

A MONARCHIST THEOLOGY OF POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

"I never cease to be amazed," writes the military historian Max Hastings, "by the continuing willingness of institutions all over the world to pay fat fees for speeches from the American academic Francis Fukuyama, who in 1992 published a ridiculous bestseller entitled *The End of History*, which proclaimed that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism were now triumphant and unassailable, having shown their superiority to all alternatives.

"Everything that has happened since shows that Fukuyama was as wrong as could be. Across large swathes of the globe, authoritarian regimes flourish like the green bay tree. Democracy has never looked rockier, even in the United States."

Among other recent events that Fukuyama failed to predict, notes Hastings, were "the dramatic rise of Muslim extremism; the 9/11 attacks in New York and 7/7 bombings in London; the global banking disaster of 2007-8; the break up of the Middle East that began with the 2003 Iraq invasion."¹

That Fukuyama failed in his predictions is self-evident; in this failure, of course, he was joined by just about every other political and social scientist on the planet. However, it is important to understand *why* his and most other liberal scientists' predictions failed. Only when we know that will we be in a position to label his thesis "ridiculous", if it is indeed ridiculous. But in the present writer's view, his thesis is far from ridiculous, only seriously wrong. In fact, it is possible for us to agree with 99% of his detailed argumentation, and derive considerable profit from it with regard to our understanding of how the modern world really works and where it is heading, while differing fundamentally from him in our final conclusions.

Fukuyama's original article entitled "The End of History?" argued, as he summarized it in his book, "that liberal democracy represented 'the end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and 'the final form of human government,' and as such constituted 'the end of history'. That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. This was not to say that today's stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without injustice or serious social problems. But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than flaws in the principles themselves. While some present-day countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the *ideal* of liberal democracy could not be improved on."²

Fukuyama's original article appeared in the summer of 1989, and it received rapid and dramatic support from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe almost immediately after. Thus by 1991 the only major country outside the Islamic Middle East and Africa not to have become democratic was Communist China - and cracks were appearing there as well. Not that Fukuyama predicted this outcome: as he honestly admits, only a few years before neither he nor the great majority of western political scientists had anticipated the fall of communism any time soon. Probably the only

¹ Hastings, "Could this Lead to War in Europe?", *The Daily Mail*, March 19, 2016, p. 16.

² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992, p. xi.

prominent writers to predict both the fall of communism and the nationalist conflicts and democratic regimes that followed it were Orthodox Christian ones such as Gennady Shimanov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, neither of whom were noted as champions of democracy.

But since then, as we have seen, democracy has had a rough ride, not only in the sense that there has indeed been some reversion to “more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship”, but also in the sense that more and more people think that the *ideal* of liberal democracy, contrary to Fukuyama, can indeed be improved on. This work takes Fukuyama's thesis as its starting point, but goes on to develop a quite different historiosophical perspective based on a quite different religious, social and political world-view.

The first draft of the present work was written eighteen years ago, and therefore takes into account none of the dramatic events that Fukuyama failed to predict. However, I have not made significant alterations to its structure and argument in the meantime, because I feel that that argument remains essentially valid. The work is divided into three parts. In the first, Fukuyama's thesis is analyzed and certain inner contradictions in liberal democracy which Fukuyama highlights but whose gravity, in the present author's opinion, he underestimates, are explored. In the second part, the principles of an alternative socio-political system, Orthodox Christian autocracy, are expounded. And in the third part, the themes developed in the first two parts are applied to the study of our apocalyptic time.

The second and third parts of this work are based on a series of twelve lectures entitled "Religion and Nationalism" which were given by the author in the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Sofia, Bulgaria in 1994.

*October 12/25. 2020.
Sunday of the Holy Fathers of the Seventh Ecumenical Council.
Holy Martyr-King Edwin of Northumbria.*

PART I. A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

*Every kingdom divided against itself
is brought to desolation, and every city
or house divided against itself will not stand.*
Matthew 12.25.

1. Reason, Desire and Thymos

Why, according to Fukuyama, is History moving towards world-wide democracy? At the risk of over-simplifying what is a lengthy and sophisticated argument, we may summarise his answer under two headings: *the logic of scientific advance*, and *the logic of human need*, in particular *the need for recognition*. Let us look briefly at each of these.

First, the survival of any modern State militarily and economically requires that *science and technology* be given free rein, which in turn requires the free dissemination of ideas and products both within and between States that only political and economic liberalism guarantees. "The scientific-technical elite required to run modern industrial economies would eventually demand greater political liberalization, because scientific inquiry can only proceed in an atmosphere of freedom and the open exchange of ideas. We saw earlier how the emergence of a large technocratic elite in the USSR and China created a certain bias in favor of markets and economic liberalization, since these were more in accord with the criteria of economic rationality. Here the argument is extended into the political realm: that scientific advance depends not only on freedom for scientific inquiry, but on a society and political system that are as a whole open to free debate and participation."³ Nor can the advance of science be halted or reversed for an indefinite period. Even the destruction of civilization through a nuclear or ecological catastrophe, and the demand for a far more careful evaluation of the effects of science and technology such a catastrophe would elicit, would not alter this. For it is inconceivable that the principles of scientific method should be forgotten as long as humanity survives on the planet, and any State that eschewed the application of that method would be at an enormous disadvantage in the struggle for survival.

Fukuyama admits that the logic of scientific advance and technological development does not by itself explain why most people in advanced, industrialized countries prefer democracy. "For if a country's goal is economic growth above all other considerations, the truly winning combination would appear to be neither liberal democracy nor socialism of either a Leninist or democratic variety, but the combination of liberal economics and authoritarian politics that some observers have labeled the 'bureaucratic authoritarian state,' or what we might term a 'market-oriented authoritarianism.'"⁴ And as an example of such a "winning combination" he mentions "the Russia of Witte and Stolypin" - in other words, of Tsar Nicholas II..⁵

Since the logic of scientific advance is not sufficient in itself to explain why most people and States choose democracy, Fukuyama has resort to a second, more powerful

³ Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵ This admission that authoritarian government can go with a certain freedom of thought and speech - enough, at any rate, to maintain a healthy scientific culture and a flourishing economy - is important coming from such a distinguished advocate of democracy. It is true, of course, that almost all authoritarian governments, including Orthodox monarchies, have employed some kind of censorship. But to use censorship to ban soul-destroying pornography or bomb-making manuals, for example, is one thing. It is quite another to ban basic scientific research, which is simply the systematic pursuit of truth in the material sphere. False ideas, whether in science or philosophy or religion, can only be defeated by being shown to be wrong in open debate. Every society, whether authoritarian or democratic, takes measures to prevent the spread of what it considers to be particularly harmful ideas, or *heresies*. Thus an Orthodox society may ban atheism, while a democratic society will ban racism or sexism. But in either case it is (or should be) recognized that censorship is only the first line of defence - essentially to prevent those who have never been exposed to the ideas from being exposed. For those who have already been infected by the false ideas, the only cure is reasoned argument - education.

argument based on a Platonic model of human nature. According to this model, there are three basic components of human nature: reason, desire and the force denoted by the almost untranslatable Greek word thymos. Reason is the handmaid of desire and thymos; it is that element which distinguishes us from the animals and enables the irrational forces of desire and thymos to be satisfied in the real world. Desire includes the basic needs for food, sleep, shelter and sex. Thymos is usually translated as "anger" or "courage"; but Fukuyama defines it as that desire which "desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be *recognized*".⁶

Now most liberal theorists in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, such as Hobbes, Locke and the founders of the American Constitution, have focused on desire as the fundamental force in human nature because on its satisfaction depends the survival of the human race itself. They have seen thymos, or the need for recognition, as an ambiguous force which should rather be suppressed than expressed; for it is thymos that leads to tyrannies, wars and all those conflicts which endanger "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness". The American Constitution with its system of checks and balances was designed above all to prevent the emergence of tyranny, which is the clearest expression of what we may call "megalothymia". Indeed, for many the prime merit of democracy consists in its prevention of tyranny.

A similar point of view was expressed by the Anglican writer, C.S. Lewis: "I am a democrat because I believe in the Fall of Man. I think most people are democrats for the opposite reason. A great deal of democratic enthusiasm descends from the ideas of people like Rousseau, who believed in democracy because they thought mankind so wise and good that everyone deserved a share in government. The danger of defending democracy on those grounds is that they are not true. And whenever their weakness is exposed, the people who prefer tyranny make capital out of the exposure. I find that they're not true without looking further than myself. I don't deserve a share in governing a henroost, much less a nation. Nor do most people - all the people who believe in advertisements, and think in catchwords and spread rumours. The real reason for democracy is just the reverse. Mankind is so fallen that no man can be trusted with unchecked power over his fellows..."⁷

But this argument is deficient on both logical and historical grounds. Let us agree that Man is fallen. Why should giving very many fallen men a share in government reverse that fall? In moral and social life, two minuses do not make a plus. Democratic institutions may inhibit the rise of tyranny in the short term; but they also make it almost certain that democratic leaders will be accomplished demagogues prepared to do almost anything to please the electorate. One man's thymos may check the full expression of another's; but the combination of many contradictory wills can only lead to a compromise which is exceedingly unlikely to be the best decision for society as a whole. In fact, if wisdom in politics, as in everything else, comes from God, "it is much more natural to suppose," as Trostnikov says, "that divine enlightenment will descend upon the chosen soul of an Anointed One of God, as opposed to a million souls at once".⁸ The Scripture does *not* say vox populi - vox Dei, but: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever He will" (Proverbs 21.1).⁹

⁶ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 146.

⁷ Lewis, *The Business of Heaven*, London: Collins, 1984, p. 186.

⁸ Trostnikov, V.N. "The Role and Place of the Baptism of Rus in the European Spiritual Process of the Second Millenium of Christian History", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 39, no. 3, May-June, 1989, p. 34.

⁹ Lewis' Screwtape (an imaginative incarnation of the devil) writes: "*Democracy* is the word with which you must lead them by the nose. The good work which our philological experts have already done in the

In any case, has democracy really been such a defence against tyranny? Let us take the example of the first famous democracy, Athens. In the sixth century B.C., Athens had been ruled by Solon, one of the wisest and most benevolent of autocrats, who showed his superiority to personal ambition by retiring into voluntary exile at the height of his fame. In the mid-fifth century, Athenian democracy was led by a good leader, Pericles. But by the end of the century Socrates, the state's most distinguished citizen, had been executed; Melos had been reduced and its population cruelly butchered; a vainglorious attempt to conquer Syracuse had been abandoned; and a futile and morale-sapping war against Sparta had been lost.

The lessons were not lost on the philosophers of the next century: Plato turned from democracy to the ideal of the philosopher-king; while Aristotle made the important distinction between "democratic behaviour" meaning "the behaviour that democracies like" and "democratic behaviour" meaning "the behaviour that will preserve a democracy" - the two usually do not coincide.

The behaviour that democracies like is peaceful money-making and pleasure-seeking. The behaviour that will preserve a democracy is war and strict discipline, in which the rights of the individual must be subordinated to the will of the leader. Moreover, in order to *attain* democracy, the rights of individuals must be not only subordinated, but destroyed, sometimes on a massive scale. Shakespeare put it well in *Julius Caesar* (II, 1):

Ligarius. *What's to do?*

Brutus. *A piece of work that will make sick men whole.*

Ligarius. *But are not some whole that we must make sick?*

Thus it is a striking fact that the greatest tyrants of modern times have almost without exception emerged on the back of violent democratic revolutions: Cromwell - of the English revolution; Napoleon - of the French revolution; Lenin - of the Russian revolution. And was not Hitler elected by the German democracy? Again, democracies

corruption of human language makes it unnecessary to warn you that they should never be allowed to give this word a clear and definable meaning. They won't. It will never occur to them that *democracy* is properly the name of a political system, even a system of voting, and that this has the most remote and tenuous connection with what you are trying to sell them. Nor of course must they ever be allowed to raise Aristotle's question: whether 'democratic behaviour' means the behaviour that democracies like or the behaviour that will preserve a democracy. For if they did, it could hardly fail to occur to them that these need not be the same.

"You are to use the word purely as an incantation; if you like, purely for its selling power. It is a name they venerate. And of course it is connected with the political ideal that men should be equally treated. You then make a stealthy transition in their minds from this political ideal to a factual belief that all men *are* equal. Especially the man you are working on. As a result you can use the word *democracy* to sanction in his thought the most degrading (and also the most enjoyable) of all human feelings... The feeling I mean is of course that which prompts a man to say *I'm as good as you*. The first and most obvious advantage is that you thus induce him to enthrone at the centre of his life a good, solid, resounding lie.

"Now, this useful phenomenon is in itself by no means new. Under the name of Envy it has been known to the humans for thousands of years. But hitherto they always regarded it as the most odious, and also the most comical, of vices. Those who were aware of feeling it felt it with shame; those who were not gave it no quarter in others. The delightful novelty of the present situation is that you can sanction it - make it respectable and even laudable - by the incantatory use of the word *democracy*." (*Ibid.*, pp. 190-191).

In another place Lewis admits that "monarchy is the channel through which all the *vital* elements of citizenship - loyalty, the consecration of secular life, the hierarchical principle, splendour, ceremony, continuity - still trickle down to irrigate the dustbowl of modern economic Statecraft" ("Myth and Fact", in *God in the Dock: Essays on Theology*, edited by Walter Hopper, Fount Paperbacks, 1979).

have been quite prepared to throw whole peoples to the lions of tyranny for ephemeral gains. We think of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, by which the West legitimised the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe; or Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations at the insistence of Red China.

On the other hand, the German idealist tradition, as represented above all by Hegel, attributed a more positive value to thymos. Hegel agreed with the Anglo-Saxons that democracy was the highest form of government, and therefore that the triumph of democracy - which for some perverse reason he considered to have been attained by the tyrant Napoleon's victory at Jena in 1806 - was "the End of History". But democracy was the best, in Hegel's view, not simply because it attained the aim of self-preservation better than any other system, but also, *and primarily*, because it gave expression to thymos in the form of "isothymia" - that is, it allowed each citizen to express his thymos to an equal degree. For whereas in pre-democratic societies the satisfaction of thymos in one person led to the frustration of thymos for many more, thereby dividing the whole of society into one or a few masters and a great many slaves, - as a result of the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century the slaves overthrew their masters and achieved equal recognition in each other's eyes. Thus *through the winning of universal human rights everyone, in effect, became a master*.

Hegel's philosophy was an explicit challenge to the Christian view of political freedom and slavery, which regarded the latter as a secondary evil that could be turned into a great good if used for spiritual ends. "For he that is called in the Lord," said St. Paul, "being a servant, is the Lord's freeman: likewise also he that is called, being free, is Christ's servant" (I Corinthians 7.22; see also the epistle to Onesimus). So "live as free men," said St. Peter, "yet without using your freedom as a pretext for evil; but live as servants of God" (I Peter 2.16).

St. Augustine developed this teaching: "The first cause of slavery is sin; that is why man is subjected to man in the state of slavery. This does not happen apart from the judgement of God, with Whom is no injustice and Who knows how to apportion varying punishments in accordance with the differing deserts of those who do wrong.

"The heavenly Lord declares: 'Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin' (John 8.34). That is why when, as often happens, religious men are slaves of unjust masters, their masters are not free. 'For whatever a man is overcome by, to that he is enslaved' (II Peter 2.19). And it is better to be the slave of a man than a slave of lust. For lust is a most savage master and one that devastates the hearts of men; this is true, to give only one example, of the lust of mastery itself. But in the peaceful order of human society, where one group of men is subjected to another, slaves are benefited by humility and masters are harmed by pride. By nature, as God first created man, no one is the slave, either of man or of sin. But slavery is ordained as a form of punishment by the law which enjoins the preservation of the natural order and prevents its disturbance. Had that law never been broken, there would have been no need for its enforcement by the punitive measure of slavery. So the Apostle instructs slaves to be subject to their masters and to serve them wholeheartedly. Thereby, if they cannot get freedom from their masters, they can make their slavery into a kind of freedom, by performing this service not in deceitfulness and fear but in faithfulness and love, until injustice passes away and all dominion and human power are brought to nothing and God is all in all..."¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX, 15; translated by Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, *Documents in Early Christian Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 241-242.

But this doctrine offended Hegel's pride, his thymos. So without arguing in detail against it, he rejected it as unworthy of the dignity of man. And he rejected Anglo-Saxon liberalism for similar reasons, insofar as he saw placing self-preservation as the main aim of life and society as effete and degrading.

He would have agreed with Shakespeare's words:

*What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.¹¹*

The essence and glory of man consists in his love of glory and honour:

*Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honour's at the stake.¹²*

For the greatness of man lies in his *transcendence* of self-preservation, in his capacity for self-sacrifice. And this is a manifestation of thymos.

Fukuyama develops the Hegelian critique of Anglo-Saxon liberalism as follows: "It is precisely the moral primacy accorded to self-preservation or comfortable self-preservation in the thought of Hobbes and Locke that leaves us unsatisfied. Beyond establishing rules for mutual self-preservation, liberal societies do not attempt to define any positive goals for their citizens or promote a particular way of life as superior or desirable to another. Whatever positive life may have has to be filled by the individual himself. That positive content can be a high one of public service and private generosity, or it can be a low one of selfish pleasure and personal meanness. The state as such is indifferent. Indeed, government is committed to the tolerance of different 'lifestyles', except when the exercise of one right impinges on another. In the absence of positive, 'higher' goals, what usually fills the vacuum at the heart of Lockean liberalism is the open-ended pursuit of wealth, now liberated from the traditional constraints of need and scarcity.

"The limitations of the liberal view of man become more obvious if we consider liberal society's most typical product, a new type of individual who has subsequently come to be termed pejoratively as the *bourgeois*: the human being narrowly consumed with his own immediate self-preservation and material well-being, interested in the community around him only to the extent that it fosters or is a means of achieving his private good. Lockean man did not need to be public-spirited, patriotic or concerned for the welfare of those around him; rather, as Kant suggested, *a liberal society could be made up of devils, provided they were rational* [italics added]. It was not clear why the citizen of a liberal state, particularly in its Hobbesian variant, would ever serve in the army and risk his life for his country in war. For if the fundamental natural right was self-preservation of the individual, on what grounds could it ever be rational for an

¹¹ *Hamlet*, IV, 4. Shakespeare was the favourite author of the German idealists. But a careful reading of his plays demonstrates that he was no democrat, but rather a convinced defender of the hierarchical order in society. See *Richard II* and *Henry V*.

¹² Ibid.

individual to die for his country rather than trying to run away with his money and family? Even in times of peace, Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided no reason why society's best men should choose public service and statesmanship over a private life of money-making. Indeed, it was not clear why Lockean man should become active in the life of his community, be privately generous to the poor, or even make the sacrifices necessary to raise a family.

"Beyond the practical question of whether one can create a viable society in which all public-spiritedness is missing, there is an even more important issue as to whether there was not something deeply contemptible about a man who cannot raise his sights higher than his own narrow self-interests and physical needs. Hegel's aristocratic master risking his life in a prestige battle is only the most extreme example of the human impulse to transcend merely natural or physical need. Is it not possible that the struggle for recognition reflects a longing for self-transcendence that lies at the root not only of the violence of the state of nature and of slavery, but also of the noble passions of patriotism, courage, generosity, and public spiritedness? Is recognition not somehow related to the entire moral side of man's nature, the part of man that finds satisfaction in the sacrifice of the narrow concerns of the body for an objective principle that lies beyond the body? By not rejecting the perspective of the master in favor of that of the slave, by identifying the master's struggle for recognition as somehow at the core of what is human, Hegel seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life that is entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and Locke. Hegel, in other words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history."¹³

Now to the Christian ear there is an inner contradiction in this critique. While agreeing that there is something profoundly repellent in the bourgeois liberal's selfish pursuit of comfortable self-preservation, we cannot agree that the struggle for recognition is anything other than a different, and still more dangerous, form of egoism. For what is self-transcending in the pure affirmation of self? Patriotism, courage and generosity are indeed noble passions, but if we attribute them to the simple need for recognition, are we not reducing acts of *selflessness* to disguised forms of *selfishness*? Thus if Anglo-Saxon liberalism panders to the ignoble passion of lust, does not Hegelian liberalism pander to the satanic passion of pride?

It follows from Fukuyama's analysis that the essential condition for the creation of a perfect or near-perfect society is the rational satisfaction both of desire and of thymos. But the satisfaction of thymos is the more problematic of the two requirements. For while the advance of science and open markets can be trusted to deliver the goods that desire - even the modern consumer's highly elastic and constantly changing desire - requires in sufficient quantities for all, it is a very tricky problem to satisfy everyone's thymos without letting any individual or group give expression to megalothymia. However, democracy has succeeded by replacing megalothymia by two things. "The first is a blossoming of the desiring part of the soul, which manifests itself as a thorough-going *economization* of life. This economization extends from the highest things to the lowest, from the states of Europe who seek not greatness and empire, but a more integrated European Community in 1992, to the college graduate who performs an internal cost-benefit analysis of the career options open to him or her. The second thing

¹³ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

that remains in place of megalothymia is an all pervasive isothymia, that is, the desired to be recognized as the equal of other people."¹⁴

In other words, democracy rests on the twin pillars of greed and pride: the rational (i.e. scientific) manipulation of greed developed *without* limit (for the richer the rich, the less poor, eventually, will be the poor), and pride developed *within* a certain limit (the limit put up, that is, by other people's pride).

If ever a house were built on sand, then this would appear to be it!

¹⁴ Ibid., op. cit., p. 190.

2. Democracy and Nationalism

Now there are two "thymotic" phenomena that will have to be controlled and neutralized if the democrat's ideal of a satisfied, isothymic citizenry is to be achieved: religion and nationalism.

Nationalism is a threat because it implies that all men are not equal, which in turn implies that it is right and just for one group of men to dominate another. As Fukuyama admits, "Democracy is not particularly good at resolving disputes between different ethnic or national groups. The question of national sovereignty is inherently uncompromisable: it either belongs to one people or another - Armenians or Azerbaijanis, Lithuanians or Russians - and when different groups come into conflict there is seldom a way of splitting the difference through peaceful democratic compromise, as there is in the case of economic disputes. The Soviet Union could not become democratic and at the same time unitary, for there was no consensus among the Soviet Union's nationalities that they shared a common citizenship and identity. Democracy would only emerge on the basis of the country's breakup into smaller national entities. American democracy has done surprisingly well dealing with ethnic diversity, but that diversity has been contained within certain bounds: none of America's ethnic groups constitutes historical communities living on their traditional lands and speaking their own language, with a memory of past nationhood and sovereignty."¹⁵

Since democracy cannot contain give expression to nationalism without contradicting its own egalitarian principles, it has to undermine it - not by force, of course, but in the democratic way, that is, by sweet reason and material inducements. However, sweet reason rarely works when passions run high and deep, so in the end the warring nations have to be *bribed* to keep the peace. This works up to a point, but experience shows that even economically advanced countries whose desire is near to be satisfied cannot control the eruption of thymotic nationalist passions. Thus "economic development has not weakened the sense of national identity among French Canadians in Quebec; indeed, their fear of homogenization into the dominant Anglophone culture has sharpened their desire to preserve their distinctness. To say that democracy is more functional in societies 'born equal' like the United States begs the question of how a nation gets there in the first place. Democracy, then, does not necessarily become more functional as societies become more complex and diverse. In fact, it fails precisely when the diversity of a society passes a certain limit."¹⁶

In spite of this fact, the ideologues of democracy continue to believe that nationalism is a threat that can only be contained by building ever larger supra-national states. Thus the European Community was founded in 1956 on the premise that, besides the economic rewards to be reaped from the Union, it would prevent the recurrence of war between the European states in general and France and Germany in particular. Of course, the bloody breakdown of supra-national states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia does not speak in support of this argument. But the democrats riposte by declaring that it is not supranationalism as such that was to blame for these breakdowns, but rather the communist system, which suppressed the thymotic aspirations of its citizens and so fuelled nationalism instead of sublimating it.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 121.

So is the democratic model of supranationalism represented by the European Union solving the problem of nationalism? The evidence seems to point in the opposite direction. As the moment of the irreversible surrender of national sovereignties, i.e. monetary union, draws nearer, resistance seems to be stiffening in several countries, as witnessed by the majorities against it in many national polls. And as this resistance becomes stronger, so the sweet reason of the Eurocrats turns into the harsh language of threatened coercion. Thus the French Prime Minister has proposed that those countries who decide not to join the monetary union (he has in mind especially Great Britain, the most sceptical of the Union's nation states) should be subject to economic penalties. And the German Chancellor has said (again, his remarks are aimed particularly at Britain) that the result of a failure to unite in Europe will be *war*. This is in spite of the fact that there has been no war or even threat of war in Western Europe for the past fifty years!

So much for the "voluntary" union of states in the spirit of democracy and brotherhood! If you don't surrender your sovereignty, we will crush you! This is the language of nationalist hatred in supra-national guise, and it points to a central paradox or internal contradiction in democracy.

The contradiction consists in the fact that while democracy prides itself on its spirit of peace and brotherhood between individuals and nations, the path *to* democracy, both within and between nations, actually involves an unparalleled destruction of personal and national life. For much has been said, and truly said, about the destructive power of nationalism; but much less about how it protects nations and cultures and people *from* destruction (as, for example, it protected the Orthodox nations of Eastern Europe from destruction under the Turkish yoke). Again, much has been said, and truly said, about how democracy creates a culture of peace which has prevented the occurrence of major wars between democratic states; much less about how democracy has drastically weakened the bonds created by societies other than the state, from the ethnic group and the church to the working men's club and the mother's union, with the result that, deprived of community identities, atomized, democratic man has found himself in a state of undeclared war against, or at any rate alienation from, his neighbour.

This may explain why, at just the moment when democracies seem to have matured and solved all major internal contradictions and inequalities, new nationalisms are appearing - the Basque, Scottish and North Italian nationalisms, for example, in the modern European Union. For men must feel that they *belong to a community*, and not just to such an amorphous community as "the European Union", still less "the International Community". But to create a community means to create partitions - not hostile partitions, not impermeable partitions, but partitions nevertheless, partitions that show who is inside and who is outside the community, criteria of membership which *not* everyone will be able to meet. The resilience of nationalism in both its positive and negative modes is a sign of the perennial need for *community*, a need which democracy has abysmally failed to satisfy. And while Fukuyama fully accepts the existence and seriousness of this lack in democratic society, he still seems to think that the most important and powerful sources of community life, religion and nationalism, are either already out or on the way out.

Thus in an uncharacteristically bold and unqualified statement he declares that "contrary to those who at the time believed that religion was a necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape, *liberalism vanquished religion in Europe* [his italics]."¹⁷

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

As for nationalism, he recognizes that this is likely to continue and even increase in some regions for some time yet. But in the end it, too, is destined to "wither away". Thus he considers the rise of nationalism in the highly cultured, democratic and economically advanced Germany of the 1920s and 30s to have been "the product of historically unique circumstances". "These conditions are not only not latent in most developed societies, but would be very hard (though not impossible) to duplicate in other societies in the future. Many of these circumstances, such as defeat in a long and brutal war and economic depression, are well known and potentially replicable in other countries. But others have to do with the special intellectual and cultural traditions of Germany at the time, its anti-materialism and emphasis on struggle and sacrifice, that made it very distinct from liberal France and England. These traditions, which were in no way 'modern', were tested by the wrenching social disruptions caused by Imperial Germany's hothouse industrialization before and after the Franco-Prussian War. It is possible to understand nazism as another, albeit extreme, variant of the 'disease of the transition', a byproduct of the modernization process that was by no means a necessary component of modernity itself. None of this implies that a phenomenon like nazism is now impossible because we have advanced socially beyond such a stage. It does suggest, however, that fascism is a pathological and extreme condition, by which one cannot judge modernity as a whole."¹⁸

Pathological and extreme nazism may be, but it cannot be dismissed as simply an ugly but easily excised wart on the superbly toned body of Modernity. Hitler was elected in a democratic manner, and nazism was the product of one of the fundamental internal contradictions of democracy, the fact that while promising fraternity, it nevertheless atomizes, alienates and in many other ways pulverizes the "brothers", making them feel that life is a jungle in which every man is essentially alone. Sovietism was also a product of democracy, and an exposure of still more of its internal contradictions - the contradictions in and between the concepts of freedom and equality. These "deviations" to the right and left do not point out the righteousness of a supposed "royal way" in between. Rather, they are symptoms, warning signs pointing to the inner pathological nature of the ideal they both professed and to which they both owed their existence.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 129.

3. Democracy and Religion

The second threat to democracy is religion. Religion is a threat because it postulates the existence of absolute truths and values that conflict with the democratic lie that it doesn't matter what you believe because one man's beliefs are as good and valid as any other's. As Fukuyama writes, "like nationalism, there is no inherent conflict between religion and liberal democracy, *except at the point where religion ceases to be tolerant or egalitarian.*"¹⁹ It is not surprising, therefore, that the flowering of liberal democracy should have coincided with the flowering of the ecumenical movement in religion, and that England, the birthplace of liberal democracy, should also have supplied, in the form of the Anglican Church, the model and motor for the creation of the World Council of Churches. For ecumenism is, in essence, the application of the principles of liberal democracy to religious belief.

Paradoxically, Fukuyama, following Hegel, recognizes that the idea of the unique moral worth of every human being, which is at the root of the idea of human rights, is Christian in origin. For, according to the Christian view, "people who are manifestly unequal in terms of beauty, talent, intelligence, or skill, are nonetheless equal insofar as they are moral agents. The homeliest and most awkward orphan can have a more beautiful soul in the eyes of God than the most talented pianist or the most brilliant physicist. Christianity's contribution, then, to the historical process was to make clear to the slave this vision of human freedom, and to define for him in what sense all men could be understood to have dignity. The Christian God *recognizes* all human beings universally, recognizes their individual human worth and dignity. The Kingdom of Heaven, in other words, presents the prospect of a world in which the isothymia of every man - though not the megalothymia of the vainglorious - will be satisfied."²⁰

Leaving aside for the moment the question whether this is an accurate representation of the Christian understanding of freedom and equality, we may note that, however useful this idea has been in bringing the slave to a sense of his own dignity, it has to be rejected by the democrat because it actually reconciles him with his chains rather than spurring him to throw them off. For Christianity, as Hegel - and, it would seem, Fukuyama, too - believes, is ultimately an ideology of slaves, whatever its usefulness as a stepping stone to the last ideology, the ideology of truly free men, Democracy. If the slaves are actually to become free, they must not be inhibited by the ideas of the will of God (which, by definition, is of greater authority than "the will of the people") and of the Kingdom of Heaven (which, by definition, cannot be the kingdom of this world). The Christian virtues of patience and humility must also go, and for very much the same reason. For the revolution needs *proud* men, *greedy* men, *impatient* men, not ascetic hermits - even if, after the revolution, they have to limit their pride and impatience, if not their greed, for the sake of the stability of democracy.

But this last point leads Fukuyama to a still more important admission: that religion is useful, perhaps even necessary, to democratic society even *after* the revolution. For "the emergence and durability of a society embodying rational recognition appears to *require* the survival of certain forms of irrational recognition."²¹ One example of such a survival is the "Protestant work-ethic", which is the recognition that work has a value in and of itself, regardless of its material rewards.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 216. Italics added.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 197.

²¹ Ibid., p. 207.

The problem for the democrats is that the thymotic passions which were necessary to overthrow the aristocratic masters and create democratic society tend to fade away when the victory has been won but the fruits of the victory still have to be consolidated and defended. It is a profound and important paradox that men are much more likely to give their lives for unelected hereditary monarchs than for elected presidents or prime ministers, even though they consider the latter more "legitimate" than the former. The reason for this is that very powerful religious and patriotic emotions attach to hereditary monarchs that do not attach to democratic leaders precisely because, whether consciously or unconsciously, they are perceived to be kings *not* by the will of the people, but by the will of God, Whose will the people recognizes to be more sacred than its own will.

Fukuyama struggles bravely with this ultimately intractable problem: "The liberal state growing out of the tradition of Hobbes and Locke engages in a protracted struggle with its own people. It seeks to homogenize their variegated traditional cultures and to teach them to calculate instead their own long-term self-interest. In place of an organic moral community with its own language of 'good and evil', one had to learn a new set of democratic values: to be 'participant', 'rational', 'secular', 'mobile', 'empathetic', and 'tolerant'. These new democratic values were initially not values at all in the sense of defining the final human virtue or good. They were conceived as having a purely instrumental function, habits that one had to acquire if one was to live successfully in a peaceful and prosperous liberal society. It was for this reason that Nietzsche called the state the 'coldest of all cold monsters' that destroyed peoples and their cultures by hanging 'a thousand appetites' in front of them.

"For democracy to work, however, citizens of democratic states must forget the instrumental roots of their values, and develop a certain irrational thymotic pride in their political system and way of life. That is, they must come to love democracy not because it is necessarily better than the alternatives, but because it is *theirs*. Moreover, they must cease to see values like 'tolerance' as merely a means to an end; tolerance in democratic societies becomes the defining virtue. Development of this kind of pride in democracy, or the assimilation of democratic values into the citizen's sense of his own self, is what is meant by the creation of a 'democratic' or 'civic culture'. Such a culture is critical to the long-term health and stability of democracies, since no real-world society can long survive based on rational calculation and desire alone."²²

Quite so; but is it rational to believe that telling the people that "they must come to love democracy not because it is necessarily better than the alternatives, but because it is *theirs*" is going to fire them more than the ideas of Islamic Jihad or "The Mystic Union of the Aryan race"? Is not loving an ideology just because it is *my* ideology the ultimate irrationality? Is not an ideology - any ideology - that appeals to a Being greater than itself going to have greater emotional appeal than such infantile narcissism? Moreover, the "purer" a democracy, the more serious the problem of injecting warmth into "the coldest of all cold monsters". For what "democratic" or "civic culture" can replace, even from a purely psychological point of view, full-blooded religion - believing in absolute truths and values that are not just projections of our desires?

Fukuyama discusses at some length how democratic society allows its megalothymic citizens to harmlessly "let off steam" - that is, excess thymos - through such activities as

²² Ibid., pp. 214-215.

entrepreneurialism, competitive sport, intellectual and artistic achievement, ecological crusading and voluntary service in non-democratic societies. He has much less to say about how thymos is to be *generated* in relation to the central values and symbols of democratic society when that society is becoming - in this respect, at any rate - distinctly anaemic and "microthymic". Why, for example, should I go to war to make the world safe for democracy? To defend the good of "tolerance" against the evil of "intolerance"? But why shouldn't my "enemy" be intolerant if he wants to? Doesn't tolerance itself declare that one man's values are just as good as any other's? Why should I kill him just because, by an accident of birth, he hasn't reached my level of ecumenical consciousness and remains mired in the fanaticism of the pre-millennial, non-democratic age?..

The fact is that whereas democracy wages war on "bigoted", "intolerant", "inegalitarian" religion - that is, religion which believes in absolute truths and values that are valid for all people at all times, and which make those who believe in them and act by them *better*, in the eyes of believers, than those who do not, - it desperately needs some such religion itself.

It needed it at the beginning; for it was only through the quasi-religious fervour of the English, French and Russian revolutions that the old regimes in those countries were swept away - and since the end of democracy justifies all ends in the perspective of History, it does not matter to the democrats that this religion was much more like the bloodthirsty sacrifices of Moloch and Baal than the humble, *self*-sacrificial love of Jesus Christ. It needed it in the middle, when some kind of religious enthusiasm was necessary to whip up the peoples in defence of democracy against communism and nazism - an enthusiasm that was shown to have become dangerously weak at the time of the Vietnam war. And it needs it even more now, at the end, when the cancers of atomism, relativism and me-too-ism threaten to eat up the whole of democratic society from within.

But where, having spent all the vast propaganda resources of the modern state in preaching the superfluity, if not complete falsehood of all religion over a period of hundreds of years, are the democrats going to find such a religion? In Gaia, the ecologist's earth goddess, who gives birth to everything that the democrats desire, while punishing, through natural and man-made catastrophes, all those who, through unforgiveable megalothymia, disobey her commands (i.e. the ecological balance of nature)? In the New Age, which worships man in every aspect of his fallenness, not excluding his union with the fallen spirits of hell? If the vice-president of the world's most powerful democracy can believe in this, then anything is possible. And yet, and yet - how can modern man return to such atavistic paganism when it contradicts the very cornerstone of his philosophical world-view and the primary engine of his prosperity - the scientific method?

4. The Dialectics of Democracy

In the last section of his book, entitled "The Last Man", Fukuyama examines two threats to the survival of democracy, one from the left of the political spectrum and one from the right.

From the left comes the challenge constituted by the never-ending demand for equality based on an ever-increasing list of supposed inequalities. "Already, forms of inequality such as racism, sexism, and homophobia have displaced the traditional class issue for the Left on contemporary college campuses. Once the principle of equal recognition of each person's human dignity - the satisfaction of their isothymia - is established, there is no guarantee that people will continue to accept the existence of natural or necessary residual forms of inequality. The fact that nature distributes capabilities unequally is not particularly just. Just because the present generation accepts this kind of inequality as either natural or necessary does not mean that it will be accepted as such in the future...

"The passion for equal recognition - isothymia - does not necessarily diminish with the achievement of greater de facto equality and material abundance, but may actually be stimulated by it...

"Today in democratic America there is a host of people who devote their lives to the total and complete elimination of any vestiges of inequality, making sure that no little girl should have to pay more to have her locks cut than a little boy, that no Boy Scout troop be closed to homosexual scoutmasters, that no building be built without a concrete wheelchair going up to the front door. These passions exist in American society because of, and not despite, the smallness of its actual remaining inequalities..."²³

The proliferation of new "rights", many of them "ambiguous in their social content and mutually contradictory", threatens to dissolve the whole of society in a boiling sea of resentment. Hierarchy has all but disappeared. Anyone can now refuse obedience to, or take to court, anyone else - even children their parents. Bitter nationalisms re-emerge even in "the melting pot of the nations" as Afro-Americans go back to their roots in order to assert their difference from the dominant race. The very concept of degrees of excellence as something quite independent of race or sex is swept aside as, for example, Shakespeare's claim to pre-eminence in literature is rejected because he is he had the unfair advantage of being "white, male and Anglo-Saxon".

Fukuyama rightly points out that the doctrine of rights springs directly from an understanding of what man is. But the egalitarian and scientific revolutions undermine the Christian concept of man which the founders of liberalism, both Anglo-Saxon and German, took for granted, denying that there is any essential difference between man and nature because "man is simply a more organized and rational form of slime". It follows that essential human rights should be accorded also to the higher animals, like monkeys and dolphins, who can suffer pain as we do and are supposedly no less intelligent.²⁴

²³ Ibid., pp. 294, 295.

²⁴ On December 27, 1995, British Television (Channel 4) screened "The Great Ape Trial", a quasi-legal debate on the question whether apes should have human rights - that is, the rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture. Evidence was heard from a variety of academic "experts" from around the world who spoke about the apes' similarity or otherwise to human beings in tool-using and making, language, social relations, emotionality, and genetic makeup. The conclusion reached by the "jury" (with the

"But the argument will not stop there. For how does one distinguish between higher and lower animals? Who can determine what in nature suffers? Indeed, why should the ability to experience pain, or the possession of higher intelligence, become a title to superior worth? In the end, why does man have more dignity than any part of the natural world, from the most humble rock to the most distant star? Why should insects, bacteria, intestinal parasites, and HIV viruses not have rights equal to those of human beings?"²⁵

The paradox is that this new understanding of life, human and sub-human, is in fact very similar to that of Hinduism, which has evolved, in the form of the Indian caste system, probably the most stubbornly inegalitarian society in history!

Fukuyama concludes his examination of the challenge from the Left: "The extension of the principle of equality to apply not just to human beings but to non-human creation as well may today sound bizarre, but it is implied in our current impasse in thinking through the question: What is man? If we truly believe that he is not capable of moral choice or the autonomous use of reason, if he can be understood entirely in terms of the sub-human, then it is not only possible but *inevitable* that rights will gradually be extended to animals and other natural beings as well as men. The liberal concept of an equal and universal humanity with a specifically human dignity will be attacked both from above and below: by those who assert that certain group identities are more important than the quality of being human, and by those who believe that being human constitutes nothing distinctive against the non-human. The intellectual impasse in which modern relativism has left us does not permit us to answer either of these attacks definitively, and therefore does not permit defense of liberal rights traditionally understood..."²⁶

Fukuyama goes on to examine "a still greater and ultimately more serious threat" coming from the Right. This amounts to the accusation that when democratic man has won all his universal human rights, and become totally free and equal, he will be, to put it crudely, *a worthless nonentity*. For individuals striving for something that is purer and higher are more likely to arise "in societies dedicated to the proposition that all men are *not* created equal. Democratic societies, dedicated to the opposite proposition, tend to promote a belief in the equality of all lifestyles and values. They do not tell their citizens how they should live, or what will make them happy, virtuous, or great. Instead, they cultivate the virtue of toleration, which becomes the *chief* virtue in democratic societies. And if men are unable to affirm that any particular way of life is superior to another, then they will fall back on the affirmation of life itself, that is, the body, its needs, and fears. While not all souls may be equally virtuous or talented, all bodies can suffer; hence democratic societies will tend to be compassionate and raise to the first order of concern the question of preventing the body from suffering. It is not an accident that people in democratic societies are preoccupied with material gain and live in an economic world devoted to the satisfaction of the myriad small needs of the body. According to Nietzsche, the last man has 'left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth.'

exception of a journalist from *The Catholic Herald*) was that apes should indeed have human rights since they belong to "a community of equals" with us.

²⁵ Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-298.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

"One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.

"No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.'

"It becomes particularly difficult for people in democratic societies to take questions with real moral content seriously in public life. Morality involves a distinction between better and worse, good and bad, which seems to violate the democratic principle of tolerance. It is for this reason that the last man becomes concerned above all for his own personal health and safety, because it is uncontroversial. In America today, we feel entitled to criticize another person's smoking habits, but not his or her religious beliefs or moral behavior. For Americans, the health of their bodies - what they eat and drink, the exercise they get, the shape they are in - has become a far greater obsession than the moral questions that tormented their forbears."²⁷

"Modern education.. stimulates a certain tendency towards relativism, that is, the doctrine that all horizons and value systems are relative to their time and place, and that none are true but reflect the prejudices or interests of those who advance them. The doctrine that says that there is no privileged perspective dovetails very nicely with democratic man's desire to believe that his way of life is just as good as any other. Relativism in this context does not lead to the liberation of the great or strong, but of the mediocre, who were now told that they had nothing of which to be ashamed. The slave at the beginning of history declined to risk his life in the bloody battle because he was instinctively fearful. The last man at the end of history *knows* better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless battles in which men fought over whether they should be Christian or Muslim, Protestant or Catholic, German or French. The loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of courage and sacrifice were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices. Men with modern educations are content to sit at home, congratulating themselves on their broadmindedness and lack of fanaticism. As Nietzsche's Zarathustra says of them, 'For thus you speak: "Real are we entirely, and without belief or superstition.'" Thus you stick out your chests - but alas, they are hollow!"²⁸

"A dog is content to sleep in the sun all day provided he is fed, because he is not dissatisfied with what he is. He does not worry that other dogs are doing better than him, or that his career as a dog has stagnated, or that dogs are being oppressed in a distant part of the world. If man reaches a society in which he has succeeded in abolishing injustice, his life will come to resemble that of the dog. Human life, then, involves a curious paradox: it seems to require injustice, for the struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man."²⁹

For a man is in fact more than a dog or a log. Even when all his desires have been satisfied, and even when all injustices have been eradicated, he wants, not to sleep, but to *act*. For, unlike the plants and animals, he has a free will which needs nothing outside itself to feed on.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-306.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-307.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

The basis of this irrational freedom was described by Dostoyevsky's underground man as: "one's own free, unrestrained choice, one's own whim, be it the wildest, one's own fancy, sometimes worked up to a frenzy... And where did these sages pick up the idea that man must have something which they feel is a normal and virtuous set of wishes? What makes them think that man's will must be reasonable and in accordance with his own interests? All man actually needs is *independent* will, at all costs and whatever the consequences..."³⁰

Here we come to the root of the democratic dilemma. Democracy's *raison d'être* is the liberation of the human will, first through the satisfaction of his most basic desires, and then through the satisfaction of every other person's desires to an equal extent. But the problem is that the will, thus satisfied, has only just *begun* to manifest itself. For the will is not essentially a will *to* anything - not a will not to eat, not a will to power; it is simply will *tout court*. "I will, therefore I *am*. And if anyone else wills otherwise, to hell with *him!* (And if I myself will otherwise, to hell with *me!*)"

So perhaps *war* (and suicide) must be permitted in the society whose purpose is "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"? Of course, this was not the Founding Fathers' intention. They were reasonable men. But perhaps they did not pursue their reasoning through to its logical conclusion. Perhaps they did not understand that those bloody Roman dictators were not stupid when they defined the desires of the mob as *panem et circenses* - bread and circuses, in which "circuses" had without fail to include some gladiatorial *murder*.

Hegel, unlike the Anglo-Saxons, did have a place for violence and war in his system - not war for war's sake, but war for democracy's sake. "A liberal democracy that could fight a short and decisive war every generation or so to defend its own liberty and independence would be far healthier and more satisfied than one that experienced nothing but continuous peace. Hegel's view of war reflects a common experience of combat: for while men suffer horribly and are seldom as frightened and miserable, their experience if they survive has the tendency of putting all things in a certain perspective."³¹

But for men who believe in nothing beyond themselves, whether democracy or any other value, there is nothing ennobling or purifying about war. It simply debases them still further. That has been the fate of those Russian soldiers, who, on returning from the war in Chechnya, continue the war in mindless murders of their own people. For such men, war has become an end in itself. In a world in which all objective values have been radically undermined, killing is the only way they have to prove to themselves that they exist, that they, at any rate, can make an objective difference to their surroundings.

For "supposing", continues Fukuyama, "that the world has become 'filled up', so to speak, with liberal democracies, such that there exist no tyranny and oppression worthy of the name against which to struggle? Experience suggests that if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause because that just cause was victorious in an earlier generation, then they will struggle *against* the just cause. They will struggle for the sake of struggle. They will struggle, in other words, out of a certain boredom: for they cannot imagine living in a world without struggle. And if the greater part of the world in which they

³⁰ Dostoyevsky, *Notes from Underground*, New York: Signet Classics.

³¹ Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, p. 329-30.

live is characterized by peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy, then they will struggle *against* that peace and prosperity, and against that democracy."³²

As examples of this phenomenon, Fukuyama cites the *événements* in France in 1968, and the scenes of patriotic pro-war enthusiasm repeated in Paris, Petrograd, London, and Vienna in August, 1914. And yet there is a much better example much closer to home - the *crime* that has become such a universal phenomenon in modern democracies from London to Johannesburg, from Bangkok to Sao Paolo, from Washington to Moscow. It is as if Dostoyevsky's underground man has now become a whole class - the underclass of the metropolitan octopuses, whose tentacles extend ever wider and deeper into the major institutions and government itself.

Democratic man, unable to free himself from the shackles of democratic thought, superficially ascribes the causes of crime to poverty or unemployment, to a lack of education or a lack of rights. But most modern criminals are not hungry, nor are they struggling for rights. There is no *need* as such in most modern crime, no *idealism*, however misguided. Their only need is to kill and to rape and to steal - not for the sake of revenge, or sex, or money, but just for their own sake. And their only ideal is to express their own, "independent will, at all costs and whatever the consequences".

Thus the logical consequence of the attainment of full democracy is *nihilism*, the universal war of *every man against every man, for the sake of no man and no thing*. For "modern thought raises no barriers to a future nihilistic war against liberal democracy on the part of those brought up in its bosom. Relativism - the doctrine that maintains that all value are merely relative and which attacks all 'privileged perspectives' - must ultimately end up undermining democratic and tolerant values as well."³³

Fukuyama should have concluded his superbly consistent argument at this point, saying: "Democracy is doomed; we must find some other truths and values - *absolute* truths and values, or we shall all perish in a morass of relativism and nihilism." But at this point the limitations of his democratic education - or is it just American optimism? - lead him to make his only act of *mauvaise foi*. Like a Shostakovich symphony, which, after plumbing the depths of tragic despair, must perforce have a bombastic finale, Fukuyama declares his faith that democracy will win out in the end, if only because all other systems are dead or in the process of dying. And in an aptly American metaphor he compares the progress of democracy to a wagon train that, having crossed the Rockies in a raging blizzard and having withstood all the assaults of wild Indians and howling coyotes, comes to rest in - smog-filled, drug-addicted, crime-infested Los Angeles?.. Only in the very last sentence does he - very tentatively, as if fearing to have his head shot off by a last Indian sniper - recover himself somewhat and look over the parapet of democracy's last stand: "Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey..."³⁴

³² *Ibid.*, p. 330.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

PART II. THE PRINCIPLES OF ORTHODOX AUTOCRACY

*It is he that shall build the Temple of the Lord,
and shall bear royal honour,
and shall sit and rule upon his throne.
And there shall be a priest by his throne,
and peaceful understanding shall be between them both.
Zechariah 6.13.*

5. A Christian Anthropology

Let us now go part of the way on a "new and more distant journey" that attempts to take us out of the impasse of democratic thought and into more verdant pastures.

The fallacy in Fukuyama's argument consists in that premise which he rightly considers to be crucial to his argument - his model of man. Fukuyama uses an essentially pagan model of man - Plato's reason, desire and thymos. To this he - or rather, the early liberal thinkers - wed what they consider to be the Christian idea of the equality of all men, and the result is: liberal democracy as the best of all possible human social systems.

Let us compare the pagan model of man with the Christian model as interpreted by the Greek Fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church. According to this latter model, the fundamental concept of Christian anthropology is neither reason nor desire nor thymos, nor any combination or balancing of these. It is *the image of God in man*.

Now the concept of the image of God in man has been identified with various faculties of human nature - for example, his freedom, his rationality, his eternity, and his love, - some of which might seem to bear more than a passing resemblance to the Platonic faculties. However, the Christian conception is always in a subtle way more profound than its Platonic or liberal counterpart because always *God-oriented*. Thus the reason of the Christian conception is much more than the liberals' utilitarian ability to calculate one's best self-interest, or even Plato's contemplation of unchanging Ideas. It is the faculty to know, through a living and personal communion, the Personal Reason and Mind of the universe - the Word of God. Again, the love of the Christian conception is much more than the liberals' primitive desire, or even Plato's more exalted eros. It is the soul's completely pure, completely self-sacrificial transcendence of itself to unite in one spirit with the Holy Spirit of God. Moreover, when the soul is not oriented towards God, and is no longer a partaker of His life-giving energies or *grace*, the image of God becomes as it were dimmed, and those aspects of it which raised it above itself towards heaven turn it back to the earth, so that man's God-like reason is reduced, morally and in reality, to the calculation of self-interest, and his God-like love - to the satisfaction of lust.

However, there is another interpretation of the concept of the image of God in man which refuses to identify it with any particular human faculty or combination of faculties, but rather with what we, in modern parlance, call *personhood*. Now the concept of the person is commonly met with in the writings of contemporary, especially humanistic psychologists. But it is rarely remembered that this concept was originally worked out in a purely theological context - the struggle against the Trinitarian and Christological heresies of the first millenium of Christianity; so that the application of the concept to man should properly take place in a similarly theological context. Thus strictly speaking only God is a Person - or rather, three Persons; and man is a person only to the extent that he mirrors the Personhood of God. That is why the concepts of personhood and the image of God are so closely linked in the writings of such modern Russian theologians as Lossky and Zenkovsky.

Thus Lossky writes: "The image cannot be objectified, 'naturalized' we might say, by being attributed to some part or other of the human being. To be in the image of God, the Fathers affirm, in the last analysis is to be a personal being, that is to say, a free responsible being. Why, one might ask, did God make man free and responsible? Precisely because He wanted to call him to a supreme vocation: deification; that is to

say, to become by grace, in a movement as boundless as God, that which God is by His nature. And this call demands a free response; God wishes that this movement be a movement of love...

"A personal being is capable of loving someone more than his own nature, more than his own life. The person, that is to say, the image of God in man, is then man's freedom with regard to his nature, 'the fact of being freed from necessity and not being subject to the dominion of nature, but able to determine oneself freely' (St. Gregory of Nyssa). Man acts most often under natural impulses. He is conditioned by his temperament, his character, his heredity, cosmic or psycho-social ambiance, indeed, his very historicity. But the truth of man is beyond all conditioning; and his dignity consists in being able to liberate himself from his nature, not by consuming it or abandoning it to itself, like the ancient or oriental sage, but by transfiguring it in God."³⁵

The reason, desire and thymos of the Platonic system are real faculties of human nature; but the mistake of the Platonists and liberals is to see them not as aspects of the person, the image and likeness of God, but as divorced from God and grace - that is, as *fallen* from grace. But fallen human nature is not the *norm* of human nature: rather, it is its abnormal, pathological condition. And while men may act most often, as Lossky says, under the influence of their fallen natural impulses, grave practical and theoretical consequences follow from taking what is abnormal as the norm.

