Malthusian fears (of an imminent crash in a population that outstrips production) and ignited population controls – quadrupled. Madcap consumption contributed to growing global environmental stresses. Because people used far more goods in industrialised, urbanized communities, especially in the United States, than anywhere else, the spread of industrialization and urbanization guaranteed that consumption would continue to hurtle out of control to what are now – or soon will be – unsustainable levels.

"Production rose inescapably with consumer demand, while the range of products multiplied bewilderingly, especially in pursuit of techno-gadgetry, medical services and remedies, and of money-making financial and commercial instruments. The world became rapidly unrecognizable to the ageing, whose lives were unprecedentedly prolonged wherever death-defying medical technologies were available."⁵⁰⁵

Yuval Noah Harari writes: "In the twentieth century per capita GDP was perhaps the supreme yardstick for evaluating national success. From this perspective, Singapore, each of whose citizens produces on average \$56,000 worth of goods and services a year, is a more successful country than Costa Rica, whose citizens produce only \$14,000 a year" – although "in one survey after another Costa Ricans report far higher levels of life satisfaction than Singaporeans."⁵⁰⁶

Mammon was decisive in determining the outcome of the Cold War from the human point of view. It was not so much the relative numbers of soldiers on the two sides, nor the relative strength of the will to win on the one side by comparison with the other that was decisive, nor even the superior

⁵⁰⁴ Morris, in *World Histories*, 8, February/March, 2018, p. 23.

⁵⁰⁵ Fernandez-Armeste, in *World Histories*, 8, February/March, 2018, p. 25.

⁵⁰⁶ Harari, *Homo Deus*, London: Vintage, 2017, p. 37.

attractiveness of Capitalism as an *ideology*. The decisive factor was the West's superiority in *technology*, which was determined especially by the West's greater *wealth*.

It was the Soviets' backwardness in technology compared to that of the West that finally compelled them to throw in the towel in the late 1980s. And we are not talking only about military technology. In 1959 the refrigerator at the American Exhibition in Sokolniky Park in Moscow attracted 2.7 million visitors – American consumer culture was deeply and subversively attractive to the other side.⁵⁰⁷ In other words, the Capitalists defeated the Communists in 1989-91 because of their greater financial and material resources and seductiveness.⁵⁰⁸ Both sides were deeply materialist; but the Americans, unlike the Soviets, were able to translate their essentially materialist philosophy into real material benefits for their people.

Political ideologies came more and more to be dominated by the theme of the redistribution of money from the rich to the poor. One of the main factors distinguishing Communism from Socialism and the western-style welfare state was their attitude to how, and how radically, money should be redistributed. Again, European capitalism was distinguished from American capitalism by the much greater share of national wealth it devoted to social security, the welfare state, and the redistribution of wealth by taxation.

In *Das Kapital* (1867), Karl Marx explained how communism would come about in terms that sound eerily prophetic today: "Owners of capital will stimulate the working class to buy more and more expensive goods, houses and technology, pushing them to take more and more expensive credits, until their debt becomes unbearable. The unpaid debt will lead to bankruptcy of banks, which will have to be nationalized, and the State will have to take the road which will eventually lead to communism." Capital and capitalism are therefore the real master of the world that worships Mammon; and the ultimate end of this idolatry is - communism.

Yanis Varoufakis has described this process well, even if we reject his determinist world-view: "The German philosopher Schopenhauer castigated us modern humans for deceiving ourselves that our beliefs and actions are subject to our consciousness. Nietzsche concurred, suggesting that all the things we believe in, at any given time, reflect not truth but someone else's power over us. Marx dragged economics into this picture, reprimanding us all

⁵⁰⁷ Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World*, London: Penguin, 2006, pp. 608-609.

⁵⁰⁸ With greater financial resources enabling them to exploit nuclear technology, the Nazis may well have won World War II. Thus Eric Hobsbawm writes: "Essentially it is now clear that Nazi Germany failed to make a nuclear bomb not because German scientists did not know how it could be made, or try to make it, with different degrees of reluctance, but because the German war-machine was unwilling or unable to devote the necessary resources to it. They abandoned the effort and switched to what seemed the more cost-effective concentration on rocketry, which promised quicker returns" (*Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century* (1914-1991), London: Abacus, 1994, p. 527, note).

for ignoring the reality that our thoughts have become hijacked by capital and its drive to accumulate. Naturally, although it follows its own steely logic, capital evolves mindlessly. No one designed capitalism and no one can civilize it now that it is going at full tilt.

"Having simply evolved, without anyone's consent, it quickly liberated us from more primitive forms of social and economic organization. It bred machines and instruments (material and financial) that allowed us to take over the planet. It empowered us to imagine a future without poverty, where our lives are no longer at the mercy of a hostile *nature*. Yet, at the same time, just as nature spawned Mozart and HIV using the same indiscriminate mechanism, so too did capital produce catastrophic forces with a tendency to bring about discord, inequality, industrial-scale warfare, environmental degradation and, of course, financial freefalls. In one fell swoop, it generated – with neither rhyme nor reason – wealth and crises, development and deprivation, progress and backwardness..."⁵⁰⁹

But we don't have to be Marxists or Darwinists in order to reach this truth. Christ said that we can choose to be ruled either by God or by Mammon (in its modern form, Capitalism); we cannot serve both. (However, there is a variant of American Protestantism, sometimes called *prosperity theology*, which teaches that if we believe in God he will give us material prosperity, and that it is God's will that His people be happy.) So a civilization that places free markets and economic growth at the head of the corner is not Christian, and will inevitably degenerate into anti-Christianity. Similarly, the moderate form of socialism called welfarism is no substitute for truly Christian faith and charity. It merely tries to ensure (unsuccessfully in the long run) that the capitalist cake is shared out with a minimum of equity and without war or revolution. And of course Communism is no solution. It simply exchanges the slavery of Capital for the still more terrible slavery of the atheist totalitarian state with its worship of dialectical materialism.

The balance-sheet of American Capitalism is fairly evenly balanced... On the one hand, American-led and American-financed capitalism after 1945 drew people all around the world out of extreme poverty at an astonishing rate. Nobody can reasonably deny that in the immediate post-war years, the role of the United States in the world can be described, more or less unequivocally, as positive and beneficial. This is most obvious in the containment of Communism (no small boon!), but is also clear in the rescuing of whole countries and regions (West Europe and Japan in particular) from poverty and chaos, and in providing refuge and protection to large numbers of Orthodox Christians and many other refugees from Communism.

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⁵⁰⁹ Varoufakis, *The Global Minotaur*, London: Zed Books, 2013, p. 19.

As St. Aristocles of Moscow prophesied in 1911: "America will feed the world, but will finally collapse." The first part of the prophecy has been abundantly fulfilled (and the second looks not far from fulfilment).

In spite of this phenomenon – which has continued into the twenty-first century - global opinion has shifted to the left in recent decades, and it has become customary to concentrate on the debit side of capitalism and minimize the credit side. St. John Maximovich, the great Archbishop of San Francisco (+1966), said that while the United States was a great country, it was threatened by the vices of greed and sensuality. And from about 1953 the interventions of American power become more ambiguous.

Many commentators, of whom perhaps the most learned and penetrating is the leftist MIT professor Noam Chomsky, have gone further and described the American role as unequivocally evil. They see American interventions as serving the interests *only* of American Big Business, and as overthrowing popular government through the CIA on the usually mendacious excuse of preventing communist takeovers but with the real aim of installing cruel, fascist-style dictators who were bribed to do the will of the big corporations.

This is an exaggerated view, but not entirely false... "All over the Third World," writes Niall Ferguson, "there were popular national movements which aimed to overthrow the last vestiges of West European colonial rule and establish some form of popularly based government. The Soviets proved remarkably good at persuading many such movements to adopt their own political an economic model. Decolonization was the wave the Soviets rode; 'popular liberation' was the phrase they knew well how to use. Of course, the American political system had also been the product of a revolt against imperial rule. Yet somehow Lenin, Stalin and Mao had more appeal than Washington, Jefferson and Madison. The American model of democracy plus capitalism had far fewer takers than the Soviet alternative of one party plus socialism. This was partly because poor former colonies like Guatemala, Cuba and Angola had a large, impoverished peasantry, of the sort that had been decisive in backing the Russian and Chinese revolutions, but only a small middle class, of the sort that made the American one. Partly it was because ambitious Third World 'freedom fighters' liked the opportunities the distinctly unfree Soviet system had to offer them. In a one-party system, the first winner takes all; there is no danger of his being asked to hand over power to some rival within just a few years. And with a planned economy, the new political rulers can acquire any economic asset they like in the name of 'nationalization'.

"The Soviets had a further advantage. They knew better than anyone how to arm illiterate peasants with cheap, reliable and use-friendly weapons. Mikhail Kalashnikov made his first rifle in 1947 – hence the abbreviated name AK-(*Automat Kalashnikov*)47 – just as the pace of decolonization was quickening and superpower relations were worsening. Such weapons were shipped in crate-loads to Third World countries, part of a low-profile small arms race running parallel to the headline-grabbing nuclear arms race. It was not long

before the AK-47 became the Marxist guerrilla's weapon of choice. What could the Americans do in response? Aside from simply yielding the southern hemisphere to Khrushchev and his successors, there were three possibilities. They could prop up or resuscitate the old colonial regimes that the Third World Lenins were aiming to destroy. That did not come easily to US leaders, with their deep-rooted anti-imperial assumptions, but there were places where they were willing to try it. No one complained in Washington, for example, when the British defeated the Communists in Malaya. The Americans also encouraged the British to prolong their informal sphere of influence in the smaller states of the Persian Gulf. A more appealing response was to find pro-American freedom fighters - in other words, to back democratic political parties that favoured multi-party elections, not to mention free markets. But experience in Eastern Europe and Asia immediately after the Second World War tended to suggest that true liberals were perilously weak in relatively backward societies. Fresh in the memories of all American policy-makers were the examples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest, where all the non-Communist political parties had effectively been snuffed out or emasculated. And, lest these memories fade, the Soviets did not hesitate to crush outbreaks of popular dissent in their European satellites - in East Berlin in 1953, Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968 and Gdansk in 1982.

"The third option for American foreign policy was to fight dirty - as dirty, in fact, as the Soviets. In practice, Soviet victories always meant dictatorship and the repression that comes with it. For the Americans it was therefore tempting to back anyone who showed signs of being able to beat the Sovietbacked revolutionaries, even if it meant imposing a capitalist dictatorship instead. The problem with this was that very quickly the United States found itself tainted by association with and support for regimes that were every bit as vicious as the worst Communist tyrannies of Eastern Europe or Asia. Worse, it was seldom clear beyond all reasonable doubt that the dictators backed by Washington were always the lesser evil, since the popular movements they crushed generally did not have the chance to show their true colours in power. Those left-wing leaders who were overthrown or murdered by CIA-backed regimes swiftly became martyrs not only in Soviet propaganda but also in the liberal press of the West. While experience strongly suggested that Marxists showed scant respect for human rights once in power, those who never made it to power or who held it only briefly could always be given the benefit of the doubt. Like Jekyll and Hyde, then, American foreign policy in the Cold War seemed to come in two guises: by day talking the language of freedom, democracy and the shining city on a hill; by night using dirty tricks to stymie suspected Soviet clients and to promote local 'strongmen' - what the United States regarded as its own geopolitical backyard: Central America, the birthplace of the dictum: 'It doesn't matter if it's a sonofabitch, so long as it's our sonofabitch.' This was the hard essence of what some commentators called realism." 510

⁵¹⁰ Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 613-615.

Central America was indeed the United States' "backyard", into which successive American presidents had claimed a special right to intervene. These interventions began long before the Cold War and were usually unsuccessful. Thus Woodrow Wilson's interventions in the region, writes Ferguson, "began a history of spasmodic intervention in Central America and the Caribbean that has continued to the present day. Indeed, when one compares the two territories in the region that the United States formally annexed - Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (purchased from Denmark in 1916) - with the countries it sought to control by indirect means, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that annexation might have been better for all these places. Between the wars American enthusiasm for the Roosevelt Corollary faded, the Wilsonian belief that the people of the region should somehow be 'taught... to elect good men' lost credibility. In 1924 the marines pulled out of the Dominican Republic. Any pretense of interest in Honduras was abandoned in the course of the 1920s; by 1932 the United Fruit Company, which dominated the country's banana production, was content to coexist peacefully and profitably with the authoritarian Tiburcio Carlos Andino, who ruled the country until 1948. 'Intervention,' Herbert Hoover told reporters shortly after being elected president, 'is not now, never was, and never will be a set policy of the United States.' In fact, his successor, Franklin Roosevelt, lost little time in intervening in Cuba; the upshot, however, was another military dictatorship under a young sergeant named Fulgencio Batista. In 1933 the Platt Amendment was effectively torn up; all that survived of American control over Cuba was the Guantanamo base. That same year Roosevelt pulled the American troops out of Haiti too.

"Perhaps the most dispiriting case of all was Nicaragua, which by the mid-1920s was in the grip of civil war between rival Liberal and Conservative factions. In went the marines once more, this time to thwart a coup attempt by Emiliano Chamorro, back went Diaz to the presidential palace and along came Henry L. Stimson to broker some kind of settlement. In the summer of 1927 he might have succeeded, but for the obstinate resistance of one Liberal commander, Augusto César Sandino. Elections were held in 1928, and again in 1932, but the marines found themselves embroiled in a gruelling guerrilla war against the Sandanistas, which not even the precocious use of airpower could dislodge from their mountain fastnesses. By 1932 the question being asked by many Americans was 'Why are we in Nicaragua and what the hell are we doing there?' One correspondent to the New York Times sounded a note that has proved especially resonant: 'We ought to go down there and clean up the situation or get out of there and stay out. There's no use our sending a handful of our boys down there to be butchered.' (In fact, total U.S. fatalities were 136.) In January 1933 the last marines were withdrawn. Thirteen months later Sandino was executed by the first Nicaraguan-born commander of the U.S. trained National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who two years later installed himself as president. The Somoza dictatorship was to endure for two generations, until 1979.

"This was not the way Wilson had planned it. The dream of using American military force to underwrite American-style governments in Central America had failed miserably..."⁵¹¹

It not only failed: the murders that the American-backed governments committed destroyed for many America's claim to be fighting for democracy and human rights against communism.

"There is no question," writes Michael Burleigh, "that the cascade of US military interventions sits heavily on the historical record. The fact that they were wrapped in paternalist verbiage (Wilson's 'a world fit for democracy' springs to mind) simply added insult to injury. The maverick Marine Major-General Smedley Butler, one of the most decorated soldiers in US history, had this to say about his own career:

"I spent 33 years in active military service and during this period I spent most of the time as a high class thug for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico safe for American oil interests. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank to collect revenues. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the Banking House of Brown Brothers. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents."⁵¹²

The best formula for peace and prosperity in Latin America was simply keeping good diplomatic relations with the Americans. Thus in Costa Rica José 'Pepe' Figueres "seized power from a democratically elected president in 1948 and promptly abolished the army, nationalized the banks, and granted women and blacks the vote. What he did not do was indulge in strident anti-*yanqui* rhetoric, for he had studied at MIT and had two successive American wives, with the result that, although balefully regarded by the CIA, he was the poster boy of the State Department, and Costa Rica became an island of peaceful democracy surrounded by variously extreme anti- and pro-US guerrilla governments and dictators. The State Department ensured that Somoza did not kill him..."⁵¹³

Less wise was President Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala, who was overthrown in 1954 because he threatened the interests of the American company United Fruit. This coup demonstrated that the relationship between the United States and Guatemala was indeed semicolonial.

⁵¹¹ Ferguson, Colossus, London: Allen Lane, 2004, pp. 57-58.

⁵¹² Burleigh, *Small Wars, Far Away Places,* London: Pan, 2014, p. 422.

⁵¹³ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 426-427.

However, at a conference in Caracas in 1978 no less an authority than the founder of Venezuelan democracy and Socialist President of Venezuela Romolo Betancourt put into perspective this mistake, as well as the similarly unfortunate intervention the Americans made in overthrowing the Dominican Republic's Juan Bosch in 1963: "There is no doubt that the very mysterious and shadowy CIA has contributed to the overthrow of a number of governments in Latin America, including governments elected through popular suffrage, and that its operations were sometimes carried out directly by the United States embassies. This was established and illustrated in the detailed report to the Senate by the Church Committee in the United States. But what emerges as most dangerous for the stability of democratic governments in Latin America is that every time a government is overthrown, we can say the CIA overthrew it, the State Department overthrew it. Carlos Rangel wrote a book with which I basically agree and which aroused broad international debate, since it was not only a bestseller in Spanish, but was also translated into English and French. He warns us against the convenient tendency of Latin American governments, when they are overthrown because they were incompetent, because they were corrupt, because they did not show a sense of responsibility toward the obligation the electorate placed in their hands, to explain these difficulties and falls as being due uniquely to external manoeuvres.

"Goodwin cited to us the case of General Arbenz, who was overthrown in 1954 by an insurrectional movement wholly fabricated by the CIA. But General Arbenz, who had been placed in power by a popular vote, surrounded himself with a communist staff as soon as he took over the government. Guatemala became a rallying point for communists of various origins, European and Asian as well as Latin American. Arbenz bought arms from Czechoslovakia. When Stalin died, he asked the Guatemalan Parliament to stand in silence for two minutes to show its grief. When Lombardo Toledano, the Mexican communist labor leader, went to Guatemala, General Arbenz, surrounded by his entire cabinet, went in person to the airport to greet him. Yet all this was combined with extraordinary corruption on the part of the team in power. These defenders of the proletariat were unbridled in enriching themselves while in office. I have precise information on all that and when we Venezuelan socialists learned of the situation in Guatemala, we sent an emissary to President José Figueres of Costa Rica with a letter explaining what was happening. Arbenz was overthrown and Arbenz left for the Eastern countries. Then he went to Cuba. I do not wish to be cruel, because he is dead, but I must be frank: since he was not a very useful imbecile, the communists dropped him and [he] disappeared.

"In the case of Juan Bosch, to whom Goodwin also referred, there is usually some confusion. President Bosch was really overthrown by a military government that he saw coming and did nothing to oppose. Throughout his term in office, he did not once call a meeting of his government. One fine day he suddenly decided to dissolve his own party, the party that had brought him to power, the Dominican Revolutionary Party. He distanced himself widely and aggressively from his democratic companions, took it on himself to tighten relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba, and was overthrown by the military. It was really not until a year later that the United States intervened, when the Caamano movement arose, which does not alter the fact that the United States's intervention in the Dominican Republic was one of the gravest and most reprehensible mistakes that government ever made. But there would have been no occasion for making that mistake if Juan Bosch had not begun by totally denaturing the mandate entrusted to him by the Dominican Republic."⁵¹⁴

Nevertheless, writes Revel, "it takes a profound ignorance of history to blame American imperialism alone for the long Latin American tradition of coups d'état, military dictatorships, civil wars, corruption, revolution, bloody terror, and repression; this goes back to the very founding of independent states there nearly two centuries ago."⁵¹⁵

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The one country in the region which seemed capable of attaining peace and prosperity without the help or hindrance of the United States was Argentina, "whose economy in the inter-war period," writes Paul Johnson, "was developing on the lines of Canada's and Australia's. Like Canada it had boomed from 1900 to 1914, experienced slower growth in the 1920s, a sharp setback from 1929 to 1933, but thereafter a long period of growth at an average of 2-3 per cent a year, with steady progress in the manufacturing, mining, oil, public utilities and electrical sectors: achieving, in fact, economic take-off - the first Latin American country to do so. It had a market economy, minimum government, a growing middle-class, a free press and the rule of law. During the Second World War it enjoyed a prosperity unknown in the southern hemisphere outside Australia, with wages rising to West European levels. It accumulated what was then the princely reserves of \$1,500 million in dollar and sterling balances - more than Britain, Argentina's chief economic partner, had been able to invest there in over seventy years. If the money had been used to create steel, petroleum and other import-substitution industries, the likelihood is that Argentina would have achieved dramatic, self-sustaining economic growth during the 1950s, and the whole history of Latin America would have been different.

"Indeed, Argentina fell victim to both the twin evils which poison Latin America: militarism and politics. In the nineteenth century the military coup had become a standard means to change government. This disastrous practice continued after the arrival of universal suffrage. In the years 1920-66, for instance, there were eighty successful military coups in eighteen Latin-American countries; Ecuador and Bolivia leading with nine each, Paraguay and Argentina following with seven each. The key one in Argentina came in 1943.

⁵¹⁴ Betancourt, in Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, pp. 321-323.

⁵¹⁵ Revel, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

The junta appointed to the Labour Ministry a certain Colonel Juan Peron, the son of a poor farmer who had done well in the army; a handsome ski and fencing champion, flashy in mind and body, student of sociology, a pseudo-intellectual of the type that was to become very common in the post-war era. The military had hitherto stamped on unions. Person discovered that, by patronising labour, he could build himself a mass-following. As Labour Minister, he took over the unions. Hitherto, union leaders had been bribed personally. Peron bribed the entire labour movement.

"Peron's career illustrated the essential identity of the Marxist and the fascist will to power, for at times he borrowed from Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, Franco and Stalin. He had great personal charm; a superb speaking voice; a gift for ideological verbiage. He spoke of his labour followers as 'the shirtless ones'⁵¹⁶ (they were in fact well paid). He called his philosophy *Justicialismo*, the first of the bogus 'isms' of what was to become the Third World. Peron could claim to be the prototype not merely of a new kind of Latin-American dictator but of all the post-colonial charismatics of Africa and Asia. He was the link between the old-style mountebank dictator and the new Bandung model. He showed how to manipulate head-counting democracy. He had no substance. When he quarrelled with his military colleagues in 1945, all he could think of was to fall on his knees and beg for mercy. It was his mistress Eva Duarte, a militant feminist, who roused the workers and got him released. By marrying her he squared the church. Then he swept on to a handsome victory (24 February 1945) in one of the few free elections in Argentina's history.

"As President, Peron gave a classic demonstration, in the name of socialism and nationalism, of how to wreck an economy. He nationalized the Central Bank, railways, telecommunications, gas, electricity, fishing, air-transport, steel and insurance. He set up a state marketing agency for exports. He created Big Government and a welfare state in one bound: spending on public services, as percentage of GNP, rose from 19.5 to 29.5 per cent in five years. He had no system of priorities. He told the people they would get everything at once. In theory they did. The workers were given thirteen months' pay for a year's work; holidays with pay; social benefits at a Scandinavian level. He would track down a highly successful firm which spent lavishly on its workers and force all firms to copy its practices, regardless of their resources. At the same time he carried out a frontal assault on the agricultural sector, Argentina's main source of internal capital. By 1951 he had exhausted the reserves and decapitalized the country, wrecked the balance of payments and built wage inflation into the system. Next year drought struck the land and brought the crisis into the open. Seeing his support vanish, Peron turned from economic demagoguery to political tyranny. He destroyed the Supreme Court. He took over the radio station, and *La Prensa*, the greatest newspaper in Latin America. He debauched the universities and fiddled with the constitution. Above all, he created public 'enemies': Britain, America, all foreigners, the Jockey Club, which his gangs burned down in 1953, destroying its library and art collection.

⁵¹⁶ Recalling the *sansculottes* ("trouserless ones") of the French Revolution. (V.M.)

Next year he turned on Catholicism, and in 1953 his labour unions destroyed Argentina's two finest churches, San Francisco an Santo Domingo, and many others.

"This was the last straw. The army turned him out. He fled on a Paraguayan gunboat. But his successors would never get back to the minimum government which had allowed Argentina to become wealthy. Too many vested interests had been created: a huge, parasitical state, over-powerful unions, a vast army of public employees. It is one of the dismal lessons of the twentieth century that, once a state is allowed to expand, it is almost impossible to contract it. Peron's legacy proved more durable than his verbiage. But he himself proved durable enough. In 1968 the head of the military, General Alejandro Lanusse, swore: 'If that man... should set foot in this land again, one of us, he or I, will leave it feet first, because I shall not let my sons suffer what I have.' Five years later, as President, he organized the elections which swept Peron back into power, aged seventy-nine: a case, as Dr. Johnson said of second marriage, of 'the triumph of hope over experience'. By this point the whole course of Argentina's history had been changed. It had forfeited its chance of becoming an advanced economy and had been permanently downgraded to the status of second-rate Latin-American republic, condemned to industrial а backwardness, political instability and military tyranny. In the late 1970s and early 1980s it even embarked on a reckless adventure against Britain's Falkland Isles, which ended in a humiliating defeat..."517

In the next fifty years, American corporatism would develop worldwide into something whose power and destructiveness nobody could have suspected in the 1950s. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway and Anthony Fauci's control of American and Global Health vaccines would come together to create a monster that was more powerful even than the American government. But that is another story...

⁵¹⁷ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 616-618.

38. KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET SPEECH AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

In 1955, public access to the Kremlin was restored. "It was, some later said, 'the first step towards the liberalization of the Soviet regime."⁵¹⁸ And indeed, the first major step towards the liberalization of the Soviet state took place in the next year, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956: with the agreement of the Politburo, Khrushchev read a secret, four-hour speech partially exposing Stalin. The main characteristic of the speech was that it laid the blame for the horrors of the Soviet regime exclusively on Stalin, exempting Lenin and other communist officials altogether: "Everything, declared Khrushchev, "was dependent on the wilfulness of one man." This line – all the horrors of communism are the result of one man's deviation from the correct Leninist norms – has been a favourite ploy of unrepentant Marxists ever since, despite the fact that "Leninist norms" were subhuman barbarism...

"Only three years earlier Stalin's death had produced a mass outpouring of grief, even near hysteria, among Soviet citizens. 'Everyone was in tears,' one woman recalled. 'We did now know what was going to happen next. We had never known anything different.' How genuine the grief was is impossible to ascertain. It was wise not to voice publicly the private reaction of a woman in Kazakhstan who simply said: 'Stalin's dead, and a good thing too.' Even so, the personality cult of the great leader, cultivated over so many years, had not been without effect. Millions had come close to worshipping Stalin. Now they were asked utterly to disavow their recent idol. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many were shocked when they learnt the content of the speech; there was also great confusion.

"Reactions were mixed. Portraits and busts of Stalin were destroyed, removed or defaced in places across the Soviet Union. There were demands to remove his body from its place of honour alongside Lenin's embalmed remains in the Kremlin mausoleum (though this was not, in fact, done until 1961). But many never forgave Khrushchev for toppling their idol from his pedestal. They defended Stalin, resisted attempts to remove his portraits, and praised his purges of those who had opposed them. Nowhere was the Stalin cult upheld more fervently than in his native Georgia, where four days of protest at Khrushchev's denunciation of the former dictator marked the third anniversary of his death. Some 50,000 people gathered to pay homage to him on 5 March at his birthplace in Gori. A crowd of over 60,000 people attended a demonstration on 7 March to place flowers on Stalin's monument in Tbilisi. During the following days, hundreds of others commandeered vehicles to carry portraits of 'the Great Stalin' around the city, shouting 'Down with Khrushchev' and 'Long Live Stalin'. Troops were sent in to quell the mounting disturbance. The events left twenty dead, sixty wounded and many others imprisoned.

⁵¹⁸ Catherine Merridale, Red Fortress, New York: Picador, 2013, p. 336.

"Across the Soviet Union there was certainly far more open criticism than had been risked only a short tie earlier. People, including those returning from the Gulag, felt emboldened to break their silence and to speak out. Party members queried the suggestion that other members of the Presidium had been ignorant of what Stalin was doing. They asked why it had taken so long to speak of Stalin's crimes. 'And where was Khrushchev himself?' asked one Stalin admirer, a retired colonel in the Red Army. 'Why did he keep quiet back then, but began to pour out all this muck on Stalin now he's dead?' Some asked why Khrushchev had made no mention of the many victims who had not been party members and questioned whether the system itself was not to blame. Such searching criticism was, however, exceptional. Critics more usually attacked abuses of Leninist ideals, not the Soviet system itself. Nearly forty years after the Revolution, it was as good as impossible to contemplate any alternative to a system that, whatever its faults, had proved victorious in the war. Most people were in any case still wary of voicing their opinions too loudly. Even so, the Central Committee was worried enough to send out a circular in June 1956 demanding tough action to curb the criticism."⁵¹⁹

Professor Andrei Zubov writes that the event was "absolutely unprecedented, not only in the Soviet Union, but in the whole communist world movement. Because the main, axial figure of the whole communist movement supported by the Soviet Union (over there, there was another, Trotskyite movement), was, of course, Stalin. Stalin was its centre and essence. His methods of rule, his attitude to men, to the world - it was against all that this people with communist views throughout the world - in China, in Europe, and in Latin America, not to speak of the Soviet Union – measured themselves. And the condemnation of Stalin - for the first time, the demonstration of his crimes (almost exclusively with regard to members of the party - the repressions after the 17th Congress of the Bolshevik Party, the 'Leningrad Affair' of 1948) – this information completely blew people's minds. Very many did not believe it. Others said that it was a provocation. A third group condemned Khrushchev and said that he was a traitor to the cause of communism. And of course those who had previously had a negative attitude to Stalin or had suffered at his hands were in raptures.

"But to some degree clever people had noticed this process even earlier. In fact, the process of destalinization began with the death of Stalin – precisely in March, 1953. Because at first Beria, and then, after Beria's overthrow, Malenkov and Khrushchev began the process of the gradual release of people from the camps, the gradual improvement of the people's situation in agriculture, the peasant collective-farmers, a relaxation in censorship – and stopped inflating Stalin's cult of personality literally from the first days. Stalin had not yet been buried, but they already said: that's enough, we must not have all these improbable panegyrics, these incredible verses, and they passed to the day-today affairs of state construction. Clever people noticed that Stalin's closest colleagues were not going to sing hosannas to Stalin as they themselves had

⁵¹⁹ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, pp. 93-95.

sung them until the last day of his life. Naturally, the case of the Jewish doctors, like many other cases, was cut short. 1956 was both unexpected and expected for those who had a good understanding of the Muscovite political kitchen.

"How was destalinization carried out?... Monuments were pulled down – that was very important; Stalin was thrown out of the mausoleum – that also was important. But much more important was what they said: under Stalin terrible crimes were carried out. And many people were rehabilitated posthumously. Most of these people were condemned according to article 58 as having acted 'in a hostile manner' (as spies, conspirators, terrorists) against Soviet power. A huge number of people killed by Stalin were rehabilitated, and those few who survived were rehabilitated in their lifetime, and a mass of people returned.⁵²⁰ In spite of Khrushchev's fantastic mistakes, in spite of the fact that he himself was just such a murderer and criminal as Stalin – both in the Ukraine and in Moscow, - a huge number of people of that generation were grateful to him for liberating, justifying and returning the repressed from exile. And in general the epoch of total repressions then came to an end..."

"As a system of mass forced labour," writes Anne Applebaum, "involving millions of people, the camps disappeared when Stalin died. Although he had believed all of his life that the Gulag was critical to Soviet economic growth, his political heirs knew well that the camps were, in fact, a source of backwardness and distorted investment. Within days of his death, Stalin's successors began to dismantle them..."⁵²¹

Several rebellions accelerated this process. Thus on May 16, 1954 the biggest rebellion of Gulag prisoners in the history of the Soviet concentration camps began in Kengir, Kazakhstan. For forty days the prisoners – of all nationalities, but especially Ukrainians – held out. However, on June 26 the NKVD regained control of "Steplag" with the aid of the Red Army and T-34 tanks. Between 500 and 700 prisoners were killed.⁵²²

There were also serious rebellions in the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, where Soviet slavery was still a relatively new experience and where the impact of Khrushchev's speech against Stalin had a still greater impact than in Russia.

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Already in June 1953, three years before the speech, writes Revel, "the people of East Germany rose against the occupying power, but the West failed to seize the opportunity to insist on peace-treaty negotiations that would have ended the dangerous division of Germany, still one of the Soviet Union's

⁵²⁰ "Two million 'politicals' returned from Gulag camps and colonies – and an equal number from the special settlements – between 1953 and 1960" (Figes, op. cit., p. 349). (V.M.)

⁵²¹ Zubov, "Stalin – eto os', vokrug kotorogo vrashchaietsa vsia nyneshniaia vlast'" (Stalin is the axis on which the whole of the present regime revolves), *Open Russia*, February 25, 2016, https://openrussia.org/post/view/13010.

⁵²² Applebaum, op. cit., p. 5.

principal means of blackmailing the United States and Europe. At the time, no Western government had yet officially recognized the East German Communist government.

"In the summer and fall of 1956, the Polish people rose; we let the Soviets arrange matters their way, by bouncing Bierut and replacing him with Wladyslaw Gomulka. Instead of acting like indifferent spectators, the West could have dusted off promises made at Yalta – the real ones – committing Stalin to organize free elections in Poland. The balance of power, then highly favourable to the United States, would have made such a demand eminently realistic and, we must insist, in no way 'imperialistic'; it would in fact have been the moral thing to do, in support of a people's right of self-determination and in the interests of that peace that the Polish tragedy in the heart of Europe has continually threatened in the twenty-five years since then.

"Shortly after the Polish October came a new explosion, the even more widespread and more violent uprising of the Hungarian people, directly challenging the Soviet presence there and communism itself, without prompting from the West. With Moscow's agent, the Stalinist Erno Gero, swept out of power, the most popular man in the country, the only one available in that time of disintegrating power structure, was old Communist Imre Nagy, a former Premier who had been ousted a year earlier. The only program he could come up with was a sort of neutralization of Hungary on the Austrian model approved the year before, which would have taken the country out of the Soviet bloc. A mere flip of the finger by the West could have been decisive then. Caught off balance, with their guard down, the Soviets were being condemned throughout the world, and they were at a strategic disadvantage. Had the West overcome its irresolution and formulated its demands, it would not even have had to use its military power. Why, after all, was Khrushchev so frightened? Why did he feel a need to cover himself with Mao Tse-tung's 'authorization', and why did he consult secretly with Tito? Why did he hesitate so long before moving, sending in his tanks only when he was sure the West would merely boo the play without interrupting the performance?"523

Determined resistance by the Hungarians to the Soviet invasion of Budapest enabled Nagy to bring the fighting to an end – temporarily. However, it was Nagy's announcement, on November 1, that Hungary was leaving the Warsaw Pact that made up Khrushchev's mind "to intervene again. "If we depart Hungary," he told his colleagues, "it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, French – the imperialists. They will perceive it as a weakness on our part and go on the offensive."⁵²⁴ In particular, if Hungary left the Warsaw Pact, the whole Soviet empire in Eastern Europe might unravel.

So on 4 November, Soviet tanks rolled in again. It took them a week to crush the uprising. Denounced by Moscow as a 'counter-revolutionary', Nagy was

⁵²³ Revel, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

⁵²⁴ Khrushchev, in Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, p. 22.

arrested, tried in secret and later executed 'as a lesson to all other leaders in Socialist countries.'"⁵²⁵ From October 23 to December 1 inclusive, 12,971 people were killed in the whole of Hungary, with 2,700 wounded. In Budapest 1,945 were killed and 11,513 wounded, of whom 559 later died.

"In Hungary the scale of the uprising, the brutal repression that followed, and Moscow's determination to maintain tight control, left Kadar's puppet government with little possibility of meaningful change at first. The need to improve living standards nevertheless worked eventually to Kadar's advantage. Decentralization of administrative controls in both industry and agriculture stimulated higher levels of production. Economic growth also benefited from the export of bauxite and uranium. The system stabilized. Standards of living rose and the improvements diluted the social disaffection that only a few years earlier had threatened to undermine communist rule. By the early 1960s Kadar was able to bring about a limited form of liberalization. Political prisoners were released and a wide-ranging amnesty was issued. The stringent restrictions on cultural activities and freedom of expression were somewhat relaxed, it became possible to listen to Western radio, intellectuals could cultivate limited contacts with the West, and overt police repression was reined in. 'Goulash communism' - a term depicting greater attention to consumer products than in the rest of the Soviet bloc - allowed even a limited market economy (though economic problems soon started to mount). But the security apparatus remained in place, under the party's control. Possibly a near doubling of annual suicide rates between 1955 and 1970 implied less than total contentment in Janos Kadar's Hungary. Hungary was even so on its way, in Western eyes, to becoming the least unattractive face of the Soviet bloc.

"So Poland and Hungary went somewhat different ways. In the first case the clamp was loosened then gradually retightened, in the second sharply tightened them somewhat loosened. But in neither case could it be released fully. What bound both countries and the rest of the bloc together was that – to paraphrase what Friedrich Engels had decades earlier said of the economy – 'in the last instance' Soviet power determined matters. There was, it is true, no return to the fully fledged Stalinism that had been the norm before 1953, though some neo-Stalinist characteristics persisted everywhere.

"Communism throughout Eastern Europe had in fact lost its earlier revolutionary raison d'etre. Whatever the cynical propaganda about building a society infinitely superior to that of imperialist Western capitalism, the Soviet Union and its satellites had turned into merely conservative authoritarian states whose actual aims soared no higher than maintaining the system but were devoid of revolutionary dynamism or utopian ambitions. Beyond the apparatchiks who profited from the system and, doubtless, a leaven of enthusiasts and true believers, most ordinary people got on with their lives, indifferent or simply resigned to seemingly unalterable political conditions. Given a choice, most would almost certainly have opted for something other

⁵²⁵ Figes, op. cit., pp. 357-358.

than the 'real existing socialism' that ultimately was kept in place by Soviet force. The reality was that they did not have that choice. Communist rule could have its harshest edges blunted and be amended somewhat in line with national demands in the varied satellite states. Fundamental change to the system, however, was out of the question."⁵²⁶

The suppression of the Hungarian uprising by Soviet tanks showed that the relaxation of total repression introduced by Stalin's successors, if it involved a "thawing" of the ice, by no means meant freedom – or precluded a return to freezing if the despotic oligarchy ruling the bloc so decided...

However, Hungary was important in that it brought to an end the illusion entertained by many European intellectuals - among them the historian François Furet in France and Leszek Kołakowski in Poland⁵²⁷ - that there could be a "good" Marxism that was not Stalinist. This beginning of a shift in intellectual opinion would bear fruit in the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Solidarity Movement in Poland in the 1980s...

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On August 13, 1961, in the course of a single night, the East Germans built a wall between East and West Berlin to stem the huge outflow of people from East to West. The West was caught napping, and did not respond, except verbally. This was a worrying precedent, because at a time when the West still enjoyed military superiority over the East, it failed to take the minimum measures – for example, sending a few tanks to disperse the civilian builders of the wall - that would have prevented this flagrant violation of the fourpower treaties over Berlin. President Kennedy's coming to Berlin and calling himself a Berliner hardly reversed this situation. And it could be argued that it was this display of Western pusillanimity - a precursor of the shameful appeasement of Soviet aggression in the 1970s - that encouraged Khrushchev to initiate the far more dangerous Cuban crisis the next year... However, it could be argued that, as in 1948, the West had called the Soviets' bluff over Berlin and had won. Thus "in the Berlin crisis of 1958-61," writes Hosking, "Khrushchev threatened to block access to West Berlin if the Western powers did not withdraw from it, but he did not have the means to implement that threat when the West stood firm..."528

This was an era in which the Soviets had a tendency to over-reach, and had to back down in the face of superior American air power. The balance would begin to be redressed only in the later 1960s when the Americans began to flounder in Vietnam. Within the Union, living conditions in the cities – but not in the countryside – rose quite rapidly as vast numbers of new flats were built.

⁵²⁶ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, pp. 129-130.

⁵²⁷ See Tony Judt's articles on these two in *When the Facts Change*, London: Vintage, 2015, chapters 26 and 28.

⁵²⁸ Hosking, Russia and the Russians, p. 516.

However, Soviet agriculture continued to fail, including the flagship project of the opening up of the virgin, but infertile steppes of Northern Kazakhstan, which created huge dust storms through erosion of the top-soil.

Moreover, the rise in living standards was by no means everywhere. In Novocherkassk on June 2, 1962 there were major demonstrations by workers against the authorities because of very sharp rises in prices on milk and meat and empty shelves in the shops. The tanks were brought in, and according to official statistics, 26 people were killed and 87 wounded, while many others were sent to the camps. In fact, the casualties were probably much higher, and when the authorities failed to scrub out all the blood stains in the main square it was asphalted over and dances on it were organized – so that the young people "could drive evil thoughts away from themselves".⁵²⁹

It looked as if the goal of freedom was as far away as ever. After every step forward, the state appeared to take two steps back. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's 1956 speech continued to shake the foundations of Soviet power, especially in the enslaved states of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Iron Curtain was looking less than fully sealed. The example and siren call of Western freedom continued to sound in the ears of the Soviet peoples...

⁵²⁹ Rustam Bultialetdinov, "Rasstrel 'Novocherkasskogo Maidana' v 1962 godu", *Fakeoff*, http://fakeoff.org/history/rasstrel-novocherkasskogo-maydana-v-1962-godu.

<u>39. THE CULTURAL THAW AND "DOCTOR ZHIVAGO"</u>

The first tentative signs of a "thaw" within the Soviet Union could be seen in a certain opening up to the West in the cultural sphere. For example, in 1957 the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould was invited to the Soviet Union, where his playing of Bach was rapturously received. Then the Soviets decided to demonstrate to the West that they had artists of equal calibre: the pianists Sviatoslav Richter and Emil Gilels, the violinists David Oistrakh and Leonid Kogan, and the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich were all allowed to go on tour in the West, where they were greatly appreciated.

Works such as Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* (1954) and Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* (1956) were the first signs of a thaw in the literary sphere. In 1957 the poet Boris Pasternak, finding no publishers in the Soviet Union, had his great novel, *Doctor Zhivago*, a great epic of the revolution, published in Italy. From there it spread around the world and back into Russia in a Russian edition (thanks to the CIA). The title was itself provocative: 'Zhivago' recalled the Church Slavonic phrase for "the living God", "Boga Zhivago", and the content was a scarcely hidden attack on the revolution for its mindless cruelty and assault on the first value for the poet – truth.

For *Zhivago* Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, which angered the Soviets because it was achieved without their "blessing" and was clearly more Russian than Soviet in spirit. (Pasternak was in fact a Jew of Russian Orthodox faith.) After a long process of harassment, in which his mistress, but not he, was sent to the Gulag, he was forced to renounce his Prize, while winning the much greater prize of international readership and acclaim.

Pasternak's novel, whose heart was a moving love story that closely mirrored his real-life loves⁵³⁰, was a vivid portrayal of the chaos and cruelty especially of the Civil War years, and a powerful lament for that Russian Christian culture that the revolution had destroyed. Nevertheless, Pasternak makes no reference to the struggle of the Church and the State in that period; and he himself appears to have been a "cultural Christian" rather than a confessor of the faith. For, as his friend Mandelstam wrote in his poem "The Age", this was an age whose back was broken: while many lamented the fall of Russian Christian civilization, few – the few of the Catacomb Church – remained loyal to its essence.

From a historical point of view, *Doctor Zhivago* is valuable as recording the feelings of a part of the literary intelligentsia – that part which still had not lost its roots in pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodox culture – towards the revolution, at a point in history when the main shocks of the revolution – collectivization, the Great Terror, the Gulag and the famines – were in the past, but the regime and its ideology was still firmly in place.

⁵³⁰ The relationship between fact and fiction has been closely examined by Anna Pasternak, *Lara*, London: William Collins, 2017.

As such it contains many valuable insights, such as:

- 1. That acceptance of the revolution was not unrelated to pre-revolutionary moral *corruption.* "Freddy lived in sin with his ward Motya and therefore saw himself as a disrupter of the established order and a champion of progressive thought" (2, 9).
- 2. The superiority of the personal principle to the national. "When the Gospels say that in the Kingdom of God there are neither Jews nor Gentiles, do they just mean that all are equal in the sight of God? I don't believe it means only that that was known already it was known to the Greek philosophers and the Roman moralists and the Hebrew Prophets. What the Gospels tell us is that in this new way of life and of communism, which is born of the heart and which is called the Kingdom of God, there are no nations, but only persons." (4, 12).
- 3. *Revolutionary destruction by itself can build nothing.* "What you call disorder is just as normal a state of things as the order you are so keen on. All this destruction it's the right and proper preliminary stage of a wide, constructive plan. Society has not yet disintegrated sufficiently. It must fall to pieces completely, then a genuinely revolutionary government will put the pieces together on a completely new basis.' Yury felt sick…" (5, 16).

Pasternak died in 1960, having refused on principle, for the love of his country, to emigrate to the West, where there awaited him family, friends, honours, physical and financial security, and artistic freedom (but he would have had to leave his mistress behind). Pasternak's Soviet readers could not, of course, express their appreciation of his work openly. But at his funeral, whose place and date had been circulated by *samizdat* (a new phenomenon of the post-Stalin era), a vast crowd of young intelligentsia assembled to celebrate the great poet, whom the Soviet literary establishment had rejected, and to recite his poems. The age of dissidence had begun...

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In the next year, 1961, another great Russian artist made the opposite choice to Pasternak's - for the sake of artistic freedom. The Kirov ballet made its first tour to the West. At that time, as a result of the Cuban revolution and Gagarin's space flight, it was felt that the Soviets were winning their competition with the West, and this tour would demonstrate that they were culturally superior also. But to the fury of his "minders", the Kirov's star dancer, Rudolf Nureyev, made his leap for freedom at Le Bourget airport in Paris. By choosing the freedom of the West over his native land, Nureyev gravely injured the image of the Soviet Union – and the KGB's reputation for competence. The result was the fall of the KGB chief Alexander Shelepin from power, the building of the Berlin Wall - and many other Soviet (mainly Jewish) emigres to the West in the 1970s...

In 1962, the journal *Novy Mir* under its enterprising editor Alexander Tvardovsky published Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, a description of life in the camps. However, as Revel writes, "it is the purest self-deception to note that Khrushchev, while 'wiping a tear from his eye', authorized the publication of *Ivan Denisovich* in 1962 unless we add the corrective note that the book was later officially declared harmful in the USSR and its publication repudiated as an error, one of the consequences of 'voluntarism in literature' (everything Khrushchev did would later be condemned in a bloc as 'voluntarism' and 'subjectivism'); the offending edition of *Novy Mir* was removed from Communist libraries, and Soviet 'newspapers' were forbidden to mention its title..."⁵³¹

But good literature continued to be published, albeit in samizdat form. Thus Solzhenitsyn, "was squeezed out of Soviet journals, but his works began to circulate clandestinely".⁵³²

"I recall," writes Hosking, "reading some of his short prose poems at Moscow University in 1964 and in 1967 *Cancer Ward* and *First Circle* made their appearance, or nonappearance, in the studies of Soviet intellectuals, hidden deep in drawers or disguised in the bindings of Lenin's complete works.

"Thereafter a veritable samizdat industry came into being: poems, novels, letters, petitions, protests, and memoranda, rejected as likely to be rejected by the censor, being copied and passed on in ever fainter and more illegible carbon copies. Samizdat symbolized a tacit revolt against official procedures. As Vladimir Bukovskii, human rights activist and author of a 'Hymn to the Typewriter', put it: '[I] write myself, edit myself, censor myself, publish myself, distribute myself, and go to jail for it myself.' In a society of repression and conformism, this spontaneous assertion of the self was liberating..."

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So green shoots were beginning to emerge from under the rubble of the drab and depressing reality of Soviet life. But the recovery was very slow and patchy, and there was still a long way to go until *full repentance for the sins of the past*, the essential condition of true regeneration. First the truth about the past would have to be told, in itself was a huge task that was only beginning to be undertaken. Then those institutions and beliefs that had caused the catastrophe would have to be renounced or purged – clearly and without reservations. Finally, the True Christ and the True Church would have to be confessed publicly before Holy Rus' could be resurrected... In the carrying out of that task help from abroad would be required. Much would depend on the Russian Church Outside Russia...

⁵³¹ Revel, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵³² Hosking, op. cit., p. 556.

40. THE KHRUSHCHEVIAN PERSECUTION

As we have seen, one of the aims of the MP's entry into the WCC in 1961 was to mask a new persecution inside the Soviet Union. The ultimate intention of the Soviets – the complete destruction of the Orthodox Church – remained unchanged, But their tactics showed some flexibility. The Khrushchev persecution demonstrated how fragile and one-sided was the State-Church accord, and how easily the State's concessions could be retracted.⁵³³

Until the death of Stalin, while True Orthodoxy was persecuted as violently as ever, "Soviet Orthodoxy" enjoyed a comparatively peaceful period. However, on July 7, 1954 the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party issued a document entitled "On Major Inadequacies in Scientific-Atheist Propaganda and Measures for its Improvement", which called for a return to the pre-war course of "attacking religious survivals". That summer some parishioners were persecuted and some churches closed. Public criticisms of this new course were issued by Metropolitan Gregory of Leningrad and Archbishop Luke of Simferopol.

However, in November the Central Committee began to change course again, in 1955 the number of registered churches began to rise, and in 1956 a print-run of 50,000 Bibles was permitted.⁵³⁴ Then came Khrushchev's famous secret speech to the 20th Congress, at which the cult of the personality of Stalin was condemned. Soon thousands of people who had been condemned for their religious or political beliefs were returning from the camps, including 293 clergy of the MP and unknown numbers from the Catacomb Church. In July the president of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, G. Karpov, informed Patriarch Alexis that he did not need to worry about the question of the opening of churches, since this process would now be uninterrupted...⁵³⁵

But it was interrupted, perhaps as a result of "the *Doctor Zhivago* affair"... On October 4, 1958 the Central Committee sent a secret letter to the Union Republics called "On the inadequacies of scientific-atheist propaganda". All party and public organizations and state organs were required to attack the Church. There followed the Khrushchev persecution of the years 1959-64, when most of the seminaries and monasteries and 12-15,000 of the parish churches, "religious survivals" of Soviet people, were destroyed. In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee and of Khrushchev personally, on October 16 the Council of Ministers accept the first anti-ecclesiastical resolutions: "On Monasteries in the USSR" and "On Taxing the Income of Enterprises of Diocesan Administrations, and also the Income of Monasteries".

⁵³³ Pospielovsky, Russkaia Mysl' (Russian Thought), N 3698, 5 November, 1987.

⁵³⁴ A.B. Vinnikov, *Ottepel'* 1943-1960 (The Thaw of 1943-1960); Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, pp. 22-23, 24.

⁵³⁵ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 27.

In the first of these the monasteries were forbidden to take on hired labour, and a significant diminution of land holdings was envisaged, as also of the numbers of communities. Moreover, the 1945 tax on building and land rent was re-introduced, and the tax rate on plots of land was sharply increased. A heavy blow was dealt to the material base of the patriarchate. Raising the tax on the income from candle factories touched every parish. The factories were forced to raise their output prices, but at the same time it was forbidden to change the old prices in the churches. An absurd situation was the result - the parishes, on acquiring the candles, were forced to sell them to themselves at a loss. To make up for this, in many parishes they began to disband the paid choirs and economize on repairs and the upkeep of the churches. The clergy fell into poverty. The patriarchate was flooded by desperate pleas for help from the hierarchs. As a result of the new regulations, all the dioceses found themselves in debt to the state and on the edge of complete insolvency. An appeal was made to the Council for the Affairs of the Orthodox Church, but it was firmly rejected. An appeal to put off the introduction of the new taxes until January 1, 1959 was also rejected.536

In November and December a massive purge of Church libraries was carried out; many books were removed, and all foreign literature was placed under censorship. On November 28, the Central Committee accepted a resolution "On Measures to stop pilgrimages to so-called 'holy places'." Various methods were used to stop pilgrims visiting 700 such places. In 1958 91 church communities were deprived of registration; the tolling of bells was forbidden; hierarchs were deprived of their telephones, churches were cut off from the water system, repairs were forbidden.

In January, 1959, at a closed session of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, the president, Karpov, was attacked by I. Sivenkov for having been "too soft" in relation to the Church. In March Karpov, having recovered from illness, counter-attacked. He declared: "Out of the 14 autocephalous Orthodox Churches in the world 9 completely support the initiatives of the Moscow Patriarchate... Now there is a suggestion to prepare and convene, in the course of one or two years, an Ecumenical Council or congress of all the Orthodox Churches in the world... How shall we carry out this work... if we encourage crude administrative methods in relation to the Church and do not react to the distortions in scientific-atheist propaganda?... I consider such actions as the blowing up of church buildings to be inadmissible." Karpov went on to speak of the mass discontent of the clergy, and of the fact that the patriarch was thinking of retiring; and even suggested making some concessions to the Church. As a result, he kept his post for another year, and a temporary departure from extreme forms of anti-religious aggression was observed in the country.537

⁵³⁶ Vinnikov, op. cit.; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, pp. 30-31.

⁵³⁷ Vinnikov, op. cit.; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, pp. 32-33.

Nevertheless, by November, thirteen monasteries had been closed, and another seventeen by January, 1960. In spite of a prior agreement between the patriarch and the Council for Religious Affairs, some communities were closed, not gradually, but almost immediately – sometimes within 24 hours. In this period about 200 clergy were compelled by various means to renounce their rank.⁵³⁸ In the single year of 1961, 1500 churches were closed in the Soviet Union. In 1963 the Kiev-Caves Lavra was closed. Attempts were made to close the Pochaev Lavra, too, but determined action by the monks and the local inhabitants, some of whom were imprisoned or exiled, saved the day.⁵³⁹

Another aspect of the Khrushchev persecution (so called because he was the chief inspirer and strategist of it) was the infiltration of agents into the ranks of the Church and, more broadly, into the whole life of the nation.

Anatoly Golitsyn, who defected from the KGB in 1961, writes: "As part of the programme to destroy religion from within, the KGB, in the late 1950s, started sending dedicated young Communists to ecclesiastical academies and seminaries to train them as future church leaders. These young Communists joined the Church, *not* at the call of their consciences to serve God, but at the call of the Communist Party in order to serve that Party and to implement its general in the struggle against religion."⁵⁴⁰

As regards the ordinary priests, Fr. Alexander Borisov writes: "Almost everyone was recruited into the KGB. I myself was recruited, and I know that our other priest, Fr. Vladimir, was also recruited. I think those who say they were not recruited are deceiving us... After all, in earlier times one could not become a bishop without making some compromise, it was simply impossible..."⁵⁴¹

The complete penetration of the Church by the KGB was confirmed when a parliamentary commission uncovered the secret files in 1992.

Schema-Monk Epiphany (Chernov), who fled to England from Russia in the 1970s, recounts the following story about a communist party member and his wife, who was secretly a member of the Catacomb Church. When their son was born, she wanted to have him baptized – but not in the Moscow patriarchate. He then "tried to convince his wife of a truth which she was well aware. But in the given case the husband's words were very convincing and concrete:

"'So you have firmly decided to baptize the child?'

"'Yes, of course!'

⁵³⁸ Vinnikov, op. cit.

⁵³⁹ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 15-16.

⁵⁴⁰ Golitsyn, *The Perestroika Deception*, London and New York: Edward Harle, 1998, p. 116.

⁵⁴¹ Anatoly Krasikov, "'Tretij Rim' i Bol'sheviki" (The Third Rome and the Bolsheviks), in L.M. Vorontsova, A.V. Pchelintsev and S.B. Filatov (eds.), *Religia i Prava Cheloveka (Religion and Human Rights)*, Moscow: "Nauka", 1996, p. 204.

"Well, that's your affair. Only I would like to introduce into this matter a certain correction or rationalization."

"'Please, I'm listening.'

"'Well, here it is. Tell me, please, have you saved an extra seven roubles which you're intending to give our 'pope' or 'priest'? If they are extra, give them to me, and I will drink them away, and I'll baptize the child for you... Tell me, what's the difference: either he'll drink them away, or I will. He and I are absolutely the same. And we sit next to each other at party gatherings.... Whether you give the child to him to be baptized or to me, we are both atheists. So it would be better and more humane for you to give the seven roubles to your atheist husband that to an atheist stranger. And listen: your husband is more righteous and decent that that atheist. After all, he pretends to be a believer. But he's an atheist! Moreover, he pretends so much that he's even become a priest! While I, honourably and in the sight of all, am an atheist! But I can baptize our child with the same effect as he...

"'Well, tell me, have I convinced you?"

While Patriarch Alexis and Metropolitan Nicholas protested against the persecution, they remained completely loyal to Soviet power. Thus in January, 1960, Karpov wrote to the Central Committee: "The patriarch is completely loyal with regards to the authorities, always and not only in official declarations, but also in his entourage he speaks sincerely and with exaltation about the government and Comrade Khrushchev. The patriarch does not pay enough attention to work abroad, but even here he accepts all our recommendations..."⁵⁴²

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Meanwhile, on March 16, 1961 the Council of Ministers passed a resolution "On the strengthening of control for the fulfilment of the legislation on churches", which gave power to the local authorities to close churches and remove registrations. On April 18, 1961 the MP Synod decided to present the resolution "On Measures to Improve the Existing Order of Parish Life" for discussion at the Council in July. This measure, which had been imposed on the Church by the Council for Religious Affairs, deprived the priest of all financial and administrative control of his parish, passing it instead to councils of twenty (the *dvadtsatky*), which were easily controllable by the authorities.

This "reform", writes Victor Aksyuchits, "presented them with new possibilities for destroying the organism of the Church from within. The priests were completely separated from the economic and financial administration of the parishes, and were only hired by agreement as 'servants of the cult' for 'the

⁵⁴² Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 37.

satisfaction of religious needs'. The diocesan organs of administration of the life of the parishes were suspended... Now the atheist authorities not only carried out the 'registration' of the priests and 'the executive organs', but also took complete control of the economy and finances of the parishes, appointing the wardens and treasurers, and using all their rights, naturally, to promote the atheists' aim of destroying the Church."⁵⁴³

Fearing that the July Council might oppose the reform, the authorities did not invite to the Council three hierarchs who had expressed themselves against it. Most of the hierarchs were invited, not to a Council, but to a celebration in honour of St. Sergei of Radonezh, and were amazed to learn that a Council was about to be conducted.⁵⁴⁴ Archbishop Hermogen of Kaluga, who appeared without an invitation, was not allowed at the session on the grounds that he was not a ruling hierarch. In the absence of all potential opponents, the parish reform was passed. It was also decided that all clergy should be banned from becoming members of the *dvadtsatky* or the parish councils. Patriarch Alexis cooperated with the parish statute and with other measures harmful to the Church during the Khrushchev persecution.⁵⁴⁵

The Khrushchev persecution of 1959-64, though less severe than that of the 1930s (which was unprecedented in the whole history of Christianity) closed some thousands of patriarchal churches and forced many patriarchal priests to serve illegally. These "pseudo-catacombs" did not merge with the True Church and continued to commemorate the Soviet patriarch.⁵⁴⁶ Overall, "the number of [official] Orthodox priests in the Soviet Union dropped by almost half within six years, between 1959 and 1965."⁵⁴⁷

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After Khrushchev's 1956 speech against Stalin, the pressure on the Catacomb Church began to wane. Thus "when, in 1961," writes Archbishop Lazarus (Zhurbenko), "the priests' rights were taken away from them and given to the church council, they quieted down and it was easier for us; at least we could get to our priests and priests began more freely to come to us, to confess and commune us. From 1961 the Moscow Patriarchate calmed down in its attitude towards us. Of course, when foreigners asked representatives of the M.P., 'Does a catacomb church exist?' the answer was always 'No'. That was a lie. There were catacomb believers all over Russia, just as there are today..."⁵⁴⁸

 ⁵⁴³ Aksyuchits, "70 let Vavilonskogo plenenia" (70 Years of Babylonian Captivity), Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia (Herald of the Russian Christian Movement), 1988, N 152.
 ⁵⁴⁴ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁴⁵ G. Pankov, "O politike Sovietskogo gosudarstva v otnoshenii Russkoj pravoslavnoj tserkvi na rubezhe 50-60-x godov" (On the Politics of the Soviet State in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church on the border of the 50s and 60s), in Bessmertny, A.R. & Filatov, S.B., *Religia i Demokratia* (Religion and Democracy), Moscow: Progress, 1993, pp. 217-31.

⁵⁴⁶ Danilushkin, *Istoria Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi* (History of the Russian Orthodox Church), part I (1917-70), St. Petersburg, 1997, chapter 18.

⁵⁴⁷ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 206.

⁵⁴⁸ Zhurbenko, "Out of the Catacombs", Orthodox America, 1990, p. 6.

In 1961 new legislation on passports was passed. It was aimed against secret Christians.⁵⁴⁹ Paradoxically, it served to swell the numbers of the True Orthodox, whose ranks had already been swelled by the large numbers of former convicts returning from the camps... Passportization had been introduced only in 1932, and only for the most urbanized areas. Already then it was used as a means of winkling out Catacomb Christians. Thus M.V. Shkarovsky writes: "Completing their liquidation of the Josephites, there was a meeting of regional inspectors for cultic matters on March 16, 1933, at a time when passportization was being introduced. The meeting decided, on the orders of the OGPU, 'not to give passports to servants of the cult of the Josephite confession of faith', which meant automatic expulsion from Leningrad. Similar things happened in other major cities of the USSR."⁵⁵⁰

Most Catacomb hierarchs did not bless their spiritual children to take passports because in filling in the forms they disclosed information making them liable to persecution.⁵⁵¹ Some leaders, such as Schema-Abbess Michaela of Kiev, sent her nuns out to convince people that the passport was the seal of the Antichrist. Many Catacomb Christians refused passports, not wishing to declare themselves citizens of the antichristian kingdom.⁵⁵²

In the 1930s the peasants had not been given passports but were chained to the land which they worked. They were herded into the collective farms and forced to do various things against their conscience, such as vote for the communist officials who had destroyed their way of life and their churches. Those who refused to do this – refusals were particularly common in the Lipetsk, Tambov and Voronezh areas – were rigorously persecuted, and often left to die of hunger. Thus passportization in the cities and collectivization in the countryside constituted two forms of the Bolsheviks' struggle to force everyone in the country to accept the Soviet ideology.

On May 4, 1961, however, the Soviet government issued a decree on "parasitism" and introduced a campaign for general passportization. It was announced that, in order to receive a Soviet passport, a citizen of the USSR would have to recognize all the laws of Soviet power, past and present, beginning from Lenin's decrees. Since this involved, in effect, a recognition of

⁵⁴⁹ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, chapter 3.

⁵⁵⁰ Shkarovsky, *Iosiflyanstvo* (Josephitism), *Iosiflianstvo: techenie v Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi* (Josephitism: a tendency in the Russian Orthodox Church), St. Petersburg: Memorial, 1999, p. 171. Cf. Edward Roslof: "Passport offices were prohibited from issuing documents to clergy; that duty belonged to a troika from the regional soviet. Passports would not be issued to men with degrees from theological seminaries or academies, to priests associated with the Josephite schism, or to conductors of church choirs (even if they were amateurs)" (*Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905-1946*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 182).

 ⁵⁵¹ Danilushkin, op. cit., p. 535; M.V. Shkarovsky, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' pri Staline i Khruscheve* (The Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khruschev), Moscow, 2005, p. 246.
 ⁵⁵² A. Smirnov, "Ugasshie nepominaiuschie v bege vremeni" (Extinguished Non-Commemorators in the Flow of Time), *Simvol* (Symbol), N 40, 1998, p. 254.

all the crimes of Soviet power, a movement arose to reject Soviet passports, a movement which was centred mainly in the country areas.