For example, the desire of man, even in his fallen state, will never be exactly like animal desire; for it will always bear the mark of that infinitely desirable Nature to which it naturally, in its unfallen state, is attracted. Unlike the animals, fallen man can never be satiated with the finite and earthly; and if he does not seek satisfaction in the infinity of the Good he will seek it in the bottomless abyss of evil. Thus his sexual lust will not be satisfied with one woman, or even with several, but will seek out ever more exotic and perverse pleasures - which is precisely why, in societies like our own that place no limit on the satisfaction of lust, standards in sexual morality fall ever lower and lower, until the very survival of the species is threatened by abortion and contraception on the one hand, and homosexuality and infertility on the other.

Similarly, thymos, the need for recognition, if not checked by the Grace of God or the authority of man, will never stop at a given level of recognition or "rights", but will always seek to have more and more, as we see in the never-ending demands for ever more "rights" of the peoples of today's liberal democracies. For there is no upper limit to the assertion of self for the being whose selfhood is made in the image of God. But there is a choice between two kinds of ascent: the ascent of humility, in which by dying to his own life the soul acquires the eternal Life of God, and the ascent of pride, in which by denying that he owes anything to God the soul acquires the absolute loneliness of Satan.

The denial of the Godlike norm of human nature is what is commonly called *humanism*. But since it denies what man can be and essentially is, it should more accurately be called, as Hieromonk Seraphim Rose pointed out - *subhumanism*. For it is "a rebellion against the true nature of man and the world, a flight from God the center of man's being, a denial of all the realities of man's existence, clothed in the language of the opposite of all these. Subhumanism, therefore, is not a disturbing obstacle to the realization of humanism; it is its culmination and goal... Subhumanism teaches us that

³⁵ Vladimir Lossky, *Orthodox Theology*, Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989, pp. 71-72.

Enlightenment 'humanism', which denies man's true nature as the image of God, is no true humanism at all."³⁶

A consistent humanism leads to two possible social and political systems: absolute obedience, or dictatorship, and absolute freedom, or democracy. The first was favoured by the first liberal theorist, Hobbes; the second by the second, Locke. For both the main aim was the satisfaction of desire, understood in a purely animal way, and the main obstacle was thymos, or pride, understood in a similarly superficial way.

Hobbes favoured dictatorship by popular consent because it was the only way to suppress anarchy, which threatened the lives of all. The problem with this is that if the dictator, too, is proud, the lives of all will be threatened by him in any case. Locke favoured parliamentary democracy through majority voting because this controlled the pride of the former ruler while giving controlled expression to the pride of the former ruled. The problem with this is that, as we have seen in the last section, in the long run it returned society to that hypothetical initial state, the war of all against all, which both theorists set out to avoid. So there is no solution to the problem of how to create a stable social and political system on the basis of secular, i.e. subhuman humanism.

The true, i.e. Christian humanism looks at the task of constructing a stable social and political system in a quite different way. It starts from the clear-eyed recognition that since man's nature in the fallen condition is fundamentally unstable, there can be no stability in society as long as man is fallen, or, at any rate, not striving to overcome his fallenness. Therefore no social or political system which compromises with the fall, that seeks merely to control or limit the fallen passions without waging an all-out war against them - in other words, no system *that legitimizes sin*, can survive in the long term. The only system which has any hope of success is that which ties itself firmly and irrevocably to the only radical Destroyer of sin, *the God-Man, Jesus Christ*. Therefore the only system which has any hope of success is that which is united to His visible manifestation in the world, the Body of Christ, *the Church*.

³⁶ Rose, in Brother Damascene Christensen, *Not of this World*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman Press, 1993, p. 133.

6. Church and State in the Ancient World

Now the Church, as the Divino-Human life of Christ in the world, is the only true example of that type of society which is called *theocratic* - that is, in which all power belongs to God. There are other societies which are called theocratic because they claim to have God as their Head; but only that society is truly theocratic which *truly* has God as its Head - that is, the Church. No society which is headed by a fallen man or woman, such as the Pope or the Queen of England, is a true theocracy; and no society which is headed by a false god or gods, such as the Muslims' Allah or the Freemasons' Jah-Bul-On, is a true theocracy.

The ideal society, therefore, in the sense of the only society that offers real hope of destroying sin and restoring man to his original, blessed condition in the image and likeness of God, is not a mere hypothesis or dream, but an existing reality - the Church of Christ. Why, then, do not all men join the Church? And why does not all politics, at any rate in Christian countries, become subsumed in the life of the Church?

The answer to the first question is tragic but simple: because not all men have faith, which is the gift of God to those who love the truth. The answer to the second is more complicated, but in part, at least, related to the first: since not all men have faith, the boundaries of human societies will almost always be wider than those of the Church, so if society is to have an organization that includes both Christians and non-Christians that organization will have to be extra-ecclesiastical or at any rate not strictly coterminous with the Church. Only in societies in which all the citizens are at the same time the members of the Church can the question of an identification of the Church and the State arise.

And yet even then there can never be a complete identification between the Church and the State; and we can be sure that in those countries in which the Church and the State are one organism - as in the Vatican, in certain Muslim countries, and in the future kingdom of the Antichrist - the "Church" is in fact a false Church and the State is an anti-Christian State. For Christ said: "My Kingdom is not of this world" (John 18.36). He said this not because He does not in fact have authority over the whole world. But His Kingdom has its origins outside the world, and is much greater in every way than the world. Moreover, it is not defended and sustained by methods that are perfectly legitimate for worldly rulers: "If My Kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is My Kingdom not from hence" (John 18.36). This leaves open the possibility that there will come a time when the Lord will take control of His Kingdom in a way that brooks no argument, when "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of His Christ" (Revelation 11.15). But until that time, for reasons that we will discuss shortly, it has pleased the Lord to keep the Kingdom over which He has immediate and undisputed control, the Church, separate from those kingdoms which, even if they are established by Him - for "by Me kings rule" (Proverbs 8.15), says the Lord, and "thou couldest have no power at all over Me," He says to Pilate, "unless it were given thee from Above" (John 19.11) - nevertheless constantly betray their fallen, earthly nature, a nature "in accordance with the traditions of men, with the elements of the world, and not in accordance with Christ" (Colossians 2.8).

For if we examine the origins of the Church and the State, we shall see that the Church is from above and from before the fall of man, whereas the State is from below and a product of the fall. Thus the Church sings: "This is our God, providing for and sustaining

His beloved inheritance, the Holy Church, comforting the forefathers who had fallen away through sin with His unlying Word, laying the foundation for Her *already in Paradise*.³⁷ The Church in Paradise consisted of Adam and Eve, living in complete harmony with God and the Church in heaven (the angels) and created nature.

And, being in Paradise, they had, of course, no need of the State. Nor, even after the fall, do we read of the people of God - the descendants of Adam through Seth - creating states before the emergence of the State of Israel under Saul and David. States arose in order to regulate the conflicts that take place between fallen men who live in large numbers in close proximity to each other, that is, in *cities*; and the first city-dwellers, we read in Genesis, were the descendants of Adam through *Cain*.

Hieroconfessor Barnabas, Bishop of Pechersk, writes: "In its original source culture is the fruit, not of the fallen human spirit in general, but a consequence of its exceptional darkening in one of the primordial branches of the race of Adam... The Cainites have only one aim - the construction of a secure, carnal, material life, whatever the cost. They understood, of course, that the Seed of the Woman, the Promised Deliverer from evil that is coming at the end of the ages, will never appear in their descendants, so, instead of humbling themselves and repenting, the Cainites did the opposite: in blasphemous despair and hatred towards God, they gave themselves over irrevocably to bestial passions and the construction on earth of their kingdom, which is continually fighting against the Kingdom of God."³⁸

In his book, The City of God, St. Augustine traced the history of the two lines of men descending from Seth and Cain respectively - the City of God, or the Church of Christ, and the City of Man, or the antichristian State. This history is a history of almost perpetual conflict between the two Cities. Until the time of David and the foundation of the state of Israel, the people of God, the Church, did not live in cities or states, and in a deeper, spiritual sense has *never* lived in states. "For here have we no continuing city, but we seek one to come" (Hebrews 13.14) - that is, the City of God, the new Jerusalem, which is to be fully revealed *only* in the age to come (Revelation 21-22). The people who rejected God, on the other hand, in general chose to live in huge urban civilizations with complex, usually totalitarian state structures, such as Babylon and Sodom and Egypt, which persecuted the people of God, spiritually if not physically, and drove them into the wilderness in the time of Abraham and Moses.

Thus the very first historical king of the City of Man, Nimrod, was both an apostate from God himself - his name means "let us rebel" - and a totalitarian ruler who turned his subjects away from God. As Josephus writes: "It was Nimrod who excited them to such an affront and contempt of God; he was the grandson of Ham, the son of Noah, a bold man, and of great strength of hand. He persuaded them not to ascribe it to God, as if it were through his means that they were happy, but to believe that it was their own courage that procured their happiness. He also gradually changed the government into tyranny, seeing no other method of turning men from the fear of God, but to bring them into a constant dependence on his own power."³⁹

³⁷ *The Order for the Week of Orthodoxy*.

³⁸ Hieroconfessor Barnabas, *Orthodoxy*, Kolomna: New Golutvin monastery, 1995, pp. 128, 129 (in Russian).

³⁹ Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, book 1, chapter 4, paragraph 2.

Now it is instructive to note that some of the pagan theocratic systems which identified their kings with the gods, of which Nimrod's kingdom was the prototype, nevertheless saw their kingdoms as products of the fall, of a rift between heaven and earth. Thus the Japanese Prince Ito, the effective creator of modern Imperial Japan, in his *Commentary on the Constitution* wrote: "The Sacred Throne was established at the time *when the heavens and the earth became separated*."⁴⁰ However, he goes on to say that "the Emperor is heaven descended, divine and sacred", which implies that while the empire is a product of the fall, its purpose is also to overcome the fall, at least in part. It is possible that Prince Ito was here betraying the influencing of Christian ideas which he picked up during his education in Europe. For, as we shall see later, the Christian concept of sacred kingship, whose prototype may be seen in the Prophet Samuel's anointing of Saul and David, sees in the Christian kingdom or empire a transformation of the originally fallen and pagan institution into an instrument of God's grace.

The very first historical king of the City of God, Melchisedek, was also a priest; so true, sacred kingship appears from the beginning as indissolubly linked with the Church. It is Melchisedek who blesses Abraham, "the father of the faithful", and prophesies: "Kings will come from you" (Genesis 17.6; cf. 17.16, 35.2). Indeed, Melchisedek is an image of Christ Himself, the King and Chief High Priest of the people of God, showing that true kingship and priesthood come from the same source.⁴¹

However, while they come from the same source, true kingship and priesthood cannot be combined in the same person, as they are in the pagan theocracies. The only exception to this rule is Melchisedek himself - and Christ, Who is "a priest for ever, after the order of Melchisedek" (Psalms 109.4). Another partial exception is Moses, who was at the same time the leader of the people in its "political" relationship with the Egyptians and the other peoples they encountered, and a priest. But from this time the priesthood, in the person of Aaron, begins to be separated from the political leadership. And some generations, in the time of Samuel, there emerges the sacramental kingship in the person of a king chosen by God.

This had been prophesied by Moses: "When you come to the land which the Lord your God gives you, and you possess it and dwell in it, and then say, 'I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are round about me', you may indeed set as king over you him whom the Lord your God will choose. One from among your brethren shall you set as king over you; you may not put a foreigner over you, who is not your brother... And when he sits on the throne of his kingdom, he shall write for himself in a book a copy of this law, from which is in charge of the Levitical priests; and it shall be with him, and he shall read in it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, by keeping all the words of this law and these statutes, and doing them" (Deuteronomy 17.14-15,18-19).

As Lev Tikhomirov writes: "Without establishing a kingdom, Moses foresaw it and pointed it out in advance to Israel... It was precisely Moses who pointed out in advance the two conditions for the emergence of monarchical power: it was necessary, first, that *the people itself should recognize its necessity*, and secondly, that *the people itself should not elect the king over itself*, but should present this to the Lord. Moreover, Moses indicated

⁴⁰ Prince Ito, in Harold Nicolson, *Monarchy*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962, p. 38.

⁴¹ Protopriest Valentine Asmus, "O Monarkhii i nashem k nej otnoshenii", *Radonezh*, N 2 (46), January, 1997, p. 4.

a leadership for the king himself: 'when he shall sit upon the throne of his kingdom, *he must.. fulfil all the words of this law*'.⁴²

"In spite of this command of God," writes Protopriest Valentine Asmus, "the Old Testament people at first tried to live on the basis of 'strict theocracy'. But this did not work. Chapters 17 to 21 of Judges recount the monstrous iniquities which took hold of the people of God because 'in those days there was no king in Israel; everyone did what seemed right to him' (Judges 21.25)⁴³ - in other words, there was anarchy.

The lesson was clear: for God's people there are only two possible forms of government: *theocracy* - that is, rule by God alone, or *anarchy* - that is, no government at all, which can then easily turn into *satanocracy*, rule by Satan. The unity of the Israelites was therefore religious, created by their common obedience to God, not political, created by their common obedience to a man. It was created in the course of the history of deliverance from the satanocracies of Babylon and Egypt and maintained by a continuing allegiance to God - the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God Who appeared to Moses and Joshua, - as their only King. That is why, when the people offered to make Gideon and his descendants kings in a kind of hereditary dynasty, he refused, saying: "the Lord shall rule over you" (Judges 8.23). Therefore Early Israel before the kings had rulers, but these rulers were neither hereditary monarchs nor were they elected to serve the will of the people. They were charismatic leaders who were elected because they served the will of God alone.

For, as St. Basil the Great writes: "Even the king of the birds is not elected by the majority because the temerity of the people often nominates for leader the worst one; nor does it receive its power by lot, because the unwise chance of the lot frequently hands over power to the last; nor in accordance with hereditary succession, because those living in luxury and flattery are also less competent and untaught in any virtue; but according to nature one holds the first place over all, both in its size and appearance and meek disposition."⁴⁴

Thus the tragedy of the story of the first Israelite king, Saul did not consist in the fact that the Israelites sought a king for themselves - as we have seen, God did not consider kingship as such to be sinful as long as *He* was recognized as the true King⁴⁵, and the apparent compromise between the principles of Church and State was turned into something holy and sui generis by the sacrament of kingly anointing, which was performed for the first time by the Prophet Samuel on Saul.⁴⁶ The tragedy consisted in the fact that the Israelites sought a king "like [those of] the other nations around" them

⁴² Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaya Gosudarstvennost'*, Buenos Aires, 1968, pp. 127-129.

⁴³ Asmus, op. cit.

⁴⁴ St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, 8.

⁴⁵ Cf. Ecclesiastes 5:8: "In all, a king is an advantage to a land with cultivated fields"; "The heart of the king is in the hand of God: He turns it wherever He wills (Proverbs 21.1); "He sends kings upon thrones, and girds their loins with a girdle" (Job 12.18); "He appoints kings and removes them" (Daniel 2.21); "Thou, O king, art a king of kings, to whom the God of heaven has given a powerful and honourable and strong kingdom in every place where the children of men dwell" (Daniel 2.37-38); "Listen, therefore, O kings, and understand...; for your dominion was given you from the Lord, and your sovereignty from the Most High" (Wisdom 6.1,3).

⁴⁶ As Zenkovsky writes, "for Church consciousness, the king is not the herald of the Caesarean principle: on the contrary, in him is already overcome the opposition between the Caesarean principle and the Will of God" (*History of Russian Philosophy*, Paris, 1948, volume 1, p. 50).

(Deuteronomy 17.14).⁴⁷ And this desire for a non-theocratic king amounted to apostasy in the eyes of the Lord, the only true King of Israel.

Thus the Lord said to Samuel: "Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected Me, that I should rule over them... Now therefore listen to their voice. However, protest solemnly to them, and show them the manner of the king that shall reign over them" (I Kings 8.4-9).

And then Samuel painted for them the image of a harsh, totalitarian ruler of the kind that was common in the Ancient World. These kings, as well as having total political control over their subjects, were often worshipped by them as gods; so that "kingship" as that was understood in the Ancient World meant both the loss of political freedom and alienation from the true and living God. As the subsequent history of Israel shows, God in His mercy did not always send such totalitarian rulers upon His people, and the best of the kings, such as David, Josiah and Hezekiah, were in obedience to the King of kings and Lord of lords. Nevertheless, since kingship was introduced into Israel from a desire to imitate the pagans, it was a retrograde step. It represented the introduction of a second, worldly principle of allegiance into what had been a society bound together by religious bonds alone, a schism in the soul of the nation which, although seemingly inevitable in the context of the times⁴⁸, meant the loss for ever of that pristine simplicity which had characterized Israel up to then.

It is important to realize that the worldly principle was introduced because the religious principle had grown weak. For the history of the kings begins with the corruption of the priests, the sons of Eli, who were in possession of the ark at the time of its capture. Thus for the kings' subsequent oppression of the people the spiritual leaders had some responsibility - and also the people, to whom the principle applied: "like people, like priest" (Hosea 4.9).

And yet everything seemed to go well at first. Samuel anointed as king Saul, who, when possessed by the Spirit of the Lord, defeated both the enemies of Israel, the Ammonites and the Philistines. But the schism which had been introduced into the life of the nation began to express itself also in the life of their king, with tragic consequences...

First, before a major battle with the Philistines, the king made a sacrifice to the Lord without waiting for Samuel. For this sin, which was an invasion of the Church's sphere by the State, Samuel prophesied that the kingdom would be taken away from Saul and given to a man after God's heart. Then Saul spared Agag, the king of the Amalekites, together with the best of his livestock, instead of killing them all, as God had commanded. The excuse which Saul gave for this sin is significant: "because I listened to the voice of the people" (I Kings 15.20). In other words, he abdicated his God-given authority and *became a democrat*, listening to the people rather than to God. And Samuel said: "Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, the Lord also shall reject thee from being king over Israel" (I Kings 15.23) - and shortly after, he anointed David as king in his place.

⁴⁷ I. Marchevsky, *Apokaliptichnata Perspektiva ot Kraya na Vremenata v Svetootecheski Sintez*, Sophia: "Monarkhichesko-Konservativen Seyuz", 1994, pp. 42-44.

⁴⁸ The Israelites had just suffered a series of severe defeats at the hands of the Philistines, who had captured the holy ark.

By modern standards, and by the standards of several of the later kings of Israel, Saul's sins were small. However, they must be understood in the context of the previous history of Israel, in which neither Moses nor Joshua, nor any of the judges (with the possible exception of Samson), had disobeyed the Lord. Moreover, a seemingly minor disobedience by the leader of the people has major consequences for the people themselves. That is why Samuel said: "To obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness as iniquity and idolatry" (I Kings 15.22-23).⁴⁹

The falling away of Saul led directly to the first major schism in the history of Israel. For after Saul's death, the northern tribes supported the claim of Saul's surviving son to the throne, while the southern tribes supported David. Although David suppressed this rebellion, and although, for David's sake, the Lord did not allow a schism during the reign of his son Solomon, it erupted again and became permanent after Solomon's death...

The reigns of David and Solomon are sometimes considered to be the peak of the theocratic kingdom of Israel. As we have seen, this is a misconception, because theocracy actually ended in the reign of Saul: from the time of Saul the original theocratic unity of Israel was divided into a theocratic Church and a non-theocratic, monarchical State. Of course, the links between Church and State were close, especially under such a God-fearing man as David. And it was the Church which found and consecrated the king. Nevertheless, the division existed and widened with time.

Thus we can trace the beginnings of the division of Church and State to the fall from theocracy. The original fall, that of Adam and Eve, divided the original unity of mankind into the people of God (the Sethites) and the people of the devil (the Cainites). The second fall, that of Saul, divided the people of God into the sacred and the profane, the Church as the sacred aspect of the people's life and the State as its profane, worldly aspect.

This division did not disappear when the state of Israel was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar and the people were exiled to Babylon. For while a part of the people repented and strengthened their spiritual unity, forming the core of those who returned to Jerusalem under Zerubbabel to rebuild the Temple, a still larger part stayed among the pagans and learned their ways, falling away forever from the people of God. Moreover, even among those who returned from Babylon to Zion, there was a sect which grew into the party of the Pharisees, who so perverted the doctrine of the Jews in the direction of the identification of the interests of the Church with the interests of the worldly state of Israel that when the True King of Israel became man and dwelt among them, they crucified Him...

And so when the Jews crucified their True King, God Himself, and said to Pilate: "We have no other king but Caesar" (John 19.15), they became no different spiritually from the other pagan peoples whose kings, like Caesar, demanded to be worshipped as gods. Thus did the City of God on earth become the City of Man, and the people of God - the people of the devil. Thus did the original sin committed under Saul, when the people of

⁴⁹ These words also contained a prophecy; for, just before his last battle at Mount Gilboa, Saul consulted a witch at Endor, asking her to call up the spirit of the dead Samuel. In fitting punishment for this sin, Samuel appeared to him from beyond the grave and prophesied his destruction, thereby depriving his last hours of any hope.

God sought a king who would rule them "like all the nations", find its final wages in death - the death of apostasy from God and submission to "the god of this world", Satan.

7. Church and State in the New Rome

And yet a remnant was saved; and out of this remnant, the holy apostles and holy women, the City of God on earth was reestablished - on the same foundation, Christ, but with a new power, the indwelling grace of the Holy Spirit, and with a new, more universal mandate, to bring all the peoples of the earth within her sacred portals. The principles of Church and State remained, as before, essentially alien to each other, as grace is alien to sin. But "where sin increased, grace abounded all the more" (Romans 5.20), and the seemingly impossible happened - Caesar himself, in the person of Constantine the Great, became a Christian, and sought to bring the State, if not *into* the Church as a constituent part of Her, at any rate *under* Her protection and influence.

For three centuries after the resurrection of Christ, the people of God, newly and gloriously reborn as the Body of Christ, was again without a State, a State that corresponded to her calling to convert the nations. And, as in the time of the patriarchs and judges, the Church was again persecuted by a State that was threatened her very existence, being totalitarian, pagan and anti-christian. Now, however, the Church did not flee from the State, as she had fled from Babylonia in the time of Abraham and from Egypt in the time of Moses. The Church remained *within* the State (from the pagan emperors' point of view, like a *State within the State*). But she did not fall into the temptation to which the Old Testament Church had succumbed, of demanding a king who would judge them "like all the nations." Instead, the Christians did something much greater and much bolder, something requiring enormous faith, patience and love: they prayed for *the conversion of the emperor*. And their prayer was answered...

The reconciliation between the Church and the State was made possible through a very wise and far-seeing seeming compromise on the part of the Church, which goes back to the famous words of Christ: "Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's" (Matthew 22.21; 17.27). While insisting that the ultimate authority in all spheres, including politics, is God, the Church allowed that the Roman emperor had been granted authority by God (Romans 13.1; I Timothy 2.2), in fact that he was "the minister of God" (Romans 13.4), and that he should be obeyed in all matters that did not directly conflict with the commandments of God. This meant in practice that the Christians were the most loyal subjects of the emperor throughout the first three centuries. Unlike the Jews, who were constantly stirring up rebellions, the Christians did not rebel or demand any rights; they conscientiously fulfilled the duty of military service, and paid their taxes. Only when asked to offer incense to the statue of the emperor did they refuse, even to the point of torture and death.

How was it possible for the people of God to offer, as the Apostle Paul commanded, "petitions, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings" (I Timothy 2.1) for an idolater like the Emperor Nero who did everything in his power to destroy the Church?

It was possible - nay, mandatory - to give thanks, first, for the principle of authority, of *law and order*, which the pagan emperors *generally* - when they were not persecuting the Church - embodied.

"For anarchy," writes St. Isidore of Pelusium, "is always the worst of all evils... That is why, although the body is a single whole, not everything in it is of equal honour, but some members rule, while others are in subjection. So we are right to say that the

authorities - that is, leadership and royal power - are established by God so that society should not fall into disorder."⁵⁰

However, the real reason why the apostle exhorted the people of God gave thanks for the empire was his prophetic intuition of its future role as the defender of the Church. As Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow wrote: "The Spirit of God in him foresaw and more or less showed him the future light of Christian kingdoms. His God-inspired vision, piercing through future centuries, encounters Constantine, who brings peace to the Church and sanctifies the kingdom by faith; and Theodosius and Justinian, who defend the Church from the impudence of heresies. Of course, he also goes on to see Vladimir and Alexander Nevsky and many spreaders of the faith, defenders of the Church and guardians of Orthodoxy. After this it is not surprising that St. Paul should write: I beseech you not only to pray, but also to give thanks for the king and all those in authority; because there will be not only such kings and authorities for whom it is necessary to pray with sorrow., but also those for whom we must thank God with joy for His precious gift."⁵¹

In general, a special authority attaches to the Roman empire, of which the Lord Himself was registered as a citizen, and which in its Christian reincarnations as the New Rome of Constantinople and the Third Rome of Moscow played such an important role in preserving Orthodox Christianity until the beginning of our apocalyptic century. Moreover, according to the Apostle Paul, the function of the Roman empire viewed from an eschatological perspective is to be "that which restrains" the coming of the Antichrist (II Thessalonians 2.7). For when the Roman empire and all monarchical authority falls, there will come a period of democracy and anarchy, which will pave the way for the final satanocracy of world history, the reign of the Antichrist.

When the Emperor Constantine believed in Christ and made Christianity the official religion of the empire, he immediately showed what a blessing the empire was. Not only did he preserve a stable social framework in which the Church could spread her influence. He also protected the Church from external enemies, built churches, passed laws that were Christian in spirit, convened councils against heretics, and promoted missionary work.

Can we say that the Christian Roman empire founded by Constantine at Constantinople was a theocracy? Not in the strict sense of the word; for, as we have seen, in the Christian understanding the only true theocracy is the Church. The empire, by becoming Christian, entered into the sphere of the Church's influence and became sanctified by the Church. It became an ally of the Church, as it were an external wall around the Church, protecting her from external evil. But the empire was not the Body of Christ; it was not the ark of salvation; and the promise of Christ to the Church that she would prevail against the gates of hell (Matthew 16.18) did not apply to the empire, which was always understood to be mortal.

However, the Christian Roman empire founded by Constantine fulfilled two of the conditions which Moses had indicated as being essential in a true and God-pleasing

⁵⁰ St. Isidore, *Letter 6* to Dionysius.

⁵¹ Metropolitan Philaret, *Sochineniya*, vol. III, p. 291.

monarchy: that the king should be chosen by God, not by the people⁵², and that he himself should be ruled by God.

Now Western scholars have accused the Orthodox Byzantine empire of having been essentially caesaropapist in spirit and structure - that is, of having allowed the emperors to rule the Church and make her in essence a department of the State. This judgement is based on a misunderstanding. And since this misunderstanding is an important one which continues to influence western attitudes to Orthodoxy, some further explanation may be in order at this point.

It is certainly true that the Byzantine emperors did not confine themselves to purely political matters. As we have seen, they convened church councils, punished heretics, passed Christian laws, built churches and encouraged missionary work. However, the victory of the Church over the pagan Roman persecutors had been too decisive for any Christian, not least the newly-converted Christian emperor, to consider that the Church should ever be in subjection to any worldly power. At the same time, the authority of the institution of kingship had been increased, and acquired a semi-sacred character as reflecting and reinforcing the authority of God. The Roman empire was seen as the providential creation of God for the furtherance and strengthening of His rule on earth; and if some of the emperors even after Constantine persecuted the Christian faith, this was not seen as outweighing the major benefits that the empire brought, reflecting as it did the unity of the Heavenly Kingdom.

Thus Bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia wrote in his eulogy to Constantine in 335: "The kingdom with which he [Constantine] is invested is an image of the heavenly one. He looks up to see the archetypal pattern and guides those whom He rules below in accordance with that pattern. The example of monarchical rule there is a source of strength to him. This is something granted to man alone of the creatures of the earth by the universal King. The basic principle of kingly authority is the establishment of a single source of authority to which everything is subject. Monarchy is superior to every other constitution and form of government. For polyarchy, where everyone competes on equal terms, is really anarchy and discord. This is why there is one God, not two or three or even more. Polytheism is strictly atheism. There is one King, and His Word and royal law are one."⁵³

The idea that monarchy is the natural form of government because it reflects, and draws attention to, the monarchy of God, was a new concept of great importance in the history of ideas. None of the major states of the Ancient World was based on this idea. This was the case, first, because none of these societies believed, as the Christians did, in a single God and Creator. And secondly because, as often as not, they invested the king with divine status, so that no higher principle or source of authority above the king or emperor was recognized; whereas in the Christian empire sacred and secular power were separated, and both emperor and patriarch were considered bound by, and subject to, the will of God in heaven.

⁵² Although Constantine came to the throne of a pagan empire scarcely less anti-Christian in its beliefs and actions than Ancient Egypt and Babylon, his kingdom could nevertheless be said to have represented a new beginning, established by God, insofar as God revealed Himself to him before the decisive battle of the Milvian bridge and gave Him the means to conquer the empire - the sign of the precious Cross.

⁵³ Eusebius, *Oration in Honour of Constantine on the Thirtieth Anniversary of his Reign*, translated in Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, *Documents in Early Christian Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 233-234.

The idea that monarchy is the natural form of government was developed by St. Theodore the Studite in the ninth century: "There is one Lord and Giver of the Law, as it is written: one authority and one Divine principle over all. This single principle is the source of all wisdom, goodness and good order; it extends over every creature that has received its beginning from the goodness of God.; it is given to one man only.. to construct rules of life in accordance with the likeness of God. For the divine Moses in his description of the origin of the world that comes from the mouth of God, cites the word: 'Let us create man in accordance with Our image and likeness' (Genesis 1.26). Hence the establishment among men of every dominion and every authority, especially in the Churches of God: one patriarch in a patriarchate, one metropolitan in a metropolia, one bishop in a bishopric, one abbot in a monastery, and in secular life, if you want to listen, one king, one regimental commander, one captain on a ship. And if one will did not rule in all this, there would be no law and order in anything, and it would not be for the best, for a multiplicity of wills destroys everything."⁵⁴

A thousand years later, when the principle of monarchical government came under attack from the Russian liberals, Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow and the Russian Slavophile thinkers returned to these ideas, arguing that the monarchical principle is found throughout nature and at all levels of human society. Thus monarchy in the State is simply the expression, on a larger scale, of the same principle as found in the family, in the school, in the tribe, etc. In this sense it is established by God and may even be said to be in the likeness of God. For even if monarchical politics first appears, historically speaking, in the pagan, antichristian states of antiquity, God's ultimate purpose was to sanctify it for the support of His own Kingdom, the Church.

Thus Tuskarev writes: "The cell of the State is the family. In the family the father is the head by nature, while the son is subject to him; the authority of the father is not the result of elections in the family, but is entrusted to him naturally by the law of God (Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow). Just as from the extended family of the tribe there arises the people, so out of the family headed by one man there arises tsarist autocracy. Both the familial and the monarchical organization are established by God for the earthly existence of the sinful, fallen man. The first-created man, living in living communion with God, was not subject to anyone besides God, and was the lord of irrational creation. But when man sinned, destroying the Divine hierarchy of submission and falling away from God, he became the servant of sin and the devil, and as a consequence of this became subject to a man like himself. The sinful will of man requires submission for the restraint of his destructive activity. This Divine ordinance has in view only the good of man - the limitation of the spread of evil. And history itself shows that whatever the inadequacies of monarchies, they bear no comparison with that evil that revolutions and anarchies have brought to the peoples.

"Monarchical administration has been established by God in accordance with His likeness. 'God being One established the authority of one person; as Almighty - autocratic authority; as Eternal - hereditary authority' (Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow). Such is monarchy in general, independent of its spiritual content; being established in accordance with the likeness of God, it already has an educational religious significance. Christian monarchy was formed and developed under the immediate leadership and grace-filled sanctification of the Church of Christ, and for that reason has a special spiritual content.

⁵⁴ St. Theodore, in *The Philokalia*, volume IV, p. 93; quoted in Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev), *Russkaya Ideologiya*, St. Petersburg: Suvorin, 1992, pp. 46-47.

"The Church, like monarchical statehood, is also established by God, although it is incomparably higher by virtue of its Divino-human nature. Therefore there could be no contradiction of principle between them, and from the time of Constantine the Great they together the common work of God on the earth. After the conversion of Constantine, the emperor, in his own words, began to fulfil the functions of 'bishop (in Greek: 'overseer') of the external affairs of the Church', while monarchical statehood itself became 'the external defence of the Church'."⁵⁵

Nor did the Christian emperor take this role upon himself of his own will: the Church entrusted it to him, seeing in the Christian empire the natural ally and protector of the Church. It was not a case of the State taking over the Church, but of the Church converting the State in the person of the emperor and then entrusting him with Christian tasks. Just as the Apostles created the order of deacons so as to make themselves free for spiritual matters (Acts 6.2), so the Church entrusted the emperor with protecting the Christians against external foes - barbarians and heretics.

Thus the Fathers of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 welcomed the Emperor Constantine with the following words: "Blessed is God, Who has chosen you as king of the earth, having by your hand destroyed the worship of idols and through you bestowed peace upon the hearts of the faithful... On this teaching of the Trinity, your Majesty, is established the greatness of your piety. Preserve it for us whole and unshaken, so that none of the heretics, having penetrated into the Church, might subject our faith to mockery... Your Majesty, command that Arius should depart from his error and rise no longer against the apostolic teaching. Or if he remains obstinate in his impiety, drive him out of the Orthodox Church."

As Tuskarev observes, "this is a clear recognition of the divine election of Constantine as the external defender of the Church, who is obliged to work with her in preserving the right faith, and in correspondence with the conciliar sentence is empowered to drive heretics out of the Church."⁵⁶

Again, when St. Athanasius the Great was condemned by a council at Tyre that considered itself "ecumenical", he appealed to the Emperor Constantine against the decision of his fellow-bishops - and no one saw anything wrong in this.

At the same time the monarchy was never absolutely powerful in Byzantium because it always had the Church exhorting it and checking it. Moreover, as the historian Arnold Toynbee points out, "in the conflicts between the East Roman emperors with the patriarchs of Constantinople, the former won many battles, but *did not win a single war*."⁵⁷ Thus the Church won the war against the Arian emperors in the fourth century, the iconoclast emperors in the eighth and ninth centuries, and the Latinizing emperors in the fourteenth century.

Even when the emperor was Orthodox, but sinned morally, the Church was quite prepared to use her spiritual authority to rebuke him - and very often her authority was decisive in changing the emperor's behaviour. Thus Theodosius the Great, one of the

⁵⁵ Tuskarev, A. *Tserkov' o Gosudarstve*, Staritsa, 1992, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵⁷ Toynbee, *The Greeks and their Heritage*, translated back into English from the Russian translation in Andrushkevich, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

most powerful men ever to wear the purple, was forbidden to enter the Church by St. Ambrose of Milan until he had repented of murder. When Theodosius said that King David had committed both murder and adultery, Ambrose replied: "As you imitated him in his transgressions, imitate him in his repentance."⁵⁸ Again, in the fifth century St. John Chrysostom rebuked the Empress Eudoxia. And in the ninth and again in the tenth century the Church refused to sanction the emperor's illegal marriage.

The relationship between Church and State in the Christian Roman empire was defined with great clarity by the Emperor Justinian the Great: "The greatest gifts given by God to men by His supreme kindness are the priesthood and the empire, of which the first serves the things of God and the second rules the things of men and assumes the burden of care for them. Both proceed from one source and adorn the life of man... For if the first is without reproach and adorned with faithfulness to God, and the other adorns the state entrusted to it rightly and decently, a good symphony will exist..."⁵⁹

As Andrushkevich points out, the word "symphony" in Greek denotes much more than simple agreement or concord. Church and State can agree in an evil way, for evil ends. True symphony is possible only where both the Church "is without reproach and adorned with faithfulness to God" and the State is ruled "rightly and decently" - that is, in accordance with the commandments of God.⁶⁰

The concept of the symphony of powers depends on the belief that the Autocracy, no less than the Church, is directed by the Providence of God. As Pope John II wrote to Justinian in 533: "'The King's heart is in the hand of God and He directs it as He pleases' (Proverbs 21.1). There lies the foundation of your Empire and the endurance of your rule. For the peace of the Church and the unity of religion raise their originator to the highest place and sustain him there in happiness and peace. God's power will never fail him who protects the Church against the evil and stain of division, for it is written: 'When a righteous King sits on the throne, no evil will befall him' (Proverbs 20.8)."⁶¹

Other "theocratic" societies have no such symphony of powers. Thus Islam "demands institutions which cover the whole life of the community. There is nothing in Islam... corresponding to the Church. There is no place for a special institution within society devoted to the ends of the faith. For it is the whole of society which is devoted to the ends of the faith."⁶²

Of course, Christian Rome was no less "devoted to the ends of the faith" than Islam; but in Christian Rome the clear distinction between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world was never lost sight of.

Thus the relationship between Church and State, emperor and patriarch in the Christian Roman empire was based on a common recognition of the following principles:-

⁵⁸ *Vita Paulini*.

⁵⁹ St. Justinian, *Novella VI*.

⁶⁰ I.N. Andrushkevich, "Doktrina sv. Imperatora Yustiniana Velikago", *Pravoslavnyaya Rus'*, N 4 (1529), February 15/28, 1995, pp. 4-12 (in Russian).

⁶¹ Gerostergios, A. *Justinian the Great: the Emperor and Saint*, Belmont, Mass.: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1982, p. 82.

⁶² Smart, N. *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, London: Fontana, 1971, p. 538

1. The purpose of life on earth is to serve God and save one's soul, and one is saved through confessing the Orthodox Faith in Christ in obedience to the Body of Christ, the Orthodox Church.

2. The purpose of the empire is to protect and strengthen the Orthodox Faith and Church, just as the purpose of the body is to protect the soul and carry out its will.

3. The empire will be strong as long as it fulfils this purpose, but will fall when it no longer fulfils this purpose. At that moment the body will die, and the soul, freed from what has now become its prison, will enter the wilderness condition which the prophets of God have prophesied will be the condition of the Church at the end of time (Revelation 12).

St. Photius the Great, Patriarch of Constantinople in the ninth century, compared the relationship of the Church and the empire to that between the soul and the body. The Church is the soul of the body politic; she is immortal, and gives life to the whole organism. The body exists in order to serve the soul, and to help her in her actions in the world. The body can and will die. At that moment the Church will again be on her own without political support, like a soul without its body.

Professor Kartashev has developed this comparison of the relationship between Church and State to that between soul and body: "This likeness demonstrates the irrationality and indeterminacy of the boundary line between the spheres of Church and State, just as the simple but real fact of the single but at the same time double nature of man is similarly irrational. In Orthodoxy this comparison links the symphony between Church and kingdom to Orthodox anthropology. The combination of the kingdom 'of this world' with the Kingdom of God which is 'not of this world' is recognized by Orthodoxy not as an absurdity (as it seems to western rationalism), but as the consequence of the Incarnation, where the two natures in Christ exist without merging and without division, i.e. as an irrational but in the highest degree real union of the poles of being...

"The hierarchy of the relationships between spirit and flesh, and therefore also of the Church and the State, has its foundation in the creation itself. Just as the body must be the obedient and perfect instrument of the spirit, so the State is ideally thought of as the obedient and perfect instrument of the Church, for it is she that knows and reveals to mankind its higher spiritual aims, pointing the way to the attainment of the Kingdom of God. In this sense the Church is always theocratic, for to her have been opened and handed over the means of the power of God over the hearts of men. She is the ideal active principle, and the role of the State in comparison with her is secondary. The Church leads the State and the people, for she knows where she is going. The Orthodox State freely submits to this leadership. But just as in the individual person the harmony of spirit and flesh has been destroyed by the original sin, so is it in the relationship between the Church and the State. Hence it is practically difficult to carry out the task of Church-State symphony in the sinful world. Just as the individual Christian commits many sins, great and small, on his way to holiness, so the people united in the Christian State suffer many falls on the way to symphony. Deviations from the norm are linked with violations of the hierarchical submission of the flesh to the spirit, the State to the Church. But these sins and failures cannot overthrow the system of the symphony of Church and State in its essence."⁶³

⁶³ Kartashev, A. *Svataya Rus' i Puti Rossii*, Paris, 1956; quoted in Tuskarev, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 35.

Now while this analogy of Church and State to soul and body is certainly illuminating, it has, like all analogies of spiritual things, certain limitations; it illumines some aspects of the reality while obscuring others.

The first important qualification that must be made is that there were times in the history of the Orthodox empire when the body disobeyed the soul, or at any rate imposed its will counter to the will of the soul, and this was pleasing to God and for the ultimate strengthening of the Church. A clear example is Byzantium in the mid-fifth century, when very many of the bishops were heretics, the spiritual quality of the emperors was in general higher than that of the bishops, and the Emperors Marcian and Pulcheria were particularly active in the convening of councils, in the punishment of heretics and in the appointment of new bishops to replace the heretics. Thus it was largely through the agency of these emperors that the "robber council" of 449, which supported Monophysitism, was overturned by the Fourth Ecumenical Council of 451, which re-established Orthodoxy.

Western critics have seen in this clear proof of the alleged "caesaropapism" of the Orthodox empire. But in this judgement they fail to understand the dual function of the emperor, who was not only the head of the secular government, but also the Divinely chosen and anointed representative of the lay principle in the Church and even "the concelebrant of the bishops", in St. Constantine's phrase.

For the sacrament of the anointing of emperors was no mere "rubber-stamping" of the legitimacy of the secular power by the Church. It bestowed upon the emperor a special grace and a special rank, a rank not *above*, still less *against* the Church, but *in* and *for* the Church. This grace was especially related to the defence of the Orthodox Faith; for the defence of the Faith is considered in Orthodoxy to be the responsibility of laity as well as clergy, and the emperor as the "first layman" of the empire had a special responsibility to lead the laity in the defence of the faith when the clergy began to falter.

This explains the prominent role of the emperor in the election of patriarchs, which has so scandalized western advocates of the separation of Church and State. In the early Church the laity had always had a part in the election of bishops. However, as the Church grew, these episcopal elections became rowdy and at times violent events. Therefore the Church, always zealous to preserve good order, had forbidden elections by the mob, and had entrusted to the emperor the task of representing the lay element in elections - although without allowing him to *overrule* the Church hierarchy, that is, to have the power of veto. Of course, there was a utilitarian motive here, in that the patriarch was more likely to be successful if he was approved by the emperor. However, the primary motive was spiritual, being based on the sacramental role of the emperor as the Church's first layman. And that is why Church writers, such as St. Isidore of Pelusium, not only did not bewail the emperor's alleged "interference" in Church affairs when the clergy faltered, but openly praised it.⁶⁴

A second important qualification is that while the Church throughout the world is one, there never was just one Christian State. For besides the major Christian empire, there have existed smaller independent Orthodox kingdoms which have had a "symphonic" pattern of Church-State relationship and whose kings have been anointed by the Church as in Byzantium. In the West, for example, King Clovis, the first Christian

⁶⁴ Cf. Tuskarev, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77

king of the Franks, was anointed by the Archbishop of Rheims on Christmas Day, 506; the first king of the Scots was anointed by St. Columba of Iona in the sixth century; and the first all-English king was anointed in 802.⁶⁵

Within the Empire, however, there was only one Christian people, the people of the Romans; and Greeks and Latins, Semites and Slavs were all equally Romans, all equally members of this commonwealth. As Fr. George Metallinos writes: "A great number of peoples made up the autocracy but without any 'ethnic' differentiation between them. The whole racial amalgam lived and moved in a single civilization (apart from some particularities) - the Greek, and it had a single cohesive spiritual power - Orthodoxy, which was at the same time the ideology of the oikoumene -autocracy. The citizens of the autocracy were Romans politically, Greeks culturally and Orthodox Christians spiritually. Through Orthodoxy the old relationship of rulers and ruled was replaced by the sovereign bond of brotherhood. Thus the 'holy race' of the New Testament (I Peter 2.9) became a reality as the 'race of the Romans', that is, of the Orthodox citizens of the autocracy of the New Rome."⁶⁶

And this international quality of the Empire was underlined by the fact that the emperors came from a wide variety of nations. Thus Constantine was a Roman crowned in Britain, Theodosius the Great was a Spaniard, Justinian the Great was a Slav or Illyrian from Skopje, Leo the iconoclast was an Armenian. This international quality of the Orthodox Empire was continued in the Third Rome of Russia, where from the late eighteenth century the Tsars were mainly German in blood (Tsar Nicolas II was only 1/256th Russian by blood).

So powerful and widely accepted was this ideal that when Charlemagne came to create his rival to the Orthodox Empire in the "Holy Roman Empire" of the West, he also spoke of "the Christian people of the Romans" without ethnic differentiation, and tried (without much success) to introduce a single Roman law for all the constituent nations of his empire. As Agobard, Archbishop of Lyons, put it: "There is now neither Gentile nor Jew, Scythian nor Aquitanian, nor Lombard, nor Burgundian, nor Alaman, nor bond, nor free. All are one in Christ... Can it be accepted that, opposed to this unity which is the work of God, there should be an obstacle in the diversity of laws [used] in one and the same country, in one and the same city, and in one and the same house? It constantly happens that of five men walking or sitting side by side, no two have the same territorial law, although at root - on the eternal plan - they belong to Christ."⁶⁷

In the West, however, there was a tendency, from at least as early as the fifth century, to over-emphasize the unity of the principles of Church and State in the single Christian commonwealth (res publica). At first it was the Popes who tended to commit this religio-political "monophysitism" by trying to subordinate the Western Christian States to itself. This was perhaps understandable and not altogether harmful in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries, when political power in the West was weak and fragmented and the papacy represented the most powerful force in defence of Christian civilization.

However, by the end of the eighth century Charlemagne had built up a powerful kingdom embracing most of Western Europe upon which the survival of the papacy

⁶⁵ See Nicolson, op. cit.

⁶⁶ Metallinos, Fr. G. "Apo ti Romaiki oikoumenikotita ston Ethnistiko Patriotismo", *Exodos*, Athens, 1991, p. 38 (in Greek).

⁶⁷ Agobard, in R.H.C. Davis, *A History of Medieval Europe*, London: Longmans, 1988, p. 147.

itself depended; so the subordination of this kingdom to the papacy was neither practically feasible nor theoretically appealing to the Carolingians, however genuine was their devotion to Rome. And this continued to be the case when the "Holy Roman Empire" became in effect the German empire. Thus the scene was set for that long series of conflicts between Church and State, between papocaesarism and caesaropapism, which characterized the history of Western Europe until at least the Protestant Reformation.

The Popes remained formal political subjects of the Eastern Roman Emperor until the year 775. But long before that they had had to look after themselves without any help from the East; and since the beginning of the iconoclast heresy they had even had to look on the iconoclast emperors as enemies of the Christian commonwealth. This physical and, at times, spiritual separation from the Eastern Emperor meant that when the question of who represented the focus of unity in Christendom was raised, the Popes were not inclined to see it in the person of the Emperor, as was the habit in the East. It became increasingly obvious to them that the focus of unity in the Church could only come from within the Church, and from the senior and most respected bishop of the Church - the Pope of Rome. Emperors were all very well, but they had no business interfering in the Church's business.⁶⁸

The fact that all Seven of the Ecumenical Councils were convened by the Emperors, that the presiding bishop was not always the Pope or his legate, and that some Popes were even condemned by them (e.g. Pope Honorius by the Sixth Ecumenical Council) - all this was considered coincidental. If the Emperors had played an important role, said the Popes, it was because they were really acting as delegates or spiritual sons of the Papacy - an evident falsehood. (This argument was probably the origin of the myth that St. Constantine had been baptized by St. Sylvester, Pope of Rome.) The Popes later tried to prove, through forgeries such as *The Donation of Constantine* and *The Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals*, that they had received their universal jurisdiction from St. Constantine. But this argument defeated its own purpose, for if true, it showed that the Emperor had originally had the universal jurisdiction and was therefore a higher authority than the Pope!

A superficially more plausible argument of the Popes was that, while Constantine convened the First Ecumenical Council, its authority did not rest on his convening of it, but on the Popes' confirmation of it. For the Popes could not accept that the authority of the Council rested simply on its conformity with Sacred Tradition; the internal criterion which was considered sufficient at the first Council of Jerusalem - "it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us..." (Acts 15.25) - did not seem good enough to them. They wanted an external, visible "stamp" - and such a stamp could not come from a mere layman, however powerful or pious, still less an unbaptized layman, as Constantine still was at Nicaea. It had to be the stamp of a bishop at the very least. And since "ordinary" bishops could err, and synods of bishops could disagree among themselves, the only solution was to recognize that God had sealed one particular bishop with the charisma of infallibility which put him above the rest and guaranteed the unity and infallibility of the Church as a whole.

⁶⁸ "For you know, most dear son," wrote Pope Gelasius to the Emperor Anastasius, "that you are permitted rightly to rule the human race, yet in things Divine you devoutly bow your head before the principal clergy." (translated in Eric Jay, *The Church*, London: SPCK, 1977, vol. 1, p. 98)

Although the East was no more inclined than the West to see in the Emperors any kind of *guarantee* (as opposed to *focus*) of the Church's unity or infallibility, a rigid separation of functions between the Church and the Emperor fitted neither the theory nor the practice of Church-State relations in Eastern Orthodoxy. Just as the Church could "interfere" into the domain of the Emperor by criticizing his actions from the point of view of the Gospel, and could refuse to recognize his authority if his faith was not Orthodox, so the Emperor could "interfere" in the spiritual domain, as we have seen, if the waves of heresy or schism threatened to overwhelm the ship of the Church - and therefore of the State, too. And this was because *both* Church *and* State were seen as being subject to Christ and serving Him alone, and because *both* the Bishops *and* the Emperor were seen as members of the same mystical organism of the Church in which *all* were responsible, albeit in different ways, for upholding the right confession of faith.

In fact, from the point of view of the confession of the faith, the Emperor was seen as having a more prominent and critical position even than the leading bishops. For everyone, both inside and outside the Empire, looked to him as representing the official faith of the Empire. That was why the killing of the king, the Lord's Anointed, was seen as such a heinous crime.

Thus if the priesthood is indispensable above all because it dispenses the Life-giving sacraments, the monarchy is indispensable because through it the Truth is proclaimed to the world. As the King of kings said to Pilate: "You say that I am a king. For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth" (John 18.37). The truth is witnessed to on a local scale by every individual believer, and by every Local Church headed by a bishop. But at the *ecumenical* level, in its full glory as the salvation of the *whole* world, the truth requires a king in the image of Christ the King. That is why the Ecumenical Councils were not accidentally associated with the Emperors who convened them, and why the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross, celebrating the establishment of the first truly ecumenical Christian autocracy, is such a great feast in the Church.

Of course, we know that the Church will prevail even against the gates of hell, as the Saviour promised (Matthew 16.18), while no such promise is given to any earthly kingdom. However, in the understanding of the Eastern Church (and in most of the West before the schism of 1054), the fall of the last Christian empire will lead to the final decline of the Church on earth, which will be halted only by the Second Coming of Christ, the King of kings. Moreover, the Church is not just the hierarchy; and it is quite possible that during the times of the Antichrist the whole of the hierarchy will fall away while only some individual laymen remain to represent the Church.

The papist position implicitly rejected this possibility. It could not conceive of the Church existing even for a short period without a hierarchy, that is, without the Pope. Strictly speaking, in fact, according to papist doctrine *the Church ceased to exist* in this period; for if the Church is founded on Peter, and Peter is visibly present neither in his own person nor in that of his successor, how can it be said to exist? It followed, according to the papist teaching, that *everything* should be subject to the hierarchy, including the affairs of State. For "if," as Pope Gregory VII wrote in 1076, "the holy apostolic see has jurisdiction over spiritual things, why not also over material things?"

Thus there was an inescapable logical progression from the first seeds of the papist heresy, as we find them in the writings of some of the Popes of the fifth century, to the full-blown blasphemy of Pope Gregory VII (Hildebrand) proclaimed at the First Lateran

council of 1076: "The Pope can be judged by no one; the Roman Church has never erred and never will err till the end of time; the Roman Church was founded by Christ alone; the Pope alone can depose and restore bishops; he alone can make new laws, set up new bishoprics, and divide old ones; he alone can translate bishops; he alone can call general councils and authorize canon law; he alone can revise his own judgements; *he alone can use the imperial insignia; he can depose emperors; he can absolve subjects from their allegiance; all princes should kiss his feet*; his legates, even those in inferior orders, have precedence over all bishops; an appeal to the papal court inhibits judgement by all inferior courts; a duly ordained pope is undoubtedly made a saint by the merits of St. Peter."⁶⁹

If, in the West, the understanding of the "symphonic" ideal of Church-State relations was undermined by papocaesarism, on the one hand, and caesaropapism, on the other, in the East it was a more subtle descent from Roman universalism to Greek nationalism which led to the point from which, as a Greek prophecy of the eighth or ninth century foretold, "the sceptre of the Orthodox kingdom will fall from the weakening hands of the Byzantine emperors, *since they will not have proved able to achieve the symphony of Church and State*."⁷⁰

For the Byzantines, while clearly discerning the apostasy of the West, nevertheless followed their last two emperors, John VIII and Constantine XI, into union with the West at the council of Florence in 1439. They did this for the sake of preserving their empire from the Turks, for the Pope had promised military support in exchange for the union. Thus unlike their great ancestors, who had often defied heretical emperors for the sake of faithfulness to the truth, they tried to preserve their earthly kingdom at the price of the Kingdom of Heaven, forgetting that the whole glory of the Christian Empire lay in its readiness to live and die for its Heavenly King; "for here we have no lasting city, but seek the City which is to come" (Hebrews 13.14). In other words, they placed the survival of the Greek State (even if it was still called "Roman") and Greek civilization (even if it was still Orthodox in spirit) above the confession of the truth to all nations, which is the only way in which the nations can be saved and enter the Kingdom of heaven.