E.A. Petrova writes: "Protests against general passportization arose among Christians throughout the vast country. A huge number of secret Christians who had passports began to reject, destroy and burn them and loudly, for all to hear, renounce Soviet citizenship. Many Christians from the patriarchal church also gave in their passports. There were cases in which as many as 200 people at one time went up to the local soviet and gave in their passports. In one day the whole of a Christian community near Tashkent gave in 100 passports at once. Communities in Kemerovo and Novosibirsk provinces gave in their passports, and Christians in the Altai area burned their passports... Protests against general passportization broke out in Belorussia, in the Ukraine, and in the Voronezh, Tambov and Ryazan provinces... Christians who renounced their Soviet passports began to be seized, imprisoned and exiled. But in spite of these repressions the movement of the passportless Christians grew and became stronger. It was precisely in these years that the Catacomb Church received a major influx from Christians of the patriarchal church who renounced Soviet passports and returned into the bosom of the True Orthodox Church."553

However, not all Catacomb Christians refused to have passports – to be consistently and completely outside Soviet society was, after all, exceedingly difficult. Some Catacomb leaders considered it permissible to be a Soviet citizen with a passport so long as one did not sympathize with Soviet power or help it, and criticized those who rejected Soviet citizenship as sinful but accepted its (admittedly very meagre) benefits.

Thus in 1960 Catacomb Archimandrite Hilarion (Andrievsky) wrote to a "hardline" nun as follows: "To call oneself 'a citizen of the Soviet state' by no means signifies recognizing oneself to be 'a Soviet person'. It does not signify agreement with the communists, it does not signify going together with them, it does not signify working in concert with them and sympathizing with all their undertakings... 'A citizen of the Soviet state' and 'a Soviet person' are by no means identical concepts: the first is recognition and submission to Soviet power, and the second – is an inner content, a feeling in the soul of man. There is a huge difference between these concepts. I experienced this myself in 1928, thirty-two years ago. When, after a long convoy, I was waiting for a decision on my fate together with other prisoners in Samarkand prison, I was told that I had been left to serve my term of exile in the city of Samarkand itself. Several people in the prison envied me because this, being the former capital of Central Asia, was a large, cultured, interesting city with ancient sites. But then, when I was summoned to the GPU to fill in a questionnaire, my position suddenly changed sharply – it appeared that my replies did not please them. To the question: 'What is your relationship to the authorities?', I replied: 'I recognize

⁵⁵³ Petrova, "Perestroika Vavilonskoj Bashni" (The Reconstruction of the Tower of Babel), Moscow, 1991, pp. 5-6 (MS).

them and submit to them in civil matters'. Then they said that 'this is not much'. But when I asked: 'What more do you need?' they replied with another question: 'But do you sympathize with them?' I replied directly: 'No, I do not sympathize with them, and as a believer I cannot sympathize with them in general. Moreover, how can I sympathize with them personally, when they brought me here completely against my will, tearing me away from my relatives and friends!...' To this they said: 'You probably need the Tsar's authority?' I replied: 'No, you are mistaken. Read history, and you will see that there were times when the Tsars also fiercely persecuted the Christians.' All these replies of mine were written down and signed. A little later I was told that there would be a sharp change in my place of exile: from the big beautiful city that I had been assigned to before I was sent to the remote steppe, whence after a five-year stay I was dispatched to another exile – in distant Siberia. Thus it became clearly evident from this questionnaire that Soviet power makes a profound distinction between 'citizenship' and 'sympathy' and does not necessarily merge and confuse these two concepts into one. Otherwise, after my reply about recognizing and submitting to Soviet power, they would not have gone on to ask me about my 'sympathy', if this 'sympathy' was truly linked with 'citizenship'. After all, they not only asked me about 'sympathy', but punished me for my negative reply, and changed the place of my exile from Samarkand to the remote steppe four hundred kilometres away from it.

"So a 'citizen' is not always and necessarily a 'sympathizer' with all the communist undertakings, for the concept of 'citizen' in itself does not contain this 'sympathy'; and for that reason there was absolutely no sin in taking part in the census and giving a positive reply to the question about 'citizenship' in the Soviet state, in which, as you well know, there are citizen-communists who are completely devoted and sympathetic to it, and there are simply citizens in the sense only of subjects – and the latter are the absolute majority, in whose number are you and I, which is clearly witnessed by your passport, which you yourself took, and you live through it with the rights of 'citizenship' in necessary cases (reception of pension, etc.). It is more than strange to say that to take advantage of the rights of a citizen here is not a sin, but to call oneself a 'citizen' is, in your opinion, such a terrible sin that you have even excluded all those who took part in the census from Orthodoxy! What amazing lightmindedness! It is this that has engendered such a profound error, which even contradicts simple common logic, not to speak of the greater error that I wrote to you about earlier and which I will not repeat. I will only add that such a spiritual double-mindedness is not pleasing to God. If, in your opinion, it is sinful merely to call yourself a 'citizen' of the Soviet state in a census, then to take advantage, as you do, of this citizenship is a still more bitter and responsible act, although you don't recognize it... Thus our participation in the census does not necessarily oblige us to work for Soviet power, the more so in that we do not sympathize with communism, as you mistakenly think. In conclusion I want to cite one more argument in favour of our positive reply to the question on 'citizenship'. We Russians received our holy Orthodox faith from the Greeks, from Constantinople, while the Greeks were in a condition of civil subjection to the Turks - Muslims. However, this Turkish citizenship did

not hinder the Greeks from preserving the Orthodox Faith in the course of many centuries. Constantinople is considered to this day to be a cradle of Holy Orthodoxy, a Centre of the Universal Church of Christ. And this historical example clearly shows that Turkish citizenship did not necessarily contain within itself sympathy with the Muslims, just as Soviet citizenship does not necessarily contain within itself sympathy with Communism – which is sinful...."⁵⁵⁴

Perhaps one could indeed be a Soviet citizen without sympathizing with, or helping, Soviet power. But it was extremely difficult; and if "recognition" involved accepting the *legitimacy* of the Soviet regime, then this in itself helped Soviet power to a certain degree. Moreover, any kind of recognition or submission contradicted Patriarch Tikhon's anathema of 1918, which called on the Orthodox to obey the Soviet *in no way whatsoever*... So Fr. Hilarion erred in seeing no essential difference between the regimes of Pagan Imperial Rome and the Turkish sultanate, on the one hand, and Soviet power, on the other.

In the 1970s the detailed questionnaires required in order to receive passports were abandoned. But in 1974 it was made obligatory for all Soviet citizens to have a passport, and a new, red passport differing significantly from the old, green one was issued for everyone except prisoners and the hospitalized. On the cover it had the words: "Passport of a citizen of the Soviet Socialist Republics", together with a hammer and sickle. This was still unacceptable to the passportless, who therefore continued to be subject to prison, exile and hunger. Those who joined the Catacomb Church at this time often erased the word "citizen", replacing it with the word "Christian", so that they had a "Passport of a Christian of the Soviet Socialist Republics".⁵⁵⁵

The issue of passports came down to the question whether the Soviet State should be considered to be "Caesar", to which "the things of Caesar" are due (payment of taxes, army service), or "the collective Antichrist", obedience to whom involves compromises unacceptable for the Christian conscience. Although the majority of members of the True Russian Church in this century have not made an issue of this, it remains debatable whether obedience to the 1918 anathema against the Bolsheviks does not in fact require rejection of the Soviet State, Soviet passports, Soviet army service, etc., in a way that only the passportless demonstrated. Certainly, experience demonstrated without a doubt that all attempts of Christians to cooperate in any way with the Soviet regime were worse than useless and only led to compromises in the faith... Since the fall of communism in 1991, as we shall see, the possession of passports has ceased to be such a burning issue. However, the question whether the Soviet Union was a state "established by God" (Romans 13.1), or, on the contrary, an anti-state established by Satan (Revelation 13.2), remains a critical one. The True Orthodox position is that since the Soviet State has been

⁵⁵⁴ Priest Alexis, "Sv. Otsy-Ispovedniki ob otnoshenii k vlastiam", http://priestalexei.livejournal.com/2197.html.

⁵⁵⁵ Bishop Ambrose, "Gosudarstvo i 'katakomby'", op. cit., p. 104.

anathematized by the Church, neither it, nor any modern state claiming continuity from it, can command the allegiance of Orthodox Christians. To this day the Russian True Orthodox Church does not commemorate the authorities of the post-Soviet Russian Federation...

The Khrushchev era turned out to be a considerable disappointment to those hoping for change after the death of Stalin. There was change, but the totalitarian system remained. While the state lost some of its ferocious edge, the Soviet Union remained Stalinist in essence. According to Paul Johnson, there was, in fact, "no 'de-Stalinization'. The term was never used inside Soviet Russia. All that the post-Stalin changes and Khrushchev's 'Secret Session' speech at the twentieth Party Congress in 1956 involved was the end of massterrorism against party members, that is those inside the ruling system. The totalitarian structure of the Leninist state, giving an absolute monopoly of power to the party - meaning in practice the tiny elite which controlled it remained in its entirety, sustained as before by the secret police and the army, itself controlled by an internal structure of party officers. The autocratic plinth endured; and at any moment a ruthless man could build a superstructure of mass terror on it. Khrushchev behaved in many ways like an autocrat, and had to be removed like one. His colleagues disliked his adventurism. They came to see him as a disturbing influence. He tried to introduce more democracy within the party, a non-Leninist notion. His ideas of 'the state of the whole people', implying the end of party power-monopoly, was thoroughly anti-Leninist. In some ways Khrushchev, unlike Lenin, was a Marxist: that is, he believed Communism to be attainable. At the twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 he laid down as his programme the outstripping of American living standards in the 1960s, the beginning of Communism (rent-free housing, free public transport, etc) in the 1970s, and its completion in the 1980s. He might be described as yet another optimist who succumbed to the illusions of the Sixties. His Presidium critics thought that such promises, which could not conceivably be fulfilled, would merely produce disappointment and anger, as had his Cuban missile venture in 1962 and the 'virgin lands' scheme of 1954 to cultivate 100 million untilled acres in Soviet Central Asia and Siberia, which in June 1960 produced the biggest dust-storm in history. While he was on holiday in the Crimea in October 1964, the Presidium voted him out of office and had their decision confirmed by the Central Committee the next day. The plot was designed by the ultra-Leninist chief theoretician of the party, Michael Suslov, and executed by the head of the KGB, Alexander Shelepin...."556 He was then sent into a comfortable retirement - officially, for health reasons, but according to an editorial in Pravda, because of his "harebrained scheming, half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions divorced from reality, bragging and bluster, attraction to rule by fiat"...

⁵⁵⁶ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 475-476.

Khrushchev was succeeded by a group of Politburo oligarchs led by one of his proteges, Leonid Brezhnev. In politics and economics, the Brezhnev era was one of "stagnation", a reaction against the unsettling liberalizing and experimental policies of Khrushchev, and the determination above all to hold on to the power that they (the party) already held. As Brezhnev himself put it to the liberal Czech Communist Alexander Dubcek in 1968: "Don't talk to me about 'Socialism'. What we have, we hold.'" But this essential conservatism did not prevent the continuing expansion of Communism overseas and outside Europe. For Communism is a malignant tumour that cannot help but grow until it is finally crushed.

The result was that the thaw in cultural life froze over; economic growth shrank to two percent a year; and dissidence was firmly repressed. However, the persecution against the MP – but not True Orthodoxy - ceased. Suslov thought that it was necessary to continue a decisive "struggle against religion", but in such a way as not to turn the West against them - but at the same time "not to give rein to all kinds of extremists".⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁷ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 19.

40. MAO'S GREAT LEAP FORWARD

By the 1960s Soviet Communism entered a staid middle age that tried to avoid excessive shocks to the system. But it was a different story in the Far East, where new nation-converts to Communism such as China and Vietnam were in a state of almost constant revolutionary turmoil.

Communist China had done well economically in the first decade of its existence. As Maria Hsia Chang writes, "By the late 1950s, bolstered by the results of the socialist transformation of China, Mao thought that the transition to communism was imminent. Between 1953 and 1957, the Chinese economy registered an annual real rate of growth of 6.2 percent, the gross value of industrial output increased by 128 percent and agriculture by 24.8 percent. Mao was convinced that what was needed was a concerted effort to mobilize China's human resources to accelerate the pace of economic development, so that production itself doubled in a single five-year period. With that, China would leapfrog over the Soviet Union by making 'a great leap forward' from socialism into utopian communism." ⁵⁵⁸

However, economic competition was not Mao's only motivation. He had become increasingly dissatisfied, writes Paul Johnson, "with the policies of Stalin's successors in Moscow. He had disliked and disagreed with Stalin: his reaction to Stalin's death was to instigate the suicide or murder of Kao Kang, the Stalinist agent and head of the State Planning Committee, in February 1954. But he objected strongly to 'deStalinization' as an attempt to blame mistakes on the character of a single man. He thought Khrushchev's 'secret session speech' repudiating Stalinism of 1956 a hypocrisy. The others, Khrushchev included, had been up to their necks in Stalin's crimes. How did Khrushchev, he demanded, see his role 'when he beats his breast, pounds the table and shouts abuse at the top of his voice'? Was he a 'murderer' and a 'bandit' himself? Or simply a 'fool' and an 'idiot'? Mao was clearly afraid that the Moscow campaign against 'the cult of personality' might be used against himself. More fundamentally, however, he felt that the sheer intellectual poverty of the new Moscow leadership strengthened his claim, now that Stalin was dead, to the pontifical primacy of the bloc. He determined to astound his comrades, east and west, by the sheer audacity of his next move, and in September-October 1957 announced the new drama of the Great Leap Forward, which was launched with tremendous publicity in the following spring."559

As Michael Burleigh writes, "Mao felt that Khrushchev's disparagement of Stalin's reputation merely served the interests of global imperialism. He argued that Stalin's legacy needed cool assessment, so that the 20 or 30 percent bad could be separated from the 80 or 70 percent good. 'Stalin is a sword,' he said. 'It can be used to fight imperialism and various other enemies... If the sword

⁵⁵⁸ Chang, Return of the Dragon, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001, p. 145.

⁵⁵⁹ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 549-550.

is put aside completely, if it is damaged, or if it is abandoned, the enemies will use the sword to try to kill us. Consequently, we would be lifting a rock only to drop it on our own feet.' Khrushchev replied that the sword was completely useless and should be abandoned.

"Compared with the two-month wait he had endured in 1949, Mao was lavished with attention when he paid his second, and last, visit to Moscow in November 1957 on the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He was housed in a palace of Catherine the Great, but slept on the floor rather than on a bed. Hidden microphones picked up Mao's private comments on his hosts, which were withering. Dismissing Khrushchev's belief in peaceful coexistence with the West, Mao said: 'If worse came to worst and half mankind died, the other half would remain, while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the world would become Socialist.'"⁵⁶⁰

Johnson has pointed out that in his theatricality, and in his belief in the efficacy of sheer willpower, Mao was closer to Hitler than to Stalin. "The Great Leap was perhaps the purest expression of Mao's chronic impatience, his belief in mind over matter, his confidence that, granted the will, the age of miracles was not over. He projected his itch to telescope history onto the peasants: they were 'poor and blank', and this was 'a good thing – poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has no blotches and so the newest and most beautiful words can be written on it.' As a piece of social engineering, the Leap was reckless and impulsive even by Mao's standards. He justified it by arguing that Stalin had walked 'only on one leg' – that is, he created industrial and agricultural areas, each separate and monoped. China would begin 'walking on two legs', moving directly to self-reliant communes (modelled historically on the Paris Commune of 1870), each with its own industrial, agricultural and service sectors and its own defence-militia: 'unity of work and arms'.

"The scale and speed of the experimental theatre was almost beyond belief. In January-February 1958, then after a brief pause to sort out the confusion, between August and December, about 700 million people (90 per cent of the population) had their economic, political and administrative life completely transformed. In Henan Province, for instance, 5,376 agricultural collectives were knocked into 208 large 'people's communes' with an average of 8,000 households in each. These units were expected to be virtually self-supporting and, in particular, to produce their own steel. It was a case, as Khrushchev put it, of Mao 'acting like a lunatic on a throne and turning his country upside down'. He said that Chou-En-Lai came to Moscow and admitted that the Chinese steel industry was in a mess as a result. A.F. Zasyadki, deputychairman of the State Planning Commission, was sent out to investigate. He reported to Khrushchev that the Soviet-trained steel engineers were now being forced to work in agriculture and the steel industry was a 'shambles'. The steel mill he visited was 'in the charge of an old man'. All Russia's equipment,

⁵⁶⁰ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2014, pp. 471.

money and effort was being wasted. Khrushchev seems to have concluded that Mao was another Stalin and worse; a madman who would wreck his country and blow up the world if he had the means. The Great Leap therefore led directly to the end of Russia's technical assistance programme (including nuclear weapons) in 1959 and to the open admission of the Sino-Soviet breach the following year at the Romanian Party Congress, when Khrushchev denounced the Chinese leadership as 'madmen', 'pure nationalists' who wanted to unleash a nuclear war."⁵⁶¹

"Rather than the realization of utopia, the Great Leap Forward ended in signal disaster. The 'steel' produced in backyard furnaces turned out to be entirely useless. To curry favor with Mao, commune cadres exaggerated their farm production figures, on the basis of which Beijing exacted its quote of grain harvest to feed China's urban populace, leaving little for the peasants. The result was a famine that ended the 1950s in which at least 15 million starved to death – a direct consequence of misguided policies and wasted resources.

"In the cost accounting that followed, Mao relinquished his post as head of state to Lii Shaoqi (while retaining his chairmanship of the party) and retreated from active governing. Liu, with Deng Xiaoping as his assistant, took over the affairs of governance. The new leadership eschewed the more radical features of Maoism. Instead of ideological appeals, the party turned to capitalist measures to revive the economy: Peasants could own small private plots, and material incentives of differential wages were used to spur production."⁵⁶²

"Mao's psychopathy surged to a new level when he launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Detailed research by Frank Dikötter has established that fiftyfive to sixty-five million people perished in this dystopian effort to surpass British industrial output within fifteen years. Even China's sparrows were not safe from this relentless venture, for they pecked away at grain and had to be kept airborne until they dropped dead by villagers banging pots through the night. Foreign relations were not spared the general hysteria; indeed, they may have been integral to it. This was the year when the Soviets sought to install their communications system for submarines operating in the northern Pacific on Chinese soil, offering the Chinese, who wanted to have their own submarine fleet, what Mao dismissed as a 'military co-operative'. Mao's response to the Soviet ambassador was so rude that Khrushchev hastened in person to Beijing, where discussions with the Chinese leader went from bad to worse. 'The British, Japanese, and other foreigners who stayed in our country for a long time have already been driven away by us, Comrade Khrushchev. I'll repeat it again. We do not want anyone to use our land to achieve their own purposes any more.'...

⁵⁶¹ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 550-551.

⁵⁶² Chang, Return of the Dragon, pp. 147-148.

"Mao gave his guest no warning that he was about to embark on his own challenge to US Pacific hegemony. He was quite explicit about the 'social imperialist' agenda: 'a tense international situation could mobilize the population, could particularly mobilize the people in the middle, and could therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction'. In other words, Mao was going to incite Chinese chauvinism.

"On 23 August 1958 the People's Liberation Army rained 30,000 artillery shells in one hour on the Kuomingtang-controlled island of Jinmen (Quenoy) off the mainland, killing 600 of Chiang Kai-shek's troops. The US responded, as they were obliged to do under the 1954 defence treaty with Taiwan, with a massive naval build-up in the Taiwan Strait and the deployment of 200 aircraft. With the US threatening war, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko rushed to Beijing, where Mao explained that his intention was to lure the Americans into an 'iron noose'. Gromyko was appalled when Mao amplified his strategy. If the Americans were to use nuclear weapons or invade China, the PLA would retreat into the interior, drawing US forces after them. At that point, the Kremlin should 'use all means at its disposal' to destroy them. Gromyko flatly told him that such support would not be forthcoming. His main object of having the Americans and Russians 'dancing and scurrying' about over two miserable little offshore islands achieved, Mao allowed tensions to subside.

"In view of Mao's cavalier attitude towards nuclear warfare, it was not surprising that the Soviets found excuses not to give Communist China a prototype nuclear bomb and related blueprints as they had agreed to do in October 1957. Further tearing noises were heard... during the Sino-Indian conflict. In September 1958 Khrushchev arrived in Beijing for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Revolution, to find no reception party at the airport and no microphone for his carefully prepared arrival speech. At the formal reception, he lectured his hosts on the need for a relaxation of international tensions, and chided them for the recklessness of their recent ventures in the Taiwan Straits and on the Sino-Indian border. The meeting between Chinese and Russians degenerated into insults, so the Russians cut short their scheduled week of talks and left. Shortly afterwards Moscow slashed aid to Beijing, which enabled Mao to blame the Soviet 'revisionists' for the failings of the Great Leap Forward..."⁵⁶³

The one admirable – and highly untypical aspect – of the whole tragedy was that on 23 July 1959, in bringing the whole disaster to a temporary close, Mao admitted his personal responsibility for it: "The chaos caused was on a grand scale, and I take responsibility..."

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⁵⁶³ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2014, pp. 471-473.

The "Great Leap Forward" is probably the greatest single act or campaign of mass murder in human history to this date, overshadowing even Stalin's feats in the 1930s.

"Yet," writes Andrew Roberts, "as so often before and since, many amongst the English-speaking peoples, though guiltless of the atrocities, looked the other way, or worse. The true nature of the Maoist regime in China was for many years deliberately downplayed by journalists and academics. Mirroring what Walter Duranty has perpetrated in Russia during the Thirties, reporters in China such as Theodore White of *Time* magazine, Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times* and Arch Steele of the *Herald Tribune* sought to portray Mao and his supporters in the best possible light, concentrating on their 'agrarian democratic' credentials, rather than their murderous Marxist-Leninist beliefs. 'We were reluctant to portray them as real Communists,' admitted Steele years later, 'because we knew that would go against the American grain'.

"The newsreels were no better: the breathlessly impressed British Movietone News broadcast of 13 October 1966 was entirely typical in its report of how nearly a million teenagers had completely filled the huge square of the Gates of Heavenly Peace, and in completely uncritical terms stated how, 'Their adulation for Mao and his teachings far exceeds hero-worship, singing songs in his praise, reciting poems from his verses, they appear to guard him something very like a god' Self-censorship amongst those whose duty it was to tell the unvarnished truth meant that that the English-speaking peoples were generally well-disposed towards an emerging superpower that itself saw democracy and capitalism as bitter ideological foes.

"Among the very worst Western apologists for the genocidal Chinese Communist Party were: the American journalist Edgar Snow, whose 1938 book *Red Star over China* was hugely influential in the West, where people did not know that Snow had submitted his manuscript to Mao to be rewritten; the `Master of Gaius College, Cambridge, Joseph Needham, who falsely accused the Americans of using biological weapons in Korea; the future Canadian premier, Pierre Trudeau, who wrote a paean to Mao appositely entitled Two Innocents in Red China; Francois Mitterand, who visited the country in 1961 and credulously repeated Mao's claim that, 'There is no famine in China'; the Cambridge economist Joan Robinson, shoes 1960 book The Cultural Revolution in China argued that Mao's policies were the solution Third World poverty, even though she admitted that China hadn't published any economic statistics since 1960; Felix Greene, who fawningly interviewed Chou En-Lai for the BBC and believed every word he was told in a manner he never would have of a Western democratic politician; Simone de Beauvoir, who declared that Mao was 'no more dictatorial than, for example, Roosevelt was since 'New China's constitution renders impossible the concentration of authority in one man's hands'; and her sometime consort Jean-Paul Sartre, who described Mao's 'revolutionary violence' as 'profoundly moral'. Finally, in his 1973 book A China Passage John Kenneth Galbraith stated that the moribund China had 'a highly effective economic system' whose claim of over 10% annual growth 'does not seem to me implausible'. China has indeed seen growth rates of that order, but only thirty years later when it effectively ditched Maoist Leninism for *laissez-faire* capitalism..."⁵⁶⁴

Again, MIT professor Noam Chomsky was (and is) a trenchant critic of the sins of America who seemed completely blind to the far worse sins of the Communist East. For example, he cited a study showing that "mortality sharply decreased in China during the Maoist years, 'mainly as a result of economic development and improvements in education and health services, especially the hygiene movement that resulted in a sharp drop in mortality from infectious diseases.' But this progress ended with the initiation of capitalist reforms thirty years ago, and the death rate has since increased."⁵⁶⁵

But this was almost the exact opposite of the truth! Does Chomsky, a highly intelligent and learned academic who has travelled the world in search of evidence of American crimes against humanity, not know that Mao killed and starved to death literally tens of millions of people, a very sharp *increase* in mortality that only came to an end after his death?

Chomsky goes on to assert that "in 1949, China declared independence".⁵⁶⁶ Again, the exact opposite of the truth! In 1949, and again in the Cultural Revolution, Mao *destroyed* the remnants of Anti-Communist China's independence under Chiang-Kai-Shek, bringing all of China except Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao under the horrific despotism of Communism.

⁵⁶⁴ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 473-474.

⁵⁶⁵ Chomsky, Who Rules the World?, London: Penguin, 2017, p. 71.

⁵⁶⁶ Chomsky, op. cit., p. 73.

41. CHINA'S INVASION OF TIBET

As we have seen, at the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, Chou En-lai had claimed to support the oppressed victims of colonialism in the region. However, China was not averse to some imperialist activity herself, pushing forward in Korea, in the South China Sea, in Vietnam – and in Tibet. Daniel Goldhagen calculates that the Chinese killed "more than half a million and perhaps as many as 1.2 million Tibetans [out of six million] since their imperial occupation of Tibet in 1950."⁵⁶⁷

"In 1951, Tibetan representatives in Beijing signed the Seventeen-point Agreement under duress, which affirmed China's sovereignty over Tibet while it simultaneously provided for an autonomous administration led by Tibet's spiritual leader, and then-political leader, the 14th Dalai Lama. During the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when Tibetans arose to prevent his possible assassination, the Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet to northern India where he established the Central Tibetan Administration, which rescinded the Seventeen-point Agreement. The majority of Tibet's land mass, including all of U-Tsang and areas of Kham and Amdo, was officially established in 1965 as Tibet Autonomous Region, within China."⁵⁶⁸

The 1959 invasion was savage. "Testimony by travellers returning from Tibet to Nepal, Bhutan and northern India indicates that, incredible as it may seem, up to 80 percent of the population remaining after the invasion died; in many cases, families of six children were left with only one survivor. Victims who were not murdered outright were felled by those other great pillars of communism: famine and forced labour. Of perhaps one thousand refugees who reached India and Nepal in 1981, more than half had served prison terms; some three hundred had been in prison uninterruptedly since 1959. Working conditions were so hard, both day and night, and food so scarce (a handful every twenty-four house of *tsampa*, the flour of grilled barley that is Tibet's staple food) that there were always a few people who failed to reply at evening roll call in the camps; they had died, the fugitives said, of exhaustion.

"The massacres were particularly ferocious among Tibetan monks. Two hundred of them who remained in the Sechen monastery in eastern Tibet were slaughtered in one day, and this is merely one of many such examples. The Chinese tortured clerics and lay believers who refused to abjure their religion. If the victims moved their lips in prayer under torture, they were beaten to death...

"The obliteration of Tibet's culture was carried out with almost insane violence, especially after the Cultural Revolution's Red Guards arrived to lend a 'spontaneous' hand to the occupation army... More than thirty thousand of

 ⁵⁶⁷ Goldhagen, Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, London: Abacus, 2009, p. 42; http://www.umass.edu/rso/fretibet/education.html.
 ⁵⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Tibet_(1950%E2%80%93present)

the country's monasteries and temples were destroyed; hundreds of thousands of woodblocks for printing ancient Tibetan scriptures were used as firewood or to build army barracks. The great monasteries at Sechen, Zongsar, Kathog, Dzochen, to cite only the main ones, were razed; only plains are there now that give no hint that the greatest treasures of Tibetan architecture once stood on those sites. Of Ganden, Turphu, Mindroeing, Palpung, nothing but ruins remain. Gone, too, are the five-storey Riwotse monastery in the Kham and the thousands of old manuscripts it contained. Over one hundred thousand woodblocks at the great Dershe print shop were saved from burning by a popular uprising that Peking elected not to crus. The sole surviving monastery is the one the world knows, the Potala in Lhasa; damaging it would have been too noticeable..."⁵⁶⁹

Jonathan Mirsky wrote in 2016: "Ceaseless repression has led to the selfimmolation of thousands of monks and nuns as well as laypeople in recent times."⁵⁷⁰

China's invasion of Tibet also led to a worsening of relations with India, which was complicated by India's dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. The Chinese had isolated and weakened the Tibetans by cutting their links through the Himalayas to India. "The two main routes between India and Tibet lay through Sikkim to the south and Leh in Kashmir to the west. Military activity on an ill-defined border was a source of Sino-Indian tension, and eventually war. India's defeat (in 1962) was aptly symbolic of Nehru's grander ambitions. India's political system (which dispersed considerable power and resources to state-level governments), the threat 'at home' of war with Pakistan, and the lackluster progress of the Indian economy (India's share of world trade fell by two-thirds in the 1950s and 1960s) conspired to frustrate India's claim, at this stage, to be an Asian 'great power'."⁵⁷¹ China, on the other hand, was now poised to become the hegemon in South Asia.

⁵⁶⁹ Revel, *How Democracies Fall*, pp. 174, 175.

⁵⁷⁰ Mirsky, in *The Spectator*, 1 October, 2016, p. 49.

⁵⁷¹ Darwin, *After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires*, 1400-2000, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 449.

42. ROCOR AT THE CROSSROADS

After the war, the Russian Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) had to face a difficult problem of self-definition. In her founding Statute she had defined herself as that part of the Russian Church that was outside Russia while still remaining in communion with the "Mother Church" in the Homeland. Thus in 1945 Metropolitan Anastasy declared that the members of ROCOR "have never considered and do not consider themselves to be outside the enclosure of the Orthodox Russian Church, for we have never broken canonical, prayerful and spiritual unity with our Mother Church... We do not cease to thank God for judging that we should remain the free part of the Russian Church. Our duty is to preserve this freedom until we return to the Mother Church the precious pledge entrusted by her to us. A completely competent judge between the bishops abroad and the present head of the Russian Church could be only a freely and lawfully convened All-Russian Council that is completely independent it its decisions, and in which as far as possible all bishops abroad and especially those now in prison will participate. We are ready to give an account before them of all our actions during our sojourn abroad."572

In this statement there was no official clarification of what ROCOR's relations with other Local Orthodox Churches in the West were to be, nor precisely who or what constituted the "Mother Church" of Russia, nor who was to be admitted to this All-Russian Council or in what capacity.

Nor did any of the ROCOR Councils of the next ten years clarify these matters, in spite of the fact that clarification was becoming more and more necessary in view of the ever-increasing deviation of the Local Churches from Orthodoxy. Thus in 1946 the ROCOR Synod declared that the election of Patriarch Alexis was uncanonical, and on May 10, it decreed: "The Higher Church Administration in Russia in the person of the current Head of the Russian Church Patriarch Alexius has more than once already addressed the bishops abroad with an exhortation to enter into canonical submission to the patriarchate, but, listening to the directions of our pastoral conscience, we do not find it morally possible to acquiesce to these appeals as long as the Higher Church Administration in Russia is found in an unnatural union with the atheistic power and as long as the whole Russian Church is deprived of true freedom, which is inherent in it by its Divine nature."

The November, 1950 the Synod, after profusely thanking the Americans for the protection they afforded to refugees from religious persecution, and lambasting the "red dragon" of communism, continued: "Insofar as the present Moscow Patriarch, and the other senior hierarchs of the Church in Russia remain closely bound with the atheist Soviet power and are its helpers in its criminal activity, which is directed to the destruction of the Kingdom of God

⁵⁷² Pravoslavnaia Zhizn', N 6, 1976; Monk Benjamin, Letopis' Tserkovnykh Sobytij (1939-1949) (Chronicle of Church Events (1939-1949)), part 3, http://www.zlatoust.ws/letopis3.htm, p. 100.

on earth, our Church Abroad remains as before out of all communion with them, praying the Lord only that He enlighten their spiritual eyes and turn them from that disastrous path on which they themselves have started and on which they are dragging their flock.

"At the same time we, her humble servants, kiss the confessing exploit of the Secret or so-called Catacomb Church, whether she is in the dens of the earth or conceals herself in the depths of the Russian people itself, preserving the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience and struggling with the lies spread by the Bolshevik authorities and by the Russian bishops and clergy who have betrayed her.

"The Russian Church Abroad is in unity, love and prayer with all the other Orthodox Churches which have preserved fidelity to the apostolic tradition, to whatever people their members may belong. Still more would she want to preserve unity of spirit in the bond of peace with the children of our one mother, the Russian Church Abroad, trying to overcome the temporary jurisdictional divisions that exist between them."

The 1956 the Synod declared that "the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad is an unsevered part of the Local Russian Orthodox Church, being temporarily self-governing on synodal bases, until the abolition of atheist rule in Russia, in accordance with the resolution of the Holy Patriarch, the Holy Synod and the Higher Russian Church Council of November 7/20, 1920, N 362".

Did this mean that for ROCOR the Moscow Patriarchate was inside or outside the True Russian Church? It was still not clear... In view of these ambiguities, it is not surprising that some Catacomb Christians who had fled to the West felt that a different spirit was reigning in ROCOR.

Thus Professor I.M. Andreyev, who had suffered in the camps, wrote: "Not only were we ready to die, but many did die, confident that somewhere *there*, outside the reach of the Soviet authorities, where there is freedom – *there* the Truth was shining in all its purity. *There* people were living by it and submitting to it. *There* people did not bow down to Antichrist. And what terror overwhelmed me when, fairly recently, I managed to come abroad and found out that some people here 'spiritually' recognize the Soviet Church. *Spiritually!* Many of us there fell, 'for fear of the Jews', or giving in to the temptation of outward cooperation with the authorities. I knew priests of the official Church who, at home, tore their hair out, who smashed their heads making prostrations, begging forgiveness for their apostasy, calling themselves Cain – but nonetheless they did not recognize the Red Church. But these others abroad – it is precisely *spiritually* that they submit to it. What good fortune that our priest-martyrs, in dying, did not find out about this betrayal!"⁵⁷³

⁵⁷³ Andreyev, in Russia's Catacomb Saints, Platina, CA: St. Herman of Alaska Press, 1982, p. 49.

Before the war ROCOR had had no conflicts with any other Local Church with the exception of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, with which there was conflict, not so much over the question of the new calendar as over the EP's relations with the Russian renovationists and its "annexation" of large territories formerly belonging to the Russian Church. Although, from a strictly canonical point of view, the Russian refugees should have sought admission into the Local Orthodox Churches on whose canonical territory they lived, these Churches (primarily the Serbian, but also the Bulgarian, the Romanian and the Eastern Patriarchates, especially Jerusalem) did not insist on this, respecting the particular needs of the refugees to stick together in one ecclesiastical organization, and taking into account the desire of the refugees to return eventually to Russia (which most believed would be soon).⁵⁷⁴

However, the triumph of the Soviets in the war dashed the hopes of an early return to Russia. So the refugees had to decide how they were to establish themselves in the West on a more permanent basis. This was made more difficult by the fact that the previously friendly attitude of the Local Churches was beginning to change, partly because they were coming under pressure from the MP to break links with ROCOR, and partly because they themselves, as we have seen, were losing the salt of True Orthodoxy and therefore had less sympathy for the True Orthodox Russians in their midst. But in any case, ROCOR showed no sign of wanting to disband its organization and merge with the Local Churches. Thus in 1947 Archbishop Tikhon, the head of the Paris Exarchate, suggested to Metropolitan Anastasy that his Synod come under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, after which he, Tikhon, would enter into submission to ROCOR. Anastasy refused...⁵⁷⁵

However, this suspension of normal canonical rules could not continue forever. In fact, there was only one completely canonical way for ROCOR to reestablish her canonical status while preserving the integrity of her flock under Russian bishops: to declare herself the *only* truly Orthodox jurisdiction in the West in view of the falling away of the Local Churches. However, the bishops of ROCOR were not yet ready to take such a bold step.

⁵⁷⁴ As late as October 25, 1952, Patriarchs Christopher of Alexandria and Alexander of Antioch made a point of telling ROCOR's Bishop Seraphim (Ivanov) of Chicago that they recognized both the MP and ROCOR, since, as Patriarch Alexander said, "we do not consider ourselves to have the right to be judges in your Russian ecclesiastical quarrel. We have both been in Russia and have seen that Patriarch Alexis has a flock, and quite a numerous one. But we love all the Russians, and for that reason relate with equal benevolence to you, too. A proof of this is the permission [I have given] for the existence in Beirut of two parishes: yours and Moscow's. If you want, serve anywhere you like with us in the confines of my patriarchate." Patriarch Christopher said approximately the same, only asking Seraphim to convey to Metropolitan Anastasy his desire that when appointing hierarchs for Africa, he confer with him about it and see to it that his name was commemorated in the Russian churches in Africa (Monk Benjamin, *Letopis'*, part 4, p. 16).

⁵⁷⁵ Monk Benjamin, *Letopis'*, part 3, p. 121-122. However, ROCOR's Archbishop Nathanael of Western Europe concelebrated with Archbishop Tikhon in May, 1947 (Archbishop Seraphim of Brussels, "Vospominania" (Reminiscences), *Russkij Pastyr* (The Russian Pastor), N 36, 2000; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 3, p. 122).

The first reason for this was that they did not appreciate how far the new calendarist churches had departed from True Orthodoxy (they did not yet have any contact with the Greek Old Calendarists, who could have told them), and they still hoped for support from them and cooperation with them in matters that were of common concern. And secondly, they feared to repel the tide of Orthodox Christians fleeing from the communist nightmare in Russia and Eastern Europe by a too-strict attitude towards the status of the official churches there, to which most of the new wave of refugees had belonged. Instead, while continuing to berate (but not too strongly) the shortcomings of the MP, ROCOR positioned itself, not as the sole representative of True Orthodoxy in the West, but as the "anti-communist church", that part of the Russian Church which was in freedom and able to tell the truth about the situation in Russia.

This was not a dishonourable position, but it did not resolve the canonical status of ROCOR, and it bore the not inconsiderable danger of exposing its flock to the winds of false doctrine. Anti-communism was part of a truly viable Orthodox ideology, but only a part. If it was allowed to assume a more important role than the struggle against heresy in general, then ROCOR could well find herself dissolving into the modernist jurisdictions around it, and even, eventually, into the MP if the fall of communism in Russia was not followed by a real repentance in the Russian people.

This problem of self-definition was only partly eased by the transfer of the administration of ROCOR to New York in 1950. America was not, and is not now, the "canonical territory" of any single Local Church, so the anomalous position of ROCOR in America (and other western territories, such as Western Europe and Australia) was less prominent there in view of the anomalous position of *all* jurisdictions in the New World. For it is a fundamental tenet of Orthodox canon law that there should be only one bishop for one territory – the division of the Orthodox flock in one place into various jurisdictions along ethnic lines is forbidden, and was even anathematised by the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the heresy of "phyletism" in 1872.

As we have seen, at ROCOR's first Council of Bishops in America in 1950, a relatively firm stand against ecumenism was adopted, and ROCOR sanctified its own chrism for the first time. Logically, this should have led to a stricter attitude towards the Orthodox Churches that took part in the ecumenical movement. But under Metropolitan Anastasy this did not take place...

*

It was at the Hierarchical Council of October, 1953 that the beginning of a real debate on this subject began to surface. Metropolitan Anastasy said: "Archbishop John [Maximovich] says that we have not deviated from the right path pointed out to us by Metropolitan Anthony. We are a part of the Russian Church and breathe with the spirit of the Russian Church of all ages. But it is

dangerous to draw from this the extreme conclusion that we are the only Church, and that we need pay no attention to the others or reckon with them. We are going along the right path, and the others have declined from it, but we must not proudly despise the others, for there are Orthodox hierarchs and priests everywhere. The words of Maximus the Confessor are often cited: 'if the whole universe were to communicate, I alone would not.' But he said: 'if'. And when the Prophet Elijah thought that he alone kept the faith, the Lord revealed to him that there were still 7000 others..."

However, Archbishop Averky, supported by Archbishop Leonty, suggested a sharper, more aggressive posture towards the MP, relating to them as to renovationists. Archbishop John replied that the Synod had recently decided to accept Archimandrite Anthony (Bartoshevich) from the MP in his existing rank.⁵⁷⁶ And he recalled, according to protocol N 5 for October 3/16, "that the question of concelebrating with clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate had been discussed at the 1938 Council, and it had been accepted that only Metropolitan Sergei was out of communion." When Archbishop Averky called the MP "the church of the evil-doers", Archbishop John replied "that it was important to clarify whether this concerns all those in this Church. Among the rank-and-file hierarchs there are very good men, while a strict examination must be applied to those at the head."⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁶ Archimandrite Anthony later became Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, and the main supporter of the supposedly grace-filled nature of the MP in the 70s and 80s. This is likely to have had something to do with his own career, which was decidedly suspicious. In 1945, when the ROCOR Synod and chancellery fled from Yugoslavia to Germany, he remained behind and joined the MP. Then, in 1949, he crossed the iron curtain somehow (it was almost impossible to do this without the blessing of the KGB) and was received back into the True Church by his brother, Bishop Leonty of Geneva.

⁵⁷⁷ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 21. Archbishop John continued to retain this "liberal" attitude toward the MP to the end of his life. Thus in a letter dated September 13, 1963 he wrote: "... When under Metropolitan Anastasy they began to speak about 'the incorrect actions of the Church', he used to stop them, pointing out that one must not ascribe the actions of the hierarchy to the Church, since the hierarchy is not the whole Church, even if it speaks in her name. On the see of Constantinople there were Paul the Confessor, Macedonius, Gregory the Theologian, John Chrysostom, Nestorius, Proclus, Flavian and Germanus. Some of them shone in sanctity and Orthodoxy, but others were the leaders of heresies. But the Church remained Orthodox. During iconoclasm after the expulsion of Severnin, Nicephorus and others, not only their sees, but also the majority of Episcopal sees were occupied by iconoclasts. The other Churches did not even have communion with it [the see of Constantinople], according to the witness of St. Paul [patriarch of Constantinople], who abandoned the heresy and his see, since they did not wish to have communion via the iconoclasts. Nevertheless, the Church of Constantinople remained Orthodox, although part of the people, and especially the guards and the bureaucrats, were drawn into iconoclasm. So now it is understandable when people who are not familiar with the language of the Church use the expression 'Soviet church', but it is not fitting for responsible and theological discussions. When the whole hierarchy of South-Western Rus' passed into uniatism, the Church continued to exist in the person of the believing Orthodox people, which after many sufferings restored its hierarchy. For that reason it is more correct to speak, not of the 'Soviet church', which is impossible in the correct understanding of the word 'Church', but of the hierarchy, which serves Soviet power. Our relationship to it can be the same as to other representatives of this power. Their rank gives them the opportunity to act with great authority and to substitute the voice of the suffering Russian Church, and it is leading into error those who think to learn from them the true position of the Church in Russia.

It has been the argument of this book that in this point Archbishop Averky was right and Archbishop John, great saint though he was, was wrong. By 1945 the great majority of the MP hierarchs were ex-renovationists, and "very good" hierarchs must have been very few and far between; and even if they were "good" in a moral sense, their submission to the MP's submission to the Bolshevik authorities, and their rejection of the True Orthodox Church, could in no way be counted as good. Moreover, the great majority of the confessing hierarchs, who were in a better position to judge about the MP than the hierarchs abroad, considered the MP to be "the church of the evil-doers".

As for the necessity of applying a strict examination to those coming from the MP, this had been dramatically proved by the large number of traitors who had infiltrated ROCOR since the war. Already during the war, the renovationist "Bishops" Ignaty (Zhebrovsky) and Nicholas (Avtonomov) had been received, it appears, with the minimum of formalities, and appointed to the sees of Vienna and Munich, respectively, before being removed at the insistence of zealous laymen.⁵⁷⁸ Again, the former renovationist and leading ROCOR hierarch in Western Europe during the war, Metropolitan Seraphim (Lyade) of Berlin, secretly petitioned to be received into the MP "in his existing rank" before his death in 1950 - but was refused.579 Again, Metropolitan Seraphim (Lukyanov) of Paris joined the MP, was received back into ROCOR in his existing orders, and then returned to the MP in 1954. Again, among the twelve Belorussian and Ukrainian bishops who were received "in their existing rank" by ROCOR in 1946, at least one proved to be a Judas - Archbishop Panteleimon (Rudyk), whose immorality left a trail of destruction in various countries before he, too, joined the MP.

Stung by these betrayals, on October 14/27, 1953, the Hierarchical Council decreed that "in cases where it is revealed that those who have received their rank from the hierarchy of the MP by the Communists with the intention of

Of course, among them there are both conscious traitors, and those who simply do not find in themselves the strength to fight with their environment and who go with the current – that is a question of their personal responsibility. But as a whole it is the apparatus of Soviet power, the God-fighting power. Being on the one hand a hierarchy in the sphere of Divine services, for grace works independently of personal worthiness, in the social-political sphere it is a cover for the Soviet God-fighting activity. For that reason those who are abroad and have entered its ranks have become conscious helpers of this power..." (Monk Benjamin, *Letopis'*, part 5, p. 13) ⁵⁷⁸ Schema-Monk Epiphany Chernov, "Proniknovenie Obnovlenchestva v Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi" (The Penetration of Renovationism into the Russian Orthodox Church) (MS); letter of Archbishop Averky to Metropolitan Philaret, September 14/27, 1966.

⁵⁷⁹ Chernov, "Proniknovenie Obnovlenchestva...", p. 3. However, Archbishop Ambrose (von Sievers), following Chernov, asserts that in July-August, 1950 Metropolitan Seraphim was *secretly* received into the MP. This was followed by his mysterious death at the hands of bandits on August 15, 1950. Archbishop Ambrose explains this by the fact that ROCOR, being a "public-legal corporation" in German law, was the only organization that guaranteed Russian emigrants freedom from deportation back to the USSR. The news that Metropolitan Seraphim had secretly defected to the MP threatened all these emigrants ("Bezobrazniki: K sobytiam v RPTsZ 1945-55gg." (Hooligans: On Events in ROCOR from 1945 to 1955), *Russkoe Pravoslavie* (Russian Orthodoxy), N 2 (16), 1999, p. 17).

preaching in holy orders the Communist principles of atheism, such an ordination is recognized as neither grace-bearing nor legal." Again, on November 9, 1959 the Council decreed that "from now on, if clergy of the MP want to enter into the ranks of our Church Abroad: (1) They must be carefully checked to see whether they are conscious agents of the atheist authorities, and if this is discovered, the Hierarchical Synod must be informed. It may not recognize the validity of the ordination of such a person to the sacred rank; (2) in cases where no such doubts arise, he who is petitioning to be received into the clergy of the Church Abroad is to be received through public repentance. Moreover, a penance may be imposed on him as the Diocesan Hierarch sees fit; (3) such clergy must give a written declaration on their reception in accordance with the form established by the Hierarchical Synod; (4) when laypeople from the flock of the MP are received into the Russian Church Abroad, spiritual fathers must try their conscience with regard to the manner of their actions while they were under the atheist authorities."

The Council confirmed the following text to be signed by those clergy being received into the communion: "I, the undersigned, a former clergyman of the Moscow Patriarchate, ordained to the rank of deacon (by such-and-such a bishop in such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time) and ordained to the rank of presbyter (by such-and-such a bishop in such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time) and having passed through my service (in such-and-such parishes), petition that I be received into the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. I am sincerely sorry that I was among the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is in union with the God-fighting authorities. I sweep aside all the lawless acts of the Moscow hierarchy in connection with its support of the God-fighting authorities and I promise from now on to be faithful and obedient to the lawful hierarchy of the Russian Church Abroad.)"⁵⁸⁰

These measures constituted important steps in the direction of greater strictness towards the MP. And at the 1954 Council of the North American and Canadian dioceses Metropolitan Anastasy declared: "[The MP] does not educate the Russian people, but corrupts it, introducing hypocrisy and lies. Historical trials have visited us, and from them there is no other exit than by way of repentance. But the corrupt authorities do not allow us to set out on this path, but inspire pride and lead to the path of destruction. And responsibility is shared with this corrupt authority by the Soviet Church.

"Let us keep away from her! We do not confuse her with the Mother Church..."⁵⁸¹

However, in relation to the American Metropolia Metropolitan Anastasy said at the 1953 Council: "They do not have the fullness of truth, they deviate, but this does not mean that they are without grace. We must maintain objective

⁵⁸⁰ Letter of Protopresbyter George Grabbe to Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, May 6/19, 1969, in Bishop Gregory Grabbe, *Pis'ma (Letters)*, Moscow, 1998, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁸¹ Pravoslavnaia Rus', N 10, 1954, pp. 5-6; http://rocormoscow.livejournal.com/3507.html, 2.

calm with regard to them. We must strive for such unity on the same fundamental concepts of the Temporary Regulations upon which we stand today. Yet it is fair to say that all unity begins with personal contact: Let us love one another that with one mind we may confess. But we seem to regret that the keenness of jurisdictional quarrelling has been dulled. But our goal is unity. Certain boundaries were needed as for disciplinary purposes. Now, when many extremes were abandoned in the American Metropolia, we still sharpen the question and speak of them as heretics with whom we can have no contact. Bishop Nikon said that we are very weak. This is not quite true. But externally, we are weaker than our opponents, who have money and the press on their side. The battlefield is not even. If we elevate the conflict, a very difficult situation will arise."⁵⁸²

So the metropolitan was advocating retaining contacts and not "elevating the conflict" because the position of ROCOR from an external point of view was weak. This policy could be justified at the time in view of the fact that the Metropolia had not yet been absorbed into the MP. However, ROCOR later abandoned it – when the Metropolia was absorbed into the MP in 1970.

With regard to the Eulogians, Metropolitan Anastasy was also lenient. Thus on October 19, 1956, in response to a statement by Bishop Leonty of Chile that ROCOR should treat the Eulogians as renovationists and not permit any concelebrations, the metropolitan said that the Eulogians were different, since they were not heretics.⁵⁸³ And yet ROCOR had herself condemned the Eulogians' teaching on Sophianism as heresy!⁵⁸⁴

Metropolitan Anastasy also said: "Metropolitan Anthony [Khrapovitsky] was guided by this rule of St Basil the Great when he said that he was prepared to accept through the third rite both Catholics and Anglicans. He was of the view that as soon as organic ties to heresy are torn and Orthodoxy is accepted, grace is received, as if an empty vessel were filled with grace. We hold to the principle that we can accept those through the third rite whose thread of succession had not been torn. Even the Armenians, who confess a definite heresy, are accepted in their existing rank. Concerning the Anglicans, the question arose because they themselves are not certain that they have succession. If we accept those who depart from heresy, how can we not accept our own? They say that Patriarch Alexy sinned more than his predecessor. Whether he sinned more or less, we cannot deny his ordination. Much is said of their apostasy. But we must be cautious. We can hardly make an outright

⁵⁸² Quoted in Nun Vassa (Larin), "The Ecclesiastical Principle of *oikonomia* and ROCOR under Metropolitan Anastasy", a report to the Conference on the History of the Russian Church in November, 2002.

⁵⁸³ Fr. Alexander Lebedev, "1956 ROCOR Sobor on Eulogian Jurisdiction", orthodoxsynod@yahoogroups.com. November 30, 2002.

⁵⁸⁴ True the Eulogian jurisdiction had obtained a retraction of his views from the leading Sophianist, Fr. Sergei Bulgakov. However, the Eulogians did not clearly condemn the heresy, and their jurisdiction continued to be a hothouse of heresy for decades. See Andrew Blane (ed.), *Georges Florovsky*, Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993, p. 67.

accusation of apostasy. In no place do they affirm atheism. In their published sermons they attempt to hold to the Orthodox line. They took and continue to take very strict measures with regard to the *obnovlentsy*, and did not tear their ties with Patriarch Tikhon. The false policy belongs to the church authority and the responsibility for it falls on its leaders. Only heresy adopted by the whole Church tarnishes the whole Church. In this case, the people are not responsible for the behavior of the leaders, and the Church, as such, remains unblemished. No one has the audacity to say that the whole Church is without grace, but insofar as priests had contact with the devious hierarchy, acted against their conscience, repentance is necessary. There can be no discussion of 'chekists in cassocks.' They are worse than Simon the Sorcerer. In this regard, in every individual case, one must make a special determination, and, if there is suspicion that a chekist is asking to come to us, we must not accept him."⁵⁸⁵

Metropolitan Anastasy's liberal attitude towards the reception of Catholics, Anglicans and Armenians is perhaps excusable in that it reflects the liberal attitude of the Russian Church as a whole just before the revolution. However, it disagreed not only with prior Russian practice, but also with the practice of the Greek Church, and with the holy canons themselves (for example: the canons decree that Armenians should be received by Chrismation). Fortunately, this illegitimate practice of "*oikonomia*" was officially rescinded by the ROCOR Synod under Metropolitan Philaret in September, 1971, when it was decreed that Catholics and Protestants should henceforth be received by baptism. And when the Copts were once allowed to conduct a service in Jordanville, Metropolitan Philaret ordered that the church be cleansed from the defilement of heresy by holy water!

As regards the Metropolitan Anastasy's assertion that the MP took "very strict measures with regard to the *obnovlentsy*", this, unfortunately, was not true. As is well-known, both the first "patriarchs" of the MP, Sergei and Alexis, were former renovationists (*obnovlentsy*), and, far from repenting of their renovationism, they transformed the MP into an institution that was "renovationist in essence" (St. Cyril of Kazan's words). Still more seriously, as we have seen, it received into the episcopate a whole series of renovationist protopriests with the minimum of formalities.

In his assertion that "the false policy [of the MP] belongs to the church authority and the responsibility for it falls [only] on its leaders", Metropolitan Anastasy was unfortunately contradicting the teaching of the Orthodox Church, which considers that lay Christians are rational sheep who can and must separate from heretical leaders. Similarly, his assertion that "only heresy adopted by the whole Church tarnishes the whole Church" would not have been accepted by the hierarchs of the Ecumenical Councils. If the hierarchy of a Church adopts a heretical or antichristian policy, then it is the responsibility of all the lower ranks to rebuke their leaders, and if the rebukes fail, to separate

⁵⁸⁵ Nun Vassa, op. cit.

from them because they are no longer true bishops (15th canon of the First-and-Second Council of Constantinople).

The OCA Archbishop John (Shahovskoj) tried to argue that the position of ROCOR towards the MP in this period was hypocritical insofar as it simultaneously called the MP apostate and sorrowed over the persecutions in the USSR and the closure of churches, although, according to its logic, it should have rejoiced over the closure of apostate churches.

In reply, the secretary of the ROCOR Synod, Fr. George Grabbe, replied that while calling the MP "apostate" and even, in some cases, using the word "gracelessness", ROCOR never, at any of its Synodal sessions, expressed any doubt that the pastors and laymen belonging to the MP who were faithful to God were true pastors. Then, citing examples of the infiltration of agents into the hierarchy of the MP, Fr. George continued: "That is the gracelessness we are talking about! We are talking about those Judases, and not about the few suffering people who are vainly trying to save something, the unfortunate, truly believing pastors."586

Of course, this answer raised more questions than it answered. If all or most of the hierarchy were KGB agents, and therefore graceless, how could the priests whom they ordained and who commemorated them be true priests? And how could the laymen be true laymen if they communicated from false bishops and priests? Is it possible in general to speak about faithful priests and laity commemorating a faithless and apostate bishop? These questions never received satisfactory answers and continued to give ROCOR's witness in relation to the MP an ambiguous character for decades to come. Only on one question was ROCOR clear: that it had no communion with the MP Synod. And so it left SCOBA (the Council of Orthodox Bishops of America) in 1956 when the MP became one of its members.⁵⁸⁷

With regard to the other Churches of World Orthodoxy, a liberal policy was pursued until the retirement of Metropolitan Anastasy in 1964, and ROCOR hierarchs continued to concelebrate occasionally with both the Greek new calendarists and with the Serbian and Jerusalem patriarchates. Thus in 1948 Archbishop Vitaly (Maximenko) concelebrated at the consecration of Bishop Michael Konstantinidas of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, a friend of Metropolitan Anastasy from the days when the latter lived in Constantinople in the 1920s. Again, Bishop Leonty of Geneva concelebrated with Patriarch Timothy of Jerusalem at a Convent on the Mount of Olives in 1954. Jerusalem had promised Moscow that it would break with ROCOR, and Patriarch Timothy explained to Bishop Seraphim of Mahopac in 1952 that he could not serve at the Holy Sepulchre because the Jerusalem Patriarchate recognized the

⁵⁸⁶ Quoted by Deacon Nicholas Savchenko, "Pis'mo otkolovshikhsia" (A Letter of Those Who Have Fallen Away), Otkliki na deiania Arkhierejskogo Sobora RPTsZ 2000 goda i na prochie posleduiuschie za nim sobytia (Reactions to the Acts of the Hierarchical Council of the ROCOR in 2000 and to Other Events that Followed it), Paris, 2001, p. 9. ⁵⁸⁷ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 28.

MP. On the other hand, all heads of ROCOR's Ecclesiastical Mission, as well as the abbesses of the monasteries, were confirmed by official letters issued by the Jerusalem Patriarchate.⁵⁸⁸ Archbishop John (Maximovich) of Western Europe consecrated several new-calendarist bishops, all of whom left ROCOR for "World Orthodoxy" after his death: Bishop Theophilus (Ionescu) of Detroit and his Romanian new calendarists to the Romanian patriarchate (ROCOR defrocked him in 1972), Bishop John-Nectarius (Kovalevsky) of Saint-Denis and his French mission (following the Gallican rite) to the Romanian new calendarists in North America, to the OCA in 1976, and Bishop Jacob (Akkerduik) of the Hague to the MP in 1971 (he complained that ROCOR wanted to "Russify" his flock).

The Synod told Archbishop John that he was not right to receive into communion people who used the new Paschalia. Bishop Gregory Grabbe wrote: "The reposed Archbishop John received already organized groups of Frenchmen and Dutchmen whose life was conducted according to the new calendar and with the new Paschalia. However, the Council did not agree with this and obtained his renunciation of the latter."

"After the death of Vladyka John, in September, 1966 the ROCOR Hierarchical Synod entrusted the leadership of the affairs of the French Orthodox Catholic Church to Archbishop Vitaly (Ustinov). On October 9 Archbishop Vitaly was present at a General Assembly of the FOCC, where he declared that it was necessary to stop celebrating the liturgy according to the western rite and insisted on the complete acceptance of the Byzantine rite. As a mark of protest, on October 19 Bishop John (Kovalevsky) declared that the FOCC was leaving ROCOR. Part of the communities of the FOCC refused to leave ROCOR, but the Gallican rite was preserved among them on condition that the Byzantine rite was used as the main rite (later most of these parishes left ROCOR and joined one of the Greek Old Calendarist Churches). At the end of the same year Bishop John (Kovalevsky) addressed the heads of the Local Orthodox Churches with a request that they receive the FOCC with the keeping of the Gallican rite."⁵⁸⁹

Thus ROCOR was neither in official communion with World Orthodoxy nor clearly separated from it: it existed in a kind of canonical limbo, a Church that consecrated her own chrism but did not claim to be autocephalous, a Church of almost global jurisdiction but claiming to be part of the Russian Church *inside* Russia. The question was: which Russian Church *inside* Russia was it part of – the MP or the Catacomb Church?

⁵⁸⁸ Andrei Psarev, "The Development of Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia's Attitude Towards Other Local Orthodox Churches", http://www.sobor2006.com/printerfriendly2.php?id=119_0_3_0, p. 3.
⁵⁸⁹ lesolub, http://www.livejournal.com/users/dododod/601987.html, December 12, 2005.

The answer to this question was left deliberately vague. On the one hand, there was clearly no communion with the *hierarchy* of the MP, which was seen to have compromised itself with communism. On the other hand, it was said that communion had never been broken with the suffering *people* of Russia. But which people were being talked about? Those who considered themselves citizens of the Soviet state, or those who rejected such citizenship? Or both?

Metropolitan Anastasy appears to have considered the MP to be the "Mother Church". Thus he wrote to Metropolitan Theophilus of New York: "Your proposed union with the Patriarchate has not only a spiritual, but a canonical character, and binds you with the consequences. Such a union would be possible only if the Mother Church were completely free…"⁵⁹⁰

In 1957, however, in his last will and testament, he clearly drew the boundaries as follows: "As regards the Moscow Patriarchate and its hierarchs, then, so long as they continue in close, active and benevolent cooperation with the Soviet Government, which openly professes its complete godlessness and strives to implant atheism in the entire Russian nation, then the Church Abroad, maintaining her purity, must not have any canonical, liturgical, or even simply external communion with them whatsoever, leaving each one of them at the same time to the final judgement of the Sobor of the future free Russian Church..."⁵⁹¹

Again, on October 18, 1959, in his address at the opening of the Hierarchical Council of ROCOR, he said: "We must not only teach others, but ourselves also fulfil [that which we teach], following the examples of the Moscow saints whom we have commemorated today. They stand before us as Orthodox zealots, and we must follow their example, turning aside completely from the dishonesty of those who have now occupied their throne. Oh if they could but arise, they not only would not recognise any of their successors, but rather would turn against them with severe condemnation. With what zeal would St. Philip be set aflame against the weak-in-faith representatives of the Church, who look with indifference at the flowing of the innocent blood of their flock, and yet do not condemn the enemies of the Church, but try in every way to flatter the atheistic authority. How the great adamantine St. Hermogen would have arisen in righteous indignation, seeing the hierarchy remaining deceitfully silent at a time when atheist propaganda is being widely disseminated, forgetting that by their silence they are betraying God. Let us in every way turn aside from them, but at the same time let us arm ourselves with apostolic zeal. We must avoid every kind of contact with them like the plague. You know that these people with their thoroughly burned consciences will never cease to wage war against us, although they constantly change their methods of warfare."592

⁵⁹⁰ Metropolitan Anastasy, in Fr. Alexis Young, *The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia*, San Bernardino, CA: the Borgo Press, 1993, p. 47.

⁵⁹¹ Metropolitan Anastasy, in Young, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

⁵⁹² Quoted by Irina Pahlen, "Metropolite Anastasy" (Metropolitan Anastasy), orthodoxsynod@yahoogroups.com. December 3, 2002.

In 1961, moreover, he showed that he had not forgotten the Catacomb Church, declaring in the name of ROCOR: "We consider ourselves to be in spiritual unity precisely with the Secret Church, but not with the official administration of the Moscow Patriarchate led by Patriarch Alexis, which is permitted by the atheist government and carries out all its commands..."⁵⁹³

Noteworthy, is his saying that ROCOR was not in communion only with "the official administration of the MP", not with the rank-and-file believers. And the Epistle of the Hierarchical Council of 1962, while rebuking the atheists, expressed sympathy for the simple believers and even for the simple priests, while the Great-Martyr Great Russian Church was identified with the whole of the church people, *including those in the Moscow Patriarchate*, but excluding "the small group of clergy having the right to a legal existence".⁵⁹⁴ But how could the priests be inside the Church and the people they served outside it? This was ecclesiological nonsense!