Fr. Alexander Schmemmann traced the beginning of this fall to the eleventh century: "After 1081, when Alexius Comnenus ascended the throne, the patriarchs seem to withdraw into the background. We find very meager information about them in the Byzantine chronicles through which we establish their names, their chief 'acts', and the years in which they were appointed or died. A curve could be traced, showing a gradually fading image of the patriarch side by side with the ever-increasing splendor of the basileus, as the Eastern emperors were called. And this is not accidental. It gives proof that the scales of the unattainable harmony were inclined in the direction of imperial power.

"It is important to emphasize that this painful weakness cannot be explained solely in terms of the government's coercing the Church - in terms of the superiority of physical force, so to speak... This was an inner, organic weakness of the representatives of the Church. Their dual situation made them not just the victims but also the agents of their own destiny. The thirst for a sacred theocracy, the desire to illumine the sinful stuff of history with the light of Christ; everything that could justify the union of Church and empire - this ideal required for its attainment a very subtle but very clear distinction

⁶⁹ Gregory VII, in R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages*, Penguin Books, 1970, p. 102.

⁷⁰ Archbishop Seraphim, "Sud'by Rossii", *Pravoslavniij Vestnik*, N 87, January-February, 1996, pp. 6-7.

between the Church and the world. For the Church is thoroughly fulfilling its mission to transform the world only when it completely feels itself to be a kingdom not of this world.

"The tragedy of the Byzantine Church consisted precisely in the fact that it became merely the *Byzantine* Church, that it merged itself with the empire not so much administratively as, above all, psychologically, in its own self-awareness. The empire became for it the absolute and supreme value, unquestioned, inviolable, and self-evident."⁷¹

Allowing for a certain exaggeration, we may accept Schmemmann's analysis, which accords with the witness of the Greek prophecy quoted above. The Byzantine empire failed because, although the emperor and patriarch remained in harmony to the end, this harmony was not true "symphony", being based on a diminished, less-than-truly-ecumenical and missionary vision which tended to degenerate into a narrow nationalism that has become increasingly evident in the post-Byzantine era, when Hellenism and revolutionary ideas of freedom at times have seemed to supplant Orthodoxy in the affections of the people. Therefore, being unable to present a truly catholic and ecumenical vision of Christian society to the world, the Byzantines fell into a false union with the West with its heretical, but more explicitly universal vision.

However, it must not be forgotten that while its universal character lasted and it remained faithful to the Orthodox Faith, the Byzantine Empire inspired the devotion even of peoples far beyond its boundaries. Thus in the fifth century the leader of the Christian Britons, Ambrosius Aurelianus, called himself "the last of the Romans", although Britain was no longer part of that empire which, since the early fourth century, had had its capital in Constantinople. As late as the tenth century the English King Athelstan called himself "Basileus" because he saw his kingdom as an heir of the Statehood of the New Rome of Constantinople. Again, the Serbs and Bulgars who tried to conquer Constantinople still called it Tsarigrad, "the city of the King", and did not dispute that it was the centre of Christendom. Again, the great princes of Kiev looked to the emperor in Constantinople as their elder brother, even though their own kingdom was both independent of, and larger than, the Empire.

This unity of diverse peoples in veneration of the Orthodox Empire must be seen as one of the most remarkable phenomena of history, and a proof that nations can coexist in one state in submission to a supra-national ideal. It shows that the idea of Christian Rome was truly a megali idea, a great idea capable of uniting and exalting the nations in peace and piety. And the fact that this idea was brought into the twentieth century, not by the Greeks of New Rome, but the Russians of the Third Rome, only goes to prove its truly universal significance...

⁷¹ Schmemmann, *The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy*, London: Harvill Press, 1963, pp. 222-223.

8. Church and State in the Third Rome

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 the mantle of the Second or "New Rome" passed to the "Third Rome" of Moscow through the bonds of inter-dynastic marriage and the blessing of the Ecumenical Patriarch.

Did Russia succeed where Byzantium failed? Schmemmann sees the Russians as having corrupted the ideal of Church-State symphony no less than the Byzantines, most obviously in the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. However, here we must disagree with the learned theologian, who betrays the bias of his Parisian training in his blindness to the "curves" of Russian history.

Although Russia succumbed at times to caesaropapism and narrow nationalism, she always recovered from these temptations as a result of several factors which distinguished Russian history from that of Byzantium.

First, Russia had a long, nearly five-hundred year training in humility in the shadow of the Byzantine empire, during which, in spite of her vastly greater size and political independence from Byzantium for most of this period, her metropolitans were always (until the council of Florence) appointed by the Constantinopolitan Patriarch, and her great-princes always (until the very fall of Byzantium) looked to the Byzantine Emperors as to their elder brothers. This meant that, when Russia came to take the place of Byzantium as the bearer of the cross of the Christian Empire, she was not tempted to think of herself as the *first* or *only* or *best* Christian people. And when that temptation appeared in the form of the Old Believer schism, it was rejected by the ecumenical consciousness of the Russian Church and State.

Secondly, while the Greeks had a long and sophisticated history as pagans before accepting Christianity, the Russians accepted the faith in the first flush of youth, as it were. This meant, among other things, that the pagan traces of idolatrous emperor-worship, which some scholars have claimed to find even in late Byzantium, were no part of the inheritance of the newly Christianized people of Rus'. Some have claimed that the Mongol yoke later injected certain pagan and idolatrous attitudes into Russian life; but there is little evidence to support this notion.

Thirdly, while the Byzantine Empire contracted from the large, multi-national dominion of Constantine the Great to the small, exclusively Greek dominion of Constantine XI, the Russian Empire grew in the opposite direction, expanding from its Muscovite heartland to the borders of Sweden and Germany in the West and China and America in the East. This meant that the Russian Empire was always and increasingly multi-national, with a large number of non-Russian saints and a strong commitment to missionary activity right until 1917 and (in the Russian Church Abroad) to the present day. This truly ecumenical, non-nationalistic character of the Russian Empire was emphasized by its last three wars - the Crimean war, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the First World War, which were fought in a self-sacrificial spirit for the sake of the non-Russian Orthodox of the Balkans and Middle East.

Fourthly, the history of the Russian Empire has been punctuated by wars against the Western heretics. Thus the history of Russia is defined, to a much greater degree than Byzantium, by her relationship with the West. And whereas Byzantium chose to compromise with the West so as to receive help against the Muslims (which never came), Russia in the person of Alexander Nevsky made the opposite choice of priorities,

and the Russian Empire died during a war against both the West (Germany and Austro-Hungary) and the Muslims (the Ottoman empire).

Again, when the Greek metropolitan of Kiev, Isidore, returned to Russia after the signing the union with the papacy in Florence, the Russian Church and people united behind their Grand-Prince in throwing Isidore out.⁷² But this put the Russians in a delicate position: what was now to be the relationship of their Church to the Great Church of Constantinople, which had now (albeit temporarily) fallen away from the Orthodox Faith through union with Rome? They solved the problem by electing their own metropolitan, the Russian St. Jonah, to the metropolitanate of Kiev, and quietly creating an autocephalous Church of Russia. When the Greeks returned to Orthodoxy, they rejected this act and placed the Russian Church under interdict. In 1589, however, the autocephaly was officially confirmed by Patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople, and the Russian Church became the youngest and most junior - but politically and numerically the most powerful - of the patriarchates.

Then, in the same year, Patriarch Jeremiah confirmed the Tsar of Moscow as Emperor of the Third Rome and the protector of all the Orthodox Christians throughout the world. Now this proclamation of Moscow as the Third Rome has been reviled by democrats ever since as the cloak for Russian, and even Soviet imperialism. But it must be remembered, first, as Ulyanov has pointed out⁷³, that Muscovy in the sixteenth century had not yet won control even over all the Russian lands, a good half of them being still under the control of Poland-Lithuania - which also had its own Orthodox metropolitan who was not in obedience to the Muscovite metropolitan, but to the Patriarch of Constantinople. This meant that, for several centuries, the Muscovite grand-princes and tsars saw as their main task the building up of a *national* kingdom embracing "all the Russias"; and the idea of Moscow as the protector of all Orthodox Christendom by virtue of its position as "the Third Rome" did not receive any intensive development until the reign of Alexander II in the nineteenth century. However, the seeds for that development were laid at this time, in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, and as the Muscovite state gradually grew and became stronger, the mission entrusted to her by Divine Providence gradually became clearer.

Secondly, the handing over to Moscow of the mantle of Byzantium was natural insofar as Russia was the only remaining independent Orthodox kingdom. As Patriarch Jeremiah said to the Tsar after enthroning the first patriarch of Moscow: "Since the First Rome fell through the Apollinarian heresy, and the Second Rome, which is Constantinople, is held by infidel Turks, so thy great Russian kingdom, most pious Tsar... is the Third Rome... and thou alone under heaven art Christian Emperor for all Christians in the world."⁷⁴ In other words, since the previous empires had fallen, unless the ideal of the one Christian Empire was to die forever, Russia would have to take their place.

History shows that Russia had been well prepared by Divine Providence to take on this burden. Already we see a complete acceptance of the idea that the State must be the servant of the Church and the Gospel of Christ in Russia's Baptizer, St. Vladimir. We see this again in 1380, when, under the inspired leadership of the churchman, St. Sergius of

⁷² Isidore went to Rome, where he received a cardinal's hat from the Pope.

⁷³ Ulyanov, N. "Kompleks Filofeya", *Voprosy Filosofii*, no. 4, 1994, pp. 152-162 (in Russian).

⁷⁴ Jeremiah II (Tranas), Quoted in Runciman, Sir Steven, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, 1971, Oxford University Press, p. 51.

Radonezh, the Russians defeated the Mongols for the first time at the battle of Kulikovo. By the end of the fifteenth century Moscovy was completely independent of the Golden Horde, and by 1589 the Tatar capital of Kazan had been conquered by the Orthodox. So Russia had proved her credentials as the only Orthodox power capable of conquering the conqueror of Byzantium.

Two centuries later, Siberia, the Caucasus and Southern Russia were in Orthodox hands; and in 1877 the Russian Armies, having liberated Romania and Bulgaria, were at the gates of Constantinople, where they were stopped, not by the might of the by now thoroughly demoralized Turks, but by the threats of the Western powers to intervene on the side of the Muslims...

In relation to the other, still more dangerous enemy of Orthodoxy, the Old Rome of Papism, the Third Rome also proved herself worthy. Thus during the disastrous thirteenth century, when it looked as if Old Rome might completely swallow up the Orthodox world, the only significant Orthodox victories had been those of the Russian prince Alexander Nevsky against the Teutonic Knights. Again, when all the Orthodox patriarchs signed the union with Rome in 1439, the Russian Church alone had refused to give up her birthright for a mess of Roman pottage. During the sixteenth century Russia held her own against the rising power of Catholic Poland-Lithuania; and even after the Poles had conquered Moscow and installed the papist false Dmitri on the throne of the Orthodox tsars, the Third Rome was not dead. From the Volga town of Nizhni-Novgorod an army of national liberation was assembled which drove the Poles out of Moscow in 1612. During the following centuries, Russian armies successfully went onto the offensive against Poland, and also defeated the armies of Sweden, Prussia and Napoleonic France, planting the Orthodox standard in the head of the western apostasy, Paris (the heart was Rome). Finally, after stopping an alliance of Western and Muslim powers in the Crimean war, the Russian Empire died in a self-sacrificial war to defend Orthodox Serbia against the predations of Catholic Austria-Hungary and Protestant Germany in 1914-17. In all these wars, it must be stressed, Russia forcibly conquered and annexed no territory belonging to other Orthodox peoples (with the possible exception of Bessarabia). Thus her "imperialism", if we can call it that, was religious, rather than nationalistic; her major aim was the defence and spread of Orthodox Christianity, not Russianism, as was proved by the astonishing successes of her missionaries from Siberia to Alaska, from Japan to Persia.

However, while successfully withstanding to the end these traditional enemies of Orthodoxy Christianity, the Third Rome finally fell to that heresy, liberal democracy, which we have already examined in detail in the first part of this work, and which now, since the fall of the last "restraining power" capable of stopping it, has spread throughout the world. Not that either the Church or the State of Russia ever officially accepted this heresy. But very many of the Russian people, especially in the ruling classes accepted it, and this led to the downfall of both Church and State.

For liberal democracy is in essence a heresy about the relationship between Church and State, a heresy that declares that, instead of the State serving the Church in its other-worldly ends, the Church should serve the State in its this-worldly ends. It rejects the doctrine that man is fallen, not only in his animal instincts, but also in his mind, and therefore declares that he should be given freedom to say whatever he thinks and do whatever he wants. It rejects the teaching of Christ that it is *the truth* that makes man free, and that "whoever commits sin is the slave of sin"(John 8.32,34).

Liberal democracy declares that man is born free. But this is true only in one sense. Man is free insofar as he has freewill and therefore cannot escape responsibility for his actions. But he is not free insofar as he is born in a condition of slavery to sin, which, without removing his freewill, nevertheless distorts his thinking, heavily influences his feeling, and weakens and diverts his willing. Moreover, it is Christian teaching that man cannot liberate himself from this slavery by his own efforts.

If man cannot liberate himself, then another must help him, even push him, along the path to true freedom. We can see this most clearly in the case of children. We do not leave children free to find out by themselves that fire burns, that arsenic kills, or that Jesus is God. We *tell* them the necessary truths, and we do not feel that we are violating their freedom in so doing. Rather, we feel that the one who deprives them of this knowledge is restricting their freedom in an unjustifiable manner.

This is the principle of *education*, and it applies throughout life. Thus the great scientific advances of modern civilization are the result of the accumulation of knowledge over many generations, and each succeeding generation makes advances by taking the truths discovered by previous generations on trust, and then building on them. Thus we are *told* that electricity and bacteria exist, and that the earth is *not* flat. These are not presented as one man's point of view which we are free to reject, but as *fact* - dogma, if you like. But no one objects to this kind of scientific dogmatism (even is some scientific dogmas, such as evolutionism, are in fact untrue), because we know that a person who continues to believe that the earth is flat will be at a severe disadvantage in the struggle of life.

Of course, if a person, contrary to all that his teachers tell him, continues to believe that the earth is flat, he is not imprisoned or tortured for his wrong belief. This is because we believe that gentle persuasion is a better means of convincing him, and/or that his error does not constitute a major threat to society as a whole. But we do penalize him in other ways - by ridicule, for example, or by failing him in his exams. And in general, if we did not penalize what we considered to be wrong belief in any way the foundations of society would quickly crumble.

No society is completely liberal; societies differ not so much in the presence or absence of liberalism as in the things they are liberal about. Tsarist society was illiberal, above all, about *heresy*,⁷⁵ because it believed - rightly, from the Christian point of view - that heresy leads to eternal slavery in the dungeons of hell, and that for the sake of the people's spiritual freedom, which comes only through knowledge of the truth, they should be protected from this worst of all scourges. Liberalism was no less illiberal about certain things, as the history of every democratic revolution emphatically proves. But since it did not believe in Christianity, it saw no harm in heresy,⁷⁶ and opened the gates to every heresy, thereby becoming, in effect, "the heresy of heresies".⁷⁷ Moreover, it

⁷⁵ The principle that it was right to torture heretics was a western invention, being proclaimed at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. Torture was not used in Orthodox countries until the Judaizing heresy in Russia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when it was introduced under the influence of the Spanish Inquisition but was opposed by St. Nilus of Sora. With this exception, torture was not used against heretics in Orthodox countries except by heretical emperors or by emperors who encouraged heresy, such as Peter the Great.

⁷⁶ As one reviewer in the *Anglican Church Times* said: "The only heresy is that there is such a thing as heresy."

⁷⁷ This term was first coined by Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov), first hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, to describe the ecclesiastical version of liberal democracy - ecumenism.

opened the gates to every kind of moral corruption. For while absolute power may corrupt absolute rulers, absolute freedom corrupts the whole of society, from the power-seeking politicians to the youngest and most powerless children.⁷⁸

The first clear manifestation of the liberal heresy in the life of Russia was during the reign of Peter the Great in the early seventeenth century, when liberal principles in their Hobbesian, absolutist variety were applied to the relationship between Church and State, leading to the abolition of the patriarchate and the assumption by the Tsar of a position in Church and State that was reminiscent of the Protestant absolutist monarchs of England and Germany. Later in the eighteenth century Masonic and Voltairean ideas of freedom penetrated into Russia. By the nineteenth century, the effects of the American and French revolutions were being strongly felt in Russia, and so the clamour was for the application of the Lockean, democratic variety of liberalism in Russian life.

In defending the Orthodox autocracy, the Church did not deny - and did not wish to deny - that the Tsarist regime was illiberal about certain things; but she rejected the charge that the Tsar was an unfettered tyrant. For "what is the essence of the religious idea of the [Orthodox] autocracy, and in what does it differ from absolutism? There are no rights to power, but only obligations of power. The power of the tsar is by no means absolute, unrestricted power. It is autocratic because its source is not the will of the people and it is not restricted by the people. But it is restricted by the Church and by Christian righteousness; it is spiritually subject to the Church; it serves not its own will, but the will of God. The tsar must not have his own will, but he must serve the will of God. The tsar and the people are bound together by one and the same faith, by one and the same subjection to the Church and the righteousness of God. Autocracy presupposes a wide national social basis living its own self-sufficient life; it does not signify the suppression of the people's life. Autocracy is justified only if the people has beliefs which sanction the power of the tsar. It cannot be an external violence inflicted on the people. The tsar is autocratic only if he is a truly Orthodox tsar. The defective Orthodoxy of Peter the Great and his inclination towards Protestantism made him an absolute, and not an autocratic monarch. Absolute monarchy is a child of humanism... In absolutism the tsar is not a servant of the Church. A sign of absolute monarchy is the subjection of the Church to the State. That is what happened to the Catholic Church under Louis XIV. Absolutism always develops a bureaucracy and suppresses the social life of the people."⁷⁹

Before Peter, even the most monarchist of Russians recognized that there were limits to the Tsar's power, limits created by the Law of the Gospel. Thus St. Joseph of Volotsk insisted that an unrighteous tsar "was not a servant of God, but of the devil".⁸⁰ But after Peter's tyrannical destruction of the symphony between the Church and the State, it was inevitable that in reaction to the overweening power of the Tsar liberals and revolutionaries, "anointed, not by God, but by the people", should attack the very principle of monarchical authority.

Those who still accepted the need for a king argued that the Tsar should be "responsible to the people" - in other words, *subject* to the people (or rather, themselves); and they looked for models to the constitutional and elective monarchies of Europe. However, they forgot the chaos which elective monarchy subjects a people to (as in

⁷⁸ See V. Moss, "What Price Freedom?", *Orthodox America*, January-February, 1992.

⁷⁹ Berdyaev, N. "Tsarstvo Bozhiye i Tsarstvo Kesarya", *Put'*, September, 1925, N 1, pp. 39-40.

⁸⁰ St. Joseph, in Marchevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Hapsburg Germany or Poland). And they ignored the great advantages that autocratic and hereditary monarchy has over other types.

Thus Nicolson writes: "On the death of a [hereditary] sovereign, his heir ascends the throne immediately and can claim immediate allegiance. *Le roi est mort. Vive le roi.* The competition of rival claimants was thereby eliminated and in most cases no dynastic or civil wars ensued. Moreover, the accepted heir could be educated from childhood in the task of kingship and would not, when he inherited his responsibilities, be wholly untrained: tradition and continuity would be preserved.

"A hereditary monarch, succeeding to his father by primogeniture, had certain other advantages which are denied to an elected president or dictator who seizes power by force. Being born in the purple, he has no political past, and as such has no party followers whom he is supposed to reward and no party antagonists who regard him with disfavour. He is not driven, as dictators are invariably driven, to win popular support by spectacular triumphs or to gain the obedience of the people by inventing some foreign menace. His aim is to personify stability rather than adventure, continuity rather than change. Representing as he does the nation as a whole, he should be in the position to mitigate class antagonism or partisan strife."⁸¹

Now republicans often point to the bad kings who have emerged in every hereditary dynasty, as if this proved that hereditary kings cannot be chosen by God. They forget, on the one hand, the many worthy, even saintly kings in Orthodox history. And on the other hand, they forget that Divine Providence also uses bad kings. For why should God always provide good kings? While He never blesses sin, He may nevertheless judge, in the inscrutable depths of His Providence, that a sinful king is sometimes better for a sinful people than a righteous one, as a rod is better for a disobedient child. In any case, history shows that the worst excesses of hereditary kings are as nothing compared to the catastrophes, spiritual and physical, that overtake a people during revolutions and anarchy. If a bad king is a sign of God's anger with His people, while being at the same time the instrument of His loving chastisement, the removal of the monarchy is a sign of His abandonment of them, in accordance with the word: "We have no king, because we feared not the Lord" (Hosea 10.3).

History also shows that only the nation that is ruled by a true, autocratic king can discern the threat posed by the revolution and effectively stand against it. Thus it was largely owing to the Russian Tsars that Napoleon was defeated and the revolution held in check in Europe for the next century. Again, in spite of the Russian intelligentsia's infection by liberal propaganda, it was only in Russia, during the nineteenth century, that the real nature of what was happening in revolutionary Europe was understood. This understanding is particularly evident in the writings of the leading churchmen of Russia before the revolution, such as Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow, Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov, Bishop Theophanes the Recluse, the elders of Optina Monastery and St. John of Kronstadt. But it is also evident in the works of several lay writers.

One of these writers was the poet and diplomat Theodore Tyutchev. In the revolutionary year of 1848, in an essay entitled "Russia and the revolution", he wrote: "There have long existed only two real powers in Europe - the revolution and Russia. Between them there can be no talks, no treaty; the existence of the one is the equivalent of the death of the other! On the outcome of the struggle which has arisen between them,

⁸¹ Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-284.

the greatest battle the world has ever seen, will depend for many centuries to come the whole political and religious future of mankind.

"... Russia, first of all, is the Christian empire; the Russian people is Christian not only by dint of the Orthodoxy of its convictions, but also thanks to something more intimate than convictions. It is Christian by dint of its capacity for self-rejection and self-sacrifice which constitutes as it were the basis of its moral nature. The revolution is above all the enemy of Christianity! The soul of the revolution is its antichristian feeling: this is its special, distinctive characteristic. Those changes in form which it has undergone in the interim, those slogans which it has acquired by turns, even its violence and crimes - these are secondary and incidental. But the one thing in it which is not so is the antichristian feeling which inspires it, and which (this has to be admitted) has given it its threatening lordship over the world. He who does not understand this is no more than a blind man present at the spectacle which the world presents to him.

"The human I, wishing to depend only on itself, not recognizing and not accepting any other law besides its own will - in a word, the human I, taking the place of God, - does not, of course, constitute something new among men. But such it has become when raised to the status of a political and social right, and when it strives, by virtue of this right, to rule society. This is the new phenomenon which acquired the name of the French revolution in 1789."⁸²

Since 1789 and 1815, in Tyutchev's opinion, the revolution had by no means retreated. It had become less violent only because priests and rulers and society in general had inwardly submitted to it, whatever mask they might place on their apostasy. And the moment the Catholic Church offered real resistance, it would be persecuted to the end - you can count on the revolution to remain faithful to itself!

Therefore the revolution of February, 1848 "rendered this great service to the world, that it had overthrown the stilted scaffolding of illusions concealing reality. Even the least penetrating minds have probably understood by now that the history of Europe in the last 33 years has been nothing other than a prolonged mystification. And what implacable light has suddenly illumined the whole of this past, which is so recent and yet already so distant from us! Who, for example, would not admit now that an absurd pretension was expressed in that wisdom of our age which naively imagined it had succeeded in suppressing the revolution by constitutional means, muzzling its terrible energy by means of a legal formula? After all that has happened, who can doubt any longer that from that minute when the revolutionary principle entered into the blood of society, all these concessions, all these conciliatory formulas are nothing else than narcotic drugs which can, perhaps, put the sick man to sleep for a time, but are not able to prevent the further development of the illness itself?"⁸³

Tyutchev saw the roots of the Socialist revolution in the rebellion of the Roman papacy against the Orthodox Church. In an essay entitled "Russia and the Roman question" (1849) he wrote: "The revolution, which is nothing other than the apotheosis of the same human I reaching its greatest flowering, has hastened to recognize Gregory VII and Luther as its own, welcoming them as its two glorious predecessors. Blood kinship has begun to speak in it, and it has accepted the one, despite his Christian beliefs, and almost deified the other, although he was a pope.

⁸² Tyutchev, F.I. *Politicheskiiye Stat'i*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1976, pp. 32, 33-34.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

"But if the evident likeness linking the three members of this row together constitutes the basis of the historical life of the West, then the starting-point of this link must necessarily be recognized to be that deep distortion which the Christian principle was subjected to through the order imposed on it by Rome. In the course of centuries the western church, under the shadow of Rome, has almost completely lost that appearance it had at the starting-point. It has ceased to be, amidst the great society of man, the society of believers freely united in spirit and in truth under the law of Christ: it has become a political organization, a political power, a state within a state. Truth to tell, during the whole course of the Middle Ages the church in the West was nothing other than a colony of Rome planted in a conquered land.

"This order which dragged the church into the dust of earthly interests created for it, so to speak, a fatal destiny: by incarnating the divine principle in a weak and passing body it inoculated it with all the infirmities and lusts of the flesh. From this order there arose for the Roman church the fateful necessity of war, material war - a necessity which, for an institution such as the church, is equivalent to indisputable condemnation. From this order there was born that battle of claims and that rivalry of interests which necessarily led to the embittered battle between the first priest and the empire, to that truly godless and sacrilegious duel, which, continuing throughout the Middle Ages, dealt a mortal wound to the very principle of authority in the West. This is the source of all those excesses and violence which have accumulated in the course of centuries, so as to underpin that material power without which, in Rome's opinion, it cannot do without in order to preserve the unity of the church, and which, however, finally led, as was to be expected, to the smashing of that imagined unity to smithereens. For it is impossible to deny that the explosion of the Reformation in the 16th century was at its root only the reaction of Christian feeling which had built up for too long against the power of the Church, but which in many respects was a power only in name. But since Rome had for so long tried to put itself between the Universal Church [of Orthodoxy] and the West, the leaders of the Reformation, instead of bringing their complaints before a higher court and lawful power, preferred to appeal to the court of their personal conscience, that is, they made themselves judges in their own case. This is that rock of stumbling on which the Reformation of the 16th century was crushed. That (this is not said to offend the wise teachers of the West) is the true and only cause of the fact that the reform movement, Christian in its root, went off course and finally arrived at a denial of the authority of the Church, and consequently, of the very principle of all authority. Through this breach, which Protestantism made, so to speak, without knowing it, there thereafter burst the antichristian principle into western society... The first French revolution is remembered in world history precisely because it provided the initiative, so to speak, in bringing the antichristian idea to governmental power over political society."⁸⁴

The logical connection between Romanism, Protestantism and Socialism was also pointed out Kireyevsky and Khomyakov. And Dostoyevsky wrote: "Present-day French Socialism .. is nothing but the truest and most direct continuation of the Catholic idea, its fullest, most final consequence which has been evolved through centuries... French Socialism is nothing but the compulsory union of mankind - an idea which dates back to ancient Rome and which was fully expressed in Catholicism."⁸⁵

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-59, 60.

⁸⁵ Dostoyevsky, *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*.

For, as Prince Myshkin says in *The Idiot*, "[Socialism] too, like its brother atheism, was begotten of despair, in opposition to Catholicism as a moral force, in order to replace the lost moral power of religion, to quench the spiritual thirst of parched humanity, and save it not by Christ, but also by violence! This, too, is freedom by violence. This, too, is union through the sword and blood. 'Don't dare to believe in God! Don't dare to have property! Don't dare to have a personality of your own! Fraternelle ou la mort! Two million heads!'"⁸⁶

In *The Devils*, one character even prophesies (taking up an idea originally voiced by Tyutchev) that the Pope will lead the revolution; for as the author says in another place, "Catholicism will tell the people that Christ also preached everything that the Socialists are preaching to them. Again it will pervert and sell them Christ as it has sold Him so many times in the past." Today's Catholic "liberation theology" might be judged a fulfilment of this prophecy!

In Dostoyevsky's last great novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*, the leading proponent of Socialist ideas is significantly portrayed as a Catholic Inquisitor. Catholicism led to Socialism, the argument goes, because, after his disillusionment with the papal system, Western man could not be satisfied with the atomic individualism of the sects and democracies that replaced it, but still yearned for that sense of the brotherhood of all men in obedience to one Omnipotent Father. And that Catholicism provided, albeit in a false and perverted form.⁸⁷

"For the chief concern of these miserable creatures," says the Inquisitor, "is not only to find something that I or someone else can worship, but to find something that all believe in and worship, and the absolutely essential thing is that they should so so all together. It is this need for universal worship that is the chief torment of every man individually and of mankind as a whole from the beginning of time. For the sake of that universal worship they have put each other to the sword..."⁸⁸

These Russian thinkers both saw the Russian revolution coming and perceived its causes in the history of the western apostasy from Orthodoxy. The philosopher Semyon Frank put it well: "Socialism is at the same time the culmination and the overthrow of liberal democracy. It is ruled by the same basic motive that rules the whole modern era: to make man and mankind the true master of his life, to present him with the possibility of ordering his own destiny on his own authority... Socialism is the last stride in the great rebellion of mankind and at the same time the result of its total exhaustion - the complete spiritual impoverishment of the prodigal son in the long centuries of his wandering far from his father's home and wealth."⁸⁹

One of the most famous - and reviled - champions of Orthodox autocracy in pre-revolutionary Russia was the lay procurator of the Russian Holy Synod, Constantine Pobedonostsev. Although his post had been created by Peter the Great, he did not have Peter's absolutist understanding of the relationship between Church and State. "This

⁸⁶ Dostoyevsky, *The Idiot*, Penguin Magarshack translation, p. 586.

⁸⁷ In his *Pushkin Speech* Dostoyevsky wrote: "The Western Church herself distorted the image of Christ, changing herself from a Church into a Roman State, and again incarnating the State in the form of the papacy... The Church was destroyed and finally transformed into a State. The papacy appeared - the continuation of the ancient Roman empire in a new incarnation." (London: Unwin Books, 1960, pp. 64, 89)

⁸⁸ Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Penguin Magarshack translation, p. 298.

⁸⁹ Frank, S.L. "Religioznoye-Istoricheskoye Znacheneye Russkoy Revolyutsii", *Po Storonu i Po Pravu*, 1972. Paris: YMCA Press.

struggle between freedom and authority," he wrote, "would have no solution if in the human soul there were no inner judge acting on the very source of human activity - on the will. This is the conscience, the focus and support of the moral law. It alone correctly evaluates our actions; in giving dominion to the will over the promptings of instinct, it creates out of it a *free power*. And so the true principle of freedom, and at the same time the principle of the spiritual union of people, is in the moral law. Only Christian faith, drawing the unfailing moral principle from the Divine perfection, rejecting the vicious principles of human egoism, pride and lust at the very root and in all its manifestations, can raise true freedom in mankind..."⁹⁰

And so we return to the Christian model of man as the justification of the Orthodox ideal of Church-State relations. Man is fallen in his reason, in his desire and in his thymos. His fallen reason is manifest in heresy and false ideas; his fallen desire - in lust and consumerism; his fallen thymos - in pride and ambition. Liberal reasoning in its absolutist form would simply crush his thymos, his pride, for the sake of his desire, the satisfaction of his basic instincts. Liberal reasoning in its democratic form would give limited expression to his pride, again for the sake of the satisfaction of his basic instincts. Since the Church is not needed in either scenario, She is simply superfluous in liberal thought except as a private motivation of certain old-fashioned individuals, and as such should simply "wither away" together with the pre-revolutionary State.

Orthodox reasoning, on the other hand, sees the aim of society as the reviving of the fallen image of God in man by the crucifixion and resurrection in a new form of both his thymos and his desire and his reasoning faculty through the Life in Christ in the Church. This will give him both true liberty (in the conscience-directed will of which Pobedonostev speaks), and true equality (for he will recognize all other men made in the same image of God to be ipso facto his equals, whose dignity is the extraordinary one of being potentially sons of God and co-heirs of Christ) and true fraternity (for where true liberty and true equality reign among men, there is true love). In view of this, the Church, far from being superfluous, is the essential medium of the salvation of men, both individually and collectively; and the State's function must be to serve the Church in every way possible, which we see, historically speaking, only when the State is an Orthodox autocracy acting in "symphony" with the Orthodox Church under the common headship of the Lord Jesus Christ.

It follows that it is not any kind of monarchy that is desirable, but precisely that kind of monarchy that works in symphony with the Orthodox Church. Thus the revolutionary-turned-monarchist Lev Tikhomirov listed three types of relationship between the Monarchy and religion:

"1. The conversion of the supreme State power into the centre of religion. Here there are various degrees of the divinization of the Monarch. Such a relationship is typical of pagan States. But in Christian States it appears in various degrees of so-called caesaropapism.

"2. The complete opposite of this type of State-Religion relations is the subjection of the State to the institution of the Church. This refers to various forms of priestocracy, hierocracy and papocaesarism. In essence there is no monarchical power here.

⁹⁰ Pobedonostsev, *Bolezni Nashego Veka*, 15; quoted in *Angel Valaama*, N 10, September, 1994, p. 3.

"3. The third type of relationship is the union of the State with the Church, which is attained by the subjection of the Monarch to the religious idea and his personal belonging to the Church, with the independence of the supreme power of his State. It is possible to call this the true expression of theocracy (and not hierocracy), that is, the dominion of God through the Tsar, who is delegated by God (and not by the ecclesiastical authority)."⁹¹

And if the Tsar should fall, what then? Then, according to St. Ambrose of Optina, will come the last period of human history as described in the Apocalypse of St. John the Theologian. That will truly be *the end of history*, when *the last man* will appear, "the man of sin" and "son of perdition" (II Thessalonians 2.3), *the Antichrist*, whose truly tyrannical government will be overthrown by no human government or revolution, but only by the Second Coming of the God-Man, the King of kings and Lord of lords, Jesus Christ.

For, as Bishop Theophanes the Recluse writes, commenting on the scriptural phrase, "he that restraineth" (II Thessalonians 2.7): "The Tsar's authority, having in its hands the means of holding back the movements of the people and relying on Christian principles itself, does not allow the people to fall away from them, but will restrain it. And since the main work of the Antichrist will be to turn everyone away from Christ, he will not appear as long as the Tsar is in power. The latter's authority will not let him show himself, but will prevent him from acting in his own spirit. That is what 'he that restraineth' is. When the Tsar's authority falls, and the peoples everywhere acquire self-government (republics, democracies), then the Antichrist will have room to manoeuvre. It will not be difficult for Satan to train voices urging apostasy from Christ, as experience showed in the time of the French revolution. No one will give a powerful 'veto' to this. A humble declaration of faith will not be tolerated. And so, when these arrangements have been made everywhere, arrangements which are favourable to the exposure of antichristian aims, then the Antichrist will appear. Until that time he waits, and is restrained..."⁹²

The abortive revolution of 1905 failed to overthrow the Tsar - but revolutionary discontent continued. St. John of Kronstadt warned that the fall of the Tsar would be followed by a terrible tyranny and untold suffering, and in 1907 he sai⁹³

Fr. John's warning were repeated by outstanding hierarchs such as Archbishop Andronicus of Perm: "While among the other peoples of Europe the power of the princes and kings conquered the peoples.. - we, on the other hand, ourselves created our own power and placed the princes - the prototypes of our tsars - over ourselves. Thus was it at the recognition of Ryurik and his brothers, whom our forefathers here, near Ilmen lake, placed over themselves to rule at a time when we had only just begun to be conscious of ourselves as a people, when our statehood was founded. With the acceptance of Christianity this power entrusted by the people to the princes received a Divine sanctification from on high: the princes became the anointed of God, receiving high authority over the people from God, so as to rule the people under God. Moreover, as Great Russia grew and became stronger, the power of the princes, who were later called Autocratic Tsars, became higher, being bound to answer for the power that was given them over the people before God and their conscience. Then, when by the

⁹¹ Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaya Gosudarstvennost'*, op. cit., volume III, p. 67.

⁹² Bishop Theophanes, in Archbishop Averky, *Rukovodstvo k Izucheniyu Soyashchennykh Pisaniyakh Novago Zaoyeta*, Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, 1962, vol. II, p. 308.

⁹³ St. John, in I.K. Sursky, *Otyets Ioann Kronshtadsky*, Belgrade, 1941, vol. 1, p. 187.

permission of God we had no Tsar in Rus', having survived the terrible years under various kinds of administrations, and not finding in any of them salvation from the destruction that threatened, we quickly and unanimously (with the exception of a few power-seekers and intriguers) restored our tried and tested form of power over the kingdom: having elected Michael Fyodorovich to the kingdom, we entrusted the whole Tsarist Autocracy over ourselves to him before God and in the name of God the Omniscient. And we were not mistaken in our wise reasoning this time: our half-destroyed and exhausted kingdom quickly gathered strength and was regenerated and strengthened in all respects, even attaining incomparably greater glory and prosperity than in the times prior to the time of troubles. We came out onto our historical road.

"In what was this autocratic power of the Tsar strong? In that fact that it was based on the conscience and on the Law of God, and was supported by its closeness to the land, through the counsel of the people. The princely entourage, the boyars Duma, the Zemsky Sobor - that it what preserved the power of the Tsars in its fullness, not allowing anyone to seize or divert it. The people of proven experience and honesty came from the regions filled with an identical care for the construction of the Russian land. They raised to the Tsar the voice and counsel of the people concerning how and what to build in the country. And it remained for the Tsar to learn from all the voices, to bring everything together for the benefit of all and to command the rigorous fulfilment for the common good of the people of that for which he would answer before the Omniscient God and his own conscience. When applied to the present situation, this was our original Russian constitution worked out by the people itself, but as different from the constitutions from beyond the seas, about which our Red Hundreds of various shades rave, as heaven is from earth. This, our constitution, our Tsarist Autocracy rests not on faithfulness to the Tsar of a chance party majority, which sometimes changes in accordance with various, sometimes purely fortuitous or artificially created conditions, but on faithfulness to the Divine, eternal Law that is supreme both for the Tsar and the people, and to its echo - the law of the conscience, which dies only with the death of its bearer, man."⁹⁴

In another place Bishop Andronicus wrote: "It is not a question of the struggle between two administrative regimes, but of a struggle between faith and unbelief, between Christianity and antichristianity. The ancient antichristian plot, which was begun by those who shouted furiously to Pilate about Jesus Christ: 'Crucify Him, crucify Him: His blood be on us and on our children' - continued in various branches and secret societies. In the 16th century it poured into the special secret antichristian order of the Templars, and in the 18th century it became more definite in the Illuminati, the Rosencrucians and, finally, in Freemasonry it merged into a universal Jewish organization. And now, having gathered strength to the point where France is completely in the hands of the Masons, it - Masonry - already openly persecutes Christianity out of life there. In the end Masonry will be poured out into one man of iniquity, the son of destruction - the Antichrist (II Thessalonians 2). In this resides the solution of the riddle of our most recent freedoms: their aim is the destruction of Christianity in Rus'. That is why what used to be the French word 'liberal', which meant among the Masons a 'generous' contributor to the Masonic aims, and then received the meaning of 'freedom-loving' with regard to questions of faith, has now already passed openly over to antichristianity. In this resides the solution of the riddle of that stubborn battle for control of the school, which is being waged in the zemstvo and the State Duma: if the liberal tendency gains control of the school, the success of antichristianity is guaranteed. In this resides the solution of the riddle of the sympathy of liberals for all

⁹⁴ Archbishop Andronicus, *O Tserkvi Rossii*, Fryazino, 1997, pp. 132-133.

kinds of sects in Christianity and non-Christian religions. And the sectarians have not been slumbering - they have now set about attacking the little children... And when your children grow up and enter university - there Milyukov and co. will juggle with the facts and deceive them, teaching them that science has proved man's origin from the apes. And they will really make our children into beasts, with just this difference, that the ape is a humble and obedient animal whereas these men-beasts will be proud, bold, cruel and unclean..."⁹⁵

But these warnings went unheeded, and the liberal ferment continued to undermine the foundations of Christian society. The year 1913 was the three-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Romanov dynasty, to which the whole of Russian society, at the Zemsky Sobor of 1613, had sworn eternal allegiance, calling a terrible curse on themselves if they ever failed in their loyalty. But in the same year, the savage rhythms of Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring* proclaimed the advent of a new allegiance, to a barbaric power that would make all previous barbarisms pale into insignificance.

This was followed, in 1914, by the real beginning of the end of history, the breaking of the first seal of the Apocalypse, the Great War which would destroy three empires and usher in the reign of the collective Antichrist, Soviet power. Finally, on March 2, 1917, betrayed by all the political and cultural leaders of society, the Tsar was forced to abdicate.

However, on the very day and at the very hour of the Tsar's abdication, the Lord sent a great consolation to His people. Inspired by heavenly revelation, the peasant woman Evdokia discovered the "Reigning" Kolomna icon of the Mother of God, which had led the Russian armies to victory over Napoleon in 1812. In its miraculously renewed colours the icon revealed the Mother of God holding the orb and sceptre of kingly power in her hands.

The meaning was clear: now that the God-established Orthodox autocracy was no more, true authority had fled from earth to heaven, to the Queen of heaven herself, who would therefore reign directly over the Christian people in the name of her Son until such time as He saw fit to return the throne of the Orthodox tsars to Russia...

⁹⁵ Bishop Andronicus, *Russkij grazhdanskij stroj pered sudom khristianina*, Fryazino, 1995, pp. 24-25 (in Russian).

PART III. TOWARDS THE ANTICHRIST

*What does it profit a man
to gain the whole world
and lose his own soul?
Mark 8.36.*

9. Communism versus Capitalism

If we look around us today, in 1996, then it would seem that one socio-politico-religious doctrine has conquered the world: democracy, human rights, anti-nationalism, free-market economics and religious indifference (ecumenism). There are still a few dictators; but very few who advocate dictatorship as such. There are still some nationalist, even racist regimes; but none - with the important exception of Israel - where a form of racism has the status of a state religion. There are still at least two communist countries - North Korea and China - where democracy and human rights are regularly trampled on; but China, at any rate, has a flourishing semi-capitalist economy. Only in the Muslim countries do we see an alternative doctrine of human society fervently and widely expressed; and the ideal of the Orthodox autocracy lives on, albeit as a distinctly minority belief, in some Orthodox countries, notably Russia.

These three world-views, which we may call Democracy, Islam and Orthodoxy for short, are essentially the same three world-views which Vladimir Solovyov, writing in 1877, identified as incarnating the three basic forces which have determined the whole of world history. Islam, said Solovyov, was under the dominating influence of what he called the first force, i.e. "the striving to subject humanity in all its spheres and at every level of its life to one supreme principle which in its exclusive unity strives to mix and confuse the whole variety of private forms, to suppress the independence of the person and the freedom of private life." Democracy he characterized as being under the dominating influence of the second force, i.e. "the striving to destroy the stronghold of dead unity, to give freedom everywhere to private forms of life, freedom to the person and his activity; ... the extreme expression of this force is general egoism and anarchy and a multitude of separate individuals without an inner bond." The third force he defined as "giving a positive content to the two other forces, freeing them from their exclusivity, and reconciling the unity of the higher principle with the free multiplicity of private forms and elements."⁹⁶

"Every sphere of activity," writes Solovyov, "every form of life in the West, keeping aloof and separate from the others, strives in its separation to achieve an absolute significance, excluding all the rest, and to become the one for all. Instead of that, however, in accordance with the unfailing law of ultimate existence, it comes in its isolation to powerlessness and nothingness; and in taking over a sphere that is foreign to it, it loses power over its own. Thus the western church, having separated from the state, but assuming to itself the significance of a state in this separation, has herself become an ecclesiastical state, and ends up by losing all power both over the state and over society. In exactly the same way, the state, on being separated both from the church and the people, and having assumed to itself an absolute significance in its exclusive centralization, is finally deprived of all independence, and is turned into.. the executive tool of the people's voting, while the people or zemstvo itself, rising up both against the church and against the state, falls apart into warring classes and then must finally fall apart into warring individuals, too. The social organism of the West, having separated from the beginning into private organisms that are hostile to each other, must finally split up into its final elements, into the atoms of society, that is, individual people; and corporative, caste egoism must be translated into personal egoism."⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Solovyov, "Tri Sily", reprinted in *Novy Mir*, 1989, N 1, pp. 198-199.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

The twentieth century has seen the virtual elimination of the third force, Orthodox autocracy. Its place, for most of the century, was taken by communism. And so the major political drama of the twentieth century so far has been the struggle between what *appear* to be varieties of the first and second forces, capitalism and communism.

This struggle has brought the world to the edge of nuclear catastrophe. And yet the strange fact is that, in spite of numerous stand-offs and surrogate wars (in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, etc.), the main protagonists never fought each other - they even teamed up with each other in the Second World War. And the battle came to an end - for the time being, at any rate - with one side laying down its arms when it was under no immediate threat. One reason for communism's failure was that it failed in its own goal of overtaking the capitalist world economically, and was in fact falling far behind. However, the most fundamental reason for its failure, according to Fukuyama, "was its failure to control thought. Soviet citizens, as it turned out, had all along retained an ability to think for themselves. Many understood, despite years of government propaganda, that their government was lying to them. People remained enormously angry at the personal sufferings they had endured under Stalinism. Virtually every family had lost members of friends during collectivization, or the Great Terror of the 1930s, or during the war, whose costs had been made much greater by Stalin's foreign policy mistakes. They knew that these victims had been unjustly persecuted, and that the Soviet regime had never owned up to its responsibility for such horrendous crimes. People understood as well that a new kind of class system had arisen in this supposedly classless society, a class of party functionaries who were as corrupt and privileged as anyone under the old regime, but far more hypocritical."⁹⁸

Decisive in raising the people's consciousness of these wrongs, and their courage to fight them, were the reforms of Gorbachev. Although Gorbachev's aim was to strengthen the communist system, he in effect dismantled it by applying to it the standards and methods of the capitalist West. "Gorbachev initially used glasnost and democratization as tools to consolidate his own leadership position, and later to mobilized popular opposition to the entrenched economic bureaucracy. In doing so he was not deviating from the tactics that Khrushchev had used in the 1950s. But these initial acts of largely symbolic political liberalization soon took on a life of their own and became changes sought for their own sake. Gorbachev's initial call for glasnost and perestroika struck an immediate responsive chord among the host of intellectuals, who did not need to be convinced of the system's defects. And it turned out that there was only one consistent set of standards by which the old system was measured and found a failure: those of liberal democracy, that is, the productivity of market-oriented economics, and the freedom of democratic politics."⁹⁹

So in a sense we could say that the struggle between communism and capitalism was not so much a struggle between varieties of the first and second forces, as a struggle between two varieties of the second force. Thus communism represented Hobbesian liberalism with a Hegelean admixture of contempt for the bourgeois, and capitalism - Lockean liberalism. Capitalism won out because it was a more attractive alternative to a people whose tastes had become bourgeois and whose thymos had been humiliated too far.

⁹⁸ Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Thus if we compare communist Russia and capitalist America between the years 1917 and 1991, there are clearly some profound commonalities in spite of the large superficial differences. Both societies were born of the same historical philosophical process - the anti-Orthodox and anti-monarchical revolution of the West; both made incantatory use of the word "democracy" and professed to regard the will of the people as supreme (although, as we shall see, they understood "the people" in different ways); both put a very high value on science and technology and economic development; both banished religion to the realm of private life (although the communists did this much more thoroughly and brutally). The reason for the superficial differences between these societies is the fact that they emphasized two mutually contradictory principles arising out of the same democratic world-view - human rights and the will of the people.

Thus "neither 'human rights' nor 'the will of the people', nor both together can be the foundation of human society. For the one contradicts the other: 'the rights of the human personality', understood as the final foundations of society, deny the primacy of social unity; 'the will of the people', as an absolute social basis, denies the principle of personality. There can be, and in fact is, only some kind of eclectic, unprincipled compromise between the two principles, which witnesses to the fact that neither is the primary principle of society. If one genuinely believes in the one or the other, then one has to choose between the unlimited despotism of social unity, which annihilates the personality - and boundless anarchy, which annihilates social order and together with it every personal human existence."¹⁰⁰

American capitalism emphasized human rights - that is, the will of the individual over the will of the people as a whole. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, emphasized the opposite - the will of the collective over the will of the individual. Of course, this collective will in fact turned into the will of a small clique and even of a single man. Nevertheless, it is only partly true to say that communism was imposed on the Soviet masses. Even if the masses did not know what their choice was leading to, by their actions they effectively put Lenin in power.¹⁰¹

It is this close philosophical kinship between Soviet communism and Western capitalism which explains the paradoxical pandering of the western democracies to Soviet communism for most of the period 1917-1991. When the Tsar fell in February, 1917, all the western democracies rejoiced and hastened to recognize the new regime, although the Tsar had close relations with the ruling families of Europe, he had been a

¹⁰⁰ Berdyaev, N. "Religioznye osnovy obshchestvennosti", *Put'*, N 1, September, 1925, p. 13 .

¹⁰¹ This fact is most clearly illustrated by the history of Russian democracy in 1917. Thus none of the democratic leaders of the Provisional Government, from Milyukov to Lvov to Kerensky, offered any real opposition to the revolution, but rather claimed that they were acting by its authority. Indeed, Novgorodtsev writes: "Prince Lvov, Kerensky and Lenin were bound together by an unbroken bond. Prince Lvov was as guilty of Kerensky as Kerensky was of Lenin. If we compare these three actors of the revolution, who each in turn led the revolutionary power, in their relationship to the evil principle of civil enmity and inner dissolution, we can represent this relationship as follows. The system of guileless non-resistance to evil, which was applied by Prince Lvov as a system of ruling the state, with Kerensky was transformed into a system of pandering to evil camouflaged by phrases about 'the revolutionary leap' and the good of the state, while with Lenin it was transformed into a system of openly serving evil clothed in the form of merciless class warfare and the destruction of all those displeasing to the authorities. Each of the three mentioned persons had his utopian dreams, and history dealt with all of them in the same way: it turned their dreams into nothing and made of them playthings of the blind elements. The one who most appealed to mass instincts and passions acquired the firmest power over the masses. In conditions of general anarchy the path to power and despotism was most open to the worst demagoguery. Hence it turned out that the legalized anarchy of Prince Lvov and Kerensky naturally and inevitably gave way to the demagogic despotism of Lenin." ("Vostanovleniye svyatyn", *Put'*, N 4, June-July, 1926, p. 44).

faithful ally of the West during the war against Germany and it was obvious that his fall was not in the West's military interests. True, several Western states did intervene on behalf of the Whites in the Civil War. But this effort was half-hearted, and the armies were withdrawn even in those theatres (e.g. the British-American thrust from Murmansk) where they were on the point of victory. In the years that followed all the western democracies recognized the Soviet Union, even though its tyrannical essence was clear for all to see. Indeed, western trade with Stalin during the 1930s was a key element in the build-up of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. And even when Stalin was starving 14 million Ukrainian peasants to death during the first Five-Year Plan, socialist-minded western journalists turned a blind eye.

The phenomenon of western collusion with Bolshevism has been well analyzed by the Harvard historian Richard Pipes: "The affinities between liberalism and revolutionary socialism.. derive from the fact that both ideologies believe that mankind, being entirely shaped by sensory perceptions (that is, devoid of inborn ideas and values), can attain moral perfection through the restructuring of its environment. Their disagreement is over the means toward that end, liberals preferring to reach it gradually and peacefully, through legislation and education, while radicals prefer a sudden and violent destruction of the existing order. Psychologically, liberals feel defensive toward genuine radicals, who are bolder and prepared to take greater risks: the liberal can never quite rid himself of the guilty feeling that while he talks the radical acts. Liberals, therefore, are predisposed to defend revolutionary radicalism and, if necessary, to help it, even as they reject its methods. The attitude of Western liberals toward Communist Russia did not much differ from that of Russian democratic socialists toward Bolshevism before and after 1917 - an attitude distinguished by intellectual and psychological schizophrenia, which greatly contributed to Lenin's triumph. Russian socialists in emigration perpetuated it. While urging Western socialists to condemn the Communist 'terroristic party dictatorship', they nevertheless insisted that it was the 'duty of workers throughout the world to throw their full weight into the struggle against attempts by the imperialist powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia.'¹⁰²

When Hitler's Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Britain and France immediately declared war on her. However, when the Soviet Union, as Germany's ally, swallowed up the other half of Poland as well as the Baltic States and Bessarabia, the reaction was far less decisive. And when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the British and Americans hastened to enter into alliance with it. Even Churchill, who had been the most anti-communist British politician after the First World War, shook hands with Stalin; while Roosevelt affectionately called him "Uncle Joe". There followed the shameful pacts of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, which effectively handed over half of Europe (and hundreds of thousands of anti-communist Russians) to the communists - including Poland, for whose sake Britain had first entered the war, and Yugoslavia, whose lawful king lived in London and whose people had put up such a strong resistance to Nazism.