This kind of ambiguity in relation to the Church in Russia was displayed also by Archbishop Vitaly (Maximenko) of Jordanville, who had once served the liturgy on his own breast in a Polish prison. He could, in one and the same article, fiercely criticize Sergei's policies as leading to the destruction of the Church and express "profound reverence before the exploit of Patriarch Sergei".⁵⁹⁵

However, his final verdict is fully in the spirit of the Catacomb Church: "They say: the patriarchate has changed nothing, in dogmas, services or rites. No, we reply, the patriarchate has destroyed the essential dogma of the Church of Christ, and has rejected Her essential mission – to serve the regeneration of men, and has replaced it by the service of the godless aims of communism, which is unnatural for the Church. This falling away is more bitter than all the previous Arianisms, Nestorianisms, Iconoclasms, etc. And this is not the personal sin of one or another hierarch, but the root sin of the Moscow Patriarchate, confirmed, proclaimed and bound by an oath in front of the world. It is, so to speak, *dogmatized apostasy…*"⁵⁹⁶

This was an inspired definition: *dogmatized apostasy*. Not simply apostasy "for fear of the Jews", but *dogmatized* apostasy – that is, apostasy raised to the level of a dogma. When apostasy is justified in this way, it becomes deeper, more serious and more difficult to cure. It becomes an error of the mind as well as a disease of the will. For it is one thing for a churchman out of weakness to submit himself and his church to the power of the world and of the Antichrist.

⁵⁹³ Metropolitan Anastasy, in *Nashi Vesti* (Our News), 1991, no. 4.

⁵⁹⁴ A.A. Sollogub (ed.), *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' za granitsej* (The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad), vol. I, 1958, pp. 306-307; quoted in Protopresbyter Victor Melehov, "O Polozhenii Russkoj Zarubezhnoj Tserkvi v Sovremennom Mire" (On the Position of the Russian Church Abroad in the Contemporary World), 2002, MS.

⁵⁹⁵ Maximenko, *Motivy moej zhizni* (Motifs of my life), Jordanville, 1955, p. 77. ⁵⁹⁶ Maximenko, op. cit., p. 25.

That is his personal tragedy, and the tragedy of those who follow him, but it is not *heresy*. It is quite another thing for the same churchman to make the same submission "not for wrath, but for conscience's sake" (<u>Romans</u> 13.5) – to use the words of the apostle as perverted by Sergei in his declaration. This is both heresy and apostasy – *dogmatized* apostasy.

However, at another time Archbishop Vitaly said that the Providence of God had placed before ROCOR the duty "of not tearing herself away from the basic massif, the body, the root of the Mother Church: in the depths of this massif, which is now only suffocated by the weight of Bolshevism, the spiritual treasures of Her millennial exploit are even now preserved. But we must not recognise Her contemporary official leaders, who have become the obedient instrument of the godless authorities."⁵⁹⁷

As V.K. writes: "In these words is contained a manifest incongruity. How did Archbishop Vitaly want, without recognising the official leadership of the MP, at the same time not to be torn away from its body? Is it possible 'to preserve the spiritual treasures' in a body whose head has become 'the obedient instrument of the godless authorities' (that is, the servants of satan and the antichrist), as he justly writes of the sergianist leaders?... The Holy Scriptures say: 'If the firstfruit is holy, the lump is also holy; and if the root is holy, so are the branches' (<u>Romans</u> 11.16). And on the other hand: 'A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit' (<u>Matthew</u> 7.18)."⁵⁹⁸

God permitted these inconsistencies in the positions of the ROCOR hierarchs during the 1950s and until the repose of Metropolitan Anastasy in 1964. But then external events – specifically, a major advance in the ecumenist heresy to engulf all the Local Orthodox Churches – forced ROCOR to clarify her position. This would be the task, above all, of the new first-hierarch, Metropolitan Philaret of New York.

⁵⁹⁷ Maximenko, op. cit., p. 45.

⁵⁹⁸ V.K. *Russkaia Zarubezhnaia Tserkov' na Steziakh Otstupnichestva* (The Russian Church Abroad on the Path of Apostasy), St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 48.

<u>43. ORTHODOXY AND THE WORLD COUNCIL OF</u> <u>CHURCHES (3)</u>

So far it had been the Ecumenical Patriarchate that had made the running in Orthodox ecumenism. However, in 1959 the MP sent its representative, Metropolitan Nicholas of Krutitsa, to the Orthodox consultation proposed by the Faith and Order Committee near Athens, which indicated that the communists had changed their minds about ecumenism, and decided that the Russian Church's participation in it would further their cause.

This change of mind was partly because they suddenly realized the opportunities for espionage among leftist Western churchmen, and partly because, as Fr. Georges Florovsky lamented, from the time of the Evanston conference a progressive takeover took place of the "Faith and Order" concerns by the "Life and Work" concerns.⁵⁹⁹ That is, of the two strands of ecumenical activity that had existed before the war – the resolving of dogmatic differences among Christians, and "concern for the world and its problems" – it was the latter that was becoming dominant.

And this was of great interest to the communists.

We have seen that, as late as the Moscow council of 1948, the MP, in obedience to its communist masters, had adopted an anti-western and antiecumenical position. However, this position began to change in the late 1950s, when the MP began to be pushed into joining the WCC by the Council for Religious Affairs. Thus on January 16, 1958, Metropolitan Nicholas asked the Council how he was to reply to the suggestion of the WCC general secretary that he meet representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. Comrade Karpov, head of the Council for Religious Affairs, said that he should reply that they in principle agreed to a meeting in June-July of that year.

And so on May 13 Metropolitan Nicholas asserted that "in the last ten years, thanks to the participation of some Orthodox Churches and the non-participation of others in the ecumenical movement, significant changes have taken place witnessing to its evolution towards churchness [*tserkovnosti*]. Very indicative in this respect have been huge movements in the sphere of German Protestant theology revealing the mystical depths of Orthodoxy and overcoming its traditional rationalism... On coming into contact with our ecclesiastical life, many actors in the ecumenical movement have completely changed their idea of Orthodoxy... Evidently approving of the declaration of the Orthodox participants in the Evanston assembly, we agree to a meeting with the leaders of the World Council of Churches exclusively in the name of our Pan-Orthodox duty – to serve the reunification of all Christians in the bosom of the Church of Christ."⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁹ Andrew Blane, Georges Florovsky, p. 122.

⁶⁰⁰ Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1958, N 6; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 30.

In 1959, as a sign of the changing times, the MP joined the European Conference of Churches... Then, on June 15, 1960 the new head of the Council for Religious Affairs, Kuroyedov met Patriarch Alexis. As Fr. Sergei Gordun writes, "Kuroyedov declared that he had carefully studied the external activities of the Patriarchate and he had come to conclusion that the situation was quite unsatisfactory. 'In recent years the Patriarchate has not undertaken a single major initiative for the unification of the Orthodox Churches around the Russian Orthodox Church headed by the Moscow Patriarchate – initiatives, that is, aimed at exposing the reactionary activities of the Pope of Rome and the intensification of the struggle for peace. The Patriarchate is not using those huge opportunities which she enjoys; she has not undertaken a single major action abroad... The Russian Orthodox Church is not emerging as a unifying centre for the Orthodox Churches of the world, usually she adopts a passive stance and only weakly exposes the slanderous propaganda concerning the position of religion and the Church in our country... The Council recommended to Metropolitan Nicholas that he work out suggestions for intensifying external work. However, Metropolitan Nicholas has not fulfilled this request of the Council and has put forward suggestions which in no way correspond to the requirements discussed with the metropolitan in this regard.' Then Kurovedov suggested that Metropolitan Nicholas be released from his duties as president of the Department of Foreign Relations and that they be imposed on another, more fitting person."

The "suggestion" was accepted, and Metropolitan Nicholas was retired on June 21. In July, he asked Archbishop Basil (Krivoshein) of Brussels to tell the world that a new persecution was beginning, and in August repeated this message to western church leaders. In August, Kuroyedov suggested to the patriarch that he retire Metropolitan Nicholas from the Moscow diocese. The patriarch suggested to the metropolitan that he accept the Leningrad diocese, but the latter sharply rejected the offer. On September 9, Metropolitan Nicholas sent a letter to Khrushchev. On September 19, the MP Synod retired him. On December 13 he died in suspicious circumstances; many believe he was murdered.⁶⁰¹ Some believe that Metropolitan Nicholas was removed because in 1959 KGB defector Major Peter Deriabin had exposed him before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee as a KGB agent...⁶⁰² There is no doubt that he was an agent, as we have seen; but it also appears likely that he sincerely wanted to protect the Church. In any case, his career is yet another illustration of the Lord's words that one cannot serve two masters, God and Mammon...

⁶⁰¹ "Nekotorie Stranitsy Biografii Mitropolita Nikolaia (Yarushevicha)" (Some Pages from the Biography of Metropolitan Nicholas (Yarushevich), *Vertograd-Inform*, NN 7-9 (16-18), 1996, pp. 16-17; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, London: Allen Lane, 1999, p. 636.

⁶⁰² Deriabin, who served in the Kremlin Guard Directorate and then as Rezident in charge of espionage in Vienna, testified that "every priest is an agent of the secret police. Even the second ranking official in the Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow [Metropolitan Nicholas] is an agent" (*Chronicle-Telegraph* of Elyria, Ohio, July 20, 1961; in Vladimir Kozyreff, "Re: [paradosis] Happiness and successes – and Bishop Meletieff", orthodox- tradition@yahoogroups.com, January 19, 2006.

The new foreign relations supremo turned out to be Bishop Nikodem (Rotov), who was born in 1929, made priest at the extraordinarily young age of 20, and Bishop of Podolsk on July 10, 1960, at the age of 31. His arrival on the scene marks a new advance in the apostasy of the MP. For his personality, as Fr. Sergius continues, was "linked with the change in the position of the Moscow Patriarchate in relation to the ecumenical movement. As is well known, the Conference of the heads and representatives of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches, which took place in Moscow in 1948, accepted a resolution declaring that 'the aims of the ecumenical movement... do not correspond to the ideals of Christianity and the tasks of the Church of Christ as those are understood by the Orthodox Church'. In this connection particular mention was made of the ecumenical movement's turn towards involvement in social and political life, which was not acceptable for Orthodoxy. This position was maintained by the Moscow Patriarchate until 1960. In a conversation which took place on April 2, 1959, his Holiness Patriarch Alexis informed the Council about the attitude of the Russian Church to the ecumenical movement, and declared that she intended gradually to increase her links with the World Council of Churches and to send her observers to its most important conferences, but would not become a member of this organization. However, a year and a half later this position changed. In the notes of a conversation which took place between Patriarch Alexis and V.A. Kuroyedov on September 15, 1960, there is the following phrase: 'The Patriarch accepted the recommendation of the Council concerning the entry of the Russian Orthodox Church into the membership of the World Council of Churches and evaluated this as a major action of the Russian Orthodox Church in its activities abroad.' What was the aim of the Council for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church in recommending that the Russian Church enter the World Council of Churches? To conceal, it would seem, the anti-ecclesiastical policy of the Soviet government. Having cornered the Church, the Council wanted to create the image of a free and active Russian Church abroad..."603

In November-December, 1960 Patriarchs Alexis and Athenagoras met in Constantinople, and discussed questions related to the Second Vatican Council

After their meeting Bishop Nikodem, now president of the MP's Department of External Relations, gave a press conference at which he said: "The Russian Church has no intention of taking part in the Council, since the union between Orthodoxy and Catholicism cannot take place unless the Vatican renounces from the beginning certain principles – for example, the infallibility of the Pope.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰³ Gordun, "Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' pri Sviateishikh Patriarkhakh Sergii i Aleksii" (The Russian Orthodox Church under their Holinesses Patriarchs Sergei and Alexis), *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia* (Herald of the Russian Christian Movement), vol. 158, I-1990, pp. 120, 133, 134.

⁶⁰⁴ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 4, p. 42.

On March 30, 1961 the MP Synod resolved "to consider the entry of the Russian Orthodox Church into the World Council of Churches to be timely, and to ask his Holiness the Patriarch to send a letter to the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches declaring the desire of the Russian Orthodox Church to become a member of the World Council of Churches."⁶⁰⁵

From September 24 to October 1 the Orthodox Churches in the WCC met on Rhodes under the presidency of Metropolitan Chrysostom of Athens. One of its participants, Archbishop Basil of Brussels, recalls that "the relations of the Orthodox Church with the rest of the Christian world were reviewed in detail. With regard to the Catholic Church, the majority of participants in the conference expressed themselves 'for the development of relations in the spirit of the love of Christ, with particular reference to the points envisaged by the 1920 encyclical of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate.'"⁶⁰⁶

Also discussed was a catalogue of topics for a future Pan-Orthodox Council. The MP tried hard to ensure that no topic that might prove embarrassing to the Soviet government was included. For, as Gordienko and Novikov write, "in the course of the debate on the catalogue, the Moscow Patriarchate's delegation [led by Nikodem] suggested the removal of some of the subjects (The Development of Internal and External Missionary Work, The Methods of Fighting Atheism and False Doctrines Like Theosophy, Spiritism, Freemasonry, etc.) and the addition of some others (Cooperation between the Local Orthodox Churches in the Realization of the Christian Ideas of Peace, Fraternity and Love among Peoples, Orthodoxy and Racial Discrimination, Orthodoxy and the Tasks of Christians in Regions of Rapid Social Change)... Besides working out the topics for the future Pre-Council, the First Conference passed the decision 'On the Study of Ways for Achieving Closer Contacts and Unity of Churches in a Pan-Orthodox Perspective', envisaging the search for contacts with Ancient Eastern (non-Chalcedonian) Churches (Monophysites), the Old Catholic, Anglican, Catholic, and Protestant Churches, as well as the World Council of Churches."607 In other words, the Orthodox were to abandon the struggle against Atheism, Freemasonry and other false religions, and were to engage in dialogue towards union with all the Christian heretics - while at the same time persecuting the True Orthodox and using ecumenical forums to further the ends of Soviet foreign policy in its struggle with the Capitalist West!608

The argument used by Nikodem for removing atheism from the agenda was that discussion of this question might elicit persecution against the Church in Russia. As for Masonry, "it does not exist in contemporary Russia, we don't

⁶⁰⁵ Monk Benjamin, "Letopis' Tserkovnoj Istorii (1961-1971)" (A Chronicle of Church History (1961-1971), http://www.zlatoust.ws/letopis5.htm, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁶ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 3.

⁶⁰⁷ "The Russian Orthodox Church in the System of Contemporary Christianity", in A. Preobrazhensky (ed.), *The Russian Orthodox Church*, Moscow: Progress, 1988, p. 387.

⁶⁰⁸ William C. Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 1945-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, chapter 9.

know it, Masonry exists only in the West. Consequently, this question is not of general, but only of local Orthodox interest, and for that reason it should not be included in the programme of a general Orthodox Council..."⁶⁰⁹

In November, 1961 Archbishop Nikodem, accompanied by Bishop Anthony (Bloom) of Sourozh, who lived in London, Bishop (and future Patriarch) Alexis (Ridiger) and "a Russian government courier who is responsible for their comfort and all their expenses"⁶¹⁰, went to New Delhi for the Third General Assembly of the WCC. On December 6-7, the MP was accepted as an official member of the WCC at its Third General Assembly in New Delhi. 142 churches voted for, 4 abstained and 3 voted against.

The Vatican immediately warned that the MP's membership was aimed "at the fulfilling of plans hatched in the Kremlin, which are bound to assist the triumph of Soviet propaganda through ecumenical Christianity". And sure enough: when an attempt was made to condemn communism, Archbishop Nikodem immediately proposed a resolution listing the vices of capitalism, as a result of which both resolutions were withdrawn.⁶¹¹

The KGB-enforced entry of the MP into the WCC, which was followed by the entry of the Romanian Church (in 1961) and of the Georgian Church (in 1962), had a devastating effect on the Orthodox position. For the Soviets not only constituted numerically by far the largest single Church in the WCC; they also controlled, through the KGB, all the other delegates from behind the iron curtain. Communism and Ecumenism therefore met in an unholy union which has been called "Ecucommunism".⁶¹²

As Deacon Andrew Kuraiev writes: "Sergianism and Ecumenism intertwined. It was precisely on the instructions of the authorities that our hierarchy conducted its ecumenical activity, and it was precisely in the course of their work abroad that clergy who had been enrolled into the KGB were checked out for loyalty."⁶¹³

The Orthodox delegates at New Delhi signed a summary statement which declared, among other things: "We consider that the work of creating the One, Universal Church must unfailingly be accompanied by the destruction and disappearance of certain outmoded, traditional forms of worship". The idea of "creating" the One Church was blasphemous, and the idea of destroying certain "outmoded" forms of worship - an outright challenge to the Holy Tradition of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church! And, having

⁶⁰⁹ Archbishop Basil of Brussels, *Vospominania* (Reminiscences); Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 3-4.

⁶¹⁰ *The Daily Telegraph* (London), November 22, 1961.

⁶¹¹ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 5.

⁶¹² V. Moss, "Ecucommunism", *Living Orthodoxy*, September-October, 1989, vol. XI, N 5, pp. 13-18.

⁶¹³ Kuraiev, "Vo dni pechal'nie Velikago posta" (During the Sad Days of the Great Fast), *Den*' (*Day*), N 13, March 29 / April 4, 1992.

delivered it, the Orthodox delegates seemed to lose all restraint; for within a decade or two of the New Delhi congress, the ecumenical movement had climbed into the realm of "Super-ecumenism" – relations with non-Christian religions.

The General Assembly of the WCC in New Delhi was closely followed by the opening of the Second Vatican Council in 1962, an event as important for ecumenism in the West as had been the founding of the WCC. Vatican II opened the floodgates to Ecumenism in the western world. For, as Malachi Martin writes: "Before the end of the fourth and final session of Vatican II presided over by Pope John's successor, Paul VI - some bishops and Vatican personnel had already adopted entirely new and innovative meanings for the idea of ecumenism. The powerful Augustin Cardinal Bea, for example, was a leading figure at the Council and a close adviser to Paul VI, as he had been to Pope John. Bea was seen as the Vatican's own spearhead in what came to be nothing less than an ecumenical revolution. The Cardinal organized 'ecumenical gatherings' that included not only Roman Catholics and Protestants as usual, but Jews and Muslims as well. In time, as was only logical, Buddhists, Shintoists, animist and a host of other non-Christian and even nonreligious groups would find a place in the poorly and broadly defined new 'ecumenism'."614

During the New Delhi Assembly, Nikodem announced that the Vatican had invited the MP to send observers to the Second Vatican Council; but that the MP had laid it down as a condition that there should be "no declarations hostile to our beloved country". So for most of the next year, the MP chose to emphasize, albeit in a gentle way, the dogmatic differences between the two Churches.⁶¹⁵ However, in September-October, at the Second Pan-Orthodox Conference on Rhodes, it was decided to begin a theological dialogue with the Catholic Church. Moreover, - still more importantly, - at the beginning of October the Council for Religious Affairs told the Central Committee that the participation of observers at the Second Vatican Council would assist the establishment of useful contacts with the Vatican and would bind the Vatican in its promotion of hostile activity against the USSR. This official address of the Council to the Central Committee completed a process of change in attitude towards the Catholic Church and the question of the presence of observers at the Vatican Council from originally negative to a positive recognition of benefit for the Soviet government and for the MP of an improvement in their relations

⁶¹⁴ Martin, The Keys of this Blood, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990, pp. 258-59.

⁶¹⁵ Thus in September, 1962 Patriarch Alexis in an interview with a French journalist said the following on the participation of MP representatives at the Second Vatican Council: "The Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches are close to each other in the spheres of faith and liturgics, and we believe that those differences that divide them can, with the help of God and mutual good-will, can be overcome in time. In respect of dogmatics, the main points dividing us are the infallibility of the pope and his headship in the Church, some questions of Mariology, the question of the *Filioque* and some other particularities." (*Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1962, N 9, pp. 14-16; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 6).

to the Vatican. The decision to allow the sending of observers to the Second Vatican Council was taken at the highest level of Soviet power, the Politburo, on October 10, 1962 (N 58/30).⁶¹⁶

The arrival of Russian Orthodox observers at the Council produced consternation in French Catholic circles, which accused the Vatican of "selling out" to communism. But the French communist press was delighted: "Since the world socialist system shows its superiority indisputably and enjoys the approval of many hundreds of millions of men, the Church can no longer rest content with crude anti-communism. She has even given an undertaking, on the occasion of her dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church, that there should be no direct attack on the communist regime at the Council."⁶¹⁷

Why did the Vatican accept this condition, which so damaged her standing in the anti-communist West? Probably for the same reason that the MP-KGB agreed to send observers – *to infiltrate the camp of the enemy*. And the possibility exists that their (the Vatican's) main agent of infiltration was precisely the MP's Metropolitan Nikodem...

This at first sight unlikely hypothesis gains credibility from the career of Fr. Michael Havryliv, a Russian priest who was secretly received into the Catholic Church in 1973. Fr. Serge Keleher writes: "The Capuchin priest told Havryliv that Metropolitan Nikodem [of Leningrad] was secretly a Catholic bishop, recognized by Rome with jurisdiction from Pope Paul VI throughout Russia. This assertion is not impossible – but neither is it entirely proved.

"On September 6 1975 Havryliv made a sacramental general Confession before Metropolitan Nikodem, who then accepted Havryliv's monastic vows and profession of Faith to the Apostolic See and the Pope of Rome. Kyr Nikodem commanded Havryliv to order his monastic life according to the Jesuit Constitutions, and presented him with a copy of this document in Russian. This was all done privately; four days later the Metropolitan tonsured Havryliv a monk. On 9 October Kyr Nikodem ordained Havryliv to the priesthood, without requiring the oaths customary for Russian Orthodox candidates to Holy Orders.

"In 1977 Havryliv was reassigned to the Moscow Patriarchate's archdiocese of L'viv and Ternopil... In Havryliv's final interview with Kyr Nikodem, the Metropolitan of Leningrad 'blessed me and gave me instructions to keep my Catholic convictions and do everything possible for the growth of the Catholic cause, not only in Ukraine, but in Russia. The Metropolitan spoke of the practice of his predecessors – and also asked me to be prudent."⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁶ Protopresbyter Vitaly Borovoj, "I on byl veren do smerti" (He, too, was faithful unto death); Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 6-7.

⁶¹⁷ France Nouvelle (New France), January 16-22, 1963, p. 15.

⁶¹⁸ Serge Keleher, *Passion and Resurrection – the Greek Catholic Church in Soviet Ukraine,* 1939-1989, Stauropegion, L'viv, 1993, pp. 101-102. Cf. *The Tablet*, March 20, 1993. Recently, writes Ludmilla Perepiolkina, "the Catholic Journal *Truth and Life* published the memoirs of Miguel

These words indicate the truth behind the mask of the Vatican's ecumenism; and the fact that Havryliv was reordained by Nikodem (acting in his capacity as a Catholic bishop) shows that Rome accepted the sacraments of the Orthodox only for only as long as it suited her. The Orthodox were, from Vatican II, not heretics, but "separated brethren". But they still had to return in repentance to their father, the Pope...

The Vatican also decided to invite ROCOR to send observers to the Council. This decision, writes Andrew Psarev, "was a precursor to a lively discussion of the [ROCOR] council session in 1962, where the so-called defensive point of view collided with the 'missionary' point of view. An ardent advocate of the 'defensive' point of view was Archbishop Averky of Syracuse and Holy Trinity Monastery, who saw the Second Vatican Council as a step in the direction of global apostasy. An opposite point of view was expressed by Bishop Savva of Edmonton, who saw declining the invitation as a loss of an opportunity to bear witness to the truth; using a forum provided an opportunity to talk about Orthodoxy, the situation in the Orthodox world, and about the persecuted Russian Church. The support given by Metropolitan Anastasy to the missionary point of view regarding the sending of representatives to the Vatican was the last major influence he had on relations between ROCOR and the non-Orthodox world during the period of his service as the first hierarch."⁶¹⁹

And so when the Council opened on October 12, 1962, the only Orthodox present were the MP delegation headed by Metropolitan Nikodem, and a group of ROCOR observers led by Archbishop Anthony of Geneva...

Paralleling the Soviets' new-found enthusiasm for ecumenism was their rather older enthusiasm for "peace". The origins of the so-called "movement for peace" and "theology of peace" can be traced at least to the founding of NATO to defend Europe against Soviet aggression in 1949: from the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism, NATO was not a defensive organization but a threat to

Arranz, in which this Jesuit, who in Nikodem's time taught at the Leningrad Theological Academy, told, among other things, that with Nikodem's blessing he celebrated 'the Eastern Rite Liturgy' in Nikodem's house church at the Leningrad Theological Academy." (Ecumenism - A Path to Perdition, St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 276, note). Again, Hieromonk Tikhon (Kazushin) writes: "In 1989 during a reception at the French embassy an elderly man, Czech by nationality, came up to me and introduced himself as head of the Jesuit pension for Russian youth in Medon near Parish and as a high-ranking officer of the [Jesuit] order. Thus he said that Nikodem was their man and also a high-ranking officer in the Order close to the General. It is know that in his cell Nikodem almost everyday performed a so-called 'spoken mass'" (communication Facebook, 24 January, 2015, on https://www.facebook.com/lregelson/posts/981429488551934?comment_id=9831376050477 89&offset=0&total comments=96¬if t=feed comment reply).

⁶¹⁹ Andrei Psarev, "Vospominania Arkhiepiskopa Leontia Chilijskago", *Pravoslavnaia Zhizn*' (Orthodox Life), N 5 (557), May, 1996, pp. 6-7.

world peace. The Soviets proved masters at insinuating the idea that they were the real peacemakers – while steadily and consistently pursuing war against the free world. In this connection, Revel points to "the KGB's slow penetration of Christian churches, panicked by their declining spiritual influence over modern societies, nudging them into adopting a fresh theme, one more 'public-spirited' than religion: the struggle for peace, or, in the Third World, the 'theology of liberation'. A bishop is always a bigger draw on such subjects than the Soviet embassy's press attaché."⁶²⁰

Thus the MP – which is not so much "penetrated" by the KGB, as a branch of it - organized a series of ecumenical conferences "in defence of peace" with representatives not only of the Christian confessions, but also of Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, Shintoism and Sikhism. Insofar as these religious "fighters for peace" worshipped completely different gods or (in the case of Buddhism) no god at all, there was no place at these conferences for the specifically *Christian* understanding of peace. Thus there was no mention of the fact that peace on earth is possible only if there is peace with God, which is obtained only through faith in the redeeming work of Christ, Who "is our peace" (<u>Ephesians</u> 2.14), and through a constant struggle with evil in all its forms, including atheism and communism.

Moreover, as P.K. Kurochkin writes, "on the pages of the ecclesiastical press and on the lips of those speaking before the believers, the similarity and closeness of the communist and Christian social and moral ideals was proclaimed more and more often." And so the cult of Stalin was transformed into the cult of communism; for "the patriarchal church, having conquered the renovationists, was forced to assimilate the heritage of the conquered not only in the field of political re-orientation, but also in the sphere of ideological reconstruction."⁶²¹

The gospel of "Communist Christianity" appeared in an encyclical of the patriarchate "in connection with the Great October Socialist Revolution", which supposedly "turned into reality the dreams of many generations of people. It made all the natural riches of the land and means of production into the inheritance of the people. It *changed the very essence of human relations*, making all our citizens equal and excluding from our society any possibility of enmity between peoples of difference races and nationalities, of different persuasions, faiths and social conditions."⁶²²

Insofar as the MP confessed that the revolution "changed the very essence of human relations" for the better, it renounced the Christian Faith for that of the faith of the Antichrist. This aspect of the MP's apostasy is often forgotten. And of course now, since the fall of communism, the MP no longer talks about

⁶²⁰ Revel, op. cit., p. 177.

⁶²¹ Kurochkin, *Evoliutsia sovremennogo russkogo pravoslavia* (The Evolution of Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy), Moscow, 1971, pp. 81, 82.

⁶²² Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii (The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1967; translated in Orthodox Life, No 110, March-April, 1968, p. 25.

its enthusiasm for the antichristian creed of communism. But by any normal definition of words, the hierarchs of the MP ceased to be, not only Orthodox in any meaningful sense, but also Christian at this time...

"The so-called 'theology of peace'," wrote Protopresbyter George Grabbe, "is in essence the chiliastic preaching of the Kingdom of God on earth, with the help of the planting of communist socialism. In their address to the Moscow council before the election of the patriarch in 1971 the Priest Nicholas Gainov and three laymen raised questions in relation to the speeches of Metropolitan Nikodem [of Leningrad] and his co-workers. They cited his words on the union of people amongst themselves in 'the service of reconciliation' with the aim thereby of 'seizing the Kingdom of God that is coming in strength'. *The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* wrote: 'For the Christian religion there can be no indifferent or neutral spheres of activity. The changes that are taking place in the world are viewed by Christianity as the action of the Providence of God, the manifestation of the power of God with the aim of establishing the Kingdom of God on earth' (1962, Nº 12, p. 12).

"The peace which the Moscow patriarchate is clamouring for is not spiritual peace, but political peace, and moreover, a false peace, for the so-called 'theology of peace' is linked with the deceptive propaganda of the Soviets. In trying to echo communist propaganda, the patriarchate is involuntarily falling into the preaching of a certain kind of chiliasm, that is, the attainment of a golden age and general peace by human means of a political character. If the Saviour said: 'Seek first of all the Kingdom of God, and all the rest will be added to you,' the Moscow patriarchate puts the question in the reverse order: the Kingdom of God must be attained through the external means of the communist social order.

"That is why, in his report 'Peace and Freedom' at the local conference of the movement for peace in Holland in 1963, Metropolitan Nikodem called for the Church to come closer to this world. 'From ancient times,' he said, 'the apologists of the unchangeability of social relations have begun to incline the thoughts of Christians to complete alienation from the world with the aim of drawing them away from burning social problems, for the struggle for the reconstruction of society on the principles of justice. Under the long influence of this pseudo-Christian preaching whole generations of narrow fanatics have been educated and grown up with distorted ideas about Christianity' (*J.M.P.*, 1963, $N_{\rm P}$ 1, p. 40).

"What is Metropolitan Nikodem renouncing in these words? He is renouncing the patristic and ascetic past, he is trying to turn the Church from striving for heaven to the path of earthly social tasks. His Kingdom of God on earth is the communist order.

"He is echoed by Protopriest V.M. Borovoj, who expressed himself still more vividly: 'Systematic theology and the historical churches have never been on the side of the revolution for the simple reason that they were prisoners of the cosmo-centric understanding of reality, prisoners of the static understanding of an order established once and for all on earth. Only in the last decades, when profound changes, a kind of revolution, have taken place in philosophical, theological and scientific thought as the result of an anthropocentric view of the cosmos, an evolutionary conception of the universe and a new rethinking of the whole history of humanity – only after all this has there appeared the possibility of working out a theology of development and revolution' (*J.M.P.*, 1966, No 9, p. 78)...

"By moving in this apostatic direction the Moscow patriarchate has already lost Christianity itself, replacing it with the religion of this world. Contrary to the word of the Saviour (<u>Matthew</u> 6.24), it is trying to serve two masters, and, as the Saviour warned, it has arrived at the point where it is careless with regard to Christianity but ardent in serving atheist communism."⁶²³

⁶²³ Grabbe, *Dogmat o Tserkvi v sovremennom mire* (The Dogma of the Church in the Contemporary World), report to the Third All-Diaspora Council, 1974.

IV. VARIETIES OF MADNESS (1960-1970)

44. THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

American appeared to reach the peak of her military and political power in the 1950s and the peak of her cultural glamour - during the presidency of John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s. As John Darwin writes, "in dynamic sectors like air transport and mass entertainment, American products were almost unbeatable. The 'soft power' of economic and cultural influence underwrote the 'hard power' of strategic might. No country that relied on a trading currency could risk Washington's displeasure, lest in moments of strain the support of the dollar might be withheld.

"The huge zone where America provided – or imposed – its strategic protection (by 1955 the United States had 450 bases in 36 countries) overlapped with the sphere of the new international economy of which America was the pivot. Together they formed the Pax Americana. In the 1950s it was consolidated rapidly, though not without friction. A critical year was 1956. Washington's refusal to help the Hungarian revolt against Soviet hegemony marked a tacit acceptance of the European partition of 1945-8. Almost simultaneously, by forcing the British and French (through financial pressure0 to abandon their effort to destroy Nasser's regime, Washington served notice that its European allies must manage what remained of their imperial space in ways that conformed with its grand design. The general return to convertibility among the Western currencies in 1958 signalled the end of 'emergency economics' and the normalization of the global trading economy. In the Middle East and South East Asia, it seemed that limited intervention was enough to forestall the expansion of Soviet influence and stabilize the frontier between the superpower spheres. With the line of 'containment' now tightly drawn across much of Eurasia, and the strategic means (by a nuclear onslaught) to deter a Soviet breakout into Western Europe, the global balance now looked firmly tilted towards American primacy..."624

However, the American position was much more fragile than it seemed. First of all, the Americans suffered from an apparent inability to find decent men to lead their anti-communist client regimes. Thus South Vietnam's Diem had some good qualities, but was increasingly authoritarian, and his intelligence chief, as Sir Max Hastings writes, "was notorious as one of the most ruthless killers in Asia... The brutality and corruption of South Korean dictator Syngman Rhee had proved no impediment to his continuing rule. President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines employed ruthless methods to triumph over the Huks. The communist threat to Greece had finally been crushed, with shocking savageries by both sides. Few of Latin America's dictators ran their countries with any pretence of honesty, justice or humanity, yet they continued to enjoy Washington's favour."⁶²⁵

⁶²⁴ Darwin, After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, London: Penguin, 2007, pp. 471-472.

⁶²⁵ Hastings Vietnam, London: William Collins, 2019, p. 97.

There were foreign policy failures. "When Washington tried to crush Castro's revolution in Cuba by barring the import of sugar, Khrushchev promised to buy it instead. When the Congo exploded, he denounced the failure to support Lumumba's government and portrayed the UN as a tool of the West needing drastic reform. In London and Washington there was deep alarm. In 1961 a new front opened in South East Asia when Ho Chi Minh launched the struggle against the Diem regime in south Vietnam. The Yemen revolution in 1962, and the civil war that followed, made it seem likely that Nasser (who intervened massively on the revolutionary side) would become much more dependent upon Soviet aid and that the Yemeni war would unsettle South Arabia. With great reluctance, the Americans promised their help against any attack on the Saudi state by Nasser's Yemeni clients. Most dramatic of all, was the dispatch of Soviet missiles to Khrushchev's new ally in Latin America..."⁶²⁶

And so American prestige began to decline. The glamour of the Kennedy court concealed inner corruption and weakness. And the younger generation, whom Kennedy was supposed to represent, began to see the Americans as the new imperialists, and the Soviets as the defenders of the poor and oppressed.

Moreover, there was no coherent nuclear strategy... By the late 1950s, not only the United States (in 1952), but also the Soviet Union (in 1953) and Britain (in 1957) had acquired, not only the atomic bomb, but also the far more powerful thermonuclear weapons capable of inflicting hitherto unimaginable destruction and death. "The race was then to upgrade their 'delivery systems' from the era of air power into the missile age. This time the Soviets beat the Americans. Their launch of a man-made satellite, Sputnik, in November 1957 was both a technological humiliation for the USA and also a sign that the USSR had a sufficiently powerful rocket to launch a nuclear missile all the way to America. Eisenhower's administration hastily accelerated its own missile programme and implemented a major scheme of civil defence."⁶²⁷

"Starting in the mid-1960s, Soviet missile production zoomed upward: hundreds were rolled out every year.

"The Soviet Union, looking through an entirely different prism than the United States, saw nuclear weapons as a blunt instrument for deterrence. If attacked, they would respond with crushing punishment. By many accounts, in the early decades they did not adopt the limited nuclear options that were embraced in the United States: they thought that the use of even one atomic bomb would trigger escalation, so they prepared for all-out war. They did not put much stock in the American idea that mutual vulnerability could lead to stability. They feared both powers would be constantly striving to get ahead, and they threw their resources into the quest..."⁶²⁸

⁶²⁶ Darwin, op. cit., p. 474.

⁶²⁷ David Reynolds, "Nuclear Fall-Out", BBC History Magazine, July, 2016, p. 43.

⁶²⁸ David Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, London: Icon Books, 2018, p. 18.

However, there was no essential difference between the two policies: the nuclear powers all adopted a system of deterrence called "Mutually Assured Destruction" (MAD). "Churchill also embraced this mad system, although there were moments when he wondered how he would answer to God for his support of the bomb... By the time he retired as prime minister in April, 1955, he had concluded that nuclear arms, especially the genocidal H-bomb, were a potentially stabilizing element in world affairs...

"The 'annihilating character of these agencies may bring an utterly unforeseeable security to mankind,' he predicted. If the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers could be balanced, then by a 'sublime irony... safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation'."⁶²⁹

Churchill was of course deluding himself. There is nothing sublime or comforting in the prospect of nuclear war; the "twin brothers" safety and annihilation are related like Cain and Abel, not James and John. And other western leaders were genuinely horrified at this truly insane policy..

"In the United States," writes David E. Hoffman, "a master plan for carrying out a nuclear war was first drafted in 1960, at the end of President Dwight Eisenhower's term. The scope of the Single Integrated Operational Plan was awesome. Given adequate warning time, the United States and allies would launch their entire strategic force of about 3,500 nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, China and satellite states. Eisenhower despatched his science adviser, George B. Kistiakowsky, to the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command in Offurt, Nebraska on November 3-5, 1960, to study the newly drafted plan. Kistiakowsky reported back that the plan would 'lead to unnecessary and undesirable overkill.' Eisenhower confided to Captain E.P. 'Pete' Aurand, his naval aide, that the estimates – the sheer number of targets, the redundant bombs for each – 'frighten the devil out of me'.

"President John F. Kennedy was no less unsettled. Briefed on the war plan on September 14, 1961, he commented afterward to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 'And we call ourselves the human race'...

"Kennedy and his defence secretary, Robert S. McNamara, were uneasy with the Eisenhower-era idea of massive retaliation. They felt the threat of a single, enormous nuclear strike did not fit the more fragmented and complex competition they faced with the Soviet Union as tensions flared first over Berlin and then over Cuba. When the war plan was revised in the spring and summer of 1962, the new plan gave the president more flexibility and choices in waging a possible nuclear attack, including the ability to hold back forces in reserve, to avoid population centers and industry and to leave out some countries as

⁶²⁹ Kevin Ruane, "Winston Churchill: Atomic Warrior, Nuclear Peacemaker", *BBC History Magazine*, November, 2016, p. 23; "Churchill, God and the Bomb", *History Today*, September, 2016, p. 6.

targets. A key feature of the new plan, put into effect before the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, was to aim largely at Soviet weapons, and not at cities and industry, an idea known as *counterforce*. If one thinks of cocked pistols aimed at each other, counterforce was an effort to shoot the gun out of the hand of the enemy. It seemed to be more humane to aim at missiles rather than cities, but counterforce also raised deeply disturbing questions. Could it make the use of nuclear weapons more tempting, since it implied a limited nuclear strike was possible? And to be successful, would the counterforce option have to be carried out first – to shoot before you were shot, to pre-empt an attack? This was the haunting fear of many decades to come, the idea of a disarming, bolt-from-the-blue first strike.."⁶³⁰

One of those who exposed the "sublime irony" – more exactly: the madness - of MAD was a Harvard professor, a German-Jewish immigrant called Henry Kissinger. In his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957), Kissinger argued for a form of limited nuclear warfare while rejecting all-out war. This idea came in for some justified criticism on the grounds that there was no way of stopping limited nuclear warfare from escalating to total warfare.

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But, as he revealed in a television interview with ABC's Mike Wallace in July 1958, Kissinger was not naïve about the official American strategy:-

"WALLACE. In order to better understand your proposal for limited war, perhaps it would be well for you to define what you understand to be our current United States military policy. What is our military policy?

"KISSINGER. Our current military policy is based on the doctrine of massive retaliation, that we threaten an all-out attack on the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union engages in aggression somewhere. This means that we base our policy on a threat that will involve the destruction of all mankind. This is too risky and I think too expensive.

"WALLACE. You obviously think it's wrong – dangerous to our security. I wonder whether you would expand on that. Just because of what you call the risk and just because of the response, it is not worthwhile?

"KISSINGER Presidents will have to make the choice whether a given objective is worth the destruction of American cities. The American President will have to decide whether Beirut or whatever the issue may be is worth thirty million American lives. In practice I am afraid the American President will have to decide that it is not worth it and it will therefore encourage the piecemeal taking over of the world by Soviet aggression.

⁶³⁰ Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

"WALLACE. Because you believe the Soviets understand our unwillingness or inability – certainly our unwillingness – to wage an all-out war?

"KISSINGER. The Soviets will understand our increasing unwillingness to engage in this kind of war and therefore their task will be to present us with a challenge which does not even seem worth taking the final jump, but the accumulation of which is going to lead to the destruction of the free world... I do not advise that we initiate war. The question of war will arise only if the Soviet Union attacks. Then if the Soviet Union attacks and in fact we are very much more afraid of total war than they are – they will gradually blackmail the free world into surrender. Everything I say is based on the assumption that we are as willing to run risks as the Soviet Union. If this is not the case, we are lost, and I think we ought to face that fact..."⁶³¹

Much more recently, Kissinger has written: "The nuclear age posed the dilemma of how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that were being pursued. Prospects for any kind of international order – indeed, for human survival – now urgently required the amelioration, if not elimination, of major-power conflict. A theoretical limit was sought – short of the point of either superpower using the entirety of its military capabilities.

"Strategic stability was defined as a balance in which neither side would use its weapons of mass destruction because the adversary was always able to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction in retaliation. In a series of seminars at Harvard, Caltech, MIT, and the Rand Corporation among others in the 1950s and 1960s, a doctrine of 'limited use' explored confining nuclear weapons to the battlefield or to military targets. All such theoretical efforts failed; whatever limits were imagined, once the threshold to nuclear warfare was crossed, modern technology overrode observable limits and always enabled the adversary to escalate. Ultimately, strategists on both sides coalesced, at least tacitly, on the concept of a mutually assured destruction as the mechanism of nuclear peace. Based on a premise that both sides possessed a nuclear arsenal capable of surviving an initial assault, the objective was to counterbalance threats sufficiently terrifying that neither side would conceive of actually invoking them.

"By the end of the 1960s, the prevailing strategic doctrine of each superpower relied on the ability to inflict an 'unacceptable' level of damage on the presumed adversary. What the adversary would consider unacceptable was, of course, unknowable; nor was this judgement communicated...

"Many efforts were undertaken to avoid the dilemma of possessing a huge arsenal that could not be used and whose use could not even plausibly be threatened. Complicated war scenarios were devised. But neither side, to the best of my knowledge – and for some of this period I was in a position to know

⁶³¹ Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger.* 1923-1968: *The Idealist*, New York: Penguin, 2016, pp. 412-413.

– ever approached the point of actually using nuclear weapons in a specific crisis between the two superpowers. Except for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when a Soviet combat division was initially authorized to use its nuclear weapons to defend itself, neither side approached their use, either against each other or in wars against non-nuclear third countries..."⁶³²

The true madness of MAD generated powerful protest movements such as Ban the Bomb and CND. It also inspired major works of art, such as the pacifist composer Benjamin Britten's *War Requiem* (1962) and Stanley Kubrick's brilliant film *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (1964). *Dr. Strangelove* (whose eponymous character was said to be modelled on Kissinger) conveyed the madness of the nuclear arms race brilliantly.⁶³³

Kubrick, one of the best film-makers of the twentieth century, explored the borderline psychotic sensibility of the era in many other spheres. His films from *Lolita* to *A Clockwork Orange* to 2001 - *A Space Odyssey* expanded the frontiers, both technological and aesthetic, of cinematic art (and the use of music in the cinema); he shocked critics but made audiences think more deeply than almost any other artist of the time. Kubrick's vision was pessimistic, and offered no solution to the depths of evil that he saw in human nature; but insofar as an unbelieving artist can provide useful insight, he did so.

The advent of nuclear weapons had a great psychological impact on the peoples of the world. And yet, as C.S. Lewis pointed out, "We think a great deal too much of the atomic bomb. 'How are we to live in an atomic age?' I am tempted to reply: 'Why, as you would have lived in the sixteenth century when the plague visited London almost every year, or as you would have lived in a Viking age when raiders from Scandinavia might land and cut your throat any night; or indeed, as you are already living in an age of cancer, an age of syphilis, an age of paralysis, an age of air raids, an age of railway accidents, an age of motor accidents.'

"In other words, do not let us begin by exaggerating the novelty of our situation. Believe me, dear sir or madam, you and all whom you love were already sentenced to death before the atomic bomb was invented: and quite a high percentage of us were going to die in unpleasant ways. We had, indeed, one very great advantage over our ancestors – anaesthetics; but we have that still. It is perfectly ridiculous to go about whimpering and drawing long faces because the scientists have added one more chance of painful and premature death to a world which already bristled with such chances and in which death itself was not a chance at all, but a certainty.

"This is the first point to be made: and the first action to be taken is to pull ourselves together. If we are all going to be destroyed by an atomic bomb, let

⁶³² Kissinger, World Order, London: Penguin, 2015, pp. 332-333, 334.

⁶³³ The more recent *Crimson Tide* (1993) depicts, with equal brilliance, if without the black humour of *Strangelove*, the madness of MAD, reminding us that the threat has not gone away...

that bomb when it comes find us doing sensible and human things – praying, working, teaching, reading, listening to music, bathing the children, playing tennis, chatting to our friends over a pint and a game of darts – not huddled together like frightened sheep and thinking about bombs. They may break our bodies (a microbe can do that) but they need not dominate our minds."⁶³⁴

Very true. And yet there was (and is) something unique – and uniquely horrific – about the nuclear arms race. Never before had a state seriously contemplated the possibility of destroying an opponent at the price not only of self-destruction but of the destruction of the whole world.

Mad? The word did not seem to be hyperbolic. It was a mad, mad world...

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Nor did the madness of MAD seem a merely theoretical possibility as tension built up over Berlin towards the end of 1958. "The Cold War, Eisenhower was warned, was entering 'a period in which risk of world war will rise to a very high point, perhaps higher than any so far.' That November, Khrushchev demanded that Western troops leave Berlin and that the control of access to the city be handed over to the East German authorities. Neither Eisenhower nor his ambassador in Berlin, David Bruce, liked the status of West Berlin as a Western 'island... surrounded by hostile territory'. If there had been a way of neutralizing Berlin as a Free City without appearing to surrender to Soviet pressure, they might well have done it, just as they might well have agreed to German reunification if the Soviets had not so blatantly intended to subvert the western part's fledgling democracy. Because Berlin clearly could not be defended by conventional forces, there was therefore no alternative but to threaten, once again, all-out war... It was the special vulnerability of West Berlin, as well as the uniquely sensitive nature of the German Question, that made it the ultimate Cold War flashpoint. The West German government was well pleased to have Kissinger - born in Germany but now a professor at Harvard - explain why any kind of Western military 'disengagement' would increase rather than reduce the risks of war. His arguments were publicly endorsed by the bellicose Bavarian defence minister, Franz Josef Strauss.

"Yet there was a fundamental weakness with the US position, as became clear when Kissinger gave a lengthy interview to Rudolf Augstein and Konrad Ahlers of *Der Spiegel*, which had already established itself as the hardest-hitting political weekly in Central Europe. Kissinger argued that if the Soviets blockaded West Berlin, then the United States should send a convoy through East German territory to West Berlin. If the Soviets attacked the convoy, then NATO would defend it. And if the Soviets drove NATO forces out of East German territory and took West Berlin? Kissinger replied, 'I should be in favour of giving the Soviets an ultimatum and, if necessary, of conducting a total war.' *Spiegel*: "Total war for Berlin and Germany? Kissinger: 'Yes, if there

⁶³⁴ Lewis, "On Living in an Atomic Age" (1948).

is no other way to defend the freedom of [West] Berlin.' What was more, if other Western European allies were reluctant to fight such a war, then the United States and the Federal Republic would fight it alone. That answer gave the *Spiegel* editors their headline. Predictably, the East German media jumped on it as an example of reckless American warmongering. Of course, Kissinger was doing no more than spelling out the implications of U.S. policy. It nevertheless illustrated the difficulty with his own thesis in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. For even he found it impossible to argue that a *limited* war could be waged over West Berlin..."⁶³⁵

The East Germans erected the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. Its aim was to stop the vast haemorrhage of East Germans to the West. In that aim it succeeded, cutting down the flow to 5000 between 1961 and 1989, when the Wall came down. But hundreds were killed trying to escape over or under it, and the West German mayor Willy Brandt called it, not without reason, "the Wall of Shame". President Kennedy decided not to go to war over the issue – the Soviets outnumbered the Americans in conventional forces, and an escalation to nuclear was ruled out. As he said to his deputy secretary of defence: "What we are talking about is seventy million dead!' and: "A wall is a hell of a lot better than a war".

He was probably right, but undoubtedly it was a blow against freedom – and one of the factors that, in the fifteen years or so that followed, contributed to the gradual demoralization of the West and weakening of the NATO alliance.

⁶³⁵ Ferguson, Kissinger, pp. 428-429.

45. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

That the crisis which nearly led to MAD should have taken place in Cuba was a function both of timing – Soviet ambitions had been thwarted in Europe, so they began to look for greener pastures elsewhere – and of that country's geographical closeness to the United States. It could also be argued that Khrushchev's aim in creating a pressure-point in Cuba was to create still more pressure on the American position in Berlin...

Cuba had been among the last Latin American countries to abolish slavery, in the 1880s, and had then, with American help, rebelled successfully against Spanish rule. But its development as an independent republic was troubled...

Fr. James Thornton writes: "In 1933, a leftist revolutionary uprising overthrew the administration of President Gerardo Machado and put Ramón Grau San Martín in power as the head of what came to be called the 'One Hundred Days Government.' Grau himself was a moderate reformer but was surrounded by radicals in his administration. That government was overthrown in January 1934 by Army Chief of Staff Colonel Fulgencio Batista, who installed a series of provisional governments throughout the remainder of the decade.

"In the election of 1940, which was reportedly open and fair, Batista won the presidency. He was succeeded in office by Grau, who was elected in 1944, and Carlos Prío Socarrás, elected in 1948. Prío's period in office was marred by a substantial increase in government corruption and political violence. Consequently, in March 1952, Batista, in concert with leaders of the military and police, seized power to prevent the country from sinking into complete chaos. The outcome of free elections in 1953, which made Batista legally the president, seemed to signal the approval of most Cubans of the coup of the previous year, since the country had grown impatient with the seemingly endless disorder.

"About Batista's administration one can say both bad things and good. On the bad side, corruption was not eliminated and organized crime, which had gained a considerable toehold in Cuba immediately after the Second World War, continued to thrive. On the good side, the nation enjoyed tremendous prosperity in the 1950s. Wages in Cuba were the eighth highest in the world. The country was blessed by a large and growing middle class, which constituted approximately one-third of the population. Social mobility (the ability of members of one class in the social strata to rise to higher levels) became a genuine reality. Of the working class, more than 20 percent were classified as skilled. During the Batista years, Cuba enjoyed the third-highest per-capita income in Latin America and possessed an excellent network of highways and railroads, along with many modern ports. Cubans had the highest per-capita consumption in Latin America of meat, vegetables, cereals, automobiles, telephones, and radios, and was fifth highest in the number of television sets in the world. "Cuba's healthcare system was outstanding, with one of the highest numbers of medical doctors per capita in the world, the third-lowest adult mortality rate in the world, and the lowest infant mortality rate in Latin America. Cuba during the 1950s spent more on education than any other Latin American country and had the fourth-highest literacy rate in Latin America.

"President Batista built part of his following through an alliance with organized labor. As a result, workers by law worked an eight-hour day, 44 hours per week. They received a month's paid vacation, plus four additional paid holidays per year. They were also entitled to nine days of sick leave with pay per year. In short, while things were not perfect in all of the areas just noted, they were nevertheless remarkably advanced and were gradually improving. Yet, much work remained to be done in rural regions, where poverty and the lack of a complete modern infrastructure remained a problem...

"In July 1953, a little-known revolutionary named Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl, and a small group of rebels attacked a military barracks in the southeast of the country hoping to spark a revolution, but were defeated. The Castro brothers were captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Unfortunately for Cuba and its people, President Batista declared a general amnesty in 1955, which set the Castros free. The two then travelled to Mexico where they, in conjunction with Argentinian Marxist terrorist Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, organized a revolutionary group known as the '26th of July Movement,' the aim of which was to overthrow the Cuban government and seize power. In December 1956, the group of some 82 fighters boarded a yacht and sailed to Cuba, where they were confronted by elements of Batista's armed forces. In the ensuing clash, most of the insurgents were either killed or captured. However, the Castro brothers, Guevara, and a small group of about 12 others escaped and fled into the Sierra Maestra mountains, where they launched the beginnings of the revolution that would bring Fidel Castro to power.

"Castro portrayed himself at that time as a devotee of democratic rule, contrasting that with Batista's non-democratic authoritarianism, and promised American-style freedoms and an end to dictatorship. Some members of his 26th of July Movement, and even a few members of the leadership corps of that organization, were actually anti-communists, misled by Castro as to the true nature of his ultimate goals. The propaganda about a return to a representative and just government was widely believed, particularly among the poorer classes, students, and some intellectuals. Consequently, Castro's movement grew as people hoped for an end to corruption, political upheaval, and revolutionary violence. Those people were soon to be sorely disappointed.

"During the late 1950s, after Castro had begun his revolutionary activities in the mountains of southeastern Cuba and up until Castro grabbed the reins of power, two men served as U.S. ambassadors to Cuba: Arthur Gardner, who served from 1953 to 1957, and Earl T. Smith, who served from 1957 to 1959. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Ambassador Gardner declared on August 27, 1960 that 'U.S. Government agencies and the U.S. press played a major role in bringing Castro to power.' He also testified that Castro was receiving illegal arms shipments from the United States, about which our government was aware, while, at the same time, the U.S. government halted arms sales to Batista, even halting shipments of arms for which the Cuban government had already paid. Senator Thomas J. Dodd asked if Gardner believed that the U.S. State Department 'was anxious to replace Batista with Castro,' to which he answered, 'I think they were.'

"Ambassador Earl T. Smith testified before the same committee on August 30, 1960. He declared in his testimony that, 'Without the United States, Castro would not be in power today.' Smith wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times in September 1979 in connection with the communist revolution in Nicaragua that put the Sandinista regime in power. Smith wished to illustrate how forces within the U.S. government brought both ultra-leftist governments to power. He wrote: 'After a few months as chief of mission [that is, as Ambassador to Cuba], it became obvious to me that the Castro-led 26th of July movement embraced every element of radical political thought and terrorist inclination in Cuba. The State Department consistently intervened ... to bring about the downfall of President Fulgencio Batista, thereby making it possible for Fidel Castro to take over the Government of Cuba. The final coup in favor of Castro came on Dec. 17, 1958. On that date, in accordance with my instructions from the State Department, I personally conveyed to President Batista that the Department of State would view with scepticism any plan on his part, or any intention on his part, to remain in Cuba indefinitely. I had dealt him a mortal blow. He said in substance: "You have intervened in behalf of the Castros, but I know it is not your doing and that you are only following out your instructions." Fourteen days later, on Jan. 1, 1959, the Government of Cuba fell.'

"In Ambassador Smith's book, *The Fourth Floor*, he lists the many actions by the United States that led to the fall of the Batista government. Among these were suspending arms sales, halting the sale of replacement parts for military equipment, persuading other governments not to sell arms to Batista, and public statements that assisted Castro and sabotaged Batista. These actions and many others, he wrote, 'had a devastating psychological effect upon those supporting the [pro-American, anti-Communist] government of Cuba.'

"Left-leaning journalists were as ubiquitous in the 1950s as they are today. One of these, *New York Times* reporter Herbert Matthews, interviewed Castro in February 1957, reporting that Castro 'has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, to hold elections.' Matthews went on to say that Castro was not only *not* a communist, but was definitely an anti-communist. That story, and other similar stories, created a myth that Fidel Castro was actually a friend of the United States and its way of life, that he was the 'George Washington of Cuba' (as television entertainer and columnist Ed Sullivan called him), and that what he fought for was a program of mild agrarian reform, an end to corruption, and constitutional representative government. The myth also claimed that after his victory in January 1959, he was driven into the arms of the USSR by the uncooperative and even hostile attitude of the United States. Curiously, that myth is still repeated to this day. However, the truth about Castro is as far from that myth as possible, as we shall now see.

"Cuba officially established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 1943, during the Second World War. Among the functionaries of the Soviet staff sent to Cuba was one Gumar W. Bashirov, an official of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police (later known as the KGB). Bashirov's job was to recruit a group of Cuban youths who, over time, could be used to subvert Cuban society and thereby advance the cause of world communism. Among those almost immediately recruited was the young Fidel Castro.

"Castro himself admitted in an interview with leftist journalist Saul Landau that he had become a Marxist when, as a student, he first read the *Communist Manifesto*. For that reason he willingly became a Soviet agent in 1943, when he was only 17 years of age. After the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe in 1944-45, some of Bashirov's young recruits were sent to Czechoslovakia for training. But the Soviets forbade Castro himself from joining the Communist Party or any communist front organizations so that he would remain untainted by such associations. Instead, they placed him in reserve, saving him for future eventualities. We see, therefore, that Fidel Castro was a Communist and a Soviet agent long before he took power in 1959."⁶³⁶

The success of the Cuban revolution in spite of the fact that Cuba had the second highest level of prosperity in the Latin American world is yet another proof that poverty is only a secondary cause of communist revolutions: the real cause is the will to power of revolutionaries and the demonic spirit of the revolution that incites them ...

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"Castro's regime," writes Michael Burleigh, "was exceptionally popular, and would remain so for many years. He seemed to be a revolutionary nationalist, a Garibaldi or Nasser, bent on freeing Cuba from colonial shackles, rather than a totalitarian tyrant intent on creating a 'new man' to serve the revolution, which he defined in Guevarist terms as a process with no time limit. There was a powerful sense of new beginnings, and it was favourably noted that the new masters of Cuba were personally austere with regard to money, although of course they took their pick from among the large number of young women excited by the hot rush of liberation..."⁶³⁷

But already in the first month the arrests, tortures, appropriations and show trials began. "Most of those already in custody were shot. Perhaps as many as 100,000 were arrested. They included the real underground, most of the CIA's

 ⁶³⁶ Thornton, "Partnering with Putin", New American, November 20, 2015, http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/21998-partnering-with-putin.
 ⁶³⁷ Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places, London: Pan, 2013, p. 434.

2,500 agents, and 25,000 counter-revolutionary sympathisers. On 1 May Castro announced that Cuba was now a socialist state. There would be no more elections: there was, he said, an election every day in Cuba since the revolutionary regime expressed the will of the people..."⁶³⁸

"In an early indication that relations with the US would be turbulent, Fidel said that if Washington did not like these trials it could send in the Marines, and there would be 'two hundred thousand dead gringos'. In a conversation with President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, he volunteered that he was thinking 'of having a game with the gringos'. The Eisenhower administration remained unsure whether Fidel was intent on confrontation or simply raising the stakes towards an eventual settlement, even though from April 1959 onwards the new regime sponsored subversive acts in Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. At a conference of US ambassadors in the Caribbean, those willing to give Castro the benefit of the doubt, including Philip Bonsal, the new man in Havana, outnumbered those favouring a hardline response. The State Department hinted that a major economic crisis assistance programme was possible, but Fidel did not pursue the offer.

"Just before his departure on a tour of the US in April 1959, Fidel explained at a reception at the US embassy that elections could not be held before necessary agrarian reforms and general improvements in popular health and education. His unstructured visit to the US distracted from that significant shift in priorities. Predictably the was fêted at various Ivy League universities, where the spoiled offspring of the Western bourgeoisie found much to like in this tropical communitarian, so removed in spirit from the dull puritanism of Moscow or Beijing. Newspaper editors were charmed by Castro's jokes, as were the usual suspects from the American *gauche caviar*. UN delegates were less enchanted when he gave the longest ever speech to the General Assembly...

"Shortly after his return to Havana, Castro presented the cabinet with a draft Agrarian Return Law, which they were not allowed to discuss. Land over a thousand acres was to be expropriated, in return for interest-yielding government bonds, which in the event were never issued. A National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) would run the land as co-operatives or grant sixtyseven acre plots to individual families. Foreigners could no longer own shares in sugar plantations, and ownership of refining mills was separated from the plantations. Young INRA officials with degrees but no practical experience took over virtually all the livestock farms, fecklessly butchering laying hens and dairy herds, and even a prize pedigree bull worth \$20,000. Castro dismissed cabinet members who protested against the folly, and thereafter the cabinet became irrelevant as the real business of government was conducted by decree.

⁶³⁸ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 624.

"Criticism of the growing influence of Communism was not tolerated. Castro sacked Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, the head of the Revolutionary Air Force who had flown in arms and ammunition for the revolution in 1958, and deposed President Urrutia in favour of Osvaldo Dorticós, a wealthy closet Communist. He made himself prime minister to 'popular acclaim', for monster rallies styled as direct democracy had become his preferred means of claiming to express the popular will. By the autumn there were more people in prison than had ever been the case under Batista, and the death penalty, abolished in 1940, was restored for counter-revolutionaries. Brother Raúl, starting with military intelligence or G2, merged the guerrillas with what was left of the army to create the new Revolutionary Armed Forces. One of his first acts was to make a secret request to the Soviets to send a mission of Spanish Communist exiles who had served in the Red Army. Five KGB officers arrived to train a new secret police.

"Shortly afterwards, when Diaz Lanz flew an aircraft over Havana dropping anti-Castro leaflets, improperly fused anti-aircraft shells fired by Cuban gunners burst on return to the ground and Fidel accused the US of complicity in 'terror bombing'. The remaining liberals in the government were forced out, and Guevara was appointed director of the National Bank, triggering financial panic and a run on the banks. Investors withdrew over US \$50 million in days. In October, Huber Matos, the military commander of Camaguey Province, attempted to resign along with forty of his officers because of Communist infiltration of the army. He was tried for 'betraying the revolution' and sentenced to twenty years in jail. In November the regime suspended habeas corpus indefinitely and the following month all Cubans were encouraged to become informers and to report any overheard criticism of the regime. Eventually, this was institutionalized by enrolling 800,000 people in Committees for the Defence of the Revolution.

"And on it went, an avalanche of decrees that often contradicted each other, by accident or design making the normal conduct of business impossible as managers spent all their time trying to comply. There was also a *Kulturkampf* against black social clubs and Santeria religious festivals – which fused folk Catholicism with Yoruba traditions from West Africa – as well as against all private clubs and associations. The labour unions, cringingly aware that their support for Batista was a sword hanging over their heads, were taken over by the Communists, who promptly requested the abolition of the right to strike. They muffled the freedom of speech that Batista had never dared to suppress by censoring all publications. All radio and TV stations were subsumed into a state corporation. Meanwhile the militarization of Cuban society proceeded apace with the creation of a 100,000-strong militia."⁶³⁹

"During the repressions of the 1960s", write Pascal Fontaine, Yves Santamaria and Sylvain Boulouque, "between 7,000 and 10,000 people were

⁶³⁹ Burleigh, op. cit., 434, 435, 437-438.

killed and 30,000 people imprisoned for political reasons."⁶⁴⁰ Conditions in the prisons were appalling, torture was normal. Much of the economy was run on slave labour provided by prisoners. The massive support the country received from the Soviet Union was not able to make up for the collapse of the economy created by Guevaran economic socialism, on the one hand, and by the American embargo, on the other.