It was only the beginning of the Cold War, the blockade of Berlin and especially the Korean war which finally made the West wake up to the real nature of the Soviet threat. In 1949, a military alliance against the Soviet Union, NATO, was created; and there can be no doubt that if the West had used its enormous technological, demographic and economic superiority over the Soviet bloc in a determined manner, communism could

¹⁰² Pipes, R. *Russia under the Bolsheviks, 1919-1924*, 1994, London: Fontana, p. 202.

have fallen - or at least been halted. However, western intellectuals continued to have a sneaking admiration for the Soviets while despising their own system. Moreover, the sufferings of the millions under the Soviet yoke elicited little sympathy from the western capitalists, interested as they were only in preserving their comforts. And so international Communism continued to make enormous strides while the West slept: in China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua...

After the American defeat in Vietnam, the West's determination to fight Communism, already weak, collapsed almost entirely. "Detente" now became the order of the day; and in spite of the overwhelming evidence for the fact that wherever Communism comes rivers of blood flow, friendship between communists and capitalists flourished, just as George Orwell had prophesied in his novel 1984. The Queen of England gave a state banquet for Ceausescu; the Soviets gained ideological control even over such bodies as the World Council of Churches; and at Red China's insistence democratic Taiwan was thrown out of the United Nations. As late as the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union was intensifying its repression of Christians and dissidents, President Reagan's accurate description of it as "the evil empire" was met with widespread scorn by western intellectuals.

During these years, when in spite of the West's vast economic and military superiority it was surrendering vast areas of the world to communism without a fight, the fundamental weakness of democracy in defending itself was exposed for all to see. No country can survive indefinitely if its people are permitted to abuse their leaders and their country, and openly to side with the enemy. Fukuyama argues that it was the superior attractiveness of liberal democracy that guaranteed its victory. And yet in the Brezhnev era before Gorbachev came to power this was by no means evident to very many people in both East and West, who judged the communist system superior. Thus communist parties in France, Italy and Greece won very large percentages of the vote, as, in W.B. Yeats' words:

*the best lack all conviction,
while the worst are full of passionate intensity.*

And so it seemed only a matter of time before detente led to the final collapse of the West, if not through military conquest, at any rate through an inner loss of belief in its own superiority. For, as Jean Francois Revel wrote in his long catalogue of democratic timidity in the face of the totalitarian menace: "That a diplomatic policy designed to defend democracy was ruined by democracy itself is a natural consequence of the system's structure", insofar as "democracy by its very nature almost infinitely fragments a society's life and thought."¹⁰³

In 1974, when detente was at its height, the great Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn was exiled to the West. As a proven campaigner for human rights in the Soviet Union, he was expected to confirm the West's image of itself as the upholder and defender of human rights and democratic freedoms. And so he was given a hero's welcome. However, admiration quickly turned to disillusion when he proceeded, not only to attack the Soviet Union for its lack of freedom, but also to criticize the West for its feeble resistance to Communism and abuse of its freedom. Let us look briefly at some of his criticisms, which remain as topical as ever.

¹⁰³ Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1985, pp. 125, 160.

Now, for all his criticisms of the West, Solzhenitsyn drew no sign of equality between the capitalist West and the communist East. The West was distinctly superior, in his view, because (a) it was free as opposed to the East's tyranny, and (b) it had a framework of law as opposed to the East's essential lawlessness. Censorship was condemned by Solzhenitsyn; he valued the traditional freedoms guaranteed by a stable and enforced code of laws no less than any western liberal.

At the same time, clear philosophical differences emerged between Solzhenitsyn and his western interlocutors, and first of all in relation to the supreme value of the West - freedom.

For Solzhenitsyn, freedom was valuable and indeed necessary, but not as an end in itself. Rather, he saw it as a means to a higher end - moral perfection. And when he saw freedom being used to undermine rather than to support that higher end, he waxed eloquently scornful, as in his 1976 speech on receiving the "Freedom Fund" prize: "Freedom! - to forcibly defile postboxes and the eyes, ears and brains of people with commercial rubbish, and television programmes in which it is impossible to see any coherent sense. Freedom! - to impose information on people without taking into account their right not to receive it, their right to mental relaxation. Freedom! - to spit in the eyes and souls of those passing by advertisements. Freedom! - of publishers and cinema producers to poison the young generation with corrupt abominations. Freedom! - for adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18 to get drunk on leisure and pleasure instead of concentrated study and spiritual growth. Freedom! - for young adults to seek idleness and live at the expense of society. Freedom! - for strikers, to the extent of allowing them to deprive all the other citizens of a normal life, work, movement, water and food. Freedom! - for justifying speeches, when the lawyer himself knows that the accused is guilty. Freedom! - to raise the juridical right of insurance to such a degree that even charity could be reduced to extortion. Freedom! - for casual, trite pens to irresponsibly slide along the surface of any question in their haste to form public opinion. Freedom! - for the collection of gossip, when a journalist in his own interests spares neither his father nor his Fatherland. Freedom! - to publicize the defence secrets of one's country for personal political ends. Freedom! - for a businessman to make any deal, however many people it may reduce to misery or even if it would betray his own country. Freedom! - for political leaders to lightmindedly carry out what the voter wants today, and not what from a longer-term perspective will protect him from evil and danger. Freedom! - for terrorists to escape punishment, pity for them as a death sentence for the whole of the rest of society. Freedom! - for whole states to parasitically extort help from others, and not to work to build their own economy. Freedom! - as indifference to the trampling of the freedom of others far from us. Freedom! - even not to defend one's own freedom, as long as someone else risks his life."¹⁰⁴

Solzhenitsyn did not mention what is probably the greatest evil consequence of freedom in present-day democratic Russia, even more than in the West - the rise of organized crime. On March 27, 1994, James Woolsey, General Director of the CIA, told a senate foreign committee that the pervasiveness of Russian organised crime, fostered by the freedoms and restraint of security forces necessary for democratic reform, has contributed to the popular backlash against Yeltsin's policies and bolstered support for right wing nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Organized crime not only threatens all personal and commercial freedoms: it even threatens the life of the planet insofar as it

¹⁰⁴ Solzhenitsyn, in Shturman, D. *Gorodu i Miru*, New York: Tretya Vol'na, 1988, p. 156.

includes potential trafficking in nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁵ If the Russian revolution of 1917 was a vast robbery at the expense of the rightful ruler and people of Russia, the "counter-revolution" of 1991 did not restore the stolen goods but simply transferred them into the hands of other thieves.

The only real defence of freedom against its own worst consequences, according to Solzhenitsyn, was a good set of laws and an effective system for enforcing them. However, democracy guarantees neither the one nor the other. For a good set of laws depends on the wisdom and morality of the lawmakers - and democratic lawmakers are elected to follow the will of their constituents, not the objective good of the country. Moreover, effective enforcement presupposes a generally high respect for the law in the population as a whole - a condition that is notably lacking in most democracies today. In any case, according to Solzhenitsyn, western democratic legalism has become, to a dangerous and debilitating degree, an end in itself. Every conflict is solved according to the letter of the law, and voluntary self-restraint is considered out of the question. It is not enough to have a wonderful system of laws and every democratic freedom. If the people are selfish, then life will still be hell.

Pluralism, freedom of speech and the press and democratic elections are all fine, says Solzhenitsyn, but they only make the choice possible: they do not tell us what to choose. The decision of the majority is no guarantee against "misdirection"; fascists, communists, nationalists and unprincipled demagogues are frequently voted in by majorities. Even in an established democracy major decisions can be swung by the vote of a small, but determined and selfish minority which holds the balance of power and can therefore impose its will on the majority.

In an article entitled "The Pluralists", Solzhenitsyn wrote: "They [the pluralists] seem to regard pluralism as somehow the supreme attainment of history, the supreme intellectual good, the supreme value of modern Western life. This principle is often formulated as follows: 'the more different opinions, the better' - the important thing being that no one should seriously insist on the truth of his own.

"But can pluralism claim to be a principle valuable in itself, and indeed one of the loftiest? It is strange that mere plurality should be elevated to such a high status... *The Washington Post* once published a letter from an American, responding to my Harvard speech. 'It is difficult to believe,' he wrote, 'that diversity for its own sake is the highest aim of mankind. Respect for diversity makes no sense unless diversity helps us attain some higher goal.'

"Of course, variety adds colour to life. We yearn for it. We cannot imagine life without it. But if diversity becomes the highest principle, then there can be no universal human values, and making one's own values the yardstick of another person's opinions is ignorant and brutal. If there is no right and wrong, what restraints remain? If there is no universal basis for it there can be no morality. 'Pluralism' as a principle degenerates into indifference, superficiality, it spills over into relativism, into tolerance of the absurd, into a pluralism of errors and lies. You may show off your ideas, but must say nothing with conviction. To be too sure that you are right is indecent. So people wander like babes in the wood. That is why the Western world today is defenceless; paralysed by its inability any longer to distinguish between true and false positions, between manifest Good and manifest Evil, by the centrifugal chaos of ideas, by the entropy of thought. 'Let's have as

¹⁰⁵ Woolsey, *Balkan News*, May 1-7, 1994, p. 2.

many views as possible - just as long as they're all different!' But if a hundred mules all pull different ways the result is no movement at all.

"In the whole universal flux there is one truth - God's truth, and, consciously or not, we all long to draw near to this truth and touch it. A great diversity of opinions has some sense if we make it our first concern to compare them so as to discover and renounce our mistakes. To discover the true way of looking at things, come as close as we can to God's truth, and not just collect as many 'different' views as we can..."¹⁰⁶

Thus just as Western democratic pluralism would not save the West from Soviet totalitarianism, so Russia would not be delivered from the same totalitarianism by simply trying to make it more democratic. Solzhenitsyn did not believe that there was any realistic path of transition to a democratic republic without creating a number of nationalist wars - a judgement which we can now see to have been prophetically true. A multi-party democracy in Russia would be "merely be a melancholy repetition of 1917". For the failure of Russian democracy in 1917 was not the result simply of the immaturity of Russian democratic institutions, but rather of a fundamental flaw in the basic theory and spirit of democracy. Communism itself springs, not from traditional authoritarian systems, which, for all their faults, still recognized the authority of God above them, but from "the crisis of democracy, from the failure of irreligious humanism".

There are, of course, defects and dangers in the traditional systems, but "authoritarian regimes as such are not frightening - only those which are answerable to no one and nothing. The autocrats of earlier, religious ages, though their power was ostensibly unlimited, felt themselves responsible before God and their own consciences. The autocrats of our own time are dangerous precisely because it is difficult to find higher values which would bind them."¹⁰⁷

Now it is from an optimistic point of view, the point of view of a convinced democrat, that Solzhenitsyn described the defects of modern democracy - the licence to which its liberty leads, its cowardice in defence of its own values, its tendency to anarchy and hence, ultimately, to despotism. That is, he believed that democracy could remedy its own defects. And yet these defects are so penetratingly described and appear so radical, and the response to Solzhenitsyn's appeals have been so feeble and uncomprehending, that it is hard not to wonder whether democracy can really right its wrongs, and whether in fact it is a fundamentally unsound and unstable system which is doomed to destruction.

For in essence, as we have seen, it is "a mechanism for the satisfaction of the demands of the consumer-voter".¹⁰⁸ The problem is, that in the absence of a strongly believed higher religious or national ideal - and very few democracies, whether ancient or modern, have had any such ideal - the demands of the consumer-voter are bound to be multiple, contradictory, changeable, fallen, materialistic and egoistical. Thus the tendency to atomization and self-destruction is built into the very base of democracy like a relentlessly ticking time-bomb; and the conversion of the "people's democracy" of

¹⁰⁶ Solzhenitsyn, A. "Our Pluralists", *Survey*, vol. 29, no. 2 (125), 1985, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁷ Solzhenitsyn, in Kelley, D.R. *The Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov Dialogue*, London: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 75-87; also the dialogue on monarchism in Solzhenitsyn's novel, *Oktyabr' Shestnadtsatogo*. Paris: YMCA Press, 1984, chapters 25-27.

¹⁰⁸ Shturman, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

the East to the "liberal democracy" of the West only masks the fundamental crisis of society on both sides of what used to be the Iron Curtain...

10. The National Idea

A kingdom which is divided and riven apart by many warring wills cannot stand; the "free" pursuit of material ends only leads to society's inner dissolution and desolation. On the other hand, the imposition on this multiplicity of wills of a single "will of the people" likewise leads to atomization and death, as the universal experience of peoples subjected to communism has proved. The concept of the "will of the people" can be life-giving and not death-dealing only if it has an idealistic content which can be shown to be the expression of something or someone greater than the will of any single individual, however charismatic, or single social group, however large.

Such a will cannot simply be the expression of the opinion of the majority at any one time, for two reasons. First because truth and justice are not necessarily with the majority, so that fulfilling the will of the majority (even in a peaceful way, without the use of bloodshed or violence) not only violates the "democratic rights" of the minority, who feel they cannot abandon their views or submit to the majority simply because it is the majority, but also runs counter to the interests of the majority itself. And secondly because the majority changes its opinions with time, so that what seemed a self-evident truth at one time is considered to be a most dangerous lie at another, as is witnessed by the recent sharp changes in all the western democracies' attitudes towards homosexuality.

The only "will of the people" that can command the free and abiding subjection of every member of society is one that is felt to be the will, not of "the people" in the sense of a greater or smaller number of individuals who are alive at present, but of "the people" in the sense of a single mystical organism composed of all the members of society both in the present and throughout its historical past. This is the will of the people in the sense of *the nation*, and its expression in general conceptual terms may be called *the national idea*, which idea has come to replace the idea of democracy, whether "people's" or "liberal", in the hearts of many. The question is: to what extent, and in what circumstances, can a national idea truly steer a nation clear of the Scylla of materialist democracy without going aground on the Charybdis of chauvinist nationalism?

Now Holy Scripture recognizes only two nations or races in the strict sense of the word: the race of fallen mankind, which derives its origin from the first Adam, and the race of redeemed mankind, which derives its origin from the last Adam, Christ.

The race of fallen mankind lost its original unity as a consequence of sin - the sin of paganism in particular, and the building of the Tower of Babel, when, in order to check the spread of sin, God separated the nations both geographically and linguistically. However, the memory of their original unity was never lost, and is the basis for the germ of truth in the democratic idea of equality. For, as the Apostle Paul said in his sermon to the Athenians: "God made from one blood every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, and has determined their preappointed times and the boundaries of their dwelling." (Acts 17.26).

Nationalism contradicts this primordial fact of the original unity of mankind in Adam. It denies the basic identity of nature among all men and all nations. For as the Apostles Paul and Barnabas said to the pagans of Lystra who wanted to make them gods: "We also are men with the same nature as you" (Acts 14.15; cf. James 5.17).

At Pentecost, our original unity was restored by the descent of the Holy Spirit, Who transplanted, as it were, men of many different nations onto a single new root - Christ; for "we hear [the word of God], each in our own language in which we were born" (Acts 2.8). From a physical, genetic point of view, there is no difference between the two races, but from the spiritual point of view the difference is enormous. In a word, fallen mankind has lost the Spirit of God (Genesis 6.3), whereas redeemed mankind has been born again "of water and the Spirit" (John 3.5).

As the Apostle Paul says: "It is written, 'The first man Adam became a living being.' The last Adam became a life-giving spirit. However, the spiritual is not first, but the natural, and afterward the spiritual. The first man was of the earth, made of dust; the second Man is the Lord from heaven. As was the man of dust, so also are those who are made of dust; and as is the heavenly Man, so also are those who are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly Man." (I Corinthians 15.45-49).

In the race of redeemed mankind, which is the Orthodox Church founded by Christ, national differences become of minor importance. For "there is neither Jew nor Greek;... for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3.28). The very first Church Council, and the very first doctrinal decision of the Church, was concerned to abolish any essential distinction between Jews and Gentiles in the New Testament Church (Acts 15).

At the same time, national differences continue to exist and play a role in the mystery of God's Providence. The separation of the nations at the time of the Tower of Babel was ordained by God in order to check the spread of evil. And the number and geographical location of the nations was also ordained by God. For "when the Most High divided the nations, when He separated the sons of Adam, He set the bounds of the nations according to the number of the angels of God. And His people Jacob became the portion of the Lord, Israel was the line of His inheritance" (Deuteronomy 32.8-9).

However, since the Jews killed Christ, they have been cut off from "the line of His inheritance", the race of redeemed mankind, while the Gentiles have been grafted in. (But this position can be reversed again, so there is no reason for "anti-semitism" - "do not be haughty, but fear" (Romans 11.20).) Now it is the Christians, both Jews and Gentiles, that are the "chosen race, a holy priesthood, a holy nation, a people whom he has gained" (I Peter 2.9). Indeed, there is an important sense in which the Christians are the only true nation, the only nation which will endure to eternity. For as the Lord said through the Prophet Hosea: "I shall call [those who were] not My people, and [those who did] not receive mercy [I shall call a people] having received mercy, and in the place where it was said, 'You are not My people', there they will be called the sons of the living God" (1.9, 2.24; cf. Romans 9.25-26; I Peter 2.10).

This is a very brief summary of the first principles of the Orthodox Church's teaching on the nations and nationalism. Let us now turn to some contemporary definitions of the nation, and how they apply to some contemporary nations.

In an article written in 1970, and entitled "Three Attitudes to the Homeland", the Russian Slavophile Vladimir Osipov proposes the following set of criteria: "What is a nation? Faith, blood, language and the land. Religion, and even a certain complex of rites, are a part - indeed, the most important part - of the spirit of a nation. An individual person can get by without religion. But without religion, an individual nation cannot

survive as a nation... A people disintegrates literally before one's eyes when faith in God disintegrates..."¹⁰⁹

Here we find the religious approach to the problem of nationalism - the importance attached to the faith of the nation - that is characteristic of almost all Russian writers. For the the Orthodox Christian tradition that is still strong in Russia, even after decades of atheist and internationalist socialist propaganda, declares that blood, after all, is not a defining quality of nations (especially in such a racially mixed nation as Russia). As for language and land, they change and develop without the essential spirit of a country changing - although there is no doubt that a deep knowledge of the language and living contact with the land has an important role in keeping the spirit of a nation alive.

Victor Aksyuchits echoes this judgement: "The positivist definitions of a people - for example, common origin (blood), language, territory, economic structure, culture, state unity - do not embrace the concept of that mysterious unity which is the people, the nation. All such definitions are only partial. They cannot, for example, explain the existence of such a people as the Jews, who in the thousands of years of their existence have become mixed in blood¹¹⁰, have changed their language and culture, have not had a common territory, or economic structure, or their own statehood, but have nevertheless been fully preserved as a people."¹¹¹

The example of the Jews is indeed instructive, and there can be little doubt that the only major bond holding them together as a nation since the destruction of their statehood in 70 A.D. has been their faith.¹¹² This faith is a nationalistic faith - as Kartashev writes, "Judaism established itself on a primordial, ethnically closed-in-on-itself blood-nationalism".¹¹³ But while blood alone cannot hold a nation together, *faith* in blood can give it a terribly powerful - and powerfully terrible - strength and unity, as the whole history of the Jews since Christ has demonstrated.

Such a false faith in the nation can and will become the heresy of the Antichrist himself. Thus we read in a contemporary Jewish journal: "When the Creator on Mount Sinai CHOSE us for a special mission, there arose a completely new form of connection between Him and the Jewish people. The distinction between the Hebrew people and the others was formed in two stages. The first stage was the epoch of our forefathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who, thanks to their selfless devotion to the Master of the universe, were raised above the limitations of their nature and laid the foundation for a new type of reality - the Jewish people.

"The second stage was accomplished by the revelation on Sinai. Thanks to their special inspiration and complete devotion to the will of the Creator, the forefathers of the Jewish people merited, not only for themselves, but also for their descendants, a special spiritual substance - a Divine soul. Thus the Jewish people was separated into a special category distinct from the other peoples. This distinction is not quantitative, but qualitative..

¹⁰⁹ Osipov, in Walters, P. "A New Creed for Russians?" *Religion in Communist Lands*, 1976, vol. 3, no. 4.

¹¹⁰ According to the Hungarian Jew, Arthur Koestler (*The Thirteenth Tribe*, London: Pan Books, 1980), the main racial element in the Jewish people is not Semitism, but Khazarism.

¹¹¹ Aksyuchits, "O sovremennykh natsional'nykh problemakh", *Posev*, March-April, 1990, p. 111.

¹¹² The founder of the Zionist movement, Theodore Hertzl, wrote in his work *The Hebrew State* that "we recognize ourselves as belonging to one people *only through the faith* of our fathers" (quoted in Andrushkevich, *op. cit.*, p. 6).

¹¹³ Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii Russkoj Tserkvi*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1959, p. 501.

"Such an approach allows us to understand the specific nature of the Jewish people. The Jew is not simply a man who has one extra quality or characteristic. The Jew is a creature into which the Most High has inserted a Divine soul - the spirit of holiness, a particle of God Himself.

"The Divine soul which belongs to the Jew is a supremely unique characteristic. All creatures, including mankind, are parts of the creation of the world with its regularities and limitations. But the Jew stands outside the creation of the world thanks to his Divine soul. This particularity of the Jewish people was formed already in the time of the forefathers, and from them was passed down by inheritance to every Jew, who bears within himself this phenomenon, the Jewish soul - a particle of God Himself.

"From this it follows that true freedom of choice belongs only to those possess a particle of God Himself - a Divine soul. As is said in the book of the Prophet Ezekiel, chapter 34, verse 31: 'You are My people, My flock. Your name is man.' From these words it follows that the definition of 'man' in the highest sense of the word, and consequently freedom of will in the full sense refer only to the possessors of a Divine soul."¹¹⁴

We may speculate that the "third stage" in the supposed superiority of the Jews over all other nations will come when the Antichrist comes to power, when it will be claimed, through a new revelation higher even than that of the law and the prophets, that he has a Divine soul to an even greater degree than the other Jews, being in fact, not just a particle of God Himself, but the whole Divinity; for he will "take his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God" (II Thessalonians, 2.4).

Now when faith begins to weaken, however, a nation resorts to other means, such as land, language and blood, to hold itself together. Thus when the Jewish leaders felt that the identity of their nation was being threatened through assimilation with the European nations in the nineteenth century, they founded the Zionist movement in 1897 with the explicit aim of strengthening the Jewish identity by a return to the land of Israel. Since then, moreover, it has been felt necessary to resurrect the Hebrew language and to make common blood a condition of citizenship in the state of Israel.

Also important in helping a nation to define itself and hold together is a common tradition of statehood. It is interesting that most nations with a strong sense of identity have been monarchies, while democracy has tended to undermine a nation's identity. This is because monarchy, being based on conservative, rather than revolutionary principles, helps to preserve a nation's memory and therefore its sense of who and what it is.

Democracy, however, usually begins with a revolution that denies the validity and sanctity of the pre-revolutionary past. Moreover, every new democratic government

¹¹⁴ Aleph, N 451, October, 1992; quoted in A.S. Shmakov, *Rech' Patriarkha Alekseya II k ravoinam g. Nyu Yorka (S.Sh.A.)*, 13 noyabrya, 1991 goda i yeres' zhidovstvuyushchikh, second edition, U.S.A., 1993, p. 13.

The verse from Ezekiel quoted here has the words "Your name is man" neither in the Greek Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, which is the only text accepted by the Orthodox Church, nor in the Old Latin text. The Authorized King James translation, which is from the Massoretic Hebrew text, reads: "And ye My flock, the flock of My pasture, are men, and I am your God, saith the Lord God" - a clear rebuttal of the Jews' claims to natural divinity.

comes to power on the promise of doing better than its inadequate predecessor; so the emphasis is on constant change and renewal - "permanent revolution".

Now since faith is so important in defining a nation's identity, a change of faith can mean the death of one nation and the birth of another, even when genetic, linguistic and territorial ties have not been broken.

Thus in a real sense the Jewish nation died when it killed Christ. And Holy Scripture affirms that anti-Christian Jews are not true Jews (cf. Romans 2.28; Revelation 2.9). And so the return of the Jews to Christ will indeed be, as the Apostle Paul says, "life from the dead" (Romans 11.15), the resurrection of the true spiritual identity of the Jewish people.

Let us take another example, that of England. Now the faith that made England a single nation with a clear self-identity was Orthodox Christianity. And for several centuries before the Norman Conquest of 1066, England was a traditional hereditary monarchy of the Orthodox type. Her kings were crowned by the Church and revered, as in Byzantium and Russia, as the Anointed of God. Disobedience to the king was considered a sin, not only against the state, but also against the faith.¹¹⁵

However, "apparently as the result of one day's fighting" in 1066, writes the historian R.H.C. Davis, "England received a new royal dynasty, a new aristocracy, a virtually new Church, a new art, a new architecture and a new language".¹¹⁶ Orthodox bishops were deposed, Orthodox churches and relics destroyed, and Orthodox warriors and nobility fled abroad to Kiev and Constantinople, while the nation as a whole was forcibly incorporated into the heretical papacy. As the nineteenth-century historian Edward Augustus Freeman put it: "The Norman Conquest is the great turning-point in the history of the English nation... Its whole importance is not the importance which belongs to a beginning, but the importance which belongs to a turning point. So far from being the beginning of our national history, the Norman Conquest was the temporary overthrow of our national being."¹¹⁷

This break in national self-awareness has been so radical that until recently English schoolchildren were taught English history beginning from 1066. It is as if the thousand or so years of Christian history before that were of no significance. Thus the English kings are counted as beginning from the French-speaking William I, while "Edward I" is not Edward the Elder or Edward the Martyr or Edward the Confessor - great kings all, but a Norman who lived hundreds of years later.

Among the traditions destroyed or distorted by the Norman Conquest was the tradition of the Orthodox autocracy. Although the king continued to be crowned by the Church, the idea of the holiness of the monarchy was gradually lost. In 1216 the powers of the monarchy were limited by the Magna Carta to take account of the interests of the nobility; and further limitations followed.

However, in the 16th century Shakespeare still had a strong feeling for it, providing one of the classic statements of the necessity of the preservation of natural order, "degree", or hierarchy in *Troilus and Cressida* (I, 3):

¹¹⁵ Abbot Aelfric, *Catholic Homily on Palm Sunday*.

¹¹⁶ Davis, *The Normans and their Myth*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1976, p. 103.

¹¹⁷ Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest*, vol. 1, p. 1

*Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark! what discord follows; each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy: the bounded waters
Should lift their bosoms higher than the shores,
And make a sop of all this solid globe:
Strength should be lord of imbecility,
And the rude son should strike his father dead:*

And even today, centuries after the democratic revolution of 1642 deprived the monarchy of any real power or sanction by making it constitutional, the English still have an instinctive veneration for the institution. This witnesses to a kind of schizophrenia in the English soul. For while the dominant faith of the English is undoubtedly democratic and materialistic, the monarchy still serves as a link with that past when England had a different faith - and was in effect a different nation.

Moreover, we still hear the argument that, while England is and should remain a democratic nation, the monarchy should also remain as the only institution that stands above the warring political parties. That is why the decline of the monarchy in recent years is regretted by so many people. For it stands as the most important symbol of the unity of the nation, not only in space, in that every citizen, whatever his political allegiance, is a subject of the queen, but also in time, in that the hereditary succession of the monarchy connects England today with the England of all previous ages.

Another instructive, and still more complex example is Greece. Before their conversion to Christ, the Greeks had already had a long and complex existence as a nation. At first they lived in a multitude of independent city-states, each with his own god, such as Athene of Athens and "Diana of the Ephesians". But in spite of their political and religious divisions, the Greeks always felt their unity as a nation; and the distinction between Greeks and Barbarians is a very ancient one. Only the Jews and the Chinese, among the very ancient nations, have a similarly clear, ethnocentric view of the universe.

Then, in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ, the Greeks' faith in their gods began to wane under the influence of philosophy and democracy; for, as Alexis Khomyakov pointed out, the rise of democracy is usually accompanied by a decline in religion. This prepared the way for Alexander the Great, under whom the Greeks acquired a world empire and an imperialist state structure. Then Greece itself became simply one province in the new world-empire of Rome, although Hellenic culture continued to extend its influence, mixing with both eastern and western elements to become the foundation civilization of Europe and the Mediterranean world from Hadrian's wall on the Scottish border to the Euphrates river on the Persian border.

With the coming of St. Constantine the Great, the empire became Christian and the Greeks were reborn as the "Christian Romans", or Ῥωμαῖοι Χριστιανοί - a name that the Greeks of Pontus and the Eastern coast of the Black Sea continued to retain for themselves well into this century. During this period, the prestige of Christianity was so great that the Christian Greeks took no particular pride in Hellenism, which was associated with the pagan, pre-Christian past; for they now redefined themselves as Christians and Romans. The best elements in Hellenism were incorporated into the Byzantine Christian synthesis, while the pagan elements were discarded and derided.

However, when Constantinople, the New Rome, fell in 1453, and especially after the liberation of Greece in 1821, the Greeks started redefining themselves again as Hellenes, and began to look back to their pagan past with pride, as if that were no less a real part of their national identity than their Christianity.

In our time this has led to a real crisis of identity. For the contemporary Greeks have to decide who their real spiritual ancestors are: the pagan democratic Greeks like Pericles and Sophocles, the pagan imperialist Greeks like Alexander of Macedon and Antiochus Epiphanes (one of the great persecutors of the people of God), or the Christian Roman Greeks such as the Fathers of the Church and the new martyrs of the Turkish yoke. Their membership of the democratic confederation of the European Union makes them emphasize their pagan democratic past. The dispute over Macedonia leads them to emphasize their pagan imperial past (for Alexander the Great came from Macedonia). And only rarely do they hark back to their Christian Roman past in its spiritual, universalist profundity. It is this schizophrenia in the Greek soul that makes it so difficult for them to define themselves and their aims, both to themselves and to the outside world.

From this discussion, we can see that a nation is in many ways like an individual person. Like an individual person, each nation can be said to have a spirit, a soul and a body. Its "spirit" is that which unites it with God and makes it unique while uniting it with all other nations that are in God - what Vladimir Solovyov called "the idea that God has of it in eternity".¹¹⁸ If every nation has a spirit in this sense, it is nevertheless sadly a fact that most nations have lost their spirit, or replaced it with another, ungodly one. How many nations lost their Christian spirits, at least temporarily, in this way - the Jews to the nationalist spirit of Zionist Judaism, other Christian nations of the Middle East to Islam or Monophysitism, the West European nations to Catholicism and Protestantism, and many of the East European nations to Marxism-Leninism, and now - to democracy-ecumenism.

The spirit of a nation is sometimes so strong that it is felt that a person cannot belong to the nation in any way unless he also confesses the faith of that nation. A clear example is Old Testament Israel in its peak period from Moses to Solomon, when "Israel" referred both to a faith and to the people confessing that faith. A modern example is Iran, whose internal identity and external foreign policy are almost completely dependent on its self-appointed status as the guardian of the Muslim faith. Another important example is "Holy Russia" in the Muscovite period, when to be Russian meant necessarily to be Orthodox Christian.

At the same time, there are important differences, even in very religious societies, between the the Church (in Christian societies) and society or the nation in general. One of these differences, as Fr. Stefan Krasovitsky points out, is that "the nucleus of society is the family, whereas the nucleus of the Church is the person. Within the Church a person is united with other persons without any loss of his individuality, for this unity takes place in the Super-Person (Divine Person) of Jesus Christ... [As to so-called 'human rights',] they are provided (in the conditions of a morally healthy society) within the family in accordance with the familial status of each member of this unit of society. So a

¹¹⁸ Solovyov, in Vadim Borisov, "Natsional'noye vozrozhdeniye i natsiya-lichnost", in Solzhenitsyn, A. *Iz-Pod Glyb*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1974, p. 208.

normal society should defend, not 'human rights'.. but *the rights of the family*, defending them from suppression and destruction."¹¹⁹

Moreover, even in such spiritually intense and unified societies, the idea of the nation is never completely exhausted by the content of its faith. For if the faith is a universalist one, it will also be incarnate in other nations having different souls but the same faith or spirit. And even if the faith is not universalist, but exclusive to one and one only nation, like "Diana of the Ephesians", the nation concerned will differentiate itself from the other nations not only in terms of its faith but also in terms of many other, less spiritual characteristics.

For the soul of a nation is tied up in certain very specific and unique ways with its history, its geography, its climate, and the physical and psychological make-up of its members. Thus for an Englishman, regardless of his faith or the faith of his country at any particular time, his Englishness involves what might be called a specifically geographical element - the feeling of belonging to the island which Shakespeare in Richard II compared to "a silvery stone set in a silvery sea"; and this element may contribute to what other nations see as the Englishman's reserved, self-contained, insular nature. On the other hand, the expansiveness and tendency to extremism that characterizes the Russians in their own and others' estimation, has been considered by some to be conditioned by the limitless flat steppes of their homeland.¹²⁰

In some nations, the spiritual element in its national feeling is so weak as to be almost non-existent. But since man cannot exist without some guiding principle, the spiritual vacuum thus created will be filled by the deification of the nation itself, or of the state or leader in which its national life is temporarily incarnate - that is, in nationalism or totalitarian statism. In pagan societies the tendency towards statism is expressed especially in the deification of the king. Hence the god-kings and emperors of Ancient Egypt, Babylon and Rome. In modern Western societies, this tendency found a less overtly religious expression in the veneration of the leader in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

However, there are some societies in which both religious faith and national feeling have been reduced to a pale shadow of themselves. The spiritual and emotional vacuums thus created will then be filled, on the one hand, by a frenzy of economic activity, what Fukuyama calls *economization*, and, on the other hand, by an extreme elaboration of state structures of every kind. This almost exclusive cult of the body, in both its personal and collective forms, is a comparatively modern development; but today, in the shape of western capitalist, democratic civilization, it has spread throughout the world.

However, even when men have agreed that the main purpose of life is to satisfy material, bodily needs, and that the best instrument to this end is through the body of the nation - the state, they still remain essentially spiritual beings whose spiritual and emotional nature cannot be satisfied by bread alone. Therefore the builders of modern western societies have provided them with something else: circuses. For whereas the religious societies of the past spent vast sums on the construction of cathedrals or

¹¹⁹ Krasovitsky, "Dva tipa kollektivizma", *Angel Valaama*, 9 July, 1994, p. 4.

¹²⁰ See Berdyaev, N. *Sud'ba Rossii*, Moscow, 1990. On the other hand, the anthropologist Geoffrey Gower attributed these traits in the Russians' character to their habit of tightly wrapping their children in swaddling clothes, which supposedly made them long, in later life, to express themselves more expansively and less restrainedly!

temples or mosques, and the nationalist societies of more recent times spent equally vast sums on the construction of the thrones and palaces of their god-kings, modern democratic societies spend substantial (but comparatively much smaller) sums on the construction of sports halls and stadia, cinemas and concert-halls. Here the need to worship something or someone greater than oneself - a sports team or a rock star - can be satisfied. And here nationalist passions can be expressed and defused in comparative safety.¹²¹

Thus just as in an individual person the weakening of the spirit inevitably leads to the domination of the flesh, so is it in the life of nations. When the soul of the nation ceases to worship God, it worships either itself or its passions. This is the origin both of the fallen kind of nationalism and of democratism, in which "the pursuit of happiness" - material happiness - becomes the constitutional foundation of society.

Of the fallen kind of nationalism we have seen many examples in recent years. But the commonness of these examples should not blind us to the fact that, when subordinate to the Spirit, nationalism can be redeemed and form a powerful support for unity *within* a nation without leading to disunity *between* nations. For the love of one's country is one of those forces in human nature which can be used for good or for evil, for the love of God and the building up of His Kingdom, or for the hatred of one's neighbour and the destruction of mankind. Thus in a sermon delivered in the revolutionary year of 1905, St. John of Kronstadt said: "The earthly fatherland with its Church is the threshold of the Heavenly Fatherland. Therefore love it fervently and be ready to lay down your life for it, so as to inherit eternal life there."

It follows that to say of nationalism that it is "caused by wounds, some form of collective humiliation"¹²², although not without a measure of truth in some situations, is misleading. For it implies that the excesses of fallen nationalism are purely psychological in nature and can therefore be cured by some kind of "collective therapy"; whereas the roots of the disease are spiritual and come from a loss of faith. Just as the fire of fallen desire is kindled when the fire of the Holy Spirit is quenched in the individual soul, so the fire of nationalism is kindled when the fire of love for the super-nation of the Church is weakened in the nation.

Thus it is not surprising that the nationalism manifested itself in Church life as a specific heresy - that of *phyletism*. As we read in a new ecclesiastical journal: "The nineteenth century, as the age of the fall of multi-national empires, the age of nationalism, made itself felt also in ecclesiastical life, which almost for the first time raised national contradictions among Orthodox Christians to the level of an ecclesiological heresy. Under the name of the heresy of phyletism ("tribalism"), it was denounced by the Council of Constantinople in 1872. In this way the Council replied to the demand of the Bulgars to create for themselves an independent hierarchy on the territory where there already existed the hierarchy of the Constantinopolitan patriarchate..."

"The heresy of phyletism consists in the substitution of national tradition for Church Tradition, the substitution of flesh and blood, which *will not inherit the Kingdom of God* (I

¹²¹ Unless, that is, British soccer fans are involved. Elder Barsonuphius of Optina prophesied the tragic consequences of soccer. See *Orthodox Life*, vol. 39, no. 3, May-June, 1989, pp. 15-16.

¹²² Sir Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism", in *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, London: John Murray, 1990, p. 245.

Corinthians 15.50) for the gift of the Holy Spirit. Phyletism places love for one's own people (that is, a creature) higher than love for Christ, thereby violating His commandment (Matthew 10.37). Of course, the preservation of national traditions is vitally necessary for life on earth - just as it would be impossible to live on earth without flesh and blood. The annihilation of these traditions is equivalent to the murder of the people. Moreover, it is necessary to remember that the division of mankind into tribes and tongues was the salvific punishment of God, Who placed a certain boundary to the mad and suicidal construction of the Tower of Babel. In this sense a certain isolation, and preservation of the peculiarity of the peoples, is necessary and salvific in a world that is striving with all its might to complete the building of the Tower and is rushing into the abyss of destruction (Isaiah 14.14). Both the Holy Scriptures and Church Tradition repeatedly witness to the existence of the special care of God for the destinies of various peoples and countries; St. Dionysius the Areopagite also mentions Angel guardians of the peoples. The salvation of mankind on earth can be built in no other way than proceeding from the Providence of God with regard to each person or people - Providence, which manifests itself in all the circumstances of life, whether blessing them or permitting them.

"It is evident that Orthodoxy is foreign both to the dualistic hatred of matter and to the rationalist, Protestant, dreamily proud attitude to life. In the Church the temporary, earthly peculiarities and differences (including national ones) do not disappear, but acquire another meaning, insofar as they are evaluated from the point of view of the main aim - eternal salvation. The Apostle Paul writes that in Christ there is neither Greek, nor Jews, neither slave, nor freeman, neither male nor female (Galatians 3.28). However, this does not mean that one can simply cast out all these differences here, during life on earth. On the contrary, we see that the Holy Church in her decrees find a fitting place for each visible, external circumstance; which is why the Apostle Paul gives detailed instructions to men and women, parents and children, slaves and masters (Ephesians chapters 5-6).

"Just as it is impossible to be saved by ignoring one's body (St. John of the Ladder), so it is impossible for a Christian people to construct its life in Christ by ignoring national peculiarities. However, this is not a reason for raising national traditions to the status of a cult - and yet that is precisely what happens when the preservation of the traditions and customs of an Orthodox people is confused with the preservation of Orthodoxy itself.

"Those Christians who reject the ecumenist heresy naturally strive to find a support in tradition. But at this point a new error is possible: appealing to national tradition instead of the Tradition of the Church. Of course, national tradition among those peoples who were fostered by the Orthodox Church is inspired by the Tradition of the Church. It can and must lead to that height upon which man meets God. The Christian empires became in history that *lampstand* on which the light of Christ was raised high above the world, *a light to give light to the world* (Matthew 5.13-16). But if we take national tradition by itself, it is similar to what we see on Mount Sinai or Thabor in their purely material aspect - piled up with earth and stones. No people except the New Israel - the Christian Church taken as a whole - is a member of the Church and a subject of salvation. In each people each person in the final analysis answers for himself; he is either saved or perishes (Acts 10.35). But national tradition and all the links which bind the individual person with the people represent a very powerful factor cooperating in his salvation or destruction. It is necessary to soak the traditions in Orthodoxy for them to

help the man towards salvation without hindering him. However, in the end everything is decided by the free will of the man.

"From this it is evident that it is wrong to place national differences at the base of the organization of the Church. Such a tendency is always fraught with the risk of schism. However, in our time it has become a much greater danger, and the Council of 1872 did not call it a heresy in vain."¹²³

However, it is no less dangerous to believe that nationalism can be cured by abolishing the nations, by merging them into some artificial kind of super-nation. The example of the former Soviet Union is a vivid example of this fallacy. The Bolsheviks first tried to use and incite national feeling in order to destroy the multi-national empire of Russia. Then they tried to impose their own brand of internationalism (i.e. anti-nationalism) upon all the nations of the former empire, suppressing the old nationalisms in favour of a new "Soviet patriotism". But the old nationalisms were not destroyed by this experiment; and now that the dead hand of Bolshevism has been removed they have emerged in a still more virulent form.¹²⁴

The European Union appears to be repeating this mistake, albeit in a less crude way. The architects of the Union give as its main justification the avoidance of those nationalistic wars, especially between France and Germany, which have so disfigured the region's history. But the old nationalisms show no sign of dying. And in traditionally insular countries, such as Britain, or traditionally Orthodox ones, such as Greece, attempts to force them into an unnatural union with other nations with quite different traditions appear to be increasing centrifugal tendencies. Moreover, the European Union has signally failed to introduce unity among the nations in other parts of the European continent, such as the former Yugoslavia.¹²⁵ For pious exhortations are as useless in the faith of nationalist fervour as exhortations to chastity in the face of aroused lust. In both cases *grace* is required to give power to the word.

The problem is that when the grace that holds apparent opposites in balance is absent, it is very easy for a nation, as for an individual person, to swing from one extreme to the other, as the history of the twentieth century, characterised by lurches from nationalist Fascism to internationalist Communism shows. Late in the nineteenth century Constantine Leontiev saw that the nationalism of the states of Europe could lead to a no less dangerous internationalist abolition of states '... A state grouping *according to tribes and nations* is.. nothing other than the preparation - striking in its force and vividness - for the transition to a cosmopolitan state, first a pan-European one, and then, perhaps, a global one, too! This is terrible! But still more terrible, in my opinion, is that fact that so far in Russia nobody has seen this or wants to understand it...'¹²⁶ 'A grouping of states

¹²³ *Alektor*, no. 1, 1997, editorial.

¹²⁴ See Shafarevich, A. "Obosobleniye ili sblizheniye", in Solzhenitsyn, A. *Iz-Pod Glyb*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1974, p. 106.

¹²⁵ Characteristic is the remark of Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission and one of the leading internationalists of our time: "I have lived through two humiliating moments in my life. The first was when I was 15 and the Germans invaded France. I saw the population fleeing before the enemy, including soldiers on bicycles whose only thought was to save their own skin. I swore then that such a thing must never happen again. But the same thing is happening again today, in Bosnia. I am ashamed, dishonored. Soon I will turn 69. One day I will die, and I will have done nothing to stop all that." ("The Czar of Brussels", *Newsweek*, May 30, 1994, p. 24)

¹²⁶ "Tribal Politics as a Weapon of Global Revolution", letter 2. Constantine Leontiev, *Selected Works*, edited and with an introductory article by I.N. Smirnov, Moscow, 1993, p. 314.

according to pure nationalities will lead European man very quickly to the dominion of internationalism.¹²⁷

As the editors of Alektor note: "Leontiev based his apparently paradoxical thought on the fact that the very striving of the nations for 'liberation' within the bounds of national states was dictated by their striving to be like everyone else: '*... having become politically liberated, they are very glad, whether in everyday life or in ideas, to be like everyone else*'. He produced an example: for a man who has been released from prison, it is a matter of indifference at what time they released him. If there is an epidemic raging at that time, it would be safer for him to remain in prison. And so, too, 'the political nationalism of our time does not give national isolation, because the overwhelming influence of cosmopolitan tastes is too strong. The epidemic has not yet come to an end.'¹²⁸

"All this was confirmed to the highest degree by the collapse of the Russian and Ottoman empires, whose preservation at that time, as the same Leontiev warned, was exceptionally important for the earthly fate of the Church. In particular, Leontiev's worst predictions concerning the possible consequences of a premature collapse of the Ottoman empire were fulfilled: the Ecumenical Patriarchate fell into direct dependence on the West, and already in 1920, through an open violation of the canons, the heretic and English Mason Meletius Metaxakis, the author of the very encyclical of 1920 which officially opened the age of ecumenism, was raised by force to the see of Constantinople.

"At the beginning of the 20th century the organizers of 'world revolution' were consciously engaged in cleverly mixing doses of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. One and the same Masonic lodge - the Grand Orient of France - simultaneously created 'cosmopolitan' masonic organisations in Russia (they first composed the core of the State Duma, and then formed the Provisional Government from its midst), and 'nationalist' ones in Turkey (the organisation of the Young Turks was a masonic lodge).

"But even in the purely ecclesiastical sphere Leontiev's fears were completely fulfilled. From the time of Metaxakis to the present day, the politics of the Patriarchate of Constantinople have been dictated by Greek nationalism: the West is necessary for it precisely for the expansion of a Greek national state, for the possibly more complete realisation of the so-called "Great Idea" - the re-establishment of the Greek state within the boundaries of Byzantium. Greek phyletism does not let it be understood that Byzantium was great because it never became a national Greek state! The greatness of the Empire of the East Romans was preserved as long as it preserved Orthodoxy. For the successors of Metaxakis everything is the other way round: Orthodoxy for them is only an instrument of national politics, and so the instrument is always being 'perfected'. Of course, the Russian 'great idea' - the re-establishment of a Russian national state within the boundaries of the Russian Empire - is not in principle different from its Greek analogue. Therefore if the contemporary 'statist' politicians are not inspired by genuine Orthodox faith they can be only temporary and unreliable allies of the Church. Before the Greeks ecumenism has arisen unexpectedly as the reverse side of the coin of phyletism; the situation has changed - and ecumenism has become useful. In Russia *today* it is not like that: Russian phyletism is not yet anti-ecumenist, but this gives no

¹²⁷ "On Political and Cultural Nationalism", letter 3, op. cit., p. 363.

¹²⁸ Op. cit., p. 360.

guarantees for tomorrow. And the most important point is that because of this it will not cease to be a heresy..."¹²⁹

A true union of nations is possible only on the basis of the common acceptance of a single spirit or faith. If the basis of the union is not spirit, but flesh - economic self-interest - then the union is bound to fail; for materialism pits nations no less than individual men against each other. Or if it succeeds, it can do so at only at the cost of the physical disappearance of the weaker nations and the spiritual death of all of them.

But if a nation, like an individual person, is an eternal personality made in the image of God, the disappearance of a nation cannot be justified by any super-national aims, however superficially laudable; for this would be murder.

So we come back to the question: to what extent can we say that a nation is like an individual person? Is it really as eternal as a person? Or are some nations destined to disappear forever?

The view that a nation is a person in all significant respects has been expressed with characteristic eloquence by Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "Recently it has become fashionable to speak of the levelling of nations, and the disappearance of peoples in the melting-pot of contemporary civilization. I do not agree with this, but to discuss it is a separate question, and at this point I think it fitting to say only that the disappearance of nations would impoverish us no less than if all individual people were assimilated into one character, one person. Nations are the wealth of humanity, its social personalities; the smallest of them bears its own special traits, and hides within itself a special facet of the Divine plan..."

"It is precisely he who gives the highest value to the existence of nations, who sees in them not a temporary fruit of social formations, but a complex, vivid, unrepeatable organism that cannot be invented by men - he it is who recognizes that nations have a fullness of spiritual life, a fullness of ascents and falls, a range extending from holiness to villainy (though the extreme points are achieved only by individual personalities).

"Of course, all this changes greatly in the course of time and the flow of history; that most mobile line dividing good from evil is always swaying, sometimes very stormily, in the consciousness of a nation, - and for that reason every judgement and every reproach and self-reproach, and repentance itself, is tied to a specific time, flowing away with the passing of that time and remaining only as memorial contours in history.

"But, you know, in the same way even individual persons in the same way, under the influence of its events and their spiritual work, change to the point of unrecognizability in the course of their lives. (And this is the hope, and salvation, and punishment of man, that we can change, and are ourselves responsible for our own souls, and not birth or the environment!) Nevertheless, we take the risk of evaluating people as "good" and "bad", and no one contests this right of ours.

"Between a person and a nation there is the deepest similarity - in the mystical nature of the uncreatedness of both the one and the other. And there are no human reasons

¹²⁹ *Alektor*, no. 1, 1997, editorial.

why, in allowing ourselves to evaluate the changeability of the one, we forbid it for the other."¹³⁰

However, there are limits to the extent we can talk about nations as persons. Thus while persons have eternal souls, this can be said of nations only in a metaphorical sense. For, as Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow says, "for earthly kingdoms and peoples, their kingly and popular existence can only have an earthly character". Again, as Shturman points out, however much individual people change, each still has one mind and one conscience. A nation, however, is composed of many people with often sharply differing aims and outlooks.¹³¹

Another criticism of the nation-person metaphor is that whereas nations can be said to have collective responsibility for their actions, in the final analysis it is only individuals that are sent to heaven or hell. Thus a man can free himself from responsibility for the crimes of his nation by condemning them, like the Germans who refused to accept Nazism - or the Jews who refused to mock Christ. And in the same way a man can deprive himself of the honour of belonging to a great nation by his betrayal of its noble ideals, like the Greeks who converted to Islam - or the Russians who joined the revolution.

We may wonder, moreover, whether every nation is called to an eternal destiny. In the Old Testament the Lord "destroyed seven nations in the land of Canaan" (Acts 13.19), and demanded of King Saul the complete extirpation of the Amalekites. And in both Old and New Testament times we see nations, such as the Assyrians, who rise and fall so rapidly that it seems as if their only purpose was to chastize the people of God and then disappear once this purpose was accomplished (for "shall the axe vaunt itself over Him Who hews it?" (Isaiah 10.15)).

But in every age there have been those who have fled from their doomed nation and joined themselves to the Nation that lives for ever, such as Ruth the Moabite or Cornelius the Centurion or Prince Peter of the Tatar horde. And if that doomed nation can be said to be eternal, it is only in the persons of these rare individuals who renounced it. For in them alone is the word fulfilled: "All the nations whom Thou hast made shall come and shall worship before Thee, O Lord, and shall glorify Thy name" (Psalms 85.9).

Even those Orthodox nations which have over the centuries evolved a collective personality that can be termed essentially Christian and therefore eternal by nature have to struggle to preserve that personality to the end. Thus "the glory that was Greece" will remain a phrase in the past mode if the Greeks exchange the truly great idea of Christian Rome for the petty nationalism of a neo-pagan Greece. And Serbia will become "greater"

¹³⁰ Solzhenitsyn, in Shturman, op. cit., 1988, pp. 327, 333-334.

Victor Aksyuchits has qualified, without radically changing, this idea of the nation-person: "A person is an individual subject, an eternal individual soul. But a people is a conciliar [sobornij] subject, its soul is conciliar. Therefore a people is not a person, but a conciliarity [sobornost'], although many characteristics of a person extend to the conciliar soul of a people. A people possesses the freedom of historical self-definition, but this freedom is conciliar, and not individual. The historical responsibility of a people and its moral accountability also have a conciliar character.

"All the metaphysical characteristics of a people are structured around conciliarity. Conciliarity is not the mechanical sum of individuals, but their free unity. A people is a conciliar unity of eternal human souls... It is the idea of the Creator concerning their common mission and the responsible thought of eternal souls concerning the unity of their historical calling." (op. cit., pp. 111-112).

¹³¹ Shturman, op. cit., p. 334.

only in the territorial sense if she abandons the universalist vision of St. Savva and gives way to the passion of revenge.

For in national, as in personal life, the principle remains true: "Whosoever shall save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the Gospel's, the same shall save it" (Mark 8.35). Only those nations will survive eternally which are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the supranational Nation of the Church, of which it is written: "And the nations of those who are saved shall walk in its light, and the kings of the earth shall bring their glory and honour into it" (Revelation 21.24). The task then, is to find a national idea which is at the same time universal, which will unite and inspire the nation while not wounding the pride of other nations.

11. The Russian Idea

For better and for worse, Russia has been at the centre of world history throughout the twentieth century; and in this period she has passed through all the socio-political formations that we have discussed so far - autocracy and democracy, communism and capitalism, nationalism and internationalism. Thus the experience of the Russian people in the recent past has been very great, just as the effect of her choice of destiny in the future will probably be very great, too - and not for herself only, but also for the whole world. Is there, then, a specifically Russian approach to these problems, a *Russian idea* which might turn out to be of universal significance?

The Russians are sharply distinguished from other great Christian nations, such as the Greeks and the Romans, by the fact that almost their entire history has been Christian, with only a brief and relatively insignificant pagan prelude. And this has been a great advantage for them in defining themselves; for whereas the Greeks, for example, have often had a problem (and not least now) in deciding which is more essentially Greek - their pagan democratic past, with its highly developed and powerful culture, or their Christian autocratic past, - for the Russians there has been no contest: from their Baptism in 988 until at least the Russian revolution of 1917, and in spite of sins and falls, the Russian soul was an Orthodox Christian one. It is as if the pagan Russian past had not existed, being merely an obscure period of "pre-history" swallowed up in the blinding light of the primal act of her true history - her Baptism at the hands of the enlightener of Russia, St. Vladimir. And Vladimir himself, by his dramatic and complete conversion from the depths of savage, lustful paganism to self-sacrificial Christianity, symbolized the new beginning that had taken place in the Russian soul. This was no tentative, half-hearted conversion, but a complete change of spirit; and so it was with the Russian people as a whole.

Of course, historians are fond of pointing to vestiges of paganism in Russia well after the Baptism. But the exceptions prove the rule: whatever other temptations Russia had to endure, a full-scale return to paganism was not one of them - until the critical turning-point of 1917. Paganism in Russia was comparatively weak, disorganized and, above all, provincial; which is why it was no match for the superior civilization and universalist grace and power of the Christian Gospel, supported as it was both by the political power and charisma of St. Vladimir and by the spiritual power of the Byzantine Church at its height.

And it was the Byzantines who provided the Russians with their national idea - the idea of the complete submission of the nation at all levels, from the Tsar to the simplest peasant, to the Gospel of Christ. Only the Russians took this idea even further than their spiritual mentors and strove to completely "churchify" (*otserkovit'*) the nation, making it, not just Russia, but "Holy Russia". We see this most clearly in the life of St. Vladimir, who was not content simply to rule with the blessing of the Church, but tried to imbue the most political tasks with Christian grace and mercy: "So merciful and full of loving kindness was the holy Vladimir that he even hesitated to put to death wicked men worthy of execution, even when there was great cause; wherefore robbers, brigands and other malefactors increased in number. And the metropolitan and elders said to Vladimir: 'Wherefore, O Prince, dost thou not execute the wicked?' And he said: 'I fear to sin.' Then the metropolitan and the elders said: 'Thou hast been appointed by God as ruler for the chastisement of the wicked and to show mercy to the good; wherefore it befitteth thee to execute the wicked with rigor. For if thou dost not execute the wicked, be thou aware that thou doest evil to the good; for because of thy neglect evils are

multiplying, to the detriment of the good. But destroy the wicked, that the good may live in peace."¹³²

The history of the Baptism of Russia explains many of the antinomies which Berdyaev and others have seen in the Russian soul.¹³³ First, the speed and completeness with which the Baptism of Russia unified the widely-scattered tribes of the Eastern Slavs and Finno-Ungrians helps to explain why religion, the spiritual realm, is, and continues to be, so important in the Russian land, as opposed to the more worldly and material factors which have served to unite other nations and which have therefore played a greater role in their subsequent development.

Moreover, the great importance which St. Vladimir himself played in the Baptism - for it was indeed a conversion of the people "from the top down" - laid the foundations both for the very powerful development of a centralized State in Russia, and for the very close links between the monarchy and the Church in the history of Russia. Thus in the Russian soul, spirituality and statehood, the Cross and the Crown, are not felt to be the opposites that they have tended to become in the West. For the "the supreme power," writes Tikhomirov, "expresses the whole spirit, traditions, beliefs and ideals of the people", since it is "not the representative of some kind of will of the people, albeit Christian, but is the expressor of the people's moral-religious ideal."¹³⁴

It was this relationship between the Tsar and the people which explained the indifference of Russians to the western idea of a constitution limiting the monarchy or "protecting" the people from it. As Dostoyevsky put it: "Our constitution is mutual love. Of the Monarch for the people and of the people for the Monarch."¹³⁵

Elder Barsanuphius of Optina expressed this contrast in the Eastern and Western conceptions as follows: "The devotion of the Orthodox Russian people to their Tsars is not at all the same as the devotion of the western peoples to their sovereigns. According to modern western conceptions, the sovereign is nothing other than a representative of his people - and the western peoples love their representatives and willingly submit to them when they faithfully carry out this mission, or when by the power of their genius they draw the people after them and blind them by the brilliance of glory and state power, like Napoleon in France and Frederick in Prussia [and, we might add, Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany]; but this love is self-serving and egoistical. In the West it is themselves that the people love in their sovereigns. If the king by his personal character is unable to be the faithful reflection and representative of the will of the people and the strivings, ideas and passions that rule in it, then they restrict and constrict his will by means of constitutional vices. But if the king does not submit to these attempts, and is unable to submit to the taste and character of his subjects, then he is deprived not only of the love of the people, but also of the throne, as it was with Charles X and Louis-Philippe and the Sardinian king Albert.

"It is not at all like that with us in Russia: our Tsar is the representative of the will of God, and not the people's will. His will is sacred for us, as the will of the Anointed of God; we love him because we love God. If the Tsar gives us glory and prosperity, we

¹³² *The Service and Akathist Hymns to the Holy Equal of the Apostles, Prince Vladimir the Great, with his Life appended*, Moscow: Synodal Press, 1888, translated by Isaac Lambertson.

¹³³ Berdyaev, *op. cit.*

¹³⁴ Tikhomirov, L. *Monarkhicheskaya Gosudarstvennost'*, Buenos Aires, 1968, pp. 80, 143. These passages cited from Andrushkevich, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹³⁵ Dostoyevsky, in Lossky, N.O. *Bog i mirovoye zlo*, Moscow: "Respublika", 1994, pp. 234-235.

receive it from him as a Mercy of God. But if we are overtaken by humiliation and poverty, we bear them with meekness and humility, as a heavenly punishment for our iniquities, and never do we falter in our love for, and devotion to, the Tsar, as long as they proceed from our Orthodox religious convictions, our love and devotion to God."¹³⁶

A second antimony in the Russian soul which has its roots in the history of the Baptism of Russia is the contrast between the Russians' great receptiveness to foreigners and foreign ideas, on the one hand, and their great pride in their own country, on the other.

For, on the one hand, the Baptism of Russia came from outside; Russia received its faith, literature and almost its entire civilization from the hands of Greeks and Bulgarians. For, as we have seen, the Christian faith and Christian civilization in Russia did not have to contend with a powerful and highly developed native pagan tradition, as it did in Greece and Rome. Hence the innate respect for foreigners, who brought to Russia almost everything that the Russians treasure in themselves.

This openness to foreigners - we are talking here of the pre-revolutionary period, and in particular of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - has been both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, it meant that Russia was able to absorb people of many nationalities, not in a "prison of the peoples", as western propaganda would have it, but in a genuinely multi-national society. The condition of this unity - as of all genuine unity - was communion in faith; and those peoples, such as the Jews and the Poles, who rejected the Orthodox faith, or tried to impose their own heterodoxy on the Russians, had a more troubled history in the Russian empire. However, for those who accepted Orthodoxy there was no bar to complete integration and acceptance in Russian society, as is witnessed by the large number of foreigners canonized by the Russian Church and by the very large number of foreign names among the nobility and merchant classes of pre-revolutionary Russia. Moreover, the astounding success of Russian missionaries from Persia to Japan, from Siberia to China and the United States, witnesses to the Russian people's freedom from xenophobia and genuine desire to communicate the riches of the Gospel to others.

However, this openness to foreigners has also meant an openness to heresy coming from abroad, especially the West. The extraordinary sight of the Russian governing class preferring to speak French rather than their native language could only take place in a society in which respect for foreigners had been taken to an extraordinary, and extraordinarily unhealthy, extreme. The schism of the Old Believers was in large part a reaction to the beginning of this spiritual subservience to the West - although the Old Believers took their reaction to the other, nationalist extreme.

As for the nationalism of the Russians, while this could take xenophobic, Old Believer-type forms, its most characteristic expression was great pride in Russia as the foremost bearer of the *universalist* ideals of the Gospel, and more generally, in her universal receptiveness.

A famous example of this is Dostoyevsky's *Pushkin Speech*, in which Pushkin - and the Russian people - are praised for their universalist ability to absorb and express the geniuses of other nations. In another place Dostoyevsky speaks of "our urge to render universal service to humanity, sometimes even to the detriment of our own momentous

¹³⁶ Schema-Archimandrite Barsonuphius (Plikhankov), *Kelejnye Zapiski*. Moscow, 1991, p. 44.

and immediate interests. This is our reconciliation with their civilizations; cognition and *excuse* of their ideals even though these be in discord with ours; this is our acquired faculty of discovering and revealing in each one of the European civilizations - or, more correctly, in each of the European individualities - the truth contained in it, even though there be much with which it be impossible to agree."¹³⁷

Thus Dostoyevsky's ideal, the ideal of Russian Orthodoxy, was "first the spiritual union of humanity in Christ, and then, by virtue of this spiritual union of all in Christ, and undoubtedly flowing from it - a correct state and social union"¹³⁸

Another example of this "universalist nationalism" comes from the pen of Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), the future first hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, who wrote in 1916: "If you take away Orthodoxy from our Russian people and our Russian life, as Dostoyevsky justly observed, nothing specifically Russian will remain. In vain have people begun to talk about some kind of national Russian Church: such a Church does not exist, only an ecclesiastical nationality exists, our ecclesiastical people (and to some extent even our ecclesiastical society), which is recognized as our own and native only to the extent that it is in agreement with the Church and her teaching, and which does not recognize the Russian Stundists as Russian, but sees no difference between itself and foreign Orthodox - Greeks, Arabs and Serbs. Tell our peasant: 'Do not curse the Jews, you know - the All-Holy Mother of God and all the Apostles were Jews'. And what will he reply? 'That's not true,' he will say. 'They lived at a time when the Jews were Russians.' He knows very well that the Apostles did not speak Russian, that the Russians did not exist at that time, but he wants to express a true thought, namely, that at that time the Jews who believed in Christ were of that same faith and Church with which the Russian people has now been merged and from which the contemporary Jews and their ancestors who were disobedient to the Lord have fallen away."¹³⁹

The paradoxes of Russian nationalism emerge particularly clearly in relation to the question of Constantinople, or *the Eastern Question* as it was known. For nearly five hundred years, until the Greeks temporarily accepted union with Rome at the council of Florence in 1439, the Russians had held the Great Church and Empire of the New Rome in the greatest respect. The Russian Church, though far larger than the Greek Church, had been content to remain a mere metropolitan province of the latter; while the Great Princes of Kiev continued to look to the East Roman Emperors as their elder brother. After the fall of Constantinople, and the passing of the Empire to Moscow as the Third Rome, the question arose, - not immediately, but increasingly as the Russian Empire expanded southwards - of the reconquest of Constantinople. Greek merchants asked the Tsars to liberate the city; and in 1877, before the western powers intervened, the Russian armies were on the verge of doing just that, and were again fighting the Turks when the revolution broke out.

The question was: if Russia conquered Constantinople, how was she to act? All agreed that a political seizure, a simple absorption of Constantinople into the Russian Empire was out of the question. Greedy nationalism, pure imperialism was not the Russian idea...

¹³⁷ Dostoyevsky, *The Diary of A Writer*, June, 1876; translated by Boris Brasol, Haslemere: 1984, p. 361.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, May-June, 1877.

¹³⁹ Khrapovitsky, "Chej dolzhen byt' Konstantinopol'", Taganrog; cited in S. Fomin, *Rossiya pered Vtorym Prishestviyem*. Sergiev Posad, 1993, p. 203.

"Thus in the name of what," asked Dostoyevsky, "by virtue of what *moral* right could Russia claim Constantinople? Relying upon what sublime aims could Russian demand Constantinople from Europe? - Precisely as the leader of Orthodoxy, as its protectress and guardian - a role designated to her ever since Ivan III, who placed her symbol and the Byzantine double-headed eagle above the ancient coat of arms of Russia, a role which unquestionably revealed itself only after Peter the Great when Russia perceived in herself the strength to fulfill her mission and factually became the real and sole protectress of Orthodoxy and of the people adhering to it. Such is the ground, such is the right to ancient Constantinople, which would be intelligible and not offensive even to the Slavs most sensitive to their independence, even to the Greeks themselves. Besides, thereby would be revealed the true essence of those political relations which inevitably must develop between Russia and all other Orthodox peoples - whether Slavs or Greeks makes no difference. Russia is their guardian, or even their leader, perhaps, but not their sovereign; their mother, but not their mistress. Even if she were to become their sovereign some time in the future, it would be only by their own election and subject to the preservation of everything by which they themselves would define their independence and individuality. So that eventually, and in the long run, such a union could even be joined by non-Orthodox European Slavs who would see for themselves that common unity under the protection of Russia is merely the assurance to each of his independent personality, whereas in the absence of this immense unifying force, they would perhaps, again exhaust themselves in mutual strife and discord, even if they should some day become politically independent of the Mohammedans and Europeans to whom they now belong."¹⁴⁰

These two antinomies of the Russian soul - spirituality and statehood, and universalism and nationalism - have marked the whole history of Russia, even in the Soviet period.

At particular times, one or the other pole of the antimony has become more dominant, but only temporarily. Thus if we examine the spirituality-statehood antimony, we note that during the later Kievan period, and under the Mongol yoke, the centralizing state disappeared and centripetal forces appeared in the Russian lands. And this went together with a decrease in spiritual power. However, the revival of spirituality associated with the name of St. Sergius of Radonezh in the fourteenth century also led to the revival of a powerful centralized state in the form of Moscow. Again, the centralized state collapsed during the Time of Troubles at the end of the sixteenth century, when the Poles conquered Moscow and placed a Catholic tsar, the false Demetrius, on the throne. But a revival of faith and courage led by St. Hermogenes, patriarch of Moscow, led to the restoration of the monarchy under the Romanov dynasty which survived until the revolution. Finally, a still steeper decline in spirituality led to the revolution and the collapse of the Russian state, from which devastating blow the Russian people has not yet recovered.

If we examine the second, universality-nationalism anomaly, we see a similar pattern. Generally speaking, the Kievan period may be described as broadly universalist, the Muscovite period increasingly nationalist, and the Petersburg period again universalist. But as long as the dominant religion and ethos of the state and people remained Orthodox Christianity, the poles of this antimony were kept in balance, and extremists,

¹⁴⁰ Dostoyevsky, *The Diary of a Writer*, June, 1876, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

such as the anti-national universalist Socialists or the anti-universalist nationalist Old Believers, remained on the borders of society.

The balanced approach to the national question in the pre-revolutionary period was expressed by the future hieromartyr, Archbishop Andronicus of Perm, who affirmed that equality was offered to all nations in the Russian empire except to the Jews - because they sought to undermine the foundations of the state: "We [the Russians] have not violated and do not violate any of the peoples which are subject to us; we give to all, as before, freedom in all affairs of life on the basis of a common law that is equal for everyone, as also freedom of confession of his native faith for everyone. But we are the masters of the country and we wish to be such in fact, and therefore nobody must dare to mock us, or acquire power over us, or encroach on our higher rights. Still less shall we allow the dignity of our spiritual wealth and most important heritage - the Orthodox Faith and the Autocratic Tsar - to be mocked... In past times the Georgians themselves asked to be received into submission to Russia; for they saw that otherwise they would perish in intestinal warfare in the Caucasus or would be seized by their neighbours, the Turks or the Persians. And let the other nationalities of our great Kingdom remember that if they separate from Russia they will perish, being seized by their very strong neighbours, who are just waiting for this. And what kind of power these neighbours have let the Poles sincerely describe, remembering their brethren in Germany. A special word concerning the Jews: we did not accept them in our land and did not even conquer them. We cannot and will not give them equal rights, in accordance with the prophetic word of warning of the great writer of the Russian land, F.M. Dostoyevsky: 'The Jews will destroy Russia.' They do not want to use our tolerating them in our midst - so let them go wherever they want: we will not detain them at the gates; and we can live freely and prosperously without them. But if they remain among us, they will be as foreigners for us, not having the right to participate in the building of the people and the state."¹⁴¹

The revolution of 1917 destroyed the balance of antinomies in the Russian idea and introduced what was in essence a quite different idea, the Soviet idea, corresponding to the emergence of a new nation, the Soviet nation. Thus the balance between spirituality and statehood was destroyed by the complete dominance of the state in all spheres of life and the attempted complete destruction of the Orthodox Church and spirituality. Of course, the Soviet Union was not without a spirituality of its own, but it was a demonic spirituality, a spirituality that exalted the revolution over morality, the flesh over the spirit, hatred over love. It was a state possessed by demons, like the provincial town that was the setting of Dostoyevsky's prophetic novel, The Demons.

The balance between universalism and nationalism was also destroyed. Everything that was native and Russian was despised and trampled on; the very word "Russia" was removed from the name of the country; and the leaders of the revolution were almost all non-Russians who hated Russia. In the place of the ideas and traditions of the Russians were introduced the ideas and traditions of the West carried to their logical and absurd conclusions. Of course, the Soviet regime claimed to be internationalist; but in actual fact it was rigorously anti-nationalist, and was aimed at the destruction of all national cultures - first of all the Russian and Orthodox cultures, and then all the others, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and pagan. Only in the "the Great Patriotic War", as the Soviets deceptively called it, was a perverted form of Russian nationalism reintroduced in order to save the state against German Fascism - only to be vigorously suppressed again after the danger had passed.

¹⁴¹ Archbishop Andronicus, *O Tserkvi Rossii*, Fryazino, 1997, pp. 136-137.

The revolution therefore presented, as Solzhenitsyn has well argued, an almost complete break in the history and spiritual identity of the Russian nation. Far from being a logical continuation of the Russian idea, it was a complete denial of that idea. So what the Mongols in the 13th century, the Judaizers in the 15th, the Poles in the 17th, the reforms of Peter the Great in the 18th and the invasion of Napoleon in the 19th century had failed to achieve, was achieved by Lenin and Stalin.

But the Russian idea lived on in the underground; and through the blood of the carriers of this idea in the Soviet period, the thousands, if not millions, of Russian new martyrs and confessors, the Soviet idea has been humbled.¹⁴² And yet the victory is far from complete: the spirit of October is no longer dominant, but now the spirit of February has taken its place. And since these two spirits are actually two forms of the one spirit, *the spirit of the revolution*,¹⁴³ which began over a thousand years ago in papal Rome, a real resurrection of the Russian idea is possible only when the *whole* process of the western apostasy that has entwined Russia in its coils - from Papism and Protestantism to Humanism, Democratism, Deism, Rationalism, Darwinism, Socialism, Communism, Ecumenism and New-Ageism - is rejected *in toto*.

Such an act of repentance and confession cannot take place on a nation-wide scale immediately. It must come about gradually and rise upward, like the leaven in a loaf of bread. As Kartashev puts it: "Through the Christian transfiguration of the 'inner man', by itself, gradually and imperceptibly, the whole environment in which the spiritually renewed Christian lives and acts - society, culture, the State - will be transfigured. The latter live and develop according to their own natural laws, which are exterior for Christianity, but can be subjected to its influences and, if only to a certain degree, transfigured. In the last analysis they are impenetrable for Christianity, for they are foreign by their nature. They are categories, not of a spiritual, but of a cosmic, order. The Lord opposed Himself to 'this world', and the apostle of love commanded us 'not to love this world'. The category 'society' is of 'this world', and for that reason the Christian heart must not cleave to it. Social life is a certain mechanism of the concatenation of personalities and is fatally subject to a certain mechanical conformity with law, which is foreign to the kingdom of spiritual freedom - that is, the Christian religion, the Church. Being a true member of this mystical society, the individual Christian, and through him the whole Church, is 'spiritually-automatically', inwardly, imperceptibly enlightening, exalting and transfiguring external, sinful society. All other methods except this, which

¹⁴² The bearers of the Russian idea in the Soviet period were to be found, within Russia, especially in the Russian Catacomb or True Orthodox Church, which refused to submit to the Sovietized Moscow Patriarchate. Thus during the 1970s the great wonderworker nicknamed the "Tsar of Mordovia", Hieromonk Mikhail Yershov, after half a century in the Soviet camps and psychiatric torture-hospitals still retained a burning faith in the resurrection of Russia. Thus Yeveny Vagin wrote: "All of the True Orthodox to one degree or another are characterized by a feeling of national and spiritual exaltation. This is especially to be felt in the 'Testament' of M.V. Yershov, published in *Russian Life* (July 7, 1977). All members of this Church, even the 'uneducated', are characterized by a special suffering over the fate of Russia, which is placed by them in the center of all the world's events (this is often interpreted in a very original way, always in apocalyptic, eschatological tones). Their 'Russianness' is not set aggressively against other nations and peoples, but is accepted inwardly and in confidential conversations, as a sign of a 'special chosenness'. I have often heard in their midst the old proverb applied to the fate of Russia: 'Whom the Lord loves more, He makes to suffer more.'..." (cited in Andreyev, I.M. *Russia's Catacomb Saints*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1982, p. 562).

¹⁴³ On March 2, 1917, the day on which the Tsar abdicated, the future foreign minister in the Provisional Government, Paul Milyukov, was asked "the poisonous question": "Who chose you?" He replied: "The Russian Revolution has chosen us!" (cited in Katkov, G. *Fevral' skaya Revolyutsiya*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1984, p. 370).

goes from the depths of the personal transfiguration of the spirit, are non-Christian methods. In certain propitious circumstances they are acceptable for the Christian conscience, in others they are perceived by it as foreign and even directly antichristian."¹⁴⁴

Only when the nation has been renewed in spirit and in truth in this way will she be ready to receive those forms - the Orthodox autocracy, in particular - which will crown and perfect that renewal by protecting it from external enemies and encouraging the same renewal in other countries. For, as Dostoyevsky said of the liberation of the peasants in 1861, if the right spirit is lacking then the right form will be unavailing. If the spirit of true Orthodoxy has not been resurrected in the people, then the offering of a tsar to the Russian people will be yet another cruel deception.

But when the time is ripe, then God will not delay to bring forth one chosen out of the people, a new Moses to lead the new Israel out of the bondage of Egypt. And then the chosen king will live in symphony with a renewed priesthood, as Moses did with Aaron, obeying in all things the Law of God. This is what many of the Orthodox prophecies declare, and this is what we as Orthodox Christians - of all nationalities - must hope and believe.

As a foreign bearer of the Russian idea, Hieromartyr John of Riga, put it: "The Lord is the same yesterday, today and forever. When the shame of godlessness and impiety now presses upon the children of the new Israel, Holy Russia, somewhere in the plains of Russia, or in the Siberian forests, or in some one of the countries of exile and diaspora of the great God-bearing people, there is already being prepared a grace-given field which will cause to sprout up a chosen one of God for the deliverance and rebirth of the God-bearing people. There are no more leaders, and pastors are in straitened conditions. The human eye does not see from where deliverance might come; but the All-knowing Lord knows this. The Lord, by ways known to Him alone, will raise up suitable men at a suitable time. Of this we can and must be convinced."¹⁴⁵

Finally, we may ask the question which still worries many people: is the Russian idea, even when purified of all Soviet internationalist and chauvinist nationalist dross, really compatible with the national ideas of other nations - the Jews, for example, or the Chinese, or the Americans?

Of course, the answer to this question does not depend only on the nature of the Russian idea, but also on the natures of the other national ideas. And even if the answer to the question may be "no" in a particular instance, we should not assume that the fault must lie with the Russian idea. Thus the Jewish idea, as we have seen, is hostile to the ideas of all other nations, being in essence chauvinist and racist. Again, the Chinese idea is similar in essence to the ideas of the ancient pagan satanocracies, and is now allied with the definitely satanic idea of Communism. Even the American idea, in spite of the altruistic assertions of successive presidents, is felt by many nations as a threat to their own national identity.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Kartashev, A. "Lichnoye i Obshestvennoye Spaseniye vo Khriste", *Russkoye Vozrozhdeniye*, 1984 (II), no. 26, pp. 26-34.

¹⁴⁵ Hieromartyr John, in Andreyev, *op. cit.*, p. 593.

¹⁴⁶ Kissinger, H. "Russian and American Interests after the Cold War," in Sestanovich, S. (ed.) *Rethinking Russia's National Interests*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994, pp. 4-5.

Thus President Truman once declared that the whole world must adopt the American free enterprise system. The American system, he said, could only survive in America if it became a world system (Andrew Alexander, "Drawing a Curtain on Mistaken Churchill", *Daily Mail*, March 15, 1996, p. 12). This is the exact obverse of the opinion of the Bolshevik leaders early in the revolution that the revolution could survive in Russian only if it became a world revolution.

Now the aim is to make the whole world part of the "New World Order".

The Russian idea is in essence the Orthodox Christian idea. It is the idea that the whole of society, from the structure of the state to the personal lives of every citizen, should be subordinate to Christ in the Orthodox Church. As such, it is not chauvinist, but universalist, for Orthodoxy is a universalist faith; and if properly understood it is an idea - in fact, the *only* idea - that can truly unite the nations.

Thus the Orthodox Christian idea, which was the Israelite idea and the Byzantine idea, and has become the Russian idea, can also become the Jewish, and the American, and the Chinese ideas, with each nation bringing its own physical and psychological individuality and talents to the service of every other nation, and the King of the nations, Christ God.

For of His One Kingdom and Nation on earth, the Orthodox Church, the Lord says: "Your gates shall be open continually; day and night they shall not be shut; that men may bring to you the wealth of the nations, with their kings led in procession. For the nation and kingdom that will not serve you shall perish; those nations shall be utterly laid waste..." ([Isaiah](#) 60.11-12).

It remains now only to summarize the preceding discussion.

12. The Kingship of Christ

When the Christian enters the Church in Holy Baptism, He promises to worship Christ "as King and as God". By using both words, "King" and "God", the Church emphasizes that there is no sphere of human life - not even politics - which is not subject to the sovereignty of Christ, our King and our God. Thus there is no valid distinction between a private morality that is subject to the commandments of God and a public morality which follows other principles. Even if Christ's Kingdom is "not of this world", "this world" was made by Christ and will ultimately be subject to Christ. And even when we give to Caesar what is Caesar's, we do not forget that Caesar receives his power from God and will finally be judged by God.

If God does not exist, then, as Dostoyevsky pointed out, everything is permitted - which is exactly what we see in those modern societies, both liberal and totalitarian, that act *as if* God did not exist. But if God *does* exist, then the ideal society is the one in which the whole life of society is subordinated, as far as possible, to the commandments of God, and it is clearly seen that *God is the King of all*. This is the fundamental idea of the theocratic society, and was expressed in the Byzantine theocracy by the emperor sitting on a small throne, next to which was a larger, more majestic, but empty throne set aside for God, the invisible King.¹⁴⁷

The very first human society, that of Adam and Eve in Paradise, was a theocracy. And even after the fall, theocracy lived on in the people of God from Seth and Enoch and Noah to Abraham and Jacob and Moses. Ancient Israel was a theocracy until the division of Church and State under Samuel and Saul indicated a weakening of the theocratic principle and the beginning of the decline and fall of Israel. However, Christ restored the theocratic principle, being Himself the God-King and High Priest of the New Israel, "the Israel of God" (Galatians 6.16), the Orthodox Church.

The other ancient societies did not know the true God, or His commandments; they worshipped sticks and stones, planets and animals and men, and, behind all these - the devil, whose commandments they obeyed. So the earliest pagan civilizations can be called satanocracies. Since the kingdom of Satan is divided, the history of the satanocratic societies has been, and always will be, a history of wars, both civil and national. But the wars within Satan's kingdom pale into insignificance in comparison with the wars between Satan's kingdom and God's Kingdom, between theocracy and satanocracy. Indeed, if there is anything that can unite Satan's kingdom, albeit temporarily, it is the war against Christ. For "why did the Gentiles rage, and the people imagine vain things? The kings of the earth set themselves in array, and the rulers were gathered together, against the Lord and against His Christ" (Psalms 2.2-3).

In his war against the Kingdom of Christ, Satan changes form many times, sometimes appearing as an angel of light. In the socio-political sphere, this involves adopting a variety of political structures and ideologies at different times. His preferred political structure is undoubtedly the totalitarian autocracy, in which everything is subordinated to the will of the king, pharaoh or commissar, who is worshipped as a god. This is satanocracy par excellence, and appeared in ancient times in Babylon and Egypt, and in modern times in the Soviet Union and China. At the end of history it will reach its apotheosis in the reign of the Antichrist.

¹⁴⁷ Marchevsky, op. cit., p. 43.

However, Satan has also perfected another political structure which, while appearing to be the antithesis of totalitarian autocracy, actually serves the same ultimate ends. This is democracy. Now democracy as a mechanism for electing rulers, whether political or ecclesiastical, is by no means satanic, and is found both in the Old Testament theocracy (Judges 11.11) and in the New (Acts 6.3-5). But as a theory of legitimacy, - that is, as the theory that rulers are given their power ultimately by the people, and not by God, - it is counter to Divine revelation. Revelation declares that all power comes from God, and quite clearly favours monarchy as the natural form of government, because most monarchical regimes recognize the Monarchy of God and seek the blessing of His Church; whereas the rise of democracy - for example, in England in 1642, in France in 1789, and in Russia in February, 1917, - is always accompanied by a violent attack on the Divine rights both of earthly kings and of the King of heaven.

Thus democratic government should not be confused with democratic ideology. "They are two quite different concepts. Democratic government allows the people to constitute a certain determining factor in government and even, at times, directly or indirectly, to choose the leader of the nation. Democratic ideology, on the other hand, insists that the authority to govern belongs to the people. That is an abominable heresy, for all power and authority to govern belongs to God. Even when a leader is elected (legally) his authority to govern, once elected, comes from God. As God shares with the human parent His own power to create pro-creating, the head of a State shares in or collaborates in God's power to govern. That is why the monarch is monarch 'by the grace of God'. It is for this reason that the Christian Orthodox obey and honour the legitimate authority, in so far as that authority does not order anything in contradiction to moral law."¹⁴⁸

In his war against theocracy, Satan likes to alternate satanocratic regimes with democratic ones. In the satanocratic phase of the onslaught, He tries to destroy the people of God by physical means - or force them to bow down to his rule through the fear of death. However, even the most powerful satanocratic regimes come to weaken under the burden of their inner contradictions, and built into human nature there are forces and safeguards that mutely oppose the totalitarian claims of the ruler, such as the love of truth and freedom, the love of one's country and family, even sexual love.¹⁴⁹

It is at this point that Satan removes the totalitarian stick and introduces the democratic carrot - any "truth" that may catch one's fancy, the most unbridled "freedoms" of all kinds, love of one's country or hatred of it - whichever one prefers, and as much sex, and in as many forms, as the perverted "art" of the times can stimulate. Democracy destroys the nation just as surely as totalitarianism; it is trial by pleasure while satanocracy is trial by pain. In some ways it is still more dangerous; for while fear and pain can sober up the soul and put it on its guard, pleasure puts its defence mechanisms to sleep. Thus the present democratic phase in Russian history is not a real relief from satanic dominion, as the Russian people realize only too well. It is simply the whip in Satan's other hand.

Ranged against both satanocracy and democracy is theocracy, or Orthodox autocracy. Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) has explained the basis of this conception with

¹⁴⁸ "A Hieromonk of the Orient", cited in Moss, V. "The Restoration of Romanity", *Orthodox Life*, July-August, 1992.

¹⁴⁹ See Orwell's *1984* and Zamyatin's *We*, in which sexual love is definitely a "counter-revolutionary" force rivalling the love of "Big Brother".

admirable clarity: "The aim of human life on earth must be the salvation of the soul, that is, in the words of Christ, the constant perfection of one's moral nature on the path to the not-completely-realizable ideal of the perfection of God (Matthew 5.48). In consequence of the fall of the first men, the attainment of this perfection is bound up, for each of us, with great labour on ourselves - the Kingdom of God is won by violence (Matthew 11.12). But the sin of the forefathers drew with itself not only the corruption of the moral nature of man, but also, instead of the easy life of Paradise, made the physical struggle for existence necessary: our bread is consumed in the sweat of our brow.

"The difficulties of earthly existence did not permit men to live in isolation and led to the union of tribes into societies that gradually developed into States. But if these are the external, material reasons for the origin of States, it would be a great mistake to disregard the other aspect of the question. A man is composed not only of a body, but also of a soul. The burdens of life often lie more heavily on the latter than on the body, and mutual moral support is no less necessary for men than physical support. Thus it was not only bodies, but also souls that were united in peoples.

"Human nature has revealed a capacity for massive spiritual perfection or collapse. A people is a collective organism which has as its main properties its separate members. Therefore the State, depending on the principles which it strives to realize, exerts very powerful pressure on each of its individual subjects, creating conditions of life which either further or hinder the salvation of the soul. So-called democracy leads the peoples to moral collapse. Prince D.N. Khilkov, a very educated and observant man, after living in America came to the conclusion that a republic 'incites in a man the worst of his instincts and qualities. While preaching equality, which does not in fact exist, it corrupts all his concepts, and in fact - as, for example, in America - leads to the dominion of the basest and most shameful ideals' ('Letters', *Bogoslovnij Vestnik*, July-August, 1916). That is why one must not limit the meaning of the existence of States to the simple satisfaction of material needs (economic, policing, etc.). Its main task is material, earthly, but it must not in serving the body forget the soul, although its salvation is the responsibility, not of it, but of the Church, to which the State is bound to afford every kind of support.

But even if it casts off the above-mentioned higher idealistic aims, the State must help the Church in every way for its own sake, for the healthy morality of the people, which is impossible without the religious influence on it, is also necessary for the State as such. A people that is not penetrated by any higher religious-moral principles, a people without faith, soon becomes depraved and earlier or later leads the State to complete breakdown. The destruction of the ancient empires was bound up, first of all, with the spiritual-moral fall of their peoples. From this it is evident how important it is both for the Church and for the State to establish their mutual relations on a correct basis so that the State, in fulfilling its own direct tasks, should not hinder, but help the Church, and that the Church, in giving health and perfection to the people, should strengthen the right-believing State. I say 'right-believing State' because the relations between the Church and the State depend first of all on the ideals which are the basis of the latter. If these ideals are antichristian, then the Church cannot fail to struggle in one way or another with the State that realizes them. In this case her very existence is the struggle with it, and she is naturally in the position of being persecuted (ancient Rome, the USSR). But in the irreligious State, which is not distinguished by militant antichristianity, but does not confess Christianity either, the Church is de facto in the position of being merely a tolerated society. The complete development of the beneficial influence of the Church on the people is attainable only when there is a union between

Her and the State, and this is possible only if the latter is Orthodox, that is, if it conforms its life to the teaching of the Church concerning faith and virtue. Of course, this is bound up with the moral subjection to the Church of the State, which, however, should not frighten Christians, for if they in their private lives strive to fulfil the teaching of Christ the Saviour, they should strive for it in union with the people.

"But the Church has never striven for such a merging with the State (or, more exactly, such a swallowing up of the State), whereby the hierarchs, for example, would be at the same time provincial governors. She wishes only that State life in its general direction should be directed in accordance with her teaching. In the same way, in the private life of her individual sons, the Church through the pastors constantly teaches them virtue, but does not interfere, for example, in housework or business as long as they they do not clearly violate the commandment of God in these activities.

"It goes without saying that normal relations between the Church and the State are not attainable with every form of government. It is not part of our task to discuss the nature of these relations with democratic regimes, under which the Church in Russia will always be, if not persecuted, at best tolerated. The Church, which is based on the hierarchical principle and obedience, is too opposed to an order based on the primacy of the people's will, restricted by no religious principle. Therefore a real union between the Church and the State is possible only with an Autocratic Monarchy, which places as the basis of its own power the will of God..."¹⁵⁰

Historically, the first Christian autocracy was established by St. Constantine in the fourth century; in him we see for the first time, in Tikhomirov's words, "the subjection of the Monarch to the religious idea and his personal belonging to the Church, with the independence of the supreme power of his State".¹⁵¹This system constituted a transformation and regeneration of the old pagan Roman satanocracy whereby the leaven of Roman Christianity, working from below, lightened the dough of Roman pagan society and finally destroyed its crust and its most pivotal and anti-Christian element, the worship of the imperator-pontifex maximus, into the worship of Christ.

Then the Orthodox emperors, in the Spirit of Christ and for the sake of the salvation of all their subjects, introduced a Christian system of laws whose basic principle was that it should in no way conflict with the laws of the Church, but should rather support them. The unity of the State was a reflection of, and inspired by, the deeper unity of the Church, the whole being the earthly incarnation of the supercelestial unity of men and angels in the Kingdom of God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Just as God ruled His Kingdom in heaven, so His servants, the bishops and the emperor, ruled his Kingdom on earth as icons of His celestial authority; so that His will should be done "on earth as it is in heaven".

The symphony of powers can work as long as the majority of the population is truly Christian and therefore wants it to work. It tends to break down when: (a) a significant part of the population believes differently and is prepared to resort to revolutionary action to destroy it (e.g. the Monophysite Semites, Copts and Armenians in sixth- and seventh-century Byzantium, or the Jews and Poles in nineteenth-century Russia); (b) the ruling class itself is infected with heresy (e.g. the iconoclast emperors in eighth- and

¹⁵⁰ Bishop Gregory, "Tserkov' i Gosudarstvo v Budushchej Rossii", in *Tserkov' i Yeya Ucheniye v Zhizni*, volume III, Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, 1992, pp. 313-315.

¹⁵¹ Tikhomirov, *Monarkhicheskaya Gosudarstvennost'*, volume III, p. 67.

ninth-century Byzantium, or the aristocrats and educated classes in nineteenth-century Russia); or (c) the empire is conquered from outside because of a betrayal on the part of one or the other of the pillars of society (e.g. the fall of Constantinople in 1453 because of the false council of Florence-Ferrara, or the fall of Russia because of the forced abdication of the Tsar). This is the pattern of Christian society that has clearly been favoured by Divine Providence for the salvation of the Christian race; for the great majority of Orthodox Christians until 1917 lived either in the Byzantine or Russian empires, or in one of the smaller kingdoms, such as Orthodox (i.e. pre-schism) England or France, Serbia or Bulgaria, which were modelled on the Byzantine model. Certainly, no other system has been found which so favours and promotes the ultimate purpose of our life on earth, the salvation of our souls for eternity.

Now just as secular democracy and Nazi fascism are patterns of society based on a philosophy of life, so is the Christian symphony of powers. This philosophy is based on the premise that the real ruler of the world and everything in it is God. That part of the world which acknowledges this rule is the Church of Christ; the rest are, consciously or unconsciously, rebels against God (Matthew 22.1-14). Ideally, therefore, as the seventeenth-century Patriarch Nikon of Moscow saw with particular clarity, Christian society should tend towards identification with the Church, in which everything is subordinated to God's rule through the hierarchy, and the aim of everything is the salvation of souls.

However, this identity between Christian society and the Church can only be approximated on this earth, never fully achieved. In practice, there have always been, and always will be, matters which are outside the canonical jurisdiction of bishops, such as the administration of non-Christians, the conduct of wars and the collection of taxes. These belong to Caesar; they are affairs of the State, not of the Church.

Nevertheless, if God's rule is recognized to be truly universal, then politics, too, must be, if not formally incorporated into His Kingdom, the Church, at any rate brought into relation to it and influenced by it. In other words, there can and should be such a thing as Christian politics. And this becomes a realistic ideal if Caesar himself is a Christian and a faithful son of the Church.

It is fashionable in the West to favour the disestablishment of the Church from the State. The principal reason given for this is that it makes the Church free from political pressure and able to carry on her own affairs without interference and undistracted by worldly concerns. This aim is indeed a laudable one. However, the argument fails to take into account the fact that nature abhors a vacuum, so that the disestablishment of the Church will unfailingly lead to the establishment of some other institution or philosophy in her place - Masonry, for example, or secular humanism, or nationalism.

For the disestablishment of the Church from the State also entails the disestablishment of the State from the Church. If the State is not governed by Christian principles, it will inevitably come to be governed by antichristian principles. Eventually, deprived of the sanctifying influence of the Church, it will turn against the Church. And then the Church, instead of freeing herself from politics, will find herself having to resist a determined invasion of her realm by politicians, as has happened in all Orthodox countries since 1453 and especially since 1917.¹⁵²

¹⁵² In 1917, Archbishop Andrew of Ufa, a member of the Russian Holy Synod, said: "To separate the Russian State from the Church would mean a separation of the nation from its conscience, its deprivation

The solution, therefore, is to preserve the relative autonomy of the two realms without legislating for their absolute independence. For the relationship between the Church and the State is like that between the soul and the body - distinct substances which are meant to work together through the Spirit, even if sin has damaged that cooperation. Just as the soul is the life, the guiding principle of the body, so is the Church of the State. The Church sets the standards and the essentially other-worldly goals of the whole of society, provides the motivating force and legitimizes and sanctifies its political institutions. The State, on the other hand, protects the Church against external foes and provides her with essential material assistance, especially in the spheres of education and welfare.

There is another difference between Church and State which reflects the soul/body analogy. The Church, like the soul, can freely choose its leaders, while the State, like the body, cannot, being bound by the law of primogeniture. For although both Church and State are hierarchical in essence, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is elective in principle, while the state hierarchy is hereditary. Thus a bishop is elected by his fellow bishops (or, in the early Church, by the whole congregation) according to a number of strict canonical criteria; and if he later fails any of these criteria he can be removed from office. A king, on the other hand, is *born* to be a king, and he can be rejected as king only if he renounces Orthodoxy.¹⁵³

On the other hand, the fact that a king is born, and not made or elected, gives him a natural authority which reflects the supernatural authority of God. For, as Tuskarev writes: "The cell of the State is the family. In the family the father is the head by nature, while the son is subject to him; the authority of the father is not the result of elections in the family, but is entrusted to him naturally by the law of God (Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow). Just as from the extended family of the tribe there arises the people, so out of the family headed by one man there arises tsarist autocracy."¹⁵⁴ In a very special way, therefore, the king is chosen by God and not by man; "the heart of the king is in the hand of God, and He directs it as He pleases" (Proverbs 21.1); and he is answerable for his actions to God alone.

If, however, the State renounces Orthodoxy, the Church can withdraw her legitimization, as she did when the All-Russian Council anathematized Soviet power in 1918. The purpose of this is to preserve the soul of society alive by preserving its communion with the heavenly world intact, even while the body, the political covering, dies. Then the Church enters the condition of isolation symbolized by the woman fleeing into the wilderness in Revelation 12.

But such a condition is unnatural and apocalyptic; it betokens the spiritual death of the world, its burning up at the Second Coming of Christ and its replacement by "a new

of moral foundations" (cited in Pospelovsky, D. *The Russian Orthodox Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982*, Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984, p. 27). That may well have been true up to 1917, and even under the Provisional Government. But when, after October, 1917, the State became definitely and officially antichristian, and fell under the anathema of the Church herself, salvation for the Christians lay only in as complete a separation as possible from the State.

¹⁵³ Even if he is elected, and not born into his office, a king cannot be removed by the decision of the people, because the choice is seen to be really God's. As the tenth-century English Abbot Aelfric wrote: "The people has the choice to choose as king whom they please. But after he is anointed as king, he has dominion over the people, and they cannot shake his yoke from their neck." (*Catholic Homily on Palm Sunday*)

¹⁵⁴ Tuskarev, op. cit., p. 9.

heaven and a new earth, in which righteousness dwells" (II Peter 3.13). Indeed, St. Paul indicated the removal of "him that restrains" (II Thessalonians 2.7) - lawful monarchical power - as the signal for the coming of the Antichrist. The period since 1917 has been precisely the period following the breakdown of lawful monarchical government, first in Russia and then successively in each of the Orthodox Balkan States.¹⁵⁵ The True Church, in all of these countries (with the partial exception of Greece, although here, too, the True Orthodox have been outlawed at times), has fled into the wilderness, while the false Church has remained wedded to the rotting corpse of the now definitely antichristian State. The fall of Communism in 1989-91 presented the Orthodox with an opportunity unparalleled since 1914 to repent of their sins and unite on the basis of their age-old holy traditions, of which the Orthodox monarchy is one of the most important. However, so far only a small minority of the Orthodox populations has taken this opportunity. The majority has been like the backsliding Israelites of old, who said: "We have no king, for we fear not the Lord, and a king - what could he do for us?" (Hosea 10.3). And the Lord, the King of kings, has said: "They have made kings for themselves, but not by Me... Therefore they shall cease a little to anoint a king and princes" (Hosea 8.4,10).

A true king could do a great deal both for the Orthodox and for the world as a whole now, when the threat to the survival of the human race, both physically and spiritually, is greater than ever before. In addition to the traditional tasks of the Orthodox monarchy - the defence of the faith, of the family, of the natural order as a whole, - he would need to assume control over *science*, which threatens the ultimate horror: cloning, the creation of mixed species, and even a "new", genetically engineered kind of human being. The democracies have proved impotent to prevent this horror: only a *real* authority, working in the name of God and with His blessing and power, can save mankind from what would truly be the end of history in the normal sense.

So the idea of the Orthodox autocracy, the idea of the integration of the whole of society in the Kingdom of Christ God, is not simply an interesting relic of a bygone age, but an idea whose realization is the most pressing necessity.

Finally, then, let us turn once more to the structure of that idea, but from a slightly different point of view. From this point of view, the Orthodox autocracy has three basic elements. These represent the socio-political equivalent of the three elements of the human being, according to Christian anthropology: (1) its religious spirit, (2) its national soul, and (3) its political body. Let us look briefly at each level.

1. Religious Spirit. It is obvious that no society can enter the Kingdom of God and receive His blessing if it does not believe in God and strive to fulfil His commandments. Therefore the religion of society - and the correctness and vitality of that religion - are the most essential conditions of its ultimate survival and happiness. For it is the Lord Who "makes nations great, and destroys them: He enlarges nations, and leads them away." (Job 12.23).

¹⁵⁵ It is interesting to note, however, that, strictly speaking, the last truly Orthodox autocracy was not that of Tsar Nicolas II of Russia, but that of King Boris III of Bulgaria, and that the clearest remaining symbol of the symphony between Church and State that is the foundation of Orthodox autocracy is to be found in Sofia's Alexander Nevsky cathedral - in the thrones, placed side by side, for king and patriarch. It was Alexander Nevsky who said: "God is not in power, but in righteousness". And it was King Boris who said: "Every true social order is based on the moral order" (cited in Tsankov, Protopriest S. "Pokoynij Tsar Boris, kak religiozno-nravstvennaya lichnost'", *Pravoslavnaya Rus'*, N 18 (1495), 15/28 September, 1993, p. 15).

In our time, Satan has challenged this conception in two major ways. First, he has provided a whole array of false religions, false spirits, with which to lead the nations astray - Judaism for the Jews, Islam for a vast swathe of countries in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and Buddhism and Hinduism for a smaller number of countries in southern Asia and (in their New Age reincarnations) a large number of adepts in the West. All these ultimately lead to the subjection of the soul and body that we find in totalitarianism, both ancient and modern.

Secondly, he has introduced the apparently antithetical concept that it doesn't matter what one believes, provided everyone is at peace with everyone else and tolerates everyone else's beliefs. This is the concept of ecumenism, otherwise known as the principle of religious pluralism. Ecumenism is the dominant religious ideology of the democratic nations of the West, and is in fact the religious aspect of democracy. Just as, according to the democratic ideology, political power should not rest forever in the hands of one man or dynasty, but should be alternated between different parties reflecting the prevailing majority opinion, so according to ecumenism, religious truth should not be considered the exclusive preserve of one religion, but should be considered to be distributed among all religions - or rather, to be the lowest common denominator extracted from the sum of all religious beliefs. The only difference between democratism in politics and ecumenism in religion is that whereas democratism encourages all-out war between the parties, even if the differences between them are not always so great, ecumenism demands peace and no argument between the religions, even though the differences between them are enormous.

Ecumenism might be dubbed "Pontius Pilatism", the weary refusal to face questions of truth and falsehood, right and wrong. The ultimate consequence of this indifference to truth is the loss of faith in the existence of truth itself. For if all religions are true, in spite of the most glaring contradictions between them, why should any one of them be true?

2. National Soul. The soul of a nation is its feeling about itself, its national calling and destiny. This feeling may be subordinated to a larger, super-national religion or ideology; or on the other hand, it may become quasi-autonomous. Mention has already been made of Zionism-Judaism, which exalts the nation of the Jews to godlike status and makes of Jewish nationalism a religion. Judaism is, of course, the oldest and most extreme form of nationalism, and the struggle of the Jews against the Church and the Christian autocracies has already led to the shedding of oceans of Christian blood - most recently in the Russian revolution, which should perhaps more correctly be called the Jewish-Russian revolution. But even less extreme forms of nationalism have been extraordinarily destructive, as we see in Bosnia today, or, most recently, in Ruanda, where over half a million people have died in tribal wars.

Satan stirs up wars between nations, as he stirs up quarrels between individual people. But in our time he has also resorted to the opposite tactic - the withering away of nations in such levelling conglomerates as the Soviet Union and the European Union. So the healthy love of one's country in obedience to a super-national ideal, as we find in the Orthodox theocracies, is replaced either by a nationalist idolatry of one's own nation and hatred of others, or by a cosmopolitan indifference to all national individualities - both evil fruits of the liberal ideology.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Leontiev believed that "nations were a creative force only when they represented a specific culture: 'naked' or purely 'tribal' nationalism was a corrosive force destroying both culture and the state, a

3. Political Body. If a society acquires Orthodox Christianity as its religious spirit, and Orthodox Romanity (Ρωμαιοσύνη, Romanitas) as its national soul, it will naturally tend towards an Orthodox autocracy as its political body. For only this body is capable of defending and nurturing this spirit and this soul. And the proof of this is that just as Orthodoxy flourished so long as the Orthodox empire flourished, so it has declined in this century, as the last Orthodox autocracies have been destroyed. For the convinced Orthodox believer, therefore, his first prayer for his society must be for the restoration of the Orthodox autocracy. And this will certainly happen, as the prophets have declared, through the prayers of the millions of new martyrs who have shed their blood in defence of this ideal in this century, beginning with Tsar-Martyr Nicolas II of Russia.

Then the Orthodox will chant with full understanding the troparion to the precious and life-giving Cross: *Save, O Lord, Thy people, and bless Thine inheritance. Grant victories to the kings over their adversaries. And through Thy Cross preserve Thy community.*

But until the King of kings grants us a true king, let us turn to the Queen whom He has given to rule over us until that time: *Seeking the City of Sion, we flee today beneath thy protection, O pure Virgin, and none can assail us, for there is no city as powerful as the one of Him Who is God, and no other might to equal that of the mercy of the Virgin Mistress.*¹⁵⁷

levelling process that was, in the last resort, cosmopolitan; in fact, nationalism was only a mask for liberal and egalitarian tendencies, a specific metamorphosis of the universal process of disintegration" (quoted in Walicki, op. cit., p. 303).

¹⁵⁷ Troparion of the Feast of the Reigning Kolomna icon of the Mother of God.

APPENDIX I. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A NEW TOTALITARIANISM?

Stealthily, unnoticed even by the great majority of its own citizens, a totalitarian monster has been born in the heart of Western Europe. Although this monster, the European Union, is the creation of a group of democratic states and is situated in the heartland of modern democracy, it has already to a large extent superseded the process of democratic decision-making in the member states and replaced it by an unelected body, the European Commission, which, together with the equally unelected European Court, has the power to issue directives that override all national legislation and which is steadily penetrating every nook and cranny of the political, economic, social and religious life of the member states, from the permitted shape of cucumbers to the date of Pascha. Moreover, the Maastricht treaty of 1992 legislated that by 1997 a single European Currency would be created run by a single (again unelected) European Bank - an institution the creation of which, in the opinion of the president of the American Federal Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan, must necessarily be accompanied by irreversible political union and the creation of a single European state.

When national sovereignty has gone and national parliaments become emasculated talking shops (a process that is already far advanced), only the European Parliament may perhaps have the power to withstand the power of the Commission-Politburo. However, all the indications are that the European Parliament, like the Soviet Central Committee, will be a toothless institution populated by people who have already imbibed the socialist spirit of the European institutions and enthusiastically accepted the ideology of the European super-state. The only real function of the European parliament, according to the well-known Anglo-French industrialist and politician, Sir James Goldsmith, "is to provide cover for the Commission"¹⁵⁸; and he argues that "at the moment the work of the European Parliament is overwhelmingly either a waste of time or downright destructive."¹⁵⁹

Like all socialist revolutions, the modern European revolution claims to be democratic while actually working against the people and in secret from it. Thus Goldsmith writes: "The European Union was built in secret: not through carelessness or casualness, but in a deliberately planned and skilfully executed manner. Claude Cheysson, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the European Commission from 1985 to 1989, described the mechanism in an interview in Le Figaro on 7 May 1994. He explained proudly that the European Union could only have been constructed in the absence of democracy, and he went on to suggest that the present problems were the result of having mistakenly allowed a public debate on the merits of the Treaty of Maastricht.