Cuba's close proximity to the United States meant that the Americans could never tolerate the Castro revolution. Moreover, a large part of the population of Florida was made up of fervently anti-communist exiles from Cuba.

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So in April, 1961 President Kennedy, using Cuban exiles, Mafia mobsters (whose businesses on Cuba had been expropriated by Castro) and American bombers, made a bungled attempt to topple Castro in the Bay of Pigs (Playa Girón) invasion. Many died, and America's reputation was severely damaged. Guevara got a message out to JFK: "Thanks for Playa Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger than ever."⁶⁴¹ Which was, unfortunately, quite true...

The Bay of Pigs was followed by farcical attempts to assassinate Castro. "Defence Secretary Robert McNamara admitted: 'We were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter.' At various times, there were plans to employ gangsters to attack Cuban officials, to spread the rumour that Castro was Antichrist and a Second Coming imminent, with a submarine letting off star shells, to attack sugar-workers with non-lethal chemicals, to use thallium salts to make Castro's beard fall out, to lace his cigars with disorienting chemicals or impregnate them with deadly botulinus, to give his mistress, Marie Lorenz, poison capsules, to use Cuban-American gangsters to assassinate him under contract, to give him a scuba-diving suit impregnated with a tuberculus bacillus and a skin-fungus, and to plant a rare seashell, with an explosive device, in the area where he dived. Richard Helms, whom Kennedy had made head of the CIA, later testified: 'It was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro, and if killing him was one of the things that was to be done... we felt we were acting well within the guidelines... Nobody wants to embarrass a President... by discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence.^{'"642}

And yet how could the President not be embarrassed when his own brother and closest confidant, Bobby Kennedy, ran the operational division of the CIA, which organized the assassination attempts?

⁶⁴⁰ Fontaine, Santamaria and Boulouque, "Communism in Latin America", in Stéphane Courtois and others, *The Black Book of Communism*, London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 656.

⁶⁴¹ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 448.

⁶⁴² Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 624-625.

"Thus was created the paradox of the top law officer in the country directing an organization whose activities were legal only on rare occasions...

"Although forbidden by law to operate in the US, the world's largest CIA station, codenamed JMWAVE, mushroomed on the south campus of the University of Miami, with an annual budget of \$50 million. This was four times the total the CIA spent on spying in twenty Latin American countries. Disguised as Zenica Technical Enterprises, it housed 300 CIA officers, who recruited thousands of Cuban exiles as agents..."⁶⁴³

Lawlessness was unfortunately a basic characteristic of the Kennedy brothers, whose family, some opined, was under a curse. "They learned their Realpolitik at home. Growing up a Kennedy was itself an advanced-level course. Their [very rich] father was a bootlegger, a womanizer, and an appeaser [that is, he supported the Munich agreement as US ambassador to London]. John and Robert Kennedy lost their eldest sister to a lobotomy in 1941, their eldest brother to the war in 1944, and their second sister to a plane crash in 1948. Jack Kennedy was a war hero but also a consummate cheat. His compulsive infidelity to his wife was only one of many deceptions. Throughout his political career, he concealed the severity of his medical problems (he suffered from acute back pain, hypothyroidism, and Addison's disease, a condition that causes the adrenal glands to produce insufficient steroid hormones, and for which he needed continual cortisone injections.) He deliberately missed the Senate vote censuring Joe McCarthy, who had more than once been a Kennedy houseguest. He lied to his own brother about his decision to make Lyndon Johnson his running mate in 1960. His campaign may have called on Mafia assistance to defeat Richard Nixon that year... John F. Kennedy had won the presidency of the United States by fighting dirty, state by state..."644

But of course, in Khrushchev, a murderer both during and after Stalin's reign, Kennedy had found his match in cunning and the ability to play dirty. "Khrushchev's motivation [in sending missiles to Cuba] was not just to defend Cuba's experiment with Marxism, though Castro was more than happy to interpret it in that way. Nor was the Soviet leader merely trying to win a psychological victory. His strategic calculation was twofold. First, by turning Cuba into a launchpad for intermediate-range missiles directed at American targets, he could narrow the gap in nuclear capability between the Soviet Union and the United States, the true nature of which the Soviets knew full well. The plan was to send forty ballistic missiles to Cuba: twenty-four medium-range R-12s (with a range of 1,050 miles, long enough to hit Washington, D.C.) and sixteen intermediate-range R-14s, which had twice that range. Both types carried one-megaton warheads. This would double the number of Soviet missiles capable of reaching the United States, and it would do it far more cheaply than the construction of new intercontinental missiles.

⁶⁴³ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 452.

⁶⁴⁴ Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger.* 1923-1964: *The Idealist*, New York: Penguin, 2016, pp. 514-515.

"To justify this action, Khrushchev had only to look out from his Georgian holiday house at Pitsunda near Turkey, where fifteen U.S. PGM-12 Jupiter missiles had been deployed in 1961 as part of the post-*Sputnik* response to the imaginary missile gap. 'What do you see?' he would ask visitors, handing them binoculars. 'I see U.S. missiles in Turkey, aimed at my dacha.' (The Jupiters were in fact stationed at Izmir, on the Aegean coast.) Soviet missiles on Cuba would simply give the Americans 'a little of their own medicine'. But it is clear that Khrushchev was thinking less of Turkey than of Germany. His second objective was to checkmate the Americans in Berlin. Kennedy did not initially grasp this, but then the penny dropped: 'whatever we do in regard to Cuba, it gives them the chance to do the same with regard to Berlin.' A U.S. blockade of Cuba would risk a Soviet blockade of West Berlin. A U.S. attack on Cuba would risk a Soviet attack on West Berlin.

"Operation Anadyr was in one respect a triumph of Soviet strategy. In addition to the missiles, the Soviets sent four motorized regiments, two tank battalions, MiG-21 fighter wing, some antiaircraft gun batteries, twelve SA-2 surface-to-air missile detachments with 144 missile-launchers, and forty-two Il-28 medium jet bombers equipped with nuclear bombs. They also sent nuclear warheads for the Sopka coastal defence cruise missiles that had previously been supplied to the Cubans. This was a huge operation. Yet between September 8, when the first nuclear ballistic missile reached Cuba, and October 15, when U.S. intelligence identified the missile sites, the U.S. government was oblivious to the fact that the arms being supplied to Cuba were nuclear. Indeed, the period of ignorance might have lasted even longer – perhaps until Khrushchev's planned visit to the United States, when he intended to reveal his masterstroke – if the Soviet troops on Cuba had thought to camouflage the launch sites, or to shoot down the U-2s that spotted them... "⁶⁴⁵

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The crisis this caused very nearly brought the world to nuclear war and MAD. Kennedy was almost alone on the American side in rejecting the option of invading Cuba, and chose instead to blockade the island. For that he deserves credit. "He was lucky [or wise?]." writes Ferguson, "that he did not heed those who urged an amphibious invasion, because Khrushchev's initial instruction to the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, on the night of October 22-23 was unambiguous: 'If there is a [U.S.] landing, [use] the tactical atomic weapons, but [not] the strategic weapons until [there is] order.' True, under pressure from the more cautious Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan and Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, he later changed this to an order to use the missiles but without nuclear warheads. Even so, he might have changed his mind in the face of a U.S. invasion, or Pliyev might have changed it for him if communication had been cut."⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴⁵ Ferguson, Kissinger, pp. 547-548.

⁶⁴⁶ Ferguson, *Kissinger*, p. 556.

As American secretary of state Dean Rusk put it, the two superpowers had been "eyeball to eyeball" and in the end it was the Soviets who "blinked". The Soviet ships heading for Cuba with military hardware turned back in exchange for the American's removing their Jupiter missiles from Turkey. So in fact Kennedy "blinked" too. But unlike Khrushchev he did not lose face, insofar as the "swap" of Turkish missiles for Cuban ones was kept secret...⁶⁴⁷ The Americans therefore won the "prestige war".

"Far more important, however [than the Turkish missiles], was Kennedy's acquiescence in the continuation of a Communist regime in Cuba, in open military alliance with Soviet Russia. On the practical issue of Cuba and Caribbean security, Kennedy lost the missile crisis. It was an American defeat: the worst it had so far suffered in the Cold War"⁶⁴⁸ – although, as a consolation prize for the US, it probably led in the end to Khrushchev's fall from power two years later.

But from the purely strategic point of view, the advantage was definitely with the Soviets. For besides the surrender of the Turkish missiles, they got a secure base only ninety miles from the shores of the United States ruled by a communist dictator whom the Americans were now not allowed to topple by military force, and who proceeded successfully to foment revolution throughout the Third World. "In the event, the Castro regime long outlived the Soviet Union itself. The Cuban missile crisis was therefore a Soviet victory, which the Kennedy White House – by keeping the peace terms secret – managed to spin into an American victory instead. Yet if anyone 'blinked first', it had been JFK..."⁶⁴⁹

The decisive moment came on October 27, when Castro "went ballistic" in a metaphorical sense; having driven to the Soviet embassy, he "raved about Cuban honour and his willingness to die 'with supreme dignity'. He spewed out a torrent of words which Soviet stenographers tried to pare down to a message for Khrushchev...

"Castro's letter had a sobering effect on the Soviets. After waiting a few days, Khrushchev sent a paternal rebuke, reminding Castro that 'above all Cuba would have been the first to burn in the fire of war'. If Castro wanted to commit suicide that was his affair: 'We struggle against imperialism not to die but to make full use of our possibilities, so that in this struggle we win more than we lose and achieve the victory of Communism.' Castro was so annoyed by the Soviet climbdown that he smashed a mirror... Although the crisis had abated by 29 October 1962, it took months for a settlement to be agreed. On 5 November the *Alexandrovsk* sailed home with its nuclear warheads, followed

⁶⁴⁷ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West*, London: Allen Press, 1999, pp. 235-240.

⁶⁴⁸ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 628.

⁶⁴⁹ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 455-456.

by MRBM warheads that had already reached Cuba. In late November the Soviets agreed to remove the Ilyushin bombers [from Cuba]. Some but not all of the tactical warheads were shipped out on Christmas Day 1962 and the remainder remained strictly under Soviet control until they too were withdrawn. In turn the US ended the naval quarantine... The Jupiters in Turkey were dismantled in April. JFK refused to make a formal pledge of non-aggression towards Cuba, reserving the right to take military action should the Castro regime persist in using the island 'as a springboard for subversion'...

"There were global ramifications to events in Cuba. Chinese newspapers took the opportunity to laud Castro's heroic resistance in bold type, while comparing Khrushchev to Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938. Given that shortly after Munich the Soviets had allied with Hitler, this was very provocative. From grudgingly and belatedly supporting China in its border war with India, the Soviets started selling India MIG-21 fighters instead. Relations between the two great Communist powers got steadily worse, while Castro joined China on a global crusade against imperialism. In later 1963 in response to an appeal from [Algeria's] Ben Bella a battalion of Cuban troops, together with tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons arrived to support the Algerian regime in a confrontation with Morocco. It was a decisive intervention, and marked the beginning of a long period of semi-independent Cuban involvement in Africa, which tended to lead rather than follow the Soviet line..."⁶⁵⁰

There were consequences in the West, too: the fact that Kennedy kept secret the swap of Cuban for Turkish missiles undermined trust of the Americans among their Western European NATO allies. Trust plummeted further during the Vietnam War, which was just beginning. But Armageddon might well have taken place if individuals had not intervened with restraint at various stages... But the possibility of Armageddon still existed (and still does exist) thanks not only to mad or semi-mad individuals,⁶⁵¹ but also to a whole mad culture of strategic defence that had been in place now for generations in both East and West...

Two other important interventions by individuals need to be considered. The first was the principled refusal of the second-in-command of the Soviet submarine B-59, Vasili Arkhipov, to agree with his Captain's order to launch nuclear torpedoes against US warships during the crisis. The US had been dropping depth charges near the submarine in an attempt to force it to surface, unaware it was carrying nuclear arms. The Soviet officers, who had lost radio contact with Moscow, concluded that World War III had begun, and two of the officers agreed to 'blast the warships out of the water'. Arkhipov refused to agree - unanimous consent of 3 officers was required...⁶⁵²

⁶⁵⁰ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 467-468, 469.

⁶⁵¹ As portrayed in such films as *Dr. Strangelove* (1964) and *Crimson Tide* (1993).
⁶⁵² PBS documentary, "The Man Who Saved the World",

⁵⁴¹ http://video.pbs.org/video/2295274962

The second intervention will be discounted by secular historians, but was undoubtedly the decisive one. This was the intervention of *Almighty God*, through the prayers of one of the great confessors of the Catacomb Church, Bishop Michael (Yershov) of Kazan. Stories about him began to seep out to the West towards the end of his life and after his death in 1974. But it was not until a full (739-page) biography of him appeared recently that his full stature and importance became apparent.

Michael Vasilyevich Yershov was born in 1911 into a poor family. His father became a Bolshevik and beat his son, but was later converted by him and repented. In 1931, Michael was imprisoned for the first time for his rejection of the Sovietized Moscow Patriarchate. Apart from a short period in the early 1940s, he remained in the camps for the rest of his life, being transported from one end of the Gulag to the other and dying, still in prison, on June 4, 1974. He presented an astounding image of patience that converted many to the Faith. He was a wonderworker and had the gifts of healing and prophecy.

But perhaps his most astounding miracle was worked in the Mordovian camps together with his fellow inmate and secret bishop, Basil Vasilyevich Kalinin. "It was August, 1962. The Cuban crisis! The attention of the world was glued to it, and it affected even the special section hidden in the Mordovian forests. 'It has to be...! Khrushchev has penetrated into the bosom of the Americans!' That was how the *zeks* [criminal inmates] interpreted it. People living beyond the barbed wire admitted the possibility that in time of war the local authorities would annihilate them, as the most dangerous politicals, first of all."

"At the special section the *zeks* insisted that Moscow had issued an order that in time of war the politicals and recidivists would be annihilated first of all. The Cuban crisis was soon resolved, and our camp calmed down. Many years later I heard that the fears of the *zeks* in 1962 had not been without foundation. They had really been threatened with annihilation at that time."

"In 1964, soon after the fall of Khrushchev, a colonel from the Georgian KGB came to our camp. And he said, among other things: 'Khrushchev adopted the policy of the complete physical annihilation of the politicals, and first of all the recidivists. During the Cuban crisis everything was prepared for your shooting – even a pit was dug'."

Bishop Basil remembered that the holy hierarch [Michael] once unexpectedly aroused him from sleep with the words: "Six minutes are remaining. Get up, Basil, and pray! The world is in danger!" And then he learned that this was the critical moment in the Cuban crisis...⁶⁵³

⁶⁵³ I.V. Ilichev, *Voin Khristov Vernij i Istinnij: Tajnij Episkop IPTs Mikhail (Yershov)* (Faithful and True Warrior of Christ: Secret Bishop Michael (Yershov), Moscow: Bratonezh, 2011, pp. 499-500.

Truly, "the effective, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much" (James 5.16). For when the two bishops Michael and Basil prayed to the Lord, the world was saved from nuclear holocaust...

"Let the world mock us," wrote Bishop Michael, "but we, poor people, must give all our strength and desire in prayer to God". "We must strictly watch over ourselves, that we do not fall under the condemnation and wrath of God. We must pour out the balsam of our strength and purity of heart whatever happens, our simple, true and holy prayer to God, which is bound by nothing except simplicity and belief in our eternal inheritance. For the Lord looks on the righteous and on their holy appeals, so that the prayer offered may be the earnest of our strength and the balsam of purification, by which the world might be preserved and the catastrophe which cannot even be expressed in words – God forbid! – might be averted."

"You yourselves know that a city is preserved if a righteous man is praying in it. Once the righteous man has left the city, the elements rule in the city. And so, dear ones, remember this one thing, that now is not that day on which the universe was created, and everything was brought into being, but now is the day on which danger menaces the creation..."⁶⁵⁴

Besides this pure prayer of a righteous man, Bishop Michael insisted on the importance of the pure confession of the truly Orthodox Faith. "Between the Church of the Tikhonite orientation [the True Orthodox Church] and the legal church [the Moscow Patriarchate] there is the following difference. The Church of the Tikhonite orientation zealously fulfils all the laws and rules that are prescribed by the Holy Fathers, while the legal church tolerates atheism, does not struggle against iniquity, but is reconciled with it. I recognize the One Apostolic Church. The legal church recognizes Lenin and Stalin, and serves Soviet power and carries out the orders of the atheist antichrists."⁶⁵⁵

This episode reminds us that, however remote the life of the True Church seems to have been from major political events in this deeply materialist period of world history, it still exerted a profound, indeed decisive influence through the Grace of God, Who holds all things, both the inner-spiritual and the external-political, in the palm of His hand. For God does not cease to steer the world directly and indirectly, through His holy angels; the lives of all men are steered by Him without violating their freedom. The processes of Divine Providence remain shrouded in mystery to us – but they exist, whether we discern them or not.

⁶⁵⁴ Ilichev, op. cit., p. 506.

⁶⁵⁵ Ilichev, op. cit., p. 410.

46. THE EUROPEAN UNION

Tony Judt writes, "The very scale of the collective misery that Europeans had brought upon themselves in the first half of the twentieth century had a profoundly de-politicizing effect; far from turning to extreme solutions, in the manner of the years following World War One, the European publics of the gloomy post-World War Two years turned *away* from politics. The implications of this could be discerned only vaguely at the time – in the failure of Fascist or Communist parties to cash in upon the difficulties of daily existence; in the way in which economics displaced politics as the goal and language of collective action; in the emergence of domestic recreations and domestic consumption in place of participation in public affairs...

"In more ways than most contemporaries could possibly have foreseen, a new Europe was being born."⁶⁵⁶

In Western Europe, the post-war poverty and depression had been much greater than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and therefore the contrast as prosperity returned in the 1950s was the more striking. Thus while in the period 1913-50 the average growth rate in Britain, France and Germany had been 1.3 percent, in the period 1950-73 "French growth rate per annum had averaged 5 percent, West Germany had grown at nearly 6 percent and even Britain had maintained an average rate above 3 percent."⁶⁵⁷ "Between 1913 and 1950," writes Mark Mazower, "per capita growth in the region had averaged 1 per cent a year; between 1950 and 1970 this rose to an incredible 4 per cent."⁶⁵⁸

The growth in prosperity went with an increased size and influence of the state, not in the totalitarian form of the contemporary Soviet Union, but in the more subtle and beguiling form of Social Democracy.

This was for the time being a great success. As Judt writes: "In the peak years of the modern European welfare state, when the administrative apparatus still exercised broad-ranging authority and its credibility remained unassailed, a remarkable consensus was achieved. The state, it was widely believed, would always do a better job than the unrestricted market: not just in dispensing justice and securing the realm, or distributing goods and services, but in designing and applying strategies for social cohesion, moral sustenance and cultural vitality. The notion that such matters might better be left to enlightened self-interest and the workings of the free market in commodities and ideas was regarded in mainstream European political and academic circles as a quaint relic of pre-Keynesian times: at best a failure to learn the lessons of the Depression, at worst an invitation to conflict and a veiled appeal to the basest human instincts.

⁶⁵⁶ Judt, Postwar, London: Pimlico, 2007, pp. 236, 237.

⁶⁵⁷ Judt, op. cit., pp. 456-457.

⁶⁵⁸ Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 297.

"The state, then, was a good thing; and there was a lot of it. Between 1950 and 1973, government spending rose from 27.6 percent to 38.8 percent of the gross domestic product in France, from 30.4 percent to 42 percent in West Germany, from 34.2 percent to 41.5 percent in the UK and from 26.8 percent to 45.5 percent in the Netherlands – at a time when that domestic product was itself growing faster than ever before or since. The overwhelming bulk of the increase in spending went on insurance, pensions, health, education and housing. In Scandinavia the share of national income devoted to social security alone rose 250 percent in Denmark and Sweden between 1950 and 1973. In Norway it tripled. Only in Switzerland was the share of post-war GNP spent by the state kept comparatively low (it did not reach 30 percent until 1980), but even there it stood in dramatic contrast to the 1938 figure of just 6.8 percent.

"The success story of post-war European capitalism was everywhere accompanied by an enhanced role for the public sector. But the nature of state engagement varied considerably. In most of continental Europe the state eschewed direct ownership of industry (though not public transport or communications), preferring to exercise indirect control, often through autonomous agencies, of which Italy's tentacular IRI was the biggest and best known...

"Doctrinal differences over the ostensible goals of the state might noisily oppose Left and Right, Christian Democrats and Communists, Socialists and Conservatives, but almost everyone had something to gain from the opportunities the state afforded them for income and influence. Faith in the state – as planner, coordinator, facilitator, arbiter, provider, caretaker and guardian – was widespread and crossed almost all political divides. The welfare state was avowedly social but it was far from socialist. In that sense welfare capitalism, as it unfolded in Western Europe, was truly postideological.

"Nevertheless, within the general post-war European consensus there was a distinctive vision, that of the Social Democrats. Social Democracy had always been a hybrid; indeed, this was just what was held against it by enemies to the Right and Left alike. A practice in lifelong search of its theory, Social Democracy was the outcome of an insight vouchsafed to a generation of European socialists early in the twentieth century: that radical social revolution in the heartlands of modern Europe – as prophesied and planned by the socialist visionaries of the nineteenth century – lay in the past, not the future. As a solution to the injustice and inefficiency of industrial capitalism, the nineteenth-century paradigm of violent urban upheaval was not only undesirable and unlikely to meet its goals; it was also redundant. Genuine improvements in the condition of all classes could be obtained in incremental and peaceful ways.

"It did not follow from this that the fundamental nineteenth-century socialist tenets were discarded. The overwhelming majority of mid-twentieth century European Social Democrats, even if they kept their distance from Marx and his avowed heirs, maintained as an article of faith that capitalism was inherently dysfunctional and that socialism was both morally *and economically* superior. Where they differed from Communists was in their unwillingness to commit to the inevitability of capitalism's imminent demise or to the wisdom of hastening that demise by their own political actions. Their task, as they had come to understand it in the course of decades of Depression, division and dictatorship, was to use the resources of the state to eliminate the social pathologies attendant on capitalist forms of production and the unrestricted workings of a market economy: to build not economic utopias but good societies."⁶⁵⁹

However, the European Social Democrat idea that "capitalism was inherently dysfunctional and that socialism was both morally and economically superior" must be borne in mind when we come to the main *political* expression of the movement – the European Union.

The underlying pathos of the European Union was socialist and collectivist, and consequently anti-individualist and anti-nationalist. This is not to say that individual rights were ignored or trampled on. As Mazower writes, constitutional reforms after the war "displayed a concern for human rights born of bitter experience, and an awareness of the need to defend the individual against the power of the state."⁶⁶⁰

Nevertheless, compared to individualistic Britain and America, Europe was certainly more collectivist. It is this fact more than any other that caused the long-running battle between Britain (standing for the sovereignty of individual nation-states) and the EU (standing for the socialist super-state) that has reached a climax in our days. However, in the early decades of the EU the federal and socialist European superstate was an aspiration rather than a reality; and the nation-state enjoyed perhaps its last flowering on the European continent... But this was not enough to tempt the British into it: theirs had until recently been at the same time the greatest empire in human history, and they were not about to exchange that for being part of somebody else's largely untested empire or super-state...

For that is what it was becoming: a super-state, that is, an empire, albeit under another name. This was the intention of its founder, Jean Monnet, and "ever-closer political integration" was written into the constitution of the new state by its founding document, the Treaty of Rome (1957). But this is what the British opposed: hesitantly at first – in the 1970s they even joined the Union – but more fervently with time, until they finally left the Union in 2020.

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⁶⁵⁹ Judt, op. cit., p. 361, 362-363.

⁶⁶⁰ Mazower, op. cit., p. 291.

It should be noted that many pro-Europeans in the early post-war years believed in the creation of the European Union, not primarily for economic reasons, but *for the sake of peace* – peace, that is, *within* Western Europe rather than between the American and Soviet blocs. As David Reynolds puts it, for them the Treaties of Rome were "effectively a peace settlement for Western Europe".⁶⁶¹ Indeed, many intellectuals in the early post-war generations believed that yet another war among the nations of Europe could be prevented only by uniting them in a new super-nation. This was also Churchill's motivation when, in a speech in Zurich on September 19, 1946, he called for a United States of Europe (with or without Britain – he never made clear), towards which the essential first step would have to be peace between France and Germany. In this sense he was, if not the father, at any rate the godfather of Europe.⁶⁶²

According to Michael McManus, peace was also the motivation of the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who took Britain into the Union in 1973. Heath "had first-hand experience of a Nuremburg rally in 1937, of the Spanish Civil War in 1938, and of combat in the Second World war itself. His greatest fear was of a resurgence of nationalism in Europe and of another ruinous war. European unity was, for him, first and foremost, the necessary key to peace. This was the predominant view within the Conservative Party from the mid-1950s until the mid-1980s including most of Margaret Thatcher's premiership. After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, however, she recognised a new reality and was fearful of a united Germany. But Sir Edward's needle had got stuck..."⁶⁶³

But was it really the European project that kept the peace in Europe? Hardly... The real causes of the preservation of peace between the West European countries were mutual exhaustion, the common threat of the Red Army just over the Elbe, and the consequent felt need for the formation of NATO. In fact, the real peace-maker was *the American army*, together with other American institutions in Europe. It was they that both defended the West against the Soviets and constantly cajoled the Europeans, especially the French, into working together for the common good.⁶⁶⁴

"British politicians," writes Tombs, "were never indifferent to Europe,... and 1950s polls showed public support for European unity. Bevin's problem was over-ambition, aiming to create an independent European super-power.

⁶⁶¹ Reynolds, *The Long Shadow. The Great War and the Twentieth Century*, London: Simon & Schuster, 2014.

⁶⁶² "Let Europe Arise! – Winston Churchill", https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/074567-008-A/let-europe-arise-winston-churchill?xtor=CS1-41-%5Bdesktop%5D-

^{%5}BSpeechChurchill%5D&kwp_0=497024&kwp_4=1786590&kwp_1=760537

⁶⁶³ McManus, "European dream that belonged to a different era", *The Sunday Telegraph Review*, July 3, 2016, p. 19.

⁶⁶⁴ Tombs "points out that Nato and nuclear weapons have done more to keep the peace than the EU" (Brian Appleyard, "Brains for Brexit: top academics and thinkers put the case for Brexit", *Sunday Times*, February 18, 2018).

These visions were dispelled by the Cold War..., and then by the beginnings of European integration through the European Coal and Steel Community. Britain's policy now focused on ensuring a continuing American commitment to European security through NATO. Behind the scenes, there was unprecedented sharing of secret intelligence with the United States under a 1947 treaty, which also included Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and which still applies [under the name of "the Five Eyes"]. The relationship with America ('special', as the British saw it) was not a barrier to integration with the Continent – far from it, as the Americans were eager backers of European unity...

"The other main pillar of Britain's foreign policy came to be Europe," and in particular the European Union...

The European Union (EU), - or, as it was originally called, the European Economic Community (EEC) – was originally composed of France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, who created it jointly at the Treaty of Rome in March, 1957. This was the right moment for the French, the real drivers of the Union, because they felt betrayed by the British at Suez in 1956, and now hurled themselves enthusiastically in the opposite direction – towards Germany and the Continent. In June, the German Bundestag voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Treaty.

However, as Matthaus Haeussler writes, "Not all Germany's parliamentarians played along. The young Helmut Schmidt – a brash, chainsmoking Social Democrat from Hamburg – refused to support the Treaties, largely because of British non-participation. 'Much as I was convinced of the necessity of European integration,' he reflected later, 'I then thought... that the EEC could never be successful in the absence of British experience and pragmatism.'"⁶⁶⁵

Britain had sent an observer to the original negotiations in Messina that led to the Treaty of Rome, but decided not to join, because the Treaty, as Tombs writes, "set up a tariff wall, a protectionist agricultural policy, and a goal of progressive integration" which "seemed to challenge Britain's great power prestige and its trade.

"The response of the Conservative government, elected in 1951, was to propose a Free Trade Area open to all, within which the Six could pursue economic and political integration, while permitting other European and Commonwealth countries to trade with them. This would arguably have been more favourable to Third World economic development and to long-term European growth. Ludwig Erhard, the West German finance minister and architect of its 'economic miracle', was a strong supporter. But, in November, 1958, the negotiations were vetoed by the new French president General Charles de Gaulle. In response, Britain successfully proposed a European Free

⁶⁶⁵ Tombs, The English and their History, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, pp. 805, 806.

Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959, with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. Over time, EFTA and the EEC would doubtless have created stable trading arrangements and patterns of cooperation.

"However, in the 1960s, the British government made a historic decision to change policy. EFTA was considered too small to provide the diplomatic clout craved by Whitehall at a time of severe post-imperial unease, aggravated by the 1956 Suez fiasco in which a Franco-British attempt to overthrow the Egyptian government had been humiliatingly thwarted by American opposition... As well as being a decade of vertiginous cultural and social change, the 1960s were years of accelerating decolonisation: between 1960 and 1966, 20 British colonies became independent, including Cyprus, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Jamaica, Uganda, Kenya, Malta and Singapore. A cabinet committee warned in 1960: 'If we try to remain aloof [from the EEC]... simultaneously with the contraction of our overseas possessions, we shall run the risk of losing any real claim to be a world power.' Besides, Washington disliked EFTA as a barrier to its aim of a united Europe, and the Americans put heavy pressure on London to join the EEC. As the former American secretary of state Dean Acheson (one of the original backers of the Schuman Plan) put it in December 1962: 'Great Britain has lost an empire, and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role... apart from Europe... based on a 'Special Relationship' with the United States, (or) being head of a 'Commonwealth'... this role is about played out.'"666

In 1961 Britain, led now by Harold Macmillan, again applied to join the EEC. As so often, the British attitude to the club they wanted to join was ambiguous: a desire, on the one hand, to profit from the economic growth of the Community (although by the 1970s European growth was slowing), and on the other, a determination not to be caught in the coils of the emerging European super-state. Macmillan was not only pursuing the wrong policy for Britain: he was betraying the interests of her main trading partners in the Commonwealth. As Andrew Roberts writes, "Britain behaved disgracefully towards Australia and New Zealand from the moment the Treaty of Rome was signed and Harold Macmillan applied for Britain to join the EEC. It is impossible to excuse what the distinguished British historian John Ramsden has described as the 'duplicity, bad faith and general obstructionism with which the British behaved in the face of the Australian government's attempts to find out exactly what the British Government intended to do when the EEC was formed in 1957. What went for Australia also went for Canada, New Zealand and the West Indies, but not Eire, which joined the EEC in January 1973.

"At one point during Macmillan's gross obfuscation of what EEC membership would mean to future trading relations, [Australian Prime Minister] Menzies even considered appealing over the heads of the Macmillan Government to British MPs and the British people, 'with the (perfectly justified) allegation that Macmillan was betraying Australians and not admitting the

⁶⁶⁶ Tombs, "The Reluctant Europeans", BBC History Magazine, September, 2016, pp. 52-53.

fact'. It is likely that if he had, Macmillan would have had serious difficulties, because his Government was already being accused of selling out the white Rhodesians at the time, and Menzies was hugely popular in Britain...."⁶⁶⁷

"The main problem," writes Tombs, "was France, newly ascendant and ambitious under Charles de Gaulle, who was elected president of the new Fifth Republic in December 1958, and an old man in a hurry. He intended to make France the leader of Europe, and wanted 'to be the cock on a small dunghill instead of having two cocks on a large one', as Macmillan put it to a sympathetic President John F. Kennedy in 1963. Macmillan's frustration stemmed from a televised press conference on 14 January when de Gaulle, after long and wearisome negotiations, summarily vetoed the British application for membership on the grounds that 'England is an island sea-going, bound up by its trade, its markets, its food supplies, with the most varied and often the most distant countries.' This would disrupt what he called a truly 'European Europe'. The humiliation of de Gaulle's veto further weakened Macmillan at home, where he was beset by the Profumo scandal, and he resigned, ostensibly on health grounds, that October.

"The Labour Party had been led since 1963 by Harold Wilson. He was the most brilliant politician of his day, prototype of a new grammar-schooleducated North Country professionalism that seemed to be elbowing aside the effect public school upper-class, embodied by Macmillan and his successor as party leader, the honourable, inoffensive, but emphatically not modern 14th Earl of Home, probably Britain's last aristocratic Prime Minister, who held office (renouncing his earldom) from 1963 to 1964 - his mother was said to have remarked that 'it was very good of Alec to have taken the job on.' Wilson, Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970, was thus an embodiment of the social and cultural changes of the 1960s. He was an economist praising 'pragmatism' and embodying the new concept of 'meritocracy'. In retrospect he seems an oddly insubstantial figure with no defining ideas, mainly remembered for his dictum that 'a week is a long time in politics'. Like most of his party, he was suspicious of European membership and urged support for Commonwealth trade: 'We are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical and marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Düsseldorf.' Once in power in 1964, Wilson found that plans for galvanizing Commonwealth trade were a pipedream. He renewed the application for the EEC, reflecting that Britain was like a faded beauty, and Europe a go-ahead young man with good prospects: if not a love match, it could be Britain's last chance for a comfortable settlement. But de Gaulle pronounced a third veto on 16 May 1967, using language of 'quite exceptional bitterness, hostility and scorn'. Britain, he said, was economically incapable of membership, and its desire for accession was driven by desperation. The English, he told his entourage, 'are a worn-out people'.'"668

⁶⁶⁷ Roberts, op. cit., p. 437.

⁶⁶⁸ Tombs, *The English and their History*, pp. 805-809.

De Gaulle said that Britain was "not European enough to be part of a truly 'European Europe'." If by a "European Europe" he meant the EU, then he was probably right.⁶⁶⁹ Its protectionist, inward-looking policies were counter to Britain's interests and traditions; and its aim of achieving full political integration in a federal super-state was never acceptable to most Britons. Perhaps they should have been warned by the sheer intractability of some of their future "partners" - Ted Heath, Britain's chief negotiator, said: "The French are opposing us by every means, fair and foul. They are absolutely ruthless."⁶⁷⁰

De Gaulle's veto was a humiliation. But it was also a salutary warning. It should have been heeded, and the attempt to join the EU finally abandoned. Ironically, De Gaulle himself was equivocal about the EU. He said that he wanted Europe "*à l'anglaise*" but "*sans les anglais*". The deciding factor that made him a pro-European and not a eurosceptic was his desire to see a superpower counter-weight to the United States. And this anti-americanism, which was born during the Second World War, if not earlier,⁶⁷¹ remains an important component of the European mind-set to this day, an enviousness of Europe's saviour (there is no other word for it) that may yet destroy Europe. "There is no doubt," writes Gerald Frost, "that many of the architects of the European project intended from the very beginning to create a rival to the United States."⁶⁷² De Gaulle was, in the last analysis, a French nationalist who saw France's traditional pursuit of "*la gloire*" was now best served though her dominance over the European super-state, from where he could lord it, supposedly, not only over Europe, but also over the Anglo-Saxons...

Very different was the attitude of the Germans, who, unlike the French, wanted the British inside rather that out. However, for them the EU had become a kind of idol, the means of national redemption from their Nazi past; which meant that they were not going to oppose the French beyond a certain limit, but rather appease them. For the EU was inconceivable without France, and without the Franco-German axis. And the Germans saw her future and national identity only inside the EU, inside which they could submerge their continuing feelings of guilt over Nazism.

⁶⁶⁹ Hans Schmidt, the Anglophile future Chancellor of Germany, changed his mind about the necessity of Britain's joining the EU at this time, believing that de Gaulle's analysis was essentially correct (Haeussler, op. cit.)

⁶⁷⁰ Tombs, "The Reluctant Europeans", p. 54.

⁶⁷¹ Andrew Roberts has intriguingly suggested that a vital factor in his attitude may have been a conversation he had with Churchill on the eve of D-Day, in which Churchill thundered: "How do you expect us, the British, to adopt a position separate from that of the United States? We are going to liberate Europe, but it is because the Americans are with us to do so. For get this clear, every time we have to decide between Europe and the open sea, it is always the open sea that we shall choose. Every time I have to decide between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt" (*A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900,* London: Penguin, 2014, p. 336).

⁶⁷² Frost, *New Criterion*, November, 2004. After quoting these words Andrew Roberts comments: "At no point did the US State Department appreciate this central feature of the European project, but instead did everything in their power to encourage deeper and closer European integration" (op. cit., p. 437).

As Haeussler writes, "For most Germans of Schmidt's generation, the European project exerted a powerful emotional pull that stretched far beyond the concrete advantages of a customs union: it offered a unique opportunity to rehabilitate and reinvent postwar Germany within a European framework and to distance itself from the horrors of the recent past. Wilson and Thatcher, by contrast, may have concluded rationally that EC membership was in Britain's national interest, but they lacked any comparative emotive and personal attachment to the European project. The EC therefore remained only one of many possible arenas for European cooperation in 1970s Britain – and not one that suited the country particularly well. For most Germans, however, the EC had by that time become the *only* framework for European cooperation. Any criticisms of its institutions and policies were almost inevitably interpreted as more general attacks on the very principles of European cooperation and solidarity..."⁶⁷³

A change in leadership in France brought a change in attitude to British membership of the EEC. "Only after the students of Nanterre and the Sorbonne had dented the general's prestige in the May 1968 riots and hastened his retirement, was the barrier to British membership of the EEC removed. De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, declared that the general, as 'a legendary personage', could defy all of Europe to keep the British out, whereas he, a mere politician, could not.

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"Edward Heath's new Conservative government, elected in June 1970, grasped the opportunity. Heath assured Pompidou that the British were ready to 'give priority to (Europe) over their other interests in the world', though he grumbled privately that the Europeans 'are constantly barging ahead with regulations drawn up to suit themselves and then coming along, more or less with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude, to present them to us'. Sir Con O'Neill, the chief Foreign Office negotiator, was clear that the EEC was essentially about power and prestige. 'None of its policies was crucial to us; many of them were objectionable.' The terms for entry O'Neill considered 'burdensome', including sharing Britain's fishing grounds, accepting the Common Agricultural Policy, and agreeing to a large financial contribution. But he considered it necessary to 'swallow the lot'.

"Belief that EEC membership 'at any price' was the only cure for Britain's perceived diplomatic, economic and political malaise was now the orthodoxy in official circles, and de Gaulle's successive vetoes seem only to have confirmed this view: Britain was 'the sinking *Titanic*', and Europe the lifeboat, into which it must scramble, whatever the drawbacks. So Britain formally entered the EEC on 1 January 1973, with Ireland and Denmark. The rest of EFTA remained outside.

⁶⁷³ Haeussler, op. cit., p. 50.

"When Labour returned to power in 1974, Harold Wilson announced the intention of 'renegotiating and denegotiating' a settlement he had condemned as unfavourable, and putting the result to a referendum. Wilson's efforts at renegotiation had no significant outcome, but the modified terms were presented as a British victory. Public support had collapsed since the first failed attempt to join, so the government mounted a huge publicity campaign with vociferous support from business and most of the intelligentsia. The issue was carefully depoliticised, indeed trivialised: 'The community... hasn't made the French eat German food or the Dutch drink Italian beer.' The main theme was the EEC's fast economic growth (which ironically had just reached its end, precipitated by a sudden rise in the price of oil). The attractions of membership were represented on the cover of an official pamphlet, *The British European*, by a young woman in a skimpy Union Jack bikini proclaiming: "EUROPE IS FUN! More Work But More Play Too!' The country chose to stay in by 67 per cent of those voting..."⁶⁷⁴

By signing up to the European Communities Act of 1973 Britain's parliament lost its sovereignty, thereby changing fundamentally the nature of her governmental system. This was not understood by most leading politicians at the time (including Margaret Thatcher, as she admits in her *Memoirs*), and certainly not by the majority of the British people. When they finally woke up to the fact that the European Commission, not "the Queen in Parliament", was their ultimate secular lord, they would seek to leave the European Union...

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"The 'economic miracle' had produced untold benefits for the population of Western Europe, improvements, too, in the southern and eastern parts of the continent. Surveys showed that people were in general more satisfied, happy and optimistic for the early 1970s than they had been in the 1950s. High levels of economic growth had, however, one lasting disadvantage, not recognized by many people at the time. They came at the cost of the environment. This suffered irreparably, as it had done under the Industrial Revolution, from the drive to improve productivity, and especially from the huge growth in manufacturing. At this point only a small minority were paying any attention to the long-term damage that was being caused. The 'golden age', though it brought great improvements to the living standards of Europeans, was responsible for a serious worsening of environmental damage. The swiftly growing use of pesticides and other chemicals in more intensive farming greatly improved crop yields but inflicted harm on the environment that only slowly came to be widely recognized. The huge boost in energy consumption from the 1950s reflected growing prosperity, for example in the use of cars and wider possibilities of travel. But it also led to new records of harmful carbon emissions (doubling in Germany, for instance, between 1948 and 1957), the scale of whose damage would become apparent in later generations. Only from

⁶⁷⁴ Tombs, "The Reluctant Europeans", pp. 55-56.

the 1970s onwards did the environment become a significant political theme = and even then have difficulty in stirring the interest of most of the population..." 675

Pollution and environmental damage were a symbol of a more serious consequence of the economic boom: the increase in sin, the decline in faith and the dechristianization of the West...

⁶⁷⁵ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 144.

<u>47. THE DE-CHRISTIANIZATION OF THE WEST</u>

The extraordinary growth in prosperity in the 1950s, unparalleled in history, could not fail to have an important and deleterious effect on the western psyche, accelerating its already pronounced turning away from God to Mammon. The American gospel of self-fulfilment played its part in this change, as depicted in so many of the Hollywood films that poured into Europe.

Nevertheless, it took time for the corruption inevitably engendered by material prosperity to destroy public morals completely. Thus for all its welldeserved reputation for flashy display, Hollywood did produce Christian films both in the pre-war era (e.g. It's a Wonderful World, in which an angel plays an important role, and A Matter of Life and Death (1946), the hub of which is the judgement of a soul in the life to come). In the 1950s films were still being produced that glorified innocence and a stable family life, and some were even notable for their Christian content, such as *The End of the Affair* (from a story by Graham Greene), Demetrius and the Gladiators (1954), The Bishop's Wife, The Devil at 4 o'clock, The Prisoner (1955), The Ten Commandments (1957) and King of Kings (1961). In the most popular box-office hit ever, Ben Hur (1959) even Christ Himself makes an appearance (but his face is concealed). Perhaps the best film to be released on a Christian theme was The Singer, not the Song (1961). Moreover, other major box-office hits, such as Mary Poppins and The Sound of Music (1964) were definitely old-fashioned and "wholesome" in their morals (proving that it is not necessary to break moral taboos in order to be popular).

It would be idle to pretend that the earlier post-war films were on a uniformly high aesthetic level or profound in content. But they did indicate that Hollywood and popular culture was still behind the curve of the atheism being promoted by the philosophers and scientist. However, a revolution was afoot... There was a marked change in Hollywood between the early 50s and the early 60s. The relative innocence of the Disney cartoons, of musicals like The Wizard of Oz, and the early Jimmy Stewart and Doris Day films, was succeeded by "bd boy" films such as The Wild One (1953) and Rebel without a Cause (1955), and then by the innovative Hitchcock thrillers *Psycho* (1960) and *Vertigo* (1958), which explored altogether darker depths of the human psyche and presaged a darker phase in the nation's history. Certain talented but exceedingly debauched figures in the creative arts, such as the novelist Norman Mailer in the US, the drama critic Kenneth Tynan in the UK and film-maker Rainer Werner Fassbender in Germany, helped remove the inhibitions on the expression of violence and promiscuous and perverted sexuality. Public tolerance for this increased. Thus while in the early 1950s the Swedish actress Ingrid Bergman's affair with the director Rossellini nearly cost her her career (although she had starred as the Christian heroine in Joan of Arc (1948)), a decade later sentiment and morality had changed: the long-running drama of the affair between Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton, which began on the set of the vastly expensive film *Cleopatra* (1964), caught the imagination of the world's new media, and their affairs, divorces, marriage and re-marriage and re-divorce seemed to make adultery and divorce glamorous. All this was seemingly legitimised by the debauched life of the American president, with the film-star looks, John F. Kennedy (although the full extent of his philandering was not known until after his death). The morality of political leaders has affected the morality of their followers in all ages...

In popular music the revolution began with Elvis Presley and Rock'n'Roll, which was very new (although strongly reminiscent of negro musicals), with a strong rhythm and explicit sexuality. However, the real revolution came from Britain, from the Beatles, who introduced the culture of hippiedom, drug abuse and Hindu influences (in Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967)). What was striking about the Beatles phenomenon was not so much the music, which, though talented, was not revolutionary, as the reaction to it from its teenage fans, especially in America: a kind of mass-hysteria that recalled similar outbreaks in the Middle Ages. This encouraged John Lennon in 1966 to declare unwisely that the Beatles had become more popular than Jesus. "Only four months later, after his comment had been reprinted in an American magazine, did the backlash hit. Pastors across the United States had long been suspicious of the Beatles. This was especially so in the South - the Bible-belt. Preachers there - unwittingly backing Lennon's point - fretted that Beatlemania had become a form of idolatry; some even worried that it was all a communist plot..."676

Lennon eventually fell victim to a deranged assassin's bullet. But the evil tradition of blasphemy in music, unfortunately, did not die with him. A few years later, Andrew Lloyd Webber produced the musical *Jesus Christ Superstar*...

The young people of the Sixties generation were distinguished not only by their taste in music, but also by their clothes (jeans, casual wear) and hair styles (long). And already for some decades feminism had been gaining in strength... This movement was by no means confined to such issues as equal pay for women. Neil Rockefeller once told Aaron Russo that the women's liberation movement was promoted and financed by his family, with two main purposes: first, that the tax base should be increased to include women, and secondly that children should go to school earlier and thereby see the state, and not their parents, as their real educators and guides...⁶⁷⁷

But the most revolutionary influence on 1960s culture was the contraceptive pill...

In the 1930s, writes Fr. Joseph Gleason, "Anglicans were the first 'church' to give approval for married couples to use contraception. They put a religious stamp of approval on seeking sexual pleasure, disconnected from procreation.

⁶⁷⁶ Holland, Dominion, p. 476.

⁶⁷⁷ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmwEHRKi-QE&fbclid=IwAR26kP2iDHcXxtYhAxpCYvdyL8i0mZzZA8TmfVroGM9-JKU_NGHZ4BhclJ4

"Over the next three decades, all the other Protestants followed. In 1965, the Supreme Court nationally legalized contraception for married couples. Seven years later the Supreme Court nationally legalized contraception for all women, whether married or not.

"There is a direct line that connects these events with the sexual revolution in the 60s, and [the abortion judgement] Roe vs. Wade in 1973. (The judges in Roe vs. Wade explicitly cited the two contraception cases as precedent.)"⁶⁷⁸

"It all began much earlier, just after the First World War. The necessities of war, and in particular the necessity of producing vast amounts of armaments at a time when most of the male factory-workers were away at the front, had thrust women forward. They took the place of their male comrades in the factories, and soon won the right to vote. Feminism was born – or rather reborn, given a new and more dangerous emphasis...

"In New York in the summer of 1921," writes Andrew Marr, "while Adolf Hitler was ranting in Munich, two women in their forties one day sat down and eyed one another. One was a red-haired agitator, born of working-class Irish stock in upstate New York. The other was an elegant daughter of America's industrial aristocracy, who spent much of her time looking after her schizophrenic husband at their Californian hideaway. Margaret Sanger and Katharine Dexter McCormick were very different kinds of American, who together would do more to change women's lives by the later part of the century than any politician, in the US or Europe. Their cause, however, was undeniably political. It was to give women control over their own fertility or, to put it more bluntly, to help them stop having babies they did not want, while continuing to have the sex they did want."⁶⁷⁹

In the 1930s there was something of a reaction against feminist attitudes and abortion, as many countries worried about falling birth rates; and, particularly in Fascist states, traditional attitudes towards motherhood enjoyed a revival with the renewed emphasis on the nation as a biological entity. Nevertheless, Sanger and McCormick campaigned tirelessly for birth control through contraception, and also smuggled large quantities of diaphragms from Europe, where they were legal, into America, where they were not. After the death of her husband in 1947, McCormick poured her vast wealth into scientific research into chemical forms of contraception. "The commercial struggle to test and produce a saleable product took years, but the Pill was finally unveiled on 11 May 1960 as a contraceptive. Few innovations have made as big an impact on as many people. How much more effective it was than other methods of contraception. A detailed study in 1961 found the failure rate from condoms was high, 28 percent; from diaphragms even higher, nearly 34 percent, and from vaginal suppositives 42 percent. With the Pill it was 2 percent. Women voted yes in the first year, four hundred thousand Americans took it. By 1965,

⁶⁷⁸ Gleason, Facebook, July 16, 2020.

⁶⁷⁹ Marr, A History of the World, London: Pan, 2012, pp. 486-487.

it was estimated that a quarter of all married women under the age of fortyfive in the US were taking it; by 1984 the worldwide estimate was up to eighty million."⁶⁸⁰

"The Pill's effect on the relations of the sexes was, said Conrad Russell, like that of the nuclear bomb on international relations. On 1 June 1961 it came on the market in Germany (through Schering AG). It had origins going back to the early twenties, a time when 'race improvement' (eugenics) was fashionable, and the poor or stupid were supposed to be discouraged from procreating (in Sweden, up to the 1970s, Lapps were being sterilized on the grounds that they drank too much and were not very bright). German scientists received grants from American foundations for such research (the money was frozen in Germany under Hitler, and was used to pay for the experiments of Josef Mengele, at Auschwitz). Preventing ovulation has been done by natural methods in the past... In 1951 Carl Djerassi, of Bulgarian-Jewish and Viennese origins, working in Mexico and connected with the Swiss chemical firm Ciba, took out a patent, and experimented with the first synthetic compound in 1956 in Haiti. Germans marketed the Pill first, but it spread very rapidly. Freeing women from unwanted childbirth was equivalent to a new dimension in world history. Before 1914, in England, women doctors had not been allowed to contribute to medical journals because this was thought to be immodest, indicating an interest in the body that was improper. Fifty years later, women were establishing themselves in a man's world - probably the single greatest change, among the very many that set in after the Second World War. In the next generation, even mothers of small children were going out to work, some of them very successful, and many others left with no choice but drudgery. Feminism became a fashionable cause..."681

David F. Prentis writes: "Although there has always been contraception, its acceptance and practice by society as a whole is a relatively new phenomenon. In the first part of the 20th century barrier methods became through mass production increasingly used. However, with the advent of the hormonal contraceptive pill in the 1960s the contraceptive era, ushering in the sexual revolution, really took off.

"The term 'revolution' is by no means exaggerated, for the result was a fundamental change in the understanding of human sexuality in society. With the pill, people thought, nothing can happen, i.e. no child could be conceived. Inhibitions broke down, so that there was an increase in adultery, living together before marriage and living together with no thought of marriage. Amoral sex education with the message, 'You can do anything you like so long as your partner agrees and you use contraception. If there is an accident, have an abortion,' promoted sexual promiscuity from puberty onwards. Sexual activity has been degraded into a form of entertainment.

⁶⁸⁰ Marr, op. cit., pp. 492-493.

⁶⁸¹ Stone, op. cit., p. 174-175.

"The immediate consequences of promiscuity starting in adolescence are obvious: the rampant increase of sexually transmitted diseases, infertility and the incapability of forming long-term relationships through frequent changes of partners and repeated disappointments.

"The assumption that 'nothing can happen' is erroneous, because contraceptives are by no means 100% effective. Children are conceived, and such 'errors' must be corrected – the child is aborted. The result has been devastating: the number of babies killed by abortion every year is about the same as the total number of deaths in the whole of World War II.

"Apart from the carnage, enormous havoc is created in the relationship of the parents, whether married or not, very often leading to its breakdown...

"The widespread practice of abortion leads to euthanasia. If it is acceptable to kill one category of people, then it is logically acceptable to kill others, specifically the ill, the handicapped and the old, for human life is no longer sacred. A chilling example of this kind of development can be seen in the National Socialist regime in Germany.

"The pill 'culture' leads to the rejection of children, small families, and a demographic winter. In the long-term it will be impossible to pay pensions...

"The separation of sexual activity from child-bearing leads to the acceptance of the production of children through assisted reproduction without recourse to the marital act in the case of infertility. Through IVF society is being led, inspired by Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, to the acceptance of controlled reproduction. Human beings are reduced to products. They are massproduced, selected, rejected, frozen or used in experiments. They are treated as material goods, in short, as slaves...

"When the practice of sterilised sexual intercourse is accepted, it leads logically to the acceptance of all practices leading to orgasm: oral, anal, homosexual acts, etc. The whole homosexual movement has become possible only through the general acceptance of contraceptive practice and the reduction of sexuality to a source of entertainment...

"Contraception, which leads logically to other evils as described above, is destroying society. There are too few children and nations are dying out. It leads to abortion, as those who promote it concede. The combination of promoting promiscuity through Godless sex education, the long-term use of hormonal contraception with back-up abortions and the postponement of child-bearing leads to increased infertility...

"The long-term purpose of this policy could well be the desire to subject reproduction to state control, which would allow only those children to be born who pass quality control. At present this is illusory, but the tendency can be seen. It would appear that an elite group wishes to create a society of virtual slaves obedient to their desires. A new totalitarianism is being formed.

"To this end it is necessary to destroy or at least weaken marriage and the family. For this purpose contraception, especially the convenient hormonal forms, is eminently suitable. And those who pour their millions into the homosexual movement and the gender ideology are not concerned with helping homosexuals and those with problems of sexual identity. Rather they are using these people to extend the concept of marriage and ultimately to widen its meaning so much as to make it meaningless."⁶⁸²

Somewhat surprisingly, it was the British who in many ways took the lead in the Western Cultural Revolution. In the past the French or Swedes had had the reputation of being the most "liberated" nations. But now the stuffy Brits began to shed their inhibitions; and the very novelty of this in the country that invented Victorian prurience and aristocratic snobbery gave a certain perverse originality to its cultural disinhibition that became popular all over the world.

Certainly, it was a confusing time for the British. The period of Conservative government, from 1951 to 1964, was an era of peace and prosperity; but at the same time Britain was a "land of lost content".⁶⁸³ This was the last period of Anglican religious dominance. The Anglicans had once been "the Tory Party at prayer" but were becoming less and less conservative (in any sense) as they rapidly lost their faith and abandoned their churches. In politics, the people were losing their patience with their stuffy, Old Etonian rulers after two major scandals – the Suez crisis of 1956, in which the Prime Minister was caught lying, and the Profumo affair of 1961, in which the War Minister was caught both lying and cavorting with a Russian spy and a prostitute. These exposed the rotten foundations of the ruling elite. Economic decline, decolonization, the threat of nuclear war and a new spirit of irreverence in the arts and culture, all contributed to the new mood...

After Suez, as Robert Tombs writes, the end of the British empire "came quickly. There were general causes: the economic, political and psychological effects of two world wars both in European states and in their colonies; the Cold War and Soviet-backed anti-colonialism; American ambivalence; pressure from the UN; and not least white-settler extremism, which led South Africa to leave the Commonwealth in 1961 and Southern Rhodesia to declare illegal independence in 1965. There seemed only unpalatable choices; as the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox Boyd, put it in 1957, 'to give independence too

⁶⁸² Prentis, "Contraception gave us divorce and gay 'marriage' and will destroy us: here's how", *LifeSiteNews*, March 4, 2015, https://www.lifesitenews.com/opinion/contraception- gave-us-divorce-and-gay-marriage-and-will-destroy-us-heres-how

⁶⁸³ The phrase belongs to Andrew Marr in his BBC documentary, "History of Britain".

soon and risk disintegration...; or to hang on too long, risk ill-feeling and disturbance, and eventually to leave bitterness behind.^{'''684}

At the same time that Britain's political and military power were declining following the Suez fiasco, its cultural, "soft power", paradoxically, was increasing. Only this increase in influence, sadly, was negative in the extreme. For it was in London in particular that the cultural revolution known as "the permissive society" and "the Swinging Sixties" began; and this was nothing less than the beginning of the final collapse of western civilization, a collapse in traditional religion and morality which, far from gradually running into the sands like the Puritan revolution of the 1650s, has continued to develop and expand well into the twenty-first century.

This moral collapse, especially in the sexual sphere, may be linked, psychologically, with the country's loss of confidence in itself following Suez. After all, it is commonly observed that wars and revolutions, periods of great stress and danger in a country's life, are often accompanied by a loosening of sexual restraint. This had certainly been the case both during the First and the Second World Wars in Britain. However, these had been temporary lapses, followed by a re-tightening of morals after the return of normality.

But Suez and decolonialisation were hardly disasters of the order of the world wars, and they were not followed by a return to normality... "Bad boy" films such as *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning* and *Alfie* popularized and normalized the rebellious and debauched. And British pop music, especially that of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, did the same.

Tombs, however, points to the stable elements of 1950s society: "full employment, the Welfare State, the mass building of new family houses, the biggest increase in church-going for a century, continuing low crime, record levels of marriage, a baby boom with falling infant mortality and 'marital stability without known historical precedent', of which the 1945 film Brief Encounter is an icon. It was a respectful, indeed deferential time: the BBC did not permit anything 'derogatory to political institutions,' including impersonation of 'leading public and political institutions'. Magistrates ordered the destruction of more than 1300 works of fiction, considered obscene, among them Flaubert's Madame Bovary (1857), and a bookseller was gaoled for two months for selling D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover (1928). In short, the 1950s saw the triumph of Victorian values, and finally a wider distribution of their fruits - the basis of Tory ascendancy. But those fruits contained seeds of destruction. For example, the Welfare State assumed social conformity and economic stability, but it tended to undermine them by lessening the penalties for nonconformity. Mass slum-clearance and the building of new towns and housing promised a better life – on the assumption that neighbourliness and respectability would continue, indeed increase, despite the disruption of

⁶⁸⁴ Tombs, The English and their History, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, p. 781.

communities and the alienating scale and uniformity of much of the architecture.

"In the vanguard of change were the young (whose wages rose 83 percent in the 1950s) and especially educated young women, who went away from home to attend universities and art schools (on the Continent they usually lived with their parents), and who led a move away from mainstream culture and morality. The popular press, a unique element of English culture, increased its coverage of sex, ostensibly to educate, and increasingly to titillate, breaking down post-Victorian reticence and making sexual gossip and pleasure a central part of popular culture. Pop songs and new girls' magazines reinforced the message. Sixth-form girls who believed that premarital sex was 'always wrong' fell from 55.8 percent in 1963 to 14.6 percent in 1970; and the percentage of girls losing their virginity before the age of sixteen rose sharply from around 5 percent in the early 1960s to over 20 percent in the early 1970s. A series of events not only symbolized, but actually created and propagated change, and to look at them chronologically shows how they cumulatively created a cultural revolution.

"In 1953 the Kinsey Report on Women, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female, received wide press coverage in its statistical analysis and open discussion of the sex lives of Americans. 'Teddy Boys', flamboyant and sometimes violent, appeared. From 1956, the year of Suez, all indices of religiosity – such as church attendance, religious marriages, infant baptism, Sunday school enrolments began to decline after a postwar rise, though this was the resumption of a trend observable from the 1920s, as Victorianism slowly melted. That same year, rock n' roll arrived with the film Rock Around the Clock, and John Osborne's play Look Back in Anger symbolized the revolt of the 'Angry Young Men'. In 1957 the Wolfenden Report urged decriminalizing private homosexual acts between consenting adults. In 1958 the teenage playwright Shelagh Delaney's A Taste of Honey brought the story of a working-class married mother into mainstream theatre. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, uniting veteran pacifists and young activists, staged its first proper march to the weapons laboratory at Aldermaston. Also in that year the Liberals had their first by-election success for thirty years, when Asquith's grandson, Mark Bonham-Carter, won Torrington from the Conservatives; and there were serious race riots in Nottingham (sparked by a pub brawl) and Notting Hill. Boyfriend, a new kind of girls' magazine, appeared in 1959, as did the most original postwar car, the Mini - designed in response to the petrol shortage caused by Suez. In 1960 the prosecution of Penguin Books under the new Obscene Publications Act for publishing Lady Chatterley's Lover generated public fascination. When the prosecuting counsel asked the jury whether it was a book 'you would... wish your wife or your servants to read', he showed a pompous old hierarchy at bay. Penguin won the case, as famous authors, critics, politicians and, perhaps most significantly, teachers and Anglican prelates asserted the book's moral value: 'What Lawrence is trying to do,' explained the Bishop of Woolwich, 'is to portray the sex relationship as something essentially sacred... in a real sense an act of holy communion' By the end of 1960 the book had sold 2 million copies.

In 1961 'the Pill' appeared, and in three years, despite restrictions, was being used by 500,000 women and talked about by many more. In 1961 the Cambridge student review *Beyond the Fringe* opened in London, in which Peter Cook, Dudley Moore, Alan Bennett and Jonathan Miller mocked a range of authority figures. Sir Hugh Carleton-Greene became director-general of the BBC, and turned it in a progressive direction. In 1962 it launched a late night satire, *That Was the Week That Was*, introduced by David Frost, which delighted and scandalized a large audience. That same year saw the last time a prisoner was flogged. Also in 1962 Dean Acheson, the former U.S. Secretary of State, caused a furore by declaring that 'Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role'. The first James Bond film, *Dr. No* (based on a 1958 novel), appeared.

"The year of sensations was 1963. The Telstar satellite made world television news possible. The Beatles became famous, screamed at by crowds of teenage girls. The MI6 and Foreign Office insider 'Kim' Philby (Westminster and Cambridge) was exposed as a Russian agent - one of several traitors whose Establishment connections had averted suspicion. The Tory war minister John Profumo resigned in June after lying about his affair with a call girl, Christine Keeler, soon one of the most famous women in Britain: the scandal exposed sex, drugs, hypocrisy and espionage in high places, and received titillating mass press coverage - 'Last Week the Upper Classes passed unquietly away,' declared one journalist. Oh What a Lovely War opened, as did a sexy film version of *Tom Jones*. The Bishop of Woolwich (now famous as a *Chatterley* witness) published Honest to God, criticizing traditional religion and morality: 'Nothing can of itself always be labelled as 'wrong'... the only intrinsic evil is lack of love.' Dr. Alex Comfort, poet and former conscientious objector, appeared in a BBC series advocating sexual freedom and the following year published the best-selling The Joy of Sex: A Gourmet's Guide to Lovemaking, which presented sex not as holy communion but as healthy recreation. The miniskirt was christened by Mary Quant."685

The pace of change noticeably accelerated in October, 1964, when the Socialists under Harold Wilson came to power. The Socialists, not surprisingly, lacked both the snobbery and the reverence for the old ways of their Tory predecessors. "The government, with the key role played by the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, backed an unparalleled series of reforms, some through private members' bills. In 1965 hanging was abolished. Anthony Crosland, Minister of Education and Science, 'requested' Local Education Authorities to adopt comprehensive education, telling his wife that 'if it's the last thing I do I'm going to destroy every fucking grammar school in England': within ten years 90 percent of secondary schools were comprehensive. The Sexual Offences Act (1966) decriminalized homosexuality. Theatre censorship by the Lord Chamberlain – dating back to Sir Robert Walpole – was abolished in 1968. The divorce laws were relaxed (1969). There were Acts on Family Planning. Abortion (1967), Race Relations (1965 and 1968) and Equal Pay (1970). This was

⁶⁸⁵ Tombs, op. cit., pp. 793-795.