"The British newspaper The Guardian lodged a case before the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg complaining of the secrecy in which European decisions were taken. Lawyers for the European Council of Ministers responded by stating to the judges that 'there is no principle of community law which gives citizens the right to EU documents.' They went on to make the astounding claim that although heads of government had repeatedly called for more openness in EU affairs, their declarations 'were of an eminently political nature and not binding on the community institutions'. So they asked the judges to ignore the repeated declarations at EU summit meetings in

¹⁵⁸ Goldsmith, *The Trap*, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 73.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 75.

the past two years in favour of greater openness. Statements by the twelve heads of government were no more than 'policy orientations' and had no binding effect.

"This belief that the nomenklatura knows best and that the public is no more than a hindrance explains why there now exists a profound and dangerous divorce between European societies and their governing elites."¹⁶⁰

This should come as no surprise to those who have studied history; for history shows that the power "of the people, by the people, for the people" always eventually gives birth to the power of *one* man or oligarchy - *over* the people and *against* the people. Thus the English revolution of 1642 gave birth to the dictatorship of Cromwell. And the French revolution of 1789 gave birth to the dictatorship of Napoleon. And the Russian revolution of 1917 gave birth to the dictatorship of Lenin and Stalin. There is no reason why the quiet European-wide revolution that began with the Treaty of Rome in 1956 should not similarly give birth to the dictatorship of a European Antichrist.

If we go still further back in history, then we shall find a very interesting, and alarming, parallel to the modern European Union - the ninth-century empire of Charlemagne, which covered the same territory as the core nations of the modern European Union and whose capital, Aachen, is not far from the modern European capital of Brussels.

The empire was born on Christmas Day, 800, when Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne as "Holy Roman Emperor". This was not simply the birth of another Christian kingdom, but a direct challenge to the authority of the Eastern Roman Empire and the latter's claim to be the only Christian empire. From now on there would be two kingdoms claiming to be the one and only Christian Roman empire - and soon thereafter, two Churches claiming to be the one and only Holy Catholic Church.

In the course of the next century, the Carolingian empire declined in strength and eventually broke up into separate kingdoms which became the ancestors of the modern France, Germany and the Benelux countries. However, before it died the empire's rebellious spirit was reincarnated in the heretical Roman papacy, which, in the persons of the first Frankish Popes Nicholas I and Gregory VII (Hildebrand), became the new, de facto "Holy Roman Empire". In the Middle Ages, there were many attempts to revive the political structure of the "Holy Roman Empire" north of the Alps - but still under the leadership of the Pope. And in modern times it seemed more than once as if the Empire had indeed come to life again, notably when Napoleon conquered most of Europe and was crowned by the Pope, and when Hitler did the same with the acquiescence of the Pope. However, these attempts have always been foiled by the cooperation of two powers at the western and eastern extremities of Europe respectively - Britain and Russia.

Britain was never part of the Carolingian empire (although she retained good relations with it); and ever since her conquest by the Normans and with the blessing of Pope Gregory VII in 1066, she has viewed the formation of continental empires with suspicion. It is therefore significant that the greatest opposition to the socialist and totalitarian tendencies of the European Union within Europe has come from Britain. Indeed, Britain was not one of the founder-states of the European Community in 1956, and joined it in the 1970s only on the understanding that it would remain no more than

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 64-65.

a trading community and would never become a super-state. Just recently, the British people has woken up to the fact that it has been deceived, and that the price of remaining in this trading community is going to be the extinction of their centuries-old national sovereignty.

Although an urgent and furious debate is now taking place in the British parliament and within the country as a whole, it looks unlikely that the country will be able to free itself from the quicksands of European union. If even the iron-willed Mrs Thatcher failed, her weaker successor is hardly likely to succeed. And if, as again seems probable, the Socialists win the next election, they are committed to accepting a single European Currency with all the irreversible consequences for British national sovereignty that that implies.

The British government is now desperately trying to push through the enlargement of the EU to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe in the hope that the enormous task of integrating so many countries will prove beyond the capacity of the Brussels technocrats, who will be forced to concede more decentralization. However, the Europeans have turned the tables on the British by saying that enlargement from twelve to fifteen or over twenty states will require the abolition of each nation's right of veto (a right that the British Prime Minister has promised never to give up), otherwise decision-making will come to a halt if unanimity is required on every major decision. Thus it is quite possible that enlargement will actually lead to a diminution in the power of the member nations and a consequent increase in the power of Brussels.

European political union and enlargement will have profound effects on the life of the Orthodox nations of Eastern Europe. The difference in economic level between the richer countries in the north and west, and the poorer countries in the south and east, will lead to large-scale emigration in search of work from the poorer to the richer countries, with consequent inflation, large-scale unemployment and social disruption in the poorer countries. This can already be observed in Greece, which has been a member of the EU for some years. The problems are likely to be even more horrendous in such countries as Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, which are not yet in the Union but which want to enter because they cannot sell their goods in the Union without access to the market that membership provides. The Treaty of Maastricht proposed to solve this problem with its special protocol on "Economic and Social Cohesion"; but this envisages typically socialist planning institutions and transfers of funds which have failed in the past and are not likely to succeed in the future.

The only country on the European mainland which the EU (and NATO) does not aim to incorporate within itself is *Russia*. The reason is as follows. The EU can expand eastwards to include even such a large country as Ukraine without changing its essential nature or its present centre of gravity - Germany. Indeed, German power is likely to grow as the EU expands eastwards. But the incorporation of Russia would inevitably shift the balance of power eastwards, not only because Russia is much larger even than Germany, but also because it would have the largest army in the Union and might use it to assert political dominance within it.

However, the fact that Russia can never form part of the EU or NATO does not mean that Europe does not want to exert influence over her and weaken her. For a powerful Russia remains, together with the Islamic world, the principal threat to the EU's ever-increasing power. Europe has attempted to weaken Russia in various ways. First, she

has tried to *divide* her. Secondly, she has tried to *democratize* her. And thirdly, she has tried to *demonize* her.

Let us look briefly at each of these in turn.

1. The Division of Russia. Europe has tried to divide Russia not only from the non-Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union, with whom she has less in common, but even from the Slavic republics, with which she shares so much. This has resulted in the fact that 25 million Russians now live outside the borders of Russia. Europe has very vigorously supported the rights to national self-determination of the various Baltic, Caucasian and Central Asian peoples, while almost ignoring these 25 million Russians, whose interests almost any kind of Russian government feels bound to defend.¹⁶¹ Even the present, greatly contracted boundaries of the Russian state, are not sacred to the Europeans, as was made clear in the recent Chechen war. For although Europe did not openly call for the independence of Chechens, who are responsible for so much of the organized crime in Russia today, it did not conceal its sympathy for them.

There is a profound irony here. The EU is trying to unite into a single state nations like the Germans and the Greeks which are profoundly different and which have *never* been parts of the same state (except for a brief spell under the Nazis). On the other hand, it is trying to drive apart nations such as the Russians, the Belorussians and the Ukrainians which for most of their history have been united, and which have very close genetic, linguistic, cultural and religious ties.

What kind of logic is this? Why create artificial nations in the west while breaking up natural nations in the east? There is in fact a profound logic in this. It is the demonic dialectical logic of *the destruction of the nation*. And in pursuing this logic, the EU is following a clear historical example - that of Lenin.

Before the revolution, Lenin called for the break-up of the Russian empire on the basis of the principle of national self-determination. When he came to power, he handed over vast areas of Russia to German control at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - an act of treachery that was condemned by his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon. However, when he felt that his power was secure, at the end of the Civil War, Lenin proceeded to suppress the independence of all the nationalities whose freedom he had demanded earlier. This was in accordance with his understanding of the aim of socialism, which was "not only the annihilation of the dividedness of humanity into small states and isolated nations, not only the drawing together of the nations, but also their fusion" - i.e. their destruction.¹⁶² For, as Dostoyevsky wrote, "socialism deprives the national principle of its individuality, undermining the very foundations of nationality."¹⁶³

The paradox that socialism both incites nationalism and destroys the nation is one aspect of the general paradox of the revolution, that while preaching freedom it practises slavery, while proclaiming inequality it creates inequality, and while dreaming of brotherhood it incites fratricidal war. In the same way, the French revolution proclaimed the freedom and equality of all nations; but its first appearance on the international arena was in the form of Napoleonic imperialism, which strove to destroy the freedom

¹⁶¹ Stankevich, S. "Towards a New 'National Idea'", in Sestanovich, S. (ed.) *op. cit.*

¹⁶² Lenin, in Borisov, "Natsional'noye vozrozhdeniye i natsiya-lichnost", in Solzhenitsyn, A. (ed.) *Iz-Pod Glyb*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

¹⁶³ Dostoyevsky, *The Diary of a Writer*, May-June, 1877, *op. cit.*, p. 738.

of all the nations of Europe. And paradoxically, it was autocratic Russia, the conqueror of Napoleon, which, despite its reputation as "the prison of the nations", guaranteed the survival of the nations of the West for at least another century.

The truth is that the revolution, while inciting the passions for personal and national freedom in order to destroy the old church and state structures, was aimed at the destruction of all freedom and individuality, both personal and national. Only Russia saw this clearly and only Russia had, moreover, the power to back up her words with deeds. That is why the propaganda of "progressive" Europe was directed primarily against her; and that is why the contemporary EU is doing all it can to prevent the re-emergence of Russia as a strong and independent nation.

2. The Democratization of Russia. If Russia cannot be destroyed as a nation, think the European socialists, then she must be at any rate neutralized by making her into a *democracy*; for it is of the nature of democracies to become so lacking in individuality, and interconnected with each other, that war between them is unthinkable. For, as Goldsmith writes: "Enlightenment liberals today believe that if the world consists exclusively of democratic states there will be no war. Therefore, the corollary must also be true: radically different regimes cannot coexist in harmony. That is how Enlightenment thinkers have concluded that worldwide cultural homogenization is a precondition of peace. It follows that any community which resists the absorption or destruction of its culture by the West is a threat to peace."¹⁶⁴

Now the underlying philosophy of democracy is that of *human rights*, by which is meant the rights of *the individual man or woman* as opposed to the rights of any larger group, such as the nation or the family. Of course, decisions are made in democracies by means of majority voting; but the majority is not a natural group, since it constantly changes, not only on different issues but even on one and the same issue. Therefore the only constant unit in democratic society is the individual person, only not the person in his full and unique personality, but the person as the *binary digit* - the "yes" or "no" of the ballot box.

However, in making the individual and his egotistical "rights" the basis of society, democracy actually undermines the very foundations of society. For, as Fr. Stefan Krasovitsky writes, "the nucleus of society is the family, whereas the nucleus of the Church is the person. Within the Church a person is united with other persons without any loss of his individuality, for this unity takes place in the Super-Person (Divine Person) of Jesus Christ... [As to so-called 'human rights',] they are provided (in the conditions of a morally healthy society) within the family in accordance with the familial status of each member of this unit of society. So a normal society should defend, not 'human rights'.. but *the rights of the family*, defending them from suppression and destruction."¹⁶⁵

Traditionally, it has been patriarchal and monarchical societies that have best defended the rights of the family. Thus Holy Russia was seen as a single family headed by the Tsar-Batyushka, or "little father". And the legitimacy of the Tsar as the head of the family of Russia was seen as a natural extension of the legitimacy of the father of every Russian family, both supporting and being supported by it.

¹⁶⁴ Goldsmith, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

¹⁶⁵ Krasovitsky, "Dva tipa kollektivizma", *Angel Valaama*, 9 July, 1994, p. 4.

As Tuskarev writes: "The cell of the State is the family. In the family the father is the head by nature, while the son is subject to him; the authority of the father is not the result of elections in the family, but is entrusted to him naturally by the law of God (Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow). Just as from the extended family of the tribe there arises the people, so out of the family headed by one man there arises tsarist autocracy. Both the familial and the monarchical organization are established by God for the earthly existence of the sinful, fallen man. The first-created man, living in living communion with God, was not subject to anyone besides God, and was the lord of irrational creation. But when man sinned, destroying the Divine hierarchy of submission and falling away from God, he became the servant of sin and the devil, and as a consequence of this became subject to a man like himself. The sinful will of man requires submission for the restraint of his destructive activity. This Divine ordinance has in view only the good of man - the limitation of the spread of evil. And history itself shows that whatever the inadequacies of monarchies, they bear no comparison with that evil that revolutions and anarchies have brought to the peoples."¹⁶⁶

It follows that with the fall of the authority of the Tsar, the authority of all heads of families suffers, with disastrous consequences for the family as a whole. And so we find in all modern democracies the break-up of the family unit, the increase of divorces and single-parent families, the corruption of youth, adolescent crime, prostitution, etc. The Russian democracy of 1917 opened the floodgates for all these evils, and the ever-widening corruption of the Soviet years was a further consequence of that original disaster. For a lover of Russia, therefore, it would be natural to hope for a return to the patriarchal, monarchical society that preceded the disaster and which has been the traditional pattern of Russian society throughout its history. However, the Europeans have done everything in their power to prevent such a return.

Thus they have persistently labelled the major non-democratic political forces as "anti-semitic" or communist or both, and have backed the Freemason Yeltsin against his rivals, forgetting that he, too, was once a communist. Again, they have insisted on the more-or-less immediate creation of a free market as a condition for economic aid, although in such an antiquated economy this was bound to lead to massive unemployment with further disruption of the already seriously threatened family. Again, they have imposed the democratic ethos of unlimited freedom, which exposes children and adults to all the corrupting influences of greed, promiscuity, drugs, pornography, rock music, etc.

Fr. Stefan Krasovitsky has defined democratic freedom as a western type of collectivism which is only superficially opposed to the eastern, socialist type of collectivism. The western type, he writes, "presupposes (under the pretext of 'free expression') the abolition of all the previous very strict moral and sexual taboos which subconsciously and genetically separate one person from another, turning their merging together into a single collective plasma with its corrupt intimacy." And he goes on: "Since the second [western] type of collectivism has deeper roots than its more superficial [eastern] analogue, it does not demand the fulfilment of the well-known unpleasant characteristics of the first type of collectivism, such as: the suppression of 'social freedoms', etc. On the contrary, **in the conditions of the second type of collectivism, true, real freedom is inversely proportional to social freedoms.** Man loses his freedom as a person (or individual essence), but not as a member of a collectivist

¹⁶⁶ Tuskarev, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

society, since he is merged genetically and subconsciously into a collective plasma with its rotten collective intimacy.

"'Perestroika' signifies the merging together of both types of collectivism into one with the effect of an atomic explosion, which can no less be localized within Russia than the Socialist revolution with its consequences."¹⁶⁷

3. The Demonization of Russia. If a man has lost his nation, and even his family, he can still survive and be regenerated by his personal relationship with God in the Church. But in Russia the Europeans (and Americans) have struck even at that. For just as they have imposed internationalism and democracy, hamburgers, rock music and Hollywood on the shell-shocked Russians, so have they imposed the still more demonic and dangerous brews of Protestant evangelism and inter-faith Ecumenism. Moreover, in sharp contrast with the period after the fall of Nazi Germany in 1945, when the West demanded a complete purging of the Nazis, and the public and prolonged repentance of the German nation, since the fall of communism they have insisted on nothing of the kind. The result is that *not a single leading communist has been convicted for the crimes of the communist period*, and unrepentant communists, miraculously transformed into capitalists and democrats, have been allowed to continue occupying all the important posts in Church and State.

And this has been the more tragic in the Church as the Church is so much more important than the State; for it is only on the basis of a regenerated and purified Church that the rebuilding of the State can truly begin.

The fact that, even after the fall of communism, the communist commissars and patriarchs still rule has created a very dangerous apathy and despondency in the hearts of Orthodox Russians. And the further fact that, after suffering all the torments and humiliation of the Soviet period, the official Orthodox Church has still not been freed inwardly, and has exchanged the unholy union with God-hating atheism for the no less unholy union with Jews and Muslims and western heretics, has exposed them to the truly demonic temptation of *despair*. "What is truth?" said Pilate wearily - and would not stay for an answer. "Where is Orthodoxy?" says the contemporary Russian - and gives up the search for the truly Orthodox Church. But for those who have ceased to search for the truth and the Church, there is destined only surrender to the snares of him "whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power and signs and lying wonders,... because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved" (II Thessalonians 2.9-10).

And yet perhaps now we, at last, we are seeing the beginning of a more widespread regeneration of Russian society in the emergence of an opposition to Ecumenism. It is right that it should begin here, in the purely spiritual, dogmatic sphere; for true faith is the foundation of all good, and "without faith it is impossible to please God" (Hebrews 11.6). On the basis of the regeneration of the individual person's relationship to God through true faith, the regeneration of the family, and then of the nation, can begin. Then, and only then, will Russians be Russians again and not simply eastern clones of Western Man. Then, and only then, will the expansion of the European Antichrist come to a halt, and begin to retreat...

¹⁶⁷ Krasovitsky, op. cit.

*February 18 / March 3, 1995.
St. Leo the Great, Pope of Rome.*

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APPENDIX II. WHAT PRICE FREEDOM?

For at least the last two hundred years, the value most highly valued in western society has been freedom. Even those, such as the monarchists, fascists and communists, whose programmes have advocated a greater degree of State control, have had, at least for propaganda purposes, to pay lipservice to the value of liberal democracy. Thus monarchists have tended to be constitutional monarchists, fascists - populists claiming to express the will of the people, and communists - self-appointed champions of the oppressed against imperialist and capitalist oppressors.

It requires an effort of historical imagination to realize that the absolute value of freedom has been by no means self-evident to previous generations. In Roman times, for example, the value most prized in Roman rule was *peace*, and the loss of their freedom was considered by most of the empire's subject peoples (the Jews were the main exceptions) to be a price well worth paying for the Pax Romana. Certainly the Christians never agitated for political freedom.

When the Roman empire became Christian, the supreme value of external peace was replaced by that of spiritual peace, which is based on *right belief* or *Orthodoxy*. And this value was transferred from the New Rome of Constantinople to the "Third Rome" of Moscow. In the medieval West the same ideal prevailed, albeit in a very corrupted form; and both popes and kings justified their rule by claiming to be God-appointed "vicars of Christ" or "defenders of the Faith".

Of course, the fact that a society values peace or Orthodoxy above all else does not necessarily mean that freedom is despised or thought not worth fighting for. Indeed, a certain measure of freedom in some spheres may be considered a necessary condition for the attainment of the supreme value. Thus in the Orthodox East, with few exceptions, the principle of freedom of expression was upheld, and if heretics were punished they were exiled rather than tortured - unlike in the West, where the torture of heretics was officially proclaimed to be Christian at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.¹⁶⁸ But history shows that societies in which freedom is the supreme value form a distinct type, liberal democracy. The question is: is it the best type?

Now freedom means different things to different people. To a Christian it means full spiritual freedom, freedom from sin, "the law of liberty" (James 1.25), of which Christ spoke when He said: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (John 8.32). The truth makes us free because, in the person of Truth Incarnate, the Lord Jesus Christ, it frees us from sin. If we were free of sin, we would be truly free, whatever physical or political environment we lived in. But being the slaves of sin, we bring upon ourselves every other kind of slavery.

For sin is the cause not only of spiritual slavery, but also of physical slavery. "The first cause of slavery," writes St. Augustine, "is sin; that is why man is subjected to man in the state of slavery. This does not happen apart from the judgement of God, with

¹⁶⁸ Probably the first clear example of the torture of heretics in the Orthodox East was the burning of some of the leading Judaizers in Muscovy in the early sixteenth century. This was done under the influence of the example of the contemporary Spanish Inquisition. St. Nilus of Sora immediately objected to the practice. Some of the heretical Eastern emperors, especially the iconoclasts, also resorted to torture; but they were, by definition, not Orthodox.

Whom is no injustice and Who knows how to apportion varying punishments in accordance with the differing deserts of those who do wrong.

"The heavenly Lord declares: 'Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin' (John 8.34). That is why, when, as often happens, religious men are slaves of unjust masters, their masters are not free. 'For whatever a man is overcome by, to that he is enslaved' (II Peter 2.19). And it is better to be the slave of a man than a slave of lust. For lust is a most savage master and one that devastates the hearts of men; this is true, to give only one example, of the lust for mastery itself. But in the peaceful order of human society, where one group of men is subjected to another, slaves are benefited by humility and masters are harmed by pride. By nature, as God first created man, no one is the slave, either of man or of sin. But slavery is ordained as a form of punishment by that law which enjoins the preservation of the natural order and prevents its disturbance. Had that law never been broken, there would have been no need for its enforcement by the punitive measure of slavery. So the apostle instructs slaves to be subject to their masters and to serve them wholeheartedly. Thereby, if they cannot get freedom from their masters, they can make their slavery into a kind of freedom, by performing this service not in deceitfulness and fear but in faithfulness and love, until injustice passes away and all dominion and human power are brought to nothing and God is all in all..."¹⁶⁹

The liberal democracies speak very little of this spiritual kind of freedom. This does not *necessarily* mean that liberal democracy is not conducive to it. However, the Church teaches that if we do not place spiritual freedom as our supreme goal, we shall not attain to it; and it must be admitted that as societies in the West have become more liberal and democratic they have at the same time become less free in the Christian sense. Christian liberals may argue that this development is the result of quite other factors - the rise of science, perhaps, or the industrial revolution. But the fact remains that, whatever the reason, England, say, in the later twentieth century is a less religious and Christian country than England in the early seventeenth century.

Many - many even who call themselves Christian - welcome this, arguing that the religiosity of seventeenth-century England was in fact bigotry and fanaticism, and the humanism of twentieth-century England - a sign of our greater humaneness. They even argue that the humanism of twentieth-century England is closer to real Christianity than the seventeenth-century version. I believe that if one examines such a person's ideal of freedom, it will turn out to have very little to do with spiritual freedom as Christ defined it, and will be much closer to freedom of conscience, of speech and of the press. People are free, according to this definition, not because they *know* the truth, but because they can speak the truth or (more usually) falsehood without being prosecuted. Sometimes this ideal is combined with an agnosticism about the existence of any absolute truth; at others - with a belief that the truth can be attained and retained by the greatest number of people only if the maximum freedom is given to those in error to express their error and, hopefully, have it refuted.

But freedom of thought, it is argued, is possible only if all power is not in the hands of one man holding one point of view. Hence the need for political freedom, or democracy. For although the ruling democratic party or leader cannot express and put into effect all points of view, he will at any rate express the *majority* point of view, and

¹⁶⁹ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX, 15; translated by Maurice Wiles & Mark Santer, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-242.

he must continue to take the views of the majority into account if he wants to remain in power.

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At this point I should like to make the assumption that absolute truth does exist, that that truth is Christianity, and that spiritual freedom is an absolute value attainable only through knowledge of the truth that is Christ. The question now is: is this spiritual freedom more surely attained and retained in a society locating its absolute values, not (or at any rate, not explicitly) in spiritual freedom, but in free speech and political freedom, or by a society which places some restrictions on the latter for the sake of the same spiritual freedom? It should be obvious that we are not here contrasting democracy and dictatorship of the Leninist or Hitlerite varieties; for the latter's highest values were explicitly anti-Christian. The contrast is rather between a modern democracy such as ours and a more authoritarian but also more explicitly Christian society such as ninth-century Byzantium or nineteenth-century Russia. It should also be obvious that the greater technological sophistication and wealth of the one kind of society is not relevant here, except insofar as one society is deemed to be more conducive to the accumulation of wealth, and this in turn is deemed to help or hinder the attainment of spiritual freedom.

Now a vital preliminary question that must be asked is: do men *begin* from a condition of freedom or slavery, spiritually speaking? The answer is: yes and no. Yes, insofar as man has freewill and therefore cannot escape responsibility for his actions. And no, insofar as he is born in a condition of fallenness or original sin, which, without removing his freewill, nevertheless distorts his thinking, heavily influences his feeling and weakens and diverts his willing. Thus it is Christian teaching that man cannot be liberated spiritually by his own efforts alone.

If man cannot liberate himself, then another must help him, even push him, along the way to freedom. We can see this most clearly in the case of children. We do not leave children to find out for themselves that fire burns, that arsenic kills, that reading and writing are useful skills, or that Jesus is God. We *tell* them these necessary truths, and we do not feel that we are violating their freedom in so doing. Rather, we feel that it is the one who deprives them of this knowledge that is restricting their freedom.

This is the principle of *education*, and it applies throughout life. Thus the great scientific advances of modern civilization are the result of the accumulation of knowledge over many generations, and each succeeding generation makes advances by taking the truths discovered by previous generations on trust, and then building on them. Thus we are *told* that electricity and bacteria exist, and that the earth is *not* flat. These are not presented as one man's point of view, no better than any other's, but as *fact* - dogma, if you like. But no one objects to this kind of scientific dogmatism - even if some contemporary scientific dogmas, such as Darwinism, are in fact untrue - because we know that a person who continues to believe that the earth is flat, for example, is going to be at a severe disadvantage in the struggle of life.

Of course, if a person, contrary to all that his teachers tell him, continues to believe that the earth is flat, he is not imprisoned or tortured for his wrong belief. This is because we believe that gentle persuasion is a better means of convincing him, and/or that his error does not constitute a major threat to society as a whole. But we do penalize him in other ways - by ridicule, for example, or by failing him in his exams. And in general, if

we did not penalise what we considered to be wrong belief in any way the foundations of society would quickly crumble. No society is completely liberal; societies differ not so much in their degree of liberalism as in the things they are liberal about.

In modern Britain, for example, it is forbidden to use corporal punishment to discipline one's children, but homosexuality is allowed; it is forbidden to emit certain industrial effluents into rivers, but abortion is allowed; it is forbidden to make racial or anti-semitic remarks, but the crudest blasphemy against Jesus Christ and Christians is allowed (blasphemy laws do exist, but they are never invoked). These laws may be counted as liberal by some, but they go directly counter to the law of liberty preached in the Gospel. According to that law, "he that spareth his rod hateth his son" (Proverbs 13.24); homosexuality is a deadly sin which brought about the destruction of Sodom and Gomorra; abortion is murder; and "if any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema" (I Corinthians 16.22).

Of course it is true that truth and virtue cannot be instilled at the point of a gun. At the end of the day the evil will will manifest itself, whatever the incitements to good, just as the good will will manifest itself whatever the enticements to evil. Thus the angel of the Apocalypse says: "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still; and he that is holy, let him be holy still" (Revelation 22.11).

And yet this truth must not be understood in a Calvinist sense, as if no amount of persuasion or external pressure makes men one whit better or worse than they would be otherwise. Both the Gospel and the common experience of mankind demonstrate that we as individuals and society as a whole both can and do influence our fellow men to good and evil, to heaven and hell. And that without violating their basic freedom of choice. Thus there can be no doubt that a society which, for whatever reason, condones homosexuality and abortion makes the incidence of those crimes that much more likely, while a society that forbids them on pain of imprisonment or worse will deter at least some who might otherwise be tempted to sin. And those who are thus deterred, far from suffering a diminution of their freedom, will be saved from that terrible slavery of the soul - far more terrible than any physical slavery - which ultimately leads down to the eternal bonds of hell.

It is an old maxim that liberty is not licence. And no society, we repeat, can license everything. The society, if such exists, which licenses everything is the lawless society.

Thus we read that in America "in order to protect ourselves from the unprincipled preferences of others a system of laws had to be devised, and every law in the code restricts someone's freedom in order to protect someone else's rights. In our republican form of government, each person's rights have to be protected from incursion by the majority. Unfortunately, unjust laws can be passed which make moral rights illegal and immoral activities legal - abortion laws being a case in point. And so-called natural law, the common ground on which church and state could co-exist peaceably, has been eliminated as a foundation for societal law. Even the Constitution is being eroded by moral relativism."¹⁷⁰

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¹⁷⁰ Presbytera Valeri Brockman, "Abortion: The Continuing Holocaust", *The True Vine*, Summer, 1991, no. 10, p. 18.

If we begin from Christian, as opposed to humanist principles, then the best society is that which most encourages and helps men along the path to salvation, which is attained by obedience to the dogmatic truths and moral commandments ordained and revealed by God. In essence, such a society is what is commonly called "theocracy"; that is, it is ruled by God, or by a king anointed by God and responsible to Him alone - *not* by the people. This is not to say that the democratic or elective principle is entirely lacking in such societies - in the theocratic society of Ancient Israel, for example, the judges were sometimes elected by the people (Judges 11.11), and the first Romanov Tsar was elected by the zemsky sobor, the assembly of the Russian land. What it means is that all authority in the theocratic society, however it is established - whether by right of primogeniture in the case of kings, or canonical election in the case of bishops, or educational qualifications in the case of teachers and magistrates, or physical parenthood in the case of fathers and mothers - is acknowledged to be providentially instituted and preserved by God, so that rebellion against these authorities is ultimately rebellion against God (unless, of course, the authorities themselves have rebelled against God, as they did in Russia in 1917). "For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God" (Romans 13.1).

Now it is important to note that all the world's leading western democracies, which have become the model for the rest of the world, have been founded on the explicit rejection of the theocratic principle. Thus the English revolution of 1649 explicitly rejected the Divine right of kings and killed the king, thereby adding murder to oath-breaking. And having abolished one pillar of the theocratic society, the Monarchy, it proceeded to dethrone another - the Church, the two being replaced (temporarily) by the Puritan republic.

The American revolution of 1776 began with a refusal to pay taxes to the lawful king. It involved less of a radical change in society than the other democratic revolutions, partly because the States were already of necessity largely self-governing through their distance from Britain. However, an important new principle was added to the Constitution: the right to "the pursuit of happiness", by which was clearly meant material prosperity and psychological well-being rather than the blessedness of the Saints. Moreover, the American revolution showed that when the virus of the lust for freedom is let loose, it is not only kings who suffer, but also the democratically elected parliaments that replace them. For, as an American historian writes, it showed that "parliamentary supremacy was vulnerable to riot, agitation and boycott..."¹⁷¹

The French revolution of 1789 was by far the most bloodthirsty and radical of the revolutions so far. Not only were the Monarchy and the Church overthrown, and a terrible persecution unleashed against the propertied classes, but a completely new and in essence atheist religion, the worship of the goddess Reason, was instituted. It was in reflecting on the French revolution that Dostoyevsky uttered his famous saying: "If God does not exist, then everything [that is, everything that is evil] is permitted." The French revolution conquered even in "reactionary" countries that feared and opposed it. For everywhere its subjectivist principles of personal and political freedom became more powerful than the objective principle of spiritual freedom.

The Russian diplomat and poet Tyutchev expressed these principles as follows: "The human I, wishing to depend only on itself, not recognizing and not accepting any other

¹⁷¹ Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly*, London: Michael Joseph, 1984, p. 166.

law besides its own will - in a word, the human I, taking the place of God, - does not, of course, constitute something new among men. But such it has become when raised to the status of a political and social right, and when it strives, by virtue of this right, to rule society. This is the new phenomenon which acquired the name of the French revolution in 1789..."¹⁷²

As the logical conclusion of all the previous revolutions came the Russian revolution of 1917. The overthrow of the Tsar was welcomed by the western democracies, although he had been their most faithful ally in the world war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. And as Dostoyevsky had foreseen and Solzhenitsyn has clearly demonstrated, it was the persistent agitation for "freedom" by liberals both within and outside Russia that led to the imposition of the most illiberal and destructive tyranny the world has ever seen.

Nor did the western democracies show any consistent zeal against the communist regimes they had done so much to instal. The Anglo-American expeditionary force withdrew from North Russia in the Civil War when it seemed on the point of breaking through to Moscow. Britain and America both recognized the Soviet Union at a time when persecution of the Faith was at its height. British journalists gave glowing reports of the Soviets at the height of dekulakization. Stalin remained "Uncle Joe" even after the end of the Second World War, when he had enslaved Eastern Europe. The Allies, and especially the United States, did fight against communism in Greece, Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam, but not in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Indonesia, Cambodia or Ethiopia. Red China was admitted to the United Nations, but democratic Taiwan was expelled. Castro and Ortega were warred against, but Brezhnev, Mao, Tito and Ceasusescu were feted. The real bogey-men for western liberals remained South Africa and Chile, even liberal America, not the communist regimes which had vowed to destroy all religion and every capitalist state. Even as communism began to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, the West hesitated to recognize the openly anti-communist democrats and feared above all a return to "fascist" Orthodox regimes.

This brief historical synopsis tells us many things about the real nature of modern democracy and its worship of freedom:-

1. Its root is anti-God. Therefore its fruit cannot be godly. For "either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad; for the tree is known by its fruit" (Matthew 12.33). The fruits we are now seeing are blasphemy, murder, greed and sexual immorality on a vast scale. It is difficult indeed to be a Christian in a modern democracy.

2. The major argument produced in favour of democracy - that it prevents the emergence of imperialist or totalitarian regimes - is false. British imperialism really began *after* the English revolution. Napoleon was a direct product of the French revolution. Russian democracy gave birth to Lenin. German democracy voted Hitler into power. The spread and continuance of communism in the twentieth century was in large measure due to the apathy and dividedness of the western democracies, whose anti-monarchical and anti-Christian ideology had infected the educated elites of the eastern countries, and most of whose leading intellectuals were socialist in their sympathies. The world has not been made safe by or for democracy. Communism was defeated (if it has been truly defeated), not by western democracy, but by the blood of

¹⁷² Tyutchev, F.I. *Politicheskoye Stat'i*, op. cit., p. 34.

the new martyrs of Russia and the thirst for freedom and truth (spiritual as well as political) of the subjugated eastern peoples.

3. The major argument in favour of unlimited free speech - that it constitutes the best conditions for the discovery of the truth - is false. If unlimited freedom, i.e. licence, is given to the publication of blasphemous and immoral material, then the result, given the fallenness of our nature and its inclination towards evil, will be an increase in blasphemy and immorality. This in turn will lead to pressure for the muzzling of those few publications and individuals who speak the truth. Already it is difficult to speak out freely against, say, anti-Christian Judaism or soul-destroying homosexuality, in liberal England and America. Absolute power may corrupt absolute rulers (although history shows many exceptions to that rule); but absolute freedom is no less corrupting. And it corrupts, not just a few people at the top (who arrived there, most often, because they were already corrupt), but vast numbers of people at every level of society, from the power-hungry politicians to the youngest and most powerless children.

4. Perhaps the greatest, most irreplaceable casualty of liberal democracy has been the concept of absolute, objective truth. Christianity proclaims that spiritual freedom comes from the knowledge of objective truth, which comes from the revelation of God. Liberal democracy reverses this relationship, and says that the knowledge of the truth comes from surveying the subjective choices of the people; vox populi - vox veritatis. Sometimes vox populi is refined to mean the voice of experts, wise men in scientific laboratories or government commissions or central banks. But since the opinions of experts are as fickle and changeable as those of the masses, this hardly improves the situation. In any case, when it comes to the most important choices and propositions, those concerning morality and religion, subjectivity reigns supreme; "situation ethics" has dispensed with all objective moral judgements, while inter-faith ecumenism has decreed that all religions lead to God, even when they contradict each other on the most basic points. Thus choosing what to believe about God, or whether to believe in him at all, becomes as subjective, personal and, ultimately, inconsequential an act as choosing a pair of shoes or a variety of ice-cream. As for right and wrong, there is only one right - to express oneself as freely, as outrageously, as possible, and only one wrong - to express oneself in a significantly different way from the majority.

However, human nature abhors a vacuum; and the dissolution of constant, absolute truths and values in the inconstant ocean of liberal, ecumenical democracy will inevitably elicit a reaction. This will be the reaction of the man who, after enjoying the freedom of the waves for a time, suddenly realizes that he is *drowning* and that he must reach dry land. And so he will follow anyone who can offer him dry land - that is, absolute truth. Only the danger is that, since he has never been on dry land, and has never flexed his mental muscles on the hard, unyielding surface of truth, he will very easily mistake quicksand for land, and a mirage for the truth. And he will finally touch the real thing only when he sets foot on - the ocean floor. "Save me, O God, for the waters are come in unto my soul. I am stuck fast in the mire of the deep, and there is no sure standing..." (Psalm 68.1-2).

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What, then, are we to do, who live in modern democracies but seek to live in accordance with absolute truth?

One temptation we should avoid at the outset. We must understand, first of all, that no real change for the better can come about in society by attempting to change the political system alone, without a change in the hearts of men. For, as Dostoyevsky warned when discussing the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, it is not *formal structures* - or not formal structures alone - that must change, but the *spiritual content* that underlies them and brought them into being.

Liberal democracy, together with its offspring, communism, came into being as the result of a change in the spirit of the western peoples, a change involving a decrease in faith in God, and an increase in the belief that man can control his destiny independently of God. So theocracy, rule by God, was rejected in favour of democracy, rule by the people. In essence, this was the spirit of rebellion, the same spirit which cast Satan out of heaven. The nature of that spirit has been masked by fine-sounding slogans, such as "freedom, equality and fraternity", "glasnost" and "perestroika". But its true nature has been revealed by the unprecedented horrors of the twentieth century, most of which have been carried out in the name of the same high-flown ideals.

The spirit of a society can change only when the spirit of its individual members has changed. Thus a truly theocratic society can come into being only when each individual has truly decided to make God his King. Then, and only then, will God - not man - act to change the structure of society in order that it may reflect and confirm the new spirit that reigns in its members.

And there is another reason why political action would be fruitless at this moment, before the Spirit of truth has brought forth fruit in individual souls. We live in the age of apostasy foretold by the prophets. And as Bishop Ignatius Brianchaninov wrote: "The apostasy is permitted by God. So do not try to stop it with your powerless hand. Flee from it yourself, protect yourself from it; that is enough for you. Learn to know the spirit of the age, study it, so that whenever possible you will be able to avoid its influence... Only God's special mercy is able to stop this all-destroying moral epidemic, to stop it for awhile, because it is necessary that everything foretold by the Scriptures should come to pass..."¹⁷³

Therefore, says the apostle, "live as free men, yet without using your freedom as a pretext for evil; but live as servants of God" (I Peter 2.16).

(Adapted from an article with the same title published in *Orthodox America*, January-February, 1992)

*October 26 / November 8, 1996.
King Alfred the Great, Restorer of Orthodoxy in England.*

¹⁷³ Brianchaninov, *Patericon*, Brussels, 1963, p. 549 (in Russian).

APPENDIX III. THE DOGMATIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ORTHODOX AUTOCRACY

It is a cliché of Western scholarship that whereas the Western Church in the Middle Ages was *papocaesarist* in structure and spirit, the Eastern Church was *caesaropapist*. That is, while Roman Catholic society was ruled by the Pope in both its political and its ecclesiastical aspects, Eastern Orthodox society was similarly ruled by the Emperor. Now it is not difficult to demonstrate that this assertion is untrue as regards the East, and that *both* papocaesarism *and* caesaropapism were western concepts and inventions. Nevertheless, the precise place of the Emperor in Orthodox society is not easy to define; the separation of Church and State in Orthodoxy is not as tidily clear-cut as the Western mind would like to have it, and there is no doubt that the Emperor, in addition to his unquestioned supremacy in the State, has an important and leading role in the Church, too. Moreover, it is precisely in the difference between the position of the Pope in Catholicism and the Emperor in Orthodoxy that the mystery and dogmatic significance of the Orthodox vision of Christian society is revealed...

Of course, the Protestants - and "Protestants of the Eastern Rite", as Fr. George Florovsky called the modernist Orthodox - deny that there is any mystery or dogmatic significance in the Orthodox Autocracy. Just as there was no infallible Pope in the early Church, they say, so there was no Emperor. And since we cannot accept any additions to the original "deposit of the faith", we must reject the doctrine of the Autocracy as unnecessary at best and antichristian at worst.

In this assertion, however, the Protestants are greatly mistaken. For while there was no doctrine of an *infallible and universal* Papacy in the early Church, there was a doctrine of Church leadership and unity at both the local and the ecumenical levels. And similarly, while there was no *Christian* Autocracy in the early Church, there was a doctrine concerning the moral and eschatological significance of the Roman Empire.

Let us examine this question in a historical context, beginning with the Nativity of the King of kings. Christ was born just as the Roman Empire was coming into being. The significance of this coincidence did not escape the Holy Fathers, whose thought was encapsulated in a verse from the Divine services for the Nativity: "When Augustus reigned alone upon earth, the many kingdoms of men came to an end: and when Thou was made man of the pure Virgin, the many gods of idolatry were destroyed. The cities of the world passed under one single rule; and the nations came to believe in one sovereign Godhead. The peoples were enrolled by the decree of Caesar; and we, the faithful, were enrolled in the Name of the Godhead, when Thou, our God, wast made man. Great is Thy mercy: glory to Thee."¹⁷⁴

This verse establishes a certain providential parallelism between the birth of the Church in the Body of the God-Man, and the birth of the Empire. The Church and the Empire were born and grew up together, as it were; Christ was a citizen of each while being at the same time the Lord of both. It is as if the Empire came into existence precisely for the sake of the Church, creating a political unity that would help and protect the spiritual unity created by the Church.

¹⁷⁴ *Festal Menaion*, December 25, Great Vespers for the Nativity of Christ, "Lord, I have cried", Glory... Both now...

Similarly, according to the apostolic teaching, the death of the Empire would presage the death of the Church - or rather, her apparent demise during the time of the Antichrist. For this is the meaning of St. Paul's words: "The mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who now restrains it will do so until he is out of the way" (II Thessalonians 2.7). According to the unanimous witness of the Holy Fathers from St. John Chrysostom to Bishop Theophanes the Recluse and St. John of Kronstadt, "he who restrains" is the Roman Emperor, or monarchical power in general.¹⁷⁵ The Roman Emperor restrains the appearance of evil in its most radical form, the Antichrist. Therefore his removal will make possible the appearance of the Antichrist and usher in the end of the world and the Second Coming of Christ.

Since the existence of the Empire and the Church on earth are so closely linked, it is small wonder that the apostles exhort Christians to venerate and obey it in all matters that do not conflict with the Law of God. St. Paul commands Christians to give thanks for the Emperor "and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceful life in all godliness and honesty" (I Tim. 2.1-2). For it is precisely the Emperor's ability to maintain law and order, "a quiet and peaceful life", which makes him so important for the Church. "For anarchy," writes St. Isidore of Pelusium, "is always the worst of all evils... That is why, although the body is a single whole, not everything in it is of equal honour, but some members rule, while others are in subjection. So we are right to say that the authorities - that is, leadership and royal power - are established by God so that society should not fall into disorder."¹⁷⁶

"Be subject for the Lord's sake," says St. Peter, "to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme, or to governors as sent by him to punish those who do wrong and praise those who do right... Fear God. Honour the emperor" (I Peter 2.13, 17). The Emperor is to be obeyed "not only because of wrath, but for conscience's sake" (Romans 13.5). For he is "the servant of God for good" and "wields not the sword in vain" (Romans 13.4).

Of course, the autocracy in the apostles' time was not *Christian*. But if the apostles speak with such reverence of the pagan autocracy, which is qualified as a "human institution", a fortiori they would have spoken with still greater reverence of the Christian Autocracy, created as it was by God's direct call to Constantine. Indeed, according to some of the Holy Fathers, in these passages St. Paul *was* speaking, from an eschatological perspective, precisely of the Christian Autocracy.

Thus Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow writes: "The Spirit of God in him foresaw and more or less showed him the future light of Christian kingdoms. His God-inspired vision, piercing through future centuries, encounters Constantine, who brings peace to the Church and sanctifies the kingdom by faith; and Theodosius and Justinian, who defend the Church from the impudence of heresies. Of course, he also goes on to see Vladimir and Alexander Nevsky and many spreaders of the faith, defenders of the Church and guardians of Orthodoxy. After this it is not surprising that St. Paul should write: I beseech you not only to pray, but also to give thanks for the king and all those in authority; because there will be not only such kings and authorities for whom it is

¹⁷⁵ Archbishop Averky, *Rukovodstvo k izucheniyu Soyashchennykh Pisanii Novogo Zaveta*, Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, vol. II, 1956, pp. 307-308.

¹⁷⁶ St. Isidore, *Letter 6* to Dionysius.

necessary to pray with sorrow.., but also those for whom we must thank God with joy for His precious gift."¹⁷⁷

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Let us look more closely at the role of the Emperor in the Church. Historically speaking, his most important contribution was in *the convening of Church Councils*, and in the enforcing of their decisions. All of the Ecumenical Councils were convened by Emperors, as well as many of the Local Councils.

Now the Protestant-minded see no great importance in this contribution. After all, they say, the Church does not need an Emperor to convene a Council, and in the first Council of Jerusalem, as in all the Councils of the first three centuries of Christianity, no Emperor was present. For Church Councils are the affair of the Church, not of the State.

And yet the influence of the Emperor is discernible even in the first Council of Jerusalem. For it is unlikely that the Apostles and the Fathers who succeeded them would have been allowed to convene any Council by the Jews if Roman power had not existed to restrain and subdue the Jewish revolution. And later in the Acts we find the Apostle Paul using his Roman citizenship to escape from the attempts of the Jews to kill him. Here already we see monarchical power restraining "the mystery of iniquity". It both restrained those dark forces that sought to scatter the flock of Christ; and created those conditions which enabled the Christians to come together and reinforce their unity.¹⁷⁸

As the Church grew and spread throughout the inhabited world, the problem of preserving this unity became more acute. By the beginning of the fourth century, it was no longer possible to deal with the problems that arose through Local Councils presided over by a single bishop or metropolitan. For heretics condemned by one Local Church could flee to another and spread their poison there, as when Arius was condemned by the Church of Alexandria but fled abroad. And conflicts that arose between Local Churches, as when the Churches of Rome and Asia Minor disagreed over the date of Pascha, required a higher authority to resolve them. Thus it became necessary to find a mechanism or focus of unity which could convene Ecumenical Councils bringing together the leaders of all the local Churches throughout the Empire.

Through the mysterious workings of Divine Providence, this focus of unity turned out to be the Emperor Constantine the Great, who convened the First Ecumenical Council in order to deal with the problems of Arianism and the Paschalion - problems that were too great for Local Councils to deal with.

Now it was at this point that the first seeds of the papist heresy appeared. For while the Popes accepted the political authority of the Emperor, it became increasingly obvious to the Roman mind that the focus of unity in the Church could only come from within the Church, and from the senior and most respected bishop of the Church - the

¹⁷⁷ Metropolitan Philaret, *Works*, vol. II, pp. 171-173.

¹⁷⁸ As St. Leo the Great wrote: "Divine Providence fashioned the Roman Empire, the growth of which was extended to boundaries so wide that all races everywhere became next-door neighbours. For it was particularly germane to the Divine scheme that many kingdoms should be bound together under a single government, and that the world-wide preaching should have a swift means of access to all people, over whom the rule of a single state held sway." (*Sermon 32, P.L. 54, col. 423*).

Pope of Rome. Emperors were all very well, but they had no business interfering in the Church's business.¹⁷⁹

The fact that all Seven of the Ecumenical Councils were convened by the Emperors, that the presiding bishop was not always the Pope or his legate, and that some Popes were even condemned by them (e.g. Pope Honorius by the Sixth Ecumenical Council) - all this was considered coincidental. If the Emperors had played an important role, said the Popes, it was because they were really acting as delegates or spiritual sons of the Papacy - an evident falsehood. (This argument was probably the origin of the myth that St. Constantine had been baptized by St. Sylvester, Pope of Rome.) The Popes later tried to prove, through forgeries such as *The Donation of Constantine* and *The Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals*, that they had received their universal jurisdiction from St. Constantine. But this argument defeated its own purpose, for if true, it showed that the Emperor had originally had the universal jurisdiction and was therefore a higher authority than the Pope!

A superficially more plausible argument of the Popes was that, while Constantine convened the First Ecumenical Council, its authority did not rest on his convening of it, but on the Popes' confirmation of it. For the Popes could not accept that the authority of the Council rested simply on its conformity with Sacred Tradition; the internal criterion which was considered sufficient at the first Council of Jerusalem - "it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us..." (Acts 15.25) - did not seem good enough to them. They wanted an external, visible "stamp" - and such a stamp could not come from a mere layman, however powerful or pious, still less an unbaptized layman, as Constantine still was at Nicaea. It had to be the stamp of a bishop at the very least. And since "ordinary" bishops could err, and synods of bishops could disagree among themselves, the only solution was to recognize that God had sealed one particular bishop with the charisma of infallibility which put him above the rest and guaranteed the unity and infallibility of the Church as a whole.

Although the East was no more inclined than the West to see in the Emperors any kind of *guarantee* (as opposed to *focus*) of the Church's unity or infallibility, several historical facts demonstrate that the Eastern Church saw much more in the office of the Emperor than the Romans did.

First, the Fathers of the First Ecumenical Council not only responded to the invitation of Constantine to come together in a Council, but gave him very considerable authority in the Council, as is evident from their address to him: "Blessed is God, Who has chosen you as king of the earth, having by your hand destroyed the worship of idols and through you bestowed peace upon the hearts of the faithful... On this teaching of the Trinity, your Majesty, is established the greatness of your piety. Preserve it for us whole and unshaken, so that none of the heretics, having penetrated into the Church, might subject our faith to mockery... Your Majesty, command that Arius should depart from his error and rise no longer against the apostolic teaching. Or if he remains obstinate in his impiety, drive him out of the Orthodox Church." As Tuskarev observes, "this is a clear recognition of the divine election of Constantine as the external defender of the Church, who is obliged to work with her in preserving the right faith, and in correspondence with the conciliar sentence is empowered to drive heretics out of the

¹⁷⁹ "For you know, most dear son," wrote Pope Gelasius to the Emperor Anastasius, "that you are permitted rightly to rule the human race, yet in things Divine you devoutly bow your head before the principal clergy." (translated in Eric Jay, *The Church*, London: SPCK, 1977, vol. 1, p. 98.

Church."¹⁸⁰ For, as Eusebius said, Constantine, "emulating the Divine example, removes every stain of godless error from his earthly kingdom."¹⁸¹

This does not mean, of course, that the Emperors were authorized to impose their own beliefs on the Church; for they, like every member of the Church from the most powerful bishop to the humblest layman, are subject to the revealed truth, "the faith once delivered to the saints" (Jude 3). Moreover, as the British historian Sir Arnold Toynbee pointed out, "in the conflicts between the East Roman emperors with the patriarchs of Constantinople, the former won many battles, but *did not win a single war*."¹⁸² Thus the Church won the war against the Arian emperors in the fourth century, against the iconoclast emperors in the eighth and ninth centuries, and against the Latinizing emperors in the fourteenth century.

Nevertheless, - and this is a second important point, - there were also moments when the leadership of the Church faltered, and it was the Emperors who played the decisive role in protecting the true faith. For example, when the pious Emperors Marcian and Pulcheria came to the throne in the year 450, they were in fact more Orthodox than the leading bishops of the time, who were infected with the heresy of Monophysitism; and it was on the initiative of these Emperors that the Fourth Ecumenical Council was convened and Orthodoxy was restored. Thus the relationship between Church and Emperor was closer than the simple formula: the Church looks after spiritual matters, the Emperor looks after earthly matters, might suggest...

Thirdly, in the liturgical order the Emperors are given a place fully equal to that of the bishops. St. Constantine was called "equal to the apostles"; he was "anointed a priest and king with the oil of mercy", being "bishop of those outside" the Church; and his successors received the Holy Mysteries at the holy table, together with the hierarchs, on the day of their coronation.¹⁸³ In pannikhidas sovereigns are commemorated before hierarchs, and in liturgical processions they come last, signifying their pre-eminence.¹⁸⁴

Fourthly, the Emperor Justinian's classic definition of the "symphony" between the Church and the State places the responsibility for maintaining the symphony on *both* the Church *and* the State. As Andrushkevich points out, the word "symphony" in the Greek text denotes much more than simple agreement or concord. Church and State can agree in an evil way, for evil ends; true symphony is possible only where both the Church "is without reproach and adorned with faithfulness to God", in the words of the holy

¹⁸⁰ Tuskarev, *Tserkov' o gosudarstve*, op. cit., p. 75.

¹⁸¹ Eusebius, *Oration in Honour of Constantine on the Thirtieth Anniversary of his Reign*, 2; translated by Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, op. cit., p. 232.

¹⁸² Toynbee, in Andrushkevich, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁸³ St. Leo the Great wrote to Emperor Theodosius II that his imperial soul was "not only imperial, but also priestly". And for the Emperor Marcian he wished "besides the imperial crown, the priestly palm". See J. Meyendorff, *Rome, Constantinople, Moscow*, Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1996, p. 11. Again, Patriarch Theodore Balsamon of Antioch wrote in the 12th century: "The Tsar is with reason adorned with hierarchical gifts"; and Archbishop Demetrius Khomatin of Okhrid wrote in the 13th century: "With the exception only of church serving, the king clearly has all the remaining rights of the episcopate" (quoted in Protopriest Valentine Asmus, "O Monarkhii i nashem k nej otnoshenii", *Radonezh*, N 2 (46), January, 1997, p. 5).

¹⁸⁴ Archimandrite Pantaleimon, "On the Royal Martyrs", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 31, no. 4, July-August, 1981. According to Bishop Ambrose (von Sievers), the Emperor took part in the laying on of hands during the ordination of clergy (personal communication, August 25, 1996).

Emperor, and the State is ruled "rightly and decently" - that is, in accordance with the commandments of God.¹⁸⁵

It follows that a rigid separation of functions between the Church and the Emperor fits neither the theory nor the practice of Church-State relations in Orthodoxy. Just as the Church can "interfere" into the domain of the Emperor by criticizing his actions from the point of view of the Gospel, and can refuse to recognize his authority if his faith is not Orthodox, so the Emperor can "interfere" in the spiritual domain if the waves of heresy or schism threaten to overwhelm the ship of the Church - and therefore of the State, too. And this is because *both* Church *and* State are seen as being subject to Christ and serving Him alone, and because *both* the Bishops *and* the Emperor are seen as members of the same mystical organism of the Church in which *all* are responsible, albeit in different ways, for upholding the right confession of faith.

In fact, from the point of view of the confession of the faith, the Emperor has a more prominent and critical position even than the leading bishops. For everyone, both inside and outside the Empire, looks to him as representing the official faith of the Empire. That is why the Right-Believing Kings are the *first* target of the enemies of the truth, why the Emperor's office is regarded as a most heavy cross, and why the killing or removal of the Lord's Anointed is a greater crime even than the killing of a bishop, leading inexorably to the collapse of the Christian State, as we see in England after the murder of St. Edward the Martyr and the rebellion against his brother King Ethelred, and in Russia after the murder of the Tsar-Martyr Nicholas. For as St. John Maximovich said: "It cannot be otherwise. He was overthrown who united everything, standing in defence of the Truth."¹⁸⁶

Thus if the priesthood is indispensable above all because it dispenses the Life-giving sacraments, the monarchy is indispensable because through it the Truth is proclaimed to the world. As the King of kings said to Pilate: "You say that I am a king. For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth" (John 18.37). The truth is witnessed to on a local scale by every individual believer, and by every Local Church headed by a bishop. But at the *ecumenical* level, in its full glory as the salvation of the *whole* world, the truth requires a king in the image of Christ the King. That is why the Ecumenical Councils were not accidentally associated with the Emperors who convened them, and why the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross, celebrating the establishment of the first truly ecumenical Christian autocracy, is such a great feast in the Church.

Of course, we know that the Church will prevail even against the gates of hell, as the Saviour promised (Matthew 16.18), while no such promise is given to any earthly kingdom. However, as we have seen, the fall of the last Christian empire will lead to the final decline of the Church on earth, which will be halted only by the Second Coming of Christ, the King of kings. Moreover, the Church is not just the hierarchy; and it is quite possible that during the times of the Antichrist the whole of the hierarchy will fall away while only some individual laymen remain to represent the Church. Thus according to some interpretations of Daniel 12.11, "the removal of the continual burnt offering"

¹⁸⁵ Andrushkevich, *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁶ St. John, "Sermon before a pannikhida for the Tsar-Martyr", *Arkhiepiskop Ioann, Arkhipastyr, Molitvoenniki, Podvizhnik*, San Francisco, 1991, p. 125. Cf. Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev): "There is no need to say how terrible a 'touching' of the Anointed of God is the overthrow of the tsar by his subjects. Here the transgression of the given command of God reaches the highest degree of criminality, which is why it drags after it the destruction of the state itself" (*Russkaya Ideologiya*, St. Petersburg, 1992, pp. 50-51.

signifies the removal of the Sacrifice of the Eucharist, which implies either the falling away of the priesthood or its inability to carry out its sacramental functions.¹⁸⁷ For perhaps, as New Hieromartyr Joseph, Metropolitan of Petrograd, wrote, "the last 'rebels' against the betrayers of the Church and the accomplices of her ruin will be not only bishops and not archpriests, but the simplest mortals, just as at the Cross of Christ His last gasp of suffering was heard by a few simple souls who were close to Him..."¹⁸⁸

The papist position implicitly rejects this possibility. It cannot conceive of the Church existing even for a short period without a hierarchy - ultimately, without the Pope; which is why, when one Pope dies and his successor has not yet been elected, the Roman Church enters a kind of metaphysical limbo, whose reflection can be observed in the strange psychological state of some fervent papists during the interregnum. Strictly speaking, in fact, according to papist doctrine *the Church ceases to exist* in this period; for if the Church is founded on Peter, and Peter is visibly present neither in his own person nor in that of his successor, how can it be said to exist?

It follows, according to the papist teaching, that *everything* should be subject to the hierarchy, including the affairs of State.¹⁸⁹ For how can it ever be right for the laity to resist the hierarchy, or the Emperor resist the Pope, if truth and salvation are in the Pope alone? Indeed, if the Pope is the first bishop and the Emperor only the first layman, and if the Pope is infallible while the Emperor is clearly fallible, *why should not the Pope also be Emperor?*

Thus there is an inescapable logical progression from the first seeds of the papist heresy, as we find them in the writings of some of the Popes of the fifth century, to the full-blown blasphemy of Pope Gregory VII (Hildebrand) proclaimed at the First Lateran council of 1076: "The Pope can be judged by no one; the Roman Church has never erred and never will err till the end of time; the Roman Church was founded by Christ alone; the Pope alone can depose and restore bishops; he alone can make new laws, set up new bishoprics, and divide old ones; he alone can translate bishops; he alone can call general councils and authorize canon law; he alone can revise his own judgements; *he alone can use the imperial insignia; he can depose emperors; he can absolve subjects from their allegiance; all princes should kiss his feet*; his legates, even those in inferior orders, have precedence

¹⁸⁷ See St. Hippolytus, in Fomin, *op. cit.*, p. 268. However, Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow, commenting on I Corinthians 11.26, "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till He come", disputes this interpretation: "Here we find an important truth in the small word 'till'. In order better to understand this, I direct the speech of the Apostle to the question will Christians eat the mystical Bread and drink of the Chalice of the Lord? We find the answer in the words of the Apostle: 'till He come,' i.e., the mystery of the Body and Blood of Christ will take place without interruption in the true Church of Christ till the very second coming of Christ, or till the end of time, which has the same meaning. Since this cannot be without the grace of the priesthood, and the grace of the priesthood cannot exist without the grace of an hierarchy, then clearly the grace of the office of bishop, according to the foresight of the Apostle, will be in the Church in all times and uninterrupted channels will flow even up to the bring of the approach of the kingdom of glory." After quoting this passage, Hieromonk Ignaty (Trepatschko) writes: "The ancient Fathers of the Church express the same opinion. St. John Chrysostom says: 'Showing that the Holy Eucharist will be till the end of the world, the Apostle Paul said: 'till He comes'. St. John of Damascus and St. Ephraim the Syrian concur with this view" ("The Church of Christ in the Time of the Antichrist", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 41, no. 2, March-April, 1991, p. 40).

¹⁸⁸ Metropolitan Joseph, in Andreyev, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁸⁹ As Pope Gregory VII wrote in a letter of August, 1076: "If the holy apostolic see, through the princely power conferred upon it, has jurisdiction over spiritual things, why not also over spiritual things?"

over all bishops; an appeal to the papal court inhibits judgement by all inferior courts; a duly ordained pope is undoubtedly made a saint by the merits of St. Peter."¹⁹⁰

Such papocaesarist madness was bound to elicit a reaction; which is why Pope Gregory was expelled from Rome by the German Emperor, and why the history of the Middle Ages in the West is the history of the continual struggle between Popes and Emperors for ultimate rule over the Christian people. But while some of the kings of the West rejected the papocaesarist heresy, it had already taken deep root in the Church as a whole. Thus when Gregory lay dying in exile in Salerno and said: "I have loved righteousness and hated iniquity"; therefore I die in exile," a monk who waited on him replied, continuing the quotation from the Psalms which can rightly be referred only to Christ: "In exile thou canst not be, for 'God hath given thee the heathen for thine inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession' (Psalm 2.8)."

The heretical Popes were the first political revolutionaries in Christian history; for by inciting the peoples of the West to rise up against their legitimate sovereigns, they transgressed the apostolic command to be subject to the powers that be.

This was clearly evident for the first time in 1066, when the Pope, egged on by Archdeacon Hildebrand, anathematized King Harold of England and all those who supported him and blessed the invasion of England by William the Conqueror. The invasion was deemed necessary because the English Church and people had refused to break their allegiance to King Harold and his predecessor, St. Edward the Confessor, when they fell out with Rome. For they were deeply imbued with the principles of the Orthodox autocracy that had served them so well since King Alfred the Great had restored Orthodoxy after the Viking invasions in the ninth century, and which had produced at least one saint in the person of King Edward the Martyr. Therefore when King Harold was killed at the battle of Hastings he died in defence, not only of his personal power, but also of the Orthodox doctrine of Church-State relations.

But one form of totalitarianism begets another and opposite kind. And the papocaesarist heresy of Hildebrand begat the first purely caesaropapist State in Christian history in the form of William the Conqueror's England. For while William's invasion of England had been blessed by Hildebrand, to whom he owed nominal allegiance, he proceeded to reject the authority of the Pope in his conquered land. For, as Eadmer of Canterbury wrote: "All things, spiritual and temporal alike, waited upon the nod of the King... He would not, for instance, allow anyone in all his dominion, except on his instructions, to recognize the established Pontiff of the City of Rome or under any circumstances to accept any letter from him, if it had not first been submitted to the King himself. Also he would not let the primate of his kingdom, by which I mean the Archbishop of Canterbury, if he were presiding over a general council of bishops, lay down any ordinance of prohibition unless these were agreeable to the King's wishes and had been first settled by him. Then again he would not allow any one of his bishops, except on his express instructions, to proceed against or excommunicate one of his barons or officers for incest or adultery or any other cardinal offence, even when notoriously guilty, or to lay upon him any punishment of ecclesiastical discipline."¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Gregory VII, in R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages*, Penguin Books, 1970, p. 102.

¹⁹¹ Edmer, *Historia Novorum in Anglia*, translated by Henry Bettensen, *The Documents of the Christian Church*, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 155-156.

The parallel with Russia in 1917 is striking. For in England as in Russia, the overthrow of the Orthodox autocracy by anti-monarchical forces led to the imposition of a caesaropapist dictatorship of unparalleled cruelty, which led in turn to the downfall of the official Church, the removal of the true bishops, the killing of the faithful believers, and the profaning of the holy relics and churches. And, as if to emphasize this correspondence, the surviving child of the last English Orthodox king, Gytha, fled to Kiev and married Great-Prince Vladimir Monomakh, making the Russian Tsar-Martyr Nicholas a direct descendant of the English Martyr Kings. It is as if the last scion of Orthodox autocracy in the "First Rome" was saved through its union with the new Orthodox autocracy of the "Third Rome", just as, four centuries later, the last scion of the Orthodox autocracy of the "Second or New Rome", Sophia Palaeologus, was united to another Russian Great-Prince, Ivan III...

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Let us now turn to the specific contribution made by Russia to the Orthodox understanding of Church-State relations. Holy Russia, "the Third Rome", came into being in the late tenth century at almost exactly the same time that the Christian West, "the First Rome", was entering its final descent into apostasy. This fact has led some to speculate that Russia has taken the place of the West in the Divine Plan, and that it is precisely Russia that will achieve the final victory over the Western apostasy. Of course, this is not to deny the great merit of the Great Church of Constantinople in exposing and anathematizing the Western heresies of the Filioque (in the ninth century), of unleavened bread and the omission of the epiclesis (in 1054), and of created grace (in the fourteenth century). But, according to a Greek prophecy of the eighth or ninth century, "the sceptre of the Orthodox kingdom will fall from the weakening hands of the Byzantine emperors, *since they will not have proved able to achieve the symphony of Church and State*. Therefore the Lord in His Providence will send a third God-chosen people to take the place of the chosen, but spiritually decrepit people of the Greeks."¹⁹²

For the Greeks, while clearly discerning the apostasy of the West, nevertheless followed their last two emperors, John VIII and Constantine XI, into union with the West at the council of Florence in 1439 for the sake of preserving their empire from the Turks. Unlike their great ancestors, who had often defied heretical emperors for the sake of faithfulness to the truth, they tried to preserve their earthly kingdom at the price of the Kingdom of Heaven, forgetting that the whole glory of the Christian Empire lay in its readiness to live and die for its Heavenly King. "For here we have no lasting city, but seek the City which is to come" (Hebrews 13.14).

Fr. Alexander Schmemmann traced the beginning of this fall to the eleventh century: "After 1081, when Alexius Comnenus ascended the throne, the patriarchs seem to withdraw into the background. We find very meager information about them in the Byzantine chronicles through which we establish their names, their chief 'acts', and the years in which they were appointed or died. A curve could be traced, showing a gradually fading image of the patriarch side by side with the ever-increasing splendor of the basileus, as the Eastern emperors were called. And this is not accidental. It gives proof that the scales of the unattainable harmony were inclined in the direction of imperial power.

¹⁹² Archbishop Seraphim, "Sud'by Rossii", *Pravoslavnij Vestnik*, N 87, January-February, 1996, pp. 6-7.

"It is important to emphasize that this painful weakness cannot be explained solely in terms of the government's coercing the Church - in terms of the superiority of physical force, so to speak... This was an inner, organic weakness of the representatives of the Church. Their dual situation made them not just the victims but also the agents of their own destiny. The thirst for a sacred theocracy, the desire to illumine the sinful stuff of history with the light of Christ; everything that could justify the union of Church and empire - this ideal required for its attainment a very subtle but very clear distinction between the Church and the world. For the Church is thoroughly fulfilling its mission to transform the world only when it completely feels itself to be a kingdom not of this world.

"The tragedy of the Byzantine Church consisted precisely in the fact that it became merely the *Byzantine* Church, that it merged itself with the empire not so much administratively as, above all, psychologically, in its own self-awareness. The empire became for it the absolute and supreme value, unquestioned, inviolable, and self-evident."¹⁹³

Allowing for a certain exaggeration, we may accept Schmemmann's analysis, which accords with the witness of the Greek prophecy quoted above. The Byzantine empire failed because, although it remained Orthodox in itself, and the emperor and patriarch remained in harmony to the end, this harmony was not true "symphony", being based on a diminished, less-than-truly-ecumenical and missionary vision which tended to degenerate into a narrow nationalism that has become increasingly evident in the post-Byzantine era, when Hellenism and revolutionary ideas of freedom at times have seemed to supplant Orthodoxy in the affections of the people. Therefore, being unable to present a truly catholic and ecumenical vision of Christian society to the world, the Byzantines fell into a false union with the West with its heretical, but more explicitly universal vision.

Did Russia succeed where Byzantium failed? Schmemmann sees the Russians as having corrupted the ideal of Church-State symphony no less than the Byzantines, most obviously in the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. However, here we must disagree with the learned theologian, who betrays the bias of his Parisian training in his blindness to the "curves" of Russian history.

Although Russia succumbed at times to caesaropapism and narrow nationalism, she always recovered from these temptations as a result of several factors which distinguished Russian history from that of Byzantium.

First, Russia had a long, nearly five-hundred year training in humility in the shadow of the Byzantine empire, during which, in spite of her vastly greater size and political independence from Byzantium for most of this period, her metropolitans were always (until the council of Florence) appointed by the Constantinopolitan Patriarch, and her great-princes always (until the very fall of Byzantium) looked to the Byzantine Emperors as to their elder brothers. This meant that, when Russia came to take the place of Byzantium as the bearer of the cross of the Christian Empire, she was not tempted to think of herself as the *first* or *only* or *best* Christian people. And when that temptation appeared in the form of the Old Believer schism, it was rejected by the ecumenical consciousness of the Russian Church and State.

¹⁹³ Schmemmann, *The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy*, London: Harvill Press, 1963, pp. 222-223.

Secondly, while the Greeks had a long and sophisticated history as pagans before accepting Christianity, the Russians accepted the faith in the first flush of youth, as it were. This meant, among other things, that the pagan traces of idolatrous emperor-worship, which some scholars have claimed to find even in late Byzantium, were no part of the inheritance of the newly Christianized people of Rus'. Some have claimed that the Mongol yoke later injected certain pagan and idolatrous attitudes into Russian life; but there is little evidence to support this notion.

Thirdly, while the Byzantine Empire contracted from the large, multi-national dominion of Constantine the Great to the small, exclusively Greek dominion of Constantine XI, the Russian Empire grew in the opposite direction, expanding from its Muscovite heartland to the borders of Sweden and Germany in the West and China and America in the East. This meant that the Russian Empire was always and increasingly multi-national, with a large number of non-Russian saints and a strong commitment to missionary activity right until 1917 and (in the Russian Church Abroad) to the present day. This truly ecumenical, non-nationalistic character of the Russian Empire was emphasized by its last three wars - the Crimean war, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the First World War, which were fought in a self-sacrificial spirit for the sake of the non-Russian Orthodox of the Balkans and Middle East.

Fourthly, the history of the Russian Empire has been punctuated by wars against the Western heretics. Thus the history of Russia is defined, to a much greater degree than Byzantium, by her relationship with the West. And whereas Byzantium chose to compromise with the West so as to receive help against the Muslims (which never came), Russia in the person of Alexander Nevsky made the opposite choice of priorities, and the Russian Empire died during a war against both the West (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and the Muslims (the Ottoman empire).

And yet Russia finally fell to a western heresy - the heresy of social democracy, or, in its extreme form, communism. And now her Church is captive to the more specifically ecclesiastical form of that heresy - ecumenism. So the promise that she is in some sense destined to be the conqueror of Old Rome remains so far unfulfilled.

How, then, can Russia fulfil her destiny in relation to the West, becoming in truth "light from the East"? *Only by demonstrating in her own life the vitality of that ideal form of Christian social life, the symphony of Emperor and Church, which Byzantium failed to achieve and of which the western forms are the heretical distortions.* For we may say that the root heresy of the West, more fundamental even than the heresies that the Byzantines fought against, is precisely a false understanding of Church-State relations, which gave birth, first to Catholic papocaesarism, then to Protestant caesaropapism and finally, in our time, to ecumenist democracy.

In trying to define this root heresy of the West, a clue is provided by a phrase in the famous speech of the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II to Tsar Theodore Ivanovich, when he enunciated and gave his blessing to the idea that Russia is the Third Rome: "Since *the First Rome fell through the Apollinarian heresy, and the Second Rome, which is Constantinople, is held by infidel Turks, so thy great Russian kingdom, most pious Tsar... is the Third Rome... and thou alone under heaven art Christian Emperor for all Christians in the world.*"¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Jeremiah II (Tranas), in Runciman, Sir Steven, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, 1971, Oxford University Press, p. 51.

Now the Apollinarian heresy rarely, if ever, figures in lists of the western heresies. And yet the patriarch here indicates that it is *the* heresy as a result of which the First Rome fell. We must therefore look for some matching in form, if not in substance, between the Apollinarian and papist heresies. Smirnov's definition of the heresy gives us a clue: "accepting the tripartite composition of human nature - spirit, irrational soul, and body - [Apollinarius] affirmed that in Christ only the body and the soul were human, but His mind was Divine."¹⁹⁵ In other words, Christ did not have a human mind like ours, but this was replaced, according to the Apollinarian schema, by the Divine Logos. A parallel with Papism immediately suggests itself: just as the Divine Logos replaces the human mind in the heretical Apollinarian Christology, so a quasi-Divine, infallible Pope replaces the fully human, and therefore at all times fallible episcopate in the heretical papist ecclesiology.

The root heresy of the West therefore consists in the unlawful exaltation of the mind of the Pope over the other minds of the Church, both clerical and lay, and its quasi-divinization to a level equal to that of Christ Himself. From this root heresy proceed all the heresies of the West. Thus the Filioque with its implicit demotion of the Holy Spirit to a level below that of the Father and the Son becomes necessary insofar as the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of truth Who constantly leads the Church into all truth has now become unnecessary - the Divine Mind of the Pope is quite capable of fulfilling His function. Similarly, the epiclesis, the invocation of the Holy Spirit on the Holy Gifts is also unnecessary - if Christ, the Great High Priest, sanctified the Holy Gifts by His word alone, then His Divine Vicar on earth is surely able to do the same without invoking any other Divinity, especially a merely subordinate one such as the Holy Spirit.

Again, if the Pope is agreed to dispense grace directly, rather than beseeching the Holy Spirit to send it down, then grace must be agreed to be created - for even the Popes do not pretend to be uncreated, and it is paradoxical for a created being to dispense uncreated grace. Rather, the Popes are created beings who partake in the essence of the Godhead through their infallible minds. Therefore, as a recent official publication of the Vatican put it, the Pope "is the ultimate guarantor of the Teaching and Will of the Divine Founder!"¹⁹⁶

Not only the Papist, but also the Protestant heresies proceed from this bitter root. For Protestantism's main difference from Papism is that, in the spirit of rationalist democracy, it wants to extend the privileges of the Pope's Divine mind - his infallible access to truth and certain possession of salvation - to the minds of all Christians. As New Hieromartyr Archbishop Hilarion (Troitsky) put it: "Protestantism only objected: Why is truth given to the Pope alone?... Every individual was thus promoted to the rank of infallible Pope. Protestantism placed a papal tiara on every German professor..."¹⁹⁷

However, if truth is given to every man in view of his naturally infallible mind, there is no need, either of the Pope, or of the Church, or even of Christ Himself. Indeed, why should any organized religion or revelation be necessary if man has only to dig into his personal divinity to find all the riches of the Heavenly Kingdom? Why not recognize all

¹⁹⁵ Smirnov, in Appendix to Protopresbyter Michael Pomazansky, *Orthodox Dogmatic Theology*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1984, p. 379.

¹⁹⁶ Mgr. Oliveri, *The Representatives*, Apostolic Legation of London, 1980.

¹⁹⁷ Troitsky, *Christianity or the Church?*, Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, 1971, p. 28.

religions and all revelations, since they all manifest that "Light which enlightens every man that comes into the world" (John 1.9)?

Thus the papist heresy of Church-State relations, whose seeds are evident already in the fifth century, leads inexorably, not only to the full-blown heresies of eleventh-century Papism and sixteenth-century Protestantism, but even to the modern pan-heresies of Ecumenism and the New Age.

More than that: it could prove to be the theoretical underpinning of the "divinity" of the Antichrist. For just as the Pope is considered to have an infallible mind, so the Jew is considered to have a *Divine soul* - and none more, of course, than the coming false king of the Jews, the Antichrist. Thus we read in a contemporary Jewish journal: "When the Creator on Mount Sinai CHOSE us for a special mission, there arose a completely new form of connection between Him and the Jewish people. The distinction between the Hebrew people and the others was formed in two stages. The first stage was the epoch of our forefathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who, thanks to their selfless devotion to the Master of the universe, were raised above the limitations of their nature and laid the foundation for a new type of reality - the Jewish people.

"The second stage was accomplished by the revelation on Sinai. Thanks to their special inspiration and complete devotion to the will of the Creator, the forefathers of the Jewish people merited, not only for themselves, but also for their descendants, a special spiritual substance - a Divine soul. Thus the Jewish people was separated into a special category distinct from the other peoples. This distinction is not quantitative, but qualitative..

"Such an approach allows us to understand the specific nature of the Jewish people. The Jew is not simply a man who has one extra quality or characteristic. The Jew is a creature into which the Most High has inserted a Divine soul - the spirit of holiness, a particle of God Himself.

"The Divine soul which belongs to the Jew is a supremely unique characteristic. All creatures, including mankind, are parts of the creation of the world with its regularities and limitations. But the Jew stands outside the creation of the world thanks to his Divine soul. This particularity of the Jewish people was formed already in the time of the forefathers, and from them was passed down by inheritance to every Jew, who bears within himself this phenomenon, the Jewish soul - a particle of God Himself.

"From this it follows that true freedom of choice belongs only to those possess a particle of God Himself - a Divine soul. As is said in the book of the Prophet Ezekiel, chapter 34, verse 31: 'You are My people, My flock. Your name is man.' From these words it follows that the definition of 'man' in the highest sense of the word, and consequently freedom of will in the full sense refer only to the possessors of a Divine soul."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ *Aleph*, N 451, October, 1992; quoted in A.S. Shmakov, *Rech' Patriarkha Alekseya II k ravoinam g. Nyu Yorka (S.Sh.A.)*, 13 noyabrya, 1991 goda i yeres' zhidovstvoyushchikh, second edition, U.S.A., 1993, p. 13.

The verse from Ezekiel quoted here has the words "Your name is man" neither in the Greek Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, which is the only text accepted by the Orthodox Church, nor in the Old Latin text. The Authorized King James translation, which is from the Massoretic Hebrew text, reads: "And ye My flock, the flock of My pasture, *are men*, and I am your God, saith the Lord God" - a clear rebuttal of the Jews' claims to natural divinity.

We may speculate that the "third stage" in the supposed superiority of the Jews over all other nations will come when the Antichrist comes to power, when it will be claimed, through a new revelation higher even than that of the law and the prophets, that he has a Divine soul to an even greater degree than the other Jews, being in fact, not just a particle of God Himself, but the whole Divinity; for he will "take his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God" (II Thessalonians. 2.4).

Thus the warning of the Orthodox Pope St. Gregory the Great that papism is "the forerunner of the Antichrist" is shown to be true. Jewish Antichristianity may be defined as a nationalist form of Papism or Apollinarianism. In essence it is the same as the Hindu teaching that man is by nature God, which is the same primordial lie that Satan whispered into the ears of Eve in the Garden of Eden.

Against this, the first and perhaps also the last of the God-fighting heresies, the Orthodox Church teaches that man is not god by nature, but can become god by grace, through union in the fear of God, in faith and in love with the only God-Man, the Lord Jesus Christ, and through participation in the Holy Spirit.

But Orthodoxy demonstrates this truth not only in words, but also in its God-inspired social structure. For the division of powers between the Emperor and the Patriarch, which was abolished by the Papacy and will be abolished again by the Antichrist, demonstrates that no man, however holy, can have the fulness of grace, which belongs to God alone. For just as the Emperor is forbidden to offer the Bloodless Sacrifice at the altar (although, as we have seen, he is a priest in a certain sense), so the Patriarch is forbidden to assume political office. And if some patriarchs in Orthodox history have been forced to assume a more than strictly priestly role, this has been exceptional, an exercise of oekonomia. In essence the throne of the Emperor at such a time remains empty; no Patriarch, however distinguished, can occupy it.

Thus the role of the Emperor in the Church may be compared to that of the Archangel Michael in the angelic hierarchy. Just as the great archangel was called to take on the leadership of the good angels, although he was not from the ranks of Cherubim and Seraphim, so the right-believing Emperor is called to take on the leadership of the Church, although he is not from the ranks of the holy bishops. And just as the archangel was called to resist the Luciferian pride of the fallen first angel, so the Emperor is called to resist "the depths of Satan" (Revelation 2.24) in the fallen first-hierarchs of the West and formerly chosen people of the East. For the name "Michael" means "Who is like unto God?", which refrain is precisely that of the Orthodox Emperors in their struggle against Papism and Judaism. Fittingly, then, is the Archangel Michael seen as the special protector of Orthodox Emperors, being the "wondrous champion of them that wage war against the spirits of evil in high places".¹⁹⁹

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We can now see why the differences with regard to monarchism in general, and Tsar-Martyr Nicholas II, in particular, between the present-day Moscow Patriarchate, on the one hand, and the True Russian Church, on the other, are by no means unimportant or secondary, but in fact underly all their other differences.

¹⁹⁹ *Akathist Hymn to the Holy Archangel Michael*, ikos 4.

The main achievements of the Tsar-Martyr consisted in his resisting the resurgent power of the Jews and papists, and in his overcoming, in his own person, of the caesaropapist legacy of the eighteenth century. Of course, his nineteenth-century predecessors paved the way for the restoration of true symphony in Church-State relations. However, it was Tsar Nicholas II who showed the most exceptional devotion to the Church, building churches, glorifying saints and, most significantly, approving the restoration of the patriarchate. The fact that the patriarchate was not restored during his reign, but some months later, was not his fault, but the fault of those who, having inwardly broken their ties with the Church, were trying to undermine the foundations of the State as well. Some claimed that it was the overbearing power of the monarchy which inhibited the restoration of the patriarchate, which therefore became possible only after the monarchy's fall. But this was not in fact the case: rather, it was the weakness of the Church, especially in its more educated strata, that undermined the strength of the monarchy, which in turn necessitated the restoration of the patriarchate if Christian society was to have a clear focus of unity and leadership. For, as one peasant delegate to the Local Council of 1917-18 put it: "We have a Tsar no more; no father whom we love. It is impossible to love a synod; and therefore we, the peasants, want a Patriarch." Indeed, the restoration of the patriarchate may be seen as the first-fruits of the shedding of the Tsar-Martyr's blood.

For a time the Patriarch carried the colossal burden of representing and defending the Christian people in the absence of a tsar. This inevitably involved certain quasi-political acts, such as the anathematization of Soviet power and the condemnation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. However, the accusation of "politicking" that was hurled against the Patriarch was misplaced, not only because these acts were necessary in the interests of the Church, and were therefore within the Patriarch's competence, but also because, in the absence of a tsar, someone had to bear the cross of witnessing to the truth and condemning the revolution publicly and on the world stage.

Nevertheless, the strain of this unnatural situation began to tell, and the witness of the Church against the revolution began to grow muted. Again, this was not so much the fault of the Patriarch as of the whole of Christian society; for just as the Tsar could not govern if nobody obeyed him, the Patriarch could not witness effectively if civil society pursued other ideals. Thus he felt unable to give his unequivocal blessing to the leaders of the White armies, probably because "the spirit was not right," as Elder Aristocleus of Moscow said²⁰⁰ - many of them were aiming, not at the restoration of the Romanov dynasty, but at the reconvening of the Constituent Assembly or the restoration of the landowners' lands.²⁰¹

Thus by the end of the Civil War the spirit of Orthodox Monarchism, without which the restoration of Holy Russia was inconceivable, had been driven largely underground and overseas, manifesting itself only rarely in public, as in the First All-Emigration

²⁰⁰ Elder Aristocleus, in Fomin, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

²⁰¹ Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) of Kiev wrote: "Unfortunately, the most noble and pious leader of this [the White] army listened to those unfitting counsellors who were foreign to Russia and sat in his Special council and destroyed the undertaking. The Russian people, the real people, the believing and struggling people, did not need the bare formula: 'a united and undivided Russia'. They needed neither 'Christian Russia', nor 'Faithless Russia', nor 'Tsarist Russia', nor 'the Landowners' Russia' (by which they will always understand a republic). They needed the combination of the three dear words - 'for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland'. Most of all, they needed the first word, since faith rules the whole of the state's life; the second word was necessary since the tsar guards and protects the first; and the third was needed since the people is the bearer of the first words" ("*Tserkovnost' ili politika?*", *Pravoslavnyaya Rus'*, N 1558, May 1/14, 1996, p. 4).

Council of the Russian Church in Exile in 1921. And a few years later the Church herself was forced underground. For, deprived of all support in the public domain, the Patriarch had been forced to make damaging concessions to the atheists - first in the affair of the requisitioning of church valuables²⁰², then in setting himself "finally and decisively" apart "from both the foreign and the internal monarchist White-guard counter-revolutionaries", in the annulling of the anathema against the Bolsheviks, in the introduction of the new calendar, and in the admittance of the renovationist Krasnitsky to a place in the Synod.

But though the Patriarch bowed to the overwhelming pressure of the Bolsheviks, he did not break. He himself foresaw, as he revealed in a conversation with the future catacomb hieromartyr Maximus of Serpukhov, that the Church could not go on making such compromises without sacrificing her inner freedom, and therefore her inner union with Christ in the Spirit. And so he blessed the formation of the Catacomb Church, which would preserve the spirit of Orthodox Monarchism in the only conditions in which it could survive in the conditions of the militantly atheist State - as an underground opposition to the State.

The "achievement" of Metropolitan Sergius, the founder of the Sovietized Moscow Patriarchate, was to give a dogmatic foundation to the heresy concerning Church-State relations that goes under his name - Sergianism. Sergianism is in fact a subtle and paradoxical form of Papism. Its paradoxicality consists in the fact that it is at the same time *both* papocaesarism *and* caesaropapism; for while, as we shall see, it creates a completely papal structure for the Church, it at the same time subordinates the whole Church to the complete control of the State.

Like Papism, Sergianism begins by denying the rights of the Emperor in the Church and monarchism in general. In fact it goes further in this direction than any of the Popes: in the spirit of the revolution it denounces the meekest and least bloodthirsty of the tsars as a blood-sucking tyrant and political criminal. Nor can this be excused as insincere words uttered to please the Bolsheviks: even after the fall of Bolshevism, the leaders of present-day Sergianism have not returned monarchism to its rightful place in the fabric of Church doctrine, nor officially recognized the martyrdom of the Tsar.

Unlike Papism, however, Sergianism did not put the first-hierarchy of the Church in the position of the overturned Emperor. That was obviously neither possible nor desirable in the context of the revolution. Rather, it accorded the roles both of Emperor and of Patriarch to the Leader of the Soviet State. And if Sergius himself was later given the title of patriarch, everyone understood who the real "Father" was - Joseph Stalin, that "wise, God-established", "God-given Supreme Leader", who had served as "the instrument of Divine Providence" in saving Holy Russia (by extending the rule of militant atheism from Berlin to Peking!). Thus whereas the Popes introduced heresy into the Church by proclaiming themselves the Vicars of Christ, Sergius' Papism consisted in becoming the Vicar of the Antichrist! And, like the Popes, he justified his heresy on the grounds that only in this way could he save the Church!

²⁰² The holy Elder Nectarius of Optina once said to the wife of Fr. Adrian Rymarenko, the future Archbishop Andrew of Rockland: "You see now, the patriarch gave the order to give up all valuables from the churches, but they belonged to the Church!" (Matushka Evgenia Grigorievna Rymarenko, "Remembrances of Optina Staretz Hieroschemamonk Nektary", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 36, no. 3, May-June, 1986, p. 39)

Thus in a real way Sergius subdued Russia to papism. Just as Old Rome fell through accepting that all truth was in the Pope, so the Third Rome, Russia, fell through accepting that all salvation was in the "Patriarch".

Hieromonk Nectarius (Yashunsky) has described how Sergius introduced papism into the Moscow Patriarchate: "Metropolitan Sergius' understanding of the Church (and therefore, of salvation) was heretical. He sincerely, it seems to us, believed that the Church was first of all an organization, an apparatus which could not function without administrative unity. Hence the striving to preserve her administrative unity at all costs, even at the cost of harming the truth contained in her.

"And this can be seen not only in the church politics he conducted, but also in the theology [he evolved] corresponding to it.

"In this context two of his works are especially indicative: 'Is There a Vicar of Christ in the Church?' (*The Spiritual Heritage of Patriarch Sergius*, Moscow, 1946) and 'The Relationship of the Church to the Communities that have Separated from Her' (*Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*). In the first, although Metropolitan Sergius gives a negative answer to the question (first of all in relation to the Pope), this negative answer is not so much a matter of principle as of empiricism. The Pope is not the head of the Universal Church only because he is a heretic. But in principle Metropolitan Sergius considers it possible and even desirable for the whole of the Universal Church to be headed by one person. Moreover, in difficult times in the life of the Church this person can assume such privileges even if he does not have the corresponding canonical rights. And although the metropolitan declares that this universal leader is not the vicar of Christ, this declaration does not look sincere in the context both of his other theological opinions and of his actions in accordance with this theology."

In the second cited article, Metropolitan Sergius explained the differences in the reception of heretics and schismatics, not on the basis of their objective confession of faith, but on the subjective (and therefore changeable) relationship of the Church's first-hierarchy to them. Thus "we receive the Latins into the Church through repentance, but those from the Karlovtsy schism through chrismation". And so for Sergius, concludes Fr. Nectarius, "to be saved it is not the truth of Holy Orthodoxy but belonging to a legal church-administrative organization that is necessary"²⁰³

The last few years have demonstrated that Sergianism does not depend on the existence of Soviet power, but has entered into the very flesh and blood of the patriarchate. Thus recently the patriarch said about Sergius' declaration: "I do not renounce it, for it is impossible to renounce one's history... I think that in the present year we have been able to withdraw from under the state's *trivial* [sic!] charge and, therefore, we have the moral right to affirm the fact that Metropolitan Sergius' declaration is a fact belonging to the past, and we no longer are guided by it. At the same time, however, this does not mean that we are against the government..."²⁰⁴

For, of course, Patriarch Alexis is *never* against the government. For in the last resort, as Fr. Peter Perekrestov points out, it is all a matter of *power* for him: "It is not important

²⁰³ Hierodeacon Jonah (now Hieromonk Nectarius) (Yashunsky), "Sergianstvo: Politika ili Dogmatika?" (MS), 29 April / May 12, 1993, pp. 2-3, 5.

²⁰⁴ Patriarch Alexis, in *Golos*, No. 33, p. 11; quoted by Fr. Peter Perekrestov, "Why Now?" *Orthodox Life*, vol. 44, no. 6, November-December, 1994, p. 40.

to them whether a priest is involved in shady business dealings or purely church activities; whether he is a democrat or a monarchist; whether an ecumenist or a zealot; whether he wants to serve Vigil for six hours or one; whether the priest serves a panikhida for the victims who defended the White House or a moleben for those who sided with Yeltsin; whether the priest wants to baptize by immersion or by sprinkling; whether he serves in the catacombs or openly; whether he venerates the Royal Martyrs or not; whether he serves according to the New or Orthodox Calendar - *it really doesn't matter*. The main thing is to commemorate Patriarch Alexis. Let the Church Abroad have its autonomy, let it even speak out, express itself as in the past, but only under one condition: *commemorate Patriarch Alexis*. This is a form of **Papism** - let the priests be married, let them serve according to the Eastern rite - it makes no difference, what is important is that they commemorate the Pope of Rome."²⁰⁵

How can the neo-papist heresy of Sergianism be overthrown in Russia? Only by clearly recognizing the root of the heresy in the overthrow of the Orthodox autocracy and in the rejection of the Orthodox doctrine of Church-State relations. Such a recognition involves much more than a nostalgia for monarchism, more even than a veneration for the Tsar-Martyr. It means the recognition that the Orthodox autocracy is the crown of Christian society, its *dogmatic completion*. For, as Patriarch Anthony of Constantinople wrote to Great Prince Basil Dmitrievich in 1393: "*It is impossible for Christians to have a Church, and not have a king; for the kingdom and the Church are in close union and communion with each other, and it is impossible to separate them.*"²⁰⁶

It is impossible for Christians to have a Church and not have a king because "no city or house that is divided against itself will stand" (Matthew 12.25), and only an Orthodox king ruling in the image of the Heavenly King and chosen by Him alone can restore unity to a nation torn apart by a multitude of self-appointed leaders in Church and State. It is impossible for Christians to have a Church and not have a king because only in obedience to the king's autocratic and paternal authority can obedience to all lawful authorities, from the paterfamilias to our Father in the Heavens, be established. It is impossible for Christians to have a Church and not have a king because only an Orthodox king ruling in obedience to Christ the God-man is able to defend the Church against the false authorities that threaten to overwhelm her, and in particular the false authority based on the Hindu-Apollinarian-Papist-Jewish doctrine of the innate divinity of man - the dogma of the Man-god, the Antichrist.

And if some will say: then there is no hope, for we have no king, we shall answer: although we have no king, yet the mystery of the Orthodox kingship has not been destroyed and can be restored if we fervently beseech God for it; for the Mother of God has revealed in her miraculous Reigning icon, which appeared at the very moment of the abdication of the last tsar, that the symbols of kingly authority are in her hands...

Once the backsliding Jews said: "We have no king, for we fear not the Lord, and a king, what shall he do for us?" (Hosea 10.3). And the Lord, the King of kings, said: "They have made kings for themselves, but not by Me... Therefore shall they be delivered up to the nations;.. and they shall cease a little to anoint a king and princes" (Hosea 8.4,10).²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Perekrestov, op. cit., p. 43.

²⁰⁶ Quoted in Fomin, op. cit., p. 95.

²⁰⁷ What is the legitimacy of a king who has not been appointed by God? As has been pointed out by Bishop Ambrose (von Sievers) (personal communication), to express this human, but not Divine legitimacy, we need a distinction similar to that between the Latin words legalis and legitimus.

But then the Lord hearkened to the repentance of the Jews in Babylon and gave them again a king of the line of David, of whom He said: "It is he that shall build the Temple of the Lord, and shall bear royal honour, and shall sit and rule upon his throne. And there shall be a priest by his throne, and peaceful understanding shall be between them both" (Zechariah 6.13). Now, as then, repentance is possible and restoration is possible. Now, as then, we can still say: "The king shall be glad in God; everyone shall be praised that sweareth by him" (Psalms 62.10).

*September 4/17, 1996.
Holy Prophet and God-seer Moses.*

APPENDIX IV. WHAT POWER IS OF GOD?

The question of the proper limits of obedience to political power has preoccupied Christians since the time of the early martyrs, who confessed loyalty to the pagan Roman emperor but refused to obey him in that which conflicted with the supreme sovereignty of God. This problem - the problem, namely, of where to draw the line between that which is God's and that which is Caesar's (or Pharaoh's) - has become particularly difficult and divisive in the last two centuries, since the French Revolution infected the whole world with the lust for freedom. Both the Greek and the Russian Churches have suffered major schisms because of differing answers to the question: What power is of God? Thus when the Greeks of the Peloponnese rose up against Turkish power in 1821, they were anathematized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople, which led to a schism between the Churches of Greece and Constantinople that lasted until 1852. Again, when the Russian Church rose up against Soviet power in 1918 and anathematized it, a reaction set in from pro-Soviet hierarchs, who drove those faithful to the decrees of 1918 into the catacombs.

In the nineteenth century, the most extensive and profound study of this question came from the pen of Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow, who refuted the anti-tsarist propaganda of the Russian liberal intelligentsia by demonstrating that the power of the Tsar in the State, being an extension, as it were, of the power of the father in the family (for the State is formed through an amalgamation of many families), is natural and established by God.²⁰⁸ However, the metropolitan directly answered only one half, and the less difficult half, of the question. Granted that the power of the Tsar, and monarchical power in general, is of God: what of the power that fights against this God-established power, which usurps and overthrows it? Are we to view it as tolerantly as the Church viewed the many coups d'etat that brought successive emperors to the throne of the New Rome of Constantinople? How are we to regard today's democratic regimes, which not only came to power over the dead bodies of lawful monarchs, but even deny the monarchical principle itself? Still more pertinently for today's Russian Orthodox Christians, what are we to say of Soviet power, which not only killed monarchs and denied the monarchical principle, but denied the very fount and origin of all lawful authority - God Himself?

There are some who say that Soviet power, too, was (or is) legitimate, and had to be obeyed insofar as "all power is of God" (Romans 13.1)? Others assert that Soviet power was the Antichrist, if not in the sense that it was that last antichristian ruler, "the man of lawlessness, the son of perdition," (II Thessalonians 2.3) whom the Lord will destroy at His Second Coming, but rather in the sense that it was one of the heads or horns of that beast whose "power and throne and great authority" comes, not from God, but from "the dragon", that is, Satan (Revelation 13.3)? For the consensus of the Holy Fathers is that this first beast of the book of Revelation is indeed the Antichrist, whose seven heads and ten horns represent a series of antichristian kingdoms culminating in "another horn, a little one,... in which were eyes like the eyes of a man, and a mouth speaking great things" (Daniel 7.8) - the false king of the Jews. So the question is: can Soviet power be construed as "the collective Antichrist" which precedes the last, "personal" Antichrist and which shares his essence to such a degree that it, too, can be said to be established, not by God, but by Satan?

²⁰⁸ Metropolitan Philaret, *Sochineniya*, vols. II, pp. 133-137, 193-196, 183-186, 141-143, 168-170, 171-173, 179-183; III, pp. 290-292, 251-255, 302, 300-301.

But how, it will be asked, can *any* power be of Satan when we have St. Paul's explicit statement that *all* power is of God? In order to understand the true meaning of St. Paul's words, we must first take into account the context in which these verses are written. In the previous chapter (Romans 12), St. Paul has been elaborating the Christian teaching on love, unity and non-resistance to evil. "Recompense no man evil for evil... Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good" (vv. 17,21). Having elaborated this teaching in the *personal* sphere, the sphere of relations between individual men, St. Paul proceeds to elaborate the *same* teaching in the *political* sphere, the sphere of relations between the individual or the group and the State. Just as we have been exhorted not to resist evil with evil in the personal sphere, so now we are exhorted not to resist evil with evil in the political sphere. In other words, as Vladimir Rusak explains, these words constitute a call to *conditional obedience*, and to *the renunciation of revolutionary action*.²⁰⁹

On what is the obedience conditional? On the ruler being, in St. Paul's words "not a terror to good works, but to the evil" (v. 3; cf. I Peter 2.14). Only such a ruler is "established by God"; only such a ruler receives his authority from God.

Pilate, according to this definition, may have been a true ruler to whom obedience was due before he condemned Christ to death. But when he condemned the Just One, Christ, and released the unjust, Barabbas, he lost all real authority. "For without justice," writes St. Augustine, "what are kingdoms but vast robberies?"²¹⁰

This does not mean, however, that *armed rebellion* against such a ruler is necessarily justified; for evil must be resisted by means that are good, and civil war, as Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky points out, is among the worst of evils.²¹¹ But it does mean that we must *spiritually* resist the injustice of such a ruler. Moreover, if the evil of obedience to an unjust or blaspheming ruler is sufficiently great, it may be right to resist that ruler even by physical means, as being the lesser of two evils. Thus St. Hermogen, patriarch of Moscow, called for armed struggle against the false tsar Dimitri in 1611. And Metropolitan Anthony and the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad called for a crusade against Soviet power in 1921...

However, there is an important sense in which *all* authorities, even when they commit injustice - and all rulers are sometimes unjust - can still be considered to be established by God. This is the sense in which political authority *as such and in principle* is good and necessary in our fallen world in order to check our fallen nature. It is in this sense, according to St. John Chrysostom, that "all power is of God". In the life of the world to come, there will be no need for politics, just as there will be no need for marriage. But until that time, political power will be as necessary to check the fallen tendency of man to self-will and rebelliousness as marriage is to his tendency to lust and fornication. "For anarchy," writes St. Isidore of Pelusium, "is always the worst of all evils... That is why, although the body is a single whole, not everything in it is of equal honour, but some members rule, while others are in subjection. So we are right to say that the authorities - that is, leadership and royal power - are established by God so that society should not fall into disorder."²¹²

²⁰⁹ Rusak, *Svidetel'stvo Obvoiveniya*, Holy Trinity Monastery Press, Jordanville, 1987, vol. 1, pp. 32-33, 38-39, 40, 42, 43.

²¹⁰ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, II, 29.

²¹¹ Khrapovitsky, *The Christian Faith and War*, Holy Trinity Monastery Press, Jordanville.

²¹² St. Isidore, *Letter 6 to Dionysius*.

"But if," continues St. Isidore, "some evildoer unlawfully seizes power, we do not say that he is established by God, but we say that he is allowed, either to spit out all his craftiness, or in order to chasten those for whom cruelty is necessary, as the king of Babylon chastened the Jews."²¹³ In other words, we can say that every ruler is allowed to rule by God in the same sense that sinners are allowed to sin - in the sense, namely, that God does not prevent them from exercising their free will, either so that they should fill up the measure of their sins before being brought to judgement, or in order to punish those who are subject to them for their sins. Thus Soviet power, though not established by God, could be said to have been allowed by Him in order to chasten the Russian people for their sins.²¹⁴

Now St. Paul exhorts Christians not only to pray for the kings, who were impious pagans and enemies of the Church at that time, but even to give thanks for them "and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceful life in all godliness and honesty" (I Timothy 2.1-2). Is it possible that St. Paul could sincerely have given thanks for the bloody persecutions of the Church?

Of course not!

His words can be interpreted in two ways. Either he gave thanks for the *principle* of authority, of law and order, which the pagan emperors *generally* - when they were not persecuting the Church - embodied, and which both preserved St. Paul himself from the wrath of the Jews in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and helped spread Christianity so rapidly from the borders of Persia in the East to Hadrian's Wall in the West. This is the most obvious interpretation.

However, there is a profounder interpretation suggested by Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow: "The Spirit of God in him foresaw and more or less showed him the future light of Christian kingdoms. His God-inspired vision, piercing through future centuries, encounters Constantine, who brings peace to the Church and sanctifies the kingdom by faith; and Theodosius and Justinian, who defend the Church from the impudence of heresies. Of course, he also goes on to see Vladimir and Alexander Nevsky and many spreaders of the faith, defenders of the Church and guardians of Orthodoxy. After this it is not surprising that St. Paul should write: I beseech you not only to pray, but also to give thanks for the king and all those in authority; because there will be not only such kings and authorities for whom it is necessary to pray with sorrow., but also those for whom we must thank God with joy for His precious gift."²¹⁵

In general, a special authority attached to the Roman empire, of which the Lord Himself was registered as a citizen, which in its Christian incarnations as the New Rome of Constantinople and the Third Rome of Moscow played such an important role in preserving Orthodox Christianity to our day, and whose final removal, according to the Holy Fathers, would usher in the reign of the Antichrist. That was why the British ruler Ambrosius Aurelianus called himself "the last of the Romans", although in his time, the late fifth century, the Roman legions had left Britain long ago. And that was why, as late as the tenth century, the English King Athelstan called himself "Basileus", declaring thereby that his State was in some sense still Roman.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ Archbishop Theophanes of Poltava, *Pis'ma*, Holy Trinity Monastery Press, Jordanville, 1976.

²¹⁵ Metropolitan Philaret, *Sochineniya*, vol. II, pp. 171-173.

All Christians were obliged to revere the authority of the Christian Roman emperor above every other political authority, even if they lived under the authority of other rulers. Thus when Patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople established the Russian patriarchate in 1589, he confirmed that the Russian Tsardom was "the Third Rome" and declared, addressing the Tsar: "Thou alone under heaven art Christian emperor for all Christians in the world."²¹⁶ Not all Christian leaders kept this testament, and there is an interesting incident from the life of Schema-Hieromonk Hilarion the Georgian, which illustrates just how dangerous such neglect could be:-

During the Crimean War of 1854-56, when the Russian armies were fighting the Turks and their Western allies on Russian soil, the Ecumenical Patriarch issued an order that all the monasteries on Mount Athos should pray for the triumph of the Turkish armies during the war. On hearing this, the Georgian elder, Fr. Hilarion said of the patriarch: "He is not a Christian", and when he heard that the monks of Grigoriou monastery had carried out the patriarch's command, he said: "You have been deprived of the grace of Holy Baptism, and have deprived your monastery of the grace of God." And when the abbot came to the elder to repent, he said to him: "How did you dare, wretched one, to put Mohammed higher than Christ? God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ says to His Son: 'Sit Thou at My right hand, until I make Thine enemies the footstool of Thy feet' (Psalm 109.1), but you ask Him to put His son under the feet of His enemies!"

Again, in a letter to the head of chancellery of the Russian Holy Synod, Elder Hilarion wrote: "The other peoples' kings [i.e. not the Russian Tsar] often make themselves out to be something great, but not one of them is a king in reality, but they are only adorned and flatter themselves with a great name, but God is not favourably disposed towards them, and does not abide in them. They reign only in part, by the condescension of God. Therefore he who does not love his God-established tsar is not worthy of being called a Christian..."²¹⁷

This authority remained in spite of the fact that at certain times the Roman empire acquired the image rather of the beast than of "the minister of God". For while some of the fruits of the tree were infected by evil influences from without, its root and trunk remained good as being established by the only Good One. That is why it was incumbent upon all Christians to pray and give thanks for the Roman emperors, whether of the Old, New or Third Rome; for, as St. Seraphim said: "After Orthodoxy, zealous devotion to the Tsar is the Russian's first duty and the chief foundation of true Christian piety."²¹⁸

In other words, God-established authority, being one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (I Corinthians 12.27), belongs in the first place only to the Christian Roman emperors and to those other Christian rulers who have received the true anointing of the Holy Church. In a secondary sense, it may also be said to belong to other, non-Christian rulers who maintain the basic principle of law and order against the forces of anarchy and revolution. However, this secondary kind of authority is only partial and relative; and

²¹⁶ Jeremiah II (Tranas), in Sir Steven Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

²¹⁷ Hieromonk Anthony of the Holy Mountain, *Ocherki zhizni i podvigov Startsa Ieroskhimonakha Ilariona Gruzina*, Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, 1985, pp. 68-74, 95.

²¹⁸ St. Seraphim, in S. Nilus, "Shto zhdyot Rossiyu?", *Moskovskiy Vedomosti*, N 68, 1905.

the authority of truly Christian rulers must always be revered by Christians above any other kind of political authority, even if the latter is the authority they live under.

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Were there any rulers for whom the early Church refused to pray and give thanks? Yes: in the fourth century, St. Basil the Great prayed for the defeat of Julian the Apostate, and it was through his prayers that the apostate was killed, as was revealed by God to the holy hermit Julian of Mesopotamia.²¹⁹ This raises the interesting question: what was different about Julian the Apostate that made him so much worse than previous persecutors and unworthy even of that honour and thanks that was given to them? Was it because he was an apostate from the Christian faith? Or because he tried to help the Jews rebuild the Temple and thereby became in a very direct sense a forerunner of the Antichrist?

Let us explore each of these suggestions in turn.