'the beginning of the end for the era of class and party. The mould in which popular policies had been set since the First World War began to crack as class divisions blurred and the major parties struggled to maintain the loyalty of voters...

"Similar changes were happening in other countries of north-western Europe, and in this broad context England's experience was unexceptional. In the long run – still unfolding in the twenty-first century – all this amounted to a cultural, social and intellectual transformation of profound importance, creating a gulf separating modern experience of life from that of previous centuries. Secularization, in the broadest sense, was at the heart of it. First and most affected were predominantly Protestant countries whose churches in modern times permitted a more individualistic and critical approach to religion, and where religion was no longer a focus of national identity or indeed of social life. What seems characteristic of England was that the transformation took place, not without pain and controversy - far from it - but with the active encouragement of much of what the historian A.J.P. Taylor in 1953 first christened 'the Establishment: the metropolitan political class, the BBC, the education system, the Church of England, 'the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised'. There ceased to be a consensus among authorities, and no moral code was any longer seen as upheld by society as a whole. This explains why there were marked differences from other English-speaking countries, notably Ireland and the United States. The Established Church, and its educated, middle-class clergy (and the BBC, its secular equivalent), played their traditional conciliatory role; they were not, and did not wish to be, a bulwark of cultural conservatism. They themselves first proclaimed that England had become 'a secularized society' - even thought most of its people considered themselves believers - and indeed radical theologians, impatient with 'institutionalized religion', believed that this was God's will. The Bishop of Woolwich, John Robinson, the most famous radical, was not a maverick outsider, but the son and grandson of canons of Canterbury, with six ordained uncles. His Honest to God sold a million copies, and was read twice by the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. In Ireland and the United States it was the most conservative groups, Catholic and Evangelical, that dominated and constituted an effective traditionalist front, whereas cultural and moral counter-revolutionaries in England, most famously the campaigner for television respectability, Mary Whitehouse, were outsiders, figures of fun.

"'Swinging London' and Liverpool became the world capitals of youth culture, and in this area England gained a lasting pre-eminence little noticed (or disapproved of) by adults, but recognized by adolescents the world over. For the first time since the fifteenth century, England was leading the world in musical fashion. The Beatles, the Rolling Stones and their contemporaries were followed by rock, heavy metal, punk rock, new wave, and later Britpop, disseminating lasting and inventive European sub-cultures."⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸⁶ Tombs, op. cit., pp. 795-796, 797-798.

Revolutions usually begin from below, and are resisted by the Establishment, especially the Church, the keeper of the nation's conscience. But then the pressure from below becomes too strong and the Establishment is either destroyed or reasons: "If you can't beat them, join them". The English revolution of the 1960s was notable because it came from the top, and that it came about in spite of the fact that the Establishment had been famously conservative; political leaders, Church leaders and social leaders were all, until the mid-1950s, old-fashioned and "fuddy-duddy" to a degree; while the working classes, too, remained remarkably conservative in their religion, in their sexual morality, in their sturdy individual independence, which manifested itself in an aversion to living on State hand-outs. But then a remarkable collapse in self-confidence and in belief in their own core values enveloped the upper classes, drawing the lower classes after them. Moreover, nearly seventy years later, there is still no significant sign of counter-revolution; the English revolution has become seemingly permanent. Moreover, it is now global, in that if the revolution in England cannot be said to have started the global revolution, it nevertheless influenced it greatly...

Peter Hitchens, writing in 2008, has analyzed how the revolution began in the key sphere of religion and the Church in England: "Hell was abolished around the same time that abortion was legalized and the death penalty was done away with... Like so many similar reforms, making Satan redundant was or appeared to be a change whose time had come. After all, nobody went to Hell any more, did they? For by the 1960s, eternal damnation, like most of the more worrying aspects of the Christian religion, had apparently fallen into disuse. Bishops, notably the 'South Bank' group headed by John Robinson of Woolwich, had begun to admit, rather coyly to start with, that they were not sure about the existence of God or the truth of their religion's central beliefs.

"It would take some years before the Bishop of Durham, Dr. David Jenkins, would speak of the resurrection as 'conjuring tricks with bones', but by the time he said these words few Anglican clergy found them shocking. The idea that one had to *believe* to be a parson or even a bishop was by then all but dead, and there was a group of Anglican clergy, known perhaps humorously as the 'Sea of Faith', who appeared to all intents and purposes to be atheists. The South Bank Bishops had done the necessary pioneering for all this, and it was only the poor believers, huddling together for warmth in the near-empty pews, who were distressed...

"Two world wars had done terrible things to English Christianity. The established church was part of the old order, rural, aristocratic, hierarchical, which was smashed to pieces at the Battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916. With some brave exceptions it had not had much to say to the common soldiers as they fought and died. Many of them would not have listened with any great enthusiasm anyway. The industrial revolution had already taken most people away from the country parishes where the Church's ancient roots were strong. The Church had never really succeeded in planting itself in the giant new cities,

or in the suburbs. Its most reliable urban supporters, the educated middle class, were assailed by doubt. Charles Darwin's theory of evolution had provided a popular scientific theory which allowed millions to expel God from the universe.

"A world without God meant no punishment for sin, and therefore no sin. This was an attractive idea to many, in an age where man appeared to be able to do everything and overcome anything. If the physical world had limitless possibilities, whey should human behaviour be limited to dusty and unwelcome prescriptions from ancient times?..

"... The Second World War – by splitting so many working-class and middle-class couples for good – had democratized divorce, previously a mainly middle- and upper-class habit. Those six years undid all the good achieved by the great struggle to prevent King Edward VIII from marrying the divorced Wallis Simpson, a struggle which had ended with the apparent victory of tradition, loyalty and constancy. When the tragedy came to be repeated, and Princess Margaret nobly chose duty instead of self by deciding not to marry the divorced Group Captain Peter Townsend, her gesture was too late. The fortress she sacrificed herself to defend had already fallen. In time, she would find that the rest of the country laughed at her rather than followed her good example, and her life since then is a sad example of the moral and marital confusion of the British people."⁶⁸⁷

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In Western Europe, no less than in America or Britain, faith and morals went into a steep decline from the late fifties. European social democracy assumed that society could be good without God, and that the only ultimately important thing was Mammon – provided it was distributed relatively equitably and there was a safety net for the poor. Not that religion was persecuted – outwardly, at any rate. But it was treated with condescension, as a relic of outdated modes of thought that would inevitably wither away in time. Even supposedly Christian political parties such as the Christian Democrats of Germany (the heirs of the Centrist Catholic Party of the 1930s) and Italy put much more emphasis on the "Democrat" than the "Christian" part of their name, and put up minimal opposition to the anti-Christian *Zeitgeist*. As Mark Mazower writes, "Christian Democrats may have varied in the closeness of their attachment to the Church; often, it seems hard to find what was distinctively religious about their policies."⁶⁸⁸

However, Roman Catholicism was a harder nut for the secularists to crack. And in the Latin countries of Italy, Spain and Portugal, it maintained its grip on the hearts and minds – and voting patterns - of their flock throughout the pontificate of Pope Pius XII (1939-58). But Pius was the last of the really papist

⁶⁸⁷ Hitchens, The Abolition of Britain, London: Continuum, 2008, pp. 105-107.

⁶⁸⁸ Mazower, Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 340.

popes. His successor, John XXIII, declared his desire "to throw open the windows of the Church so that we can see out and the people can see in"; and the Council that he convened, which came to be called "Vatican II", certainly let people see into the soul of the Vatican hierarchy, causing many crises of faith among the laity.

"Vatican II accorded increased 'collegial' authority to the bishops, alongside the Pope (the Bishop of Rome), though the diminution of papal primacy was countered by the reaffirmation of the doctrine of papal infallibility. The Council went a good way in opening the Church to ecumenism, advocating reconciliation with other churches. There was an apology to Jews for their suffering at the hands of Christians (and the offensive [but true!] attribution to Jews of blame for the killing of Christ in the Good Friday service was removed), a call to re-enter into dialogue with Jews, and a denunciation of anti-semitism. In 1965 healing of the centuries-old schism with the Eastern Orthodox Church began. For ordinary churchgoing Christians the most overt – and for traditionalists highly objectionable – change emanating from the Council was the replacement of Latin, the language of the Church in Western Europe since ancient times, by the vernacular language when celebrating Mass, a move designed to make the Church less remote from the people...

"Many attending the Council had hoped that there would be at least a relaxation in the rules prohibiting priests from marrying. But celibacy for the clergy was re-affirmed by Pope Paul VI, the more conservative successor to John XXIII, who died in 1963, long before the Council he had summoned had finished its work. This almost certainly contributed to the decline in the numbers of those willing to enter the priesthood – and an increase in those leaving it to get married. A far wider problem was the continued ban on contraception pronounced by Pope Paul in his encyclical *Humanae Vitae* ('Of Human Life') in 1968. This led to heated protests among the Catholic clergy as well as laity; the papal ban was in practice widely ignored. Quite apart from the damage that did to papal authority, it marked the limits of Vatican II's ability to change Catholicism in ways that could significantly redress the advance of secularization and the decline in Catholic observance. With the ban on birth control, the papacy was plainly in conflict with changes in sexuality and in the family that the Church was powerless to halt..."⁶⁸⁹

Vatican II generated a psychological crisis for many Catholics. On the one hand, they were told that it was possible, contrary to the teaching they had imbibed, to be saved outside the Catholic Church. And on the other hand, various forbidden sexual practices were now tolerated by the priests (if not by the Pope), many of whom were later revealed to be child-abusers...

If Churches were compelled – in the case of Catholicism, kicking and screaming – before the tide of changing attitudes, it is not surprising that democratically elected governments bent more willingly.

⁶⁸⁹ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, pp. 209-10.

"Governments were compelled to adjust to the changing climate. Sweden and Denmark again took the lead in the accessibility of contraceptive methods. Britain made the Pill freely available to married couples on a doctor's prescription from 1961, and from 1968 to all women, married or not. Following pressure from feminists, France removed the ban on birth control in 1965. Catholic countries, in accordance with the Church's official stance, resisted relaxation of restrictions on contraception, which were only lifted in Italy in 1970, in Ireland more than a decade later still. Abortion had been legal in the Soviet Union and among its allies since the 1950s. But laws permitting abortion - usually still with strictly applied conditions - spread within Western Europe only from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards. Although the passage of legislation usually followed heated debate and was opposed particularly by the Catholic Church, predominantly Catholic countries too gradually moved to legalize abortion, though some countries, such as Malta, continued to hold on against the trend and would still impose a ban on abortion into the next century.

"Changing social attitude were also reflected in legislation on homosexual practice. The stance of European governments towards homosexuality had historically been varied. Official bans existed in most (though not all) communist states. Most Western democracies had criminalized homosexuality. It had been legal in France since the Revolution, however (though the Vichy regime, in common with other fascist regimes, had banned it), and in Denmark, Sweden and Iceland (although not Norway or Finland) for two or three decades. But from the late 1960s onwards, responding to growing objections to current law, governments across Europe began to liberalize legislation on homosexuality. The 'Gay Rights Movement', beginning in the United States, exerted further pressure. Gradually, though the process would extend into the 1990s, the criminalization of homosexual acts among consenting adults was brought to an end throughout Western Europe and post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Widespread discrimination against homosexuals nevertheless continued, most plainly in Russia..."⁶⁹⁰

In his book *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* (1966) the sociologist Philip Rieff analysed "what he calls the "deconversion" of the West from Christianity. Nearly everyone recognizes that this process has been under way since the Enlightenment, but Rieff showed that it had reached a more advanced stage than most people — least of all Christians — recognized.

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"Rieff, writing in the 1960s, identified the Sexual Revolution – though he did not use that term – as a leading indicator of Christianity's demise. In classical Christian culture, he wrote, 'the rejection of sexual individualism' was 'very near the center of the symbolic that has not held.' He meant that

⁶⁹⁰ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, pp. 212-213.

renouncing the sexual autonomy and sensuality of pagan culture and redirecting the erotic instinct was intrinsic to Christian culture. Without Christianity, the West was reverting to its former state..."⁶⁹¹

It was reverting to *paganism*, and in particular to the idea that the expression of unbridled sexuality is natural and good. Milotkessem writes: "Published in a highly underrated 1934 book called *Sex and Culture*, the anthropologist J.D. Unwin found a universal correlation between monogamy and a civilization's 'expansive energy.' His aim in the book was to test the Freudian thesis that advanced civilizations were founded upon repression of sexual desire, and a re-channeling of this energy through a defense mechanism Freud called 'sublimation.'

"A non-Christian, and as relativistic as any modern anthropologist, he insisted that he offered 'no opinion about rightness or wrongness' concerning sexual norms. Nevertheless, among the 86 different societies he studied, he not only found monogamy to be correlated with a society's strength, but came to the sobering conclusion that 'In human records there is no instance of a society retaining its energy after a complete new generation has inherited a tradition which does not insist on pre-nuptial and post-nuptial continence.'

"In other words, once a society loosened its sexual mores and abandoned monogamy, it began to degenerate and would eventually dissipate away. So much for 'permissive' sexual attitudes being 'progressive'; the complete opposite of the sexual regression described by Unwin in his research on his study of a society's regression.

"In his own words: 'These societies lived in different geographical environments; they belonged to different racial stocks; but the history of their marriage customs is the same. In the beginning each society had the same ideas in regard to sexual regulations. Then the same struggles took place; the same sentiments were expressed; the same changes were made; the same results ensued. Each society reduced its sexual opportunity to a minimum and displaying great social energy, flourished greatly. Then it extended its sexual opportunity; its energy decreased, and faded away. The one outstanding feature of the whole story is its unrelieved monotony...

"Sumerian, Greek, Roman, Babylonian, Moorish, Anglo-Saxon, and many other societies, all fell shortly after they abandoned sexual chastity. Sexual permissiveness would cause societies to decline unless and until their sexual mores became more rigid."

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⁶⁹¹ Rod Dreher, "Cheap Sex = Dying Christianity", *The American Conservative*, September 5, 2017.

⁶⁹² https://www.tremr.com/Duck-Rabbit/sexually-permissive-societies-always-fallanthropologist-says

The collapse of Christianity in the 1960s recalls the "prophecies" of the demonic but insightful Nietzsche in the 1880s. As J.R. Nyquist writes: "Though Nietzsche celebrated the demise of Christianity, his writings paint a grim picture of that which comes *after*. Make no mistake, says Nietzsche, the demise of Christianity means the rise of Caesars, immoralists, mass murderers, and a new slavery. *The demise of Christ means the rise of Antichrist*. Carl Jung, recoiling with horror at this vision, thought to salvage Christianity by declaring its mythical and therapeutic significance. But half measures are useless at this stage. One does not save Christianity by paganizing it. Christianity is not at all well served by becoming a mere 'tool' of the spiritualized science of psychology. Besides, can a bygone paganism [even resurrected in a 'New Age' form] import life to a faltering Christianity?

"Whatever the ultimate outcome, it is clear that the spiritual foundation of our civilization has been taken away. One is tempted to ask the arrogant modern man, strutting so proudly on the top of the Christian centuries, whether he can deny that today's achievements have not ultimately been made possible by Christ? Is not our civilization, at bottom, a Christian structure with a mere liberal addition on the tope ultimately traceable to Christ? Is not our science, our industry, and our humanistic politics ultimately traceable to Christ? What *is* this social fabric, this structure of life, with its limited state bound by laws – 'under God'? Wherefore came these modern impulses to decency and humanity out of barbarian Dark Ages? Wherefore now these rising crime rates? Wherefore these wars of unprecedented brutality? Wherefore these new signposts of the future – 'Hiroshima' – 'rocket war' – 'gulag'? Our fashionable liberals may, with Nietzsche, curse the Christian civilization which gave rise to so much freedom and prosperity, but do they seriously expect to thrive in the Badlands of the future? Have they not learned that the death-knell of Christianity is *their* death knell too?"⁶⁹³

⁶⁹³ Nyquist, Origins of the Fourth World War, Chula Vista, Co.: Black Forest Press, 1999, p. 36.

48. THE OLD CALENDARISTS RESTORE THEIR HIERARCHIES

After the repose of Metropolitan Chrysostom of Florina on September 16, 1955, 92 of his 150 True Orthodox priests gathered together and established a twelve-member Commission to administer the Greek Old Calendar Church. On January 10, 1957 a second Clerical Assembly was held, attended by all the Florinite priests and several zealot monks from Mount Athos. A new twelve-member commission was appointed and three archimandrites – Akakios (Pappas), Chrysostom (Kiousis) and Chrysostom (Naslimes) – were voted worthy of receiving the episcopal rank. Acacius was elected president of the Commission, Auxentios Pastras – deputy president, and Chrysostom (Kiousis). - general secretary. The Commission then began to search for a way of restoring their hierarchy.⁶⁹⁴

The Florinite hierarchy was restored in the following way. First, Archimandrites Akakios Pappas (the nephew of Akakios the elder) and Chrysostom Kiousis were sent to ROCOR's Archbishop John Maximovich in Brussels. He looked favourably on their request, but said that they would need to obtain the blessing of the ROCOR Synod in New York. The Florinites then sent Archimandrite Akakios the elder to Metropolitan Anastasy in New York. But the metropolitan refused to consecrate him.

Nun Vassa writes that "at the Council of 1959, following the opinion of Metropolitan Anastasy, the Council decided to once again decline the request of the Old Calendarists. While considering this matter, the opinion was expressed that through the principle of oikonomia, they could help their Greek brethren. Metropolitan Anastasy rejected this oikonomia, finding that the ordination of a bishop in this instance would not be constructive but destructive for the Church, first of all because of the condemnations such an act would invoke among the other Local Churches and the Moscow Patriarchate."⁶⁹⁵

So vital brotherly help to the persecuted Greeks was refused on the grounds that it would irritate the heretics of World Orthodoxy...

⁶⁹⁴ I Phoni tis Orthodoxias (The Voice of Orthodoxy), N 272, October, 1957, reprinted in N 928, May-June, 2004, pp. 8-9; Monk Anthony Georgantas, *Opheilomene Apantesis se Kakoetheis kai anistoretes Epikriseis* (A Necessary Reply to Malicious and Unhistorical Criticisms), Gortyna: Monastery of St. Nicodemus, 1992, p. 8; *Khristianike Poreia* (The Christian Way), March, 1992, p. 5. See also Irenée Doens, "Les Palaioimérologites: Alerte pour leurs Monastères" (The Old Calendarists: An Alert for their Monasteries), *Irénikon*, 1973, N 1, pp. 48-49.

⁶⁹⁵ Nun Vassa (Larin), "The Ecclesiastical Principle of *oikonomia* and the ROCOR under Metropolitan Anastasy", Report at the Conference on the History of the Russian Church, November, 2002. In 1978 Metropolitan Epiphanios of Kition (Cyprus) told the present writer that when he visited New York in the 1960s, Metropolitan Anastasy had refused his request on the grounds that it would upset Constantinople...

In December, 1960 Archimandrite Akakios again arrived at the ROCOR Synod with his nephew, Archimandrite Akakios, and was again refused. According to Akakios the younger⁶⁹⁶, Metropolitan Anastasy refused to participate himself in the consecration of Akakios the elder for fear of upsetting the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but did not discourage the consecration in another city and at the hands of other bishops. According to other sources, however, the metropolitan had insisted that no ROCOR bishop take part in such a consecration.

In any case, on December 22, 1960, Archimandrite Akakios Pappas was consecrated as Bishop of Talantion in Detroit, by Archbishop Seraphim of Chicago (a disciple of the famous Athonite zealot, Elder Theodosius of Kapsovalyvia (+1937)) and the Romanian Bishop Theophilus (Ionescu) of Detroit. As Anastasios Hudson writes, "this was a secret consecration, and was thus of questionable canonicity, given that the canonical literature presupposes that an ordination is approved by the bishops of the province [cf. I Nicaea, Canon 4]. Akakios, now styling himself Archbishop, returned to Greece and was later joined by ROCOR Archbishop Leonty of Chile, who helped him consecrate six [correct: four] more bishops.

"The committee of archimandrites initially did not accept the consecration, as Archbishop Akakios refused to divulge his consecrators and the circumstances surrounding the event. Members of the committee and laymen proficient in English wrote the ROCOR Synod several letters asking if Fr. Akakios had indeed been consecrated. Not having the knowledge that in face the consecration had occurred, Fr. George Grabbe wrote to Archimandrite Kalliopios (Yannacoulopios): 'Archimandrite Akakios Pappas visited our Synod when he was in the United States and presented a petition for consecration. However, our Synod did not agree to his request. Therefore his consecration by Bishops of our Church did not take place.' [The new calendarist] Archbishop Iakovos, hearing of the rumors, wrote a letter to Metropolitan Anastassy on June 13, 1961, where he inquired if Archimandrite Akakios (Pappas) had been consecrated. Metropolitan Anastassy confirmed in his reply that Archimandrite Akakios did visit and request consecration, but stated that '... our Synod rejected his plea because it did not find it possible to interfere with internal matters of another Orthodox Church, namely the Church of Greece, and had no information about Archimandrite Akakios.'

"In addition to the consecration of Akakios (Pappas), and the ordinations performed in Greece, Bishop Petros [Astifides] of Astoria was also consecrated on November 29, 1962 [old style] at Saint Markella's Church by Bishop Leonty of Chile and Bishop Seraphim of Caracas. This was also a secret ordination..."⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁶ Metropolitan Akakios of Diauleia, personal communication, May, 1985.

⁶⁹⁷ Hudson, Metropolitan Petros of Astoria, USA, 2014, pp. 20-21.

For taking part in the consecration of Akakios, Archbishop Seraphim of Chicago was reprimanded by the ROCOR Synod, but not further punished. Moreover, the Matthewites bitterly contested its canonicity, saying that Akakios the elder had bribed Seraphim. But this accusation is firmly rejected by Akakios the younger, who accompanied his uncle throughout the trip. The Matthewites also asserted that Theophilus was a new calendarist, having been appointed to look after the new calendarist Romanian parishes which had joined the Russian Synod. This was true, but did not necessarily invalidate the consecration because he was a member of a Synod that followed the Orthodox Calendar. In other words, his following the new calendar was uncanonical, but insofar as he was a member of a True Orthodox Synod which, for reasons of pastoral condescension, tolerated it for a certain group, he was to be considered a true bishop. Another problem was the fact that in 1971, in a letter to Metropolitan Philaret, Bishop Theophilus denied that he had taken part in the consecration. However, his participation was witnessed both by Archbishop Seraphim, and by Archimandrites Peter and Akakios the younger.

On returning to Greece, Bishop Akakios administered the Church with the aid of a Commission of archimandrites. As we have seen, in May, 1962, Bishop Akakios and the Commission invited Archbishop Leonty of Chile, a member of the ROCOR Synod, to Greece. Leonty told the Old Calendarists' Committee: "I'm not coming here for the sole purpose to ordain three or four bishops. My purpose is wider. Orthodoxy is at risk. That is why I desire to create a resistance place here in Greece, which will soon be extended to the Patriarchates of the East that are being ravaged by the Masons."

Akakios and Leonty then consecrated: Parthenios (Skurlis) as Bishop of the Cyclades, Auxentios (Pastras) as Bishop of Gardikion, Akakios the younger as Bishop of Diauleia and Gerontios (Margiolis) as Bishop of Salamis. It was also decreed that the newly consecrated bishops should consecrate Archimandrites Chrysostom (Naslimes) and Chrysostom (Kiousis). Chrysostom (Naslimis) was duly consecrated the next year. However, Chrysostom (Kiousis) was not consecrated...

"Later Archbishop Leonty ordained Akakios Douskos a priest in New York. This Akakios was a subdeacon of Archbishop Vitaly of Montreal, and he was ordained without Archbishop Vitaly's consent. Later he returned to Montreal where he set up a Greek Old Calendar parish independent of Archbishop Vitaly."⁶⁹⁸

For some years the ROCOR Synod did not recognize the consecrations carried out by Archbishops Seraphim and Leonty... But during the ROCOR Hierarchical Council on November 17/30, 1962, Archbishop Averky of Syracuse and Jordanville said: "I myself would not have decided to carry out the consecration of the Greek Old Calendarists. But at the same time, in the

⁶⁹⁸ Hudson (op. cit., p. 23) cites a Protocol from the ROCOR Synod archives dated August 25 / September 7, 1972 declaring this ordination invalid.

depths of my soul, I cannot help being delighted at the boldness with which Archbishop Leonty carried out this act to which his conscience called him.

"We emphasize that we do not recognize Patriarch Alexis, while all the patriarchs recognize him. We talk about communion with these patriarchs, and thereby we turn out paradoxically to be in communion with Moscow. A vicious circle is the result. In view of this irrational position, it is especially important for us to stand on a firm canonical foundation, preserving the essence, and not the letter, which can lead to the worship of Satan...

"He [Vladyka Leonty] carried out a courageous act of assistance to a fraternal Church, which is now the closest to us in spirit. The Greek Church is now attacked and persecuted. It was a great mistake that we in our time were too condescending to the introduction of the new style, for its aim was to introduce schism into the Orthodox Church. It was the work of the enemies of the Church of Christ. Its fruits are already evident. Even in America there are Greek clergy whose conscience torments them for accepting the new style. The keeping of various traditions in various spheres is bound up with following the old style. With the expulsion of the old style from the church the ascetic principle is also expelled. The Old Calendarists are the closest to us in spirit. The only 'but' in the action of Archbishop Leonty consists in the fact that he acted as it were in a non-fraternal manner, contrary to the decision of the council, although from good motives."⁶⁹⁹

At the same session Archbishop John Maximovich noted: "... The Old Calendarists have been knocking on our doors for six years. The Hierarchical Council cannot take the decision upon itself, since it recognizes that this is an internal matter of the Greeks. We must accept Archbishop Leonty's explanation as satisfactory, and with that bring our arguments to an end."

Vladyka John also recalled that in the past century there had been similar disturbances in the Antiochian Church. At that time the Constantinopolitan Church had intervened. In the same way the Greek Church had helped the Church of Cyprus. The Council expressed its regret to Archbishop Leonty with regard to his participation in the consecrations of the bishops for the Greek Old Calendarists. Archbishop Leonty, in his turn, expressed his regret that he had not been able to ask Metropolitan Anastasy.⁷⁰⁰

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After the war, the Romanian Old Calendarists led by Hieromonk Glycherie continued to be fiercely persecuted. Nevertheless, as Metropolitan Cyprian writes, "the work of building churches was begun anew, since all of those formerly built had been demolished. In as short an interval of time, between

⁶⁹⁹ Andrei Psarev, "Vospominania Arkhiepiskopa Leontia Chilijskago", *Pravoslavnaia Zhizn*' (Orthodox Life), N 5 (557), May, 1996, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁰⁰ Psarev, op. cit., p. 12.

the end of the war and 1950, almost all of the razed churches, as well as the ruins of the Monastery of Dobru, had been rebuilt. Between 1947 and 1948, the large Monastery of Slatioara (for men) was constructed, along with the monasteries of Bradatel Neamt and Bradatel Suceava (both for women)."⁷⁰¹

Metropolitan Blaise writes: "In 1947 some people from our village went to Archimandrite Glycherie and said: something like freedom has come. The point was that the communists at first tried to win over the people to their side. They told them that they could come out of the woods and build a monastery. And in 1947 they built the monastery of Slatioara – the spiritual centre of our Church.

"It is difficult to say whether our position got worse under the communists or not. But essentially things remained the same – the persecutions continued. The communists destroyed only eight of our churches – not all of them. They were comparatively moderate.

"Before the war the Church was almost completely annihilated. Before the coming of the communists in 1944 we were accused of being Bolsheviks because we had the same calendar as the 'Russians'. Under the communists, after 1944, they called us followers of Antonescu, Iron Guardists, fascists, enemies of the people. In fact we took part in no political movements or parties. We entered into agreements neither with the civil authorities, nor with the monarchy, nor with the Iron Guardists, nor with the communists, nor with the Masons...

"1947-52 was a period of comparative freedom. The communist authorities even compelled the official church to return to us the icons, iconostases, bells and church utensils which they had removed. But in 1952, at two o'clock in the night of February 1st to 2nd, two lorries loaded with security police came to the monastery and arrested almost all the young monks together with the igumen, sparing only the very aged. They were sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Four of them died in camp."⁷⁰²

"The aim of this raid," writes Constantin Bujor, "was to destroy the organization of the Old Calendarist Church, to put a stop to her activities, and thus to abolish her. Arrests were carried out in an abusive manner because the Securitate had unlimited powers – it was a manifestation of Communist totalitarianism under the notorious 'dictatorship of the proletariat' promoted nationwide by the Romanian Workers' Party. During these years, thousands of arrests were made without any legal warrant in order to populate the forced labor camps. But the inhuman treatment of those detained in prisons and labor camps – the nation's leaders had always turned a blind eye to these abuses –

⁷⁰¹ Metropolitan Cyprian, "The True Orthodox Christians of Romania", *The Orthodox Word*, January-February, 1982, vol. 18, N 1 (102).

⁷⁰² Metropolitan Blaise, *Pravoslavnaia Rus*' (Orthodox Russia), N 2 (1479), 15/28 January, 1993, pp. 8-9.

had a negative impact on foreign relations for Romania, which was striving at the time to become a member of the United Nations. In order to extricate themselves from this mess, the Communist leaders sought a scapegoat by organizing a secret trial for a group of officers in charge of the labor camps. One of these officers, Cormoş from Cluj, testified that the officers did not consider themselves culpable, since they were under direct order from the higher authorities, who now were trying to wash their hands of any guilt. Needless to say, the leadership of the country accepted no culpability, and instead condemned the officers either to death or to years of harsh imprisonment. Then, in 1954, after two years, all of the Old Calendarists arrested were set free, together with numerous other political prisoners.

"While the clergy and some of the Faithful of the Old Calendar Church were serving time in prisons and labor camps, in Ardeal more and more believers were returning to the Church Calendar...

"[Nevertheless,] a careful analysis of the situation demonstrated that the persecution was now being intensified, especially against the leaders of the Church, who had already undergone years of harsh imprisonment and other sufferings at the hands of the previous regime. In order to ensure continuity in the leadership, it became necessary to Ordain Priests and Hierarchs to take up the banner of the struggle for the truth. The presence of a Hierarch was absolutely indispensable for the Old Calendar Church. To this end, contact was established with Bishop Galaction in Bucharest, who had in the past expressed his attachment to the Old Calendar, for which he had been condemned at the time of the German Occupation during the First World War.⁷⁰³ He promised that when conditions at the Slatioara Monastery were favourable, he would come and assume the leadership of the Old Calendar Church. Thus, a delegation of Priests who formed part of the leadership and were personally known to Bishop Galaction was sent to Bucharest - Father Dionisie, Father Evloghie, and Father (later Metropolitan) Silvestru - and persuaded him to come to Slatioara Monastery."704

On April 5/18, 1955 Bishop Galaction wrote to the newcalendarists that he had accepted to be the head of the Old Calendarist Church, and on May 8/21 he arrived in Slătioara Monastery, where the people greeted him with the cry: "Axios!", "He is worthy!" Thus was fulfilled a prophetic vision that Hieromonk Glycherie had had during the war, while in a forest being pursued by enemies: "It was night. Before him, he saw a beautiful Church. Metropolitan Galacteon

⁷⁰³ Bishop Ambrose of Methone writes: "[Galaction] was Bishop of Silistre, which after the war was, with Southern Dobrodgea, ceded to Bulgaria. He was thus left without a diocese, and having been the confessor of the royal family, was a *persona non grata* who could not possibly be appointed to another see. He was thus a bishop in retirement, who continued to serve as invited (he in fact consecrated Teoctist, the present Patriarch, bishop) until 1955" (personal communication, 28 August, 2005). (V.M.)

⁷⁰⁴ Bujor, *Resisting unto Blood: Sixty-Five Years of Persecution of the True (Old Calendar) Orthodox Church of Romania (October 1924 – December 1989),* Etna, CA: Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 2003, pp. 113-114, 115-116.

(Cordun)... appeared. Vladyka was holding Icons and a Cross in his hands, and he was giving each believer in the Church an Icon. When he reached the pious Father Glycherie, he gave him the Cross."⁷⁰⁵

In November Metropolitan Galaction and Fr. Glycherie were summoned to the police to register and legalise the Church. The faithful were against them going, sensing a trap, but the metropolitan insisted. The result: he was placed under house arrest in the monastery of St. Callinicus at Cernica, while Fr. Glycherie was exiled. However, under the pretext of visiting his doctor, the metropolitan went several times to Moarea Domneasca, which belonged to the Old Calendarists, and consecrated two bishops (Evloghie and Meftodie⁷⁰⁶) and several priests. When this was discovered, about a year later, he was placed under stronger observation in a monastery. But on Good Friday, 1959, Metropolitan Galaction was abducted by Fr. Pavel Mogârzan, Georghe Hincu and the advocate Albu, disguised as Securitate agents. He went the next day to Slatioara... "When, two or three hours [later], the patriarch phoned to find out what the metropolitan was doing, they told him that two officers of the security police had taken him. The patriarch shouted: 'I didn't send any officers!' But the metropolitan was already far away."

This was not the first dramatic abduction carried out by the Romanian Old Calendarists in this period...

"During the night of November 17, 1956, Archimandrite Glycherie, who had been abducted from his forced labour, was secretly consecrated a bishop [in Moara Domnească]. Then they hid in our monastery [of Slătioara], where every day ordinations took place. A year later they were again arrested."⁷⁰⁷

At this time, the future Bishop Pahomie and Hierodeacon Paisie (Urdă) "travelled to Alba County to celebrate the Feast of Saint Nicholas at one of the Churches there. It was soon after the anti-Communist uprising in the Third Hungarian Revolution (October 10/23-October 22/November 4, 1956), had been crushed by Soviet tanks. The Romanian Securitate was monitoring all activities, making arrests, and trying and sentencing individuals. The intention of the monks was apparently known to Securitate forces, because on the way to Râmeţ, Fathers Pahomie and Paisie were detained and taken to Securitate headquarters in Alba Iulia. After a few hours of interrogation, the Fathers were transported later than same night to Aiud, where, the next day, the

⁷⁰⁵ Metropolitan Blaise, *The Life of the Holy Hierarch and Confessor Glycherie of Romania*, Etna, Ca.: Center for Traditionalist Studies, 1999, p. 50.

⁷⁰⁶ Bishop Evloghie was consecrated in 1955 and died in 1978. He had previously spent seven years in prison after declaring his adherence to the True Orthodox Church, and spent 14 years in prison in all. Bishop Meftodie was consecrated in 1956 and died in 1977. Metropolitan Galaction himself died in 1959. See *Foi Transmise et Sainte Tradition* (Transmitted Faith and Holy Tradition), N 79, November, 1994, p. 15; Bujor, op. cit., pp. 133-145..

⁷⁰⁷ Metropolitan Blaise, *Pravoslavnaia Rus'*, op. cit. ; Bujor, op. cit., pp. 126-127; Metropolitan Cyprian, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Stefan and Girgiu Hincu, personal communication, September, 1994; Bishop Ambrose, personal communication, May, 2006.

interrogation continued. The monks began a hunger strike to protest their innocence. After five days of questioning, Father Pahomie was granted a vision at night in his cell, in which the Holy Hieromartyr Cyprian (+304) appeared to him and said, 'Brother, why have you been arrested, and why are you so distressed?' Father Pahomie replied that he was distressed because he had been illegally detained. Saint Cyprian told him not to be upset, but to pray to him, and they would be allowed to go home. With much difficulty, Father Pahomie succeeded in communicating his vision to Father Paisie, and both agreed to spend the whole night in prayer. In the morning, they were interrogated once more, signed the transcripts, and were then taken to the prosecutor's office. After their dossiers had been examined, the monks were released, although by that time it was too late for them to perform the Divine Services for Saint Nicholas' Day as they had planned...

"The monks returned to Bucharest, where they celebrated the Divine Services for Theophany. The news that in the Bucharest area a 'hotbed' of Old Calendarists had been established under the leadership of Bishop Evloghie swiftly reached the Patriarchate, which in turn notified the Securitate. Thus, Father Pahomie and Father Paisie were arrested again, while Bishop Evloghie went into hiding. Taken back to Aiud, where only two months earlier they had been set free, they were sentenced to eight months in prison..."⁷⁰⁸

After being abducted from captivity, Metropolitan Galaction "returned to Slatioara, where he was so weighed down with his sufferings that he was unable to serve the Divine Liturgy", and died on July 12, 1959.⁷⁰⁹

"The majority of the clergy who had been ordained were however arrested, and were not finally liberated until the amnesty of 1963, when Ceaucescu came to power. In 1958, the Romanian authorities ordered that all the monks under 60 and all the nuns under 55 should leave their monasteries, but, as always in these cases, the order had to be given through the local Metropolitans. Those of the new calendar complied (with one exception) and thousands of monks and nuns found themselves on the streets after a lifetime in their monasteries; the authorities, however, met with an absolute refusal from Saint Glicherie, who declared himself happy to return to prison rather than betray those under his care. Before this, the authorities bowed, though harassment of the monasteries continued, and several monasteries were closed by force..."⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰⁸ Bujor, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

⁷⁰⁹ "Saint Glicherie the Confessor, Metropolitan of Romania, 1881-1985", typescript of the Monastery of Sts. Cyprian and Justina, Fili, Attica, Greece, July, 1999. Bishop Ambrose of Methone writes: "Metropolitan Vlasie, who looked after [Galaction] remembers that he had a stroke six days before his death and was unconscious during that time; only his right hand moved, constantly passing the knots of his prayer-rope... He was buried secretly at night, and a load of concrete poured into the grave, for fear lest the new calendarists should take his body" (private communications, August 28, 2005, May 3, 2006).

⁷¹⁰ "Saint Glicherie", op. cit. About 4000 monastics were expelled from their communities.

One of those who suffered at this time was Father (now Bishop) Demosthenes (Ionita): "In 1957 Metropolitan Glycherie ordained him to the priesthood. Within a month after his ordination, Fr. Demosthenes went to Bucharest to assist Bishop Eulogius who was in hiding. There he was betrayed by an Old Calendar priest and arrested. The authorities demanded that Fr. Demosthenes reveal the whereabouts of the bishop, but he refused.

"On July 23, 1958, Fr. Demosthenes was again arrested. He, with a group of chanters, had served a funeral for his cousin in a closed church. A New Calendar priest reported this to the authorities, which resulted in his and the chanters' arrest. Six officers took Fr. Demosthenes to the city Tirgu-Mures. Upon his arrival, he was led to a room where several guards took off his clothes, and later shaved off his hair and bear. His prison cell had a cement bed with no covers. For five months the civil authorities investigated and interrogated Fr. Demosthenes in an attempt to find some excuse to have him sentenced. The first round of questioning went along these lines:

"Interrogator: What activity does Glycherie have in this country? What measures does he plan against the Communists?

"Fr. Demosthenes: The Metropolitan teaches us to work, pray, and obey the laws of the state.

"Interrogator: Where are you hiding your guns?

"Fr. Demosthenes: Our guns are our church books.

"Chief Interrogator: Why doesn't he tell us where the guns are? Hang him!

"At this point Fr. Demosthenes lost consciousness and fell to the floor. When he awoke, he found himself in his cell with a doctor. The doctor asked where he hurt and why he had fallen. Fr. Demosthenes responded, 'I don't remember.' The doctor kicked him and responded, 'This is our medicine for Old Calendarists who want to kill Communists.'

"Fr. Demosthenes spent the next seven years in concentration camps. His experience could comprise a chapter of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*. The prisoners were starved, tortured, and denied any form of comfort. At one point Fr. Demosthenes was so exhausted that he could not even remember the Lord's Prayer. In 1959 the authorities promised all religious prisoners from his camp freedom if they signed a declaration of apostasy. Out of 2,000 prisoners only 90 agreed to sign. In the prison camp in Salcia, Fr. Demosthenes saw prisoners being trampled by horses as he and others worked on building canals and other projects in the freezing winter. Many years later, Fr. Demosthenes met one of the prison guards of Salcia, who informed him that it was indeed a miracle he had survived, for the guards had orders that no one was to leave that camp alive.

"In 1964 Fr. Demosthenes was freed from prison. When his mother saw him for the first time in seven years, she asked, 'Why did they release you, did you compromise the faith?' His mother was relieved to hear that her son had not betrayed the Church; this was her main concern. After three weeks he was again under house arrest. Fr. Demosthenes fled to the forests and lived in hiding for five more years."⁷¹¹

⁷¹¹ Victor Boldewskul, "The Old Calendar Church of Romania", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 42, N 5, October-November, 1992, pp. 13-15. Bishop Demosthenes spent seven years in prion.

49. MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

"The Great Leap disaster," writes Paul Johnson, "seems to have exhausted a large portion of the political capital Mao had banked with his colleagues during the successful revolutionary war. He never held the supreme and solitary power of a Hitler and a Stalin, both because of the intractable nature of China's problems, her lack of centralization and modern communications, and because he never possessed a terror apparatus on the same scale as the KGB or the Gestapo-SS. The party was more regionalized than in Russia; in particular, there was a profound polarity between the conservatism of Peking and the radicalism of Shanghai. After the curtain came down on the drama of 1959, Mao eschewed histrionics for a while; he seems to have been 'resting'. From this point dated the beginning of 'the two-line struggle', with 'revisionists' temporarily on top. They never again allowed Mao to touch the productive process directly, either in agriculture or in heavy industry. Instead he brooded on culture and education. He had always disliked mandarinism and he cultural establishment. In a sense, he hated 'civilization' as much as Hitler did. In China it represented not the international Jewish conspiracy but the dead hand, the insufferable, insupportable weight of a 4,000-year past. In this respect his revolution appeared to have changed nothing - and it was because of this cultural failure, he reasoned, that the Great Leap had proved impractical.

"By 13 February 1964 Mao was making ominous noises. 'The present method of education ruins talent and ruins youth. I do not approve of reading so many books. The method of examination is a method of dealing with the enemy. It is most harmful and should be stopped.' Nine months later he betrayed unmistakable signs of impatience and a hankering for a new drama: 'We cannot follow the old paths of technical development of every country in the world, and crawl step by step behind the others. We must smash conventions... when we talk of a Great Leap Forward, we mean just this.' Thus the Leap was transmuted from a physical to a mental one: by the beginning of 1965 Mao's interest in brainwashing had revived and was to be the dominant feature of his next and greatest drama..."⁷¹²

Frank Dikötter has argued that the Cultural Revolution was caused, first of all, by Mao's fear that the revolution in China might adopt a revisionist course similar that adopted by Khrushchev in 1956. "In August 1963, Chairman Mao received a group of African guerrilla fighters. One of the young visitors, a tall, square-shouldered man from Southern Rhodesia, had a question. He believed that the red star shining over the Kremlin had slipped away. The Soviets, who used to help the revolutionaries, now sold weapons to their enemies. 'What I worry about is this,' he said. 'Will the red star over Tiananmen Square in China go out? Will you abandon us and sell arms to our oppressors as well?' Mao became pensive, puffing on his cigarette. 'I understand your question,' he observed. 'It is that the USSR has turned revisionist and has betrayed the revolution. Can I guarantee to you that China won't betray the revolution?

⁷¹² Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 551-552.

Right now I can't give you that guarantee. We are searching very hard to find the way to keep China from becoming corrupt, bureaucratic and revisionist.'

"Three years later, on June 1st, 1966, an incendiary editorial in the *People's Daily* exhorted readers to 'Sweep Away all Monsters and Demons'. It was the opening shot of the Cultural Revolution, urging people to denounce those representatives of the bourgeoisie who were trying to lead the country down the road to capitalism. As if this were not enough, it soon came to light that four of the top leaders in the party had been placed under arrest, accused of plotting against Mao. The mayor of Beijing was among them. He had tried, under the nose of the people, to turn the capital into a citadel of revisionism. Counter-revolutionaries had sneaked into the party, the government and the army. Now was the beginning of a new revolution in China, as the people were encouraged to stand up and flush out all those trying to transform the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

"Who, precisely, these counter-revolutionaries were and how they had managed to worm their way into the party was unclear, but the leading representative of modern revisionism was the Soviet leader and party secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. In a secret speech in 1956, which shook the socialist camp to its core, Khrushchev had demolished the reputation of his erstwhile master Joseph Stalin, detailing the horrors of his rule and attacking the cult of personality. Two years later, Khrushchev proposed 'peaceful coexistence' with the West, a concept that true believers around the world, including the young guerrilla fighter from Southern Rhodesia, viewed as a betrayal of the principles of revolutionary communism...

".... In 1956, some of Mao's closest allies, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, had used Khrushchev's secret speech to delete all references to Mao Zedong Thought from the party constitution and criticize the cult of personality. Mao was seething, though he had little choice but to acquiesce. The biggest setback came in the wake of the Great Leap Forward, a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale directly caused by his own obstinate policies. At a conference held in 1962, as some 7,000 leading cadres from all over the country gathered to talk about the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao's star was at its lowest. Rumours were circulating, accusing him of being deluded, innumerate and dangerous. Some of his colleagues may have wanted him to step down, holding him responsible for the mass starvation of ordinary people. His entire legacy was in jeopardy. Mao feared that he would meet the same fate as Stalin, who was denounced after his death. What would become of China's Khrushchev? The Cultural Revolution, then, was also a long and sustained effort by Mao to prevent any party leader from turning against him..."⁷¹³

Maria Chang writes: "Mao became increasingly troubled by the direction of the new leadership, convinced that the party under Liu had betrayed the

⁷¹³ Dikötter, "The Cultural Revolution. A People's History", *History Today*, September, 2016, pp. 13-14, 15.

revolution by conceding to selfish capitalist appetites and corroding the egalitarian ideal. Most alarmingly, Mao discerned in the *apparatchik* of the rapidly mushrooming government bureaucracies nothing less than the formation of a new ruling class. To stem the erosion, Mao emerged out of his sabbatical. When he failed to correct his errant colleagues through the customary method of a rectification campaign within the party, he resolved that the apparatchiks would have to be dislodged. In the gathering storm of what became the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), he brought together his lieutenants: a small coterie composed of his wife, Jiang Qing, and Defense Minister Lin Biao. To dislodge the apparatchiks, Mao used his charismatic authority to mobilize the masses with the Red Guards, the naïve and impressionable youth of China, at the fore.

"In the hysteria that ensued, entire provinces were engulfed in a frenzy of recrimination and destruction. Bands of Red Guards roamed the country, laying waste to life and property. Schools and universities were closed and productivity declined in critical sectors of the economy. 'Enemies of the people' were subjected to public vilification and abuse: In some areas, the vengeful masses took to cannibalism against their presumed class enemies. Finally, even Mao thought the chaos and mayhem had exceeded all limits. The military was brought in to rein in the revolution. The Red Guards, for their part, who had only sought to do their revered Chairman's bidding, were banished in permanent exile to the remote countryside."⁷¹⁴

It really began on August 19, 1966, when, as Constantine Richard Parr writes, "Chinese students launched a fight for social justice to fight for the rights of the oppressed in China. It was widely believed that the 'patriarchal system' in China had been created by the elites and held down women, minorities, and the working class. The students cried out for a revolution and change, and consequentially launched the infamous Chinese Cultural Revolution.

"Students put a red band around their arm to stand in solidarity with the oppressed and called for a change on old ideas that they called the 'Four Olds. The Four Olds were: Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas.

"The movement was supported by the Chinese media.

"Mass demonstrations and looting by the students ensued.

"Statues were torn down.

"Chinese architecture was destroyed.

"Classical literature and Chinese paintings were torn apart and burned.

⁷¹⁴ Chang, *Return of the Dragon*, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001.

"Temples were desecrated.

"The Cemetery of Confucius was attacked.

"The corpse of the 76th-generation Duke Yansheng was removed from its grave and hung from a tree.

"Wealthy homes were attacked and destroyed.

"Many families' long-kept genealogy books were burned to ashes.

"All of history, in short, was to be removed and replaced. This was the central meaning of Cultural Revolution: That China was going to destroy every trace of its bourgeois (privileged) past and replace it with a new culture built on the principles of Maoism and Marxism.

"Communist leaders like President Liu Shaoqi were taken out of power and replaced with men Mao believed were not critical of his reign.

"Public leaders who were considered to be oppressive were tried by angry mobs and vigilantes.

"Three days later, August 22, 1966, a central directive was issued to stop police intervention. The police were disbanded in the city and the students formed a community solution called the RED GUARDS. The RED GUARDS policed the communities and punished anyone who did not agree with their ideas. Even people that supported the movement, but had bad thoughts ('wrong thinking') could be punished."⁷¹⁵

Leninism involved the rejection of four bases of human civilization: religion, property, hierarchy and the family. But the Soviet Union, for all its horror, went only part of the way in rejecting all of these. The Chinese revolution went further. By the 1960s, private property had already been destroyed, and the 1951 campaign of Thought Reform had destroyed every vestige of independent belief. Now the only truth was that contained in Mao's Little Red Book. As for authority, as Jonathan Glover writes, during the Cultural Revolution "hostile treatment was given to anyone in any kind of authority: teachers were particularly singled out".⁷¹⁶ And as for the family, an institution that even Stalin had attempted to defend, the *China Youth Journal* declared that "the framework of the individual family, which has existed for thousands of years, has been shattered for all time... We must regard the People's Commune as our family, and not pay too much attention to the formation of a separate family of our own."⁷¹⁷

⁷¹⁵ Parr, on *Facebook*, July 2, 2020.

⁷¹⁶ Glover, *Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Jonthan Cape, 1999, p. 290.

⁷¹⁷ Glover, op. cit., p. 298.

"Jung Chang, who saw some of the consequences of Mao's theories at close quarters, reflected on them: 'In the days after Mao's death, I did a lot of thinking. I knew he was considered a philosopher, and I tried to think what his 'philosophy' really was. It seemed to me that its central principle was the need – or the desire – for perpetual conflict. The core of his thinking seemed to be that human struggles were the motivating force of history and that in order to make history 'class enemies' had to be continuously created *en masse*. I wondered whether there were any other philosophers whose theories had led to the suffering and death of so many..."⁷¹⁸

A good question. The toll in lives was indeed horrific. "Three million were killed between 1966 and 1976; millions more were deported or tortured."⁷¹⁹ One of the millions killed was the Chinese Orthodox priest, Fr. Stefan Wu Zhiquan (+1970), who was beaten to death by Red Guards in an Orthodox Church in Harbin. The Red Guards dressed him up clown's dressing gown, put a cap on his head, and smeared his face with soot. He was beaten over the head with a wooden hammer, breaking his teeth, one by one, and beaten with steel rods on shoulders. His tormentors spat on his cross and then shot him in cold blood.

The head of state and "capitalist roader number one", Liu Shao-Chi, perished. Deng Xiaoping, whose son was crippled by the Red Guards, was removed from public office, but survived to emerge as the ultimate winner from the chaos... The great survivor, Chou-En-Lai, survived, too, and was one of the architects of Nixon's visit to China in 1972.

But for the next few years, until Mao's death in 1976, the country was led by Mao's unpopular actress wife, Chiang Ching, with three others - collectively known as the Gang of Four...

⁷¹⁸ Glover, op. cit., p. 298.

⁷¹⁹ Montefiore, op. cit., p. 518.

50. THE LIFTING OF THE ANATHEMAS

As we have seen, the ecumenical movement began to gather pace with the Second Vatican Council and the entry of the Moscow Patriarchate (at the behest of the KGB) into the World Council of Churches in 1961. The chief defenders of Orthodoxy remained ROCOR, the Catacomb Church, and the Greek and Romanian Old Calendarists. However, only ROCOR was able to proclaim the faith in public in the free world

On May 14/27, 1964, ROCOR's Metropolitan Anastasy retired (he died in 1965). There were two candidates for the vacant post, Archbishops Nikon and John Maximovich, but the animosity between their two sets of supporters was so great that, to avoid a schism, Archbishop John withdrew his own candidature and put forward in his place the youngest bishop, Philaret (Voznesensky) of Brisbane. In fact, Fr. Christopher Birchall writes that Philaret's election was "entirely due to the prompting and influence of Archbishop John".⁷²⁰ The suggestion was then universally accepted, and Bishop Philaret was enthroned by Metropolitan Anastasy himself in a service that used the ancient text for the enthroning of a metropolitan of Moscow for the first time in centuries.

The new metropolitan's endurance of torture for Christ at the hands of the Japanese pagans in Manchuria has already been described. During the Soviet occupation he continued to show great courage, refusing to accept a Soviet passport or commemorate the authorities, although he unwillingly found himself in the Moscow Patriarchate. Later, the Chinese even unsuccessfully tried to blow up the confessor in the house in which he was living.

Archimandrite Philaret left China in 1961, only after almost the whole of his flock had left Harbin. "While striving to guard my flock from Soviet falsehood and lies," he recounted, "I myself sometimes felt inexpressibly oppressed – to the point that I several times came close to the decision to leave altogether – to cease serving. And I was stopped only by the thought of my flock: how could I leave these little ones? If I went and stopped serving, that would mean that they would have to enter into service to the Soviets and hear prayers for the forerunners of the Antichrist – 'Lord, preserve them for many years,' etc. This stopped me and forced me to carry out my duty to the end.

"And when, finally, with the help of God I managed to extract myself from red China, the first thing I did was turn to the First Hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, Metropolitan Anastasy, with a request that he consider me again to be in the jurisdiction of the Russian Church Abroad. Vladyka

⁷²⁰ Birchall, *Embassy, Emigrants, and Englishmen. The Three-Hundred Year History of a Russian Orthodox Church in London,* Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Publications, 2014, p. 425. According to one source, Archbishop John's candidature was especially opposed by Archbishop Anthony of Geneva. The two men had never been friends...

Metropolitan replied with mercy and love, and immediately blessed me to serve in Hong Kong already as a priest of the Synodal jurisdiction, and pointed out that every church server passing into this jurisdiction from the jurisdiction of Moscow must give a special penitential declaration to the effect that he is sorry about his (albeit involuntary) stay in the Moscow jurisdiction. I did this immediately."

Soon Fr. Philaret flew to Australia and arrived in Sydney. The ruling Archbishop of Australia accepted him with joy and love, and already in the first weeks of Fr. Philaret's stay in Australia began to speak about the possibility of ordaining him as a Bishop. In 1963 he was ordained Bishop of Brisbane, a vicariate of the Australian diocese. In his sermon at his nomination as Bishop Archimandrite Philaret said to the Archpastors who were present:

"Holy Hierarchs of God! I have thought and felt much in these last days, I have reviewed and examined the whole of my life – and... I see, on the one hand, a chain of innumerable benefactions from God, and on the other – the countless number of my sins... And so raise your hierarchical prayers for my wretchedness in this truly terrible hour of my ordination, that the Lord, the First of Pastors, Who through your holiness is calling me to the height of this service, may not deprive me, the sinful and wretched one, of a place and lot among His chosen ones...

"One hierarch-elder, on placing the hierarchical staff in the hands of a newly appointed bishop, said to him: 'Do not be like a milestone on the way, that points out for others the road ahead, but itself remains in its place...' Pray also for this, Fathers and Archpastors, that in preaching to others, I myself may not turn out to be an idle slave."

The new metropolitan faced a daunting task. On the one hand, he had to lead his Church in decisively denouncing the apostasy of World Orthodoxy, communion with which could no longer be tolerated. And on the other, he had to preserve unity in his own Synod, some of whom were in spirit closer to "World Orthodoxy" than True Orthodoxy... He continued the tough anticommunist line adopted by Metropolitan Anastasy. But it was above all for his zeal against ecumenism that Metropolitan Philaret would become especially renowned...

Since the founding of the WCC in 1948, the leader of the ecumenical movement on the Orthodox side had been the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras. He had cooperated willingly with the CIA to remove his predecessor, Maximus, on the grounds of mental illness, and in 1949 he had flown into Constantinople in President Truman's personal plane, appropriately called "Sacred Cow".⁷²¹

⁷²¹ Mikhail Tiurenkov, "Operatsia 'Sviaschchennaia Korova': rassekrecheny materialy TsRU o tajnakh tserkovnogo dvora" (Operation 'Holy Cow': CIA materials on the secrets of the church

The key figure on the Catholic side was Pope John XXIII, who early in the 1960s, as we have seen, convened the three-year Vatican II Council, which thrust forward an ecumenist agenda. "One of the council's key documents, *Unitatis Redintegratio* (Restoration of Unity), issued in 1964, identified "restoration of unity among all Christians" as a key long-term goal. The document described baptized Christians who profess faith in another church as "separated brethren", not as "heretics", the term commonly used for centuries prior."⁷²²

Olga Chetverikova writes: "Setting as one of its central aims the leadership of Catholicism in the movement for Christian unity, the Council formulated its own ecumenical conception, as an alternative to the way of the Protestants, which allowed it to open itself out to dialogue to other religions, while keeping untouched its position on the power of the pontiff. In the dogmatic constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium), it was affirmed that the Church of Christ, 'established and constructed in this world as a community remains in the Catholic Church ruled by the successor of Peter and the bishops in communion with him', but now it was added that 'even outside her membership there exist many principles of sanctification and truth, which, being gifts, are proper to the Church of Christ, and propel towards Catholic unity'. Thus the Council defined two basic points in its relations with other churches. It affirmed that it was possible to receive 'the whole fullness of means of salvation' only through the Catholic Church, but at the same time it recognized that other ecclesiastical communities, linked to her by virtue of baptism, 'can, in different ways, corresponding to the particular situation of each church or community, truly engender the life of grace', and 'they are capable of opening access to saving communion'. Although the latter 'suffer from certain faults, nevertheless they are endowed with significance and weight in the mystery of salvation'. The main reversal in ecumenical consciousness consisted in the conclusion that 'those who believe in Christ and have been baptized in the right manner are in definite communion with the Catholic Church, albeit not complete, while full communion is possible only with the recognition of the power of the successor of Peter, that is, the Pontiff of Rome."723

The new ecumenist course was sealed on January 5 and 6, 1964, when Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople met in Jerusalem and prayed together. This was a clear transgression of Apostolic canon 45 concerning relations with heretics. Archbishop Chrysostom of Athens said: "While the Pope is going to the Holy Land to kneel before the Saviour's

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court declassified), *Tsargrad*, February 12, 2020, https://tsargrad.tv/articles/operacijasvjashhennaja-korova-rassekrecheny-materialy-cru-o- tajnah-cerkovnogo-dvora_238100.

⁷²² Victor Gaetan, "The Church Undivided", Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2013, p. 118.

⁷²³ Chetverikova, *Izmena v Vatikane ili Zagovor Pap protiv Khristianstva* (Betrayal in the Vatican, or the Conspiracy of the Popes against Christianity), Moscow, 2011, p. 35.

sepulchre, you (Athenagoras) are going to kneel before the Pope and bury Orthodoxy."⁷²⁴

On January 23 / February 5, 1964 a large number of Athonite monks, including the abbots of four monasteries, protested against this ecumenical activity: "the undersigned Fathers of the Holy Mountain, abbots, priest-monks and monks, learning of the recent machinations and plots against our blameless Orthodox Faith by the Papal insurrection and of the pro-uniate actions and statements of the Ecumenical Patriarch and his co-workers, do proclaim with a stentorian voice that we denounce these uniate tendencies and leanings, and remains steadfast and unshaken in our Orthodox Faith…"⁷²⁵

Unfortunately, however, this "stentorian voice" became more and more muted, until only the Monastery of Esphigmenou remained out of communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate...

The calendar question again reared its head during this period. Thus during the Second Pan-Orthodox Conference, the Church of Greece had threatened to boycott the meeting if the calendar question were raised. "But the representatives of the Jerusalem Patriarchate," writes Bishop Ephraim, "insisted that the calendar be placed upon the agenda for discussion, and with good reason. The Jerusalem Patriarchate is especially interested in settling the calendar issue because of its position as a place of pilgrimage. When Athenagoras met Pope Paul in Jerusalem, he went afterwards to Bethlehem to attend the service for Christmas (which, of course, is celebrated there according to the Old Calendar). In the meantime, the new calendarists were celebrating Epiphany in Constantinople. By the time Athenagoras returned to Istanbul, Epiphany had already been celebrated. In other words, Athenagoras himself, because of this calendar confusion, celebrated two Christmases but did not celebrate Epiphany that year. Also, many pious pilgrims came from Greece to celebrate Christmas in Bethlehem, not knowing that the Jerusalem Patriarchate follows the Old Calendar... They arrive in Bethlehem and discover that it is only St. Spyridon's day and that Christmas is two weeks away. They have only arranged to stay for a few days, and few are those who have made the provisions or have the money to wait for two weeks. In their dismay, they beg the priests there to chant a few Christmas troparia and, of course, the priests refuse, because not only is it not Christmas according to their reckoning, but they are also in the midst of the fast. The pilgrims return to Greece confused and disheartened since they did not get to celebrate Christmas, even in Bethlehem, and Christmas has already been celebrated in Greece. Therefore, that year they do not celebrate Christmas anywhere. This happens annually there - hence Jerusalem's concern."726

⁷²⁴ Ulrich Duckrow, *Conflict over the Ecumenical Movement*, Geneva: The World Council of Churches, 1981, p. 53.

⁷²⁵ Proclamation of the Holy Mountain, in Alexander Kalomiros, *Against False Union*, Seattle: St. Nectarios Press, 2000, p. 101.

⁷²⁶ Monk (later Metropolitan) Ephraim, *Letter on the Calendar Issue*, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston. The present writer remembers meeting the head of an Athonite monastery

Immediately after the Holy Land meeting, a proclamation of the whole monastic community of Mount Athos to "the pious Orthodox Greek people and the whole of the Orthodox Church" denounced the 'pro-uniate actions and statements' of the Patriarch and his co-workers.

In 1964 several parishes in the USA, Canada and Australia left the Ecumenical Patriarchate, complaining of the dependence of the patriarchate on the Turks, the rapprochement with the Catholics, and the dictatorial behaviour of Archbishop James. The Turks promptly increased their harassment of the Patriarchate in Constantinople; much property was confiscated, and 15,000 Greeks were deported. This led some to speculate that the Patriarch's *rapprochement* with the Pope was elicited by his need to find powerful friends to support him in the West. Thus in April, 1965, Archbishop James pleaded with the Pope to help the Patriarch, as in 1274 and 1438. The Pope promised his support, whereupon the two hierarchs prayed together.

Further intense activity led, on December 7, 1965, to the "lifting of the anathemas" of 1054 between Orthodoxy and the Papacy. The announcement was made simultaneously in Rome and Constantinople. It included the following words: "Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras I with his synod, in common agreement, declare that: a) They regret the offensive words, the reproaches without foundation, and the reprehensible gestures which, on both sides, have marked or accompanied the sad events of this period [viz. in the 11th century]. b) They likewise regret and remove both from memory and from the midst of the Church the sentences of excommunication which followed these events, the memory of which has influenced actions up to our day and has hindered closer relations in charity; and they commit these excommunications to oblivion. We must recognize that the sentences were directed at particular persons and not at the Churches, and did not aim to break ecclesiastical communion between the sees of Rome and Constantinople."⁷²⁷

"In short," writes Peter Hebblethwaite in his biography of Paul VI, "1054 had been an accident, much ado about nothing very much, frozen into permanent schism only by later 'non-theological' events."⁷²⁸

The *Tomos* was historically inaccurate: both sees recognized in 1054 that a break in ecclesiastical communion *had* taken place between them; this is an historical fact that cannot be denied. Moreover, in saying that the schism of 1054 was based on "reproaches without foundation", the Patriarch was in effect saying that the Papacy was not, or never had been, heretical – although the Papacy had renounced none of its heresies, and Pope Paul VI had reasserted

in a convent of which he was the spiritual father in the north of Greece. He admitted that he celebrated Christmas twice – first on the Greek mainland according to the new calendar, and then on Mount Athos according to the Julian calendar.