The first suggestion can be expressed as follows. A ruler can be called a true, God-established authority if he provides a minimal degree of law and order. Such a ruler may be a Christian or even a pagan; for even pagans can be good rulers in the purely political sense, and the early Christians found no difficulty in obeying and honouring the pagan emperors in everything except their religious policies. However, an apostate from the true faith represents a much more dangerous threat to the Christian people. For the weaker brethren may be tempted to obey him, not only in his political demands, but also in his religious policy, seeing in him a Christian by baptism. Moreover, the apostate ruler may attack the authority of previous Orthodox rulers, declaring that they were not only religious heretics, but also political traitors or usurpers. Therefore an apostate ruler has the ability to shake the foundations of both Church and State.

It is certainly true that some of the most critical periods in the history of the Church have coincided with the reigns of apostate rulers. Thus the Church was much fiercer in her condemnation of the iconoclast rulers of eighth- and ninth-century Byzantium than of the pagan rulers of the first three Christian centuries. At the same time, there is no evidence that the Church called on the faithful of that time to refuse to pay taxes or give military service to the iconoclast emperors, still less rise up in open rebellion against them. Indeed, the Acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council make it clear that the confessors of the truth prayed for the success of the iconoclast emperors in military affairs while rebuking them for their impiety. Perhaps this was because the iconoclast rulers continued the political traditions of Christian Rome, if not her religious traditions, so that they could still be called authorities in the political sense. Or perhaps the Church foresaw that the last iconoclast ruler would die and be succeeded by the Orthodox rulers Michael and Theodora - in other words, that the ship of State would right itself in time without the need for any violent corrective action.

A more ambiguous example is the Norman invasion of England in 1066. The Norman ruler, William the Conqueror, was crowned as the first Catholic king of England on January 6, 1067. One year and one day earlier, on January 5, 1066, King Edward the Confessor, Harold's predecessor, had died after prophesying: "Since those who have climbed to the highest offices in the kingdom of England, the earls, bishops and abbots, and all those in holy orders, are not what they seem to be, but, on the contrary, are

²¹⁹ V.A. Konovalov, *Otnosheniye Khristianstva k Sovyetskoj Vlasti*, Montreal, 1936, p. 35.

servants of the devil, on a year and one day after the day of your death God had delivered all this kingdom cursed by Him, into the hands of the enemy, and devils shall come through all this land with fire and sword and the havoc of war."²²⁰ William not only imposed the heresy of Papism upon his new subjects. He also rejected the legitimacy of the last, Orthodox ruler, King Harold, who had been anointed by the Holy Church, and himself imposed a completely new culture upon England which can best be described as "totalitarian".²²¹

Seeing, therefore, that they stood to lose *everything* of true value, the Orthodox English resisted force with force, and, when defeated, emigrated in large numbers to foreign lands - mainly Constantinople (where English soldiers formed the core of the emperor's bodyguard until the Fourth Crusade in 1204) and Kievan Russia (where the daughter of the last Orthodox English king, Gytha, married Great-Prince Vladimir Monomakh, and a colony called "New England" was founded in the Crimea).

Are we to say, then, that from 1066 England entered the era of the Antichrist, and that all faithful Christians were bound to refuse obedience to the pseudo-authority represented by William and his successors?

Britain had been part of the Roman Empire since 43 A.D., and her Christianization began at about the same time. In the ten centuries that followed, in spite of falls and apostasies, Britain remained culturally and religiously, if not politically, within the orbit of Rome, both the Old Rome and the Orthodox Christian Empire of New Rome. However, when the Roman papacy fell away from the Truth in 1054, and all the kingdoms of the West were gradually forced into submission to papist rulers, of which William the Conqueror was one, "he that restrains" the advent of the Antichrist "was removed from the midst" of the Western peoples (II Thessalonians 2.7). And so, as the English Proto-Protestant John Wiclif wrote in 1383, "the pride of the Pope is the cause why the Greeks are divided from the so-called faithful... It is we westerners, too fanatical by far, who have been divided from the faithful Greeks and the faith of the Lord Jesus Christ."²²²

So perhaps rebellion against the pseudo-authority of William was indeed necessary for the first generation of Englishmen he ruled, who had been born in Orthodoxy and of whom an anonymous English poet wrote: "The teachers are lost, and many of the people too".

However, as time passed and new generations which had never known Orthodoxy were born, the question of resistance to the rulers became meaningless; for in the name of what, and for the sake of what, should heretics rise up against heretics? And now, over nine hundred years later, Orthodox Christians, both native and foreign, live in the apostate nations of the West without, generally, giving a thought to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their rulers. This is not, of course, because the West has repented of its apostasy, but because that apostasy has become less overtly aggressive towards Orthodoxy, and because the present rulers, unlike those of the late eleventh century, do

²²⁰ Anonymous, *Vita Aedwardi Regis* (in Latin).

²²¹ As one historian has written, "apparently as the result of one day's fighting (14 October, 1066), England received a new royal dynasty, a new aristocracy, a virtually new Church, a new art, a new architecture and a new language" (R.H.C. Davies, *The Normans and Their Myth*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1976, p. 103).

²²² Wyclif, De Christo et Suo Adversario, 8; in R. Buddensig (ed.), *John Wiclif's Polemical Works in Latin*, London: The Wiclif Society, 1883, vol. II, p. 672.

- for the time being - guarantee that minimum of law and order which, as we have seen, is the essence of authority in the apostles' sense of the word.

Moving on some three hundred years, we come to the first clear example of a successful armed rebellion of an Orthodox Christian people against their rulers - that of the Russians against the Tatars. Now when the Tatars had first invaded Russia in the thirteenth century, St. Alexander Nevsky had decided to fight the Catholic Teutonic Knights but submit to the Tatars because the former threatened the faith of his subjects while the latter threatened only their political independence. So the Tatars were granted to have greater political legitimacy than the Catholics, if only because their pretensions were only political. Why, then, some 150 years later, did the Russians rise up against the rulers they had accepted as legitimate for so long - with the blessing, moreover, of one of the holiest men who ever lived, St. Sergius of Radonezh? There is no evidence that the Tatars had become significantly more intolerant towards the Orthodox Faith; nor were they apostates from that faith, having never confessed it.

It is tempting to conclude that the difference here consisted in the fact that St. Sergius foresaw, through the Spirit of God that was in him, that a rebellion now would be successful and would have good long-term consequences for the Church as a whole. But does that not mean that the judgement as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a ruler, and whether or not it is right to remain in obedience to him, - at any rate if he is not an Orthodox Christian, - is not a purely moral question, but contains an element of political or military calculation? Of course, prudence and foresight are not qualities having nothing to do with morality; but we might reasonably suppose that if a ruler is legitimate, that is, established by God, it would be wrong to rebel and try to overthrow him in *any* circumstances, even if we could be sure that our attempt would be successful and would not lead to any terrible reprisals for the Orthodox people.

Let us consider another example of a successful and righteous rebellion against the powers that be - that of the Russian people against the Catholic Poles in 1612. Of course, the Catholics were heretics, and it was reasonably expected that the false Dimitri, even if he formally converted to Orthodoxy, would protect the Jesuits whose aim was to catholicize Russia. On the other hand, the enterprise was fraught with great risk; the Russians themselves were divided, and other foreign powers, such as the Swedes, were waiting to pounce. Why, then, did the holy Patriarch Hermogen bless what was, in effect, civil war? Was it again because he foresaw, by the Spirit of God within him, that the Russian armies would triumph and usher in the Orthodox dynasty of the Romanovs?

If the Tatars in 1380, and the Catholics in 1612 (and again in 1812), were less than fully legitimate rulers against whom the Lord Himself, in the persons of His saints, raised successful rebellions at specific times, there can be no doubt that a rebellion against Soviet power could have been both legitimate and successful. Moreover, an implicit blessing for rebellion was contained in the decree of the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church of January 22, 1918, which confirmed Patriarch Tikhon's anathematization of Soviet power three days earlier and his exhortation "not to commune with such outcasts of the human race *in any matter whatsoever* - 'cast out the wicked from among you' (I Corinthians 5.13)", and went on to declare: "Orthodox! His Holiness the Patriarch has been given the right to bind and to loose according to the word of the Saviour... Do not destroy your souls, cease communion with the servants of Satan - the Bolsheviki. Parents, if your children are Bolsheviki, demand authoritatively that they renounce their errors, that they bring forth repentance for their eternal sin, and

if they do not obey you, renounce them. Wives, if your husbands are Bolsheviks and stubbornly continue to serve Satan, leave your husbands, save yourselves and your children from the soul-destroying infection. An Orthodox Christian cannot have communion with the servants of the devil... Repent, and with burning prayer call for help from the Lord of Hosts and thrust away from yourselves 'the hand of strangers' - the age-old enemies of the Christian faith, who have declared themselves in self-appointed fashion 'the people's power'... If you do not obey the Church, you will not be her sons, but participants in the cruel and satanic deeds wrought by the open and secret enemies of Christian truth... Dare! Do not delay! Do not destroy your soul and hand it over to the devil and his stooges."²²³

Moreover, in his Epistle to the Council of People's Commissars on the first anniversary of the October revolution the Patriarch wrote: "It is not our affair to judge the earthly authorities; every power allowed by God would draw upon itself our blessing if it were truly 'the minister of God' for the good of those subject to it and 'terrible not for good works but for evil' (Romans 13.3,4)" - which clearly implied that Soviet power, which was terrible for good works and not for evil, was *not* "the minister of God".

Nevertheless, in spite of all these historical, scriptural and conciliar justifications, the Patriarch did not in the end bless the White armies who fought against the Soviets; nor were those armies blessed with victory from on high. Why? Because the Patriarch foresaw, by the Spirit of God within him, that it would not be successful? Perhaps; but this begs the question why it was not successful, why God did not bless it. Because Soviet power was in fact of God, so that rebellion against it was rebellion against God, as the renovationists and sergianists would have it? We have already given sufficient reasons why this argument is invalid. In any case, if it were valid, then the sergianists would be forced to recognize that the rebellions of the Russian people in 1380 and 1612, though blessed by the greatest Russian saints, were also wicked rebellions against legitimate, God-established authorities.

The White armies failed, not because Soviet power was of God, nor because armed rebellion against the Soviets was unjustified, but because, as Starets Aristocles of Moscow put it, "the spirit is not right". And the spirit was not right because, while there were many true Christians and monarchists on the side of the Whites, their leaders (admittedly, under strong pressure from their western allies) did not put as their aim the restoration of Holy - that is, Orthodox and Tsarist Russia, but rather the restoration of the property of the landowners, or the reconvening of the Constituent Assembly, or one or another similar non-spiritual goal.²²⁴

The rebellion of the Catacomb Church, which began some ten years later, in 1927-28, was more spiritual and therefore more successful; and it is to the many thousands, perhaps millions, of martyrs and confessors of the Catacomb Church that we must ascribe the fall of Soviet power - or, at any rate, its temporary eclipse. Having never had much to lose, they did not aim at the restoration of material goods; having no faith in democracies, they did not agitate for "human rights". They simply repented, suffered and died; and with every death, the walls of the Antichrist's kingdom became weaker...

²²³ "Iz sobraniya Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Oktyabr'skoj revolyutsii: listovka byez vykhodnykh dannyx, pod N 1011", *Nauka i Religiya*, 1989, no. 4.

²²⁴ See the quotations from Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) and Fr. Vladimir Vostokov in Hieromonk Euthymius (Trofimov), "O tropare prazdniku Vozdvizheniya", *Pravoslavnaya Rus'*, N 17 (1566), 1/14 September, 1996, p. 3.

And it is to a document of the Catacomb Church dating from the 1960s that we owe the clearest, most theologically convincing explanation of why Soviet power was not simply a true authority gone wrong, not simply a ruler abusing his God-given authority, but precisely an *anti-authority*. Here is an extract from this document: "How should one look on the Soviet authority, following the Apostolic teaching on authorities [Romans 13]? In accordance with the Apostolic teaching which we have set forth, one must acknowledge that the Soviet authority is not an authority. It is an anti-authority. It is not an authority because it is not established by God, but insolently created by an aggregation of the evil actions of men, and it is consolidated and supported by these actions. If the evil actions weaken, the Soviet authority, representing a condensation of evil, likewise weakens... This authority consolidates itself in order to destroy all religions, simply to eradicate faith in God. Its essence is warfare with God, because its root is from satan. The Soviet authority is not authority, because by its nature it cannot fulfill the law, for the essence of its life is evil.

"It may be said that the Soviet authority, in condemning various crimes of men, can still be considered an authority. We do not say that a ruling authority is totally lacking. We only affirm that it is an anti-authority. One must know that the affirmation of real power is bound up with certain actions of men, to whom the instinct of preservation is natural. And they must take into consideration the laws of morality which have been inherent in mankind from ages past. But in essence this authority systematically commits murder physically and spiritually. In reality a hostile power acts, which is called Soviet authority. The enemy strives by cunning to compel humanity to acknowledge this power as an authority. But the Apostolic teaching on authority is inapplicable to it, just as evil is inapplicable to God and the good, because evil is outside God; but the enemies with hypocrisy can take refuge in the well-known saying that everything is from God.

"This Soviet anti-authority is precisely the collective Antichrist, warfare against God..."²²⁵

*

Let us now turn to the second possible criterion indicated above for the legitimacy or otherwise of political power: its relationship to "the mystery of lawlessness" (II Thess. 2.7), *the Jewish revolution*.

Julian the Apostate was uniquely repugnant to the Church among the pagan Roman emperors, not only because he was an apostate from Christianity, but, still more important, because he helped the Jews in their attempt to rebuild the Temple of Solomon. If God had not thwarted the Jews' plan by causing fire to emerge from the foundations of the Temple, it is very possible that they would have proclaimed Julian himself as the Messiah, just as the Great Sanhedrin offered to proclaim Napoleon as the Messiah when he proposed to complete Julian's project some fifteen hundred years later. Thus when St. Basil, whose name means "king", prayed for the destruction of Julian, he

²²⁵ Andreyev, *Russia's Catacomb Saints*, pp. 541-42. For similar arguments against the "authority" of Soviet power, see Archbishop Averky, "Mir nevidimij - sily byezplotniya", *Slova i rechi*, Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1975, vol. 2, pp. 593-95; Metropolitan Innokenty, "O Sovyetskoj Vlasti", in Archbishop Nikon, *Zhizneopisaniye Blazhenneishago Antoniya, Mitropolita Kievskago i Galitskago*, Montreal, 1960, vol. VI, pp. 168-172.

was in fact carrying out, in the absence of a true king, the kingly role of "him who restrains" the appearance of the Antichrist (II Thessalonians 2.7).

Roman pagan power, for all its antichristian excesses, did not support the Jewish revolution, but rather restrained it, through the destruction of Jerusalem and the suppression of successive Jewish rebellions.²²⁶ The same could be said of the Catholic and Islamic powers, which, although apostate and antichristian in the sense that they converted nations that had formerly been Orthodox Christian into enemies of God, remained hostile to the ambitions of the still more apostate and antichristian Jews. Thus it was Arabic Islamic power which cast the Jews out of Babylon in 1040, and Tatar Islamic power which threw the Jews out of Khazaria in the thirteenth century (whence they migrated to Catholic Poland). And it was English Catholic power which threw the Jews out of England in the Middle Ages, and Spanish and Portuguese Catholic power which threw the Jews out of the Iberian peninsula in the fifteenth century.²²⁷ For all these powers, antichristian or heretical though they were, understood from bitter experience (and their reading of the Talmud) that the Jews recognized no other authority than their own, and were essentially revolutionaries bent on establishing Jewish dominion over all other nations.²²⁸

It is extremely significant that the first political power in history that recognized and supported the Jewish revolution was the European socialist revolution in its major successive stages: the English revolution of 1642, the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917. Thus Cromwell, after killing King Charles I and introducing the Puritan revolution with its heavily socialist and communist overtones, invited the Jews back into England. Again, the French Jacobins gave full rights to the Jews, and these were confirmed and extended by Napoleon. This was followed, in the course of the nineteenth century, by the emancipation of the Jews in all the countries of Europe except Spain and Portugal in the West and Russia and Romania in the East. Thus immediately after the Orthodox Balkan nations were liberated from the Turks, they gave the Jews the privileges that the Ottoman Turks had denied them.

It was in 1917 that the Jewish revolution first emerged fully out of the underground, and seized significant political power - and not only in Russia. For by one of those extraordinary coincidences by which God reveals His mysteries to those with eyes to see, the October revolution in Petrograd and the promise of a homeland to the Jews in Palestine by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour took place *at exactly the same time*, being reported *on the very same column of newsprint* in the London Times of November 9, 1917. It was as if the beast suddenly emerged out of the sea of the Gentile peoples, being visible simultaneously in two of its horns - one situated in Bolshevik Moscow, on the ruins of the last Orthodox Christian empire, and the other in Zionist Jerusalem. Indeed, as Chaim Weitzmann, the first president of Israel, witnessed in his autobiography, the leaders of the Bolshevik and Zionist movements came, not only from the same race and territory - the formerly Khazarite Jews of the Russian Pale of Settlement, but even,

²²⁶ I. Antonopoulos, *Synomosia kai Agape*, Athens, 1979, pp. 36-37 (in Greek).

²²⁷ Douglas Reed, *The Controversy of Zion*, Durban, S.A.: Dolphin Press, 1978. In fact, the Islamic powers were not quite consistent in their attitude towards the Jews, varying from a more hostile to a more tolerant attitude.

²²⁸ See Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), "Christ the Saviour and the Jewish Revolution", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 35, no. 4, July-August, 1988, pp. 11-31. See also the Jewish writer Bernard Lazare, who writes: "The complaint of the anti-Semites seems to be founded: the Jews has the revolutionary spirit; consciously or not he is an agent of revolution" (*L'Antisemitisme*, p. 328; quoted in N. Webster, *Secret Societies and Subversive Movements*, The Christian Book Club of America, 1924, p. 177.

sometimes, from the same families.²²⁹ It is now accepted even by "pro-Semite" historians, such as the Harvard professor Richard Pipes, that the great majority of the leaders of the Bolshevik party were Jews.²³⁰

Now "pro-Semites" point out that the Bolshevik Jews were very different from the Zionist-Talmudic Jews, being atheist as opposed to theist, internationalist as opposed to nationalist; and that they persecuted the Jewish religion only a little less severely than Orthodox Christianity. This is true; but the similarities remain more striking and profound than the differences. First, Bolshevism should be described as antitheist rather than atheist, having a quasi-religiously intense hatred of God that is not typical of simple unbelievers. It is as if the Bolsheviks, like the demons who inhabited them, both believed and trembled - but drowned their fear in the intense zeal of their hatred of everything that reminded them of God. Similarly, Talmudist Zionism should be described as antitheist rather than theist, being based on an intense hatred of the One True God, Jesus Christ (Who is described in the Talmud as a sorcerer born of a whore and a Roman soldier), and of the race of the Christians, such as is rarely if ever found in any other religion or world-view.

Secondly, as Bertrand Russell pointed out, many elements of the Marxist system are reminiscent of Judaism: the same striving for the promised land on earth and in time (communism and the withering away of the state); the same division of the peoples of the world into the chosen people (the proletariat) and the goyim (the exploiting classes), and the hatred incited against the latter; and the same cult of the false Messiah (the infallible leader or party).²³¹

Thirdly, there is considerable evidence that the Bolshevik revolution was conceived in the bowels of Zionism. Thus it is well known that Western Jewish financiers financed the Bolshevik revolution (as they financed the early rise of Hitler, according to Hitler himself²³²). And the murder of the Tsar and his family was carried out not only by Jews but also in a specifically Jewish religious, ritualistic manner.²³³

But the most famous evidence for the specifically Talmudist-Zionist origin of the Bolshevik revolution lies in the so-called *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which was first published in Russian at the turn of the century by the disciple of the Optina elders and future confessor of the Catacomb Church, Sergius Alexandrovich Nilus.²³⁴ The Protocols consist of minutes of a series of meetings of the leaders of Judaeo-Masonry in Paris, and describe in great detail the means whereby the Zionists planned to gain control of the Gentile States and eventually enthrone one of their number as king of the Jews and ruler of the world. When the revolution took place in 1917, the actual course of events was so close to that described in the Protocols that it became imperative for the Bolsheviks to destroy and/or fatally discredit them by all possible means. So the Bolsheviks invaded the Holy Trinity Lavra, where the book was published, and destroyed every copy of it they could find; while the Jewish press in the West tried to prove it was a forgery.

²²⁹ *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weitzmann*, New York: Harper, 1949

²³⁰ Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924*, London: Fontana, 1994, pp. 112-113.

²³¹ Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, London: Allen Unwin, 1947.

²³² Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

²³³ See Nikolai Kozlov, *Krestnij Put'*, Moscow, 1993; Enel, "Zhertva", *Kolokol'*, Moscow, 1990, N 5, pp. 17-37, and Michael Orlov, "Ekaterinburgskaya Golgofa", *Kolokol'*, 1990, N 5, pp. 37-55.

²³⁴ Monk Boris (Ephremov), "Sergius Nilus", *Pravoslavnaya Rus'*, N 1 (1454), January 1/14, 1992, pp. 5-9.

However, General Nechvolodov proved that all these attempts to refute the authenticity of the Protocols were themselves based on forgeries.²³⁵

The high point of Bolshevik-Zionist cooperation came in 1948, when the Soviet Union became (with Britain) one of the guarantors of the newborn State of Israel, thereby repaying the debt which the Bolsheviks owed to the Jewish American financiers in 1917.

Thereafter, however, Stalin and his successors became increasingly "anti-semitic", until, in the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union came to be seen, with the Arabs, as the main threat to Israel's existence. It is significant that this change of direction coincided with a limited, but definite relaxation of pressure on Orthodox Christianity (of the official kind) in the Soviet Union, and a gradual regeneration of Russian national consciousness. This could not fail to be reflected in a reaction against that other national principle which had destroyed Holy Russia.

At this point Satan's kingdom on earth looked dangerously divided against itself; the two horns of the beast began to turn in towards each other, threatening "mutually assured destruction". Now nuclear war between Israel and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies, on the other, was not in the plans of the Elders of Zion. So it was decided that the leaders of the southern and western half of the conspiracy should take control of the northern and eastern half - "perestroika" was born. Under Gorbachev the Bolshevik bear, having served its purpose nicely, was muzzled; and under Yeltsin, "the empire of evil" is being turned into just another shopping mall - or gangster wasteland.

Yeltsin, as was openly announced in Pravda, is a Mason, and Masonry has been re-established in Russia under his protection. Moreover, his policies have promoted the westernization of Russia which has been the aim of the Masons since before the revolution. Thus the prophecy of Hieroconfessor Theodore (Rafanovich) of the Russian Catacomb Church (+1975) has been fulfilled: "The communists have been hurled at the Church like a crazy dog. Their Soviet emblem - the hammer and sickle - corresponds to their mission. With the hammer they beat people over the head, and with the sickle they mow down the churches. But then the Masons will remove the communists and take control of Russia..."

Meanwhile, the Judaization of the West nears its zenith: Ecumenism has destroyed any remaining "prejudices" against the Jewish religion, and the Vatican has recognized Israel; some Protestant sects have begun to argue that anti-Christian Israel is "the Bride of Christ"; the U.S.A. is preparing to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in spite of Palestinian protests; the murder of Orthodox priests and monastics has begun again in Israel; and Jewish extremists with the full cooperation of the government build a tunnel under the Dome of the Rock with the aim of destroying it and rebuilding the Temple of Solomon in its place - the essential prerequisite to the enthronement of the Antichrist.

Thus the religio-political situation towards the end of the twentieth century may be summarized as follows. The Orthodox Christian Empire, "that which restraineth" the advent of the Antichrist, is dead and buried - and only a tiny remnant still awaits its resurrection. The first major power that began the dismemberment of its eastern and southern territories, Islam, is more powerful than ever - but remains bitterly opposed to

²³⁵ Nechvolodov, *L'Empereur Nicholas II et les Juifs*, Paris: Chinon, 1924

the Jewish Antichrist. The power that carved up its western territories, Catholicism, together with its bastard child, Protestantism, is also very powerful; and spiritually and politically it has already handed over its birthright to the Antichrist. And the power that destroyed its northern territories, Bolshevism, has been put to sleep like a dog because it threatened to bite the hand that fed it..

*

What can we conclude from this about the legitimacy of the present-day Russian democracy? Has Russia again acquired a power that is from God? Or is the successor to the Soviet beast no better than the beast itself?

In order to answer this question let us return to the fateful year 1917. It is usually assumed that while the democratic revolution of February, 1917 paved the way for the communist revolution of October, it was more legitimate than the latter because less fierce, more expressive of the will of the people. But it should be clear by now that neither gentleness nor popularity are criteria of legitimacy in a theological sense. After all, it is not the mandate of earth, but of heaven, that we are seeking. The Antichrist himself, according to the Tradition of the Church, will both bring both peace and prosperity, and will be highly popular in the first part of his reign.

Some very distinguished men refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Provisional Government, among them Metropolitan Macarius (Parvitsky), the Apostle of the Altai.²³⁶ Again, Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) wrote in 1922: "Who can deny that the February revolution was as God-fighting and anti-monarchist [as the October revolution]? Who can condemn the Bolshevik movement and at the same time approve of the Provisional government? It raised its hand against the Anointed of God. It annihilated the ecclesiastical principle in the army. It introduced the civil oath. In a word, all this was the triumph of that nihilism which has been known to Russian society already for three quarters of a century."²³⁷

Thus if the transition from democracy to communism in 1917 was by no means a transition from light to darkness, but rather from one phase of the revolution to another, we cannot assume that the transition from communism to democracy in 1991 was any different in principle. Certainly, this Russian democracy has not brought peace or prosperity, but division and crushing poverty. It has not restored true religion, but confirmed the authority of the KGB agents in cassocks. It has not raised the morals of the people, but sunk them to hitherto unheard-of depths. It has not restored law and order, but rather created the criminal state par excellence, a state run by ex-communists who use their power in the pursuit of the worst kinds of capitalist excess.

In this connection, it is highly significant that the same communist who destroyed the Ipatiev house, in which the last Tsar was murdered, is now the democratic president of Russia. For in the last analysis it is by its attitude to the events that took place in that house that every Russian government since 1917 must be judged. Regret at the barbarity of the deed is not enough; attendance at the burial of the Tsar's remains, or his official canonization, is not enough. What is required is repentance and *the reversal of the revolution by the restoration of the Orthodox monarchy*. Thus at present only a Provisional

²³⁶ For a short biography of this outstanding hierarch, see *Pravoslavnaya Rus'*, N 3 (1552), 1/14 February, 1996, p. 15.

²³⁷ Khrapovitsky, "Tserkovnost' ili politika?", *Pravoslavnaya Rus'*, N 9 (1558), May 1/14, 1996, p. 4.

Russian government can be a legitimate one - Provisional, that is, in the sense that it is merely preparatory to the rule of the future Tsar...

*October 15/28, 1996.
Icon of the Most Holy Mother of God "Who Ripens the Grain".*

APPENDIX V. THREE FAITHS, THREE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

If we look around us today, in 1997, it would seem as if one socio-politico-religious doctrine has conquered everywhere: democracy, human rights, anti-nationalism, free-market economics and religious indifference (ecumenism). There are still a few dictators; but very few who advocate dictatorship or absolute monarchy as such. There are still some highly nationalist, even racist regimes; but none - with the important exception of Israel - where a form of racism has the status of a state religion. There are still at least two communist countries - North Korea and China - where democracy and human rights are regularly trampled on; but China, at any rate, has a flourishing semi-capitalist economy. Only in the Muslim countries do we see an alternative doctrine of human society fervently and widely expressed; and the ideal of the Orthodox Theocracy lives on, albeit as a distinctly minority belief, in some Orthodox countries, notably Russia.

These three world-views, which we may call Democracy, Islam and Orthodoxy for short, are essentially the same three world-views which Vladimir Solovyov, in an article written in 1877 and entitled "Three Forces", identified as incarnating the three basic forces which have determined the whole of world history. Solovyov characterized Islam as being under the dominating influence of what he called the first force, and which he defined as "the striving to subject humanity in all its spheres and at every level of its life to one supreme principle which in its exclusive unity strives to mix and confuse the whole variety of private forms, to suppress the independence of the person and the freedom of private life." Democracy he characterized as being under the dominating influence of the second force, which he defined as "the striving to destroy the stronghold of dead unity, to give freedom everywhere to private forms of life, freedom to the person and his activity; ... the extreme expression of this force is general egoism and anarchy and a multitude of separate individuals without an inner bond." The third force, which Solovyov believed was incarnate especially in the Slavic world, is defined as "giving a positive content to the two other forces, freeing them from their exclusivity, and reconciling the unity of the higher principle with the free multiplicity of private forms and elements."²³⁸

1. Democracy. Let us begin by examining Democracy. "Every sphere of activity," wrote Solovyov, "every form of life in the West, keeping aloof and separate from the others, strives in its separation to achieve an absolute significance, excluding all the rest, and to become the one for all. Instead of that, however, in accordance with the unfailing law of ultimate existence, it comes in its isolation to powerlessness and nothingness; and in taking over a sphere that is foreign to it, it loses power over its own. Thus the western church, having separated from the state, but assuming to itself the significance of a state in this separation, has herself become an ecclesiastical state, and ends up by losing all power both over the state and over society. In exactly the same way, the state, on being separated both from the church and the people, and having assumed to itself an absolute significance in its exclusive centralization, is finally deprived of all independence, and is turned into.. the executive tool of the people's voting, while the people or zemstvo itself, rising up both against the church and against the state, falls apart into warring classes and then must finally fall apart into warring individuals, too. The social organism of the West, having separated from the beginning into private organisms that are hostile to each other, must finally split up into its final elements, into the atoms of

²³⁸ Solovyov, V. "Tri Sily", reprinted in *Novy Mir*, N 1, 1989, pp. 198-199.

society, that is, individual people; and corporative, caste egoism must be translated into personal egoism."²³⁹

The history of the world in the century since these words were written fully bears out their truth. The widening and deepening of democracy has coincided with a catastrophic increase in the atomization of society on all levels. Thus the existentialist term "alienation" has with justice been used to describe a common condition of democratic, especially urban democratic man. Now it is a question whether democracy causes atomization, or is simply one of its manifestations, the true cause being the falling away of European man from the true faith following the primary act of self-assertive atomism - the rebellion of the Pope. However, what is clear is that the institution of party warfare in democratic politics has not checked, but has rather strengthened the warfare between individuals that we see all around us, in the rise of crime and selfishness of all kinds.

This fact is most clearly illustrated by the history of Russian democracy in 1917. Thus none of the democratic leaders of the Provisional Government, from Milyukov to Lvov to Kerensky, offered any real opposition to the revolution, but rather claimed that they were acting by its authority. Indeed, as Novgorodtsev wrote: "Prince Lvov, Kerensky and Lenin were bound together by an unbroken bond. Prince Lvov was as guilty of Kerensky as Kerensky was of Lenin. If we compare these three actors of the revolution, who each in turn led the revolutionary power, in their relationship to the evil principle of civil enmity and inner dissolution, we can represent this relationship as follows. The system of guileless non-resistance to evil, which was applied by Prince Lvov as a system of ruling the state, with Kerensky was transformed into a system of pandering to evil camouflaged by phrases about 'the revolutionary leap' and the good of the state, while with Lenin it was transformed into a system of openly serving evil clothed in the form of merciless class warfare and the destruction of all those displeasing to the authorities. Each of the three mentioned persons had his utopian dreams, and history dealt with all of them in the same way: it turned their dreams into nothing and made of them playthings of the blind elements. The one who most appealed to mass instincts and passions acquired the firmest power over the masses. In conditions of general anarchy the path to power and despotism was most open to the worst demagoguery. Hence it turned out that the legalized anarchy of Prince Lvov and Kerensky naturally and inevitably gave way to the demagogic despotism of Lenin."²⁴⁰

The truth of the historical law that democracy leads to anarchy which leads to despotism had already been demonstrated by the English revolution, which ushered in the dictatorship of Cromwell, and by the French revolution, which ushered in the Jacobins and Napoleon. And it was to be demonstrated once again in 1933, when democratic Germany, rocked by conditions of general anarchy, voted Hitler into power. So Lenin had history on his side when, in an address to American trade unionists in 1920, he mocked those western democrats who recognized the legitimacy of the revolutions of 1642 and 1789, but not that of 1917: if the first two were democratic, he said, so was the third, which differed from the first two only in its greater consistency with the bloody principles they all shared.

Of course, democracy and communism are traditionally thought to be opposing principles; and if we compare Soviet Russia and America between the years 1917 and

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

²⁴⁰ Novgorodtsev, P. "Vostanovleniye svyatyn", *Put'*, N 4, June-July, 1926, p. 44.

1991, there are indeed large superficial differences. However, both societies were born of the same historical philosophical process - the anti-Orthodox and anti-monarchical revolution of the West; both societies have been exploited and dominated by Jews; and both societies, as is becoming clearer by the hour, are descending into the atomistic chaos and hatred that is the ultimate end of the revolution. The reason for the superficial differences between these societies is the fact that they emphasized two mutually contradictory principles arising out of the same democratic world-view - human rights and the will of the people.

Thus "neither 'human rights' nor 'the will of the people', nor both together can be the foundation of human society. For the one contradicts the other: 'the rights of the human personality', understood as the final foundations of society, deny the primacy of social unity; 'the will of the people', as an absolute social basis, denies the principle of personality. There can be, and in fact is, only some kind of eclectic, unprincipled compromise between the two principles, which witnesses to the fact that neither is the primary principle of society. If one genuinely believes in the one or the other, then one has to choose between the unlimited despotism of social unity, which annihilates the personality - and boundless anarchy, which annihilates social order and together with it every personal human existence."²⁴¹

American democracy champions human rights - that is, the will of the individual over the will of the people as a whole. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, emphasized the opposite - the will of the collective over the will of the individual. Of course, this collective will in fact turned into the will of a small clique and even of a single man. Nevertheless, it is only partly true to say that communism was imposed on the Soviet masses. Even if the masses did not know what their choice was leading to, by their actions they effectively put Lenin in power.

It is this close philosophical kinship between Western democracy and Soviet communism which explains the paradoxical pandering of the western democracies to Soviet communism for most of the period 1917-1991. When the Tsar fell in February, 1917, all the western democracies rejoiced and hastened to recognize the new regime, although the Tsar had close relations with the ruling families of Europe, he had been a faithful ally of the West during the war against Germany and it was obvious that his fall was not in the West's military interests. This attitude may be explained partly by the fact that the leaders of the West and of the new Russian democracy were almost all Freemasons. However, this is only a partial explanation; for when Lenin came to power in October, 1917, and declared his absolute hostility to all the institutions of the West, including Freemasonry, the West's attitude did not change radically. True, British, American, French and Japanese armies did intervene on the side of the Whites in the Russian civil war. But this effort was half-hearted, and the armies were withdrawn even when they were on the point of victory. In the years that followed all the western democracies recognized the Soviet Union, even though its tyrannical essence was clear for all to see. Indeed, western trade with Stalin during the 1930s was a key element in the build-up of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. And even when Stalin was starving 14 million Ukrainian peasants to death during the first Five-Year Plan, socialist-minded western journalists turned a blind eye.

The phenomenon of western collusion with Bolshevism has been well analyzed by Richard Pipes: "The affinities between liberalism and revolutionary socialism.. derive

²⁴¹ Berdyaev, N. "Religioznye osnovy obshchestvennosti", *Put'*, N 1, September, 1925, p. 13.

from the fact that both ideologies believe that mankind, being entirely shaped by sensory perceptions (that is, devoid of inborn ideas and values), can attain moral perfection through the restructuring of its environment. Their disagreement is over the means toward that end, liberals preferring to reach it gradually and peacefully, through legislation and education, while radicals prefer a sudden and violent destruction of the existing order. Psychologically, liberals feel defensive toward genuine radicals, who are bolder and prepared to take greater risks: the liberal can never quite rid himself of the guilty feeling that while he talks the radical acts. Liberals, therefore, are predisposed to defend revolutionary radicalism and, if necessary, to help it, even as they reject its methods. The attitude of Western liberals toward Communist Russia did not much differ from that of Russian democratic socialists toward Bolshevism before and after 1917 - an attitude distinguished by intellectual and psychological schizophrenia, which greatly contributed to Lenin's triumph. Russian socialists in emigration perpetuated it. While urging Western socialists to condemn the Communist 'terroristic party dictatorship', they nevertheless insisted that it was the 'duty of workers throughout the world to throw their full weight into the struggle against attempts by the imperialist powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia.'²⁴²

When Hitler's Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Britain and France immediately declared war on her. However, when the Soviet Union, as Germany's ally, swallowed up the other half of Poland as well as the Baltic States and Bessarabia, the reaction was far less decisive. And when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the British and Americans hastened to enter into alliance with it. Even Churchill, who had been the most anti-communist British politician after the First World War, shook hands with Stalin (he said that if the devil himself helped him against Hitler he would make an honourable mention of him in the House of Commons); while Roosevelt affectionately called him "Uncle Joe". There followed the shameful pacts of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, which effectively handed over half of Europe (and hundreds of thousands of anti-communist Russians) to the communists - including Poland, for whose sake Britain had first entered the war, and Yugoslavia, whose lawful king lived in London and whose people had put up such a strong resistance to Nazism.

It was only the beginning of the Cold War, the blockade of Berlin and especially the Korean war which finally made the West wake up to the real nature of the Soviet threat. In 1949, the West created a military alliance against the Soviet Union, NATO; and there can be no doubt that if the West had used its enormous technological, demographic and economic superiority over the Soviet bloc in a determined manner, communism could have fallen - or at least been halted. However, western intellectuals continued to have a sneaking admiration for the Soviets while despising their own system; and the sufferings of the millions under the Soviet yoke elicited little sympathy from the western capitalists, interested as they were only in preserving their comforts and trade. And so international Communism continued to make enormous strides while the West slept: in China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua...

After the American defeat in Vietnam, the West's determination to fight Communism, already weak, collapsed almost entirely. "Detente" now became the order of the day; and in spite of the overwhelming evidence for the fact that wherever Communism comes rivers of blood flow, friendship between communists and capitalists flourished, just as George Orwell had prophesied in his novel 1984. The

²⁴² Pipes, R. *Russia under the Bolsheviks, 1919-1924*, London: Fontana, 1994, p. 202.

Queen of England gave a state banquet for Ceaucescu; the Soviets gained ideological control even over such bodies as the World Council of Churches; and at Red China's insistence democratic Taiwan was thrown out of the United Nations. As late as the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union was intensifying its repression of Christians and dissidents, President Reagan's accurate description of it as "the evil empire" was met with widespread scorn by western intellectuals.

Nor was this simply the result of the fear of nuclear war. Democratic socialism was, and is, deeply embedded in the ideological consciousness of the West, and had penetrated into the churches and political parties, the media, schools and institutes of higher education. In accordance with this ideology, the communist states were considered to be pursuing essentially the same ideals as the West. And if these ideals were not always attained, this was not considered the fault of socialism as such, but rather of the relics of Russia's pre-communist, Tsarist past - or to the innate servility of the Russian people. What the Soviet bloc needed was not a complete change of mind, but just some more human rights and political parties.

Democracy is in essence "a mechanism for the satisfaction of the demands of the consumer-voter".²⁴³ The problem is, that in the absence of a higher religious or national ideal - and very few democracies, whether ancient or modern, have had any such ideal - the demands of the consumer-voter are bound to be multiple, contradictory, changeable, fallen, materialistic and egoistical. Thus the tendency to atomization and self-destruction is built into the very base of democracy like a relentlessly ticking time-bomb. Democracy of its nature cannot be stable; it can only be a transition between the more stable and ancient forms of government; and in modern times it has represented an ever-quickening descent from the theocracy it overthrew to the satanocracy it is becoming. It cannot be more than a transition because the rule of the people by the people is a contradiction in terms.

What is the religious faith underpinning Democracy? Alexis Khomyakov pointed out that, in ancient times as well as modern, democracy has been associated with a decline in religion, whatever the ruling religion may be. Thus since the Reformation, Democracy has been linked with *Protestantism*, which represents a disintegration of Catholic Christianity; and certainly, the Protestant rejection of all forms of authority except the individual human mind fits in well with the democratic ideal.

In the West today Democracy is yoked with *Ecumenism*, whose leaders are usually ex-Protestants who have lost faith in Christ. However, insofar as ecumenism is in essence simply indifference to religious truth, the real religion of Democracy must be considered to be *atheism*. Thus Democracy is the political system which best expresses the ideal of atheist man, his desire to run his own affairs in accordance with his own desires without interference from any higher authority.

2. Islam. Let us now turn to Islam. In the seventh century, at a time of crisis in the Orthodox Christian Empire, a rival empire, and a rival concept of the relationship between religious and political power, arose in the East - Islam. In the eleventh century, a second rival empire arose in the West - the Roman Catholic papacy. Catholicism is strikingly similar to Islam in its theocratic conception of politics and society, and from this point of view we may regard Catholicism as a variant of Islam. Certainly, in the field of political thought it is more useful to consider Islam and Catholicism as one form

²⁴³ Shturman, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

of reaction to, and deviation from, the Orthodox Christian ideal of separation but "symphony" between Church and State.

Thus Miloslavskaya and Miloslavsky write: "At the base of the socio-political doctrine [of Islam] lies the idea that society must be ruled by the commands of Allah, and not by the laws of men, since Allah is the only source of power. People are only conducters of the divine will, whose realization is the basic function of earthly power. The second fundamental thesis declares that the caliphate's secular and spiritual powers (the sultanate and the imamate) are indivisible."²⁴⁴

Thus there is no separation between secular and religious power in Islam corresponding to the separation between Church and State that we find in Orthodox Christianity. Whereas the Orthodox Church forbids bishops and priests to engage in political activity and receive political posts, since this involves being subject to two masters (Apostolic Canons 30, 81), the sight of imams at the head of Islamic states has become familiar to us since the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. And although there has never been a time, since the early caliphates, when all Muslims have been united under one religio-political power, the ideal of such a unity remains a powerful force in the Islamic world.

According to the "Muslim Brothers" movement, the distinctive Islamic path of development, which sets the Muslim world apart from the rest of humanity, consists in an increasing cultural, political and economic cooperation between Muslim countries, which should be followed by the formation of a "union of Islamic nations" under the caliphate and the election of an imam who would be seen as the "means of unification" of the Islamic world. This religio-political leader who will unite all Muslims is reminiscent of the religio-political leadership of the Pope in Catholicism. Only the Pope, of course, already exists as the unquestioned head of Catholicism, whereas such a centre of unity is only a wished-for ideal in the Muslim world.

Dostoyevsky and the Russian Slavophiles were fond of pointing out the links between Catholicism and the pagan cult of the imperator-pontifex maximus, on the one hand, and Socialism, on the other. As Dostoyevsky said, the Roman Church swallowed up the Roman State, becoming a State in the process. Certainly, Catholicism may be said to represent the rebirth, in Christian guise, of the classically pagan idea of the divine priest-king, having supreme authority in both Church and State, over both the souls and the bodies of men. From the eleventh century, the Popes were not simply religious leaders, but also secular kings, possessing lands and armies and even fighting in them - to the horror of Byzantine writers such as Anna Comnena. Moreover, they blessed the invasion of Christian lands for their own purposes, as when Pope Alexander blessed the invasion of England in 1066.

The totalitarian pretensions of the medieval papacy gave birth to long and bitter conflicts between Church and State in several western states. It was only to be expected that secular rulers would not lightly hand over all their power to the Pope. Thus a prolonged struggle for power took place between Pope Gregory VII and the German Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV, and there were further struggles between the Popes and King John of England and King Philip the Fair of France.

²⁴⁴ Miloslavskaya, T.P., Miloslavsky, G.V., op. cit., p. 12.

The Crusades were the logical expression of the new theory of papal power. Since the Eastern Orthodox Christians had refused to accept papal jurisdiction, and had anathematized the papacy in 1054, the Pope felt justified in launching the Crusades to bring "the schismatic Romans" to heel. Thus, although ostensibly aimed at the liberation of the Eastern Christian lands from the Muslim yoke, the practical effect of the Crusades was to devastate Orthodox Christianity in these lands and to replace the Muslim yoke by the much crueller yoke of the Latins. Latin kingdoms and patriarchates were set up in Jerusalem, Syria, Cyprus and Constantinople; and a determined, but unsuccessful, effort was made to conquer Western Russia. The horrific sacking and destruction of Constantinople by the soldiers of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 set the seal to this process, and made the schism between Orthodox and Western Christianity permanent.

Since the sacking of Constantinople, by far the greatest city of the civilized world, had disturbed even some western minds, it was necessary for the Popes to provide some doctrinal justification for it. This was duly forthcoming at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which declared that it was lawful to kill heretics. Then came the "two swords" theory, according to which God had entrusted the Popes with the swords both of ecclesiastical and of political power. For, according to the bull Unam Sanctam of 1302, submission to the Pope in all things was held to be absolutely necessary for the salvation for every creature on earth. It is doubtful whether any rulers in history, not excluding even the totalitarian dictators of the twentieth century, have made such extravagant claims to power as did the medieval popes - and their claims have never been officially denied by the papacy to the present day.

However, since the decline of Catholicism and the apostasy of vast numbers of Catholics to the rival faith of Ecumenism-Democracy, it has been left to a revived Islam to resurrect the pseudo-theocratic idea. So far, as we have seen, the political and theological divisions within the Islamic world have prevented the emergence of an Islamic Pope. However, there is no theoretical objection to the emergence of such a figure; and if he does appear, then we can expect jihad-crusades against the West and Russia which would make the Muslim campaigns in Bosnia and Chechnya insignificant by comparison.

History demonstrates that fervent religious zeal, even if it is "not according to knowledge", will in the long run triumph over Laodicean indifference to the truth. Islam has, both in its countries of origin, in the Far East, and in the West, large numbers of adherents who fervently detest the decadence of the West and who are prepared to die for what they see to be the truth. Only a third force, comprising zealots for a faith that has all the insuperable strength of the Truth Himself, can hope to triumph over it...

3. Orthodoxy. In 1926 the bishop-confessors on Solovki wrote: "The Church is not concerned.. with the political organization of power, for She is loyal with regard to the government of all the countries within whose frontiers She has members. She gets on with all forms of State structure from the eastern despotism of old Turkey to the republics of the North-American States." However, while Orthodoxy may coexist with States that either reject the influence of religion on politics, or completely merge the two, there is no question that it flourishes best in the system known as the "symphony of powers", in which the Church lives as the soul and sanctifying principle of the body politic, being neither separate from, nor completely merged with it.

Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) has explained the basis of this conception with admirable clarity: "The aim of human life on earth must be the salvation of the soul, that is, in the

words of Christ, the constant perfection of one's moral nature on the path to the not-completely-realizable ideal of the perfection of God (Matthew 5.48). In consequence of the fall of the first men, the attainment of this perfection is bound up, for each of us, with great labour on ourselves - the Kingdom of God is won by violence (Matthew 11.12). But the sin of the forefathers drew with itself not only the corruption of the moral nature of man, but also, instead of the easy life of Paradise, made the physical struggle for existence necessary: our bread is consumed in the sweat of our brow.

"The difficulties of earthly existence did not permit men to live in isolation and led to the union of tribes into societies that gradually developed into States. But if these are the external, material reasons for the origin of States, it would be a great mistake to disregard the other aspect of the question. A man is composed not only of a body, but also of a soul. The burdens of life often lie more heavily on the latter than on the body, and mutual moral support is no less necessary for men than physical support. Thus it was not only bodies, but also souls that were united in peoples.

"Human nature has revealed a capacity for massive spiritual perfection or collapse. A people is a collective organism which has as its main properties its separate members. Therefore the State, depending on the principles which it strives to realize, exerts very powerful pressure on each of its individual subjects, creating conditions of life which either further or hinder the salvation of the soul. So-called democracy leads the peoples to moral collapse. Prince D.N. Khilkov, a very educated and observant man, after living in America came to the conclusion that a republic 'incites in a man the worst of his instincts and qualities. While preaching equality, which does not in fact exist, it corrupts all his concepts, and in fact - as, for example, in America - leads to the dominion of the basest and most shameful ideals' ('Letters', *Bogoslovnij Vestnik*, July-August, 1916). That is why one must not limit the meaning of the existence of States to the simple satisfaction of material needs (economic, policing, etc.). Its main task is material, earthly, but it must not in serving the body forget the soul, although its salvation is the responsibility, not of it, but of the Church, to which the State is bound to afford every kind of support.

"But even if it casts off these above-mentioned idealistic aims, the State must help the Church in every way for its own sake, for the healthy morality of the people, which is impossible without the religious influence on it, is also necessary for the State as such. A people that is not penetrated by any higher religious-moral principles, a people without faith, soon becomes depraved and earlier or later leads the State to complete breakdown. The destruction of the ancient empires was bound up, first of all, with the spiritual-moral fall of their peoples. From this it is evident how important it is both for the Church and for the State to establish their mutual relations on a correct basis so that the State, in fulfilling its own direct tasks, should not hinder, but help the Church, and that the Church, in giving health and perfection to the people, should strengthen the right-believing State. I say 'right-believing State' because the relations between the Church and the State depend first of all on the ideals which are the basis of the latter. If these ideals are antichristian, then the Church cannot fail to struggle in one way or another with the State that realizes them. In this case her very existence is the struggle with it, and she is naturally in the position of being persecuted (ancient Rome, the USSR). But in the irreligious State, which is not distinguished by militant antichristianity, but does not confess Christianity either, the Church is de facto in the position of being merely a tolerated society. The complete development of the beneficial influence of the Church on the people is attainable only when there is a union between Her and the State, and this is possible only if the latter is Orthodox, that is, if it conforms its life to the teaching of the Church concerning faith and virtue. Of course, this is bound

up with the moral subjection to the Church of the State, which, however, should not frighten Christians, for if they in their private lives strive to fulfil the teaching of Christ the Saviour, they should strive for it in union with the people.

"But the Church has never striven for such a merging with the State (or, more exactly, such a swallowing up of the State), whereby the hierarchs, for example, would be at the same time provincial governors. She wishes only that State life in its general direction should be directed in accordance with her teaching. In the same way, in the private life of her individual sons, the Church through the pastors constantly teaches them virtue, but does not interfere, for example, in housework or business as long as they do not clearly violate the commandment of God in these activities.

"It goes without saying that normal relations between the Church and the State are not attainable with every form of government. It is not part of our task to discuss the nature of these relations with democratic regimes, under which the Church in Russia will always be, if not persecuted, at best tolerated. The Church, which is based on the hierarchical principle and obedience, is too opposed to an order based on the primacy of the people's will, restricted by no religious principle. Therefore a real union between the Church and the State is possible only with an Autocratic Monarchy, which places as the basis of its own power the will of God. But even with a Monarchy mutual relations may be incorrectly set. Tikhomirov lists three types of relationship between the Monarchy and religion:

"1. 'The conversion of the supreme State power into the centre of religion. Here there are various degrees of the divinization of the Monarch. Such a relationship is typical of pagan States. But in Christian States it appears in various degrees of so-called caesaropapism.

"2. The complete opposite of this type of State-Religion relations is the subjection of the State to the institution of the Church. This refers to various forms of priestocracy, hierocracy and papocaesarism. In essence there is no monarchical power here.

"3. The third type of relationship is the union of the State with the Church, which is attained by the subjection of the Monarch to the religious idea and his personal belonging to the Church, with the independence of the supreme power of his State. It is possible to call this the true expression of theocracy (and not hierocracy), that is, the dominion of God through the Tsar, who is delegated by God (and not by the ecclesiastical authority).' (*Monarkhicheskaya Gosudarstvennost'*, volume III, p. 67).

"Tikhomirov goes on to point out that for a 'pure', that is, Autocratic Monarchy, only the third type of relationship is possible. The point is that with people's power, on which the majority of contemporary States is based, the State is not supposed to be ruled by the ethical principle. The aim of democracy is supposed to be to provide for only the material interests of its citizens, placing them in a position of equal rights. At the foundation of democracy is the defence of rights, and not the consciousness of duty and responsibility. On the contrary, the Monarchy is founded on the supremacy of the ethical principle, the source of which is the Church with her teaching on virtue, which leads the Monarchy to consciously seek union with the Church."²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ Bishop Gregory, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-316.

The three faiths of Democracy, Islam and Orthodoxy, with their corresponding political structures, are in a state of constant conflict with each other. However, Democracy and Islam can come to mutually beneficial agreements with each other (as in Bosnia in the recent war), whereas Orthodoxy can compromise with either of the others only at the cost of her very soul. In 1453, Orthodoxy in the form of the New Rome of Constantinople fell to Islam, having previously compromised with Catholicism at the council of Florence in 1439. In 1917, Orthodoxy in the form of the Third Rome of Moscow fell to Democracy, having previously compromised with the revolution through the Tsar's Manifesto of 1905. Resurrection is possible, but only by consciously correcting both errors: by rejecting ecumenism, which would reconcile Orthodoxy with the false faiths of Islam and Catholicism, and by rejecting the revolution, which would separate Church and State, and thereby destroy both the one and the other...

*February 12/25, 1997.
Moscow "Iveron" icon of the Mother of God.
St. Alexis of Moscow.*