⁷²⁷ Full text in *Eastern Churches Review*, vol. I, No 1, Spring, 1966, pp. 49-50.

⁷²⁸ Hebblethwaite, *Paul VI: The First Modern Pope*, 1993; in Fr. Alexey Young, *The Rush to Embrace*, Richfield Springs: Nikodemos Orthodox Publication Society, 1996, p. 63.

papal infallibility as recently as the Second Vatican Council. Thirdly, while relations with excommunicated individuals or Churches can be restored if those individuals or Churches repent, anathemas against heresies cannot be removed insofar as a heresy remains a heresy *forever*. And yet in December of 1968 Athenagoras announced that he had inserted Pope Paul VI's name into the Diptychs, thereby signifying that the Pope was not a heretic and was in communion with the Orthodox Church. And he made the following formal renunciation of True Christianity: "We must pray and struggle that Jerusalem becomes a place of dialogue and peace. So that together we may prepare the way for the return of Jesus, the Mahdi of Islam, the Moshiach [Messiah] of Israel, our Lord".

Archbishop Chrysostom of Athens protested the Patriarch's action, but other Greek Churches supported him. Thus in March, 1966 the Synod of the new calendarist Church of Cyprus approved the lifting of anathemas.⁷²⁹

ROCOR had three observers at the Vatican Council who witnessed the ceremony of the "lifting of the anathemas". One of them, Archimandrite Ambrose (Pogodin), after describing the ceremony with evident sympathy, wrote: "The Russian Church Abroad did not recognize the actions of Patriarch Athenagoras, considering that the patriarch was obliged to do this only with the agreement of all the Orthodox Churches, because the matter of the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches concerned all the Orthodox Churches – it was not only the personal relations between the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople. We, observers from the Russian Church Abroad, received by telephone the order from our ecclesiastical authorities not to be present at the ceremony of the mutual lifting of the anathemas between the Constantinopolitan and Roman Churches. But we, having taken counsel amongst ourselves, thought that such a demonstration would have been harmful for our Church, which we represented with dignity. However, our demonstration would have remained unnoticed: what would the absence of three people in a mass of tens of thousands of people signify?!"730

At this critical moment, on December 15, 1965, Metropolitan Philaret issued the first of a series of "Sorrowful Epistles" designed to warn the Orthodox against ecumenism.⁷³¹ First, he wrote to Patriarch Athenagoras protesting against his action: "The organic belonging of the Orthodox to the union of the contemporary heretics does not sanctify the latter, while it tears away the Orthodox entering into it from Catholic Orthodox Unity… Your gesture puts a

⁷²⁹ Monk Benjamin, *Letopis' Tserkovnykh Sobytij* (Chronicle of Church Events), part 5, http://www.zlatoust.ws/letopis5.htm, p. 29.

⁷³⁰ Pogodin, "O Chine Priniatia v Pravoslavnuiu Tserkov'" (On the Rite of Reception into the Orthodox Church); Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 24-25.

⁷³¹ It was claimed by Matushka Anastasia Shatilova that the Sorrowful Epistles were in fact written by her father, Protopresbyter George (later Bishop Gregory) Grabbe. See Andrei Psarev, "The Development of Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia's Attitude Toward Other Local Orthodox Churches", http://www.sobor2006.com/printerfriendly2.php?id=119_0_3_0, p. 8.

sign of equality between error and truth. For centuries all the Orthodox Churches believed with good reasons that it has violated no doctrine of the Holy Ecumenical Councils; whereas the Church of Rome has introduced a number of innovations in its dogmatic teaching. The more such innovations were introduced, the deeper was to become the separation between the East and the West. The doctrinal deviations of Rome in the eleventh century did not yet contain the errors that were added later. Therefore the cancellation of the mutual excommunication of 1054 could have been of meaning at that time, but now it is only evidence of indifference in regard to the most important errors, namely new doctrines foreign to the ancient Church, of which some, having been exposed by St. Mark of Ephesus, were the reason why the Church rejected the Union of Florence... No union of the Roman Church with us is possible until it renounces its new doctrines, and no communion in prayer can be restored with it without a decision of all the Churches, which, however, can hardly be possible before the liberation of the Church of Russia which at present has to live in the catacombs... A true dialogue implies an exchange of views with a possibility of persuading the participants to attain an agreement. As one can perceive from the Encyclical Ecclesiam Suam, Pope Paul VI understands the dialogue as a plan for our union with Rome with the help of some formula which would, however, leave unaltered its doctrines, and particularly its dogmatic doctrine about the position of the Pope in the Church. However, any compromise with error is foreign to the history of the Orthodox Church and to the essence of the Church. It could not bring a harmony in the confessions of the Faith, but only an illusory outward unity similar to the conciliation of dissident Protestant communities in the ecumenical movement."732

Tatiana (now Nun Cassia) Senina writes: "Metropolitan Philaret sent a similar address to another leader of the ecumenical movement - the American Archbishop James. However, the apostate hierarchs paid no attention to his exhortations. The ecumenical movement continued to gather speed. The holy Hierarch Philaret looked with sorrow on the falling away from the faith of the once Orthodox Churches. And he called the epistles which he sent to all the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church just that - 'Sorrowful Epistles'. In his first Epistle, written in 1969, St. Philaret says that he has decided to turn to all the hierarchs, 'some of whom occupy the oldest and most glorious sees', because, in the words of St. Gregory the Theologian, 'the truth is betrayed by silence', and it is impossible to keep silent when you see a deviation from the purity of Orthodoxy – after all, every bishop at his ordination gives a promise to keep the Faith and the canons of the holy fathers and defend Orthodoxy from heresies. Vladyka quotes various ecumenist declarations of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and clearly shows, on the basis of the patristic teaching and the canons, that the position of the WCC has nothing in common with Orthodoxy, and consequently the Orthodox Churches must not participate in the work of this council. The holy Hierarch Philaret also emphasizes that the voice of the MP is not the voice of the True Russian Church, which in the

⁷³² Full text in Ivan Ostroumoff, The History of the Council of Florence, Boston, pp. 193-199.

homeland is persecuted and hides in the catacombs. Vladyka calls on all the Orthodox hierarchs to stand up in defence of the purity of Orthodoxy.

"Vladyka Philaret wrote his second 'Sorrowful Epistle' on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, 1972. In it he noted that although in the last two years hierarchs had made declarations about the heterodoxy of the ecumenical movement, not one Orthodox Church had declared that it was leaving the WCC. Vladyka placed as the aim of his Second Epistle 'to show that abyss of heresy against the very concept of the Church into which all the participants in the ecumenical movement are being drawn'. He recalled the threatening prophecy of the Apostle Paul that to those who will not receive 'the love of the truth for salvation' the Lord will send 'strong delusion, that they should believe a lie. That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness' (II Thessalonians 2.10-12). St. Philaret's third Epistle was devoted to the so-called 'Thyateira Confession' of Metropolitan Athenagoras [of Thyateira and Great Britain], the exarch of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate in Europe – a document written in a completely heretical spirit, but which did not elicit any reaction from the leaders of the 'official churches'. Evidently Vladyka Philaret hoped at the beginning that at any rate one of the bishops of 'World Orthodoxy' might listen to his words, which is why he addressed them in his epistles as true Archpastors of the Church. Besides, attempts at exhortation corresponded to the apostolic command: 'A man that is a heretic after the first and second admonition reject, knowing that he that is such is subverted, and sinneth, being condemned of himself' (Titus 3. 10-11). It was fitting, before accepting an anathema against the apostates, to try and convert them from their error.

"Alas, no conversion took place, and the ecumenical impiety continued to pour out. Vladyka addressed his word not only to bishops, but also to their flock, untiringly explaining the danger of the new heresy. While telling about the zeal of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, who slapped the face of Arius when he blasphemed against the Son of God, Vladyka said: 'O how often we do not have enough of such zeal when it is really necessary to speak for the insulted and trodden-on truth! I want to tell you about one incident that took place not long ago and which it would have been difficult even to imagine several years ago - and now we are going further and further downhill all the time. One man came from Paris and said that the following incident had taken place at a socalled "ecumenical meeting'. Of course, you know what ecumenism is; it is *the heresy of heresies.* It wants to completely wipe out the concept of the Orthodox Church as the guardian of the Truth, and to create some kind of new, strange church. And so there took place this 'ecumenical meeting'. Present were a socalled Orthodox protopriest from the Paris Theological (more exactly, heretical) Institute, a Jewish rabbi, a pastor and a Catholic priest. At first they sort of prayed, and then began the speeches. And then (forgive me for saying such things from the holy ambon, but I want to show you what we have come to) the Jewish rabbi said that the Lord Jesus Christ was the illegitimate son of a dissolute woman...

"'But that's not the main horror. The Jewish people has opposed God for a long time... - so there's nothing surprising in this. But the horror was that when he said this everyone was silent. Later, a man who had heard this terrible blasphemy asked the 'Orthodox' protopriest: 'How could you keep silent?' He replied: 'I didn't want to offend this Jew.' It's wrong to offend a Jew, but to insult the All-Pure Virgin Mary is permitted! Look at the state we have come to! How often does it happen to us all now that we do not have the zeal to stand up, when necessary, in defence of our holy things! The Orthodox cleric must zealously stand up against blasphemy, just as the holy Hierarch Nicholas stopped the mouth of the heretic... But now, unfortunately, we have become, as the saying goes, 'shamefully indifferent to both the evil and the good'. And it is precisely in the soil of this indifference, of a kind of feeling of selfpreservation, that the heresy of ecumenism has established itself - as also apostasy, that falling away which is becoming more and more evident... Let us remember, brethren, that Christian love embraces all in itself, is compassionate to all, wishes that all be saved and is sorry for, and merciful to, and love every creature of God; but where it sees a conscious assault on the truth it turns into fiery zeal which cannot bear any such blasphemy... And so must it always be, because every Orthodox Christian must always be zealous for God."733

The zeal of the new ROCOR metropolitan was matched by Archbishop Averky, abbot of ROCOR's main monastery at Jordanville, New York, who on the metropolitan's namesday, December 1/14, 1967, said to him in a welcoming speech: "We are going through a terrible time. But not only because the forces of world evil are gaining a greater and greater hold over the world, but still more because – terrible to say! – many highly-placed hierarchs of the Church of Christ are carrying out a very real betrayal of our holy faith and Church. Some completely new epoch in Christianity is being proclaimed. They are thinking to create a new church into which not only all the Orthodox must enter, but also the heterodox, and even the Muslims, Jews, and pagans. They are even talking about some kind of 'dialogue' with the atheists! In this way, instead of the true faith and the true Church, a false faith or, in the expression of our great Spirit-bearing lamp, Bishop Theophan the Recluse, 'an evil faith and a false church, is arising.

"And it is in these terrible times that we wish to see in your person our steadfast and unshakeable spiritual leader inspiring us all for the holy struggle – the holy battle – for the true faith and the true Church against this false faith and false church."

Two years later he wrote: "We must make a decisive break with ecumenism, and we must not have anything in communion with its co-travellers. Our path is not theirs. We must say this decisively and show it in our deeds. A time of genuine confession is coming for us, a time when will perhaps remain alone and will be in the position of being persecuted. Insofar as all the Orthodox Local

⁷³³ Senina, "And his lot is among the saints...", *Vertograd-Inform*, No 15, January, 2000, pp. 15-17.

Churches have now entered into the ranks of the 'World Council of Churches' and have thereby betrayed Orthodoxy and bowed down to Satan, the time of our complete isolation has come. We cannot and we must not have any communion with apostates from True Orthodoxy, and we must be ready, if required, to depart into the 'catacombs', like the 'True Orthodox Christians' in our homeland."

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"Patriarch" Athenagoras expressed, perhaps better than any contemporary church leader, what ecumenism really means for its adherents. As Basil (now Bishop Gregory) Lourié writes: "Athenagoras ... did not consider [the Latins] to be heretics. But his denial of their hereticalness was not the manifestation of a special love for them: Athenagoras did not recognise the existence of heresy in general! On hearing of a certain man who saw heresy everywhere, Athenagoras said: 'I don't see them anywhere! I see only truths, partial truths, reduced truths, truths that are sometimes out of place...'

"The teaching of the Church, of the Holy Fathers, is based on the rock of the confession of the fullness of the Truth incarnate in Christ, which is organically incapable of being mixed with lies. The ecumenists consciously choose the sand of 'partial truths' cemented by the lie of the denial of Christ as the true Son and Word of God.

"Why can Athenagoras and people like him, who are characterized by their own kind of deep faith, asceticism and even capacity for sacrifice, completely consciously go against, not simply individual Fathers, but even all of them taken together? Why have they come to the decision that certain decrees of the Fathers in relation to the Church and the dogmas may supposedly have lost their force in our time? There can only be one answer: their Orthodox faith was been mixed with certain tares, which have grown up and suffocated the shoots of Truth. The tares are faith in something about which the Lord did not announce to the Church. This is what we read in this connection in Athenagoras himself: 'Palestine has again become the centre of the world... We must pray and struggle that Jerusalem may again become a place of dialogue and peace. So that we may together prepare the way for the return of Jesus, the Mahdi of Islam, the Messiah of Israel, our Lord.' 'In Jerusalem Abraham met Melchizedek, a priest of the Most High God, a mystical foreshadowing of the Word which is present in all peoples and in all religions.' (This is how Athenagoras explains why he and the Roman Pope Paul VI decided to meet in Jerusalem.) The union with the Latins was seen by Athenagoras in connection with this coming advent of the person he called Jesus: 'Unity may be attained unexpectedly, as is the case with everything great. As can happen with the return of Christ, Who, as He said, will come as a thief. Catholicism is now in a vortex. Everything is possible.' Neither Athenagoras nor the other ecumenists refer to any other positions based on Church Tradition. And not surprisingly. The teaching of the Church foresees the union of all peoples, not around Christ,

but around him whom the Jews call the Messiah, and the Muslims Mahdi. 'When the Son of Man comes will He find faith on the earth?' (Luke 18.8).

"But this Tradition of the Church has ceased to be of interest to them because they have accepted another: faith that some special age has dawned precisely now. If all the people of this age understand its content, they will turn out to be much more closely united with each other than with their co-religionists of previous ages. The people of this age are united by certain 'pan-human', as they put it, values of their own, values which are much more important to them than the heritage of the past, which disunites them. This is that age of which the bearers of the so-called 'Russian religious philosophy' (particularly Soloviev, Berdyaev, Florensky and Bulgakov) became the heralds throughout the world. These people expressed in a pseudo-Christian language the idea of the coming of a 'new age' - the age of some new, post-New Testament 'revelation of the Holy Spirit', which would be given in the last times, and which they borrowed from occult teachings. (See, for example, the letter on the Holy Spirit in Florensky's The Pillar and Ground of the Truth.) For these people there exists some kind of special 'age of the Fathers', which is already completely past. With it have also gone into the past the canons of the Fathers. In our time, instead of the Fathers there are those who have received the new revelation of the new age. And so for the Orthodox Church today ecumenism is not a particular problem which might pass some countries by. But at the same time it is only a particular case of a more widespread phenomenon - the placing of the whole of contemporary civilisation on a new principle of unity. It is on this principle that the universal religion which Hieromonk Seraphim Rose of blessed memory (+1982) called 'the religion of the future', the religion of the Antichrist, is being created at the present time.

"This principle is much more clearly formulated in various movements of the 'New Age' and Masonry type, while ecumenism is called to carry out only one particular task: force the entry into this new unity of such people as would wish to preserve their unity with traditional forms of religion. The Antichrist will have to satisfy everyone..."⁷³⁴

Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose) wrote with regard to an article written by Archbishop James entitled "A New Epoch?": "I suddenly felt that I had found an insight into the 'essence of Iakovism'. Is it not, indeed, the basic heresy of *chiliasm*? What else, indeed, could justify such immense changes and monstrous perversions in Orthodoxy except the concept that we are entering entirely new historical circumstances, an entirely new *kind* of time, in which the concepts of the past are no longer relevant, but we must be guided by the voices of the new time? Does not Fr. Patrinacos, in past issues of the *Orthodox Observer*, justify Patriarch Athenagoras – not as a theologian, not as a traditionalist, but precisely as a *prophet*, as one whose heresies cannot be condemned because he already lives in the 'new time', ahead of his own times? Patriarch Athenagoras

 ⁷³⁴ Lourié, "The Ecclesiology of a Retreating Army", *Vertograd-Inform*, No 3, January, 1999, pp.
 24- 25 (English edition).

himself has been quoted as speaking of the coming of the 'Third Age of the Holy Spirit' - a clearly chiliastic idea which has its chief recent champion in N. Berdyaev, and can be traced back directly to Joachim of Fiore, and indirectly to the Montanists. The whole idea of a 'new age', of course, penetrates every fiber of the last two centuries with their preoccupation with 'progress', and is *the* key idea of the very concept of Revolution (from French to Bolshevik), is the central idea of modern occultism (visible on the popular level in today's talk of the 'age of Aquarius', the astrological post-Christian age), and has owed its spread probably chiefly to Freemasonry (there's a Scottish Rite publication in America called 'New Age'). (I regret to say that the whole philosophy is also present in the American dollar bill with its masonic heritage, with its novus ordo saeculorum and its unfinished pyramid, awaiting the thirteenth stone on top!) In Christian terms, it is the philosophy of Antichrist, the one who will turn the world upside down and 'change the times and seasons.'... And the whole concept of ecumenism is, of course, permeated with this heresy and the 'refounding of the Church'."735

⁷³⁵ Rose, in Hieromonk Damascene (Christensen), *Father Seraphim Rose: His Life and Works*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Press, 2003, p. 397.

51. THE FALL OF THE SERBIAN CHURCH

After 1945 the struggle to keep the Orthodox Church in the Balkans free from Communist control immediately encountered difficulties. The communists tried to break down the resistance of all the bishops who opposed them. In most cases they succeeded - but there were exceptions. For example, as Hieroschemamonk (now Bishop) Akakije writes: "The Bishops' quarters in Novi Sad, in which Bishop Irenaeus (Tsilits) of Bachka lived, became the target of 'national rage' - communist demonstrations that threw a large number of stones at the building with terrible exclamations. During a festal litia in 1946 in one village, when the bishop came out from the church in full vestments, the organized communist crowd threw a number of stones at him. Being hit on the back of his head, Bishop Irenaeus fell on the ground. The raging crowd attacked the bishop, and the priest who was trying to defend him was stabbed by knives. Severely hurt, all covered in blood, his beard pulled out, his vestments torn, spat upon and insulted, Bishop Irenaeus was taken to Novi Sad during the night. As a consequence of these heavy wounds, he spent the rest of his life mostly in his sickbed.

"Metropolitan Nectarije was lynched by the communists. In August 1953 a group of about 150-250 communists (including some women) arrived unexpectedly in the monastery of Osren. They forced their way into the monastery guest-house, and uttering terrible words they came to the bishop's cell, where they started to hit and push him until he fell to the ground. One of the women was pulling his beard. The calls for help of an old bishop, who was at that time 75 years old, were heard by nobody. They kept on tearing his ryasa, pushing and torturing him. Heavily wounded, he had to leave Tuzla, and go to Belgrade, where he lay in hospital for several months. Metropolitan Nectarius was the spine of the resistance to the communists in the Serbian Orthodox Church. Before the election of German as patriarch, the president of the socialist republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – his name was Djuro Putsar, his nickname was "the old one" - said to Metropolitan Nectarius and Bishop Basil: 'The two of you represent 80% of the Council, and if German is not elected, we know who is responsible.' Metropolitan Nectarius called patriarch German 'Judas' son'.

"In 1944 Metropolitan Arsenije was condemned in Cetinje by the national court to ten-and-a-half years' hard labour for anti-state activities because he did not carry out various requests made by the communists and because he said in his sermons that the Catholic Church did very evil things to Orthodox people. Together with him, seven old Montenegrin priests were condemned too. In 1960, due to serious illness, he was released at the age of 77. Rejected by all, his last days were spent with his daughter and son-in-law. He reposed, humiliated and persecuted by Patriarch German, whom he cursed on the last day of his life. Up to his last hour he rejected the communists and German. Even on his deathbed, the communists asked him to sign a statement by which he approved of the official policy of Patriarch German. Under the pressure of the communists, his funeral was conducted in secret.

"Bishop Vasilije was forced to leave Banja Luka by the communists. At his question whether there was any written document by the state authorities about his ban from Banja Luka, the communists answered: 'The people does not give written decisions, and it does not make any such decisions. The people has the right to make such decisions, because it is above the authorities, and each authority originates from the people.' After constant threats to lynch him, he decided to leave for Belgrade. On his way to the railway station, a lot of men and women ran after him, shouting: 'You wanted it written, here it is written, you will get it from the people, who are waiting for you. Down with the bearded man! Down with the people's enemies and the collaborators of the occupiers!' One of them attacked the car and started to curse God. When the bishop had hardly reached the station, an even larger mass of people were waiting for him there. They started to throw tomatoes and stones at him, and when they had surrounded him completely they started to spit at him, pull his beard and hit his head and body. The police was present all the time, but did not react to this public violence. One communist sub-officer kept on getting close to his face, and saying: 'We are materialists, we only believe in matter, and not in the immortality of the soul, as you priests teach. Confess that it is senseless. You collaborated with the occupiers, and you don't want to collaborate with today's authorities. That is why people are making you leave. Confess that you were wrong, and repent.' He was so badly hurt that he twice fell on the ground. Then they dragged him over the railway line and tore his sleeveless coat and his mandiya. In the train all the passengers kept on insulting him, and as he sat by the window it was broken from the outside. The reason for this lynching was his resistance to compromise with the godless authorities. Still, he couldn't withstand the communist tortures to the end, and under UDBA pressure he gave his support to Bishop German as candidate for patriarch.

"Bishop Varnava (Nastić) was condemned in 1948 by a communist court to ten years' hard labour for the 'crime of treason: he helped to weaken the economy and the military power of the state, he helped terrorist bands, he published enemy propaganda, and he was a spy for the Anglo-Americans.'⁷³⁶

⁷³⁶ Jared Hall writes: "Bishop Barnabas (Varnava Nastić), was born in Gary, Indiana in 1914. In the nine years he lived there, he gained an outstanding appreciation for our love of freedom. Eventually, he moved to Serbia, from where his parents had come. In Serbia, St. Barnabas worked diligently against the Communists regime and was eventually brought to trial in spite of his position in the Orthodox Church. Here is part of the transcript of his interrogation for allegedly spying for the United States. Try to imagine yourself in the courtroom.

[']Q. What do you have to say? A. All your accusations are inventions and false. I tell you, I am not afraid. You may kill me, but that is not important. The Serbian people are against you and all the civilized world despises you. You have already lost the war.(The courtroom cheered the prisoner.{!!}) Q. You are reported to have said that the regime in Yugoslavia is atheistic, that violence and

crime have the upper hand and there is urgent need for action to remove the tyranny. Did you speak in this manner? A. Yes, and more than that. I have spoken what all the people are speaking, feeling and desiring.

He suffered his punishment in Zenitsa jail. All the time he was in total isolation in a dark and damp cell under the greatest affliction of soul and body. The communists immediately cut his hair off and shaved his beard to humiliate him and make him a laughing-stock. They made him do the hardest jobs because they knew he was physically sensitive and weak in health. They starved him of food and water, tortured him with loneliness and deprived him of information from books or newspapers, with no communication with the outer world, just in order to break down his morale and subject him to their godless commands. In reply to all those tortures, he chanted church songs in his cell. Since no torture could break his spirit, the spirit of Bishop Varnava, the UDBA planned his so-called transfer in 1949 and arranged a traffic accident by crashing a locomotive into a parked, locked railway car in which he and a number of other political prisoners were bound. The impact was so powerful that out of a full car only eleven prisoners survived. Bishop Varnava was thrown through the window while tied together with a Catholic priest who died immediately as they fell. Bishop Varnava stayed alive, but both legs and one arm were broken. People from the train station and other trains ran to help, but police surrounded the car and would not allow anyone to come close to the wounded, and one policeman even turned an automatic gun against the people. One hour later, the UDBA came and took all the wounded to the city hospital nearby, where the doctors immediately started to help. Suddenly an UDBA man came back to the hospital and ordered the doctors to stop helping the wounded and to take them off the operating tables. The protests of the doctors were not considered. Bishop Varnava at that moment was on the operating table with a hole in his heel where a metal rod was to be inserted to help his broken leg heal. All the wounded were put in an army truck on wooden planks and they were driven at a horrific speed over very bad roads, so that two of them died during the trip. In 1960, after several transfers, from one prison to another, where he

Q. Do you believe that Americans will come to overthrow the present regime? A. I believe that quite positively. And I know that our people will meet the Americans with cheers as liberating army. Q. Did you speak to the farmers that they will be better off when the Americans come? A. In substance I did say that to them. And the same I say to you here and now. In a long question the bishop was charged with being in contact with anti-Tito Chetniks in the hills of Praca and Rogatica. A. Not a word will I say about those brave men in the free hills who are ready at every moment to lay down their lives for their ideals and those of their people. (The approving uproar was so great that the judges ordered the courtroom cleared.) The prosecutor produced a letter, purportedly written by the bishop, in which it was stated that 1,300,000 Serbs had become innocent victims of the hammer & sickle. Q. Did you write this letter. and do vou think this statement is true? A. With my own hand I wrote it. The only thing that might be incorrect in that statement is the number of victims. For, since I wrote that letter, you have killed very many more people. only number might be Therefore, T say, the incorrect.' In the end the bishop's legs were manacled, and, clanking his new chains, he was taken off to eleven years of labor in the prison ironworks of Zenica. St Barnabas was released in 1951, eight years early - though he always remained under government surveillance. He "died suddenly," some say poisoned, on November 12, 1964, aged just 50." ("An American Saint Faces the Communists", Death to the World, October 4, 2014, http://deathtotheworld.com/articles/anamerican-saint-faces-the-communists) (V.M.)

became severely ill, the much-suffering Bishop Varnava came to the end of his term of punishment. At that moment he submitted a plea to the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church to be reactivated. Patriarch German did not take his plea before the Synod, but sent him a message: 'It is necessary that you first regulate your relationship with the authorities', which practically meant that he had to give a statement of loyalty to the communist regime. From that time the UDBA started to pressure him again. The boss of the religious section of the UDBA Milan Velić sent him a letter signed by about ten hierarchs recommending that he sign the statement of loyalty to the authorities and request that the Holy Synod retire him. Velić brought him the prepared text of his statement, a very cunning document prepared by Bishop Vissarion Kostić in which, among other things, they asked him to praise Tito's regime, be one with the official position of the Church and to fence himself off from the work of the emigration. When he strongly resisted, the UDBA officer told him: 'That means you are condemning Patriarch German and the other bishops who have already given such statements.' Bishop Varnava said: 'Everybody shall answer before the Last Judgement for his deeds on earth.' Then the UDBA officer said: 'You think Patriarch German will answer before the Last Judgement?' Bishop Varnava answered: 'The first and the hardest!'

"When Patriarch Vikentije went to Moscow and laid flowers at the tomb of Lenin, Bishop Varnava under his full signature from prison sent a letter saying: 'In whose name did you go, who did you represent, and who authorised you to put the flowers on the tomb of Lenin? From that wreath that you laid on Lenin's tomb, take off one leaf in the name of the Serbian priesthood, one leaf in the name of Serbian bishops, one leaf in the name of the Serbian people, and the remaining six leaves will represent you and the members of your delegation.' Because of this letter, the Hierarchical Synod gathered and pronounced him irresponsible and irrational. That was when his real spiritual torments began, because his brother hierarchs became his enemies. The notorious Bishop Vissarion led the systematic action against Bishop Varnava, who often used to say: 'Being imprisoned by the communists was sweet for me, but now it is not the communists who are persecuting me, but my brother bishops.' Lonely, and surrounded by the iron wall of the communist police, Bishop Varnava died in unexplained circumstances.

"During his ordination, on the Feast of the Transfiguration, 1947, in the Saborna church in Belgrade, the newly ordained Bishop Varnava uttered the following prophetic words: 'When our Lord Jesus Christ sent his apostles into the world, he put before them sacrifice as the programme and way of their lives. And only readiness for apostolic sacrifice made the Galilaean fishermen receive apostolic honour. Lofty honour in the Church of Christ means lofty sacrifice. The Holy Hierarchical Council led by the Holy Spirit chose my unworthiness as bishop of the Church of Christ. By that choice they condemned me to the sacrifice of Christ's Golgotha. And in condemning me to that highest sacrifice they gave me the loftiest honour that can be given to a mortal man. All I can say is that I shall gladly climb my Golgotha, and I shall never trade that honour for any other under the sun of God. The bishop's position is a sacrifice on Golgotha because the bishop's service is apostolic service, and to the apostles the Lord said: "The cup which I am drinking you will drink, and the baptism which I am being baptised with you will be baptised with" (<u>Mark</u> 10.39). And the cup which our Lord drank and the baptism with which he was baptized, what else could it be but the cup of Golgotha and the bloody baptism in His own Blood?... And that is why, though I know the weaknesses of the soul, I am not afraid that my leg will shatter on the road of Golgotha strewn with thorns that I am today undertaking. Even if it wanted to shatter, the light and the warmth of innumerable examples of Christ's heroes will bring back to it firmness and might.' This sermon by Bishop Varnava was fulfilled completely through his much-suffering hierarchical service and struggle to defend Church freedom.

"This was the way they prepared the total collapse of the Serbian Church. First by removing unfitting [bishops], and then carefully choosing new bishops sympathetic to the regime, or at least those who would accept the new kind of situation. In the period after the war the existence of the Serbian Church depended on the way the patriarch and the bishops treated Tito's regime. In the time of Metropolitan Joseph, the patriarchal *locum tenens*, the Church still, regardless of external persecution, enjoyed internal freedom, because his firm position, if we exclude his lukewarm and flexible position towards the MP, let everybody know that he would firmly hold to the Church canons. And he succeeded. Much more modest, but still firm, was the position displayed by Patriarch Gabriel. The two of them represented the last defence of Church freedom.

"As we have seen, after the death of Patriarch Gabriel, the situation in the Church became more difficult. Using the UDBA, the communists choose Vikentije as patriarch, who did many favours for them. In 1958 the act of the destruction of the Serbian Orthodox Church came to its end when the UDBA imposed as patriarch German, who was an absolutely submissive tool, accepted all the requests of the regime. The first big concessions to Tito were the act of forming the Macedonian Autocephalous Church and the blessing of the pro-communist association of priests (partisans), through which the possibility of total control of the Church was created. Patriarch German told the priesthood in Belgrade: 'Whichever priest insults Tito, insults me.' Really the position of the Serbian patriarchate was harder than at any time in its longlasting history, because for the first time its patriarch and bishops joined the enemies of the Church. In the years after the war most of the Serbian bishops obviously had no ecclesiological consciousness, which is a confessing position of struggle for the purity of the Orthodox faith, which was best illustrated by the presence of the Serbian Church at the councils of Moscow in 1945 and 1948, as well as the fact that not a single bishop or clergyman – though many of them were against the communists and criticized the behaviour of Patriarchs Vikentije and German, - never thought of stopping communion with the red patriarch in Belgrade, which all this time was in full eucharistic communion with the new calendarists..."⁷³⁷

From the time of the election of Patriarch German in 1958, and with the exception of a very few clergy, the communists were now in complete control of the Serbian Patriarchate. Archimandrite Justin Popovich wrote on the catastrophic situation of the Church at this time: "The Church is being gradually destroyed from within and without, ideologically and organizationally. All means are being used: known and unknown, open and secret, the most subtle and the most crude... And all this is skilfully dissolved, but in fact it is the most deadly of poisons with a sugar coating... The most elementary and rudimentary logic demonstrates and proves: cooperation with open atheists, the cursed enemies of Christ and the Orthodox Church of Christ, is illogical and anti-logical. We ask those who seek such cooperation, or already cooperate, or – terrible thought! – compel others to cooperate, with the words of Christ: 'What communion can there be between righteousness and lawlessness? Or what is there in common between light and darkness? What agreement can there be between Christ and Belial?' (II Corinthians 6.14-15). Do you not hear the Christ-bearing Apostle, who thunders: 'If we, or an angel from heaven begins to preach to you that which we have not preached to you, let him be anathema!' (Galatians 1.8). Or have you, in the frenzy of the atheist dictatorship, gone completely deaf to the Divine truth and commandment of Christ: 'You cannot serve God and Mammon' (Matthew 6.24)?"738

According to a report dated October 18, 1961 and prepared by the United States Senate's Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, in 1950, on the death of Patriarch Gabriel of Serbia, the Communists "made certain that the new patriarch would be a 'cooperative' one, and forced the election of a weak man, Bishop Vikentije Prodanov, who became a manageable tool of communist propaganda." ⁷³⁹

He was elected patriarch, as Fr. Akakije writes, "with heavy pressure from the secret police" and "by one episcopal vote only. Even though he was very obedient to the authorities, the newly chosen Patriarch Vikentije resisted some of Tito's plans, for example, the forming of the Macedonian Church. So he didn't last long on the patriarchal throne. He died eight years later.

"After Vikentije, the communists needed a completely loyal person, who would bring the Serbian Church in service to the atheist regime. Such a candidate they found in the person of the widowed priest Chranislav Djorič, who became a monk with the name German and in 1951 became Vikentije's vicar-bishop. In the campaign electing German as patriarch, the communist

⁷³⁷ Hieroschemamonk (now Bishop) Akakije, in V. Moss, *Letopis' Velike Bitke* (Chronicle of a Great Struggle), Belgrade, 2007, pp. 345-350.

⁷³⁸ Popovich, in *Vestnik Germanskoj Eparkhii Russkoj Tserkvi za Granitsei* (Herald of the German Diocese of the Russian Church Abroad), No 3, 1992, pp. 15, 16.

⁷³⁹ A Time to Choose, Libertyville, Ind.: Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 1981, p. 10.

regime did not hide its active participation. All the memories of the electing council were very thoroughly worked upon by the secret police. The boss of the Serbian secret police Milan Velić openly said to the members of the electoral council: 'We want German to be chosen, and he will be chosen, whether you vote for him or not. We want in the person of the patriarch to have a safe and sound friend, and with Vikentije we were too credulous.' Everyone received an envelope with money. One of the examples of various blackmailing and threats was Abbot Platon Milevoyević of Studenitsa, to whom the bloody boss of the Belgrade secret police, Miloš Minić, came with one associate and told him he would be arrested for public immorality and misuse of money in selling the monastery's woods unless he voted for German. The secret police claimed that they had all the proofs of all his weaknesses, having mistresses in the monastery, several children born outside wedlock, and so on."⁷⁴⁰

"Father Macarius, abbot of the famed Dečani Monastery, was given 200,000 dinars (\$650) as payment for his coerced vote for German. He came back to his monastery after the election and threw the money at his monks, telling them that he 'felt like Judas'.

"Many delegates to the Electorate were given a special pen and paper on which they were to cast their ballots, in order to show whether they had kept their promise to the agents of the Secret Police. (Two sworn statements by witnesses)."⁷⁴¹

According to witnesses in the patriarch's house, he had a party card. And when he was once accused of embezzling a very large sum of money and was threatened with a court trial, the Serbian equivalent of the KGB (UDBA) saved him and paid the money themselves. Thereafter he was completely "their man".⁷⁴² The Belgrade newspaper *Telegraf* recently confirmed that German was elected by UDBA.⁷⁴³ As Archimandrite Justin Popovich wrote in 1960: "… The atheist dictatorship has so far elected two patriarchs… And in this way it has cynically trampled on the holy rights of the Church, and thereby also on the holy dogmas."⁷⁴⁴

The result of the subjection of the Serbian Church to the communists was predictable: "an alarming tendency on the part of the hierarchy of the 'Mother Church' to abandon true Orthodoxy and embrace heresy... the worst heresy that has ever assaulted the Orthodox Church – the heresy of 'ecumenism'."⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴⁰ Hieroschemamonk Akakije, op. cit., p. 395.

⁷⁴¹ A Time to Choose, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷⁴² M. Atavina, personal communication.

⁷⁴³ June 13, 2015. http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/1111926-dobrica-cosic-krcun-i-udba-izabralisu-germana-za-patrijarha-foto. See also Dr. Milosh Sekulich, *The Free Serbian Orthodox St. Sava Church*, London: The Voice of the Serbian Community, 1979, pp. 6-8.

⁷⁴⁴ Popovich, "The Truth about the Serbian Orthodox Church in communist Yugoslavia", translated into Russian in *Vestnik Germanskoj Eparkhii Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi za Granitsei (Herald of the German Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad)*, NN 2 and 3, 1992.
⁷⁴⁵ A Time to Choose, p. 43.

The decisive moment of apostasy from Orthodoxy came in 1965, when the Serbian Church entered the World Council of Churches, with Patriarch German becoming co-president the following year. Undoubtedly he did so at the orders of the communist Yugoslav government. However, Joachim Wertz has suggested another possible motive for the Serbian Church's entry into the WCC. He considers that "the main 'practical' reason why the Serbian Orthodox Church joined the WCC was that that body would provide the Serbian Church with visibility in the West and thus forestall any liquidation of the Church by Tito. Also the WCC would contribute to the rebuilding of many of the churches destroyed by the Croatian Ustasha in WWII. The rebuilding of these Churches was very high on the agenda of the Serbian Church. The Croatians wanted to erase the presence of Orthodoxy. The Serbian Church felt it imperative to bring back that presence and VISIBILITY. Similarly the WCC, and individual Western protestant Churches contributed to the building of the new Theological Faculty in the Karaburma section of Belgrade. This can be viewed as a posthumous slap in the face of Tito, who forbade the construction of any church in that neighborhood. He wanted it to be an ideal progressive, socialist community of ugly high rise apartments with no trace of the Church."746

From now on, there was no stopping "Patriarch" German... In September, 1966, two inter-Orthodox Commissions were established in Belgrade to negotiate with the Anglicans and the Old Catholics. In 1967 German said to the Roman Catholic bishop of Mostar: "The times are such that our sister Churches have to lean on each other, to turn away from that which divided us and to concentrate on all that we have in common." The next year he recognized Catholic marriages, and became one of the presidents of the WCC. In 1985, at a nuns' conference, he welcomed two Catholic bishops "with special honour" into the sanctuary, and then all the conference members (Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants) recited the Creed together in the Liturgy. In 1971 he signed the following WCC statement in Geneva: "The powerful Breath of renewal will blow into the mighty arena of the Church, as well as into each of her communities; for these are not simple administrative units, but they all constitute a part of the one great Christian Church."

Patriarch German liked to justify his ecumenism by quoting the Serbian proverb: *Drvo se na drvo naslanja; a čovek na čoveka* – "Tree leans on tree and man on man." But the Free Serbs had an answer to this. "We can also quote the proverbs of our people: *S'kim si, onaki si.* – 'You are like those with whom you associate.' If you find your fellowship with heretics, you begin to share their erroneous thinking and eventually become a heretic. As an American proverb goes: 'Birds of a feather flock together.'"⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴⁶ Wertz, "Re: [orthodox-synod] Strange letter", orthodox-synod@yahoogroups.com, 26 February, 2003.

⁷⁴⁷ A Time to Choose, op. cit., p. 47.

Commenting on the decision of the Orthodox Churches to become "organic members" of the WCC, Fr. Justin wrote: "Every true Orthodox Christian, who is instructed under the guidance of the Holy Fathers, is overcome with shame when he reads that the Orthodox members of the Fifth Pan-Orthodox Conference in Geneva [in June, 1968]... on the question of the participation of the Orthodox in the work of the World Council of Churches, considered it necessary 'to declare that the Orthodox Church considers itself to be an organic part of the World Council of Churches.'

"This assertion is apocalyptically horrifying in its un-orthodoxy and antiorthodoxy. Was it necessary for the Orthodox Church, that most holy Body of the God-Man Christ, to become so debased to such a pitiful degree that its theological representatives – some of whom were Serbian bishops – have begun to beg for 'organic' participation and membership in the World Council of Churches, which will supposedly become a new 'Body' and a new 'Church', which will stand above all other churches, in which the Orthodox Churches and the non-orthodox churches will appear only as parts. God forbid! Never before has there been such a betrayal and abandonment of our holy Faith!

"We are renouncing the Orthodox Faith of the God-Man Christ, and organic ties with the God-Man and His Most Holy Body: we are repudiating the Orthodox Church of the holy apostles, the Fathers, and the Ecumenical Councils – and we wish to become 'organic members' of a heretical, humanistic, humanized and man-worshipping club, which consists of 263 heresies – every one of which is a spiritual death.

"As Orthodox Christians we are 'members of Christ.' 'Shall I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute?' (<u>I Corinthians</u> 6.15). We are doing this by our organic union with the World Council of Churches, which is nothing other than the rebirth of atheistic man, of pagan idolatry.

"The time has finally come for the patristic Orthodox Church of Saint Sabbas, the Church of the holy apostles and Fathers, of the holy confessors, martyrs and new-martyrs, to stop mingling ecclesiastically and hierarchically with the so-called 'World Council of Churches', and to cast off forever any participation in joint prayer or services, and to renounce general participation in any ecclesiastical dealings whatsoever, which are not self-contained and do not express the unique and unchangeable character of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church – the Orthodox Church – the only true Church that has ever existed."⁷⁴⁸

Fr. Justin's critique of ecumenism was part of a broader critique of the whole of Western European culture. A disciple of Bishop Nicholas Velimirovich, Fr. Justin followed his teacher in attributing the cause of God's wrath against

⁷⁴⁸ Popovich, in A Time to Choose, op. cit., p. 53.

Christian Europe to its betrayal of the faith and its embracing an antichristian humanistic metaphysics of progress that was in fact regression.

The end of such a nihilist metaphysic could only be death, death on a massive scale, death with no redeeming purpose or true glory, no resurrection in Christ: "It is obvious to normal eyes: European humanistic culture systematically blunts man's sense of immortality, until it is extinguished altogether. The man of European culture affirms, with Nietzsche, that he is flesh and nothing but flesh. And that means: I am mortal, and nothing but mortal. It is thus that humanistic Europe gave itself over to the slogan: man is a mortal being. That is the formula of humanistic man; therein lies the essence of his progress.

"At first subconsciously, then consciously and deliberately, science, philosophy, and culture inculcated in the European man the proposition that man is completely mortal, with nothing else left over... Humanistic man is a devastated creature because the sense of personal immortality has been banished from him. And without that sentiment, can man ever be complete?

"European man is a shrunken dwarf, reduced to a fraction of man's stature, for he has been emptied of the sense of transcendence. And without the transcendent, can man exist at all as man? And if he could, would there be any meaning to his existence? Minus that sense of the transcendent, is he not but a dead object among other objects, and a transient species among other animals?

"... [Supposedly] equal to the animals in his origin, why should he not also assimilate their morals? Being part of the animal world of beasts in basic nature, he has also joined them in their morals. Are not sin and crime increasingly regarded by modern jurisprudence as an unavoidable by-product of the social environment and as a natural necessity? Since there is nothing eternal and immortal in man, ethics must, in the final analysis, be reduced to instinctive drives. In his ethics, humanistic man has become equal to his progenitors, monkeys and beasts. And the governing principle of his life has become: *homo homini lupus*.

"It could not be otherwise. For an ethic that is superior to that of the animals could only be founded on a sentiment of human immortality. If there is no immortality and eternal life, neither within nor around man, then animalistic morals are entirely natural and logical for a bestialized humanity: let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die (cf. <u>I Corinthians</u> 15.32).

"The relativism in the philosophy of European humanistic progress could not but result in an ethical relativism, and relativism is the father of anarchism and nihilism. Wherefore, in the last analysis, the practical ethic of humanistic man is nothing but anarchy and nihilism. For anarchy and nihilism are the unavoidable, final and apocalyptic phase of European progress. Ideological anarchism and nihilism, ideological disintegration, necessarily had to manifest themselves in practical anarchism and nihilism, in the practical disintegration of European humanistic man and his progress. Are we not eyewitnesses to the ideological and practical anarchism and nihilism that are devastating the European continent? The addenda of European progress are such that, no matter how they might be computed, their sum is always anarchism and nihilism. The evidence? Two world wars (actually European wars).

"European man is stupid, catastrophically stupid, when, while disbelieving in God and the immortality of the soul, he still professes belief in progress and life's meaning and acts accordingly. What good is progress, if after it comes death? What use are the world, the stars, and cultures, if behind them lurks death, and ultimately it must conquer me?"⁷⁴⁹

ROCOR's attitude towards the Serbian Church now began, belatedly and imperfectly, to change. Thus on September 14/27, 1967, Archbishop Averky of Jordanville wrote to Metropolitan Philaret: "With regard to the question of the Serbian Church, whose Patriarch German is a stooge of the communist Tito, as the Serbs themselves are convinced, calling him 'the red patriarch'. We have heard this from many clergy and laity who have fled from Serbia. How can we recognize, and have communion in prayer with, 'the red patriarch', who maintains the closest friendly relations with red Moscow? Cannot our Hierarchical Council make *erroneous* decisions? Do we in the Orthodox Church have a doctrine about the *infallibility of every Council of Bishops*?"

Archbishop Averky's attitude to the Serbs was confirmed by the ROCOR Council of Bishops in 1967, which resolved to annul the resolution of the Council of Bishops in 1964 on the preservation of prayerful communion with the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church.⁷⁵⁰

On May 19 / June 1, 1967 the ROCOR Synod decreed: "In addition to the resolution of the present Council of Bishops on relations with the Serbian Orthodox church, the suggestion of his Eminence the First Hierarch and President of the Council of Bishops Metropolitan Philaret has been accepted and confirmed, that all the Reverend Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad should refrain from concelebration with the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church."⁷⁵¹

Early in 1970, Metropolitan Philaret of New York announced to the members of the ROCOR Synod that since the Serbian Patriarch German had chosen to serve as Chairman of the World Council of Churches, ROCOR should avoid joint prayer and service with him, while at the same time not making a major demonstration of the fact. ⁷⁵² He said: "Our position as fighters and confessors of the pure and undefiled truth of Christ places us under great obligation, more than at any time in the past. We must always remember that a true pastor of

⁷⁴⁹ Popovich, *The Orthodox Church and Ecumenism*, Thessaloniki, 1974, in *Orthodox Life*, September-October, 1983, pp. 26-27.

⁷⁵⁰ Psarev, op. cit., p. 4

⁷⁵¹ Pashkovsky, August 21, 2007, http://guest-2.livejournal.com/294723.html.

⁷⁵² Psarev, op. cit., p. 4.

the true Church of Christ can never and must never have any other interests besides pure zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of the souls of his flock – to this and this alone must all his thoughts, all his feelings and all his activity be always directed."

Nevertheless, communion with the Serbs continued. For many hierarchs and priests of ROCOR had been brought up in Serbia, and out of gratitude felt that the Serbs should not be condemned or excommunicated. To what extent this attitude was truly motivated by gratitude, and to what extent simply by fear of ROCOR's losing its last friends in "World Orthodoxy", is a moot point. In any case, it was contrary to the canons of the Church, which require the breaking of communion with all those in communion with heresy. Such an act would have been truly loving, for true love for the Serbs dictated that it should be pointed out to them into what an abyss their ecumenism was leading them, an exhortation which would have acquired greater weight by a full break in communion...

Inside Serbia, nobody broke completely with the heretical patriarchate. The closest to doing so was Archimandrite Justin, who broke off relations with the patriarch in 1971, while retaining contact with the other bishops.⁷⁵³ When Fr. Justin died on March 25, 1979, the patriarch did not attend his funeral...

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In the Serbian emigration, there was a bigger rebellion in 1963, when German and his Synod decided to divide the diocese of Bishop Dionisije of America and Canada into three. Claiming to see in this a communist plot, Dionysius refused to accept the decision, made his diocese autonomous and broke communion with the patriarch and his synod. On March 27, 1964 the Serbian Synod defrocked Dionisije. Then three pro-Belgrade priests were ordained bishops in his place. Dionisije and his supporters refused to recognize these acts, for which the patriarchate condemned them as graceless schismatics.

However, this rebellion was not all that it seemed. Fr. Joseph of Avila writes: "In 1963 the American-Canadian diocese left the patriarchate of Belgrade. The American-Canadian diocese headed by Bishop Dionisije (Milivojevič) belonged to the Serbian Church in the United States. Besides Bishop Dionisije, since 1946 in the US there lived the Serbian Bishop Nikolai Velimirovič. Several years after the war, he was active in events in the Serbian emigration in the USA, he was rector of the theological school at Libertyville, and associate lecturer at the Academy of St. Vladimir and at the theological school in Holy Trinity monastery in Jordanville. In the 50s Bishop Nikolai withdrew from public life and he started living in the Russian monastery of St. Tikhon in Pennsylvania, where in the monastery theological school he lectured in

⁷⁵³ Orthodoxos Typos (Orthodox Press), No 144, June 15, 1971, page 4; Hieromonk Sabbas of Dečani, personal communication.

Pastoral and Dogmatic Theology and Homiletics, and later in 1955 he became rector of the theological school.

"Several Serbs at that time went to the Russian Church Abroad, among them former judge of the church court of the diocese of Žiča Jovan Saračevič. Under the name of Savva he was made a monk by Archbishop Leonty of Chile, was ordained as hieromonk in Argentina and later was chosen as a bishop of ROCOR in Edmonton, Canada.

"At the beginning of the 1950s, because of the bad situation in the Serbian Church, Michael Tošovič joined the Russian Church Abroad. He was one of the important people in Serbian True Orthodoxy. In the year 1952 he was chosen as teacher and lecturer of the Holy Bible and Greek language in the Russian seminary of Holy Trinity in Jordanville. In Jordanville he became a monk with the name Arsenije. Later he became a hieromonk and after that an archimandrite. In the middle of the 50s, with the blessing of Metropolitan Anastasy, he began to published the theological journal, *Srpski misionar*, in which he revealed the falling away of the Serbian Church, the Moscow Patriarchate and World Orthodoxy. Fr. Arsenije tried to convince the Serbs that since the Serbian patriarchate was enslaved by the communists, it was necessary to separate from the patriarchate and was in favour of founding a Serbian Church Abroad like the Russian Church Abroad.⁷⁵⁴ Bishop Nikolai Velimirovič supported this idea, but in 1956 he reposed under very suspicious circumstances - there is a serious supposition that he was murdered.⁷⁵⁵

"In 1963 the American-Canadian diocese with Bishop Dionisije left the Serbian patriarchate. The direct cause for the split was Bishop Dionisije's suspension in May, 1963 because of moral and disciplinary transgressions. Dionisije claimed that he was suspended because he was anti-communist and that all the accusations were made up by the communist authorities, who were aiming to remove him and enslave the Serbian Church in the States using bishops loyal to the communists.

"In August, 1963 the clergy-laity assembly of the American-Canadian diocese refused obedience to the Serbian patriarchate. The followers of Dionisije claimed that the guilt of their bishop was invented, and they themselves brought up several accusations against the patriarchate, such as accepting Patriarch German from the communist authorities and his submission to those authorities, the foundation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the splitting of the American-Canadian diocese into three parts and the enthroning of three new bishops, all at the orders of the communists, etc.

⁷⁵⁴ Hieromonk Arsenije, "Slobodnim Srbima – slobodna i normalizovana Tsrkva", *Srpski* misionar, N 19, 1964. (V.M.)

⁷⁵⁵ *The New Chrysostom, Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović,* St. Tikhon's Seminary Press, 2011, pp. 106-117. (V.M.)

"Although most of the accusations against the patriarchate were wellfounded, and for that reason Dionisije had more than enough reasons to separate, many facts indicate that his sincerity was questionable.

"In 1963 Djoko Slijepčevič, a Church historian with an anti-communist orientation, but at the same time the follower of Patriarch German, wrote: 'Dionisije is trying to defend himself by his anti-communism, which was quite problematic for a long time, and later nothing else but a pile of empty phrases. What is really anti-communist about Bishop Dionisije?' On June 28, 1962, *Srpska Borba*, Bishop Dionisije's main ally and defender today, stated several of his 'anti-communist' slips. These are: in his article on November 7, 1957 but published in *Amerikansky Srbobran* on January 16, 1959, Bishop Dionisije was telling the chetniks about Karl Marx's example of unity. The newspaper *Srpska Borba* explains: 'Maybe there is some logic in this act of Bishop Dionisije, because even the manner in which he led the action for a 'Serbian gathering' and the ideas that he disclosed in his article on the foundation of the Association of Ravnogortsy, really are much closer to Karl Marx and his proletarians than to the holy things and interests of the Serbian nation and Serbian Orthodox Church.

"'It could be said that in this case Bishop Dionisije was a victim of confusion both in a logical and an ideological sense: he was confused, but later 'he gained his eyesight and found the right way'. The facts tell a completely different story: Bishop Dionisije sent his regards to Stalin, praised and glorified Tito and his People's Liberation Army, and of course was for a long time on the payroll of Tito's embassy in New York.

"'Glas Kanadskikh Srba twice, on July 25 and September 12, 1963, openly stated that Bishop Dionisije "in the autumn of 1944 through Dr. Šubšič greeted Marshal Tito and his courageous People's Liberation Army in a telegram. He was on the payroll of the Yugoslav communist embassy in Washington until the leaders of Serb nationality in the US promised that they would give him financial support. He was the only one of the Serbian bishops who, on October 23, 1958, delightedly greeted the foundation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as 'a grand act and very useful for our Church" (*Glas Kanadskikh Srba*, September 12, 1963).

"'In the same article in which he revealed this opinion, and which is entitled 'His Holiness Kir German, the fifth patriarch of the renewed patriarchate of Peč' (*Glas Kanadskikh Srba*, October 23, 1958) Bishop Dionisije had this to say in trying to praise the new patriarch: 'The first great act of the new patriarch, which is perhaps of ultimate importance for the whole of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was the satisfactory solution of the question of the so-called Macedonian Church'. At that time, Bishop Dionisije had not the slightest doubt as regards the regularity of the election of Patriarch German, because he wrote this as well: 'And so the Holy Spirit and the electoral council of the Serbian Orthodox Church has decided that on the throne of the Serbian patriarchs should come Bishop German of Žiča, indisputably a very capable and gifted man, active and full of every virtue' (*Glas Kanadskikh Srba*, October 23, 1958).'⁷⁵⁶

"Slobodan Draškovič, who in 1963 was one of the main followers of Dionisije and played a major role in the National Church Council of the American-Canadian diocese at which this diocese decided to disobey the patriarch, wrote in 1967: 'There is no need to talk a lot about Bishop Dionisije. His policy, not only until May, 1963, but later as well, was marked by a policy of co-existence with the hierarchy of the enslaved and enchained Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia, in contrast with the very clear and strong decisions of the National Church Council. On March 1966, after almost four years of struggle against the Joseph Broz's Patriarch German, he complained against German to the notorious Soviet agent, the 'Russian Patriarch' Alexis, and sought justice from him.'⁷⁵⁷

"The fact that Dionisije split from the Church only for personal reasons is shown by the fact that he often stated he was against any split from the Mother Church - until he was suspended and understood that he would be condemned.

"Besides this, it was not only the anti-communism of Bishop Dionisije that was problematic. In 1957 the American-Canadian diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church headed by Bishop Dionisije became a member of the heretical church organization, the National Church Council of America. Dionisije did not stop at that, but already then (in the 50s) he started to practise the most extreme ecumenism.

"In Orthodox Russia (no. 17, 1959) the following note was printed: 'On Sunday, 15/28 August in Buffalo (Lakavana) there took place the consecration of the newly built Serbian church of St. Stefan. The all-night vigil was served by the parish priest Miodrag Djurič, accompanied by two Serbian priests and one Anglican priest. In the morning the triumphant reception of Bishop Dionisije and Anglican Bishop Scafe took place. 15 priests were serving, among them Serbs, Anglicans, Belorussians, Ukrainian samosviaty and Ukrainians under Archbishop Palladius. Besides Bishop Dionisije, as the oldest hierarch, Bishop Scafe also took part in the service. He made some exclamations in the service, kissed Bishop Dionisije, and they said: 'Christ is among us, He is and will be'. He communed together with Dionisije in the Holy Gifts, and after that Bishop Dionisije gave communion to all the serving priests. At the banquet Bishop Scafe spoke of his admiration for Orthodoxy and how happy he was that America was having a chance to see beautiful Orthodox services on its land. He stated that in accordance with his abilities he was making a donation of \$2500.

⁷⁵⁶ Slijepčevič, "Ogreshena vladike Dionisija", Iskra, Munich, 1963, pp. 13-14 (V.M.).

⁷⁵⁷ Drašković, "Kojim putem? Poruka mladom srpskom narashtaju koji Broz nije uspeo da prevaspita", Chicago, 1967, p. 60 (V.M.).

"... Just before the consecration of the church Bishop Scafe called Bishop Dionisije and the local priest of Lacavan to his side and showed them that the Episcopalians had sent \$75,000 to our church in Yugoslavia. At this point Bishop Scafe showed pictures of those in the Orthodox world with whom he had communed before: the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Constantinople, as well as our Vikentije. As he was going to commune with Bishop Dionisije the next day, at the banquet he gave a gift of \$2500 for the church in Lacavan.'⁷⁵⁸

"Concerning the Church situation among the Serbs abroad, Fr. Arsenije Tosovich wrote in 1964: 'Bishop Dionisije recently for the first time referred positively to *Misionar* for its writing about separating from the enslaved patriarchate in Yugoslavia and for the letter of Bishop Nikolai.' And then he condemned Hieromonk Arsenije as the one who was 'for the separation from the patriarchate'. And it was only when he was suspended and it was clear that he would be condemned, that he reminded us that the Church in Yugoslavia was not free and that he was being persecuted not only because he was guilty but because the communists wanted it. To tell the truth, nobody did more for the communists and for dissolving the Serbs in America than that same great Serb and great anti-communist Dionisije. If Tito was looking all over the world for a man for this job, he could not find a better one than this Dionisije, even if we don't mention his blessing telegrams on the occasion of the liberation of Belgrade 'to the father of the people, Stalin'....

"... And so if Bishop Dionisije was wrong, it doesn't mean that the patriarchate was right and that the Serbian Church in Yugoslavia was free and that we should unconditionally submit to its decisions. On the contrary. Everything was said about that in the above-mentioned article of 1954, including the fact, for example, that all candidates for the hierarchy had to be approved by the communist central committee. The central committee of course would approve only of those candidates who were theirs or at least did not have any dispute with them. We, who are free, and who don't want to put our necks under the communist yoke, cannot and should not accept in any way the communist choice of hierarchs. That would mean those candidates first have to receive Satan's blessing and seal, and then be consecrated as hierarchs!...

"So far the American diocese and the whole emigration has had one unsuccessful bishop, Dionisije Milivojevich, and now there are five of them: three sparrows and two Dionisijes. Stefan, Firmilian and Grigorije, because of their dependence on the enslaved patriarchate, and his dependence on the communist godless authorities, will be obliged, whether willingly or not, 'to fly over the sea', keep in touch with the patriarch, and through him with the religious commission and communist authorities...

".... Since these three hierarchs are willingly going into communist enslavement, and thereby have to submit to the godless authorities, there arises

⁷⁵⁸ Srpski misionar, NN 9-10, 1959 (V.M.)

the question of their grace and the question of our submission to them. Of course, the answer to both questions can be only no. 'For what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? Or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel?' (II Corinthians 6.14-15).

"We have two Dionisijes, that is, Dionisije Milivojevič and Irinej Kovačevič, who are both illegal and graceless. The first was condemned by the authority that enthroned him and which he constantly acknowledged. It is understandable that now he is trying to deny the right of that authority to condemn him, but that does not save him. Irinej Kovačevič was consecrated by Ukrainian *samosviaty*, who themselves are not lawful and have no grace, so they could not give him what they themselves did not have. In his message for the Nativity of the Lord Dionisije has promised us more of these *samosvyaty* hierarchs. For this consecration Bishop Dionisije turned to the ROCOR and American Metropolia, but only the *samosvyaty* accepted.

"With regard to that subordination of the official church to the godless authorities, we should do as the Russians did in the same case. Will we found a Catacomb Church, as it was in Russia, which will not acknowledge the official Serbian Church and its capitulation before the godless authorities? We don't know. But we know what the emigration should do, it is the foundation of the Serbian Church Abroad. What Bishop Dionisije is doing now is nothing, since he is under suspension and he is guilty of many things and should have been defrocked long ago. For two decades he has been leading the American-Canadian diocese, and now we see her pitiful end. And the same thing would have happened with the Church Abroad if he had been the leader. But will the Serbian emigration do something in this direction, or will it go on following the leader without a head? We cannot tell for sure. In any case, honourable and God-loving Serbian emigrants, who have God and faith in the Church in the first place in their lives, should remember that each hierarch who comes to freedom but out of submission of Patriarch German and in connection with the godless communist authorities and their representatives, is not a real hierarch and has no grace of God in him. In the same way, the suspended Bishop Dionisije and his samosviat Irinej and all the others whom he may invent are not real and have no grace. To the Serbian God-loving emigration it is left that until the foundation of the Serbian Church Abroad the Serbian God-loving emigration should turn for their spiritual needs to the representatives of our sister Church, the Russian Church Abroad. She is the only one in the world that has remained faithful and undefiled as the Bride of Christ.' 759"760

⁷⁵⁹ Srpski Misionar, N 19, 1964, pp. 3-9 (V.M.)

⁷⁶⁰ Monk Joseph of Avila, Serbia, in Moss, *Letopis Velike Bitke*, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 399-404. Joachim Wertz (private e-mail communication, February 4, 2001) writes: "You ask me about my attitude toward the 'Free Serbs', by which I understand what has become the New Gračanica Metropolia. The schism has been overcome, but the healing continues. Therefore I am reluctant to speak on this matter (and also because I do not have first-hand experience of that tragic time). Nevertheless it is something that needs to be discussed, especially for the benefit of non-Serbian Orthodox. I have read on the matter, but much of what I know comes

Cast out in this way, three dioceses and about forty parishes of the Free Serbs, as they now called themselves, applied to join ROCOR. Two archbishops – Averky of Jordanville and John (Maximovich) of San Francisco - supported them. However, other bishops, including Archbishop Vitaly of Canada, were opposed, and the Free Serbs' petition was rejected.

After being rejected by ROCOR, the Free Serbs briefly came into communion first with two Ukrainian bishops of the Polish Orthodox Church and then with the Patriarchate of Alexandria. Fleeing the Ecumenism of the latter, they briefly found refuge with the "Florinite" Greek Old Calendarists led by Archbishop Auxentius, on September 11/24, 1981.

from others who were either involved in the issue or who were witnesses. Most of these people were very close to Vladika Nikolai [Velimirovič]. And I personally trust them. Complaints were made against Bishop Dionisije to the mother Church in Belgrade long before the events of 1963. He was accused of conduct unbecoming of a Bishop. People are willing to suggest financial misconduct, but certainly moral misconduct is implied (one of these areas where Serbs are not too open). Dionisije had successfully established for himself his own domain in North America 'from the Atlantic to the Pacific' that was untouchable. Perhaps much like Archbishop Iakovos did. No one doubts the sincerity of his anti-fascism or his anti- communism. During WWII he did much to publicize the plight of the Serbs. But he had his 'own little thing going' and no one could intrude. Problems began happening after the war when the Serbian émigrés, including Bishop Nikolai, started to arrive. Many of these émigrés, several of whom I know or knew personally, had various levels of theological education. Their services were not welcomed by Dionisije. Neither was Vladika Nikolai. He was treated rudely and often ignored. Dionisije perceived him as a threat, though Nikolai always deferred to him as the ruling Bishop. Eventually Vladika Nikolai accepted the offer of the rectorship of St. Tikhon's Seminary and virtually 'retired' from American Serbian Church life. In short, Dionisije was threatened by the potential for spiritual and ecclesiastical 'revival' that came with the émigrés. (Please bear in mind that Vladika Nikolai, while in exile, was still the ruling bishop of the diocese of Zhiča. He remained such until his repose. He could not have been a canonical threat to the bishop of another diocese). In a remarkable example of bad timing, the complaints to the Patriarchate against Bishop Dionisije reached a crescendo at the very time Dionisije was most vocally anticommunist. Pressure on the Patriarchate to remove him came from two sources: his own flock and the Tito regime. Several bishops were sent to investigate him and they were treated not in a dignified manner. Dionisije refused to cooperate. There was no choice but to remove him. (Note this happened in 1963, Bishop Nikolai having died in 1956). Dionisije wrapped himself in anticommunism to conceal other matters. This is my understanding and opinion. Left on his own, at one point he even applied to be accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate! He was refused, as he was by the Synod Abroad. To create a hierarchy, he resorted to uncanonical Ukrainian bishops. Fortunately his successor, Bishop Irinej (Kovačevič), later Metropolitan of the New Gračanica Metropolia, was a much more Church centered man. Later when the diocese became 'the Free Serbian Church' and he had contacts with the Greek Old Calendarists (at that time it was with Paisios of Astoria and whatever Synod he was part of), and also with the antiecumenist Patriarch of Alexandria Nicholas VI (under whose jurisdiction he was for a brief time), he and some of the clergy became more traditionalist (although I can't say how well this trickled down). It does seem that Metropolitan Irinej did leave a traditionalist legacy. As I said above, the schism is over, but is still healing. All of the antagonism now revolves around property claims and money. I should point out that I believe it is true that Fr. Justin Popovich truly believed that Bishop Dionisije was being persecuted because of his anti-communism. I feel he only knew, or was willing to believe, only one aspect of the story."

Whatever their canonical status, the Free Serbs did oppose ecumenism – until their reabsorption into the patriarchate in 1991. Moreover, not all the Free Serbs joined the patriarchate, and some parishes remain independent to this day.

There were some anti-ecumenists in the patriarchate. Thus in November, 1994 Bishop Artemije of Raska and Prizren, in a memorandum to the Serbian Synod, said that ecumenism was an ecclesiological heresy, and that the Serbs should withdraw from the WCC.⁷⁶¹

Decades later he wrote: "The result of this participation [of the Serbs in the WCC] was reflected in certain material aid which the Serbian Orthodox Church periodically received from the WCC in the form of medicine, medical care and rehabilitation of some individuals in Switzerland, student scholarships, and financial donations for certain concrete purposes and needs of the SOC, such as the construction of a new building by the Theological School. We paid for these crumbs of material assistance by losing, on the spiritual plane, the purity of our faith, canonical consistency and faithfulness to the Holy Tradition of the Orthodox Church. The presence of our representatives (and Orthodox representatives in general) at various and sundry ecumenical gatherings has no canonical justification. We did not go there in order to boldly, openly and unwaveringly confess the eternal and unchangeable Truth of the Orthodox Faith and Church, but in order to make compromises and to agree more or less to all those decisions and formulations offered to us by the non-Orthodox. That is how we ultimately arrived at Balamand, Chambésy and Assisi, which taken as a whole represent infidelity and betrayal of the Holy Orthodox Faith."762

Logically, in order to make his actions conform with his words, Bishop Artemije should have left the Serbian Synod. Nevertheless, his words remain true, and constitute a clear condemnation of the position of the Serbian Church since its entry into the WCC in the 1960s. At the present time, Bishop Artemije is in schism from the official Serbian patriarchate, but not for reasons of ecumenism; and he claims to be still in communion with the rest of World Orthodoxy...

⁷⁶¹ "The arrangements were made by Bp. Paisius of Astoria acting as Auxentius' representative... The decision is signed by Abp. Auxentius, Metr. Paisius of North and South America and Metr. Euthymius of Thessalonica" (George Lardas, "The Old Calendar Movement in the Greek Church", Holy Trinity Monastery, Jurdanville, 1983 (unpublished thesis), p. 22). 762 Bishop Artemije, Statement to the Thessalonica Theological Conference, September, 2004.

52. THE BULGARIAN CHURCH AND THE NEW CALENDAR

The early sixties were years of persecution throughout Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria many priests and monks were held in approximately 30 death camps, where prisoners were brought up one by one to be slaughtered.⁷⁶³

Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech was not allowed to be published in Bulgaria (as in Romania), so there was very little thawing of the Stalinist communist system. In 1961 Todor Zhivkov assumed complete dictatorial power, becoming Prime Minister as well as Party General Secretary. "His supporters were placed in all the key positions at the top of the party. Bulgaria, economically dependent on the Soviet Union, remained a subservient Stalinist satellite – practically another Soviet republic. As Zhivkov stated after Khrushchev had visited the country in 1961, Bulgaria's watch was set to Moscow's time."⁷⁶⁴

The Bulgarian Church also set its watch to Moscow's time. Thus in 1968 it adopted the new calendar at the KGB's insistence. The change was imposed, according to one account, at the insistence of the WCC, which in 1965-66 had sent letters on the subject to the churches.⁷⁶⁵ But according to another, more authoritative account, this was done on orders from the KGB-controlled Moscow Patriarchate, which wished to see how the people reacted to the change in Bulgaria before proceeding with the same innovation in Russia. In the event, the only Orthodox in Bulgaria who rejected the innovation in 1968 turned out to be the *Russian* women's monastery of the Protecting Veil at Kniazhevo, Sophia. Consequently, the KGB decided to hold back from imposing it on the still more conservative-minded believers of Russia...⁷⁶⁶

Bishop Photius of Triaditza writes: "For some months before the introduction of the reform, *Tserkoven Vestnik* informed the astonished believing people that the reform was being carried out 'in accordance with the ecumenist striving of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church...' The Bulgarian clergy and even episcopate were completely unprepared to resist the calendar innovation, while the people, suspecting something amiss, began to grumble. The calendar reform was introduced skilfully and with lightning suddenness by Patriarch Cyril – an ardent modernist and 'heartfelt' friend of the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras! Everyone knew that the patriarch was on good terms with the communist authorities (for his 'services' to it he received the title of 'academic' – member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences!) Everyone also knew of his despotic temperament: he did all he could to persecute and annihilate his ideological opponents."⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶³ Ivan Marchevsky, personal communication.

⁷⁶⁴ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster, p. 108.

⁷⁶⁵ Eastern Churches Review, vol. II, No 3, Spring, 1969, p. 335.

⁷⁶⁶ Archimandrite Porphyrius of Sofia, personal communication, February, 1981.

⁷⁶⁷ Pravoslavnaia Rus' (Orthodox Russia), No 21 (1522), November 1/14, 1994, pp. 8, 9.

There is other evidence that the Moscow Patriarchate was planning to adopt the new calendar – and had been instrumental in imposing it on Bulgaria. Archimandrite (now retired Bishop of Portland) Sergei writes: "In 1971 Metropolitan Nikodem of Leningrad visited Alaska in order to venerate the relics of St. Herman. In an effort to distance itself from the MP, the then-new OCA had not invited the MP hierarchs to participate in the August, 1970 canonization of that Saint. Metropolitan Nikodem (and his OCA guide, Father Kyril Fotiev) spent 5 days in Sitka en route to Kodiak and I was the local host. During several long conversations, Metropolitan Nikodem mentioned that he was intent on adopting the civil calendar for the MP, and as a test case, had brought about Bulgaria's switch from the patristic to the civil calendar [in 1968]."⁷⁶⁸

Already, in 1967, the MP declared: "Bearing in mind the practice of the Ancient Church, when East and West (Rome and the Asian bishops) celebrated Pascha at different times, while preserving complete communion in prayer between themselves, and taking into account the experience of the Orthodox Church of Finland and our parishes in Holland, as also the exceptional position of the parishioners of the church of the Resurrection of Christ amidst the heterodox world, [it has been resolved] to allow Orthodox parishioners of the Moscow Patriarchate living in Switzerland to celebrate the immovable feast and the feasts of the Paschal cycle according to the new style." ⁷⁶⁹

In 1964, some parishes of the Bulgarian patriarchate in the USA petitioned ROCOR to ordain their leader, Archimandrite Cyril (Ionchev), to the episcopate. The petition was granted, and in August Metropolitan Philaret and four other bishops ordained him. However, in 1968 the Bulgarian patriarchate adopted the new calendar, and soon the Bulgarian parishes began to agitate that they be allowed to use the new calendar. In 1971 Bishop Cyril gave a report on this subject to the Hierarchical Council in Montreal, and in 1972 he and his parishes joined the American Metropolia with the permission of ROCOR.⁷⁷⁰

Concerning the correctness of the Julian calendar, the Bulgarian Old Calendarist Archimandrite Sergei (Iazadjiev) relates the following: "In August of 1971, Nikolai [now Hieromonk Theophan] and I were coming back from rest and medical treatment at Narechen. Passing through the town of Plovdiv, we called in at the Metochion of Zographou to venerate the tomb of the Holy King Boris [+906]. Schema-monk Seraphim of Zographou was in attendance at the tomb. He told us that recently (1969-70), under pressure from the Geneva-based World Council of Churches, the Jerusalem Patriarchate had introduced the 'New Julian' Calendar (as had the Bulgarian, Macedonian, and other Patriarchates, since there was overwhelming pressure at the time to introduce

⁷⁶⁸ Archimandrite Sergei (later Bishop of Portland), personal communication, 15 February, 2004.

⁷⁶⁹ Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1967, No 8, p. 1; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 36.

⁷⁷⁰ Pravoslavnaia Rus', No 16 (1829), August 15/28, 2007, pp. 14-15.

the New Calendar). That same year, on Great Saturday, when from time immemorial the Holy Fire descends on the Lord's Sepulchre, this year the Fire did not appear. Shocked, Patriarch Benedict of Jerusalem commanded that the Old Calendar, which had been in use until then, be restored immediately in the jurisdiction of his Patriarchate. The next year, the Holy Fire once again descended on the Lord's Sepulchre on Great Saturday; the same occurs even until the present."⁷⁷¹

On April 14/27, 1972 St. Philaret of New York said about the condemnations of the Gregorian calendar: "These condemnations (of 1583, 1587 and 1593) have never been revoked by a later council. They keep their force and are obligatory for all Orthodox Christians. The innovation of the new calendar has caused a schism in all the Local Churches that have adopted it. Thus Greece, Cyprus, Romania and now Bulgaria have tasted the fruit of disobedience..."

⁷⁷¹ Hieromonk Cassian, *A Scientific Examination of the Orthodox Church Calendar*, eds. Archbishop Chrysostomos and Hieromonk Gregory (Etna, CA: Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 1998), Ch. 9.

53. ECUMENISM ACCELERATES

In the second half of the 1960s opposition to Ecumenism in the Local Orthodox Churches was gradually suppressed. Some conservative hierarchs died, such as Patriarch Christopher of Alexandria (in 1967); others were more forcibly removed or replaced, such as Archbishop Chrysostom of Athens and the leaders of some of the Athonite monasteries. Others were effectively silenced by bribery, such as the Orthodox Church of America. The Greek State Church was worn down by a mixture of bribes and political arm-twisting. The bribes came from the Vatican in the form of the return of the relics of Saints Andrew, Titus and Isidore to the Greek Church (and of St. Sabbas to the Jerusalem Patriarchate). The Greeks found it difficult on the one hand to give thanks for the return of these relics, and on the other hand to put up a firm resistance to the lifting of the anathemas against Rome.

Another clever move on the part of the Vatican was to allow 3000 Catholics in Corfu and on the Ionian islands to celebrate Pascha in 1967 on 30 April, the Orthodox date. As the journal *Ekklesia* pointed out: "The decision evokes natural suspicion that fundamentally this is a propaganda move and an attempt to proselytize the Orthodox population of Corfu."⁷⁷² As full union beckoned, it became less important to the papists on which day they and the Orthodox celebrated the feasts as long as it was the same day.

There is other evidence that the Pope was attempting to force the pace in this year. Thus in May the Catholic Ecumenical Directory was published, which allowed Catholics to take communion in Orthodox churches if they were isolated or could not receive Catholic sacraments for a long period. And yet in March Patriarch Athenagoras had said that Orthodox could not (yet) receive "sacramental grace from a priest who is not himself Orthodox". Then in July the Pope travelled to Constantinople, where he prayed together with the Patriarch. This visit was returned in October, when Athenagoras visited Rome, and the two prelates sat on equal and identical thrones – "an event which must be unprecedented in the annals of papal Rome, and for which there was certainly no parallel at the Council of Florence in 1438-9."⁷⁷³

This exchange of visits was made easier by the fact that on April 21 a military coup had taken place in Greece. On May 10 the newly established government promulgated a "compulsory law" which dismissed the Synod, replaced it by a Synod chosen by the government, retired Archbishop Chrysostom as being too old, and replaced him with Archimandrite Jerome, who had been a member of the central committee of the World Council of Churches since 1954. This act was very reminiscent of the way in which the revolutionary government chose Chrysostom Papadopoulos in 1922 and must be presumed to have had the same aim – the replacement of the existing incumbent by one more closely identified with the West and Ecumenism.

⁷⁷² Eastern Churches Review, vol. I, No 3, Spring, 1967, p. 291.

⁷⁷³ Eastern Churches Review, vol. I, No 4, Winter, 1967-68, p. 419.

The new archbishop quickly showed his credentials by coming to "full agreement" with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and issuing the following statement in his enthronement address: "Our relations with non-Orthodox confessions must be marked by Christian love and by mutual respect, so as to foster friendship; but at the same time we must preserve our dignity and our firm adherence to the Orthodox faith and teaching. As a pre-condition for any closer relations, we must insist on the condemnation of proselytism."⁷⁷⁴

The only problem about this seemingly conservative statement was that "firm adherence to the Orthodox faith" and "the condemnation of proselytism" are incompatible, in that if we believe that the Orthodox Faith is the True Faith we are bound to hope and work for the conversion of people of other faiths.⁷⁷⁵ We condemn proselytism among the Orthodox, not because it is "unfair" and goes against some kind of ecclesiastical non-aggression pact, but because it takes people away from the saving ark of the One True Church. By the same token we support Orthodox missionary work among the heterodox because it brings the heterodox to salvation, in fulfilment of the Saviour's words: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations" (Matthew 28.19).⁷⁷⁶

Archbishop Jerome of Athens also introduced several innovations, as Fr. Basile Sakkas writes:

"(a) that the priests cut their hair and their beards and go about in civilian dress.

"(b) that the use of organs and mixed choirs singing in harmony be adopted in the churches, although this is in contradiction of the Tradition of the sacred music of our Church.

"(c) that Mattins be suppressed and two Liturgies be served instead 'in order to facilitate the faithful'. In this manner, anyone can enter in the middle of the first Liturgy and leave in the middle of the second, just like in the cinema. Hence, we adopt the practices and conceptions of the Latins.

⁷⁷⁴ Eastern Churches Review, vol. I, No 4, Winter, 1967-68, p. 425.

⁷⁷⁵ As St. Anatoly the Younger of Optina (+1922) said: "My child, if you see some people of another faith quarrelling with an Orthodox and wanting by flattery to tear him away from the Orthodox Church, help the Orthodox. In this way you will deliver a sheep from the jaws of a lion. But if you are silent and leave him without help, this is the same as if you took a redeemed soul from Christ and sold him to Satan." "If somebody tells you: 'Both your and our faith is from God,' you, child, reply as follows: 'Corrupter of the faith! Or do you consider God also to be of two faiths! Haven't you heard what Scripture says: "There is one God, one Faith, one Baptism" (Ephesians 4.5).'... Amen."

⁷⁷⁶ Archimandrite John Lewis of Holy Theotokos Monastery, North Fort Myers, Florida related to the present author how he had once visited Patriarch Athenagoras in August, 1967, when he was a subdeacon in the Ruthenian Byzantine Catholic Church but was seeking to convert to Holy Orthodoxy. Athenagoras discouraged him, saying that he had to stay in the Uniate church and act as a "bridge" between Catholics and Orthodox! (V.M.)

"(d) that there be a change of the *Paschalia* (this is still being debated furiously). The proposal here is that the date of the celebration of Pasch be fixed so that it always occurs on the second Sunday of April.

"(e) that for 'archaeological' concerns, the iconostases in the churches be taken down.

"(f) that the sacrament of Holy Baptism be changed (read 'mutilated') little by little. Forget for a moment that the triple repetition of the Symbol of Faith has almost everywhere fallen into oblivion and instead of blessing the waters used for the baptism with the appropriate prayers, previously blessed holy water is simply added (as though the Fathers who prescribed that the Symbol of Faith be recited three times and that the waters be blessed directly knew nothing and we are therefore obliged to correct them). Moreover, the exorcisms are suppressed and the children are made to sit in the baptismal font and then water is poured upon their heads by the hands of the priest and thus there is no *immersion*..."⁷⁷⁷

There were other, more political reasons for the coup in the Church. Athenagoras was favoured by the Americans as being the man best able, on the one hand, to effect a *rapprochement* between Turkey and Greece, and, on the other, to resist the influence of the Soviet-dominated Moscow Patriarchate. So his opponents in the Greek Church had to be removed.⁷⁷⁸

But the majority of the monks on Mount Athos were still fiercely opposed to the lifting of the anathemas. Therefore in November, 1967, an exarchate consisting of three bishops of the newly constituted Greek Church was sent to Athos to try and reconcile the monks and bring those monasteries that had broken communion with the ecumenists back into obedience to the patriarchate. In this mission, however, they failed – for the time being.

In 1968 the Fourth General Assembly of the WCC took place in Uppsala. As we have seen, Patriarch German of Serbia was one of the six presidents, and remained in that post for the next ten years. Uppsala considerably furthered the ecumenical movement. The Orthodox, as the new general secretary Carson Blake joyfully pointed out, were now taking full part in all the sections and committees and not, as often in the past, issuing separate statements disagreeing with the majority Protestant view.

 ⁷⁷⁷ Sakkas, *The Calendar Question*, Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1972, pp. 43-44.
 ⁷⁷⁸ Fr. George Macris, *The Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement*, Seattle: St. Nectarios Press, 1986, pp. 101-105.

54. CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The 1960s was a pivotal era for America and the world. For America, it contained one great achievement and one great failure.

The great achievement was the beginning of the real emancipation of the black former slaves of the south. Formal emancipation had taken place already a hundred years before; but the blacks of the south had remained, if not slaves, at any rate definitely second-class citizens, oppressed and poor, as a result of the continuing power of racist white supremacists, southern senators, local authorities and the Klu Klux Klan. Successive presidents from Roosevelt to Eisenhower, had looked with sympathy on their plight, but without being able to help them much practically owing partly to their preoccupation with other matters and partly to the ability of southern senators to block change in the Congress. The main issue in the 1950s was segregation between black and white children in schools. A judgement made in 1954 (*Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education*) made segregation illegal. But obstruction of its implementation continued.

However, this stranglehold exerted by the white supremacists was broken under the liberal presidents JFK (John Fitzgerald Kennedy), who narrowly won the 1964 election largely on black votes, and – especially – LBJ (Lyndon Baynes Johnson), who won such a crushing victory in the 1964 election that he was able to proceed with his civil rights agenda without serious opposition from the politicians, Democrat or Republican, although there was much violence – bombing of black churches and murdering of black people.

An important part in this victory was played by local protestors, especially the eloquent and courageous Baptist pastor, Dr. Martin Luther King, who in August 1963 said: "I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.' I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood..."

King emphasized the Christian message of love for one's enemies; peaceful protest, not retaliation was his tactic. He hoped to stir up White Christians to live up to their Christian heritage, and had some success. In 1965 a huge procession was organized in Alabama, where two civil rights volunteers had just been killed. "The local sheriff," writes Hugh Brogan, "thought of a new refinement of brutality: he and his men used electric cattle-prods on demonstrators to make them trot. (This was too much even for the sluggish consciences of some Southern whites: seventy ministers marched to the county courthouse to show their disapproval.) After an embarrassing false start a grand march of protest set off to walk from Selma to Montgomery, led by almost every prominent black in the country, and a good many notable whites too. Four days on the way, it was addressed on its arrival by the two African-American winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, Ralph Bunche, who had won his fifteen years previously for his work in Palestine, and Martin Luther King, who had been awarded his only a few months previously. But the Confederate flag waved over the state capitol, and that very night (25 March 1965) yet another civil rights activist was killed.

"The savagery lurking in American life was welling to the surface; but the resources of civilization were not yet exhausted. Reasoning that the only way to end the crisis in the South was by supporting the blacks to the hilt, so that an irreversible defeat could be dealt the white supremacists, Lyndon Johnson sent another civil rights bill to Congress. It was a short, sharp measure, and probably the most effective law of its kind ever passed in American history. It struck down all the instruments of obstruction and delay that the segregationist states had placed in the way of the black voter, and authorized the American Attorney General to send federal registrars into states and counties where he had reason to think that the registration process was being used to deny citizens their voting rights. Congress, which now had an overwhelming liberal majority, thanks to the Johnson landslide in 1964, passed the bill swiftly into law, and almost at once it began to show its value. The threat of federal intervention spurred on some local officials in the Deep South to undertake reforms; elsewhere the federal registrars appeared. As a result nearly 250,000 new black voters were registered before the end of 1965, and in the years that followed the black population of the South continued to register itself, at last, in numbers proportionate to its strength. The effect was soon felt in elections; blacks began to appear in state legislatures where they had not been seen since Reconstruction (though it would be ten years before an African-American won a state-wide election in the South); and the way was clear to a fundamental change in American politics and society. In 1976 Jimmy Carter, a white Georgian, would be elected to the Presidency thanks, in large part, to the vote of Southern blacks; racist Southern white politicians would begin to court the black vote; and the castle of white supremacy fell into ruin. There was still great hostility and tension between the races, but as the years went on and the South realized that the old demon was gone for ever, there was a quickening of energy and hope. At last spring came again to Dixie..."779

However, it was a different story in the north, where the appalling living conditions and massive unemployment in the black ghettoes of the great cities led to criminality, riots and murder. The civil rights movement had been "of inestimable advantage to the black middle class: the number of blacks in professional occupations doubled between 1960 and 1974, and their place in society was increasingly unchallenged. But most blacks were not middle-class; indeed about half of them lived on, or below, or near, the poverty line, the line below which, statisticians reckoned, their income was inadequate for the necessities of life. It proved exceedingly difficult to find effective means of

⁷⁷⁹ Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 636-637.

helping them, though Lyndon Johnson talked of a war on poverty, and A. Philip Randolph proposed a 'Negro Marshall Plan', which would have involved the expenditure of \$10,000,000,000 a year for ten years: but even the liberal Congress of the mid-sixties balked at the idea of expenditure on anything like this scale for such a cause (though at the same time it was voting much larger sums for the war in Vietnam) and after the election of Richard Nixon to the Presidency in 1968 it was clearly to vain to hope for anything of the kind. Indeed, one of Nixon's advisers tactlessly suggested that the time had come to practice a little 'benign neglect' of black problems. This outraged the black community, but outrage alone was not going to change anything.

"The dilemma was most cruelly exposed in the last years of Martin Luther King. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act the first phase in 'the Second Reconstruction' was virtually complete: in political and legal terms blacks now were, or would soon become, formally equal to whites. But their social and economic deprivations were as bad as ever, and it was clearly incumbent on the leaders of 'the Movement' to launch a second phase which would tackle the horrors of black life in the North. At first King tried to apply the Gandhian tactics which had proved so successful in the South, but they did not work. For one thing he had decided that the war in Vietnam was mopping up economic resources that should have been used to improve conditions at home; that it was killing a disproportionate number of black Americans; that it was hideously cruel; and that it might lead to world war. These considerations impelled the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize to denounce the war repeatedly; but in so doing he alienated the administration which was waging it. Lyndon Johnson was a vindictive man who never liked or trusted Martin King; he never again gave more than token countenance and protection to the activities of the SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership Conference]. What this meant became painfully clear when, in 1966, King took his organization to Chicago and launched a series of marches through the all-white suburbs of the city, hoping to bring down the structure of *de facto* housing segregation there, for he reasoned that if the blacks could break out of the ghetto they might find decent jobs, houses and schools waiting for them. His concrete aim was to shame the city of Chicago into living up to its own open-housing ordinances, its own regulations which required, for example, that all rented property should be repainted once a year. He did manage to get a surprising number of concessions out of the city administration, and a large number of paper promises. But the spirit of willing compliance, essential for real progress, was lacking. Richard J. Daly, the mayor, was the last of the great city bosses. He was under no pressure from Washington to work with King. He knew that the black movement itself was splitting, as the younger activists turned away from King and non-violence to the phantasms of 'Black Power' and war on whitey phantasms which blended all too well into the criminal violence in which the days of all too many young blacks were passed. He felt that his own political power in Chicago was challenged, and in any case he could hardly make concessions to the blacks when the whites on whom he depended politically were showing such bitter hostility to the marchers. The climax came when 200 marchers through the suburb of Cicero (Al Capone's former lordship) were met with an incessant rain of bottles and stones: the inhabitants of Cicero, mainly Polish-Americans, saw the black demonstrators as embodiments and precursors of all the forces which were threatening their way of life: but for the protection of the police and the National Guard, there would certainly have been killings. King withdrew from Chicago to carry on the struggle elsewhere; then, on 4 April 1968, he was assassinated by yet another of the wretched, half-insane murderers who were so tragically common at that time...^{"780}

"The campaign for civil rights," writes Holland, "gave to Christianity an overt centrality that it had not had since the decades before the civil war. King, by stirring the slumbering conscience of white Christians, succeeded in setting his country on a transformative new path. 'In talk of love as Paul had talked of it, as a thing greater than prophecy, or knowledge, or faith, had once again become a revolutionary act. King's dream, that the glory of the Lord would be revealed, and all flesh see it together, helped to animate a great yearning across America – in West Coast coffee shops as in Alabama churches, on verdant campuses as on picket lines, among attorneys as among refuse-workers - for justice to roll on like a river, and righteousness like a never-failing stream..."⁷⁸¹

Unfortunately, the flow was to come to an abrupt halt with King's murder in 1968. Fifty years later, the movement for civic rights had mutated into a form of Marxist identity politics that resorted to precisely the violent means that King had abhorred. As for Christianity, it had fallen by the wayside...

⁷⁸⁰ Brogan, op. cit., pp. 642-643.

⁷⁸¹ Holland, op. cit., p. 475.

55. THE VIETNAM WAR

"The conflict between the superpowers for predominance in the third world," writes Niall Ferguson, "might equally well be called the Third World's War. If the threat of mutually assured destruction ultimately sufficed to produce a 'long peace' for the United States, the Soviet Union, and a divided Europe, the same was not true for much of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. There the war between the superpowers, often waged through proxies, had a shockingly high cost in human life. We now know much more about that war than anyone outside official circles knew at the time. True, it was no secret that, as the European empires fell apart or dismantled themselves in the great postwar scramble to 'decolonize', the Soviet Union had an advantage. 'Almost any one of the new-born states of the world,' grumbled Eisenhower, 'would far rather embrace Communism or any other form of dictatorship than to acknowledge the political domination of another government.' The 'new countries' reminded him of a row of dominoes waiting to topple one after another. At times this process seemed to be happening even more rapidly than the 'sweep of the dictators' in the 1930s. 'The Korean invasion, the Huk activities in the Philippines, the determined effort to overrun all Viet Nam, the attempted subversion of Laos, Cambodia and Burma, the well-nigh successful attempt to take over Iran, the exploitation of the troublespot of Trieste, and the penetration attempted in Guatemala' were all examples 'of Soviet pressure designed to accelerate Communist conquest of every country where the Soviet government could make its influence felt'. Eisenhower and Dulles might have come into office talking of 'liberation', as if the Soviet empire could somehow be rolled back; they very quickly realized that the Kremlin noted with the sharp schadenfreude of a man ousted from the classical world that they were 'saddled' with containment. Although Cuba and, arguably, North Vietnam were the only countries lost to Communism on Eisenhower's watch, that was not for want of trying on the part of Moscow. In January 1961 Khrushchev explicitly pledged Soviet support for 'national wars of liberation'. The idea was to ride the wave of decolonization by representing Moscow as the ally of all revolutionaries and branding the United States as the new imperialist. It is all too easy to forget just how successful this strategy was. Short of fighting multiple Korean-style wars, it was only through a huge campaign of 'grey' and 'black' propaganda and covert operations that the United States was able to slow the spread of Soviet influence..."782

The Vietnam War cost between two and three million lives, the vast majority Vietnamese: "Around forty Vietnamese perished for every American..."⁷⁸³ But the slaughter of the Vietnamese was not what sapped the will of the Americans: it was the unpopularity of the war with the younger generation of the American people (the older generation in general continued to support it), together with the incompetence, cowardice and mendaciousness it revealed in the higher reaches of government. It was the great test of Americanism, of America's

⁷⁸² Ferguson, *Kissinger 1923-1968: The Idealist*, New York: Penguin, 2016, pp. 408-409.

⁷⁸³ Max Hastings, *Vietnam*, London: William Collins, 2019, p. xix.

claims to provide the way, the truth and the life for mankind. It must be admitted that she failed the test; and all subsequent foreign initiatives (for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan) have lived under the shadow of that failure, and have to a greater or lesser extent replicated it. Even the Cold War itself was not so much won by America as lost by the Soviet Union. This is not to say that the aim itself – the overthrow of Communism - was not laudable and necessary. But the means used to attain that necessary end were the wrong means, and, as St. Aristoclei of Moscow said of another failed war against Communism, the Russian Civil War, "the spirit was not right".

The war was waged by two liberal presidents, John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, who hated each other but pursued essentially the same failed policy. Kennedy came from a very rich Irish-American family from Boston; his father's money bankrolled his (and his brothers') ascent to political stardom, where his debauched private life and mafia connections betrayed the essential emptiness of his idealism. "Resembling a bull elephant," Johnson "had a far more coherent political vision than his stylish predecessor. He had been a committed New Dealer and as such FDR's favourite son in Texan politics. He never lost that vision, even as he reached pragmatic accommodations with the big oil men and cattle ranchers of his home state. Lying and fighting dirty came as naturally to him as belching and farting in genteel company..."⁷⁸⁴

The South Vietnamese prime minister from 1954 was "Ngo Ninh Diem, a nationalist from a Hué Mandarin family,... a militant Roman Catholic in a predominantly pacifist and Buddhist country." ⁷⁸⁵ He and his opium-addicted brother Nhu ran the country in a thoroughly corrupt and nepotistic manner...

And yet it could be argued that it was neither Kennedy nor Johnson, nor even Diem, who started the Vietnam War on the anti-communist side, but Eisenhower... He and Dulles had refused to sign the Geneva Accords of 1954; in effect, therefore, they refused to accept that the war was over when the French withdrew. Moreover, Eisenhower "acquiesced in Diem's refusal to submit to the test of free elections. That was a fundamental departure from American global policy in the Cold War, which had always rested on the contention that conflict between East and West should be decided not by force of arms but by the test of an honest poll. Diem was permitted and, indeed, was rewarded by American military and economic assistance; for the first time direct and not through a French intermediary. Thus it was Eisenhower who committed America's original sin in Vietnam. In default of unitary elections, the Vietcong emerged in 1957 and a new war started up in the South. Eisenhower made America a party to that war, claiming, in his last major statement on the subject (4 April 1959: 'The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.'

⁷⁸⁴ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 491-492.

⁷⁸⁵ Burleigh, op. cit., p. 240.

"When Kennedy reached the White House, Vietnam was already one of America's largest and costliest commitments anywhere in the world. It is hard to understand why he made no attempt to get back to the Geneva Accords and hold unified free elections. In Paris on 31 May 1961, de Gaulle urged him urgently to disengage: 'I predict you will sink step by step into a bottomless military and political quagmire.' Nevertheless, in November that year Kennedy authorized the despatch to Vietnam of the first 7,000 American troops, for 'base security'.⁷⁸⁶ General Maxwell Taylor, who recommended the step, warned him that, if things got worse, 'it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce' and that 'there is no limit to our possible engagement.' Kennedy himself shared the unease. He told his colleague Arthur Schlesinger: 'The troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told to send in more troops. It's like taking a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another.' That was an accurate prediction. Kennedy's instinct was either to stay out or bring things to a head by a direct American attack on Hanoi. An American invasion of the North, which would have been successful at this stage [?], would at least have had the merit of putting the clock back to 1954 and the Geneva Accords. There could be no fundamental moral objection to such a course, since by 1961 the South had effectively invaded the South. It must always be borne in mind when analysing the long tragedy of Indo-China, that it was the determination of Ho, his colleagues and successors, to dominate the entire country, including Laos and Cambodia, which was, from 1945 onwards, the principal dynamic of the struggle and the ultimate cause of all the bloodshed. America's errors were merely a contributing factor. Nevertheless they were serious. Unwilling to leave the country to its fate, or to carry the land war to the North, Kennedy settled for a hopeless compromise, in which military aid, in ever-growing but never decisive quantities, was given to a client government he could not control. Diem was by far the ablest of the Vietnam leaders and he had the great merit of being a civilian. Lyndon Johnson, then Vice-President, termed him with some exaggeration 'the Churchill of South-East Asia', and told a journalist, 'Shit, man, he's the only boy we got out there.' But Kennedy, exasperated by his failure to pull a resounding success out of Vietnam, blamed the agent rather than the policy. In the autumn of 1963 he secretly authorized American support for an anti-Diem coup. It duly took place on 1 November, Diem being murdered and the CIA providing 542,000 in bribes for the soldiers who set up a military junta. This was America's second great sin: 'the worst mistake we ever made,' as Lyndon Johnson put it. Three weeks later Kennedy himself was murdered and Johnson was president."787

It is difficult not to see in Kennedy's murder Divine retribution for the murder of his fellow-Catholics Diem and his brother...

⁷⁸⁶ J.J. Roberts has a slightly different figure. Kennedy sent "not only financial and material help, but also 4,000 American 'advisers' to help the South Vietnam government put its military house in order." *9History of the World*, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, p. 845) (V.M.)

⁷⁸⁷ Johnson, Modern Times, pp. 632-634.

"The overthrow of Diem," writes Niall Ferguson, "was not only a genuinely criminal act: it was also a strategic disaster. Far from strengthening the South Vietnamese state, it had precisely the opposite effect, increasing its dependence on the United States. In an act that wholly invalidated all the earlier talk of reducing troop levels, Kennedy had to all intents and purposes made it clear that the government in Saigon was as much a creature of the United States as that in Budapest was a creature of the Soviet Union. In both cases, the incumbents owed their power to a bloody superpower-sponsored coup..."⁷⁸⁸

"The Kennedy administration," writes Burleigh, "was captive to the doctrine of sub-nuclear 'flexible response'. Counter-insurgency operations were only one item in the tool-kit. It also included tactical good deeds of a progressive nature, what nowadays is called 'nation-building'. JFK was sympathetic to hearts-and-minds warfare, involving quarantining the population from the Viet Cong so as 'to put a TV in every thatched hut', while the army pursued and killed the enemy lurking in between. Senior military commanders appreciated that this flexible response might boost their budgets, but were fundamentally wedded to more conventional forms of warfare based on eliminating the enemy with main force, or as they had it: 'Grab 'em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow.'...

"... By September 1962 some 4,322,034 people (33.4 per cent of the population) were gathered in 2,800 strategic hamlets, corralled within moats and bristling bamboo spikes. The Americans dubbed them 'oil spots', the coalescence of which would exclude the Viet Cong from operating in a given area. While they marvelled at the speed with which all this was done, the Americans were unaware that that the official driving the programme so fast, Colonel Pham Ngoe Thao, was a highly placed Viet Minh agent, whose aim was to encourage peasant dissatisfaction. He certainly succeeded.

"The problem was that the oil spots were widely dispersed, while the strategic hamlets took little or no notice of how peasants related to ancestral graves or worked their patchwork fields. All intervening areas were declared free-fire zones in which anything that moved could be pulverized with artillery and bombing. While US officials saw the strategic hamlets as an opportunity to introduce modernizing reforms in village life, Diem regarded them primarily as a means of political control. Aid money was now embezzled by an even larger number of corrupt officials, in a country where the pool of educated administrators was modest to begin with. The CIA also spread vast sums of money around, so much that they got the Vietnamese to sign for the few available trolleys the bulky cash was moved on rather than for the cash itself. By contrast, where they were in control, which meant much of the country after dark, the Viet Minh were scrupulously egalitarian, combining this with the systematic assassination of corrupt government officials."⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁸ Ferguson Kissinger, pp. 591-592.

⁷⁸⁹ Burleigh, op. cit., pp. 480, 481-482.

The Americans, as George Friedman has pointed out, had another, very important motive: the desire to shore up the USA's credibility as a defender of freedom all over the world. The French President De Gaulle had been cynically insinuating that if war broke out in Europe with the Soviet Union, the Americans would not come to Western Europe's defence in accordance with its NATO obligations. By intervening against the communists in Vietnam, the Americans reassured those Europeans who may have been swayed by De Gaulle's cynicism. Of course, the Europeans still criticized the American intervention. And for the first time the British (unlike the Australians and New Zealanders) refused to send troops to support their allies.⁷⁹⁰ But, as Friedman says, they would very likely have been much more worried if the Americans had not intervened; for that would have given some credibility to De Gaulle's assertions. As it turned out, it was De Gaulle who turned out to be soft on Soviet Communism...

Throughout the war, the Americans were frightened that a direct assault on North Vietnam would lead to World War Three against China or the Soviet Union or both. This was not an idle fear: the two Communist super-powers supplied vast amounts of supplies and technicians to the North, which enabled them to repair the damage caused by American air raids almost as soon as it was inflicted. Moreover, in 1964 the Chinese successfully tested their first nuclear bomb – and few could doubt that Mao would use it if he thought it necessary. If the Chinese had decided to take over their North Vietnamese ally in the way that the Americans took over their South Korean proxy in the 1950s, world war would probably have resulted. It did not because the Vietnamese remained fiercely independent of their historic enemy to the north, and because the two Communist superpowers hated and feared each other almost as much as they hated the Americans.

So by Divine Providence world war was averted because the kingdom of Satan was divided against itself...

*

⁷⁹⁰ The British attempt to distance themselves from the Americans politically coincided with their final abandonment of their attempt to remain independent of them militarily.

Thus they spent a great deal on defence, and tried to retain an independent strike force. But in 1965 they were forced to cancel their most advanced and promising project, the TSR-2 strike fighter. "The TSR-2 was the victim of ever-rising costs inter-service squabbling over Britain's future defence needs, which together led to the controversial decision in 1965 to scrap the programme. It was decided to order an adapted version of the General Dynamics F-111 instead, but that decision was later rescinded as costs and development times increased. The replacements included the Blackburn Buccaneer and McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, both of which had previously been considered and rejected early in the TSR-2 procurement process. Eventually, the smaller swing-wing Panavia Tornado was developed and adopted by a European consortium to fulfil broadly similar requirements to the TSR-2." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAC_TSR-2)

Kennedy had been planning to withdraw all American help from Vietnam by the end of 1965. But there were 14,000 "advisers" there at the time of his death in 1963. And from the time Lyndon Johnson became president, as the Vietcong increased its power in the south, the American commitment inexorably increased. Johnson, like Kennedy, had neither the wisdom nor the courage to prevent a fateful escalation of the war by the sending of a large number of American troops to Vietnam. In March 1965 he sent more troops in, and also initiated a bombing campaign of targets in the north called "Rolling Thunder" that continued for another eight years. Though less indiscriminate than the American bombing of Germany and Japan in World War Two, this still involved much slaughter and suffering to the civilian population without destroying the enemy's will to fight. By the end of 1975 there were 175,000 American troops in Vietnam. The Rubicon had been crossed: if Kennedy had still been able to withdraw, Johnson by the end was not able to do so without incurring unacceptable psychological and political damage...

"No fateful imperative," writes Max Hastings, "obliged the new president to bomb North Vietnam, nor to dispatch half a million troops to the South. It was unthinkable, however, that in his first year of office – a re-election campaign year – he should tell the Americans already in Indochina to pack up and come home. Nothing that came later was inevitable, but everything derived from the fact that sixteen thousand men were in the country, because John F. Kennedy had put them there. Just before David Nes took off to become deputy US mission chief in Saigon, his commander-in-chief told him: 'Lyndon Johnson is not going down as the president who lost Vietnam. Don't you forget that.'"⁷⁹¹

Ferguson writes: "The decision to escalate the Vietnam War in a 'slowly escalating tempo' (the words of NSAM) rather than to devise an exit strategy was the worst strategic mistake that the United States made in the Cold War. From the outset, Johnson had his own doubts about this strategy, as did other members of the administration, notably George Ball. But the president went ahead for four reasons. First, direct U.S. action seemed the simplest way to contend with the chronic instability of South Vietnam, whose 'squabbling politicians seemed less and less likely to achieve military success by their own efforts...

"Second, the military under General William Westmoreland was promising Johnson 'limited war with limited objectives, fought with limited means and programmed for the utilization of limited resources'. Johnson believed that any greater commitment – in particular, an invasion of North Vietnam – would risk bringing the Chinese into the war; the fear of another Korea was never far from his mind....

⁷⁹¹ Hastings, *Vietnam*, pp. 170-171

"Third, 'slowly ascending' military force was the most Johnson could employ without jeopardizing his much more rapidly ascending domestic program. Indeed, so fast did Johnson move on both welfare and civil rights that he very nearly overreached, despite his party's control of Congress...

"Finally, and crucially, those who had doubts about the strategy of creeping escalation failed miserably to make their case..."⁷⁹²

Perhaps the man most responsible for failing to make the case for withdrawal was the most important American policy-maker, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara. "Fatally for his own reputation and future peace of mind, McNamara jumped the wrong way. It was he who clinched the crucial July 1965 debate by reviving the domino theory, predicting that defeat in Vietnam would lead to 'Communist domination' not only in 'Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma [and] Malaysia' but also potentially in Japan and India. Pakistan, he warned darkly, 'would move closer to China. Greece, Turkey would move to a neutralist position. Communist agitation would increase in Africa.'

"Thus, with a wild prediction that the United States would lose the third world if it lost Vietnam, was the die cast..."⁷⁹³

As American troop levels escalated, and the American bombing of Hanoi continued, a secret channel between the two sides was created in Paris. Johnson desperately wanted negotiations to begin, especially as domestic opposition to the war was growing. However, Hanoi made no concessions, and the talks to begin talks foundered. It is likely that the North Vietnamese were, in the American phrase, "taking the Americans for suckers".

Ferguson notes: "Only those accustomed to fighting Communism in Asia had the measure of the other side. When the Singaporean prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, visited the newly renamed John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard in October 1967, he began a meeting with the senior faculty by inviting comments on the Vietnam War. As Kissinger later recalled, 'The faculty, of which I was one dissenting member, was divided primarily on the question of whether President Lyndon Johnson was a war criminal or a psychopath.' After hearing a litany of criticisms of Johnson's policy, the thrust of which was that the United States could not leave Vietnam a moment too soon, Lee responded simply, 'You make me sick'. As he told *The Harvard Crimson*, the United States was performing a valuable service to the region in maintaining a 'military shield' around South Vietnam. 'Saigon can do what Singapore did,' he argued. 'If you leave, we'll soldier on,' he told an audience of students at Dunster House. 'I'm only telling you the awful consequence which withdrawal would mean...'"⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁹² Ferguson, *Kissinger*, pp. 608, 609, 610.

⁷⁹³ Ferguson, Kissinger, p. 611.

⁷⁹⁴ Ferguson, Kissinger, p. 753

The turning-point of the war was the so-called "Tet offensive" of January-February, 1968, when the North Vietnamese deceitfully used a Tet holiday ceasefire to assault the South Vietnamese cities, including Saigon. The offensive failed, with around 50,000 communist dead in this and the "mini-Tets" of May and August. The Americans suffered about 4000 dead, and the South Vietnamese – 6000. So the South won the battle convincingly...

Nevertheless, the shock and the destruction were so great, and the media were so biased, that the communists managed to snatch a major propaganda victory from the jaws of military defeat. Their army "emerged from the engagement very much weaker militarily. But the media, especially TV, presented it as a decisive Vietcong victory, an American Dien Bien Phu. An elaborate study of the coverage, published in 1977, showed exactly how this reversal of the truth, which was not on the whole deliberate, came about. The image not the reality of Tet was probably decisive, especially among influential East Coast liberals. In general, American public opinion strongly backed the war, which was throughout more popular than the Korean War. According to the pollsters the only hostile category was what they described as 'the Jewish sub-group'. Johnson's popularity rating rose whenever he piled on the pressure - it leapt 14 per cent when he started the bombing. Throughout the fighting, far more Americans were critical of Johnson for doing too little than for doing too much. The notion of a great swing away from the war in public opinion, and above all the axiom that the young opposed it, was an invention. In fact support for withdrawal was never over 20 per cent until after the November 1968 election, by which time the decision to get out had already been taken. Support for intensifying the war was always greater among the under thirty-fives than among older people; young white males were the most consistent group backing escalation.

"It was not the American people which lost its stomach for the kind of sacrifices Kennedy had demanded in his inaugural. It was the American leadership. In the last months of 1967, and especially after Tet, the American establishment crumpled. The Defence Secretary, Clark Clifford, turned against the war; so did old Dean Acheson. Senate hard-liners began to oppose further reinforcements. Finally Johnson himself, diffidently campaigning for reelection, lost heart on 12 March 1968 when his vote sagged in the New Hampshire primary. He threw in the electoral towel and announced he would spend the rest of his term seeking peace. It was not the end of the war. But it was the end of America's will and effort to win it. The trouble with the American ruling class was that it believed what it read in the newspapers, and they saw New Hampshire as a victory for peace. In fact, among anti-Johnson voter the Hawks outnumbered the Doves by three to tow. Johnson lost the primary, and with it the war, because he was not tough enough..."⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁹⁵ Johnson, Modern Times, p. 637.

The American press and leading politicians began to talk about the impossibility of winning the war. A powerful anti-war movement sprang up. The president unilaterally halted bombing of the north, and the North Vietnamese agreed to official peace talks - but conceded nothing...

The South Vietnamese were also divided amongst themselves: the mass of the people were by no means pro-communist, but they disliked both their own government and the Americans. The unity of purpose, moral purity and ideological zeal needed to defeat the communists were sorely lacking. "Vietnam had suffered atrociously from war ever since the Japanese conquest; by 1963 it was a society lapsing into incoherence. Catholics were at odds with Buddhists, communists with capitalists, civilians with military; the traditional order had largely disappeared. The drift of population from the countryside to the cities, which had characterized so many societies since 1945, had been greatly accelerated by the disruptions of war and had inevitably bred deep hostility between rulers and ruled, between town and country. Now the Americans swamped the economy. The immense inflow of men and equipment; the tidal wave of dollars; the load placed on all the social services of a comparatively undeveloped country by the needs of a highly mechanized, well-paid and pampered army; the opportunities that opened for black marketing and profiteering: all this spelt ruin. The intensification of the war brought with it the cumulative destruction of agriculture, Vietnam's most important source of income, so that it changed from a rice-exporting to a riceimporting nation. Worse, if anything was the devastation wrought on town life by the surge of wartime inflation. The middle class was largely destroyed; girls were driven into prostitution, boys into crime. The government kept going by bribery, corruption and tyranny. It became harder and harder to see what good the Americans were achieving in Vietnam, and very easy to see the evil. Certainly, they were not helping to establish a stable society with manageable problems, one which could resist the communists successfully by its own strength. Critics constantly clamoured for a political solution rather than a military one, the truth was that there was no such solution. The elements of civil society had been destroyed in South Vietnam, and even the victorious communists were to find, in the seventies, that they did not know how to restore them. Still less did the Americans..."796

"While Buddhists and Roman Catholics quarrelled bitterly and the peasants were more and more alienated from the regime by the failure of land reform, an apparently corrupt ruling class seemed able to survive government after government. This benefited the communists. They sought reunification on their own terms and maintained from the north support for the communist underground movement in the south, the Vietcong."⁷⁹⁷

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⁷⁹⁶ Brogan, op. cit., p. 654.

⁷⁹⁷ Roberts, op. cit., p. 845.

In 1968 President Johnson resigned. He was succeeded by the Republican Richard Nixon. Nixon was a seasoned Cold War warrior (notably in his "kitchen sink" debate with Khrushchev), but he, too, failed as the communists shrugged off military defeats to conquer Saigon in 1975.

Long before the end, the superior morale of the Vietnamese communists had effectively secured the victory over the most powerful nation on earth. In retrospect, there were several reasons for this: the Americans' disdain for and lack of engagement with, their allies, the South Vietnamese; the chronic weakness and incompetence of the South Vietnamese government; the "collateral damage" inflicted on South Vietnamese peasants by American airstrikes and napalm bombing of agricultural land; the advantages enjoyed by Vietcong guerrillas that could retreat into safe-havens in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia, and their continuing control over most of the rural population; the failure to persuade other western nations (besides Australia and New Zealand) to join the war; the revelation that American leaders had so often lied to their people about the war and the chances of winning it⁷⁹⁸; the fact that the war was broadcast by television into the homes of millions of Americans, eliciting disgust and disillusion (although the worst suffering was not shown); above all the fanatical determination and ruthlessness of the communists.

However, the main cause of the American failure was simply *hubris*. Like the Russians in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, they underestimated their Asian opponent. As Michael Howard puts it: "there was in the US... an enormous self-confidence and pride not unlike that of the Germans before 1914; a consciousness of national greatness seeking an outlet, a searching for an appropriate challenge to their powers, a refusal to believe that any problem was beyond their capacity to solve..."⁷⁹⁹ The Americans might build their capital (and especially the Capitol) to look like ancient Rome; but they had neither the discipline of Old pagan Rome, nor the faith of the New Christian Rome. Against the supreme evil of Communism, only real *morale* - in the sense,

⁷⁹⁸ This was revealed in 1971 in the so-called Pentagon Papers. The release was dramatized by the Steven Spielberg film *The Post* (2017). "The *Pentagon Papers*, officially titled *Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force*, is a United States Department of Defense history of the United States' political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. The papers were released by Daniel Ellsberg, who had worked on the study; they were first brought to the attention of the public on the front page of *The New York Times* in 1971. A 1996 article in *The New York Times* said that the *Pentagon Papers* had demonstrated, among other things, that the Johnson Administration had 'systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress.'

The Pentagon Papers revealed that the U.S. had secretly enlarged the scope of its actions in the Vietnam War with the bombings of nearby Cambodia and Laos, coastal raids on North Vietnam, and Marine Corps attacks – none of which were reported in the mainstream media. For his disclosure of the *Pentagon Papers*, Ellsberg was initially charged with conspiracy, espionage, and theft of government property; charges were later dismissed, after prosecutors investigating the Watergate scandal discovered that the staff members in the Nixon White House had ordered the so-called White House Plumbers to engage in unlawful efforts to discredit Ellsberg." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers) ⁷⁹⁹ Howard, in Hastings, *Vietnam*, p. 226.

not only of courage and determination, but also, and primarily, of *morality founded on true faith* – can construct a real defence; victory over a foreign state depends on the spiritual health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. Since 1917, no state had the inner purity and power and grace to prevail against the Antichrist...

Hubris prevented the Americans from remembering the words of the diplomat George Kennan in his famous "long telegram" from Moscow in 1947: "Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit - Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies."⁸⁰⁰

The global consequences of the failing war effort in Vietnam were hardly less important than the regional consequences. For the first time, many people in the West began to have doubts whether the worldwide war against Communism was really worth fighting, and whether, even if it were, the Americans were capable of fighting it. Paradoxically, leftist and neo- or Eurocommunist ideas were becoming popular in the West just as disillusion with Communism was setting in Eastern Europe and the vast superiority of Capitalism to Communist in the economic sphere was being demonstrated in the spectacular growth of the "tiger" economies of East Asia: Japan, Hong Kong Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. When Solzhenitsyn emigrated to America in the 1970s, he speculated that there were more true believers in Marxism in the West than in the East, and that the West would never understand the reality of Communism until they had experienced it on their own backs...

⁸⁰⁰ https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf.

56. THE "EVENEMENTS" IN PARIS

Throughout the West after the war, as individuals and states became wealthier, more and more money was poured into education, which was increasingly seen as the panacea of all ills. Unfortunately, this ignored the very real possibility that educators might teach, not the truth, but lies, with a consequent increase in the ills of society. Moreover, an increase in the quantity of students by no means guaranteed an increase in their quality.

And this is precisely what happened: just as German students in the 1930s became among the foremost supporters of Nazism, so western, especially Italian and West German students in the 1960s became increasingly violent supporters of various Marxist and Cultural Marxist doctrines, sweeping noisily and destructively through campuses from Paris and Rome to San Francisco to Beijing to Prague. This process culminated in "the year of revolutions", 1968...

Compared with the seriousness of the disturbances in China and America, there was something almost trivial about "the events" of May, 1968 in Paris. Nobody died (either at home or abroad), no government was overthrown, and the consequences (apart from a pay rise for the workers) seemed to be minimal - for the time being... The French had always had a snobbish attitude towards American Hollywood and Coca-Cola "culture" (although their "New Wave" film-makers like Truffaut admired Hitchcock), and a none-too-grateful attitude to the nation that had not only joined them in defeating the Kaiser in the First World War, and liberated them from the Nazis in the Second World War, but had also lifted the whole of Western Europe onto its economic feet and created a wall of steel against the Soviet threat at very little cost to the Europeans themselves. In a sixties book called Le Défi Américain Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber elaborated on various threats supposedly posed by the Americans, but, as Norman Stone points out, "failed to notice that French industry, far from languishing, was doing better than it had done since the 1890s, when the arrival of electrical energy had enabled it to bypass the coal in which France was poor. Quite soon France was going to overtake England, for the first time since the French Revolution itself.

"All of this allowed de Gaulle to appear as a world statesman, to put France back on the map. Now he, like many Frenchmen and many Europeans in general, resented the American domination. There was not just the unreliability, the way in which the USA, every four years, became paralysed by a prospective presidential election. France's defence was largely dependent upon the USA, and, here, there were fears in Paris and Bonn. They did not find Washington easy. The more the Americans became bogged down in Vietnam, the more there was head-shaking in Europe. They alone had the nuclear capacity to stop a Russian advance, but the Berlin crisis had already shown that the Americans' willingness to come to Germany's defence was quite limited, and they had not even stood up for their own treaty rights. France was already showing signs of wanting to free herself from American leadership. On August 1, 1963 "the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain agreed to a limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting other than underground testing."⁸⁰¹ But France refused to sign...

Now, in 1964, the Americans were involved in a guerrilla war in south-east Asia and were demonstrably making a mess of it. The question was: would the Asian theatre have priority for them over the European? Perhaps, if West Germany had been allowed to have nuclear weapons, the Europeans could have built up a real deterrent of their own, but that was hardly in anyone's mind now – if Europe was to have her own deterrent, it would have to be French....

"At the turn of 1962-3 the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had met Kennedy (at Nassau) and agreed to depend upon a little American technology [Polaris nuclear missiles] on condition that the French got even less. There would be no Franco-British nuclear link (France's first atomic test had been in 1960) and as far as de Gaulle was concerned, France would have to make her own way forward. He got his own back. The Americans were trying to manoeuvre Great Britain into the EEC, and, conscious now of their comparative decline, the British reluctantly agreed to be manoeuvred. At a press conference in January 1963, de Gaulle showed them the door. Europe was to be a Franco-German affair, and de Gaulle was its leader. France could not go it alone. If she had seriously to offer a way forward between the world powers, she had to have allies, and Germany was the obvious candidate. Adenauer, too, needed the votes of what, in a more robust age, had been called 'the brutal rurals', and the Common Agricultural Policy bribed them. In return for protection and price support, they would vote for Adenauer, even if they only had some small plot that they worked at weekends.

"France, with a seat on the Security Council and the capacity to make trouble for the USA with the dollar and much else, mattered; the Communists were a useful tool, and they were told not to destabilize de Gaulle. He was being helpful to Moscow. In the first instance, starting in 1964, the French had made problems as regards support for the dollar. They built up gold reserves, and then sold dollars for more gold, on the grounds that the dollar was just paper, and inflationary paper at that. There was of course more to it, in that there was no financial centre in France to rival that of London, and the French lost because they had to use London for financial transactions; by 1966 they were formally refusing to support the dollar any more, and this (an equivalent of French behavior in the early stages of the great Slump of 1929-32) was a pillar knocked from under the entire Atlantic financial system.

"De Gaulle had persuaded himself that the Sino-Soviet split would make the USSR more amenable, that it might even become once more France's ideal eastern partner. There were also signs, he could see, of a new independence in

⁸⁰¹ Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 21.

eastern Europe. The new Romanian leader, Ceausescu, looked with envy on next-door neighbour Tito, cultivated and admired by everybody. Romania had been set up by France a century before, and French had been the second, or even, for the upper classes, the first language until recently. Now, de Gaulle took up links with her, and also revisited a Poland that he had not seen since 1920, as a young officer. In March 1966 he announced that France would leave the NATO joint command structure, and the body's headquarters were shifted to Brussels, among much irritation at French ingratitude. In June the General visited the USSR itself, and unfolded his schemes to Brezhnev: there should be a new European security system, a nuclear France and a nuclear USSR in partnership, the Americans removed, and a French-dominated Europe balancing between the two sides. He had already made sure of Europe's not having an American component, in that he had vetoed British membership of the Community. Now he would try to persuade Brezhnev that the time had come to get rid of East Germany, to loosen the iron bonds that kept the satellite countries tied to Moscow, and to prepare for serious change in the post-war arrangements. Brezhnev was not particularly interested, and certainly not in the disappearance of East Germany; in any case, although France was unquestionably of interest, it was West Germany that chiefly concerned Moscow, and there were constant problems over Berlin. De Gaulle was useful because, as Brezhnev said, 'thanks to him we have made a breach, without the slightest risk, in American capitalism. De Gaulle is of course an enemy, we know, and the French Party, narrow-minded and seeing only its own interests, has been trying to work us up against him. But look at what we have achieved: the American position in Europe has been weakened, and we have not finished vet.'"⁸⁰²

France had indeed acted ungratefully and treacherously, and a serious breach in the Western alliance could well have emerged.⁸⁰³ However, while France was no longer part of the command structure of NATO, and NATO was forced to withdraw its troops from French soil, the French did not retract their obligation to collective security. As David Reynolds points out, "they intended to engage in such alliance activities as suited them – what one Belgian diplomat called a policy of "Nato à la carte... France did not rejoin the command structure until 2009, and then only under 'conditions' that effectively preserved its independence."⁸⁰⁴ De Gaulle began to speak of the world as tripolar, the three poles being America, China – and Moscow-Paris...

However, France's behaviour was more the result of De Gaulle's exceptionally prickly personality and French national pride than any deeper shift in allegiance; Brezhnev was right to see in him more a useful, but still essentially *Capitalist* idiot than a real convert to the Communist International.

⁸⁰² Woolfson, "Belated Revenge of the 1968 Generation", Standpoint, May, 2018, p. 30.

⁸⁰³ Simon Jenkins calls the French move "a gesture devoid of strategic force but complicating any collective security" (*A Short History of Europe*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2018, p. 279).

⁸⁰⁴ Reynolds, "Security in the New World Order", *New Statesman*, March 29 – April 4, 2019, p.
32.

In any case, hubris soon reaped its reward. For in May, 1968 "the students of Paris rebelled against him, and would have brought him down if the Communist Party had not, for Moscow's sake, saved him. The episode in itself was farcical, but it was a farce with a sinister side, edging into terrorism..."⁸⁰⁵

The May events, like all French revolutions, were in the name of "freedom" and against the bourgeoisie. In fact, as Sir Roger Scruton writes, the students "were busy recycling the old Marxist promise of a radical freedom, which will come when private property and the 'bourgeois' rule of law are both abolished. The imperfect freedom that property and law make possible, and on which the soixante-huitards depended for their comforts and their excitements, was not enough. That real but relative freedom must be destroyed for the sake of its illusory but absolute shadow. The new 'theories' that poured from the pens of Parisian intellectuals in their battle against the 'structures' of bourgeois society were not theories at all, but bundles of paradox, designed to reassure the student revolutionaries that, since law, order, science and truth are merely masks for bourgeois domination, it no longer matter what you think so long as you are on the side of the workers in their 'struggle'. The genocides inspired by that struggle earned no mention in the writings of Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault and Lacan, even though one such genocide was beginning at that very moment in Cambodia, led by Pol Pot, educated member of the French Communist Party..."806

In France, as in America, the riots did not express the majority opinion of any section of the population except students. Jean-Paul Sartre "took the side of the students, as he had done from his first days as a teacher. Very few people emerged with any credit from the events of May 1968 – Raymond Aron was an outstanding exception in France – so Sartre's undignified performance does not perhaps deserve particular censure. In an interview on Radio Luxembourg, he saluted the student barricades: 'Violence is the only thing remaining to the students who have not yet entered into their fathers' system... For the moment the only anti-Establishment force in our flabby Western countries is represented by the students... it is up to the students to decide what form their fight should assume. We can't even presume to advise them on this matter.'"⁸⁰⁷

Such irresponsibility was bound to elicit a reaction. And indeed, in June De Gaulle won almost the biggest victory in French electoral history. For the majority of the people were *serious:* they did not want anarchy; the students had not lived through the war, but their parents had, and so were able to evaluate properly the benefits of the peace that followed. Nevertheless, the shock was great: De Gaulle soon retired; and with him it seemed that a whole generation – the relatively serious and sober generation that lived through the shame of the thirties and saw its results in the forties - had passed, opening up new and frightening possibilities for the future...

⁸⁰⁵ Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 271.

⁸⁰⁶ Scruton, *How to be a Conservative*, London: Bloomsbury, 2014, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁰⁷ Paul Johnson, Intellectuals, London: Harper Perennial, 1988, 2007, p. 246.

"It is worth insisting," writes Tony Judt, "upon the parochial and distinctly self-regarding issues that sparked the May Events, lest the ideologically charged language and ambitious programs of the following weeks mislead us. The student occupation of the Sorbonne and subsequent street barricades and clashes with the police, notably on the nights of May 10th-11th and May 24th-25th, were led by representatives of the (Trotskyist) *Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire*, as well as officials from established student and junior lecturer unions. But the accompanying Marxist rhetoric, while familiar enough, masked an essentially anarchist spirit whose immediate objective was the removal and humiliation of authority.

"In this sense, as the disdainful French Communist Party leadership rightly insisted, this was a party, not a revolution. It had all the symbolism of a traditional French revolt – armed demonstrators, street barricades, the occupation of strategic buildings and intersections, political demands and counter-demands – but none of the substance. The young men and women in the student crowds were overwhelmingly middle-class – indeed, many of them were from the Parisian bourgeoisie itself: *'fils à papa'* ('daddy's boys'), as the PCF leader Georges Marchais derisively called them. It was their own parents, aunts and grandmothers who looked down upon them from the windows of comfortable bourgeois apartment buildings as they lined up in the streets to challenge the armed power of the French state.

"Georges Pompidou, the Gaullist Prime Minister, rapidly took the measure of the troubles. After the initial confrontations he withdrew the police, despite criticism from within his own party and government, leaving the students of Paris in *de facto* control of their university and the surrounding *quartier*. Pompidou – and his President, De Gaulle – were embarrassed by the wellpublicized activities of the students. But, except very briefly at the outset when they were taken by surprise, they did not feel threatened by them. When the time came the police, especially the riot police – recruited from the sons of poor provincial peasants and never reluctant to crack the heads of privileged Parisian youth – could be counted on to restore order. What troubled Pompidou was something far more serious.

"The student riots and occupations had set the spark to a nationwide series of strikes and workplace occupations that brought France to a near-standstill by the end of May. Some of the first protests – by reporters at French Television and Radio, for example – were directed at their political chiefs for censoring coverage of the student movement and, in particular, the excessive brutality of some riot policemen. But as the general strike spread, through the aircraft manufacturing plants of Toulouse and the electricity and petro-chemical industries and, most ominously, to the huge Renault factories on the edge of Paris itself, it became clear that something more than a few thousand agitated students was at stake. "The strikes, sit-ins, office occupations and accompanying demonstrations and marches were the greatest movement of social protest in modern France, far more extensive than those of June 1936. Even in retrospect it is difficult to say with confidence exactly what they were about. The Communist-led trade union organization, the *Confédération du Travail* (CGT) was at first at a loss: when union agreement reached between government, unions and employers was decisively rejected by the Renault workers, despite its promise of improved wages, shorter hours and more consultation.

"The millions of men and women who had stopped work had one thing at least in common with the students. Whatever their particular local grievances, they were above all frustrated with their conditions of existence. They did not so much want to get a better deal at work as to change something about their way of life; pamphlets and manifestos and speeches explicitly said as much. This was good news for the public authorities in that it diluted the mood of the strikers and directed their attention away from political targets; but it suggested a general malaise that would be hard to address.

"France was prosperous and secure and some conservative commentators concluded that the wave of protests was thus driven not by discontent but by simple boredom..."⁸⁰⁸

Boredom, anomie, frustration with nobody knew exactly what - this was the existential crisis of comfortable Western Social Democracy in the 1960s. The sheer *frivolity* of the events is illustrated by some of the street slogans: "Liberty, Equality, Sexuality!" "Boredom is counter-revolutionary." "I'm a Marxist -Groucho tendency." "Workers of the world, enjoy yourselves!"809 Frivolous though they might be, these slogans point to something serious brewing in the souls of the post-Marxist yet abidingly revolutionary young. They suggested that the West's problems were not primarily political or economic, but "existential" - the result of the expulsion of religion from the Social Democratic project. The young perhaps felt it most acutely, but they were simply expressing a general malaise that went deeper as one went further down the scale of class and up the ladder of age. The very *frivolity* and sheer ignorance of their attachments - their passion for Mao and Che Guevara, and even champions of Cultural Marxism, such as Marcuse, without knowing anything about the mind-boggling evil that such men were accomplishing, or their mindless slogan, 'It is forbidden to forbid' - this amoralism (which thrilled De Beauvoir), this fundamental lack of seriousness in the generation that was soon to take over the leadership of the West paradoxically highlighted the seriousness of the malaise.

⁸⁰⁸ Judt, Postwar, London: Pimlico, 2007, pp. 409-411.

⁸⁰⁹ Peter Furtado, History Day by Day, London: Thames and Hudson, 2019, p. 183

57. THE HIPPIE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA

"Nineteen sixty-eight was the *annus horribilis* of modern American history. Beginning on the Vietnamese lunar New Year the Tet offensive – though it looked much worse to television viewers than it did to U.S. military planners – was the first of a cascade of calamities. Nineteen Vietcong sappers broke into the U.S. embassy in Saigon, killing five American soldiers. For weeks Hue was the scene of bloody house-to-house fighting. Eddie Adams's photographs of the cold-blooded execution of the capture Vietcong officer Nguyen Van Lem by a South Vietnamese police officer summed up the ruthlessness of the counterattack. The violence seemed to seep from television screens into the United States itself. On April 4, James Earl Ray shot Martin Luther King, Jr., dead as the civil rights leader stood on the balcony of his room in a Memphis motel. Two months later Robert Kennedy was fatally wounded by the Palestinian immigrant Sirhan Sirhan as he walked around the kitchen of L.A.'s Ambassador Hotel. There was even an attempt on the life of Andy Warhol by an unhinged radical feminist writer named Valerie Solanas.

"Student protests swept universities all across America, beginning in Berkeley and then spreading to New York University and Columbia; by December the craze for anti-war 'sit-ins' had reached even Harvard. Two black students from South Carolina State University were shot dead by police during a demonstration against segregation in Orangeburg. In the streets outside the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, there were pitched battles between police and protestors led by the Youth International Party ('Yippies'), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. There were fresh race riots as young African Americans took to the streets after Martin Luther King's assassination, which they blamed on a government conspiracy. Black Panthers and other militant black power groups fought gun battles with the police in Oakland, California, and Cleveland, Ohio.

"Abroad, the world went to hell in a handcart. Though the Tet Offensive was halted and heavy losses were inflicted on the Vietcong and their North Vietnamese allies, discipline among U.S. and South Vietnamese forces threatened to collapse in a wave of massacres of civilians. In June the Malayan Communist Party launched the second Malayan insurgency. In August a huge Soviet-led force invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring and overthrow Dubček's reformist government. There were coups in Iraq, Panama, and Mali. Even in placid Britain there were intimations of bloodshed, from the Royal Ulster Constabulary's beating of Catholic marchers in Londonderry to Enoch Powell's prophecy that immigration from Britain's former colonies would end in racial violence. Though he quoted the Aeneid ('I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood'), it was the American experience of race riots that inspired Powell's speech. Everywhere the phrase Pax Americana seemed an oxymoron. The American ambassador was gunned down in the streets of Guatemala City, North Korean forces boarded and captured the USS Pueblo. The nuclear submarine Scorpion sank off the Azores. Not even the skies were safe. In November 1968 a wave of hijackings began when armed men seized control of Pan Am Flight 281, bound from New York's Kennedy Airport to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Between 1961 and 1967 there had been just seven attempts to hijack U.S. aircraft. Between 1968 and 1971 the number soared to seventy-one. Nearly all were redirected to Cuba, making 'Take me to Havana' one of the catchphrases of the era....^{"810}

The riots of 1968 were a symptom of a deep cultural malaise. The change can be measured most easily in the arts...

Perhaps the most typical American cultural figure of the 1950s had been Walt Disney, the Hollywood producer whose animations *Snow White, Dumbo, Pinocchio, Fantasia* and *Cinderella* were innovatory masterpieces in the history of cinema, while his last film, *Mary Poppins,* emphasized the main theme of his life and period – the wholesomeness of childhood and the family. But with the death of Disney in 1966, the escalation of the Vietnam War, and the draft of unwilling young men into the army to fight a war to which there seemed to be no end, the mood changed. Rebellion was in the air and on the streets... The country now entered an altogether darker phase, as if transiting directly from childhood to an embittered old age. Confidence was lost, and with it the illusion that America was unconquerable *because she was good…* Was it really possible that the land of the free, God's own country, could be defeated by a bunch of sandle-wearing guerrillas? And what did such a defeat augur for the future?

"The words 'turn on, tune in, drop out'", writes Peter Furato, "were first publicly uttered in New York during a September 1966 press conference by Timothy Leary (1920-96). They were to become the defining slogan of the 1960s' counter-culture, providing the theme of the first and arguably most radical 'happening' of that movement: the 'Gathering of the Tribes for a Human Be-In', which took place in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park on 14 January 1967 and was attended by 30,000 people. Promoted mainly through the 'underground' newspaper the *San Francisco Oracle*, it brought together the New Age hippies of the city's Haight-Ashbury district with the Berkeley campus radicals and the anti-Vietnam War agitators.

"Many movers and shakers of the United States' counter-culture were present, including San Francisco bands such as *The Grateful Dead* and *Jefferson Airplane*, the poet Allen Ginsburg (1926-97), the activist Jerry Ruben (1938-94), and Timothy Leary himself, the apostle of personal liberation achieved through liberal use of the hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide ('acid' or LSD). The drug had been developed for therapeutic use in 1947 but made illegal in California in October 1966..."⁸¹¹

⁸¹⁰ Ferguson, Kissinger, pp. 786-788.

⁸¹¹ Furato, *History Day by Day*, London: Thames & Hudson, 2019, p. 18.

As political protest descended into hippiedom, drug abuse and the practical (and sometimes public) expression of the slogan "Make love, not war", it could be seen that the seriousness of the events was not so much in any specific ideas or plans of the youthful revolutionaries as in a general sapping of authority and morality in the western world. The new president, Richard Nixon, caught the essence of the situation well in his inaugural speech in 1969: "We are caught in war, wanting peace. We are torn by division, wanting unity. We see around us empty lives, wanting fulfilment..."

The Vietnam War was unique in that, perhaps for the first time in history, we see the *youth* of a country forcing its leaders to change course on a major issue of war and peace. For it was the prolonged demonstrations of American youth against the war that finally wore down the administration, first the Senate and then the presidency, leading to the final withdrawal of American involvement in 1975 and a serious undermining of the nation's unity and self-confidence worldwide.

Nor was it only in America that revolutionary youth seemed to take control (if anarchy can be called control), but also in France (in the events of May, 1968), in Czechoslovakia (where students played an important part in the Prague Spring), in England (where the "Swinging Sixties" were largely led by young people), in China (where rampaging young Red Guards led China's Cultural Revolution), and in Cambodia (where the majority of Pol Pot's soldiers in the 1970s were extraordinarily young).

Not coincidentally, this was the first generation to be born after the Second World War, the first generation that had taken no direct part in the titanic struggle between Fascism, Communism and Democracy, that had not shared in the sufferings or the ideological enthusiasms of their parents. They did have their own enthusiasms, but these were of a different kind - essentially anarchical, anti-authoritarian, anti-traditional, unfocussed and frivolous. Of course, youth have always played an important part in revolutions, being drawn by the whiff of violence and sexual license. But earlier revolutions had an ideological content or vision of the future that supplied testosterone-fuelled zeal with a certain intellectual backbone, a self-sacrificial discipline and quasijustification. Not so with most of the revolutions of the Sixties. Whether in Mao's China or Johnson's America, the revolutionary young could think of no better ideology than Feminism or the Thoughts of Chairman Mao's Little Red Book to justify their sickening abuse of almost everything that previous generations had considered sacred. For "this was the freakish moment of history," as Hastings writes, "at which a significant portion of the youth of the Western democracies professed to admire Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and other revolutionaries, heedless of the oppression their heroes promoted - and in Mao's case, the mass murders over which he presided, incomparably worse than any modern horror for which the US could be held responsible."812

⁸¹² Hastings, op. cit., pp. 328-329.

Alexander Woolfson writes: '[Richard] Vinen provides a useful overview [of 'the Long 68']: 'It had several components: general rebellion of the young against the old, political rebellion against militarism, capitalism and the political power of the United States... These rebellions sometimes intersected, but they did not always do so.'

"The year 1968 was an important milestone, the moment that the 'New Left' departed from Marxist orthodoxy. By that point the contradictions of Marxism could no longer be ignored, not just in terms of repressive brutality behind the Iron Curtain but also the failure of the working class to fulfil Marxist theory in the form of revolution. Indeed, 1968 was largely a middle-class affair, seizing upon the cultural criticisms that the 'Frankfurt School' directed both at capitalism and Soviet socialism.

"In the US, 1968 was largely about opposition to America's involvement in the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement. In France it was part student revolt, part disillusionment with contemporary life and part street party. The point is that the events of the 'long 68' were chaotic, even deliberately evasive of concrete definition.

"The multitude of ideas and organisations produced no unified body of political thought. This makes understanding what the demonstrators wanted hard to discern. Much of the discourse of 1968 was concerned with the idea of self-management. Implicit in this was a rejection of the norms of classical ideology and the rejection of the role of intellectuals in forming that framework – perhaps best summarized as 'we don't believe the experts'. Ultimately it was a politics of refusal and individualism that remains most easily defined by what the 68ers were opposed to rather than a concrete programme of change. The result was, in the words of the political theorist Simon Tormey, 'political paganism, a politics of the faithless, of those who move from one campaign against injustice to another'.

"It is easy to dismiss the legacy of 1968. Despite important civil rights victories in the US, which should rightly be seen as an historic triumph, in the short term the protests were largely unsuccessful in fostering the sort of revolution many wanted. There was far greater mobilisation across Europe and the US in favour of the established order. Richard Nixon's electoral triumph at the end of the year came from appealing to the 'silent majority' about the breakdown in law and order that the demonstrations had symbolized. In France too, de Gaulle achieved electoral victory..."⁸¹³

This may be largely true in political terms. But it must not be thought that the government was uniformly, in all its parts, innocent of involvement in the Hippie sub-culture. Marilyn Ferguson writes: "Ironically, the introduction of major psychedelics, like LSD, in the 1960s was largely attributable to the

⁸¹³ Woolfson, "Belated Revenge of the 1968 Generation", Standpoint, May, 2018, p. 30.

Central Intelligence Agency's investigation into the substances for possible military use. Experiments on more than eighty college campuses, under various CIA codenames, unintentionally popularized LSD. Thousands of graduate students served as guinea pigs. Soon they were synthesizing their own 'acid'. By 1974, according to the National Commission on Drug and Marijuana Abuse, nearly 5 percent of all American adults had tried LSD or a similar major psychedelic at least once..."⁸¹⁴

The "Swinging Sixties" came to a shuddering halt in August, 1969 with two events that symbolized the decade. On the one hand, the Americans put a man on the moon, an event that was translated live on television into millions of homes, and demonstrated the scientific and technological achievements of the age. The second was the savage murder in Hollywood of the actress Sharon Tate and six others by the Satanist Charles Manson and his "family" (Manson considered himself to be both Christ and Satan), which demonstrated that underneath the wealth, the cultural glitter and the technological achievement there lay nothing less that *the reign of Satan*...

⁸¹⁴ Ferguson, *The Aquarian Conspiracy*, Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher, 1980, p. 126.

58. THE PRAGUE SPRING

The Prague Spring – the brief but highly significant period of semidemocratization in Czechoslovakia - came to a country that had suffered more than any other Central European nation from post-war Soviet repression. "As late as 1954," writes Norman Stone, "several months after the USSR had started to release Stalin's victims, there was a minor purge trial, and a commission in 1957 even reaffirmed the guilt of the 1950-51 victims, though some were released. A huge Stalin statue even went up in 1955, demolished only when Khrushchev insisted, along with the removal of Klement Gottwald from his mausoleum. In an obscure place, much later, there was still a little 'Stalin Square'. In Czechoslovakia there was nothing like the Polish peasantry, stubbornly stuck in subsistence agriculture; nor was there anything like the Polish Church, the Czechs having inherited a powerful anti-clerical tradition. Opposition to the Communists was enfeebled from the outset because it was itself largely Communist.

"Still, there were signs of trouble in the woodwork, and a Party congress was postponed for several months in 1962. The 1951 purge trials continued to be a cause of unease, and there was a new commission to investigate them. In 1963 it pinned the blame on Gottwald, and by implication his close colleagues, still in high places. A Slovak journalist – Miroslav Hysko – publicly denounced them, and was not himself arrested: the old trial verdicts were, instead, cancelled. All of this was evidence of much deeper currents. Further evidence came when a report late in 1963 stated that the campaign against Slovak nationalism in 1951 had been unjustified..."⁸¹⁵

The calls of Slovak Communists for federalization of the country were an important stimulus to what followed. Another was a student demonstration for "More Light!" (both physical and spiritual) in the Strahov district of Prague. But the critical event was the election, on January 5, 1968, of a new First Secretary of the Party after Novotný, Alexander Dubček.

"The new man," writes Tony Judt, "was young (at 47 he was sixteen years Novotný's junior), from the reform wing of the Party and, above all, a Slovak. As leader of the Slovak Communist Party for the past three years he appeared to many to be a credible compromise candidate: a longstanding Communist *apparatchik* who would nevertheless support reforms and appease Slovak resentments. Dubček's early moves seemed to confirm this reading: a month after his appointment the Party leadership gave its unstinting approval to the stalled economic reform program. Dubček's rather artless manner appealed to the young in particular, while his indisputable loyalty to the Party and to 'Socialism' reassured for the time being the Kremlin and other foreign Communist leaders looking anxiously on.

⁸¹⁵ Stone, op. cit., pp. 359-360.

"If Dubček's intentions were obscure to observers, this is probably because he himself was far from sure just where to go. At first this ambiguity worked in his favour, as different factions competed for his support and offered to strengthen his hand. Public rallies in Prague in the weeks following his election demanded an end to censorship, greater press freedom and a genuine inquiry into the purges of the fifties and the responsibilities of the old guard around Novotný (who remained President of the country even after being ousted from the Party leadership). Carried on this wave of popular enthusiasm, Dubček endorsed the call for a relaxation of censorship and initiated a purge of Novotnýites from the Party and from the Czech army.

"In March 22nd Novotný reluctantly resigned the presidency and was replaced a week later by General Ludvík Svoboda. Five days after that, the Central Committee adopted an 'Action Program' calling for equal status and autonomy for Slovakia, the rehabilitation of past victims and 'democratisation' of the political and economic system. The Party was now officially endorsing what the Program called 'a unique experiment in democratic Communism': 'Socialism with a human face' as it became colloquially known. Over a period of time (the document spoke of a ten-year transition) the Czechoslovak Communist Party would allow the emergence of other parties with whom it would compete in genuine elections. These were hardly original ideas, but publicly pronounced from the official organs of a ruling Communist Party they triggered a political earthquake. The Prague Spring had begun.

"The events of the spring and summer of 1968 in Czechoslovakia hinged on three contemporary illusions. The first, widespread in the country after Dubček's rise and especially following publication of the Action Program, was that the freedoms and reforms now being discussed could be folded into the 'Socialist' (i.e. Communist) project. It would be wrong to suppose, in retrospect, that what the students and writers and Party reformers of 1968 were 'really' seeking was to replace Communism with liberal capitalism or that their enthusiasm for 'Socialism with a human face' was mere rhetorical compromise or habit. On the contrary: the idea that there existed a 'third way', a Democratic Socialism compatible with free institutions, respecting individual freedoms *and* collective goals, had captured the imagination of Czech students no less than Hungarian economists.

"The distinction that was now drawn between the discredited Stalinism of Novotný's generation and the renewed idealism of the Dubček era, was widely accepted – even, indeed especially, by Party members. As Jiří Pelikán asserted, in his preface to yet a third report on the Czech political trials (commissioned in 1968 by Dubček but suppressed after his fall) 'the Communist Party had won tremendous popularity and prestige, the people had spontaneously declared themselves for socialism'. That is perhaps a little hyperbolic, but it was not wildly out of line with contemporary opinion. And this, in turn, nourished a second illusion. "If the people believed the Party could save Socialism from its history, so the Party leadership came to suppose that they could manage this without losing control of the country. A new government headed by Oldřich Černík was installed on April 18th and, encouraged by huge public demonstrations of affection and support (notably in the traditional May Day celebrations), it relaxed virtually all formal controls on public expressions of opinion. On June 26th censorship of press and media was formally abolished. The same day it was announced that Czechoslovakia was to become a genuine federal state, comprising a Czech Socialist republic and a Slovak Socialist republic (that was the only one of Dubček's reforms to survive the subsequent repression, becoming law on October 28th 1968).

"But having relaxed all control on opinion, the Communist leadership was now pressed from every side to pursue the logic of its actions. Why wait ten years for free and open elections? Now that censorship had been abolished, why retain formal control and ownership of the media? On June 27th *Literárny Listy* and other Czech publications carried a manifesto by Ludvik Vaculík, 'Two Thousand Words', addressed to 'workers, farmers, officials, artists, scholars, scientists and technicians'. It called for the re-establishment of political parties, the formation of citizens' committees to defend and advance the cause of reform, and other proposals to take the initiative for further change out of the control of the Party. The battle was not yet won, Vaculík warned: the reactionaries in the Party would fight to preserve their privileges and there was even talk of 'foreign forces intervening in our development'. The people needed to strengthen the arm of the Communists' own reformers by pressing them to move forward even faster.

"Dubček rejected Vaculík's manifesto and its implication that the Communists should abandon their monopoly of power. As a lifelong Communist he would not countenance this crucial qualitative shift ('bourgeois pluralism') and anyway saw no need to do so. For Dubček the Party itself was the only appropriate vehicle for radical change if the vital attributes of a Socialist system were to be preserved. But as Vaculík's manifesto made cruelly clear, the Party's popularity and its credibility would increasingly rest upon its willingness to pursue changes that might ultimately drive it from power. The fault line between a Communist state and an open society was now fully exposed.

"And this, in turn, directed national attention in the summer of 1968 to the third illusion, the most dangerous of all: Dubček's conviction that he could keep Moscow at bay, that he would succeed in assuring his Soviet comrades that they had nothing to fear from events in Czechoslovakia – indeed, that they had everything to gain from the newfound popularity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the renewed faith in a rejuvenated socialist project. If Dubček made this mortal miscalculation it was above all because the Czech reformers had crucially misinterpreted the lesson of 1956. Imre Nagy's mistake, they thought, had been his departure from the Warsaw Pact and declaration of Hungarian neutrality. So long as Czechoslovakia stayed firmly in the Pact and

unambiguously allied to Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues would surely leave them alone.

"But by 1968, the Soviet Union was worried less about military security than the Party's loss of monopoly control..."⁸¹⁶

Brezhnev hesitated, knowing the unpopularity this would bring to his regime. Finally, however, on August 21-22, half a million Warsaw Pact troops, 7,500 tanks and a thousand aircraft invaded the country, restoring "normality" - that is, unreformed Communism - at the barrel of a gun. "On the orders of the Czech government, there was no armed resistance. But television and radio - until the stations were brought into line - carried vivid reports of the opposition to the invaders and the mass support for Dubček, soon shown in huge crowds that began to gather in Prague and Bratislava in protest at the invasion. Dubček, Cernik and four other party leaders were taken into custody and flown to Moscow (where Dubček seems to have suffered a nervous collapse). Alongside President Svoboda and a number of leading figures in the party who had joined them in Moscow, they were subjected to intense pressure to denounce the liberalization programme. On 26 August they caved in and signed their agreement to accept a Soviet ultimatum, reversing the Prague Spring reforms in return for the withdrawal of the occupying forces (almost all of which left by the end of October). 'Fraternal' relations were restored - under duress. The agreement was framed under a new, ominous premise, later known as the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'. This laid down a 'common international obligation' to defend socialist countries against 'counter-revolutionary forces'. From now on, then, Warsaw Pact states had an explicit duty to intervene where any member was adjudged to be out of line..."817

And yet after 1968 in Paris and Prague, nothing was "normal" again: both Western liberalism and Soviet socialism had reached their peaks and were on the cusp of a long descent into the new reality of the post-Cold War world...

The Romanian President Ceauşescu protested against the invasion. But Moscow could afford to ignore his eccentricities. For he kept an iron grip on his country, encouraging (with the help of his no less unbalanced wife Elena) a cult of his own personality, so his protest was not likely to elicit any liberal reaction that constituted a threat to the communist system...

"The Kremlin had made its point – that fraternal socialist states had only limited sovereignty and that any lapse in the Party's monopoly of power might trigger military intervention. Unpopularity at home or abroad was a small price to pay for the stability that this would henceforth ensure. After 1968, the security of the Soviet zone was firmly underwritten by a renewed appreciation of Moscow's willingness to resort to force if necessary. But never again – and this was the true lesson of 1968, first for the Czechs but in due course for

⁸¹⁶ Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 440-442.

⁸¹⁷ Ian Kershaw, Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2107, London: Penguin, 2019, pp. 245-246.

everyone else – never again would it be possible to maintain that Communism rested on popular consent, or the legitimacy of a reformed Party, or even the lessons of history...

"The illusion that Communism was reformable, that Stalinism had been a wrong turning, a mistake that could still be corrected, that the core ideals of democratic pluralism might somehow still be compatible with the structures of Marxist collectivism, that illusion was crushed under the tanks on August 21st 1968 and it never recovered. Alexander Dubček and his Action Program were not a beginning but an end. Never again would radicals or reformers look to the ruling Party to carry their aspirations or adopt their projects. Communism in Eastern Europe staggered on, sustained by an unlikely alliance of foreign loans and Russian bayonets: the rotting carcass was finally carried away only in 1989. But the soul of Communism had died twenty years before: in Prague, in August 1968..."⁸¹⁸

"*Pravda* followed up the invasion with a statement reiterating the legitimacy of 'separate roads of socialism' but warned that parties exercising this right 'must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist counties, nor the worldwide workers' movement.' This statement became known as the 'Brezhnev doctrine'; it implied that any reform undertaken by a country within the Warsaw Pact would require the approval of the Soviet communist Party.

"The suppression of reform in Czechoslovakia had profound effects on the Soviet Communist Party. The movement back toward the European Marxist tradition – what was becoming known as 'Eurocommunism' – was halted and reversed. Economic reform of even the timid Kosygin variety became taboo. In a very real sense the Soviet Communist Party became stagnant, unable to reform itself, to tolerate a lively intellectual or cultural life, or to render the economy more productive." ⁸¹⁹

Perhaps more serious than any of these threats to the Union's long-term survival was the disillusion engendered by the regime's flagrant failure to live up to its own egalitarian ideals. "Direct access to the West was granted only to select members of the Soviet upper ranks. No less restricted was access to the lives of those higher strata. Elite hospitals, resorts, supply networks, and schools were close affairs; even the maids of the elite were usually KGB employees who reported on their masters. Russia's socialist revolution, having originated in a radical quest for egalitarianism, produced an insulated privileged class increasingly preoccupied with the spoils of office for themselves and their children. The existence of a vast and self-indulgent elite was the greatest contradiction in the post-war Soviet Union, and the most volatile..."⁸²⁰

⁸¹⁸ Judt, Postwar, pp. 446, 447.

⁸¹⁹ Hosking, Russia and the Russians, p. 547.

⁸²⁰ Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, p. 48.

"The Soviet tanks rolling into Czechoslovakia," writes Jean-François Revel, "failed to open De Gaulle's eyes to the nature of communism and the Soviet system. He attributed that 'accident en route' to the 'policy of blocs' and the damage done by the 'Yalta agreements', thus again displaying his ignorance of just what those agreements were, since the Czech question was not touched on at Yalta. His dream of a Europe in harmony 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' seemed no more unlikely to him after the Red Army occupied Prague than it had before. 'Let us guard against excessive language,' the general said at a French cabinet meeting on August 24. 'Sooner or later, Russia will return [to its old ways].... We must build Europe. We can construct something with the Six [of the original Common Market], even build a political organization. We cannot build Europe without Warsaw, without Budapest, and without Moscow.'

"All the future illusions and surrenders in détente are contained in that statement: De Gaulle's acceptance of Moscow's fait accompli, his unwillingness to consider sanctions to punish a crime against freedom, his de facto alliance with Soviet imperialism, which he forgave all sins. Add to this his lack of understanding of Communist reality, in short, his incompetence and his blind trust in the Soviet Government's desire and ability to become part of a harmonious and homogeneous Europe – which, be it noted, General de Gaulle thought Britain had no right to join!"⁸²¹

De Gaulle died in 1970. He had built his career on rudeness, ingratitude and treachery to Anglo-Saxons who had helped his nation, and on friendship with the Soviets who wanted to destroy it. In the end he had no answer to the Maoist youth of Paris who humiliated him, or to the Soviet tanks that rolled into Prague for the second time in a single generation...

⁸²¹ Revel, Why Democracies Perish, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, pp. 262-263.

59. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

The Sino-Soviet guarrel went back to the 1950s, when, as Paul Kennedy writes, Mao's belief "in the inevitability of a clash with capitalism made him bitterly suspicious of Khrushchev's early détente policies. From Moscow's viewpoint, however, it seemed foolish in the late 1950s to provoke the Americans unnecessarily, especially when the latter had a clear nuclear advantage; it would also be a setback, diplomatically, to support China in its 1959 border clash with India, which was so important to Russia's Third World policy; and it would be highly unwise, given the Chinese proclivity to independent action, to aid their nuclear programme without getting some controls over it – all of these being regarded as successive betrayals by Mao. By 1959, Khrushchev had cancelled the atomic agreement with Peking and was proferring far larger loans that had ever been given to China. In the following year, the 'split' became open for all to see at the World Communist Parties' meeting in Moscow. By 1962-3, things were worse still. Mao had denounced the Russians for giving in over Cuba, and then for signing the partial Test Ban Treaty with the United States and Britain; the Russians had by them cut off all aid to China and its ally, Albania and increased supplies to India; and the first of the Sino-Soviet border clashes occurred (although never as serious as those of 1969). More significant still was the news that in 1964 the Chinese had exploded their first atomic bomb and were hard at work on delivery systems.

"Strategically, this split was the single most important event since 1945. In September 1964, *Pravda* readers were shocked to see a report that Mao was not only claiming back the Asian territories which the Chinese Empire had lost to Russia in the nineteenth century, but also denouncing the USSR for the appropriation of the Kurile Islands, parts of Poland, East Prussia, and a section of Rumania. Russia, in Mao's view, had to be reduced in size – in respect to China's claims, by 1.5 million square kilometres! How much the opinionated Chinese leader had been carried away by his own rhetoric it is hard to say, but there was no doubt that all this - together with the border clashes and the development of Chinese nuclear weapons - was thoroughly alarming to the Kremlin. Indeed, it is likely that at least some of the buildup of the Russian armed forces in the 1960s was due to this perceived new danger to the east as well as the need to respond to the Kennedy administration's defence increases. 'The number of Soviet divisions deployed along the Chinese frontier was increased from fifteen in 1967 to twenty-one in 1969 and thirty in 1970' - this latter jump being caused by the serious clash at Damansky (or Chenpao) island in March 1969. 'By 1972 forty-four Soviet divisions stood guard along the 4,500mile border with China (compared to thirty-one divisions in Eastern Europe), while a quarter of the Soviet air force had been deployed from west to east.' With China now possessing a hydrogen bomb, there were hints that Moscow was considering a pre-emptive strike against the nuclear installation at Lop Nor... "822

⁸²² Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London: William Collins, 1988, pp. 513-514.

Let us look at another account of how this startling reversal, which changed the Cold War from a two-way into a three-way contest, came about.

"Maoist foreign policy was predicated on the assumption that history ordained the certain triumph of the 'proletarian' less developed countries over the capitalist industrialized states. To foster this historical inevitability, China would aid and support revolutionary communist movements in the Third World – in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. But that effort met with little success. In one case in particular, China's complicity in the subversive activities of the Indonesian Communist Party resulted in a major policy debacle. Only in Vietnam, where China had contributed to the defeat of the United States, could Beijing claim success.

"More ominously, along the long [4,500 mile] Sino-Soviet border in the north, there were developments that threatened the very survival of China. Since the death of Stalin in 1953, relations between Beijing and Moscow had become increasingly strained. From the perspective of the Chinese, Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin reflected badly on the cult of Mao. For their part, the Soviet leaders harbored increasing reservations regarding the direction of Mao's foreign policy. At a time when Moscow began to entertain the possibilities of a peaceful coexistence with the preeminent capitalist power, the United States, Mao agitated instead for the active promotion of the 'proletarian' world revolution. He expected that nuclear war between the two superpowers was inevitable and that China, with its massive population, would survive the devastation and emerge the victor. While Moscow was illdisposed toward adventurism, Mao sought every opportunity to provoke foreign confrontations. In 1958, the PLA fired at the ROC's off-shore islands of Quenny and Marsu in the Taiwan Strait, inciting a crisis that almost engaged the United States. In 1961, border disputes between China and India erupted into open conflagration. Not surprisingly, Beijing received scant support from Moscow in both incidents. More than that, the Soviet Union so distrusted China that it decided it would not share nuclear weapons technology with its socialist brother."823

"The already strained friendship between Moscow and Beijing was further attenuated during the Cultural Revolution when a band of Red Guards, armed with the 'mighty atom bomb' of Mao Zedong thought, challenged Soviet troops along a contested sector of the border. In March 1969 a new phase of the simmering dispute erupted when Chinese irregulars ambushed a Soviet border patrol in Zhenbao Island [Damansky Island in the Ussuri River] and killed a number of Soviet troops. Two weeks later, Moscow responded by savaging Chinese border troops with massive artillery and rocket attacks that destroyed Chinese emplacements within PRC territory."⁸²⁴

⁸²³ Chang, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

⁸²⁴ Chang, op. cit., pp. 145-148.

According to Sir Geoffrey Hosking, "it appears that at this time the Soviet leadership seriously discussed the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against China before she could develop her delivery systems to the point of being able to respond in kind."⁸²⁵

At this point the Americans began to get involved. According to Vasily Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew, "Henry Kissinger, recently appointed as President Nixon's National Security Advisor, was originally inclined to accept Soviet claims that these clashes were started by the Chinese. When he looked at a detailed map of the frontier region, however, he changed his mind. Since the clashes occurred close to Soviet railheads and several hundred miles from any Chinese railway, Kissinger concluded that 'Chinese leaders would not have picked such an unpropitious spot to attack.'...

"In August and September Moscow began sounding out both Washington and European Communist parties on their reaction to the possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear installations before they were able to threaten the Soviet Union. A series of articles in the Western press by a journalist co-opted by the KGB, Victor Louis (born Victor Yevgenyevich Lui), mentioned the possibility of a Soviet air strike against the Lop Nor nuclear test site in the XUAR [Xinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region]... In retrospect, the whole exercise looks more like an active-measures campaign. Though the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, appears to have proposed a plan to 'get rid of the Chinese threat once and for all', most of his Politburo colleagues were not prepared to take the risk...

"As a result of the lack of any high-level Soviet intelligence source in Beijing, Moscow seems to have been unaware of the dramatic secret response by Mao to its campaign of intimidation after the border clashes. Mao set up a study group of four marshals whom he instructed to undertake a radical review of Chinese relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. Marshals Chen Yi and Ye Jianying made the unprecedented proposal that the PRC respond to the Soviet threat by playing 'the United States card'. Fear of a pre-emptive Soviet strike seems to have been a major reason for the Chinese decision to enter the secret talks with the United States which led to Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972 and a Sino-American *rapprochement* which only a few years earlier would have seemed inconceivable. During Nixon's visit, Kissinger gave Marshal Ye Jianying an intelligence briefing on Soviet force deployments at the Chinese border which, he told him, was so highly classified that even many senior US intelligence officials had not had access to it.

"There was prolonged discussion in the Centre [of the KGB] in the early 1970s as to whether the PRC now qualified for the title 'Main Adversary', hitherto applied exclusively to the United States. In the end it was relegated in official KGB jargon to the status of 'Major Adversary', with the United States

⁸²⁵ Hosking, Russia and the Russians, London: Penguin, 2012, p. 519.

retaining its unique 'Main Adversary' status. For China, by contrast, it was clear that the Soviet Union had become the Main Adversary..."⁸²⁶

It is important to understand that to this day (2021) the Sino-Soviet quarrel, has not been satisfactorily resolved. The Chinese still claim parts of Russia, including the vital Far Eastern port of Vladivostok, and their vastly increased power since the 1970s, and massive infiltration of the Russian side of the Amur frontier, makes an eventual Chinese takeover of Siberia more than likely. The Russian attitude under Putin has been one of appeasement; but if the Chinese did invade, they would have little choice but either to surrender or to unleash nuclear war...

⁸²⁶ Mitrokhin and Andrews, The KGB and the World, London: Penguin, 2006, pp. 280-281

CONCLUSION. FROM LENINIST MARXISM TO CULTURAL MARXISM

By the late 1960s old-style Marxism was beginning to go out of fashion in the first world (but not in the second or third worlds). In the West, a new-style "Cultural Marxism" began to emerge...

Douglas Murray writes: "In 1911 a famous poster appeared, entitled 'Industrial Workers of the World', depicting what it claimed to be the 'Pyramid of the Capitalist System'. At the bottom of the pyramid were the brave men, women and children of the working class. With their proud, sturdy yet struggling shoulders they were holding up the entire edifice. 'We work for all' and 'We feed all' were the captions accompanying this lowest but most fundamental part of the system. A floor above them, wining and dining in black tie and evening dresses, were the well-off capitalist classes, supported by the workers and only able to enjoy themselves because of the labour of working men. 'We eat for you' said this tier. Above them were the military ('We shoot at you'). Above them the clergy ('We fool you'). Above them the monarch ('We rule you'). And finally, perched at the very top of the pyramid, even above the monarch, was a great bag of money with dollar signs on the outside. 'Capitalism' was the label for this highest tier of the state.

"Today a version of this old image has made its way to the centre of social justice ideology. Just one of the things that suggest the Marxist foundations of this new structure is the fact that capitalism is still at the top of the pyramid of oppression and exploitation. But the other top tiers of this hierarchy pyramid are inhabited by different types of people. At the top of the hierarchy are people who are white, male and heterosexual. They do not need to be rich, but matters are made worse if they are. Beneath these tyrannical male overlords are all the minorities: most noticeably the gays, anyone who isn't white, people who are women and also people who are trans. These individuals are kept down, oppressed, sidelined and otherwise made insignificant by the white patriarchal, heterosexual, 'cis' system. Just as Marxism was meant to free the labourer and share the wealth around, so in this new version of an old claim, the power of patriarchal white males must be taken away and shared around more fairly with the relevant minority groups."⁸²⁷

The new version of the old image of Marxism appeared, not coincidentally, at the end of the 1960s. At that time, it was not easy to determine who was winning the Cold War. On the one hand, the Americans were facing a major and humiliating defeat in Vietnam, which was creating dangerous fissures not only in the NATO alliance, but within the American people itself, where the younger generation showed little enthusiasm for the causes their parents had fought for, and were showing a dangerous contempt for western civilization itself - not from a conservative, religious point of view, but from its anarchical,

⁸²⁷ Murray, The Madness of Crowds, London: Bloomsbury, 2020, pp. 51-52.

hate-filled opposite. On the other hand, the economic and technological superiority of Western Capitalism over Soviet Communism was impossible to hide and increasing – an important factor if the war was to continue for many more years. Moreover, the Communist bloc had major fissures of its own, as the crushing of the Prague Spring had demonstrated; the Sino-Soviet split was a less obvious but no less dangerous fissure in the long term. And if Western youth was disillusioned by Capitalism, Soviet and East European youth was no less disillusioned with Communism!

But it was in the West, not the East, that the dangerous new mutant of Marxism-Leninism appeared. It has been called *Cultural Marxism*, and shares with orthodox Marxism, apart from the pyramidal structure noted above, a supposed passion for justice for the oppressed. Only the oppressed in this late-twentieth-century version of the revolutionary creed were not the workers (who by this time had much more than their chains to lose in the rich West) but various minorities, especially sexual and racial minorities.

And this, paradoxically, at just the time when feminism appeared to have achieved most of its aims, and the civil rights movement had at last achieved substantial benefits for the blacks.

Thus by the late 1960s it was generally agreed that women were equal to men and should receive equal economic rewards to men - and yet the ultrafeminist strand in Cultural Marxism now claimed that women were *superior* to men and that their male oppressors - especially the white, heterosexual ones should be forced to "empower" them even more. Again, it was generally agreed that blacks were equal to whites - and yet the ultra-anti-racist strand in Cultural Marxism insisted on denigrating all the cultural achievements of whites, and on whites "bending the knee" to blacks (a trend that became enforced during the summer of 2020).

Even more radically, the 1960s sexual and feminist revolutions and the removal of the ban on homosexuality, together prepared the way for the still more radical revolution of Cultural Marxism in the last quarter of the twentieth century: *the LGBT revolution*, in which the most basic fact of human nature – that all human beings are either male or female, and the most basic longing of human nature – the urge to reproduce itself – were denied.

St. John Chrysostom said that "The love of husband and wife is the force that welds society together." The contemporary would-be re-makers of human nature deny this, insisting that men can become women and women men in defiance of the most basic laws of biology, thereby laying the foundations for the complete collapse of human society...

This, if it were possible, would be much more than a political, economic or even cultural revolution: it would be a recreation of human nature, both in its individual and collective form – more precisely, *the abolition of man* (to use the title of one of C.S. Lewis' books).

Cultural Marxism first made its presence felt in the wake of the revolutionary events on the American campuses in 1968-69, which initiated a lasting change in American education. Especially important was the rebellion in Harvard on April 9, 1969.

Daniel Pipes writes: "I was a sophomore in college when my fellow students at Harvard University decided that politics, especially the war in Vietnam and the presence of a military training program on campus, compelled them to take over the main administrative building, called University Hall.

"Although opposed to this action, I joined the Communists in University Hall to witness the uprising first hand and take pictures. My photographs reveal about 250 students packed into the august President's and Fellows' Room, harangued as they disrespectfully stood and sat among its statues and under its portraits reaching high to the ceiling.

"The mood was triumphalist: Finally, students had taken matters into their own hands and showed those deans that they mean business! Flexing their muscles, the students escorted establishment lackeys out of the building, rifled through their files, and announced to humanity the dawning of a revolution.

"Only, the revolution did not dawn. About 400 policemen entered University Hall at 3 a.m. and reminded the 500 students inside who the real boss was; that would be Harvard's president. Letting off some righteous proletarian anger at the expense of pampered student radicals, the 'pigs,' as they were then infelicitously dubbed, ignominiously beat and carted off the play-revolutionaries to jail.

"That began the real crisis. For reasons that a full half-century later still escape me, the consensus of Harvard's good and wise was that, while the students may have gone overboard in their idealistic fervor, the university's administration had gravely sinned by calling in the police. The 'bust,' not the 'occupation' became the paramount issue.

"Eight days of crisis followed, including one meeting in the university church and two in the football stadium. The latter were unusual experiments in direct democracy, at which some 10,000 men of Harvard (plus its women, to be sure), myself among them, yelled out 'yes' and 'no' to questions about closing or opening the university.

"In brief, the first meeting called for a three-day shutdown ('strike' in student parlance), the second for a re-opening. And so, after ten days of unadulterated politics, debating topics as small as Harvard's role as landlord and as great as U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, the university returned to a normal schedule. "Normal schedule, but not normality. This event, and its equivalents across the country, caused a deep shift in the nature of American higher education. What had since World War I been a liberal institution (recall William F. Buckley, Jr.'s 1961 quip, 'I would rather be been governed by the first 2,000 people in the telephone directory than by the Harvard University faculty') now began its sad decline into radicalism.

"The would-be revolutionaries of the late 1960s went on to change the fundamentals of American academic life, eventually bringing on such delights as women's studies, political correctness, micro-aggressions, and intersectionality. That descent still continues, not only with far-leftists almost everywhere dominating the humanities and social sciences, but with their radicalism growing more intense and intolerant."⁸²⁸

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The roots of Cultural Marxism go back forty years to the evident failure of Western Marxism in the years after the First World War. As Martin Jay writes, "One of the most far-reaching changes brought by the First World War, at least in terms of an impact on intellectuals, was the shifting of the socialist center of gravity eastward. The unexpected success of the Bolshevik Revolution – in contrast to the dramatic failure of its Central European imitators – created a serious dilemma for those who had previously been at the center of European Marxism. In rough outline, the choices left to them were as follow: first, they might support the moderate socialists and their freshly created Weimar Republic, thus eschewing revolution and scorning the Russian experiment; or second, they could accept Moscow's leadership, join the newly formed German Communist Party, and work to undermine Weimar's bourgeois compromise. Although rendered more immediate by the war and rise of the moderate socialists to power, these alternatives in one form or another had been at the center of socialist controversies for decades. A third course of action, however, was almost entirely a product of the radical disruption of Marxist assumptions, a disruption brought about by the war and its aftermath. This last alternative was the searching re-examination of the very foundations of Marxist theory, with the dual hope of explaining past errors and preparing for future action. This began a process that inevitably led to the dimly lit regions of Marx's philosophical past..."829

Reflecting on the reasons for the failure of Western Marxism, two prominent Marxist thinkers, Antonio Gramsci and George Lukács, "concluded that the working class of Europe had been blinded by the success of Western democracy and capitalism. They reasoned that until both had been destroyed, a communist revolution was not possible.

⁸²⁸ Pipes, "Harvard's Communist Uprising, 50 Years Later", National Review Online, April 9, 2019.

⁸²⁹ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, London: University of California Press, 1996, p. 3.

"Gramsci and Lukács were both active in the Communist party, but their lives took very different paths.

"Gramsci was jailed by Mussolini in Italy where he died in 1937 due to poor health.

"In 1918, Lukács became minister of culture in Bolshevik Hungary. During this time, Lukács realized that if the family unit and sexual morals were eroded, society could be broken down.

"Lukács implemented a policy he titled 'cultural terrorism,' which focused on these two objectives. A major part of the policy was to target children's minds through lectures that encouraged them to deride and reject Christian ethics.

"In these lectures, graphic sexual matter was presented to children, and they were taught about loose sexual conduct.

"Here again, a Marxist theory had failed to take hold in the real world. The people were outraged at Lukács' program, and he fled Hungary when the Romanians invaded in 1919.

"All was quiet on the Marxist front until 1923 when the cultural terrorist turned up for a 'Marxist study week' in Frankfurt, Germany. There, Lukács met a young, wealthy Marxist named Felix Weil.

"Until Lukács showed up, classical Marxist theory was based solely on the economic changes needed to overthrow class conflict. Weil was enthused by Lukács' cultural angle on Marxism.

"Weil's interest led him to fund a new Marxist think tank – the Institute for Social Research. It would later come to be known as simply The Frankfurt School."⁸³⁰

In the same year of 1923, according to Bernard Connolly, another of the founders of the Frankfurt School of social philosophy, Willi Munzenberg, "reflected on the failure of the 'urban proletariat' to mount successful revolutions in economically advanced countries in the way predicted by Marx. To counter that failure it was necessary, he proclaimed, to 'organise the intellectuals and use them to make Western civilization stink. Only then, after they have corrupted all its values and made life impossible, can we impose the dictatorship of the proletariat.' Corrupting the values of Western civilization meant undermining and, ultimately, proscribing all the institutions, traditions, structures and modes of thought ('tools of oppression') that underpinned that

⁸³⁰ Admin 1, "The Birth Of Cultural Marxism: How The "Frankfurt School" Changed America (and the West)", *Smash Cultural Marxism*, January 15, 2017.

civilization. Once national sovereignty and political legitimacy were got out of the way, it would be much easier for a central, unaccountable and malign ('politically correct') government to proscribe all the other foundations of civilization."⁸³¹

"In 1930, the school changed course under new director Max Horkheimer. The team began mixing the ideas of Sigmund Freud with those of Marx, and cultural Marxism was born.

"In classical Marxism, the workers of the world were oppressed by the ruling classes. The new theory was that everyone in society was psychologically oppressed by the institutions of Western culture. The school concluded that this new focus would need new vanguards to spur the change. The workers were not able to rise up on their own.

"As fate would have it, the National Socialists came to power in Germany in 1933. It was a bad time and place to be a Jewish Marxist, as most of the school's faculty was. So, the school moved to New York City, the bastion of Western culture at the time.

"In 1934, the school was reborn at Columbia University. Its members began to exert their ideas on American culture.

"It was at Columbia University that the school honed the tool it would use to destroy Western culture: the printed word.

"The school published a lot of popular material. The first of these was Critical Theory.

"Critical Theory is a play on semantics. The theory was simple: criticize every pillar of Western culture – family, democracy, common law, freedom of speech, and others. The hope was that these pillars would crumble under the pressure.

"Next was a book Theodor Adorno co-authored, *The Authoritarian Personality*. It redefined traditional American views on gender roles and sexual mores as 'prejudice.' Adorno compared them to the traditions that led to the rise of fascism in Europe.

"Is it just a coincidence that the go-to slur for the politically correct today is 'fascist'?

⁸³¹ Connolly, *The Rotten Heart of Europe*, London: Faber, 2012, p. x. Mary Wakefield and Freddy Gray write: "In the 1930s, brilliant operatives like Willi Muenzenberg convinced 'useful idiots' to join anti-fascist organisations that were in reality fronts for the Soviet-backed Communist International." ("Vladimir Putin's New Plan for World Domination", *The Spectator*, 22 February, 2016).

"The school pushed its shift away from economics and toward Freud by publishing works on psychological repression.

"Their works split society into two main groups: the oppressors and the victims. They argued that history and reality were shaped by those groups who controlled traditional institutions. At the time, that was code for males of European descent.

"From there, they argued that the social roles of men and women were due to gender differences defined by the 'oppressors.' In other words, gender did not exist in reality but was merely a 'social construct.'

"Adorno and Horkheimer returned to Germany when WWII ended. Herbert Marcuse, another member of the school [who joined it in Germany in 1933], stayed in America. In 1955, he published Eros and Civilization.

"In the book, Marcuse argued that Western culture was inherently repressive because it gave up happiness for social progress.

"The book called for 'polymorphous perversity,' a concept crafted by Freud. It posed the idea of sexual pleasure outside the traditional norms. *Eros and Civilization* would become very influential in shaping the sexual revolution of the 1960s.

"Marcuse would be the one to answer Horkheimer's question from the 1930s: Who would replace the working class as the new vanguards of the Marxist revolution?

"Marcuse believed that it would be a victim coalition of minorities – blacks, women, and homosexuals.

"The social movements of the 1960s – black power, feminism, gay rights, sexual liberation – gave Marcuse a unique vehicle to release cultural Marxist ideas into the mainstream. Railing against all things 'establishment,' the Frankfurt School's ideals caught on like wildfire across American universities.

"Marcuse then published Repressive Tolerance in 1965 as the various social movements in America were in full swing. In it, he argued that tolerance of all values and ideas meant the repression of 'correct' ideas.

"It was here that Marcuse coined the term 'liberating tolerance.' It called for tolerance of any ideas coming from the left but intolerance of those from the right. One of the overarching themes of the Frankfurt School was total intolerance for any viewpoint but its own. That is also a basic trait of today's political-correctness believers.

"To quote Max Horkheimer, 'Logic is not independent of content.'

"The Frankfurt School's work has had a deep impact on American culture. It has recast the homogeneous America of the 1950s into today's divided, animosity-filled nation.

"In turn, this has contributed to the undeniable breakdown of the family unit, as well as identity politics, radical feminism, and racial polarization in America."⁸³²

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Writing in 2018, Robert Grözinger has an arresting image for the impact of Cultural Marxism and the Frankfurt School on the world since 1968: "The activities of the Frankfurt School, the group of intellectuals which spawned the New Left, the movement that from 1968 onwards captured the cultural hegemony in the West, can be likened to the story of the 'Sorcerer's Apprentice'.

"This famous ballad by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe is known in the English-speaking world primarily due to the cinematic rendering of it in Walt Disney's 'Fantasia', with Mickey Mouse in the title role. The creators of the tenminute cartoon episode remained fairly true to the original, with these exceptions: Goethe's apprentice does not fall asleep, and he hacks the bewitched broom in two only, not in innumerable splinters. A third deviation comes right at the end: In the original, the sorcerer doesn't whack his wayward assistant with the broom. Instead, the returning senior wizard simply puts everything back in order. There is no mention of any sanction at all. Prompted maybe by Paul Dukas' compelling and in parts spooky music (a symphonic poem composed in 1897 specifically with Goethe's ballad in mind), Disney's filmmakers may simply have assumed the punishment and the other changes.

"In the German-speaking world, one line of the poem is often cited when describing a development over which the instigator has lost control: 'Die ich rief, die Geister, werd' ich nun nicht los.' Which translates into: The spirits which I summoned, I now cannot get rid of.

"What's interesting in this context is that Goethe wrote the ballad in the year 1797, according to Wikipedia as a warning to his contemporaries in view of developments in France after the revolution.

"Disney's *Fantasia* makes no mention of Goethe, although their version is quite obviously based on his poem. Possibly because, by the time the film was being made in 1940, talk of looming war made it inexpedient to mention the great German. Instead, the introduction simply says it is an 'ancient tale.'

"So, how does this ballad relate to the Frankfurt School and their doings in the real world? It is now half a century since the pivotal year of 1968, when

⁸³² Admin 1, op. cit.

people – mostly young and impressionable – across the whole West, inspired by the Frankfurt School, started their infamous 'long march through the institutions.' These '68ers' can be divided into two groups: Sorcerer's apprentices and hobgoblins.

"The sorcerer's apprentices are those who with their words change – not a broom, but – other humans into the equivalent of hobgoblins and set them in motion. The latter become the water carriers for the former, until a few of the apprentices (by far not all), appalled at the 'terrible waters' ('entsetzliches Gewässer') thus rendered, desperately try to dispel the new evil.

"The representatives of the Frankfurt School, the intellectuals of the socalled 'critical theory,' are, or were, real life sorcerer's apprentices. 'Critical theory' is not actually a theory but a school of thought, or rather a project. According to its leading theorist, Max Horkheimer (1895 – 1973), critical theory seeks 'to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.' According to the German Wikipedia page on the subject, the aim of critical theory is to 'reveal the ideologies of the mechanisms of power and oppression' and to achieve a 'rational society of responsible human beings.'

"On the face of it, this all sounds well and good. However, if those really are the aims, why do we never hear anything from that group about our monetary system? Maybe I've overlooked something, but I don't think any representative of the Frankfurt School has ever seriously grappled with, say, the Austrian business cycle theory. Indeed, the words 'rational society' indicate a very different tradition from that of the Austrians, namely that of Plato and his notion of philosopher kings, who were permitted unethical means, such as the 'noble lie,' to attain the overarching aim.

"The only person who was in any way close to the attitudes of the Frankfurt School and who had seriously dealt with economics, was of a slightly earlier generation, namely John Maynard Keynes (1883 – 1946). Leading Austrian School economist Ludwig von Mises once wrote an article titled 'Stones into Bread: The Keynesian Miracle,' in which he charges the British mathematician turned economist with exactly that: bragging to be able to perform an economic miracle akin to one of the demands with which Satan tempted Jesus Christ.

"In other words, Keynes too was a sorcerer's apprentice of the kind Goethe described. Ethically and morally too, he was of the same corrosive substance as the Frankfurt School thinkers. He was a serial philanderer and described himself as an 'immoralist.' As such, the Platonist Keynes anticipated what leading Frankfurt School representative Herbert Marcuse (1898 – 1979) propagated in his book 'Eros and Civilization.' Marcuse claimed that liberation of the 'non-procreative Eros' would lead to new, paradisiacal conditions, where alienated labor would disappear and be replaced by non-alienated libidinal work.

"As Keynes despised principles, among others the principle of solid financing, he was an early representative of the present relativism and the modern sorcerer's apprentice of magical money proliferation. Without this – today pervasive – deliberate inflation, there would be much less money illusion, much less loitering, much less financing of unproductive, dreamy, or even destructive activities and organizations. His cynical adage, in the long run we are all dead, is virtually the paragon of wilful present-orientation and dismissal of the future, which is characteristic of the basic attitude to life among today's representatives of the New Left, and of their followers, conscious or otherwise.

"Marcuse, in turn, was the creator of the term 'repressive tolerance.' What he meant was that normal tolerance actually serves to marginalise and suppress the truth about our immiseration (or impoverishment) in the ruling system. Contrary to that, Marcuse established the term 'liberating tolerance.' He simply claimed that revolutionary minorities are in possession of the truth and that it is therefore their duty to liberate the majority from their fallacious views. Thus the revolutionary minorities have the right to suppress rival and supposedly harmful opinions. In addition, Marcuse also permitted the use of violence by this revolutionary minority. He legitimised this use of force as 'defensive.' It isn't the beginning of a new chain of violence, he claimed, but the attempt to break an existing one.

"This kind of misuse of language was typical of the Frankfurt School. Another example is immiseration. Because the Marxist theory of immiseration had been refuted by reality, the thinkers of the New Left switched from economics to psychology. Now they claimed that while capitalism had lead to material wealth, it had caused psychological and intellectual immiseration.

"What is also striking, apart from the distortion of words and meanings, is the predominance of negativity. As the name indicates, 'critical theory' was always keen to criticise. Their utopia always remained very woolly. The reason for this is simple: Otherwise they would have had to admit that their vision was that of communism. Nevertheless, clear-sighted contemporaries realised this even in 1968. In that year, Erwin K. Scheuch edited a book about the '68ers and gave it the title 'Die Wiedertäufer der Wohlstandsgesellschaft,' meaning 'The Anabaptists of the Affluent Society.' In this book he wrote that the New Left wanted an 'undifferentiated society,' without division of labor. It seems that Marx's vision that in future people would hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, farm livestock in the evening and criticise after dinner, is still the vision of the New Left even today.

"However, the Frankfurt School suggested a different road to the communist paradise than that chosen by Lenin and Stalin in Soviet Russia. The direct intellectual precursors of the Frankfurt School, the Italian Antonio Gramsci (1891 – 1937) and the Hungarian Georg Lukács (1885 – 1971), had recognized that further west in Europe there was an obstacle on this path which could not be eliminated by physical violence and terror: the private, middle

class, classical liberal bourgeois culture based on Christian values. These, they concluded, needed to be destroyed by infiltration of the institutions. Their followers have succeeded in doing so. The sorcerer's apprentices of the Frankfurt School conjured up an army of hobgoblins who empty their buckets over us every day. Instead of water, the buckets are filled with what Lukács had approvingly labelled 'cultural terrorism.'

"The hobgoblins of 1968 and the following years, mostly students, later became lecturers, teachers, media employees, civil servants and of course politicians. They and their later progeny are endowed with a sense of mission and the illusion of being on the side of moral righteousness. In thousands of more or less important, but always influential, positions of authority, they succeed in injecting entire generations with a disgust for their own culture and history, and a selective inability to think. With their allegedly liberating tolerance, they have torn down natural or culturally nurtured inhibitions and replaced them with state enforced prohibitions on thinking and acting. These in turn have almost completely destroyed the natural workings and defense mechanisms of a healthy society.

"How could they have been so successful in such a short space of time? The sorcerer's apprentices apparently managed to fill a psycho-spiritual gap in the market; they supplied a demand keenly felt by those they turned into hobgoblins. The market niche to fill was an apparent shortcut to paradise. The sorcerer's apprentice in Goethe's ballad transforms the broom into a hobgoblin, so that it can do the hard work of carrying water for him. Likewise, we are always tempted to find a shortcut to paradise. Just as Keynes did with his monetary policy, which would allegedly turn proverbial stones into bread.

"The sorcerer's apprentices of the Frankfurt School dreamt of a communist paradise on earth. Initially, among the hard left they were the only ones aware of the fact that this brutal path to paradise would fail. With the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, however, this failure was obvious to all. This was the New Left's moment. It was only then that they got any traction and noticeable response. At least in Western Europe. In the US, this moment of truth may have come a little later. Gary North contends in his book 'Unholy Spirits' that John F. Kennedy's death was 'the death rattle of the older rationalism.' A few weeks later, Beatlemania came to America. However, the appearance of the book 'Silent Spring' by Rachel Carson in September 1962, which heralded the start of environmentalism, points to the Berlin Wall as the more fundamental game changer in the West. A few years later, the spellbound hobgoblins began their long march through the institutions.

"Half a century after 1968, we see the catastrophic effects of this magic: a desire for instant gratification and a loss of meaning of life. The desire for instant gratification can be seen in the destruction of established institutions, especially the family, and in the countless number of abortions. Or in unbounded sexuality and the supremacy of the pleasure principle. Loss of meaning of life can be recognized in drug abuse, for example. Other effects are

the dulling of the mind, a lack of general, all-round education, uncritical acceptance of claims that cannot be falsified, such as that of a supposedly manmade climate change, the acceptance of violence as a means of political debate and, of course, the cultural bursting of the dam concerning migration.

"The sorcerer's apprentices have become very quiet lately. Maybe some of them are shocked by what they have wrought. At least two of them could see what was happening even in 1968 and tried to stop the unfolding catastrophe. One of them was Theodor W. Adorno (1903 – 1969). The other was his student Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). In the face of disrupted lectures and rising violence in general, they accused the radicals of 'left-wing fascism.' Like Goethe's apprentice, they realised they had created a 'spawn on hell' ('Ausgeburt der Hölle'). They tried to stop the hobgoblins with a new spell, but failed.

"Currently, some people are trying to turn things around with other spells. The spells of these new sorcerer's apprentices use magic words such as 'nation' and 'the people.' Like their predecessors, they believe that they can use the state as a magic wand, e.g. to force children into schools to learn certain world views, and everything will be all right again.

"So far, none of them, neither the older nor the younger apprentices, are calling for the 'master' to return, as Goethe's apprentice does in desperation near the end. However, the 'cultural terrorism' keeps flowing, and the 'terrible waters' are rising alarmingly. The legacy of the revolt of 1968 is a complete catastrophe for western civilization. This civilization had already been suffering from the disease of statism, but nevertheless had survived two world wars and one depression. Now, the culture war is finishing it off. The result is a society that still harbours some civilizing elements, but is no longer a civilization. It is merely a shaky structure that has not yet collapsed completely, but only because the hobgoblins have not yet managed to create a strong enough wave.

"What can be done? First, we need to stop using the state like a magic wand. We have to urgently defund the hobgoblins. That means defunding, i.e. withdrawing the state from, the universities, schools and media that keep them on the move. However, there is something more fundamental we must do. We have to recognise that there's no short cut to paradise. We have to call the 'master.' In Goethe's ballad, this is a master sorcerer. Goethe himself seems to have been an agnostic. Nevertheless, I interpret this figure as the Creator. Disney's film makers seem to have had a similar idea, consciously or not. The way they depict the master removing the water, accompanied by Dukas' dramatic music, reminds the viewer of Moses parting the sea.

"In his *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe,* C.S. Lewis has Aslan, the Christlike lion, talk of 'deeper magic' that is more powerful than that of the White Witch. Mises' Student Murray Rothbard spoke of 'Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature.' For those who believe, state-funded, forced egalitarianism is a revolt against God. To successfully combat this illusory magic, we ultimately need God's 'deeper magic.'

"Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn once said, in a speech entitled 'Godlessness: the first step to the Gulag': 'If I were called upon to identify briefly the principal trait of the entire twentieth century, ... I would be unable to find anything more precise and pithy than to repeat once again: Men have forgotten God.'

"In the face of the atrocities of the French Revolution, Goethe predicted in his ballad that, in the end, only the 'master' would be able to finally stop the march of the hobgoblins and make everything right again. We would do well to remember that when we attempt to put a stop to the New Left's evil game."⁸³³

⁸³³ Grözinger, "The Frankfurt School and the New Left: Sorcerer's Apprentices and Hobgoblins", *Equity and Freedom*, February 5, 2018.